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Date Printed: 10/31/1997 DOC_NUMBER: 91STATE398497

CHANNEL: n/a

148

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ORIGIN EUR-01

INFO	LOG-00	AF-01	AIT-03	AMAD-01	ARA-01	AS-02	A-01
	CIAE-00	DODE-00	EAP-01	INRE-00	INR-01	IO-19	ADS-00
	MMP-01	M-01	NEA-01	NSAE-00	OIC-02	OIG-01	PA-02
	PRS-01	SP-01	SS-01	/042R			

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DRAFTED BY: EUR/PA: MFJUDGE

APPROVED BY: PA/PRESS: JSNYDER

EUR/SOV: JFTEFFT

PA/PRESS: PYOUNG

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE

ALL POLADS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

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USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 0000

AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL KARACHI IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL PESHAWAR IMMEDIATE

SPECIAL EMBASSY PROGRAM IMMEDIATE

USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0000

XMT AMEMBASSY MASERU

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E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: OPRC

SUBJECT: DEPARTMENT DAILY PRESS BRIEFING - FRIDAY, DECEMBER 6, 1991

INFORM CONSULS ALSO FOR USEC/USOEC

ROME PASS VATICAN FOR HOLY SEE

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE INSPECTION Date 9/18/98

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FOIA Exemptions _____ TS authority to

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DHAHRAN PLEASE PASS TO JOINT INFORMATION BUREAUS.

THE FOLLOWING SUBJECTS WERE COVERED IN THE DEPARTMENT'S DAILY PRESS BRIEFING:

YUGOSLAVIA: US URGES OBSERVANCE OF CEASEFIRE/INSTITUTES ECONOMIC SANCTIONS/IMPACT ON OTHER COUNTRIES -- US CONTACTS WITH UN, US POLICY ON BORDER RECOGNITION.

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS: BILATERAL TALKS -- CO-SPONSORS PROPOSAL/PRIOR CONSULTATIONS -- PROSPECTS FOR RESUMING TALKS/DISCUSSIONS TO EFFECT RESUMPTION -- CO-SPONSORS NOT CONTEMPLATING NEW PROPOSAL -- SOURCE OF FUNDING -- SECRETARY BAKER'S INVOLVEMENT -- UPCOMING APPEARANCE ON CBS SUNDAY, MULTILATERAL TALKS: DISCUSSIONS BY USSR DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER AND DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS.

TERRORISM: ABU NIDAL: REPORTED ENTRY INTO US FOR SURGERY/STATUS AS TERRORIST/CURRENT WHEREABOUTS, REPORTED TUNISIAN PROPOSAL FOR EUROPEAN-ARAB REVIEW OF US INDICTMENTS IN PAN AM 103 BOMBING.

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UNITED NATIONS: ARAB VIEW OF REPEAL OF UN RESOLUTION EQUATING ZIONISM WITH RACISM.

IRAQ: STATUS OF OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT, MASS MOVEMENT OF KRUDISH REFUGEES, STATUS OF UN SANCTIONS.

LATVIA: AMBASSADOR TO PRESENT CREDENTIALS AT DEPARTMENT -- CREDENTIALS PRESENTED BY OTHER BALTIC STATE AMBASSADORS.

SYRIA: REPORTED REQUEST TO BE REMOVED FROM TERRORIST LIST.

HAITI: BOAT PEOPLE PICKED UP/REPATRIATED/IN SAFE HAVENS NUMBER HAVING PLAUSIBLE ASYLUM CLAIM.

DEPARTMENT: DETERMINATION OF FELIX BLOCH'S PENSION.

TEXT FOLLOWS:

MS. TUTWILER: I HAVE A STATEMENT I'D LIKE TO MAKE ON YUGOSLAVIA.

THE CEASE-FIRE IS NOT BEING OBSERVED. THERE HAVE BEEN EXTENSIVE VIOLATIONS. HEAVY SHELLING BY YUGOSLAV MILITARY FORCES WAS REPORTED THROUGHOUT EASTERN CROATIA, AS WELL AS SOUTH AS ZAGREB AND AROUND DUBROVNIK.

THERE ARE REPORTS THAT SISEK, ZADAR, OSIJEK AND DUBROVNIK WERE HIT HARD. FOURTEEN PEOPLE WERE REPORTED KILLED IN OSIJEK OVERNIGHT.

EC MONITORS IN CROATIA HAVE LAUNCHED A FORMAL PROTEST WITH
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THE YUGOSLAV MILITARY IN REGARD TO THESE ATTACKS. THESE CONTINUING ATTACKS AGAINST NON-MILITARY TARGETS AND CIVILIAN URBAN CENTERS ARE REPREHENSIBLE. THE CONTINUING USE OF AGGRESSIVE FORCE AND INTIMIDATION AGAINST CROATIA AND BOSNIA BY THE SERBIAN LEADERSHIP AND ITS ALLIES IN MONTENEGRO AND BY THE YUGOSLAV MILITARY REPRESENT THE GREATEST OBSTACLE TO A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

WE URGE ALL PARTIES TO FULLY COMPLY WITH THE CEASE-FIRE AGREED TO ON NOVEMBER 23 AND TO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO GENUINE NEGOTIATIONS. THEY SHOULD SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY TO STOP THIS SENSELESS CARNAGE AND TAKE HOLD OF THE WAY FORWARD OFFERED BY NEGOTIATIONS.

TODAY WE ARE GOING TO IMPLEMENT U.S. SANCTIONS ON YUGOSLAVIA IN SUPPORT OF EFFORTS TO END THE FIGHTING AND TO OBTAIN A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. THESE SANCTIONS TERMINATE GSP BENEFITS, U.S. ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS AND THE BILATERAL TEXTILE VISA AGREEMENT.

WE'LL POST A STATEMENT LATER GIVING YOU ALL THE DETAILS OF THESE STEPS AND A FACT SHEET THAT ACCOMPANIES IT AND U.S. ASSISTANCE TO ALLEVIATE THE SUFFERING OF INNOCENT VICTIMS IN THE FIGHTING. OUR SANCTIONS APPLY TO ALL OF THE COUNTRY.

AND SHOULD YOU ASK, I WOULD BE GLAD TO TELL YOU THAT TRADE WITH THE UNITED STATES PRIOR TO THE CONFLICT REPRESENTED FIVE PERCENT OF ALL YUGOSLAV TRADE. IN 1990, U.S. IMPORTS WERE DOLS. 776 MILLION; DOLS. 280 MILLION OF THIS CAME UNDER THE GSP PROGRAM.

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BETWEEN JANUARY AND SEPTEMBER OF THIS YEAR, U.S. EXPORTS DROPPED BY 23 PERCENT AND U.S. IMPORTS FELL BY 13 PERCENT.

Q: MARGARET, WOULD YOU, IF YOU CAN, GO INTO THE THINKING OF WHY THE SANCTIONS ARE BEING APPLIED TO THE ENTIRE COUNTRY INSTEAD OF SELECTIVELY? BECAUSE, OBVIOUSLY, THE DEPARTMENT HAS MADE A JUDGMENT HERE AS TO WHO'S AT FAULT PRIMARILY FOR THE CARNAGE.

I THINK OTHER COUNTRIES -- AREN'T THEY? -- TRY TO BE MORE SELECTIVE IN MAKING SURE THEY JUST HIT THE SERBIANS AND --

MS. TUTWILER: OTHERS ARE, BARRY, BUT I WOULD ALSO REMIND YOU THAT THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT WE WERE GOING TO FULLY LOOK AT THE SANCTION ISSUE ON NOVEMBER 9, WHEN HE WAS IN THE NETHERLANDS. WE HAVE; WE SAID WE'VE BEEN STUDYING IT, AS YOU KNOW. AND THAT'S WHY I JUST POINTED OUT WE HAVE -- FIVE PERCENT OF OUR TRADE IS WITH YUGOSLAVIA. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID WHEN WE WENT TO YUGOSLAVIA MANY MONTHS AGO, WHEN YOU TALK ABOUT AN ECONOMIC INPUT -- A REALISTIC ECONOMIC INPUT THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS -- HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT IT WAS NOT THAT GREAT.

Q: IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO --

Q: CAN I JUST GO BACK TO THAT? YOU SAID EARLIER --

MS. TUTWILER: A FACT? YES.

Q: -- THAT FIVE PERCENT OF YUGOSLAVIA'S TRADE IS WITH THE
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U.S.

MS. TUTWILER: RIGHT.

Q: IS IT FIVE PERCENT OF U.S. -- AND NOW YOU JUST SAID FIVE PERCENT OF U.S. TRADE WAS --

MS. TUTWILER: EXCUSE ME.

Q: -- WITH YUGOSLAVIA. WHICH WOULD BE THE RIGHT ONE?

MS. TUTWILER: PRIOR TO THE CONFLICT REPRESENTED FIVE PERCENT OF ALL YUGOSLAV TRADE.

Q: IT WAS SMALLER, I THINK. O.K.

Q: I'M SORRY. JUST AGAIN ON THE SANCTIONS, IS IT A MECHANICAL PROBLEM?

MS. TUTWILER: NO, I DON'T BELIEVE IT'S A MECHANICAL PROBLEM. THIS IS THE WAY THE UNITED STATES IS CHOOSING TO DO THIS. IT APPLIES TO THE ENTIRE COUNTRY.

Q: AND HOW ABOUT RECOGNITION? GERMANY, I THINK -- AUSTRIA, PERHAPS -- ARE MOVING TO RECOGNIZE CROATIA. IS THE U.S. NOT ABOUT TO DO SOMETHING LIKE THAT? WHAT'S THE THINKING ON RECOGNITION?

MS. TUTWILER: I WILL BE HAPPY TO RESTATE FOR YOU, AS I DID YESTERDAY --

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Q: NO, NO.

MS. TUTWILER: -- FOR ALAN, OUR POLICY. IT'S WELL KNOWN. I'M NOT AWARE -- YOU MENTIONED TWO COUNTRIES THAT HAVE FORMALLY SAID THAT THIS IS WHAT THEY'RE GOING TO DO. WE HAVE READ, JUST AS YOU HAVE READ -- AND WE HAVE HAD ANY NUMBER OF CONVERSATIONS CONCERNING THIS SUBJECT -- BUT OUR POLICY HAS NOT CHANGED.

Q: I WAS JUST WONDERING -- THE LAST THING -- I WAS JUST WONDERING IF THE U.S. WAS GOING TO MOVE IN CONCERT WITH THE EUROPEANS, AND THE GERMANS SEEM TO HAVE TAKEN CHARGE OF EUROPE -- TAKEN THE LEADING POSITION SO FAR AS YUGOSLAVIA IS CONCERNED. NO CONSULTATION, NO NOTION OF MOVING IN A COORDINATED WAY SO FAR AS RECOGNITION, SO FAR AS SANCTIONS?

MS. TUTWILER: NOT THAT I'M AWARE OF.

Q: WHAT'S THAT FIRST ITEM ON THAT LIST OF SPECIFIC

MEASURES?

MS. TUTWILER: OF THE SANCTIONS?

Q: YES.

MS. TUTWILER: I BELIEVE IT WAS GSP, JIM.

Q: AND WHAT IS THAT?

Q: GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES.
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MS. TUTWILER: THANK YOU, BILL.

Q: YES, BUT WHAT DOES IT MEAN?

MS. TUTWILER: WHAT I'LL DO FOR YOU, JIM, AS I SAID, IS WE HAVE A VERY DETAILED FACT SHEET FOR YOU THAT WILL LAY EVERY BIT OF THIS OUT AS PART OF OUR TRADING ARRANGEMENTS. WE HAVE GSP WITH, I BELIEVE, MANY NUMBERS OF COUNTRIES.

Q: IS IT ANOTHER WAY OF SAYING MFN?

MS. TUTWILER: NO, I DON'T THINK SO. NO.

Q: HAS THIS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH CYRUS VANCE?

MS. TUTWILER: I DON'T KNOW IF SOMEONE HAS HAD A PERSONAL CONVERSATION WITH HIM OR NOT. HE IS WELL AWARE OF THE PRESIDENT'S PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON NOVEMBER 9 IN THE NETHERLANDS. I AM SURE THAT THIS INFORMATION HAS BEEN GOTTEN TO HIS OFFICE OR TO THE PEOPLE WHO ARE HELPING HIM, THIS MORNING, BUT I CAN'T TELL YOU THAT WE PERSONALLY SPOKE TO HIM BEFORE WE MADE THIS ANNOUNCEMENT.

THEY KNEW IT WAS COMING. WE'VE SAID WE HAVE BEEN STUDYING IT, AND THIS IS WHAT THE UNITED STATES CAN DO.

Q: AT THE TIME THE PRESIDENT MADE HIS STATEMENT IN THE NETHERLANDS, THE EC HAD SANCTIONS AGAINST ALL SIX YUGOSLAV REPUBLICS. THEY'VE SINCE LIFTED THEM AGAINST ALL BUT

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SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO.

MS. TUTWILER: YES.

Q: I TAKE IT THEIR -- YOU KNOW, CAN YOU BE A LITTLE MORE SPECIFIC AS TO WHY THE UNITED STATES DECIDED TO BREAK WITH THE EC ON THIS ISSUE?

MS. TUTWILER: I WOULD JUST TELL YOU THAT AT THIS POINT THE UNITED STATES' ANNOUNCEMENT TODAY OF OUR SANCTIONS APPLY TO THE WHOLE COUNTRY. I'M NOT GOING TO CHARACTERIZE IT AS A BREAK WITH THE EC.

Q: MARGARET, JUST ON THIS RECOGNITION ISSUE, I TAKE IT FROM YOUR STATEMENT THAT THE UNITED STATES OPPOSES RECOGNITION OF CROATIA OR SLOVENIA UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. ARE YOU URGING OTHER COUNTRIES NOT TO DO THIS BECAUSE YOU FEEL THAT IT WOULD WIDEN OR WORSEN THE CIVIL WAR?

MS. TUTWILER: THE UNITED STATES FEELS, AND HAS FELT FOR A LONG TIME, THAT WHAT IS NEEDED IS PEACEFUL NEGOTIATIONS, NOT CONTINUED FORCE -- WE USED THE WORD THIS MORNING, "CARNAGE." AND WE HAVE SAID THAT UNDER PEACEFUL CONDITIONS THAT WE WOULD BE WILLING -- AND I SAID THIS YESTERDAY -- TO RECOGNIZE WHATEVER THE PEOPLE OF YUGOSLAVIA CHOOSE UNDER PEACEFUL CONDITIONS, NOT THROUGH FORCE.

Q: BUT I'M TALKING ABOUT TODAY'S CONDITIONS. THE CHANCELLOR OF GERMANY HAS SAID IN THE LAST WEEK THAT HE

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INTENDS TO RECOGNIZE THE INDEPENDENCE OF SLOVENIA BY CHRISTMAS, AND YESTERDAY HIS OFFICE CAME OUT WITH AN OFFICIAL STATEMENT SAYING THAT GERMANY INTENDS TO RECOGNIZE THE INDEPENDENCE OF CROATIA BY CHRISTMAS.

MS. TUTWILER: YES.

Q: THE UNITED STATES, PRESUMABLY, WOULD REGARD THOSE AS REGRETTABLE STEPS AND NOT CONDUCTIVE TO SOLVING THIS CRISIS. AM I CORRECT IN THAT SUPPOSITION?

MS. TUTWILER: THAT IS YOUR SUPPOSITION. I'M NOT AWARE THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS EVER EXPRESSED ITSELF THAT WAY AT ALL. THE UNITED STATES HAS CONTINUOUSLY EXPRESSED ITSELF BY SAYING THAT, IN REGARD TO THE FUTURE OF YUGOSLAVIA AND ITS REPUBLICS, WE HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT ANY OUTCOME THAT IS CHOSEN PEACEFULLY, DEMOCRATICALLY AND THROUGH A PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION.

Q: SO TODAY YOU ARE NOT PREPARED TO RECOGNIZE THOSE REPUBLICS?

MS. TUTWILER: TODAY WE ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT ANY OUTCOME THAT IS CHOSEN PEACEFULLY, DEMOCRATICALLY AND THROUGH A PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION. THAT WAS OUR VIEW YESTERDAY; THAT HAS BEEN OUR VIEW FOR MANY, MANY WEEKS HERE.

Q: IF THE CROATIANS AND SLOVENIANS DECIDE TO COME TO A PEACEFUL DECISION TO GO THEIR SEPARATE WAYS, LIKE UKRAINE, FOR INSTANCE, WILL THE ADMINISTRATION EXPEDITIOUSLY

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RECOGNIZE THEM?

MS. TUTWILER: THAT WOULD BE SOMETHING THAT I WILL LEAVE UP TO A PRESIDENTIAL DECISION, BARRY, AND NOT SPECULATE WITH YOU TODAY, ON WHAT THE PRESIDENT, UNDER THE HYPOTHETICAL CONDITIONS YOU JUST EXPRESSED, WOULD DECIDE.

Q: MARGARET, DO THESE SANCTIONS THAT THE U.S. IS IMPOSING TODAY EXTEND TO OTHER COUNTRIES WHO TRADE WITH YUGOSLAVIA? IN OTHER WORDS, WILL THE U.S. PREVENT SHIPMENTS OF GOODS AND PERHAPS SERVICES TO OTHER COUNTRIES IF THEY WILL SUBSEQUENTLY FIND THEIR WAY TO YUGOSLAVIA?

MS. TUTWILER: I HAVEN'T HEARD THAT EXPRESSED, RALPH. I'LL BE HAPPY TO ASK THE EXPERTS AND THE TECHNICAL PEOPLE IF IT APPLIES TO THAT. I JUST DON'T KNOW.

Q: WHEN THE FACT SHEET IS PUT OUT, IF IT COULD ANSWER THE

QUESTION WHETHER --

MS. TUTWILER: SURE.

Q: -- IT INCLUDES A SECONDARY.

MS. TUTWILER: SURE. IS THAT ALL? ARE WE THROUGH?

Q: CAN WE ASK ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST?

MS. TUTWILER: YES, MARY.

Q: ON THE PEACE TALKS ISSUE, YOU TALKED ABOUT THE CABLE
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THAT GOT THE PARTIES HERE, OR SOME OF THE PARTIES HERE,
NOT BEING AN INVITATION, BEING --

MS. TUTWILER: IT'S A PROPOSAL.

Q: -- BEING PROPOSALS.

MS. TUTWILER: YES.

Q: BUT IN THAT PROPOSAL, THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID, "I
INVITE YOU TO WASHINGTON ON DECEMBER 4TH TO BEGIN
NEGOTIATIONS." WHY IS THAT CONSIDERED A PROPOSAL AND NOT
AN INVITATION?

MS. TUTWILER: ONE, MARY, I HAVEN'T MEMORIZED THE CABLE
LANGUAGE, AND I HAVEN'T EVEN LOOKED AT IT IN THE LAST TWO
WEEKS. MAYBE YOU ARE MORE FAMILIAR WITH IT THAN I AM, BUT
I KNOW YOU ARE VERY FAMILIAR WITH THE ACTUAL LETTER OF
INVITATION TO MADRID. AS WE HAVE SAID MANY TIMES, EVERY
COMMA AND EVERY SENTENCE WAS NEGOTIATED OUT OVER EIGHT
MONTHS.

THIS PROPOSAL BY THE CO-SPONSORS -- IT WAS NOT "THE
SECRETARY OF STATE," IT WAS "THE CO-SPONSORS ARE
PROPOSING" -- IS EXACTLY AS WE HAD EXPRESSED IT. SINCE
THE PARTIES WERE UNABLE -- AS THEY HAD REQUESTED -- TO
AGREE UPON A DATE AND A VENUE THEMSELVES, THE CO-SPONSORS,
AS WAS WELL-KNOWN, PUT OUT THERE A PROPOSAL. THIS WAS OUR
PROPOSAL.

Q: MARGARET, THE ISRAELIS HAVE SAID THAT THE SECRETARY OF
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STATE DID NOT CONSULT WITH THEM ON THIS INVITATION AND
THEY HAVE SAID THAT HE DID CONSULT WITH THEM ON -- OR THAT
THE UNITED STATES DID CONSULT WITH THEM ON THE INVITATION
TO ATTEND THE TALKS IN MOSCOW.

THAT'S NOT AN UNNAMED ISRAELI OFFICIAL. THAT'S BENJAMIN
NETANYAHU, IN A PUBLIC STATEMENT SAID THOSE TWO THINGS.

MS. TUTWILER: YES.

Q: IS THAT TRUE? DID THE UNITED STATES NOT CONSULT WITH
THE ISRAELIS ON THE INVITATION TO COME HERE, AND DID THEY
CONSULT WITH THE ISRAELIS ON THE INVITATION THAT THEY
LATER ACCEPTED TO GO TO MOSCOW?

MS. TUTWILER: I DON'T THINK, MARY, THAT IT SERVES ANY
USEFUL PURPOSE TO SAY WHO SAID WHAT. I HAVE DONE AT LEAST
THREE OR FOUR HOURS ON THE RECORD, GOING THROUGH
STEP-BY-STEP, THE QUESTION THAT YOU HAVE JUST ASKED ME.
AND I REALLY WILL REFRAIN FROM RE-ENGAGING IN IT ALL OVER
AGAIN TODAY, A WEEK LATER.

Q: MARGARET, TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, IS THERE AN AGREEMENT TO
RESUME THESE TALKS HERE NEXT WEEK?

MS. TUTWILER: NOT THAT I KNOW OF.

Q: ARE THERE ANY CONTACTS TODAY?

MS. TUTWILER: ON SPECIFIC MEETINGS, THERE ARE ANY NUMBER
OF EXPERTS HERE, I AM SURE, WHO ARE TALKING TO OTHER
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GOVERNMENTS AND INDIVIDUALS. AS A LITERAL MEETING, THE
LAST TIME I CHECKED BEFORE I CAME TO THE PODIUM, I DON'T
HAVE A MEETING TO ANNOUNCE.

Q: ARE THE ISRAELIS FREE TO REPEAT THE EMPTY CHAIR

PANTOMIME IN REVERSE ON MONDAY?

MS. TUTWILER: THE RULES ON MONDAY WILL BE THE SAME RULES AS THEY WERE LAST WEDNESDAY. WE ARE NOT GOING TO BE A PARTY TO FILMING EMPTY CHAIRS IN ROOMS. WE WILL NOT BE DOING THAT ON MONDAY NOR ON THURSDAY OR FRIDAY OR ANY DAY.

Q: BUT AS A MATTER OF PRACTICAL CONSIDERATION, HOW DO BOTH SIDES KNOW THAT THEY ARE FREE TO COME NEXT MONDAY OR TUESDAY OR WHENEVER? ARE THEY EXCHANGING MESSAGES THROUGH THE UNITED STATES?

MS. TUTWILER: THEY ALREADY KNOW THAT THEY ARE FREE TO COME ANY DAY THAT THEY CHOOSE. EVERYBODY KNOWS THAT.

Q: ARE THEY EXCHANGING MESSAGES THROUGH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT?

MS. TUTWILER: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, AS SECRETARY OF STATE BAKER SAID YESTERDAY AFTERNOON, WILL CONTINUE TO DO WHAT WE CAN TO BRIDGE THE DIFFERENCES HERE.

Q: SO THEY ARE EXCHANGING MESSAGES THROUGH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT?

MS. TUTWILER: WE HAVE BEEN HAVING DISCUSSIONS FOR THE
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LAST MANY, MANY WEEKS. THOSE DISCUSSIONS CONTINUE.

Q: MARGARET, HAVE YOU PROPOSED A MEETING IN WHICH THE ISRAELIS EXPERTS/OFFICIALS, OR THE ARAB EXPERTS/OFFICIALS, WHATEVER, SIT DOWN TOGETHER WITH U.S. OFFICIALS TO SORT THIS OUT INSTEAD OF SOMEBODY ACTING AS POSTMAN BETWEEN THEM? HAVE YOU PROPOSED A MEETING, A THREE-WAY MEETING?

MS. TUTWILER: THERE HAVE BEEN ANY NUMBER OF IDEAS AND SUGGESTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN FLOATED. THERE HAVE EVEN BEEN NEW ONES THIS MORNING. BUT THERE IS NOTHING THAT I THINK IS SERVED BY GOING THROUGH PUBLICLY EVERY SINGLE SUGGESTION AND IDEA, EVERY SINGLE PHONE CONVERSATION. IT DOESN'T GET YOU WHERE YOU WANT TO GO, WHICH IS WHERE WE WANT TO GET, AND WE BELIEVE THE PARTIES WANT TO GET, AND THAT IS TO SIT DOWN AND HAVE THESE TALKS RESUMED.

Q: COULD YOU CLARIFY THAT, MARGARET? IS IT THE U.S. POSITION --

MS. TUTWILER: WHERE ARE YOU?

Q: BACK HERE.

MS. TUTWILER: SORRY.

Q: IS IT THE U.S. POSITION THAT WE, THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IS SAYING TO THE PARTIES, "WE ARE OUT OF THE PROPOSAL BUSINESS. WE PROPOSED DECEMBER 4TH --"

MS. TUTWILER: CORRECT.

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Q: "-- AND AS A RESULT THE UNITED STATES IS NOT GOING TO PROPOSE ANY MORE DAYS." OR ARE YOU NOW ENGAGED IN A DIALOGUE WITH THE PARTIES AND SAYING, "IF THE TWO OF YOU WILL AGREE, WE ARE READY TO PROPOSE A THIRD DATE?"

ARE WE OUT OF THE PROPOSAL BUSINESS?

MS. TUTWILER: WE ARE OUT OF THE PROPOSAL BUSINESS. OUR PROPOSAL IS OPEN-ENDED AND, AS WE HAVE SAID, THERE IS NOT A MATCHING BOOK END, WHERE WE SAID WE WILL ONLY MAKE THESE FACILITIES AVAILABLE FOR THREE DAYS OR SEVENTEEN DAYS OR SEVENTY-THREE YEARS, OR WHATEVER IT MAY BE. WE JUST SAID THAT WE WILL BE OPEN AND READY FOR BUSINESS ON DECEMBER 4TH.

SO WE HAVE NEVER HAD A CUT-OFF POINT WHERE WE TOOK THE FACILITIES AWAY.

Q: RIGHT, BUT IT WAS IN THE INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES TO PROPOSE A DATE, BECAUSE THE SIDES COULD NOT AGREE, AFTER MADRID --

MS. TUTWILER: CORRECT. THAT'S RIGHT.

Q: IT WAS CLEARLY IN THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO PROPOSE A DATE. IT PROPOSED DECEMBER 4TH. THE PARTIES STILL COULD NOT AGREE ON THAT. THEY ARE CLEARLY STILL LOOKING FOR SOMEONE TO PROPOSE AN

ALTERNATIVE.

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MS. TUTWILER: RIGHT.

Q: WHY IS IT NO
T NOW IN THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED
STATES TO PROPOSE AN ALTERNATIVE?

MS. TUTWILER: BECAUSE, TOM, WE HAVE SAID THAT WE ALSO
WEREN'T RECEIVING CONDITIONS, AND WE WERE NOT GOING TO
UNILATERALLY CHANGE OUR PROPOSAL, THAT WHEN WE STARTED
THIS EXERCISE, TWO PARTIES VERY RAPIDLY --- I BELIEVE ONE
THAT VERY AFTERNOON, SEVERAL HOURS LATER -- ACCEPTED BASED
ON THAT ORIGINAL PROPOSAL.

NOW WE HAVE FOUR PARTIES THAT HAVE ACCEPTED THE PROPOSAL,
AND I WOULD ARGUE WITH YOU THAT WE HAVE FIVE. THE ISRAELI
GOVERNMENT SENT A LETTER FROM PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR
THROUGH AMBASSADOR SHOVAL LAST FRIDAY, ACCEPTING THE
PROPOSAL.

THEY HAVE A DIFFERENT DATE, AND THEY HAVE EXPLAINED THEIR
REASONS FOR THE DATE, ET CETERA.

I HAVE SAID -- AND SECRETARY BAKER SAID YESTERDAY -- THAT
THE UNITED STATES WILL CONTINUE TO WORK TO BRIDGE THE
DIFFERENCES, AND WORK AS A FACILITATOR TO TRY TO GET THE
PARTIES TOGETHER. BUT THAT IS VERY DIFFERENT THAN SAYING
THAT THE UNITED STATES, IS AND THE SOVIET UNION,
CONSIDERING CHANGING THE PROPOSAL. WE ARE NOT.

Q: MARGARET, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT -- I AM FINDING THIS A
BIT HARD TO BELIEVE. I MEAN, IF I WAS HAVING A DINNER
PARTY AND I WANTED MY GOOD FRIEND, BARRY SCHWEID AND MY
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OTHER GOOD FRIEND, MARGARET TUTWILER, TO COME (LAUGHTER),
AND I SAID, "LET'S HAVE IT ON FRIDAY," AND BARRY SAID,
"FINE," BUT YOU SAID, "SORRY, I CAN'T MAKE IT ON FRIDAY,"

HOW ABOUT NEXT TUESDAY?" WOULDN'T IT BE A BIT NAIVE OF ME TO SAY TO BARRY, "OKAY, YOU COME ON FRIDAY, AND WE'LL LET THE FOOD GET COLD UNTIL MARGARET IS READY TO COME NEXT TUESDAY." (LAUGHTER) I MEAN, WHAT IS SO HOLY ABOUT THIS PROPOSAL? DECEMBER THE 4TH IS IN THE PAST ALREADY. IT IS HISTORY. WHY CAN'T YOU JUST FIX ANOTHER DATE FOR THESE -- I KNOW YOU --

MS. TUTWILER: BECAUSE, ALAN, ONCE YOU GO DOWN THAT ROAD, ONCE YOU OPEN THAT DOOR, WHERE DOES IT END? THIS, RIGHT NOW, IN YOUR WORDS, SAYS THIS SEEMS A LITTLE SILLY.

Q: IT COULD BE.

MS. TUTWILER: I WILL REFRAIN FROM CHARACTERIZING WHAT OUR VIEW IS OF THIS. BUT, ON THE SERIOUS SIDE, ONCE YOU START DOWN THAT ROAD, IT WILL NEVER END, AND YOU WILL NEVER, EVER, IN OUR OPINION, AND THE CO-SPONSOR'S OPINION, CUT IT OFF. SO, YOU CANNOT PICK AND CHOOSE WHAT THINGS YOU WANT TO CHANGE. THIS IS NOT, AS ONE OF OUR GOOD ISRAELI FRIENDS SAYS, A FRUIT SALAD, WHERE YOU PICK WHAT YOU WANT.

WE THINK THAT IT IS VERY IMPORTANT TO MAINTAIN THE INTEGRITY OF THE CO-SPONSORS' PROPOSAL, THAT PEOPLE ACCEPTED UNCONDITIONALLY. AND I TOLD YOU YESTERDAY -- AND I HAVE NO REASON NOT TO BELIEVE SO DIFFERENTLY TODAY -- THAT WE HAVE NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE PARTIES THEMSELVES DO NOT WANT A RESUMPTION OF THESE TALKS, THAT

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THEY RECOGNIZE AND ARE SERIOUS ABOUT THESE TALKS, AND WE HAVE NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THIS DIFFICULTY WILL NOT BE WORKED OUT.

Q: ARE YOU OPEN FOR BUSINESS TOMORROW AND SUNDAY?

MS. TUTWILER: THE STATE DEPARTMENT IS OPEN 24 HOURS A DAY --

Q: I MEAN, FOR THIS BUSINESS?

MS. TUTWILER: -- 365 DAYS A YEAR. OBVIOUSLY, WE ARE NOT GOING TO ASK EMPLOYEES TO COME DOWN AND SIT IN FRONT OF A ROOM IF THE PARTIES HAVE TOLD US, AS THEY HAVE TODAY -- AND THEY DID YESTERDAY -- "WE WON'T BE HERE." BUT THE

BUILDING IS OPEN. THE BUILDING IS OPEN 24 HOURS A DAY, 7 DAYS A WEEK, 365 DAYS' OUT OF THE YEAR.

Q: WAIT A MINUTE. THEY TOLD YOU THAT THEY WOULDN'T BE HERE SATURDAY AND SUNDAY?

MS. TUTWILER: NO, I HAVEN'T ASKED THAT QUESTION. I KNOW THEY TOLD US YESTERDAY AND THEY WEREN'T. MY UNDERSTANDING IS THAT THEY WILL NOT BE TODAY. I HAVE NOT ASKED ABOUT SATURDAY AND SUNDAY.

BUT WHAT I'M SAYING -- SO WE'RE STRAIGHT -- IS THE FACILITIES ARE OPEN.

Q: WAIT A MINUTE. THE QUESTION IS WHETHER -- MAYBE WE CAN GET AN ANSWER BY THE END OF THE DAY -- WILL THE STATE
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DEPARTMENT MAKE ITS FACILITIES AVAILABLE TO THEM SATURDAY?

MS. TUTWILER: SURE.

Q: SUNDAY?

MS. TUTWILER: YES.

Q: AND MONDAY?

MS. TUTWILER: YES. I ANSWERED ALL THIS YESTERDAY.

Q: NOW, THE PALESTINIANS SAY MONDAY IS AN ANNIVERSARY OF THE INTIFADA.

MS. TUTWILER: THAT'S CORRECT.

Q: BUT YOU'RE OPEN IF THEY WANT TO COME IN?

MS. TUTWILER: SURE. I ANSWERED THIS YESTERDAY. SAME ANSWER TODAY.

TOM.

Q: TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, ARE THE PARTIES ENGAGED IN A DIRECT DIALOGUE WITH ONE ANOTHER TO RESOLVE THIS PROBLEM? OR ARE THEY ONLY TALKING TO THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED

STATES IS THEN ACTING AS A MAILMAN?

MS. TUTWILER: I'M NOT AWARE IF THEY ARE ENGAGED. I HAVE NO PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF IT. IT IS NOT JUST THE UNITED
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STATES, IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING, THAT THE PARTIES ARE DISCUSSING THIS WITH. THE SOVIET UNION IS OUR CO-SPONSOR, AND THERE ARE OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES, WHO HAVE GOVERNMENTS HERE IN THIS TOWN, AND I BELIEVE CONVERSATIONS ARE GOING ON WITH THOSE GOVERNMENTS ALSO.

Q: THEY'RE NOT TALKING TO N9THER, AS --

MS. TUTWILER: TO MY KNOWLEDGE, BUT ASK THEM. IF THEY'RE HAVING CONVERSATIONS AND THEY WANT TO MAINTAIN THOSE PRIVATELY, THAT'S THEIR PREROGATIVE. I KNOW OF NONE THAT THE PARTIES HAVE INFORMED US OF, OR THAT THEY HAVE PUBLICLY INFORMED YOU OF.

Q: MARGARET --

MS. TUTWILER: YES, JIM.

Q: -- SPEAKING OF THE CO-SPONSOR, WHAT WAS THE POINT OF THE VISIT THIS MORNING BY THE SOVIET DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER TO MR. DJEREJIAN?

MS. TUTWILER: PREDOMINANTLY, TO DISCUSS THE FUTURE PLANNING FOR THE MULTILATERALS THAT WE ANNOUNCED WE'RE HOSTING IN JANUARY IN MOSCOW.

Q: WILL HE BE THE SOVIET POINT MAN DURING --

MS. TUTWILER: I DON'T KNOW. YOU MIGHT ASK THE SOVIET EMBASSY. I JUST DON'T KNOW. HE CAME HERE TODAY TO DISCUSS THIS. I DON'T KNOW IF HE'S GOING TO BE THEIR
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DESIGNATED POINT MAN FOR THIS.

Q: BUT THERE'S NO CHANGE IN PROCEDURE OR PLANNING --

MS. TUTWILER: NONE.

Q: -- AS FAR AS THE BILATERALS ARE CONCERNED?

MS. TUTWILER: BILATERALS?

Q: YEAH.

MS. TUTWILER: NO.

Q: DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING TO SAY ABOUT THE MULTILATERALS?
ANYTHING YOU CAN SAY FURTHER ABOUT THE MULTILATERALS AT
THIS POINT?

MS. TUTWILER: NO.

Q: MARGARET, I HAVE THREE ITEMS --

Q: IF THE BILATERALS BEGIN ON MONDAY OR TUESDAY, OR
ANYTIME NEXT WEEK, DO YOU EXPECT THEM TO IMMEDIATELY GO
INTO SUBSTANTIVE MATTERS, OR WILL THE FIRST TALKS BE ON
PROCEDURE?

MS. TUTWILER: YOU WOULD HAVE TO ASK THE PARTIES.

Q: WHAT DOES THE UNITED STATES WANT?

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MS. TUTWILER: THE UNITED STATES WANTS -- WHENEVER THE
PARTIES THEMSELVES DETERMINE THAT THEY'RE GOING TO -- THE
UNITED STATES BELIEVES THESE ARE SERIOUS, IMPORTANT TALKS.

Q: MARGARET, WOULD YOU PLEASE TELL US, ARE YOU -- YOU HAD
SAID THAT WHAT YOU WANTED TO CREATE HERE WAS A PROCESS
WHEREBY THERE WERE DIRECT BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN
ISRAEL, THE ARAB STATES AND THE PALESTINIANS?

MS. TUTWILER: IT'S WHAT THE PARTIES THEMSELVES, MARY,
SAID THEY WANTED TO DO.

Q: RIGHT. THAT'S NOT HAPPENING. ARE YOU DISAPPOINTED
THAT THESE PARTIES ARE NOT SPEAKING TO EACH OTHER? THAT

YOU CAN'T EVEN GET THEM TO SPEAK TO EACH OTHER ABOUT A POSSIBLE DATE TO SHOW UP HERE NEXT WEEK?

MS. TUTWILER: WE EXPRESSED OUR DISAPPOINTMENT LAST WEEK AND WE EXPRESSED IT EARLIER THIS WEEK. THAT'S OUT THERE.

Q: IS IT A CONTINUING SOURCE OF FRUSTRATION FOR YOU, MARGARET?

MS. TUTWILER: THIS IS SOMETHING WE'RE ACTIVELY WORKING ON, MARY.

Q: (INAUDIBLE) TRYING TO GET THREE FOLLOW-UPS. THERE ARE REPORTS ON ISRAELI RADIO THAT THE LOWER LEVEL OFFICIALS MIGHT MEET ON SATURDAY NIGHT AFTER SHABBAS. IS THAT -- DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING ON THAT?

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MS. TUTWILER: I HAVEN'T HEARD THAT YET.

Q: WOULD YOU CARE TO LOOK INTO THAT, OR DO YOU REFER US BACK TO THE PARTIES? THAT SOME OF THE ISRAELIS AND SOME OF THE ARABS WILL GET TOGETHER --

MS. TUTWILER: I WOULD SUGGEST THAT YOU DO, AS WE HAVE BEEN DOING EVERYDAY -- MAYBE YOU MIGHT WANT TO CHECK IT OUT WITH THE PARTIES. THEY ALL HAVE OFFICES SET UP HERE. I AM NOT GOING TO BE, AS I'VE SAID, THE SPOKESMAN FOR EVERY SINGLE PERSON THAT'S HERE OR THESE GROUPS. I'M NOT GOING TO DO IT, SO CHECK WITH THEM.

Q: I'VE GOT THREE THINGS. BUT THEY'RE NOT SCHEDULED TO MEET HERE, THOUGH?

MS. TUTWILER: I KNOW OF NO SUCH MEETING HERE ON SATURDAY.

Q: WAIT A MINUTE. I HAD THREE --

MS. TUTWILER: SHE HAS THREE QUESTIONS SHE SAYS.

Q: I'VE BEEN TRYING SO HARD TO -- DO YOU KNOW WHETHER ANY ISSUES OF SUBSTANCE HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED AT ALL BY ANYONE, OR HAS IT ALL BEEN PROCEDURE IN THIS ENTIRE TWO OR THREE WEEKS?

MS. TUTWILER: I DON'T KNOW OF ANY MEETINGS, CONNIE, THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE.

Q: THIRD QUESTION: HAVE --
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Q: HOW ABOUT THE U.S. -- IN THE TALKS WITH THE U.S.?

MS. TUTWILER: ARE YOU ASKING ME, "HAS THE UNITED STATES HAD ANY SUBSTANTIVE CONVERSATIONS?

Q: ON LOWER-LEVEL OFFICIALS, YES? OR ONE-ON-ONE OR THE GROUPS HERE? WHEN THESE GROUPS COME IN, DO YOU JUST TALK PROCEDURE WITH THEM AND VENUE --

MS. TUTWILER: I WOULD SAY IT'S A COMBINATION OF PROCEDURE AND SUBSTANCE.

Q: SO THERE IS SOME?

Q: WHEN YOU TALK ABOUT BRIDGING THE GAPS --

MS. TUTWILER: SHE HAS A THIRD QUESTION, I THINK, RALPH.

Q: -- ARE YOU TALKING ABOUT --

MS. TUTWILER: RALPH, I THINK SHE HAS A THIRD QUESTION.

Q: LET HIM FINISH THIS LINE.

MS. TUTWILER: WHAT? I THOUGHT YOU HAD A THIRD QUESTION.

Q: OKAY, WELL, DID WE EVER SETTLE THE QUESTION OF EXPENSES? WHO'S PAYING THE EXPENSES FOR ALL THIS? IS THE U.S. PAYING THE EXPENSES FOR ALL THESE DELEGATIONS?

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MS. TUTWILER: NO. THE UNITED STATES -- THE CO-SPONSORS DID NOT PAY THE EXPENSES IN MADRID. IT'S THE SAME FORMULA USED IN MADRID.

Q: WHEN YOU TALK ABOUT BRIDGING THE GAPS, ARE YOU TALKING ABOUT BRIDGING THE GAPS ON THE QUESTION OF BEGINNING BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS, OR ARE YOU TALKING ABOUT BRIDGING GAPS ON SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES?

MS. TUTWILER: I WOULD REFER YOU TO SECRETARY BAKER'S PUBLIC TESTIMONY WHERE HE HAS STATED MANY, MANY TIMES THAT WE ARE HERE TO HELP, TO FACILITATE, TO BRIDGE POTENTIAL GAPS. HE HAS NOT CATEGORIZED THEM AS TO WHETHER THEY'RE SUBSTANTIVE OR PROCEDURAL.

WE HAPPEN TO THINK THAT THIS IS AN IMPORTANT PROCESS, AND WE BELIEVE THE PARTIES DO. WE BELIEVE MOST OF THE WORLD DOES, AND WE'VE SAID THAT A HUNDRED TIMES. WE'RE HERE TO HELP.

Q: MARGARET, THAT --

MS. TUTWILER: IF THE PARTIES WANT OUR HELP.

Q: THE U.S. INVITATION NOT ONLY SAID DECEMBER 4, IT SAID IN WASHINGTON. YOU'VE MADE IT, OBVIOUSLY, VERY CLEAR THAT THE DATE CANNOT BE RESET. WHAT ABOUT THE LOCATION? MUST THEY MEET IN WASHINGTON?

MS. TUTWILER: THAT WOULD BE CHANGING OUR PROPOSAL.

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Q: SO YOU WILL NOT CHANGE YOUR PROPOSAL THAT THEY MEET IN -- EVEN THOUGH YOU SENT OUT THAT LITTLE FLARE EARLY ON THAT AT SOME POINT DOWN THE ROAD THERE MIGHT BE SOME VALIDITY TO MEETING IN THE REGION -- WHICH, OF COURSE, IS WHAT THE ISRAELIS WANT TO DO -- THIS IS NOT THE TIME. IF THERE ARE TO BE TALKS, AS FAR AS THE U.S. WOULD SET THE TIME AND PLACE, THOSE TALKS MUST BE IN WASHINGTON?

MS. TUTWILER: WE HAVE SAID THREE THINGS: ONE, WE WERE NOT IN A RECEIVER MODE FOR NEW CONDITIONS ON OUR PROPOSAL; (2) WE'RE NOT CHANGING OUR PROPOSAL; (3) WE SAID IN THE SAME BREATH, IF THE PARTIES THEMSELVES WANT TO AGREE UPON

A TIME AND A PLACE, WE WOULD BE DELIGHTED. IT WOULD BE TERRIFIC.

Q: THAT'S UNLIKELY THAT THE SYRIANS WOULD AGREE --

MS. TUTWILER: THAT'S CORRECT.

Q: -- TO MEET IN ISRAEL.

MS. TUTWILER: SO, WE ----

Q: IT WAS ALSO UNLIKELY THAT THE ISRAELIS --

MS. TUTWILER: I WAS GOING TO FINISH -- WAIT ONE SECOND. OUR FOURTH POINT, WHICH WE HAVE SAID, IS THAT THE UNITED STATES' VIEW IS THAT AT SOME TIME, AS YOU ACCURATELY STATE, THESE TALKS SHOULD MOVE TO THE REGION. THAT IS OUR VIEW. BUT WE HAVE NOT STATED AT WHAT POINT IN TIME.

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Q: CAN I TRY ON SOMETHING DIFFERENT, JUST FOR A MINUTE? THERE'S A REPORT IN TIME MAGAZINE ABU NIDAL SLIPPED INTO THE COUNTRY EARLIER THIS YEAR AND HAD SURGERY IN BOSTON. DOES THE STATE DEPARTMENT KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT THIS?

MS. TUTWILER: I DON'T.

Q: THE OTHER THING IS, WHAT IS THE STATUS OF OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT? IT'S DUE TO COME TO AN END WITHIN THE NEXT TWO OR THREE DAYS. DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING ON THAT?

MS. TUTWILER: I'LL CHECK FOR YOU.

Q: COULD YOU CHECK? AND A THIRD -- A TOTALLY UNRELATED QUESTION: THE LATVIAN AMBASSADOR, WHO IS COMING TO PRESENT CREDENTIALS --

MS. TUTWILER: WHO?

Q: THE LATVIAN, THIS AFTERNOON. IS HE THE FIRST OF THE BALTIC AMBASSADORS TO DO SO?

MS. TUTWILER: I DON'T KNOW, JAN. I'LL FIND OUT FOR YOU.

Q: MARGARET, DO YOU HAVE ANY REACTION TO THE DECISION BY

ALL THE ARAB STATES, INCLUDING EGYPT, TO VOTE AGAINST THE
REPEAL OF THE ZIONISM EQUALS RACISM RESOLUTION?

MS. TUTWILER: I'VE READ ONE REPORT OF THAT THIS MORNING.
I WAS UNABLE TO CONFIRM FOR YOU THAT THAT IS ACTUALLY,
INDEED, WHAT HAPPENED. I WILL TELL YOU, AGAIN, AS WE
STATED -- I BELIEVE IT WAS EARLIER THIS WEEK WHEN WE MADE
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OUR ANNOUNCEMENT -- HOW IMPORTANT WE THINK THIS IS, THE
REPEAL OF THIS. THE PRESIDENT STATED IT IN HIS SPEECH AT
THE UNITED NATIONS, AND WE ARE ACTIVELY WORKING AS HARD AS
WE CAN TO HAVE THIS REPEALED.

Q: IN FACT, YOU'RE WORKING SO HARD THAT YOU'RE CANVASSING
AND TALLYING VOTES.

MS. TUTWILER: I'M NOT GOING --

Q: WELL, YOU ARE, BECAUSE IT SAYS SO

MS. TUTWILER: THANK YOU.

Q: -- IN THE U.N. NO, I'M SAYING -- I DON'T THINK ON
THIS CASE YOU CAN RELY ON REPORTS TO TELL US WHAT THE
ARABS ARE TELLING YOU ABOUT ZIONISM AND RACISM. I THINK
THE U.S. IS IN CONTACT WITH ALMOST ALL THE COUNTRIES OF
THE U.N.

MS. TUTWILER: OF COURSE WE ARE.

Q: SO, PLEASE, CAN YOU TELL US TODAY -- YOU KNOW, IF NOT
NOW, BY THE END OF THE DAY -- IF THE ARABS HAVE TOLD YOU,
INCLUDING EGYPT WHICH SIGNED A PEACE TREATY, WHETHER THEY
STILL THINK ZIONISM AND RACISM ARE EQUIVALENT?

MS. TUTWILER: YES.

Q: MARGARET, SOMETHING ABOUT THE PROCEDURAL AND
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES: AT LEAST CAN YOU SAY THE DIVIDING
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LINES BETWEEN THE TWO ARE CLEAR TO YOU AND TO BOTH SIDES?

MS. TUTWILER: I'M NOT SURE EXACTLY WHAT YOUR QUESTION IS.

Q: THE DIVIDING LINES BETWEEN WHAT IS PROCEDURAL AND WHAT IS SUBSTANTIVE --

MS. TUTWILER: WHAT'S IMPORTANT TO US --

Q: -- IN THE TALKS ARE CLEAR?

MS. TUTWILER: YOU KNOW, I DON'T KNOW HOW OFTEN I CAN SAY THIS OR HOW MANY DAYS I CAN CONTINUE TO SAY THE SAME THING. WHAT IS IMPORTANT TO US -- BUT WE CANNOT FEEL THAT IT IS MORE IMPORTANT TO US THAN IT IS TO THE PARTIES -- IS GET TO TALKS. IT'S QUITE SIMPLE. IT'S QUITE CLEAR.

Q: MARGARET, SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE PALESTINIAN DELEGATION ARE MEETING WITH JIMMY CARTER TODAY. ARE YOU AWARE OF ANY PRIVATE EFFORTS, LIKE BY THE FORMER PRESIDENT, TO HELP THE MIDEAST PEACE TALKS TO GO BACK ON TRACK?

MS. TUTWILER: I'M NOT AWARE OF ANY PRIVATE EFFORTS. I THINK THAT OUR POSITION HAS BEEN THAT ANYONE, ANY COUNTRY, THAT CAN HELP IN THIS IMPORTANT AREA, WE WOULD WELCOME.

Q: MARGARET, HAVE THE CO-SPONSORS PLEDGED TO BE A DRIVING FORCE BEHIND THE PEACE PROCESS, AND DOES THAT STILL APPLY?

MS. TUTWILER: THE CO-SPONSORS HAVE PLEDGED, AND I'LL
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REFER YOU -- JUST YESTERDAY AFTERNOON -- TO SECRETARY BAKER'S RESPONSE TO THIS QUESTION, TO DO WHAT WE CAN TO HELP BRIDGE THE DIFFERENCES, TO BE A CATALYST, TO WORK AT THIS, AND THAT IS WHAT WE HAVE DONE IN GOOD FAITH, AND, AS PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR HIMSELF ASKED, AS AN HONEST BROKER. WE WILL CONTINUE TO DO THAT AS LONG AS THE PARTIES WANT US AND CONTINUE TO TELL US THEY WANT US TO HELP.

Q: HAVE THE WORDS "DRIVING FORCE" BEEN USED IN COMMUNICATION WITH THE PARTIES AND --

MS. TUTWILER: THAT PARTICULAR PHRASE, MARK, I HAVEN'T HEARD, BUT THERE ARE SO MANY CONVERSATIONS GOING ON THAT IT WOULD BE LITERALLY HUMANLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR ME TO KEEP UP WITH ALL OF THEM.

Q: BUT YOU WOULDN'T USE THAT TERM NOW TO --

MS. TUTWILER: YOU CAN USE REALLY ANY TERM THAT YOU WANT. THE UNITED STATES IS HERE AS LONG AS THE PARTIES WANT US TO BE, WHICH THEY CONTINUOUSLY SAY THEY DO, TO HELP.

Q: MARGARET, HAS THE UNITED STATES SENT A CONGRATULATORY TELEGRAM TO PRESIDENT ASSAD ON HIS RE-ELECTION?

MS. TUTWILER: I FORGOT TO ASK YESTERDAY, ALAN. I WON'T FORGET TODAY.

Q: I WON'T FORGET EITHER.

Q: ANYTHING NEW ON HAITI?

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MS. TUTWILER: NOT A LOT, NORM. THERE WERE NO HAITIANS THAT WERE PICKED UP YESTERDAY, SO THAT LEAVES OUR TOTAL AGAIN TODAY AT 6,420. TWO HUNDRED AND TWELVE HAVE BEEN FOUND TO HAVE A PLAUSIBLE CLAIM TO ASYLUM AND HAVE BEEN FLOWN TO THE UNITED STATES -- SO THE TOTAL OF PLAUSIBLE CLAIM TO ASYLUM NOW IS AT 445. THE UNHCR OFFICE IN HONDURAS HAS ADVISED US THAT 35 HAITIANS PRESENTLY IN TEMPORARY SAFE HAVEN FACILITIES IN HONDURAS HAVE ASKED TO BE REPATRIATED TO HAITI.

Q: MARGARET, THE STATE DEPARTMENT YESTERDAY ISSUED A VERY STRONG STATEMENT ON SOMALIA. DO YOU HAVE AN UPDATE ON THE SITUATION THERE?

MS. TUTWILER: NO, I DON'T.

Q: MARGARET, COULD I ASK YOU TO BROADEN JAN'S QUESTION ABOUT ABU NIDAL, A COUPLE OF OTHER THINGS? DOES THE U.S. STILL CONSIDER HIM A TERRORIST? WHERE DOES THE U.S. BELIEVE HE IS NOW BASED, AND HAS HE TRAVELED TO ALLIED COUNTRIES SUCH AS THE UNITED KINGDOM? JUST ADD THAT TO --

MS. TUTWILER: I'LL BE HAPPY TO PUT THAT IN JAN'S CATEGORY.

Q: THAT'S WHAT I MEAN.

MS. TUTWILER: I WILL.

Q: MARGARET, HAS THE UNITED STATES STILL REVIEWING THE
IDEA OF TAKING SYRIA OFF THE LIST OF TERRORIST NATIONS --

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NATIONS SUPPORTING TERRORISM?

MS. TUTWILER: I'M NOT AWARE, SIR, THAT THAT IS UNDER
REVIEW BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.

Q: WAS IT UNDER REVIEW?

MS. TUTWILER: WAS IT REQUESTED YESTERDAY?

Q: DIDN'T THE SYRIANS ASK?

MS. TUTWILER: YESTERDAY?

Q: OR THE DAY BEFORE.

MS. TUTWILER: IF THEY HAVE, I DON'T KNOW.

Q: AND THEY DIDN'T ASK DJEREJIAN TO BE TAKEN OFF THE LIST?

MS. TUTWILER: BARRY, IF THEY HAVE, I DON'T KNOW.

Q: NO, I'M SORRY.

MS. TUTWILER: I CANNOT POSSIBLY BE UP ON EVERY SINGLE
CONVERSATION --

Q: I THINK IT'S A LIVE ISSUE IS WHAT I MEAN.

MS. TUTWILER: -- THAT'S GOING ON.

Q: MARGARET, DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING ON CAMBODIA?

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MS. TUTWILER: NO.

Q: DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING ON BURMA? OR DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING ON THE REPORT OF 200,000 KURDISH REFUGEES ON THE MOVE?

MS. TUTWILER: I'M AWARE THAT THERE ARE CURRENTLY, IT'S MY UNDERSTANDING, IN NORTHERN IRAQ -- I BELIEVE THE U.N. NUMBERS ARE 500,000, AND THAT THERE ARE 200,000 NEW K

URDISH REFUGEES THAT ARE MOVING INTO THAT AREA. THE UNITED NATIONS PEOPLE THERE ON THE GROUND TELL US THAT THEY BELIEVE THAT THEY CAN HANDLE THIS SITUATION. IT IS SOMETHING THAT IS OF CONCERN TO US, AND SOMETHING THAT WE ARE OBVIOUSLY WATCHING CLOSELY.

Q: ONE ON THAT AREA. WHAT IS THE STATUS OF U.N. SANCTIONS VERSUS IRAQ? DOES THE U.S. HAVE ANY FEAR THAT THE U.N. MIGHT REPEAL THOSE OR RESCIND THOSE?

MS. TUTWILER: MIGHT DO WHAT?

Q: SANCTIONS.

MS. TUTWILER: I HAVEN'T HEARD ANYBODY SUGGESTING THAT THEY'RE GETTING READY TO REPEAL THEM. AS YOU KNOW, IRAQ HAS NOT COMPLIED WITH ALL OF THEM TO BEGIN WITH.

Q: IT WAS UNDER DISCUSSION THIS MORNING AT THE U.N., BUT --

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MS. TUTWILER: REPEALING THEM?

Q: I THOUGHT THAT WAS UNDER DISCUSSION.

MS. TUTWILER: I DON'T KNOW, RALPH. MAYBE YOU'RE RIGHT. I DON'T KNOW.

Q: DO YOU HAVE ANY MORE ON IRAQ'S NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT, THAT ABC -- U.N. REPORT YESTERDAY?

MS. TUTWILER: NO, I DON'T.

Q: COULD WE HAVE A WRAP-UP WEEKEND TYPE QUESTION?

MS. TUTWILER: O.K.

Q: COULD YOU TELL US WHAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S INVOLVEMENT HAS BEEN THIS WEEK IN THE MIDEAST THING? I MEAN, HAS HE TALKED LITERALLY TO ANY OF THE -- HE'S TALKED TO SHEVARDNADZE -- BUT DID HE TALK TO ANY OF THE PRINCIPALS? HAS HE BEEN GETTING REPORTS FROM DJEREJIAN AND DENNIS ROSS, ETC.? COULD YOU GIVE US SOME NOTIONS?

MS. TUTWILER: SURE.

Q: AS WE TRY TO WRAP UP THIS WEEK, YOU KNOW, THERE'S A LOT TO WRITE ABOUT.

MS. TUTWILER: I GUESS SO. WE COULD START IT ALL OVER AGAIN ON MONDAY.

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Q: NO. IT WOULD BE A SHORT STORY.

MS. TUTWILER: BARRY, HE HAS OBVIOUSLY BEEN KEPT INFORMED BY HIS STAFF AND THE EXPERTS. HE HAS NOT MET NOR SPOKEN, TO MY KNOWLEDGE, WITH ANY OF THE VARIOUS PARTIES THAT HAVE BEEN HERE IN TOWN. THAT'S BEING HANDLED AT THE EXPERT LEVEL.

Q: HAS HE MADE PHONE CALLS TO ANY -- TO MR. SHAMIR OR TO MR. LEVY OR TO ANYBODY?

MS. TUTWILER: NO.

Q: MR. ASSAD?

MS. TUTWILER: NO.

Q: DOES HE PLAN TO BE INVOLVED AT ALL OVER THE WEEKEND?

Q: WILL HE BE ON TELEVISION?

MS. TUTWILER: AS A MATTER OF FACT, HE HAS ACCEPTED DOING A SUNDAY SHOW ON THE CBS NETWORK.

Q: WELL, WE'LL GET HIS WORDS THAT WAY.

Q: MARGARET, DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENT ON THE TUNISIAN PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN-ARAB JOINT COMMITTEE TO LOOK AT YOUR INDICTMENT AGAINST THE TWO LIBYANS WITH THE PAN AM AFFAIR?

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MS. TUTWILER: DO I HAVE ANY WHAT? WHAT WAS THE FIRST PART?

Q: ANY COMMENTS ON THE PROPOSAL BY TUNISIA?

MS. TUTWILER: BASICALLY THE SAME AS WE DID YESTERDAY, THAT WE WHAT WE WANT TO SEE IS ACTION, NOT WORDS.

Q: MARGARET, DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENT ON THESE PRESS REPORTS THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT IS REVIEWING FELIX BLOCH'S PENSION AND MAY RESTORE IT?

MS. TUTWILER: THE LEGAL ADVISER'S OFFICE AND OTHER APPROPRIATE BUREAUS ARE REVIEWING THE PENSION ISSUE. THIS DECISION WILL BE MADE BY A SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL. THERE IS NO TIME LIMIT ON WHEN THIS DECISION HAS TO BE MADE. AND UNDER THE PRIVACY ACT, I REALLY CANNOT SAY MUCH MORE BEYOND THAT.

Q: MARGARET, DO YOU HAVE ANY REACTION TO THE FACT THAT THE JAPANESE PARLIAMENT WILL NOT NOW BE ISSUING A STATEMENT OF REGRET ABOUT THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR?

MS. TUTWILER: PRESIDENT BUSH HAS ADDRESSED HIMSELF TO THAT QUESTION, MOST RECENTLY I BELIEVE YESTERDAY, AND I BELIEVE THAT HE IS EN ROUTE TO PEARL HARBOR TO REPRESENT OUR COUNTRY THERE. SO I WILL LEAVE ANY KIND OF COMMENTS CONCERNING PEARL HARBOR TO THE PRESIDENT.

Q: THANK YOU.

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Date Printed: 10/31/1997 DOC_NUMBER: 91STATE398497

CHANNEL: n/a

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MS. TUTWILER: THANK YOU ALL.

BAKER

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED

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ACTION SS-25INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 DODE-00 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Exemptions

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ROME PASS DRAPER

LONDON FOR HABIB

E.O. 12365: DECL:OADR

TAGS: MOPS, PREL, LE, US, IS, XF

SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM SALEM TO HABIB

1. [REDACTED]
2. MESSAGE FROM AMBASSADOR HABIB TO FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM PASSED TO SALEM IN PARIS. AFTER CONSULTING WITH BEIRUT, SALEM HAD FOLLOWING MESSAGE FOR HABIB:
3. QUOTE THE MEETING ON MUTUAL RELATIONS WILL TAKE PLACE ON MONDAY MORNING. THE DELAY IN THE MEETING UNTIL FRIDAY IS REQUESTED BY ISRAEL, NOT BY LEBANON, BECAUSE MR. KIMCHE IS LEAVING MONDAY NOON TO EUROPE AND WILL NOT BE BACK TO ISRAEL BEFORE THURSDAY EVENING. THE LEBANESE TEAM IS INSISTING THAT THE MEETINGS GO ON ON TUESDAY OR WEDNESDAY. MINISTER SALEM RECEIVED THIS INFORMATION FROM PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AND AMBASSADOR TWEINI. END QUOTE.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN

In the discussion we have had relating to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, it has been generally assumed that a world in which there was a non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was more desirable, at least from the point of view of the United States, than a world in which there was a proliferation of such weapons. Mr. McNamara has suggested that perhaps the assumption should be examined and that the general acceptance of the desirability of non-proliferation may be more instinctive than analytical. He has further suggested that it might be the duty of this Committee to look deeper into the question than the Government has thus far done, if only to give consideration to the price we might be willing to pay for non-proliferation if we find it to be desirable. The significance of proliferated guarantees which might be an incident of a series of non-proliferation agreements is one of the elements which has to be weighed in trying to arrive at a conclusion.

I believe that it is the view of the Committee that non-proliferation is desirable from the point of view of the United States though it may be difficult to be analytical about it and though we may not stand a good chance of bringing it about.

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has made it clear that the Soviet Union is opposed to the concept of MLF because of its fear of German encroachment in the nuclear weapons field. It is reported that the

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Soviet Union would be willing to sign a non-proliferation agreement the minute we gave up the idea of a M.L.F. Whether this is actually the case may be debatable, but believing that such an agreement is desirable, that Agency has been inclined to oppose the M.L.F.

The above considerations have been adduced as reasons for abandoning M.L.F. or something like it and avoiding anything which may even look like proliferation to others. I believe that on the other hand we have not given due consideration to the price we may have to pay if we do give up M.L.F. and the concept of which it was a part. I believe that the risks we run on that score, at least equal, if they do not exceed, those that we risk with the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

In talking about the risks of proliferation and the dangers of offending the Soviets or the Gaullists, I think we have lost sight of the deep significance of the Alliance and of the concept of collective security for the Atlantic World, which has been the keystone of our post-war policy. Under present circumstances, if we allow matters to drift along for an indefinite period, say till after the German elections in 1965, we shall see an ever-accelerating deterioration of the Alliance and the collective security concept we took such pains to build after the close of the war. We must remember that it was this concept which was responsible for the Marshall Plan, the defense of Berlin, the erection of NATO, the Schuman Plan and the Common Market. All of these moves the Soviet Union opposed and General

de Gaulle opposed the last three and, until recently at least, was quite lukewarm in respect of the second. The recent decision to "go easy" on the M.L.F., "to put the ball in the court of the Europeans" with, at best, an equivocal attitude on the part of the United States in respect of M.L.F., has already resulted in a real triumph for de Gaulle and for his opposition to the collective security of a Europe united and in partnership with the United States. It has already caused an increasing fragmentation of the once steadfast German position; it could readily expedite the return to nationalism in Europe and it has, in my judgment, increased the threat of eventual German possession of a national nuclear weapon.

The possibility of confronting the Soviets and the Chinese with a convincingly solid Western front to discourage or inhibit all disposition on the part of the Communist powers to attack or subvert, is diminishing with every day that goes by. The hope for the creation of a common Western policy in respect of the great issues which will sooner or later have to be faced by the West, such as the evolution of Eastern Europe, including the reunification of Germany, the future of the under-developed countries including the looming menace of the emerging African continent with its Asian overtones is also impaired by every postponement of further steps to unify the West.

One of the great achievements of our foreign policy after World War II was the reorientation of Germany and Japan. This required bold

measures and it was accomplished over the opposition of both de Gaulle and the Soviet Union. We made a mistake after World War I in our treatment of Germany and we shall be making much the same mistake in respect of Germany now if we take the attitude that we owe nothing to the Germans and "to hell with them anyway". Poincare was wrong in 1919 and so is de Gaulle in 1965. The Germans must be given a position of equality with the other Western powers if they are not, in due course, to go off on another nationalist adventure. Twice such an adventure brought the nations to a world war in my lifetime -- I do not think we should risk the same course to a third world war.

The attempt of France to seek primacy in Europe at the expense of the Germans and the other Europeans; the attempt to revert to a system of European alliances; the axes of power concepts of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries are simply not good enough as a basis for security in a nuclear world -- it is toying with outworn concepts. It was not good enough to avert wars in the days of conventional weapons a fortiori -- it is not good enough for the world of nuclear weapons. The M.L.F. may have been clumsily presented and handled, but it was put forward in an attempt to create a sense of collective security which would preclude return to national power balances. It may well have been put forward in a maladroit manner without appropriate preparation and consolidation of the position at home and abroad, but, in my judgment, the concept of which it partook must not now be abandoned in favor

of a laissez-faire attitude such as we appear now to be assuming.

We can talk and speculate about the effects of India having the bomb, or Israel, the U.A.R. or Pakistan, but these effects are less ominous compared with those which would flow from further acquisition of nuclear power in Europe. This idea which de Gaulle so strongly presses for, i.e., nurturing national prestige through the acquisition of nuclear power is the destruction of collective security in Europe and proliferation in Europe, is more dangerous than proliferation in Asia, considering the past history of Europe.

It also should be remembered that Germany has been allied with Russia before and if Germany cannot find a solid berth as a member of a Western partnership, she might try it again. After all, the Russians have a good bit to offer her, or, as Adenauer frankly puts it, if we do not go along with de Gaulle he (or France) might follow the traditional route of an entente or alliance with Russia. Neither of these prospects may appear reasonable now, but times change and if all we have is a combination of separate nationalist-minded powers in Europe, any combination of alliances and intrigues becomes quite possible.

The surest way to produce a condition on which a lasting peace can be erected is to maintain in reality a solid Atlantic Alliance with the European nations, all on an equal basis, equal vis-a-vis themselves and together or jointly equal with the United States. On this basis, I can see the

hope for constructive steps in disarmament and the means of a far-reaching modus vivendi with the Soviet Union and even with China. I repeat, we must not lose sight of the real danger we face if we now reverse our highly successful policy of European integration in partnership with the United States -- a policy which was forged after World War II and which resulted in the rehabilitation of Europe, the successful defense of Berlin and the reorientation of Germany and Japan.

It is not a question of what we owe the Germans. It is a question of what will produce a lasting peace. I think the objective is so important that we should take all the risk of leadership to bring it about. I do not believe we can successfully "put the ball in the European's court". They cannot handle it alone -- they never have and I do not believe they ever will. The prospect of their doing so in the face of competing designs of General de Gaulle without our help is almost nil. It requires some participation on our part as well and participation is not arm-twisting or pressurizing. Of course, de Gaulle will oppose all steps in this direction and so will the Soviet Union. He will oppose them because they are incompatible with his concept of French primacy in Europe (which even with a divided Germany is a fanciful concept in today's world). And the Soviets will oppose them because they lead to true European unity with the United States and this represents an end to all hope of Communist world domination. Both, on the other hand, will

conform when the unity is effected.

The conclusion to be drawn from this is, in my judgment, that we cannot afford to reverse or let this, to date, highly successful policy further deteriorate, but quite promptly we should actively assist the British, the Germans and the Italians to reach a formula which does recognize this concept in the handling of nuclear power in Europe. We cannot afford, in our own interest, to let the matter drift until the Alliance has deteriorated to such an extent as no longer to be a convincing front of combined power and policy vis-a-vis the Communist forces of the East. If we do let matters drift, as I believe ^{NS, 111} 322 ^ implies, and the present conditions indicate, we are on the way to losing both the essence of the Alliance and non-proliferation.



John J. McCloy

January 8, 1965

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January 7, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary

THROUGH: S/S

FROM: G - Ambassador L. E. Thompson

SUBJECT: Talking Points for Meeting with the Gilpatric Committee

1. Curbing Proliferation as an Objective

We are against proliferation of national nuclear capabilities, and we seek by a variety of means to prevent or retard this process. This is an important aim of US policy. But it is not the only aim, and we cannot be indifferent to the impact on other important US objectives of possible measures designed to curb proliferation.

2. Curbing Proliferation is a Diplomatic Task

We oppose proliferation in general, but to do so effectively we must oppose proliferation in concrete detail. As you know, the first rank of potential proliferators are India, Japan, Israel, and Sweden. Each is tempted to acquire its own nuclear weapons for differing combinations of reasons; each can be dissuaded only by particularly suited arguments, inducements, or pressures. We have efforts underway to deal with the Indian and Israeli cases, and we are studying carefully the Japanese case as well. Sweden is not likely to be the next in line and is therefore less critical. We will welcome additional suggestions, as we are constantly moving to make our efforts more effective.

3. General Agreements

There is hope for a general world-wide non-proliferation agreement and a comprehensive test ban (though neither is likely to be universal--Communist China is not likely to agree to either, nor France to a test ban). There seems to be a widespread view that the Soviets are really eager for both. If they were eager enough, they could have both. While it is true that the MLF-ANF appears to be the main obstacle to a non-proliferation agreement (at least so far as the nuclear powers are concerned) this is so only because the Soviets are more interested in attempting to cause problems for the Western Alliance than in having an agreement.

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General agreements may help, but they are not likely to be the whole answer. Certainly such countries as India will insist on an escape clause to cover continuing Chinese non-adherence and weapons development--and so would we. We do not want proliferation, but we also do not want to give the Chinese a blank check on future military power in Asia.

Incidentally, if we were willing and able to give up MLF-type options for a general agreement, we might find we had given up the strongest card we could offer some countries as an alternative to national nuclear programs. Moreover, the Soviets might well immediately stretch their objections to cover any physical transfer of weapons even kept under US custody, thus challenging the whole NATO nuclear two-key arrangement.

4. Guarantees

It is necessary to consider very carefully any form of guarantees we may offer as inducement or compensation for not embarking on national nuclear programs. We cannot, of course, give a blank check to everyone or, perhaps, even to anyone. It is doubtful whether we should give more than general or conditional guarantees; and it is doubtful that a country which feels really threatened and is capable of building nuclear weapons will indefinitely refrain from doing so merely in exchange for general or conditional guarantees. I would not like to see 100 million American lives placed in escrow for renewed hostilities in Ladakh, at some distant time when the Chinese might have reestablished an effective military alliance with the Soviet Union.

5. Pressures

There may be occasions when either subtle pressures or even blunt warnings may serve to reinforce shaky dispositions not to take the nuclear path. But these must be very, very carefully considered. For example, to threaten withdrawal from Europe as a means to dissuade Germany from acquiring a larger nuclear role would be the most sure way to stimulate belief that the US could not be counted on and that a German or European nuclear force was needed. To threaten to cut off all economic aid to India if it set out to manufacture nuclear weapons, if it did not succeed in its purpose, could persuade the Indians that they had no choice but to align themselves more with the Soviets. It also would jeopardize all the hopes in Indian development on which our policies have been based. And we would lose all restraint on India over Kashmir. At the same time, Pakistan would want nuclear weapons stationed for her defense, and our rebuff would turn her to China or the USSR.

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Pressures must also be commensurate to the aim. To pursue vindictive policies against France simply because their test program lags a few years behind that of the first three nuclear powers would not be effective in curbing proliferation, and would seriously undercut our efforts to rebuild a slightly larger common ground with our French ally. We can show our disapproval of the French nuclear policy, and help demonstrate to others the costliness of such efforts, without appearing to have placed France in the ranks of the enemy.

6. Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy

The US has long been working for the establishment of international safeguards on non-military nuclear programs, especially over transfers of nuclear materials. This continues to be a useful supplementary line of action to help curb proliferation. The IAEA safeguards are still only developing, but progress in getting them accepted has been reasonably good. As you know, we are converting our own bilateral safeguards arrangements to IAEA arrangements. In due course, I think we can urge EURATOM to do the same. It would, however, be premature to pressure EURATOM suddenly when their own system of safeguards is technically more highly developed than that of the IAEA, and when the nuclear powers have opened up their own national civil programs only to a token degree or not at all.

7. Nuclear Free Zones

Nuclear free zones may be acceptable or even desirable in certain areas, but it is almost axiomatic that for the only areas where this is so they would also be of little significance. Cuba has adamantly refused to consider a Latin American zone, and our chief interest in that area would be to get Cuba in. In Africa, and possibly even in Latin America, we face considerable risk of provisions barring any transit or transport of nuclear weapons by air or sea. We have a long-established and well-considered policy of neither confirming nor denying whether any particular ship or airplane has nuclear weapons aboard. Such a ban on transit would, therefore, in effect bar any US military presence. This is not a sacrifice to be made lightly, and we could not support or accept a zone which precluded our transit.

In all other areas than these two (with the exception of a Near Eastern zone limited to the Arab States and Israel), military security requirements preclude our accepting non-nuclear zones.

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8. US Weapons Dispersal

I understand that you have construed "proliferation" to include the question of US deployments of nuclear weapons overseas. I agree that this question is relevant, but I hope you will help us preserve the real distinction between physical dispersal of nuclear weapons under US control, and proliferation of independent national nuclear capabilities.

We are constantly reconsidering requirements for dispersal of nuclear weapons. Speaking very broadly I think we have reached, or may soon reach, a point beyond which we do not need to increase stocks overseas. However, it may be that in some cases it would be necessary to extend deployments, perhaps even as reinforcement to reassure those who might otherwise decide to acquire such weapons. It is a complex military and political question which requires careful case-by-case consideration.

9. Europe and the MLF/ANF

I have left to last the case of the European Alliance and its nuclear arrangements. George Ball has spoken earlier with some of you about the possibilities for an Allied Nuclear Force, probably incorporating an MLF of reduced dimension. We are not pushing anyone on this; you are familiar with NSAM 322. But I feel I must stress that the problems which gave rise to the MLF and ANF are real ones, and must be met one way or another. Even more is involved than the future of the NATO military alliance. The very future of the Atlantic Community and the growing integration of Western Europe are critically involved.

Our aims in the Alliance are fully compatible with, and indeed serve the cause of, preventing proliferation of national nuclear capabilities. We are ready to reassure the Soviets of this, as I have already done more than once. I repeat again, the Soviets have simply been more interested in creating mischief than in non-proliferation. If they become sufficiently serious about non-proliferation, there is no necessary problem. Meanwhile, we shall certainly press for a fair non-proliferation agreement, as well as pursuing other policies aimed at preventing proliferation.

10. The Future

The many facets of this problem are necessarily interrelated to a host of political and military matters. Your recommendations on courses of action that the Government should consider will be especially useful if you have taken this fact into account in framing them.

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I do not want to end on a note of pessimism, but I should also add that I do not regard this as an "all-or-nothing" problem. It is certainly true that with each additional nuclear power the barriers to others are reduced. But we have not "given up" simply because China has exploded a device. By paying close heed to the needs of each of the main potential nuclear powers we might succeed in nine cases even if we fail in one. In addition, there are stages of nuclear weapons developments, and not all states which embark on this course will necessarily persist in it. We hope the UK will change course; even France may eventually.

I have outlined some points in my thinking on the question, and want merely to add that we appreciate very much your assistance and shall welcome and carefully consider the recommendations based on your study of the proliferation problem.

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Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: January 7, 1965

SUBJECT: Secretary's Meeting with the Gilpatric Committee
on Non-Proliferation

PARTICIPANTS: See Page 10 for list of participants

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The Secretary opened by expressing appreciation that this Committee is working on the proliferation problem, and said that he was awaiting its recommendations with interest. The US opposes nuclear proliferation. Each nuclear power does not wish to see further proliferation. Thus it is easy for the US to speak out against proliferation, but the Prime Minister of India or Japan must look on the question quite differently. The problem of alternatives to national nuclear proliferation arises. It is easier to see solutions in cases where firm defense alliances with the US exist, e.g., Japan and the Philippines. The solution is not so clear or easy in a case such as India. De Gaulle doubts the US commitment even in Europe--it is much easier to have such doubt in distant areas not traditionally bound to us. Moreover, do we want to give guarantees which would guarantee that we will be involved at the risk of 100 to 150 million lives ten years from now in the face of possible Sino-Soviet alliances? An Asian nuclear defense community, perhaps with a US nuclear stockpile available for it to draw upon, may be one solution. A commonwealth nuclear committee for South Asia may be an answer; the UK is ready to commit its nuclear force in NATO, if we can find an answer to support for her commitment East of Suez. In general, a different organization of nuclear arrangements will probably be necessary.

The Secretary remarked that General de Gaulle had said to him that unless the nuclear powers physically suppress proliferation, it is inevitable. De Gaulle opposes, and does not expect, such suppression. On the other hand, de Gaulle has indicated that France would not disseminate nuclear weapons to

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anyone, including Germany. The UK is more optimistic on agreements to curb proliferation.

We have long sought a non-proliferation agreement, the Soviets have opposed it ostensibly because of the MLF, but really because of their more basic opposition to NATO. The Secretary noted that he had inquired of Gromyko with respect to Warsaw Pact arrangements, and had mentioned reports of Soviet nuclear aid to China in the 1950's. Gromyko made no comment on the Warsaw Pact, but said only that we should not listen to rumors with respect to Soviet aid to China. In fact, the Secretary added, we did not know if they did anything more than assist the Chinese peaceful nuclear program. Soviet interest in non-proliferation is 95 percent centered on the FRG, just as we have been on China. The Secretary suggested that Soviet interest in the partial test ban in 1963 seemed to be based in part on a hope to restrain Communist China. This, however, is inference, since the Soviets steadfastly refuse to discuss China with us. For a long time the Soviets played down Chinese nuclear development, until shortly before the Chinese test.

Mr. Gilpatric asked the Secretary whether he had reassured the Soviets on the US veto and European clause in the MLF. The Secretary replied that he had. He had pointed out that the MLF was a move against proliferation and it was the Soviets who had put the FRG in the nuclear picture by targetting them. MLF arrangements would not give the Germans control of nuclear weapons nor would the Germans acquire nuclear weapons technology through it. In fact, he had pointed out that the MLF would be more secure than existing NATO arrangements. Gromyko kept objecting that the MLF was only the "first step" to a German capability. The Secretary noted that he had replied that the Soviets should then sign up on a non-proliferation agreement which would commit us all to the proposition that this "first step" was also the "last step." Mr. Ball commented that if the Soviets can use an issue to divide the West, they do so. Also, to the extent that the MLF would strengthen the Alliance, they also oppose it. Ambassador Thompson added that the Soviets also oppose an MLF because it would establish a longer term and closer knitting together of the US with Europe in defense.

The Secretary then raised the question of nuclear free zones, stating that we were favorably inclined toward such zones in Latin America and Africa, assuming the problem of transit rights were worked out, because there would be no need for the nuclear powers to target these areas. Other areas are too closely involved both with the presence of nuclear weapons, and as potential nuclear targets. In the Far East there is a special problem of requiring an alternative to conventional forces for meeting the enormous Chinese masses. We therefore oppose the Chinese Communist proposal for no first use of nuclear weapons.

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General Gruenther asked the Secretary if he would comment further on France. The Secretary drew attention to the extreme sensitivity of the information he was about to give. For de Gaulle, the French nuclear program is strictly political, not military. There is a touch of Poincaré in de Gaulle's view that France must have a special place, and is only safe when Germany is in a secondary position. He cited a sarcastic reaction by Couve to a plea from Schroeder for equality. The French regard a divided Germany as better than a reunified one. De Gaulle objects that an MLF would give Germany a preferred position, though France has always been invited to have that same opportunity. De Gaulle is not yet prepared to say that Europe should organize its defenses entirely separately from the US. He would preserve the Alliance, while giving Europe an independent ability to bring the US in. Messmer did say that France would talk about coordinating nuclear targetting with us when the Force de Frappe was ready.

The Secretary noted that strategy is discussed in NATO on three levels: (1) Deterrence--with a premium on telling the opponent that all hell would break loose right away; (2) the question of how to wage combat--for example, there has been full agreement on the measured use of force in our Berlin contingency planning; and (3) talk about strategy, by those (such as de Gaulle) who assume there will be no war, and therefore manipulate strategic questions for present political purposes. Our forces are under the NATO Guidelines; the French are not.

Mr. Ball noted the French justification for the Force de Frappe. Pompidou has said that any country which can develop nuclear weapons has an obligation to do so. At the same time, they have said they did not want Germany to have the bomb. Couve has said that proliferation is not too bad in most areas because it would only excite local problems (e.g., in the Near East, or South Asia). When Mr. Ball had noted Pompidou's statement to Couve, the latter had replied that Germany was not a "nation." Recently Raymond Aron has also written an article contending that proliferation is not a very serious danger.

The Secretary raised the problem of US actions with respect to the French nuclear program. To begin with, we are clearly obligated not to transgress the provisions of the partial test ban. But there is a difficult question of where, beyond that, we should draw the line. The US has never openly opposed or adopted sanctions against the French program. Nor for that matter, the Secretary said, will US sanctions stop the French. We do not want out of vexation to open a spiral of economic reprisal and retaliation. Should we not sell to France that which we would sell to other Allies? Finally, there would be particularly serious consequences of attempting to stir up resistance to the French program. Mr. Gilpatric noted that Mr. Ball had earlier stated

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that the French expect such a policy of us. Mr. Ball replied that there were problems on the border line, but that we have not tried to use our power in the way the French might have if they were in our place. General Gruenther asked how the French react to our decisions on the sale of computers. Mr. Ball noted particularly the problem of a nuclear weapons laboratory as a designated recipient. Mr. Watson, remarking that he was not speaking from the standpoint of a selfish interest, raised the question of possible repressive retaliation by the French against a company with large assets in France. Mr. Ball agreed that we must look hard at this problem and that the French might use such instances as an excuse for action against American subsidiaries. The current instance of artificial limitations on the dollar element in the French treasury reserve is an example of political interjection.

Mr. Gilpatric asked the Secretary's view on what the FRG would do if the MLF/ANF does not come into being. The Secretary replied that the German elections this year might make a difference. But more generally, in the long run the Germans would face a choice between two solutions: (1) joint development with France in a European force, or (2) a national nuclear weapons program. Mr. Ball remarked that Germany would probably first of all turn to us for bilateral arrangements with MRBMs in Germany under the two-key system. The Secretary remarked that the Germans seem to have drawn away from the idea of placing MRBMs on their own territory, where they would attract additional fire. He believed the FRG would probably reject de Gaulle's terms for collaboration in a basically French controlled force, so that in the long run the pressure would be for a German nuclear capability. Ambassador Thompson suggested the Germans might also increase pressure for more tactical nuclear weapons. The Secretary stated his agreement with Mr. Ball and Ambassador Thompson that in the first instance the Germans would seek bigger and better bilateral arrangements with the US, but that later they would seek their own. Mr. Ball remarked that many German ministers and others have been saying that without an alliance nuclear arrangement there will inevitably be pressures for a German nuclear force. The Secretary said that when Secretary McNamara had asked von Hassel why the latter wanted an MLF, he replied that he wanted it first to tie the US to Germany, and in addition because he did not trust the Germans, his fellow countrymen. Mr. McCloy noted that Erler of the SPD is also concerned over eventual pressures for a German force. Mr. Ball noted that after World War I four restrictions had been placed on German rearmament, but three went by the board very quickly, and the last by 1936. We can not make the Germans into second-class citizens. We can not subject them to a discriminatory state of original sin. In the first place, the Germans themselves would not put up with it, and in the second place, over time the West itself would refuse to press such discrimination. The Germans had already

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spent \$850 million in atomic energy research. The Secretary said that in Adenauer's last year as Chancellor he had privately declared that the WEU restrictions were no longer binding by virtue of rebus sic stantibus.

Mr. Dean inquired whether, if we have to give the Germans an MLF, does it not mean the Soviets would not agree to non-proliferation. Mr. Ball noted that the Germans will not sign a non-proliferation agreement except in a situation in which they participate in nuclear defense arrangements. Mr. Gilpatric asked whether it would be possible to put more pressure for German reunification. The Secretary replied that that very morning the German Ambassador had told him, not officially under instructions, that there was German thinking along lines of holding back from any further commitments on nuclear non-proliferation as a bargaining counter for reunification. The Secretary further commented in reply to Mr. Dean's question that the MLF does not involve proliferation. It would, on the contrary, deal with the German appetite for a nuclear role on a basis of equal participation. Mr. Dean noted that the Soviet delegates still oppose an agreement providing for an MLF. He asked whether this means abandoning a non-proliferation agreement.

Mr. Dulles noted that we all agree that non-proliferation is desirable; the problem is in costs. We apparently need a big effort, with many kinds of measures, to have much chance of success. He then asked the Secretary if he would sacrifice a great deal in terms of other policies in order to get non-proliferation. The Secretary replied that when faced with this question we had not decided in 1956-57 to launch an all-out effort against France, with threats and the like. We probably could not have succeeded even if we had tried. And we have not struck China to deal with its nuclear program. Non-proliferation is not the overriding element in US relations with the rest of the world. In individual cases--e.g., the UAR/Israel--it could become dominant. Mr. Gilpatric asked how we can approach the problem on a case-by-case basis when each case has so much impact on others. The Secretary replied that each case is different. India may face a nuclear attack; the UAR does not. They must be dealt with differently. In general, the Secretary added, there is probably more time to deal with this problem in the Alliance than with respect to India, Israel, etc. Mr. Gilpatric asked what the terms might be if we decided that it was definitely in our interest that India remain non-nuclear. The Secretary replied that the Indians want guarantees from the Soviets and from us. We do not think that a joint guarantee with the Soviets would be feasible or desirable, and we do not believe the Soviets would grant a meaningful effective guarantee. Perhaps some Commonwealth arrangement can be reached providing nuclear weapons to support India in time of crisis. In further reply to Mr. Dulles, Mr. Ball noted that it was necessary to give these potential nuclear powers something concrete in order to get them to give up the nuclear

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option. A mere general undertaking would otherwise probably be no more effective than the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Mr. Dean questioned whether we would be giving a blank check to India to do whatever it wanted. The Secretary agreed that the question of guarantees opened a difficult chain of problems. He stated that he did not favor one-way US guarantees; an alliance with reciprocal obligations, or to meet certain specified conditions, might be another matter. But a conditional guarantee satisfactory to us might not be sufficiently satisfying to India. Mr. Dean asked what would happen if Japan and India sign a non-proliferation agreement, then later when under threat asked for our assistance and we did not give it--would not the credibility of our commitments in general go down the drain. The Secretary replied that he considered the situation covered in cases where we have an alliance like Japan but not in other cases. Mr. McGloy asked the Secretary if he regarded Indian policy as a complete change from the time of Nehru. The Secretary replied that present Indian policy was not basically different. After all, Nehru had moved into Kashmir, Hyderabad, Ladakh, and Goa. The Indians are probably already working on the first stages of preparation for nuclear weapons if they later decide to proceed. Changes in Indian policy are due more to circumstances than to changes in the leadership. (Mr. Ball left the meeting at approximately this stage in the conversation.)

Mr. McGloy remarked that while we were talking about the price of proliferation, he was concerned about the price of dissolving the Alliance. He expressed the view that NSAM 322 placed the ball in the court of the Europeans, who can't handle it. He had received ominous views from Germany and Brussels of our stepping back from leadership. Is the MLF out? Mr. McGloy noted that Secretary McNamara had said he would give the MLF at most a 50 percent chance. Without arm twisting, we must nonetheless lead. The Secretary replied that he considered the idea of the Europeans looking to us for a lead as phony. They all want us to "lead" in different directions. The Europeans now feel secure, not under threat from the East. This gives them the luxury of playing around in pursuit of other objectives. With respect to the MLF, we had attempted to respond to the European view that something was needed. After waiting a year or two after Nassau we said that we would then show them a way. There was at that time no serious objection in the Alliance and eight countries showed serious positive interest. Lord Home said privately that they would go along with the MLF after the election. We went further along the MLF path before meeting real objection in the Alliance. Then, in October 1964, France suddenly got worried about its success and the Scandinavians hardened their position from non-participation to opposition. The Secretary remarked that when he was in Paris the Quai had remarked to the press the incorrect notion that he would ask de Gaulle to coordinate the Force de Frappe with SAC and the ANF. Gordon Walker quickly

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objected, of course, to that idea. Meanwhile, Italy wants a special role with Germany in a Directoire of five. Mr. McCloy remarked that if not the MLF, we need something to keep the Western community together. He did not like the idea of dropping the MLF just to suit the Soviets and de Gaulle. The Secretary said that was not the point. Italy and Germany will next take the lead, then with the UK, and then with us. Erhard and Wilson will meet this month. Moreover, there is more maneuver in the UK position than has been disclosed so far. There is a strong impetus to do something with the UK nuclear deterrent. The problem of control in the ANF is open--the UK wants the veto for all principal members; Germany does not want the UK to have a veto. But the UK will eventually come through, even on participation in an MLF surface fleet component. In Germany the situation is complicated by the fact the present government does not want to give the SPD any chance for credit. Mr. McCloy reiterated his concern over talks among the Germans, Italians, and British without us. The Secretary replied that we will continue to be deeply involved, but that we must stand back from the position of appearing to be out in front of the rest, where we had been with the MLF. It is, he noted, essential to present the ANF to Congress as a unifying measure in the Alliance.

Mr. Perkins inquired whether the Secretary wished to comment on the relation of this subject to German reunification. The Secretary replied that the MLF-ANF, as we had indicated to others, would not be permitted to stand in the way of German reunification, the unity of Europe, or major disarmament.

Mr. Gilpatric requested the Secretary's view on the appropriate time to broach any non-proliferation approaches to the Soviets. Should such approaches precede or follow the Communist Party talks scheduled for March? The Secretary noted that we have been talking with the Soviets, that there is an on-going dialogue, and that we can approach them at any time that seems appropriate. He added that he was concerned at present about possible erosion of the atmospheric test ban. Mr. McCloy commented that General Wheeler had indicated that the JCS may oppose a comprehensive test ban. The Secretary remarked that he did not see urgency in seeking a comprehensive test ban at a time when France and China are testing. The Soviets, he noted, will not yield on inspection. He had discussed the question with Mr. Gromyko, and Gromyko had made quite clear that inspection is for the Soviets strictly a political question, and that they did not care about the technical side of the question. Moreover, the Secretary continued, it was not inconceivable that under some circumstances the Soviets might test clandestinely in China. In response to a doubting interjection, the Secretary recalled that the

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Stalin-Hitler Pact showed how two hostile totalitarian states could sometimes get together very quickly when it suited them. In conclusion, the Secretary stated that he was not convinced that a comprehensive test ban would yield a major gain for non-proliferation.

(At this point, the Secretary was obliged to excuse himself to meet another commitment, and suggested that Ambassador Thompson take the chair.)

Ambassador Thompson opened by suggesting that the March meeting of the Communist Parties, as it occurs, may tell us more about the Soviet position. Mr. Gilpatric asked for the Ambassador's view on the signs of displeasure in Moscow at the President's State of the Union address. Ambassador Thompson emphasized that Moscow's behavior at the moment is largely conditioned on their expectation with respect to the March meeting. He stated that for the Soviet leaders five other things take priority over general relations with the West: (1) consolidation of their power; (2) dealing with crucial internal problems left by Khrushchev; (3) dealing with the East Europeans; (4) dealing with Communist China; and (5) relations with other Communist Parties around the world. Under these conditions, the Soviet leaders seek to remain loose and flexible. Ambassador Thompson added that he believes the Chinese Communists will force a split in the movement, despite the fact that the Soviets have shrunk back from forcing a split. Dr. York inquired why this should be so. Ambassador Thompson responded by noting that the Chinese were doing well in splitting the Communist movement, especially in Asia. The Chinese leaders also feel that it benefits them, especially with respect to Taiwan, whenever they can raise hell anywhere for the US. The Soviets, by contrast, are playing a longer-range game of establishing their presence and influence in various areas without wildly provoking outbreaks. The Chinese have very real tactical and strategic differences with the Soviets.

Mr. Dulles asked whether the Soviets are really very interested in non-proliferation. Ambassador Thompson stated that he did not believe so, except for their concern over West Germany. The Soviets did make threats when, several years ago, the Swiss considered developing a nuclear weapons capability, and have pressed the Swedes. But in some other areas they may be inclined to see problems caused for us.

Mr. McCloy asked Ambassador Thompson for his views of the possibilities of a Sino-Soviet rapprochement. Ambassador Thompson said that he thought such a development was very remote, that all evidence points to the depth of the split. Of course, as the Secretary had noted, for the very long run we must consider all possibilities.

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Mr. Gilpatric raised a question relating to putting pressure on EURATOM. He indicated that Dr. Seaborg had said that we should not pressure EURATOM because of the value of that institution to European unity, even if EURATOM was delinquent in permitting us to verify its safeguards. Ambassador Thompson replied that he believed we should proceed with the scheduled plutonium transaction, not only for reasons of supporting European unity but because failure to carry out a commitment could have serious disadvantages. We have faced a similar problem with South Africa. Many considerations enter such decisions, including the availability of other suppliers. Mr. McCloy asked whether we wanted the French to dominate EURATOM. Ambassador Thompson replied that this was not the case. Mr. Perkins remarked that he had learned that the French serving in the EURATOM staff were by no means partisans of General de Gaulle.

Mr. Gilpatric expressed his thanks to Ambassador Thompson for the opportunity to meet with the Secretary. He wanted to express his great appreciation to the Secretary for having made Mr. Garthoff available to assist the Committee. Ambassador Thompson thanked Mr. Gilpatric and reiterated the Department's readiness to assist in every way that it could. He noted that if Mr. Gilpatric found it useful to submit a draft of the Committee's conclusions, when such a draft is available, we would be happy to look at it.

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Participants:

Secretary Dean Rusk
Under Secretary George W. Ball
Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson
Raymond L. Garthoff, G/PM

Mr. Roswell Gilpatric, Chairman, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation
Mr. Arthur H. Dean
Mr. Allen W. Dulles
General Alfred M. Gruenther
Dr. George B. Kistiakowsky
Mr. John J. McCloy
Dr. James A. Perkins
Mr. Arthur K. Watson
Mr. William S. Webster
Dr. Herbert F. York
Mr. Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., Staff Director

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WASHINGTON REPORT

Washington, January 4, 1965

WR 65-1

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PROBLEMS OF PROLIFERATION

During the pre-dawn of the nuclear age a tight security lid was clamped over the U. S. Army Engineers' Manhattan Project. The enemy was not to be forewarned. Of equal importance, neither was any success in the effort to be shared with friends. The atom's staggering power was to become a permanent United States monopoly maintained by harboring from all others both the know-how and fissionable ingredients needed to fabricate atomic weapons. Following the war the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 cut off even our British partners in the original effort from further U.S. weapons data. The Act took the extreme precautionary step, since retraced, of nationalizing all material capable of nuclear fission. Until this day the constant public policy of the United States has been against proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries.

Despite this stern policy and our many vigorous protests, the world's "Nuclear Club" now has a membership of five. Unquestionably assisted by effective espionage, the U. S. S. R. gained membership in 1949. This prompted the British to produce their bomb by 1952. Following a rule-of-thumb that any relatively industrialized country with a \$2-3 billion desire for nuclear weapons can have them, France became the fourth nuclear power in 1960 and Red China the fifth in 1964.

Russian and English stockpiles of enriched uranium, plutonium and hydrogen weapons are regarded by many experts to rival the American stockpile in ingenuity. Available evidence on the French indicates reliance on plutonium techniques, but they have announced an enrichment program. They are expected to test their thermonuclear research this year by exploding a hydrogen device at a South Pacific test site. Contrary to expectations China exploded an enriched uranium device rather than a plutonium bomb. Its significance is that enrichment evidences greater technological sophistication than plutonium production.

The British, who gained American nuclear knowledge honestly, and the Russians, who got it otherwise, evidence the impossibility of suppressing technology for long by secrecy measures and security regulations. On their part, the French and Chinese demonstrate that neither a democracy nor a dictatorship will be deterred from the nuclear weapons path by pleas to allocate the massive effort involved to more productive channels. There are possibly a dozen more countries now scientifically, industrially and financially capable of building primitive nuclear devices. These include: Canada, Sweden, Spain, Israel, the U. A. R., Italy, Czechoslovakia, West

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Germany, East Germany, Argentina, India and Japan. It is certain the American anti-proliferation policy will not dissuade them if real or imagined national interests spark the will to undertake the necessary sacrifices. However, this is not to say that other negative influences might prevail, such as discouragement from a powerfully disapproving neighbor, concerted economic retaliation and the like.

As the world has turned increasingly to nuclear power for electric generation, opportunity for proliferation has enlarged. Power reactors unavoidably produce some amounts of plutonium as a by-product. As a control measure, the U.S. once seriously considered buying up the Free World's by-product plutonium. The idea proved financially impractical. Instead, increasing reliance has been placed on the International Atomic Energy Agency to police plutonium away from military channels. However, no such resort to the IAEA has been made in the case of enriched uranium, the alternate fissionable material suitable for A-bomb manufacture. In this case the U.S. has stepped up efforts to suppress knowledge of the inner workings of American enrichment facilities. Tight domestic accounting for the material has been established and exports limited to slightly enriched uranium, suitable for power reactors but not bomb fabrication. Successful pressures have been maintained on Britain, the only other Free World enriched uranium producer, to do likewise.

Expressing frequent concern over the proliferation problem, President Johnson recently appointed a Task Force to study (1) its relationship to U.S. military and civilian programs; and, (2) the more general question of how independent nuclear programs of other nations "may be confined to peaceful purposes." The Task Force report is due early this year. Headed by former Defense Undersecretary Roswell Gilpatric, now slated to head CIA, the group consists of: Arthur H. Dean, former test ban treaty negotiator; Allen W. Dulles, ex-CIA Director; Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther, an Eisenhower advisor; Dr. George B. Kistiakowsky, ex-White House Science Advisor; John J. McCloy, Chairman of the Disarmament Agency's General Advisory Committee; Dr. James A. Perkins, a member of that Committee; Arthur K. Watson, IBM official; William S. Webster, utility executive; and Dr. Herbert F. York, former DoD research chief.

Despite past failures of the anti-proliferation policy, the group's charter apparently fails to include a review of its basic wisdom, future practicality or possible alternatives. The official connections and past statements of several members lead some observers to believe the Task Force will have difficulty emerging from present rutted levels of official disarmament thinking and coming up with fresh ideas. It will be of particular interest to learn how the glaring inconsistency between our approaches to the plutonium and enriched uranium policing problems is dealt with -- or if it is dealt with at all.

If the Task Force is to perform any signal service it must take the wraps off a threat toward proliferation so far substantially withheld from public discussion. This threat is a rapidly developing technology for easier and cheaper uranium enrichment -- the centrifuge process. It was hopefully considered by Manhattan Project engineers but then existing limitations on high stress materials voided manufacture of the advanced centrifuges required. Within the technology of the war years, however, was the gaseous diffusion approach and the giant, multi-billion dollar diffusion plants at Oakridge and elsewhere resulted. These facilities separate uranium's fissionable U235 isotopes, constituting 1/10th of one-percent of natural uranium,

from its remaining non-fissionable U238 atoms. The two isotopes are chemically indistinguishable from each other so cannot be sorted apart by the chemical means dissimilar elements are segregated. The sorting process has to be based on the infinitesimally small three neutron weight difference between them. Success of the diffusion process stems from the fact that in gaseous solution U235 will pass through a sieve of atomically small holes slightly easier than U238. Sieving the solution enough times eventually obtains uranium "enriched" in the fissionable U235 isotope. In contrast, a centrifuge accomplishes this segregation by the same simple principle cream is separated from milk.

Long strides have been taken in metallurgy in the decades since World War II. Tough new materials are available which put practical uranium centrifuges just on the horizon if, in fact, they are not already here. These devices will require neither the great capital investment nor the large physical plants associated with gaseous diffusion. Both technologically and financially uranium enrichment will pass within the grasp of a growing number of countries. It will be propelled only partially by military considerations. The centrifuge has great economic appeal in such civilian fields as separation of viruses for preparation of vaccines, chemical production and other industrial processes. The cost of civilian power could be brought down by cheaper enriched uranium. Abroad there are many countries with uranium ore to which a share in the market for enriched uranium power reactor cores would prove a bonanza. At home, we must give increasing thought to the replacement of our aging diffusion plants. Inescapably the centrifuge will play a role in all these endeavors and more. Already the West Germans have spent some \$1 3/4 million on advanced research and the East Germans have filed centrifuge patents.

The U. S. response to these developments has been dubbed a quixotic effort to "un-invent" the wheel, which, in simplest terms, is the heart of the centrifuge. Access to such work as the AEC has carried on is denied to industry. The British, West Germans, Dutch and others have been induced to classify their research. These moves aim not at stopping centrifuge progress, but at slowing it down and delaying the day when its consequences in terms of nuclear proliferation must be dealt with. The time gained will be valueless, however, unless used quickly to learn what to do. It may prove negative in value should the attempt to sweep applications of modern science under the rug bar the IAEA from learning procedures for policing uranium enrichment as a parallel to its plutonium surveillance functions.

Moreover, a second proliferation problem dwarfing even that posed by the centrifuge may be sweeping down upon us. It is the probability of someone inventing an all fusion weapon -- a pure hydrogen bomb. Today's H-bombs require the great heat and energy from a plutonium or enriched uranium "trigger" bomb to start the thermonuclear process of hydrogen fusion. H-bombs produce yields in the megatons while A-bombs are confined mostly to kiloton ranges. If a non-atomic means to initiate hydrogen fusion can be found the entire plutonium/enriched uranium requirement can be skipped. The world's vast supply of hydrogen will become available for unlimited manufacture of a truly "poor man's" H-bomb. Recent demonstration of the capability of lasers to focus great energy on a given point at a precise time is a case in point. In their present stage of development these devices are powerless to trigger hydrogen fusion. But future developments powerful enough for the purpose utilizing lasers or some other exotic technique for energy storage and release cannot be ruled out.

Thus, from more than one technological standpoint "the genie is out of the bottle" -- or so close to it that efforts to ram it back in seem increasingly futile. Possibly the President's Task Force could perform its best service by declaring this fact and calling for intelligent examination of the proliferation problem as it actually is, rather than as so many close their minds and hopefully wish it to be.

Even now, except from Washington quarters, some new suggestions are being voiced for handling it. Some of them are quite unusual. From the right and left editor William F. Buckley, Jr., of National Review and entertainer Steve Allen, a frequent Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy spokesman, have joined in one. The pair want to tear up Red China's Nuclear Club membership card by dropping U.S. A-bombs on its nuclear installations. The same treatment would be promised any future Club applicant. A Texas political science professor makes the same suggestion, except that conventional bombs are recommended. Unfathomly he explains that President Johnson could get away with the caper since he is well known throughout the world as a man of peace. In contrast, asserts the professor, Goldwater as President couldn't have pulled it off under the handicap of his "trigger-happy" image.

Still another suggestion for coping with a potential "bad-country" is to employ the same deterrent principle that keeps the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. from clobbering each other. This concept calls for the two senior nuclear powers to join in a threat of massive retaliation against any third power firing off a nuclear weapon in anger. Still others think it would be better for the two old-timers to learn how to make tiny, clean nuclear devices. These then would be furnished cut-rate to tiny, troublesome countries on the theory their use would be less disturbing to world peace than the messy conventional armaments they will otherwise be using.

Fortunately the foregoing is unlikely to exhaust the list of possible fresh approaches to the proliferation problem. Unfortunately, however, the quickie review being made by the Presidential Task Force also is unlikely to turn up for proper public evaluation many more of them.

Craig Hosmer

CRAIG HOSMER, Member of Congress

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4. While such arguments are real and should be cultivated within the framework of a total US policy towards non-proliferation they have clearly proved insufficient in the past to prevent the emergence of the present situation; and, by themselves, they are liable to prove insufficient in the future.

5. The choice we face at the present time is essentially this. We can let the present situation drift. In that case there is a real danger in the years ahead that five or six other powers may join the nuclear club. The danger to the US is not simply that the statistical chance of a nuclear explosion or nuclear engagement increases with the number of nuclear powers. The danger is that the US may be faced with the dilemma of being committed, in vital strategic areas, by the nuclear decisions of other powers or of diluting its commitment to the defense of those areas. Such dilution could tempt potential enemies and impose at a critical moment the choice of committing ourselves in an uncertain nuclear environment, under circumstances not of our making or accepting a setback in a vital strategic area. It is the increased danger and risk posed for us in trying to hold the balance of power under circumstances where others have the right to fire nuclear weapons that constitutes one fundamental basis for our desire to avoid nuclear proliferation.

6. If we are not to let things drift we must seek to mount a systematic policy which would try to limit the spread of nuclear weapons and maintain effective US control over them and their firing in areas of vital concern to the US. This is, I believe, the proper objective of US policy until international agreements for effective inspected arms control can be secured.

7. The pursuit of this latter policy requires not merely that we seek to negotiate devices like the all-environment test ban but that we also pursue policies designed systematically to strengthen the negative arguments

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and weaken the positive arguments for the production of nuclear weapons in each of the relevant capitals. We must try to mount specific policies within the Free World which converge with or would support broader efforts to stop nuclear proliferation.

8. Specifically, this means we must take account of the positive arguments for the production of nuclear weapons which have thus far outweighed the negative arguments in Britain, France, and Communist China as well as the Soviet Union. In particular we must try to provide in each case three elements.

a. Increased knowledge of the nuclear game and maturity about the inherently collective and global nature of an effective deterrent system.

b. Increased roles of participation and international prestige in nuclear decisions, including a role in arms control negotiations.

c. A steady demonstration of the credibility and the relevance of US power to the security position of each nation.

9. Applying this view to particular regions our present MLF negotiations are evidently one example of an effort to produce an alternative to nuclear proliferation in the Atlantic world. It constitutes an effort gradually to disengage Britain from an independent nuclear role; to provide an alternative for such a role to Germany and Italy; and to provide a matrix into which France may move in the future from a national to a collective role in nuclear matters. The alternative to the MLF is not the maintenance of the status quo. If the MLF fails we shall almost certainly see either nuclear proliferation in Europe or some other form of bilateral or collective nuclear arrangements (e.g. an independent European nuclear force) which would increase the risks of maintaining the US guarantee to the security of Berlin and the NATO frontiers.

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A number of measures are possible which would enhance and dramatize the nuclear proliferation problem of the MLF; for example, a repeal of the 1958 Atomic Energy Act which constitutes virtually an incentive to the development of national nuclear capabilities; a German non-acquisition commitment to its allies that would help close the gap in the 1954 treaty; a UK White Paper on its experience as a national nuclear power and the lessons to be derived for others from that expensive and frustrating experience; and efforts to dramatize the role of the MLF in encouraging serious collective efforts in the direction of arms control and arms control negotiations.

10. Given the role of nuclear matters in national policy the MLF solution will only work if it is accompanied by a heightened effort at consultation on political issues over a wide range within the Atlantic. It is for that reason that we in S/P have sought to develop a total Atlantic package, including some ten items, rather than to regard the MLF as an end in itself.

11. With respect to Japan the package which would give to the Japanese an alternative to a national nuclear capability is still to be designed. What we know is that while the Chinese nuclear explosion produced no panic in Japan, it led the present Prime Minister to speculate publicly about a national nuclear capability; Gallois has published his argument in Japan for a national nuclear capability as the only road to security in a nuclear age; and the Japanese Foreign Office planner (Okawa) has urged us to assist the Japanese in helping spread knowledge of the nuclear deterrence problem both through our bilateral Defense Agency channel and through the sponsoring of articles in the Japanese press designed to deal with the Gallois approach.

12. In the long run, given the historical relation of China and Japan, it is hard to think of Japan sitting passively by and letting China alone in Asia emerge as a

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world nuclear power, unless some alternative role of dignity and prestige is devised for Japan in the nuclear field. At the moment we in S/P have no Japanese formula; but it is clear that a process of intensified dialogue with the Japanese on nuclear matters should be undertaken.

13. With respect to India the problem is even more difficult than with the Japanese. India has been attacked by China and still feels humiliated by the Tibetan affair. Japan is explicitly committed to a Mutual Defense Treaty with the US; whereas India is trying to maintain a relationship with Russia both as a counterweight to China and as a means of strengthening its international position over the Kashmir question. As with Japan it is too soon to try to formulate an India package that would meet the complexities of the situation and grant it adequate alternatives to a national nuclear role. But a quiet dialogue ought to begin, governed, as in the case of Japan, by a US posture which does not display excessive anxiety and grant them excessive bargaining leverage over us on the one hand; and, on the other hand, does not foreclose any particular forms for finding a non-proliferation solution to India's problem.

14. With respect to both Japan and India the outcome is likely to depend heavily on two factors. First, whether the Communist Chinese acquisition of a nuclear capability leads on to a seat in the UN Security Council, a major role in arms control negotiations, etc. If this is the outcome I find it difficult to see how Japan and India can forego proceeding to produce nuclear weapons. Second, it will depend on whether US military power proves relevant and credible in containing Communist China in Southeast Asia. If Southeast Asia should crumble, the judgment in India, and to a lesser extent in Japan, may be that whatever the scale and quantity of our hardware it is not relevant to the defense of Asia against Communist China, and they had better look to their own devices.

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15. Although no particular formula for giving India and Japan knowledge, participation, and prestige in the nuclear field within the framework of US military power is yet clear, suggestions have been made for an Asian pool of nuclear weapons that might be released under previously specified circumstances and an Asian MLF. Other formulae may emerge from a patient protracted dialogue.

16. The problem with respect to Israel is a narrow security question rather than a matter of prestige and influence on the world scene, focusing as their anxiety does around the believed vulnerability of Israel to a quick strike by aircraft or rockets with conventional weapons. The Arab-Israeli arms race evidently requires urgent special handling.

17. The problem in Sweden is also a narrow military problem. Sweden's decision is likely to be a residual of the total effort over the next few years which will determine whether we go forward into a period of nuclear spread or move towards a situation which makes the French and Chinese Communist national efforts look fruitless and somewhat passé.

18. The general conclusions are, therefore, the following:

a. Our approach to a non-proliferation effort must include but transcend the approach through international negotiation of test ban and non-diffusion agreements. These must be supplemented by efforts to meet the arguments of security, prestige, and power which, in different balances, weigh heavily in the various relevant capitals.

b. We should be clear that the US interest is not merely an interest in minimizing the chances of nuclear engagement or explosion, but in creating an environment of reasonable stability and control, in which we can continue to hold the world balance of power

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against the Communists in circumstances which minimize the likelihood that nuclear weapons will be used apart from our own decision.

c. The MLF and related Atlantic negotiations could be a turning point in this effort if Britain moves away from a national capability and if we accomplish the negotiation with a repeal of the 1958 law; non-acquisition declarations from Germany and Italy; a UK White Paper; and a heightening of the role of the MLF as a catalyst if not a forum for the formulation of collective arms control positions.

d. With respect to the others, we must promptly design a dialogue leading in time to the emergence of policies which would satisfy their legitimate interests by means other than the development of national nuclear capabilities.

e. What, in fact, Communist China derives from its nuclear explosion by way of international status and prestige and the outcome of the struggle in Southeast Asia will heavily determine whether or not a non-diffusion policy will work in Asia.

f. As the British experience shows we should not regard a nuclear explosion by one power or another as the end of the line in the policy of non-diffusion. We should try to avoid their making decisions to pursue this course; but we must be prepared to continue to wrestle with the problem of maintaining a reasonable degree of US control over our own nuclear environment, should our initial efforts fail.

g. In general, this view of the matter would recognize that since the failure of the Baruch proposal a considerable degree of nuclear diffusion has occurred; that the Communist Chinese explosion threatens to produce

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a new wave of nuclear powers; that a purposeful two-sided approach is now necessary if we are to maintain tolerable order and control within the Free World until the Soviet Union and Communist China are ready for serious international arms control agreements.

W.W. Rostow

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The problem of nuclear weapons control in the Middle East focuses most particularly on two countries, the UAR and Israel, whose capabilities are discussed in separate papers. Those whose aim is to prevent nuclear proliferation in the area might attack the problem in terms of reducing or removing entirely the enmity between these countries, thus reducing the danger of a nuclear arms race, or alternatively, by applying nuclear containment approaches having wide applicability in other situations, such as on arms NFZ.

On the basis of considerable study, it is believed it would be unrealistic to look in either of these directions for ways to cut off the embryonic Middle East nuclear race. Arab-Israeli enmity has persisted in spite of the most determined efforts of the US, the UN and other countries to reduce it over the last sixteen years. If anything, the patterns of hostility have hardened during recent years. Proponents of a peace settlement allowing for the continued existence of Israel are not heard in public now in the Arab nations, and a "Fortress Israel" philosophy which holds that Israel's only salvation can come from preponderant military strength is closing its grip over that nation's thought. The outlook for any early improvement in Arab-Israel relations sufficient to reduce nuclear arms building pressures is bleak indeed and it would be chimerical to base our hopes for nuclear arms control even partially on initiatives designed to bring about such an improvement.

Given the intractability of the Arab-Israeli dispute in general--and in by far its most important specific embodiment, the Israel-UAR dispute --it is not surprising that many approaches aiming at nuclear containment worthy of consideration in other contexts are not applicable in this. A special ACDA-State Study Committee in May of this year, considering possible initiatives to deal with the Arab-Israeli nuclear problem, decided that while we continued to pursue many of the following approaches we should not place our main reliance on them in the Arab-Israeli context: a world-wide non-dissemination/non-acquisition agreement; unilateral non-acquisition declarations on a world scale; a formal Arab-Israeli nuclear free zone; encouragement of an African nuclear free zone that would include the UAR and therefore provide a basis for an Israeli non-acquisition undertaking; and an attempt to build a non-acquisition arrangement on the existing Arab-Israeli armistice agreements.

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The Committee reported that reliance should be placed on: individual statements by Israel and the UAR that they would not acquire nuclear devices; statements by nuclear powers that they would respect the Israeli and UAR statements by not providing nuclear weapons or the wherewithal to make them; acceptance of IAEA safeguards by the UAR and Israel; and nuclear powers' conditioning their nuclear assistance of Middle East countries on the latter's acceptance of IAEA safeguards. Approaches along these lines seem still to offer the best chance for fruitful results. Various delicate and sensitive initiatives in pursuance of these possibilities have been handled by NEA/NE in coordination with appropriate USG agencies.

Clearances:

NEA/NE - Mr. Symmes (draft)

ACDA - Mr. Freund (draft)

NEA/NE:NEStackhouse:rw 12/17/64

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NUCLEAR EXPORT CONTROLS OF OTHER COUNTRIES

The following report summarizes certain important multilateral approaches to the export control problem, as well as policies and procedures of the major supplying countries, including certain specific steps the US has taken in each country to influence those policies and procedures.

1. The Battle Act and COCOM. (These controls apply only to East-West trade and therefore only limit Western contribution to atomic energy programs in the Sino-Soviet bloc.) The Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 (Battle Act) establishes the US policy that no military, economic or financial assistance shall be supplied to any nation unless it applies an embargo on shipments of listed strategic items to any nation or combination of nations threatening the security of the United States. A list of items including equipment of importance to atomic energy programs was devised for the purpose of the Battle Act. In addition, and consistent with the intent of the Battle Act, a voluntary multinational organization, COCOM, was formed, including the NATO countries (except Iceland) and Japan. In 1954 this organization established a list of defined commodities which the members agreed to embargo from the Sino-Soviet bloc. The list has been reviewed and revised in 1958, 1961, and 1964. In practice, the atomic energy items embargoed by the Battle Act list are the same as those agreed to in the COCOM organization. The equipment items on the International Atomic Energy Embargo List include: (a) certain radiation detecting instruments, (b) certain mass spectrographs and spectrometers, (c) equipment specifically

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designed for the separation of isotopes of uranium and/or lithium,
(d) certain valves of particular importance to gaseous diffusion plants,
(e) certain gas centrifuges, (f) blowers and compressors of importance
to gaseous diffusion plants, (g) electrolytic cells for the production
of fluorine, (h) certain heat exchangers of significance to gaseous
diffusion plants, (i) nuclear reactors and major components thereof,
(j) neutron generator tubes, and (k) certain process control instrumentation.

2. Establishment and Development of the IAEA as a Control Organ.

The first major step that the United States undertook to influence supplying
countries to safeguard nuclear materials supplied for peaceful purposes
against diversion to military uses was the initiation in 1955 of negotiations
to establish an international entity which would function in part as an
organization to safeguard peaceful nuclear materials against military uses.
Such an organization came into being as the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) in October, 1957, and presently has 92 members, including
all of the nuclear powers with the exception of Communist China, as well
as all major countries in a position to supply meaningful quantities of
nuclear materials and equipment to other states.

In January, 1961, on US initiative, the IAEA formally adopted a document
setting forth principles and procedures for the application of safeguards
to nuclear materials or equipment supplied from one country to another
through the Agency or supplied from one country to another bilaterally
and voluntarily submitted by the two countries to the Agency for safeguards.
This system was limited to reactors having a capacity up to 100 thermal

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megawatts, but it provided a mechanism for supplier nations to ensure that materials and equipment which they supplied to another nation for peaceful purposes were not diverted to military uses. This system was expanded in February, 1964, to include reactors of any size. It is currently under review so as to clarify some obscurities as well as simplify some of the procedures. The review is proceeding well and it appears that no weakening of the system will result from this general review.

In the initial consideration of the IAEA safeguards system in 1960 and 1961, there was strong opposition to the whole concept, spearheaded by India and the United Arab Republic, with strong support from the Soviet Union and the Soviet Bloc members of the Agency. During the consideration of the extension of the system in February, 1964, and in the current general review of the system, the Soviet Union and the Soviet Bloc states have become firm supporters of a strong and effective Agency system. The opposition by India has weakened considerably, but the UAR continues its opposition.

In June 1962 the US Government signed a two-year agreement with the IAEA providing for that organization to safeguard four US reactors. This submission was made for three principal reasons:

- (1) To give the Agency staff experience in applying safeguards.
- (2) To demonstrate to member states of the IAEA that submission to IAEA safeguards was not regarded by the US Government as an infringement of its sovereignty.

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(3) As a possible first small illustration of the type controls that might be used in a broad-scale disarmament program.

In June, 1964, this agreement was renewed for an additional period of five years, and in lieu of one of the four original reactors, which had since become non-operational, a major US power reactor (Yankee, at Rowe, Massachusetts) was included in the submission.

3. Western Suppliers Group. During the years of development (1955-59) by the US, UK, and Canada of programs of international cooperation on a bilateral basis, the three countries consulted frequently on the nature of the safeguards requirements which should be involved in such exchanges. In 1959, the US called a meeting of a group referred to at the time as the Ottawa Powers and consisting of representatives of the Governments of Australia, Canada, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom, and the United States. The group discussed the establishment of uniform standards for safeguards requirements and the need for a common front among suppliers of important atomic energy commodities. Subsequent meetings in 1960, 1961, 1963, and 1964, ultimately including also Belgium, France, and Japan, have been held for more detailed discussions of these problems and current review of efforts and policies for such control purposes. West Germany has been informed of developments in the recent meetings and is expected to be a participant in future meetings. The US has been a major proponent of these meetings and US representation has usually been on an ambassadorial level.

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The subject of export controls received initial major emphasis at the request of the Union of South Africa in the 1961 meetings. The pattern of governmental response to this initiative established in 1961 has been fairly consistently followed since that time. There has been an informal understanding that a common front would be maintained as long as no member of the group flagrantly violates it. Primary supporters of the necessity for requiring peaceful use controls on exported specialized atomic energy equipment and materials have been the United States, Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom and Canada, although as indicated no formal commitments have been made, and nothing more than a "gentleman's agreement" can be said to exist.

The French have consistently maintained a position that they will not agree to maintaining a common suppliers front requiring safeguards on any exported specialized equipment (including reactors per se). They have indicated only that they would review each opportunity to export a reactor and the possibility of their requiring safeguards on such an exported reactor on a case-by-case basis. To date, the French have not had many opportunities in which to exercise this option concerning the export of entire reactor facilities. It appears that France desires that the assistance it supplies not be devoted to military purposes but that it is prepared to place more emphasis than does the US on assurances other than those acquired through a formal system of safeguards. Despite this French attitude, which might be used by others to justify deviation, the Department of State is not aware that any other member of the Western Suppliers Group has violated the common line.

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The UK had entered into bilateral programs of general cooperation in the field of atomic energy with other countries prior to the establishment of the Western Suppliers Group. Their Agreements included safeguards requirements. At one point, in the early stages of discussions in 1960 with the Indians on obtaining a power reactor, the UK appeared to be wavering in the face of possible Indian requirements that the reactor sale could be concluded only if made without safeguards, but in the end this as well as other sales of reactors abroad by the UK have included provisions for safeguards application. Thus far UK exports of nuclear equipment have been fairly limited. They have indicated that rather than mounting a large bilateral safeguards operation, they would prefer to have an international or multinational organization perform the function or rely on their various bilateral technical liaison programs to provide assurances. In major cases such as the SIMEA power reactor in Italy and the Calder Hall type reactor in Japan, the UK has, in the former case, arranged for EURATOM to apply safeguards and, in the latter case, is negotiating for the assumption of the safeguards responsibilities by the IAEA.

The Canadians supplied India with a 40 MWt natural uranium fueled reactor which attained criticality in July, 1960, without effective safeguards rights on the reactor. The negotiations for this reactor were completed prior to the formation of an effective common front. Since then another arrangement between Canada and India involving a large CANDU-type power reactor has been agreed which provides for safeguards. The US had

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discussions with the Canadian Government on what we would consider should be safeguarded in such an export and also reviewed and comment on a draft of the safeguards portion of the Canadian-Indian Agreement prior to its finalization. Canada has performed safeguards inspections under its Agreement for Cooperation with West Germany.

4. The US, UK, Dutch and West German Agreement Regarding Gas Centrifuge Technology. Due to the potential use of gas centrifuges for producing fissionable material which could be used for military as well as peaceful purposes, the US has gained agreement of the four governments most involved in developing such devices to classify all gas centrifuge technology other than that described in the published literature as of August 1960. Such classification is important as a means of controlling export of equipment potentially capable of circumventing the intent of the classification controls.

5. The Test Ban Treaty. All of the major nuclear powers and industrial powers with the exception of France have signed the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of August 1963. (China is also a non-signatory.) Section II of Article I of the Treaty provides that each of the parties to the Treaty undertakes to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion anywhere which would take place in the prohibited environments. As far as France is concerned, we have interpreted this obligation as constraining us from assisting the French in devising, conducting, or evaluating any test as long as they contemplate prohibited testing.

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We have as yet no definite information as to how other signatories of the Agreement are interpreting their obligations under this section of the Treaty. It is our intention to inform other signatories of our own interpretation and actions and inquire as to their own.

6. Summary Report on the Status of Controls in Individual Countries Supplying Nuclear Materials or Equipment for Peaceful Purposes and of US Efforts to Influence Those Controls

Argentina. Argentina has recently agreed to accept IAEA safeguards in lieu of bilateral US safeguards on all materials and equipment supplied to Argentina by the US under the Agreement for Cooperation.

The Department of State and the AEC were, however, recently informed that the Argentine Government has sold 100 tons of natural uranium to Israel without safeguards of any kind although the Argentines have reportedly required the Israelis to agree to use the uranium for peaceful uses only. An instruction was sent to the US Embassy at Buenos Aires to approach appropriate Argentine officials in an attempt to get them to require international safeguards on this material. The initial reaction from the atomic energy authorities in Buenos Aires was negative. The Embassy was then instructed to approach the Foreign Office. Although the initial reaction of the Argentine Foreign Office to this proposal was negative, no final reply has as yet been received.

Australia. Australia, as a supplier of nuclear source material, can become important in the non-proliferation problem, and it is therefore an encouraging sign that Australia fully supports the concept of safeguards.

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While recognizing that they will not be fully effective in stopping the potential proliferation of nuclear weapons, the Australian Government believes that safeguards can measurably delay such proliferation and are for this reason valuable. Throughout the negotiations on the IAEA safeguards system, the Australian Government has been a firm supporter of that system. In February, 1960, a ministerial decision was made by the Australian Government providing for application of safeguards to all nuclear materials furnished to a foreign country by Australia. This decision did not specify whether these safeguards should be bilateral or multilateral.

In September, 1964, a distinguished Australian was appointed as Inspector General in charge of all safeguards functions in the IAEA. In recent months a representative of the Australian Government has indicated his government's readiness to initiate negotiations for the transfer to the IAEA of responsibility for the safeguards on materials and equipment furnished to Australia by the United States.

Belgium. The Belgian Government was initially included in the Western Suppliers Group because of Belgian control over the natural uranium resources in the then-Belgian Congo. Since it would have been difficult to drop Belgium from the group after Congolese independence, that Government continues to participate in the periodic meetings, though their role as a supplier is relatively unimportant. In the last formal bilateral discussions on the subject of safeguards with the Belgians in the fall of 1962 the Belgian officials indicated some dissatisfaction with the IAEA safeguards system for the following reasons:

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(1) They do not feel that international inspectors would have the same close familiarity with the equipment that American inspectors have.

(2) They fear that the political nature of the IAEA might make recipient nations afraid to accept IAEA safeguards.

(3) They fear that the IAEA could not muster a sufficient number of qualified inspectors.

(4) They, themselves, would be unwilling to accept Soviet inspectors in Belgium and believe that other nations would also not wish inspections by hostile inspectors.

Despite the foregoing, the Belgian representatives have supported the US position in favor of strong international safeguards in which Belgium has participated.

Canada. Representatives of the Canadian Government have cooperated closely with the United States in the establishment of an international safeguards system. In connection with all their transfers abroad for peaceful purposes, the Canadians have obtained a formal undertaking from the government involved that these materials and this equipment will be used only for peaceful purposes. In addition, they have--in most cases--obtained the right to verify this undertaking by inspection and by the examination of reports and other data. In one instance (the Canadian-Indian reactor on which an agreement was signed in April, 1956) Canada got an undertaking that the materials would not be used for military purposes and got the right of controls on Canadian uranium used in the

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reactor or material produced as the result of the use of Canadian uranium. They did not, however, get the right of controls on the reactor itself, or on any non-Canadian fuel which might be irradiated in the reactor during its operation.

In formal discussions with Canadian officials in Ottawa in the fall of 1962, US Government representatives were assured that Canada fully shares the US aim of maintaining safeguards. At that time the Canadians also expressed a strong preference for international, instead of bilateral, controls. While they expressed a definite preference for international controls, they did point out that in their view the same purpose could be accomplished through bilateral safeguards, if the members of the Western Suppliers Group worked very closely together to make certain that the different bilateral systems were uniform and, above all, of equal stringency.

At the time of US negotiations for the safeguarding of Yankee by the IAEA, informal approaches were made to various high-level officials of the Canadian Atomic Energy Control Board and the Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) with the suggestion that Canada at the same time place its Douglas Point reactor under IAEA safeguards. The Canadians responded that the main reason for such a move would be to demonstrate the West's acceptance of the Agency's safeguards system, that this objective was satisfied by the US offer, and they saw little reason for Canada to duplicate the US gesture. More importantly, however, the Canadians were concerned that the Indians might object and accuse them of bad faith, since Canada and India had recently entered into an agreement under which Canada would help India

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build a reactor in India similar to the Douglas Point reactor, and Canada had agreed to give India reciprocal bilateral safeguards control on the Douglas Point reactor in return for India giving Canada such rights on the new Canadian reactor in India. US officials at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva made this same suggestion about the Douglas Point reactor to Canadian disarmament officials. They seemed more enthusiastic about accepting this suggestion than had the officials of the Atomic Energy Control Board and the AECL, but to date no action has been taken.

Canadian officials are now and have been for the past three years negotiating with the Japanese Government for transfer of Canadian safeguards in Japan to the IAEA but have not been able to reach agreement up to now. The difficulty stems largely from linguistic problems which the Japanese Government seems to have in most agreements, as well as difficulties that Japanese industry has with certain parts of the IAEA safeguards system.

Federal Republic of Germany. West Germany is developing a large industry in the field of the peaceful uses of atomic energy and will become more and more important as a supplier of such equipment in the near future. Because of West Germany's post-war status as a non-member of the UN, her representatives did not play a major role in the organizing of the IAEA.

Nevertheless, West Germany has been a strong supporter of the safeguards concept and has never, to the knowledge of the US Government, transferred any major nuclear equipment to any foreign country without appropriate safeguards. On October 27, 1964, a State Secretary in the West German

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Foreign Office stated that the Federal Republic of Germany has frequently committed itself to carry out control measures in the field of nuclear energy, that the renunciation of ABC weapons* is a principle of Federal Republic policy and that the Federal Republic has always supported international cooperation in the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy.

Because of the growing importance of business transactions in the field of nuclear equipment, it is regarded as important that West Germany, as a potential major supplier, participate in any future meetings of the Western Suppliers Group.

France. France, as a nuclear power and a potential major supplier of nuclear materials and equipment, is an important element in the whole problem of bilateral and international safeguards. Dr. Bertrand Goldschmidt, of the French Commissariat Energie Atomique (CEA), has stated officially that the French attitude toward the question of international safeguards has been "greatly influenced by the exclusion of France from the Anglo-American arrangements on nuclear matters." In addition to this politically-derived resistance to safeguards, the French believe that any effort to place safeguards on natural uranium is not logical because of the wide availability of this material. The French believe that the success up to now in maintaining the so-called "common front" of the Western Suppliers Group results more from a lack of opportunity to sell such materials than from the existence of any real adherence to the "common front" by the members.

* atomic biological and chemical weapons

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Another objection that the French have to the concept of international safeguards is that France and presumably other NATO countries would probably be reluctant to accept Agency inspectors, including Soviet Bloc personnel, without reciprocity.

Throughout the meetings of the Western Suppliers, the French have been unwilling to make any commitment to adhere to a "common front" on their supply to foreign countries of any nuclear materials or equipment. Insofar as anyone is aware, however, the French have up to now violated this "common front" only once, and that was by helping the Israelis build a 24 thermal megawatt reactor at Dimona. The United States Government has been informed that the French have a form of controls on this reactor but we have no specifics as to what rights they have or the extent to which they will implement them.

In the Fall of 1963 the French Government reached an agreement in principle with the Government of Spain for the joint construction of a large power reactor on the French-Spanish border, using French equipment and technology. In October, 1964, officials of the State Department and the AEC informally asked a responsible French official of the CEA what arrangements had been made for bilateral or international safeguards on this reactor. The French official stated that no decision had been reached on this question as yet, pointing out that the agreement as of now was a broad, general agreement in principle and that none of the details had been worked out. He gave no indication whether the French would or would not require safeguards.

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About two years ago US officials asked a group of French officials from the CEA and the Foreign Office if they would be prepared to require the recipients of French nuclear assistance to accept IAEA safeguards on any such assistance. The French officials laughed and said such an idea had never crossed their minds. They agreed to think it over but have made no further comments on the subject.

In connection with the extension of the IAEA safeguards system in February, 1964, and the general review of that system that has been under way since that time, the French have not supported enthusiastically the US position, nor have they, on the other hand, opposed it. In the final vote on the extension in February they did, in fact, vote in favor, as did all other members of the IAEA Board of Governors who were present.

Japan. Despite extensive exploration for uranium, no substantial deposits have been discovered in Japan. The Japanese do have, however, an extensive nuclear energy program, which started in 1956 and which is limited by law to peaceful purposes. Japanese officials have supported strongly the concept of international safeguards and have entered into formal agreements with the US Government and the Australian Government providing that safeguards on US or Australian supplied materials or equipment in Japan will be safeguarded by the IAEA. The Japanese are, moreover, currently engaged in negotiations with Canada and the United Kingdom to transfer the bilateral safeguards of those two governments in Japan to the IAEA.

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Despite this strong governmental orientation toward international safeguards, industry in Japan has certain problems with the international safeguards system, relating primarily to the concept of resident international inspectors, which is a necessary part of any effective safeguards system; and relating further, to the manner in which IAEA safeguards inspectors are selected. It is anticipated that, when Japan's potential as a supplier of nuclear equipment is realized, that government will require international safeguards on any equipment which is sent from Japan to a foreign country.

South Africa. Because of the large quantities of natural uranium available in South Africa and the role which South Africa played in supplying the US and the United Kingdom with such uranium at a time of world-wide shortage, the Government of South Africa has played a surprisingly important role in the development of the IAEA and in the development of the safeguards system of that organization. For the same reasons, South Africa has also been an important member of the Western Suppliers Group since its inception.

South Africa recognizes no formal commitment of any kind in the Western Suppliers Group, but insofar as anyone is aware, that government has up to now not violated the "common front" in any new commitments made, though she is still selling large quantities of source materials to the United States and the United Kingdom without safeguards under agreements that were reached in the early 1950's.

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Up to now the South African Government has insisted on EURATOM safeguards for source-material sales in any EURATOM countries and has insisted on Agency safeguards for sales to any other country, with the exception, as noted above, of the US and the UK. Nevertheless, the South African Government has explicitly reserved the right to change this practice in the event they should not be satisfied that other individual Western countries are abiding by comparable rules of conduct.

In conversations held two years ago, the South African Government representative said that their government would not be prepared to accept IAEA safeguards on US materials or equipment supplied to South Africa. Nevertheless, US approaches have recently been made to appropriate South African officials for the transfer of US bilateral safeguards in South Africa to the IAEA. These approaches were made in Geneva and Vienna in September and October, 1964. At that time the South African officials expressed their willingness to reconsider their previous point of view, and it is anticipated that negotiations for the transfer of these safeguards to the IAEA will take place in Washington during December, 1964.

Spain. Spain is not a major supplier of nuclear-source material or equipment. Latest reports from Spain indicate, however, that there are in Spain uranium deposits amounting to about 10,000 tons. In addition, Spain has an ore-concentrating plant which can handle an input of about 200 tons a day.

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Given this capability, Spain found itself in 1961 with a surplus of uranium concentrates. The Spanish approached the US to purchase a portion of this surplus and, in view of the US surplus of uranium, were refused. Subsequently, in September, 1961, it was found that the Spanish Government had contracted to deliver 20 tons of uranium concentrates to India without safeguards. The agreement contained an understanding that India would not transfer the materials to a third country and guaranteed not to use the material for military purposes but did not provide for verification of any kind. The US Embassy at Madrid approached the Spanish Government and requested that they not go through with the sale or that they require international safeguards. Despite this approach, the sale was consummated. About one year later the US Government received word that the Spanish were negotiating a further sale with India amounting to an additional 20 tons. Despite further US protests, this sale was completed in April, 1963. A further request for 10 to 15 tons by India was rejected because the Spanish anticipated that all available refining capacity would be required to meet Spanish needs.

It is unlikely that the Spanish will make any more sales without safeguards, since it appears that Spain will need all of her uranium for internal programs. A large power reactor is now going to be built by a US firm in Spain, and the US Government has agreed to "toll-enrich" Spanish uranium for use in this reactor. Moreover, as indicated above, the French are helping Spain build a large natural uranium reactor on the Spanish-French

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border, which will require large amounts of Spanish uranium. The fact remains, however, that the Spanish were unwilling to cooperate in requiring bilateral or international safeguards on the two sales of uranium which they have made to India up to now.

USSR. In this paper there is no need to go into the over-all disarmament negotiations with the USSR since World War II. In the context of peaceful uses of atomic energy and the controls developed on such uses through the IAEA, the USSR originally opposed the IAEA system in general and in detail. In June, 1963, however, USSR representatives reversed themselves and supported the US position on international safeguards and have done so consistently in all subsequent safeguards discussions at Vienna.

Despite this recent support, there are two aspects of the US position on international safeguards which the Soviet representatives still resist. The first area of resistance is any effort of the US Government to tie the IAEA discussions into the disarmament discussions in Geneva. The second point of difference lies in the Soviet opposition to the US position that IAEA safeguards should be financed internationally through the IAEA budget. The Soviets believe that if US bilateral safeguards are transferred to the IAEA, the US or the recipient nation, or a combination of both, should pay for the safeguarding. A meeting on this subject is scheduled for early January, 1965, and it is hoped that some accommodation between the US and the USSR on this question can be developed.

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At the time of the US turnover of the Yankee reactor to the IAEA, Chairman Glenn Seaborg, of the US AEC, sent a letter to Mr. Petrosyants, of the Soviet State Committee on Atomic Energy, suggesting that the Soviet Union make a similar gesture in connection with one of the large Soviet power reactors. Mr. Petrosyants replied that the Soviet Union could not do this, but the tone of the letter was such that a reversal of that position does not appear impossible.

In May of 1964 the Yugoslav Director of the IAEA Safeguards Division in Vienna informed a US State Department representative that the Soviets were at that time seriously considering placing a power reactor in one of the Soviet satellites under IAEA safeguards. No further reports on this question have been received, and up to now the Soviets have not made or proposed such a transfer.

United Kingdom. The United Kingdom, as a nuclear power and the closest collaborator with the United States in the development of the original atomic bomb, has always played a significant role in policy decisions in the question of controls. The British were intimately connected with the founding of the IAEA and played a major role in the successful establishment of the IAEA safeguards system. From the beginning of the international Peaceful Uses program, the bilateral agreements of the United Kingdom have included an undertaking that materials for peaceful purposes will not be diverted, as well as provisions for bilateral safeguards. They have also included a clause providing for consultation between the UK and her bilateral

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partners with a view to transferring the safeguards function to the IAEA. As far as anyone in the US Government is aware, the British have made no transfers of nuclear materials or equipment without provisions for bilateral safeguards. They are currently engaged in negotiations with Japan for the transfer of British bilateral safeguards on a 150 electric megawatt reactor in Japan to the IAEA. They regard the question of bilateral or international safeguards on peaceful programs as a holding operation for a period of plus or minus ten years, pending some solution of the over-all disarmament problem. They believe that with the development of technology the safeguards controls on the peaceful programs around the world will probably break down within the next ten years or so.

At the time the US Government was considering whether or not to adopt a policy requiring nations to accept IAEA instead of bilateral safeguards, the British were unwilling to commit themselves to adopt a similar policy but reaffirmed their intention to continue to require bilateral or international safeguards on all foreign transfers.

At the time of the US negotiations with the IAEA concerning the submission of the Yankee reactor to IAEA safeguards, the British Government was approached at an intermediate level with the request that they place one of the British power reactors under similar safeguards. The British pointed out that this would be difficult for them because of the intermingling of their peaceful and military programs. They did say, however, that this

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would be broached at the Cabinet level in the British Government. Up to now the US Government has received no formal and final reply to this proposal. A recent high-level group of British officials in Washington indicated that no decision has as yet been made.

In addition to the foregoing points on US-UK cooperation, it is worthwhile to note that as one aspect of US-UK cooperation made possible under the 1954 amendments to the Atomic Energy Act, there has been established a Joint Classification Guide covering certain technology in these areas. As one result of this effort, there exists a classification restraint on UK export of equipment employing the technology in question.

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December 11, 1964

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BACKGROUND PAPER ON NATIONAL ATTITUDES TOWARDS ADHERENCE TO A
COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY AND TO A NON-PROLIFERATION AGREEMENT

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I. The Projection of Historic Attitudes Has to be Heavily Qualified.

This paper makes an assessment of how the governments of the world might react if faced with a decision on whether to sign a comprehensive test ban treaty and a non-proliferation agreement. The behavior patterns of governments do provide clues which help in this assessment; indeed, past positions are the primary indicators used in this paper. Nevertheless, in making a guess at how governments will weigh their national interests on a matter of such vital importance to their security and prestige, the past is not a sure guide. For one thing, to many governments the technical and financial resources required to produce a nuclear weapon and a crude delivery system must not appear so awesome today as they did only a few years ago. This is due partly to the diffusion of technology, partly to growing GNP's, and partly to the acquisition of nuclear weapons by states that are far from being classed as super-powers.

The continuing progress of France in the nuclear weapons field and the recent Chinese Communist nuclear test explosion demonstrate that nuclear weaponry is not necessarily a game for those who are both white and very rich. More importantly, nuclear competition has now been introduced into the ranks of the secondary powers in a way which can only increase among these nations the incentives for acquiring a nuclear arsenal.

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Not only has no government ever been faced with the need to make a decision to renounce its right to acquire nuclear weapons, no government has ever had to take such a decision in the knowledge that at least two other governments of a similar power status are steadily proceeding towards a significant nuclear strike force. The refusal of Paris and Peking to adhere to the partial test ban treaty and the apparently universal estimate that nothing short of force will alter French and Communist Chinese nuclear aspirations have created a situation which has only recently become a part of the national security equation for most governments. Thus past UN votes, acceptance of IAEA safeguards, and views expressed in disarmament forums cannot now be construed as proofs of how a government will react at the moment of truth.

II. The Prospects for Favorable National Decisions on Non-Proliferation Will Be Strongly Influenced by Whether Certain Conditions are Met.

There are conditions which, if they could be brought into existence, might tip the balance in favor of agreements providing for nuclear abstinence. Since they are generally applicable to all countries, these conditions will be touched upon briefly in this introductory section.

They are:

1. Soviet-US agreement on the text of a test ban treaty and on an understanding with respect to non-proliferation. US-USSR agreement would probably weigh more heavily with some non-nuclear states than with others and such an agreement should not be regarded as insuring the success of a non-proliferation program. Nevertheless, it is essential to understand that

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there can be no by-passing of a negotiation leading to Soviet-US accord. Unilateral declarations of intent by either the US or the USSR, while they might rally some governments to the cause of a test ban and a non-proliferation policy, are not likely to lead to a world-wide system of parallel declarations. Most non-aligned countries, including especially those of most immediate concern from the nuclear standpoint, are not likely to find it convenient to issue declarations paralleling one issued by the US but rejected by the Soviet Union, or vice versa.

2. Assurance of adherence by competitors. If a government were convinced that its rivals or potential rivals were not going to adhere to the agreements in question, the attractiveness of the agreements would be very much diminished. Adherence might not be ruled out, but this possibility could not be rated as better than an even chance in such a case.

3. Assurance of stability. Both of the foregoing conditions would lend an atmosphere of stability to the proposed agreements which would lead governments to expect that their signatures would create something enduring on the international landscape. But other assurances of stability may also be needed. These may take various forms, and they should be considered an integral part of a world-wide non-proliferation program. Thus, the general acceptance of IAEA safeguards might take on a new significance to countries like Pakistan and the UAR. To create a sense of security, closer relations with one or more of the nuclear powers may seem necessary to some countries, while the UN Security Council as a watch-dog

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over non-proliferation matters may be more appealing to others. In each country there would also be special factors which have to be taken into account to reinforce national interest in a non-proliferation program. This attention to the harmony of a policy of non-proliferation with the various security preoccupations of each country would not end with the signing of a treaty; getting a government to sign an agreement will not make the proliferation problem go away.

4. A substitute for the prestige conferred by nuclear weapons.

National pride has had a great deal to do with decisions to produce nuclear weapons. Governments that choose to abstain from producing nuclear weapons in the future will wish to make clear that their abstention is not for want of means. International assistance to national scientific programs aimed at peaceful ends may thus in some cases be an indispensable adjunct to a nuclear test ban treaty and a non-proliferation agreement.

III. The Decisions of a Very Few Countries Will Have a Strong Influence on the Attitudes of Others.

Given their technical capacity and their position on the world scene, there are four countries who could be next in line to construct nuclear weapons. These key countries are: India, Israel, Sweden, and Japan. If the governments of these four countries could be brought to accept a comprehensive nuclear test ban and a non-proliferation arrangement the chances that most other governments would also sign would be very much brighter. Conversely, if any one of these four governments decided to manufacture nuclear weapons, the problems generated by this decision would make the outlook for non-proliferation by common consent very black

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indeed. In the cases of pro-nuclear decisions by India and Israel, Pakistan and the Arab states would inevitably insist that they, too, should be free to acquire nuclear weapons. The effect of Swedish and Japanese decisions to acquire nuclear weapons would not be felt so directly on specific countries as in the cases of India and Israel. But the object lesson furnished by Sweden and Japan would not be lost on others. For a neutral peacefully-disposed Sweden to build nuclear weapons, and for a Japan clearly protected by the US security treaty and with its anti-nuclear tradition, to take the same decision would undercut most of the arguments that other governments might muster against the necessity of possessing nuclear weapons.

IV. Will These Key Countries Sign Self-Denying Agreements?

It is not clear at the moment whether any of the four governments mentioned in the previous section would sign a comprehensive test ban treaty or an effective non-proliferation accord. In all cases, these governments could be expected to ask that certain conditions be met before they signed these agreements.

Israel

Neither public nor private statements by Israeli officials suffice to establish an Israeli position on a comprehensive test ban treaty and a non-proliferation agreement. Israel signed the partial test ban treaty and was recorded as favoring the Irish resolution on non-proliferation. The government has thus far refused to accept IAEA safeguards at the large Dimona reactor. Israel has always avoided any commitment, either private or public,

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which would bind its hands with respect to production of nuclear weapons. It has been, in fact, moving steadily into a position where it would have the capability to fabricate nuclear weapons.

Israel probably would sign test ban and non-acquisition agreements if the Arab countries signed, if the agreements contained escape clauses similar to that contained in the partial test ban treaty, and if the Israeli government received some assurances of aid from the Western governments in the event of an overwhelming Arab attack. This last condition might be watered down or waived in view of the substantial economic leverage which the US can wield in any negotiations with Israel.

The connection with France may be an important factor in the considerations of the Israeli government. Paris does have some leverage with Tel Aviv because of French military and technological assistance to Israel. And the force de frappe could play a more important role in Levantine politics than in the European context. If France saw some advantage in establishing a close link with Israel, in line, for example, with de Gaulle's "Third Force" views, Israel might see fit to withstand US pressure to sign a test ban and a non-proliferation agreement. This unpleasant scenario is not likely to take place, but its possibility does highlight the potential for mischief held by those governments that might actively oppose a test ban treaty or a non-proliferation agreement.

Japan

All Japanese governments since the Second World War have staunchly supported efforts to end nuclear weapon testing. This attitude has been

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shaped by the experience of Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and the "Lucky Dragon" incident of 1954. Japan customarily delivered notes of protest to both the US and Soviet governments on the occasion of nuclear test explosions by those governments. The Japanese Government and virtually all sectors of public opinion also denounced the Chinese Communist nuclear tests. Japan, of course, has signed the partial test ban treaty. Major elements of Japanese public opinion have also opposed the deployment of US nuclear weapons on Japanese soil. Although recorded as favoring the Irish non-proliferation resolution in the UN General Assembly, Japan has been somewhat less explicit in its position on the non-proliferation issue as such. It has supported IAEA safeguards.

If the Japanese Government were asked to decide today whether it would sign a comprehensive test ban treaty and a non-acquisition agreement the decision would doubtless be affirmative. It might be interested in an escape clause, in view of Communist Chinese nuclear activities, although it is doubtful whether Japanese popular opinion would permit the government actively to seek it.

Developments over the next few years could change this favorable forecast. Continued Communist Chinese development of nuclear weapons and delivery systems might prompt Japan to follow suit. An Indian nuclear weapons program might have the same effect. Even now there are those highly placed persons who evidently think that nuclear weapons are an indispensable part of the future of a great power like Japan. US influence, however, will

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weigh heavily in Japan's decision. If sufficient attention is given to preserving a mutually fulfilling US-Japan relationship and maintaining a credible US nuclear deterrent for Japan, the prospects for Japanese adherence should continue to be good.

Sweden

The comprehensive test ban agreement is viewed by the Swedish Government as an important step toward international control over nuclear weapons and disarmament. While the Swedes would prefer that such a test ban be combined in a wider disarmament and control package, the government has become so committed, particularly by former Foreign Minister Unden, to support of a ban that it would no doubt become a signatory. The test ban would not answer Sweden's security problem in the eyes of many Swedish leaders in the long run, however, and the government might become restive under such a ban if no further progress were made towards controls and disarmament after a few years.

In the test ban negotiations at Geneva, Swedish officials diligently and capably sought out formulas which would provide a negotiating platform for a comprehensive test ban treaty. As recently as September 14, 1964, Sweden joined the other seven non-aligned states in submitting a memorandum on the test ban question to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee. The memorandum expressed regret that no progress had been made towards a comprehensive test ban treaty, and urged the nuclear powers "to take all immediate steps towards an agreement to ban all nuclear weapon tests and to discontinue all such tests." It should be noted, however, that on "scientific


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grounds" the Swedes were very effective at the last session of the Geneva Disarmament Conference in persuading the neutrals not to press for more specific ways of making progress towards a test ban agreement. Sweden, of course, has consistently supported anti-test resolutions in the General Assembly and signed the partial test ban treaty.

Recent comments by Swedish officials on their attitude towards a non-acquisition arrangement have contrasted rather surprisingly with the Swedish record on the test ban. Sweden would require that another arms control arrangement of some kind be linked with the non-acquisition undertaking, if these recent statements are authoritative. This seems inconsistent with their whole-hearted endorsement of a comprehensive test ban treaty, but apparently the Swedish Government finds it somewhat difficult to renounce flatly the right to enter the nuclear weapons field.

The internal situation in Sweden might account for this. The Swedish military and many political leaders (including some in the governing Social Democratic Party) believe Sweden cannot, without nuclear weapons, maintain for long a defense force strong enough to command respect from the USSR for Sweden's neutrality policy and therefore to keep the country from having to rely on larger powers for its security. The government has, as a compromise measure among contending domestic forces, declared that it remains free to construct nuclear weapons if it judges that there is a need to do so. It therefore is not willing to bind itself by acceding to a non-proliferation agreement that is not combined with commitments on the part of the USSR that, in Swedish eyes, would improve the Swedish security position.



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Hopefully, Soviet-American agreement on both a test ban treaty and a non-proliferation agreement would be sufficient evidence of a new trend in world affairs to buttress the anti-nuclear element in Sweden.

It should be noted, finally, that Soviet pressure on Finland is one of the principal Swedish arguments for acquisition of nuclear weapons; an increase in such pressure would encourage the Swedish Government to acquire these weapons.

India

With Nehru the spiritual father of the test ban, India's exhortations to the nuclear powers to cease testing have become a standard part of the UN repertory. Nehru's successor, Prime Minister Shastri, has inherited this tradition and apparently believes firmly in the rightness of it. India's opposition to nuclear proliferation has also been reaffirmed since Shastri took office. But the Chinese Communist nuclear explosion would have made life difficult even for Nehru; with Shastri in power the pressures to build a nuclear bomb will be heavy and unceasing and, perhaps, quite vocal. So far, the Prime Minister has resisted these pressures and, so far, he has the support of his party. Even so, he has had to point out that India's present policy may not be valid forever.

Under the aggressive leadership of Homi Bhabha, India's nuclear development program has meanwhile been moving steadily ahead. While India has in principle accepted future application of IAEA safeguards to the US Tarapur reactor, the Canada-India reactor is covered only by a bilateral

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undertaking that it will be used only for peaceful purposes. Indeed, the operation and the characteristics of some parts of India's nuclear establishment suggest that Bhabha has at least been keeping open the option of manufacturing weapons. His recent public statements almost give the impression that Bhabha is actively lobbying for such a decision. These statements are also designed to reaffirm India's capacity in the nuclear field and to let everyone know that India has preserved its option. Bhabha can be expected to conform to the policy of his government.

Whether India will sign a test ban treaty and a non-proliferation agreement may depend on how soon such accords could be negotiated. India might sign such agreements today, although escape clauses and security assurances might figure importantly in negotiations with New Delhi. It is not at all clear, however, whether India has fully faced the implications of its signing a non-proliferation agreement while Communist China continues on its nuclear weapons program. If any lengthy delay--say two or three years--should occur before appropriate treaties could be presented to the Indians the chances of Indian accession might be substantially less. The decrease could be presumed to be proportional to the intensity of Chinese nuclear developments and the evidence of Chinese aggressiveness.

V. The NATO Allies: Probable Support but Potential Problems.

The NATO Allies, with the notable exception of France, have backed the US position in the test ban negotiations and probably would sign a comprehensive test ban treaty if the US and USSR could agree on one. The health

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of the alliance is an important consideration which would affect the outlook of the several NATO governments. For example, a successful conclusion to the present negotiations on NATO's nuclear arrangements should encourage non-proliferation sentiments generally. Conversely, the failure of these negotiations might cause some countries, such as Italy and the Netherlands, to be more reluctant to endorse a non-proliferation program at an early stage in order not to foreclose some kind of nuclear role for Europe.

In the case of Germany, consent to a test ban treaty might be given with some misgivings, stemming from (1) the French attitude, (2) doubts about the firmness of the US nuclear commitment to Europe, (3) concern over the status of the GDR. These problems should probably be manageable, although some strains within the alliance should be expected. The FRG signed the partial test ban treaty and ratified it without significant opposition. Bonn was most unhappy over the multilateral accession provision of the treaty but not opposed to the purpose of the treaty.

The way in which the negotiations with the USSR are conducted is a more important consideration for our Allies than for any other governments. With full consultation within NATO we can minimize the strains which arise whenever the US and the USSR engage in negotiations affecting the interests of NATO nations. Without it, we run a serious risk of undercutting governments who would like to support arms control measures but who also have to contend with pressures forcing them in other directions.

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A non-proliferation agreement may turn out to be a little more difficult for the Europeans than a test ban treaty, because of previous negotiating experiences. The Federal Republic of Germany has been skittish about enlarging the scope of the WEU accords: Bonn draws a distinction between a pledge to its allies and a pledge to others. Moreover, the FRG has expressed misgivings about a non-acquisition arrangement which did not include Communist China. The most recent German thinking on the subject definitely indicates that Bonn does not want to make any commitments respecting non-acquisition at least until a NATO nuclear force has been agreed upon. Adenauer, for example, when asked recently if the FRG should accede to a non-proliferation agreement in the absence of a MLF or similar nuclear force, answered with a flat no.

German opposition is not today based on any desire by the Germans to have their own nuclear weapons. Even if the project for a NATO nuclear force should fail, it is unlikely that the Germans would soon thereafter turn to France or seek to develop a national nuclear weapons capability. Over the longer run, however, this abnegating attitude might change if the Germans should come to feel that they were being discriminated against or that their security interests were not being adequately protected.

The form of a non-acquisition agreement may be quite important for Bonn. It is not possible to be definitive now as to Bonn's future preferences regarding the form of the agreement, but the FRG has implied that it might be willing to make a unilateral statement regarding non-acquisition at the time a NATO nuclear force has been agreed upon.

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The French attitude towards a test ban treaty, while it should not be decisive, will be a very significant part of the European picture. Should Paris come to feel that a comprehensive test ban treaty without France would seriously impair French interests by isolating her in Europe and the world generally, she could make many European capitals very dubious about the advantages of a test ban treaty. French withdrawal from NATO and from the Common Market has already been threatened and it could be threatened again, accompanied by propaganda against a test ban. The French could, for example, point to the anomaly of continued testing in Communist China. Or they could argue that Europe should raise the price for cutting off nuclear defense preparations while hundreds of Soviet MRBM's were still aimed at Europe. Even the questions of whether the USSR was going to be adequately inspected or whether Europe was going to be over-inspected might find a responsive chord in European capitals. Here again, as in the case of Israel discussed previously, the tactics of rounding up world-wide support for a test ban treaty should be carefully calculated so as to ensure at least benevolent neutrality on the part of Paris. Otherwise, the activities of a shrewd opponent to the treaty could introduce hesitancy and doubts in many capitals.

The French position on a non-proliferation agreement is less clear-cut. France would probably not wish to disseminate nuclear weapons to others, and might favor a move which closed the barn door with France safely out and other potential proliferators locked inside. The French have already noted

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publicly that the five nuclear powers are the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (thus crediting Communist China as a nuclear power and as the ultimate holder of China's seat in the Council), possibly implying that a logical cut-off point on national nuclear weapons centers has now been reached. In the long run, this would surely assist French aspirations to be the dominant power in Continental Europe west of Russia. Nonetheless, general French opposition to arms control resolutions and agreements might lead them to abstain from a non-proliferation agreement; their position is not clear.

VI. The Rest of the World: Where are the Trouble Spots?

In the "Third World" of Africa, Asia, and Latin America there is likely to be near-unanimity on the desirability of a comprehensive test ban treaty and a non-acquisition agreement. Spain, the neutral nations of Europe, the European Communist countries (except Albania), Australia, and New Zealand are also likely to go along with these agreements. There is some hesitation to be seen in the Australian attitude, however, particularly on a pledge not to acquire weapons, but this is hard to document.

There are some obvious exceptions to this forecast and there may be other, less obvious but more important, exceptions. Albania, Cambodia, North Korea, North Viet Nam, Guinea, and Cuba have not signed the partial test ban treaty and (except possibly for Cuba) probably would not sign a comprehensive test ban treaty or take a non-acquisition pledge. The hand of Communist China is obviously at work here and this demonstrates the potential trouble that Peking could cause for any non-proliferation program.

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If, for example, Cuba refused to join in a non-acquisition arrangement this could have a serious effect on the willingness of such countries as Argentina and Brazil to sign a test ban or non-acquisition arrangement. What Castro would actually do would depend on what else was happening at the time; there would not be a great deal one could do in advance to influence his decision. In the end, it is probable that Argentina and Brazil would acquiesce in a test ban and in a non-acquisition agreement, regardless of Havana, provided the US promised it would keep a close eye on developments in Cuba.

The abstention of Albania from arms control arrangements would have no perceptible effect on other European countries. But the abstention of Peking's friends in the Orient could have a cumulative effect there and perhaps in Africa, when taken together with strong Chinese Communist opposition to a test ban treaty. It cannot be taken for granted that Burma and Indonesia would sign a test ban treaty or a non-acquisition arrangement if Peking made it plain that signature of the treaties would be regarded as an unfriendly act. In the past, Communist Chinese dislike for the partial test ban treaty, and to non-proliferation efforts in general, failed to influence Burma and Indonesia, both of whose governments signed the treaty. It is probable that on this "peace issue," Peking would not be particularly successful in the next two or three years in keeping countries (other than Cambodia, North Viet Nam, North Korea, Guinea) out of a comprehensive test ban treaty if, indeed, it tried to do so. One factor which might unfavorably affect this forecast would be a requirement for inspection of the territories of the newly independent Asian countries.


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US Allies in Asia--Thailand, Republic of China, Philippines, Pakistan--and Britain's ally, Malaysia, are likely to accept arms control agreements provided India, Burma, and Indonesia also sign. Chinese Communist pressure on Pakistan might cause some hesitation there but the advantages of having India bound by a test ban and non-acquisition agreement should bring Pakistan into the arrangements. But conversely, if India, Burma, and Indonesia decided against the non-proliferation program, it would become difficult to persuade Pakistan, Thailand, and Malaysia that they should go along. Taipei would be a special case. While Chiang's government would be uneasy about entering accords which Peking ignored, they would probably accede to US wishes in the matter.

In Africa, the Central African Republic, Congo (Brazzaville), and Guinea have not yet adhered to the partial test ban treaty. Generally, the sentiment among all African states has favored non-proliferation efforts and probably all governments (except possibly those above mentioned) would subscribe to a non-proliferation agreement and a test ban treaty. In fact, the Organization for African Unity adopted a resolution in July, 1964, which said that the African states were willing to undertake in a treaty "not to manufacture or acquire control of nuclear weapons." There are four factors which could change this: (1) Failure of Israel to join in the agreement would keep out the UAR and other Arab States,* (2) Communist Chinese pressure might deter one or two of the smaller African states from signing a test ban

*Saudi Arabia has not adhered to the partial test ban treaty on grounds that it has no nuclear program.


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agreement, (3) French pressure might have a similar effect on a few other states, (4) Refusal of South Africa to sign the agreements might cause other African states to boycott the agreements as a form of pressure on South Africa. The first possibility is a serious problem which again highlights the necessity of securing the cooperation of certain key countries. The second and third possibilities do not seem to present much of a threat, considering the irrelevance of most African states to the proliferation problem. The fourth possibility, while worthy of mention, seems rather unlikely. South Africa might be tempted to improve its leverage with the West on certain problems by holding up its signature on arms control arrangements, but the chances are fairly good that the African states would choose (either spontaneously or with some persuasion) the path of isolating South Africa by subscribing to the arms control agreements.

Department of State
December 12, 1964

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A POSSIBLE STATEMENT OF US POLICY RELATING TO NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES

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The Proposal

On an appropriate occasion, a high level US official might include in his remarks a statement along the following lines:

"In some regions of the world, the question of nuclear weapons cannot be separated from other questions affecting the military security of the states concerned. The United States does not regard this as a satisfactory situation, and we shall continue the search for arrangements that will better serve the security of all. But while seeking such arrangements, we shall continue, in light of the wishes of our friends and allies, to view the presence or availability of our nuclear and non-nuclear forces as one means of discouraging the misuse of the military power others may possess.

"There are other regions of the world where the emplacement of nuclear weapons could have disruptive rather than stabilizing effects. Therefore, to avoid any misapprehensions or misunderstandings, I wish to make it clear that the United States has no intention of stationing nuclear weapons on the Continent of Africa, in the territory of the Arab States or Israel, or in the territory of our friends and neighbors the Latin American Republics. We do not station nuclear weapons in the countries in these regions today, and we do not plan to station them there in the future.

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"We would commend this policy to other nuclear powers, whose adoption of a different course would clearly have disruptive effects. Similarly, we would encourage non-nuclear states in these regions, as well as others, to refrain from seeking nuclear weapons of their own since such a course could interrupt progress toward a sound basis for preaceful relations among states within and outside these regions.

"The differences among the several regions of the world insofar as the question of nuclear weapons is concerned should not be interpreted as meaning that one part of the world must live constantly under the threat of nuclear war. In the view of the United States, there has occurred in recent years significant progress in relations among the major nuclear powers. And while meaningful and effective ways are sought to diminish both the incentive and capacity for war, there is no reason why the threat of war should not itself diminish if states will act responsibly and with due regard for the rights of others."

Interpretative Comments

1. The statement would be made on a unilateral basis and could be modified or revoked in whole or in part should need arise. Two loopholes are provided. The third paragraph has the effect of making our own policy

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contingent at least in part on what others may do with respect to introducing nuclear weapons into the regions involved. The first paragraph could also provide a basis for changing our policy if one of the regions should, for some reason that cannot now be foreseen, become an area where "the question of nuclear weapons cannot be separated from other questions..."

2. The terms "emplacement" and "stationing" are intended to exclude "transport and transit" (whether they would have the desired effect is considered in the "Discussion" section below). The US does not at this time have nuclear weapons stationed in the countries that would be covered under this policy.

3. Reference to the "Continent of Africa" is largely self-explanatory. Nearby islands in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans except for Madagascar, would not be covered.

4. The "Arab States" comprise more of a political than geographic unit. The term would cover states associated with the Arab League and the Arab "Summit" meetings. Reference to "the Arab States and Israel" would tend to focus geographically on the UAR, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. Greece, Turkey, and Iran would not be covered by this terminology.

5. The term "Latin American Republics" would, of course, exclude Puerto Rico. The Panama Canal Zone is more troublesome. If necessary we might construe "territory" in the legal sense of "territory under the jurisdiction and control" of another state, the Canal Zone being under

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our own jurisdiction and control. The problem here would not be transit but such possibilities as the stationing of air defense weapons in the Canal Zone itself. If that particular problem should arise, we might need to make an exception (tacit or otherwise) to our general policy.

Discussion

1. There are two questions that always need to be asked about proposals of this character: first, what benefits the US would derive; and second, whether there are disadvantages which might outweigh these benefits. In the present instance, the benefits are probably marginal, and the disadvantages, problematical.

2. In a broad sense, the proposed statement ought to convey to others a sense of responsibility on the part of the US as well as an impression of our desire to be responsive to the concern expressed by a majority of countries in several regions of the Southern Hemisphere respecting the possibility that they might become targets in a nuclear conflict. The statement might assist in undercutting efforts by some countries in these areas to secure the adoption of arrangements which would adversely affect our interests, and it might to an extent strengthen our ability to retain some non-nuclear installations we now have in these areas. The approach would be consistent with our position on non-proliferation and would, in particular, put some pressure on Israel and the UAR. It would not have much direct bearing on US-Soviet relations but could conceivably have some precedential value if Cuba-type operations should tempt the Soviet

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Union (or Communist China) at a future time. In this connection, it is worth noting that we would retain our own forward deployment while providing ourselves with an additional basis for arguing against changes in the status quo by others.

3. There is a question, however, whether the US should take the initiative or whether we would not do better to let matters take their course. Although the regions involved have been vocal enough in expressing their concerns, they have not yet shown a capacity for effective action. If we precipitate the matter, we may find the transit issue, in particular, both an embarrassment to us politically and a hazard to the flexibility of our forces. The statement could also have the effect of generating similar proposals for other regions where we could not today accept limitations similar to those outlined in the statement, for example in the Far East or the Indian Ocean Area.

4. On balance, the view adopted in this paper is that during a period when major steps in arms control do not seem to be in the cards and when the US is seeking to influence the course followed by the developing nations, a gesture of this type, which may mean a great deal to the countries directly involved, would be useful. If we cannot find ways of working out the transit problem against the background of the assurances provided in the proposed statement, we shall probably not work it out at all. In this regard, the statement would give us (and our friends in these regions) a reasonable basis on which to take our stand.

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5. As a unilateral expression of policy, the statement could, if necessary, be modified or revised. Although there might be political difficulties in doing so, they could probably be overcome in any really urgent case. Meanwhile, there is no reason for the US to appear insensitive to the concerns that have been expressed. On the contrary, we would serve our over-all interests best by taking the initiative rather than by acquiescing reluctantly in some future arrangement we might not like but could not oppose. Perhaps most importantly, there is much merit in making clear that the East-West struggle as it applies to these regions is not a nuclear struggle and need not become one.

6. It is not unlikely that the proposed statement would lead to some intensification of proposals that similar arrangements be applied to other regions. However, there have already been a number of such proposals, and we shall undoubtedly see more in the future whatever we may do. But a number of countries in other regions do not favor such proposals, and we would have substantial support for limiting our policy to the three regions that would be specified. The last paragraph of the proposed statement is, of course, intended to strengthen our hand in fending off limitations in regions where we and our friends and allies do not want them.

7. Prior consultation with certain of our friends and allies (in particular, the UK, FRG, Australia, and certain of the Latin American countries) would be desirable. The Soviets can always out-bid us on proposals of this character, and negotiations with the Soviet Union would not be useful. However, consideration might be given to notifying the

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Soviet Union immediately in advance of the statement or to calling their attention after it has been made.

8. Finally, it may be tactically wiser to make separate declarations, e.g., with respect to the Continent of Africa at the time of UNGA debate on the African denuclearization resolution.

Department of State
December 11, 1964

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TAB 8

W. W. Rostow

November 19, 1964

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A Way of Thinking About Nuclear Proliferation

Introduction

The decision by a country to develop nuclear weapons -- leaving the U.S. and the USSR aside -- has been and will continue to be a complex politico-military calculus at the highest and most sensitive levels of national policy-making. It is the argument of this memorandum that, if we intend to limit or stop nuclear proliferation, we must look at the specific factors which affect that calculus in different capitals and operate directly upon them. Present thought about nuclear proliferation tends to vacillate between proposals for over-all arms control measures (e.g., an all-environment test ban) and rather fine-grained attempts to apply a little pressure here and there on an ad hoc basis, as with the Israeli. It is only by reconstructing the complex calculus faced by the various governments concerned and mounting policies of substance and weight to influence the components of that calculus that we have a chance of shaping the course of events -- not merely in preventing new nations from entering the nuclear club but in influencing their subsequent course of behavior.

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1. Arguments for

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1. Arguments for the Production of Nuclear Weapons. In general the following six elements have tended to argue, in different combinations in different capitals, for the production of nuclear weapons:

-- National pride; that is, as a demonstration of scientific and industrial virtuosity.

-- As an entrance ticket to the highest levels of East-West diplomacy.

-- To exert increased influence on the two nuclear superpowers; that is, to enhance a nation's position within its own power bloc.

-- To provide deterrent military power should collective security arrangements fail.

-- To strengthen the diplomatic weight of a nation's diplomatic and non-nuclear military initiatives, including (in the Chinese Communist case) the possible practice of nuclear blackmail a la russe 1956-1962.

-- To gain access to certain areas of industrial technology uniquely associated with nuclear weapons and delivery systems.

2. Arguments Against

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2. Arguments Against the Production of Nuclear Weapons.

The following arguments, in different combinations, have influenced or are now influencing governments to forego the production of nuclear weapons.

Pacific arguments.

-- A generalized sense that proliferation increases the likelihood of nuclear war.

-- The production of nuclear weapons is a step away from rather than towards arms control.

-- Since the test ban treaty atmospheric tests involve for signatories to the treaty a denunciation, while underground tests are complex and expansive.

Regional complications.

-- Production of nuclear weapons and delivery capabilities may complicate or endanger the political stability within a region, yielding undesirable playback effects on the country which goes the national nuclear route.

Security arguments.

-- Nuclear production and delivery facilities are likely to be promptly targeted by atomic powers in the other bloc and the danger of atomic attack is increased.

-- In isolated

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-- In isolated confrontation between a small nuclear power and a superpower the possibility of providing a credible deterrent is difficult.

-- The acquisition of a national capability may relieve the allied or potentially allied superpower, in some degree, of responsibility for acting in support of the small nuclear power; and, in any case, the insistence of the right to fire a national nuclear capability tends to dilute collective security arrangements.

Economic argument.

-- A national nuclear capability is expensive; and, although it enlarges the scope and role of certain modern industries, the constructive playback effects on the civil economy are highly limited.

3. In the light of this array of considerations, certain observations can be made on the decisions already taken by the U.K., France, and China as follows:

United Kingdom. Given its wartime experience and status, the three most powerful arguments in Britain were those of national pride, the maintenance of a place in the top East-West club, and the maintenance or expansion of London's influence

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influence on Washington. Notably after the experience of Suez, the argument for a reserve minimal national deterrent, at a time of isolation and extreme danger, may have played some part in Britain's persistence as a national nuclear power. Aside from nuclear capabilities as a ticket to Moscow and Washington, the argument of extra weight behind British diplomacy did not figure greatly in British thought, though it figures increasingly as an ultimate element of bargaining for a British role on the continent, in the wake of de Gaulle's Common Market veto. The British decision to proceed was taken at a stage when various national considerations easily overrode the possibility that the British decision would increase the likelihood of war or move away from arms control measures; and the test ban treaty did not then exist. London was relatively callous or opaque about the long-run consequences of its decision on French and German behavior, tending to think of quasi-equality with Washington rather than of its continental relations. With a sense of considerable confidence in the military alliance with the U.S., the negative security considerations did not exist or were easily overridden. The economic cost of the enterprise was accepted but has gained weight

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weight as a negative factor, with the passage of time, as has an increased consciousness of the playback effects of British policy on other nations (notably Germany and France).

France. Positive considerations, almost identical with those in London, moved the government of France in the 1950's to proceed with the production of nuclear weapons, with the added fillip of staying equal to the British in a critical field. The French decision was taken at a time when the negative arguments were overridden in France on much the same grounds as they were overridden earlier in Britain. And there was, as in London, a certain lack of appreciation of the long-run consequences on German policy of a French decision to proceed with a force de frappe. The French argument for a national nuclear force as dernier ressort (should the defense of Germany fail) was made more explicitly than in the case of Britain; and French historical experience on the continent, in one sense, justified a higher rating for this factor. Suez contributed marginally.

In the most inner discussions in Paris one critical issue may have been the argument that a French acquisition of a nuclear capability which Germany could not match, gave

France

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France some long-run balance in the French-German relationship. Despite arguments to the contrary, French confidence in the U.S. and NATO overrode the three negative security arguments. The economic factor was overridden initially, but may gather weight with the passage of time, as may an increased consciousness of the playback effects of French policy on German nuclear policy.

Communist China. The Chinese arguments in favor of a national capability closely parallel those of Britain and France, with this added dimension: the possibility of exerting increased diplomatic pressure in Asia against the background of a Chinese nuclear capability. The strength of these positive arguments easily overrode the negative pacific arguments; that is, increasing the likelihood of war; moving away from arms control; and the political costs -- such as they may be -- of conducting atmospheric tests. With respect to the complication of regional relations, China (like Britain, and then France) has not taken into account seriously (or it has overridden) such anxieties as may have arisen over whether Japan and India might be led, by its initiative, also to develop nuclear capabilities. Peiping is probably conscious, to some degree, of the increased

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of the increased vulnerability that the creation of a national nuclear capability might bring about; but it either accepted this enhanced vulnerability or underestimated it. As for a dilution in the collective security commitment of Moscow to China's defense, Peiping must have judged that the Soviet commitment, in any case, was fairly dilute, notably if China intended to pursue objectives which were not shared or sanctioned in Moscow. The Quemoy-Matsu experience of 1958 may have been important in this context.

The economic cost of the enterprise was accepted, given the overriding view of the advantages initially taken; it remains to be seen whether it will weigh more heavily with the passage of time, along with the playback effects of Chinese Communist nuclear policy on Japan and India.

4. Potential Future Nuclear Powers. Turning now to India, Japan, Israel, and Sweden, the following observations can be made.*

India.

*The peculiarly complex case of Germany is left out of this exploratory paper; although it evidently deserves rigorous attention.

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India. National pride is evidently one positive factor which may grow in importance, as the younger generation comes forward in Indian politics. This may be strengthened by the fear that a lack of an Indian nuclear capability will exclude India (and elevate China) in global negotiations at the highest level, in the UN Security Council, etc. On the other hand, some in New Delhi may calculate that the development of a national nuclear capability might diminish rather than increase Delhi's capacity to generate military and diplomatic support in Washington and Moscow. The calculation may be that a non-nuclear India can get more support from these two essential quarters than nuclear India. The strictly security argument for a deterrent in extremis is more powerful than in any of the other cases thus far examined, given the looseness of India's collective security commitments; although, as suggested below, there are contrary security considerations. The notion of adding weight to Indian diplomacy beyond its borders is relatively unimportant. On the negative side the pacific factors do operate in Indian life: the political feeling in India at the present time is influenced by the warlike nature of the act required and the problem posed by atmospheric

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atmospheric or even underground testing. Moreover, there may be more sensitivity in Delhi, than is articulated about the implications of an Indian nuclear capability for relations with Pakistan. Given New Delhi's probable sense that it could not have a significant capability for a considerable period of time, there may also be a consciousness of its increased transitional vulnerability and of the possible diminution in the willingness of the U.S. -- and possibly the Soviet Union -- to support it in a confrontation with China if it bases its security on a national capability. If this is to be persuasive, however, Moscow and/or Washington will have to make such an eventuality credible to Indian leaders in some way. The logic of the situation will not automatically do so.

The economic argument probably weighs quite heavily in the Indian calculus, notably in the face of conflicting considerations on the positive side of the calculus.

Japan. In Japan the arguments pro and anti may not have been explored as systematically as they have been in New Delhi: the Indians have been brooding over the Chicom nuclear capability for some time; the Japanese have been living under the Soviet nuclear gun for some time, covered by the U.S.

deterrent

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deterrent, so that the Chicom event is somewhat less sharp, and their underlying fear of Russia is greater than their fear of China. One can guess that a positive impulse among a good many Japanese, which may grow in time, is national pride and an unwillingness for the long pull to see China engage in technical and military activities unmatched in Japan. As in the case of India, the impulse to build a national nuclear force as a ticket to the top East-West club and to increase influence in Washington is probably weak.

The consideration of having a reserve deterrent in extremis may be lurking in the background and would certainly increase, in degree, should the U.S. fail to hold in Southeast Asia; but Japan, unlike India, is already targeted by the Russians and may feel that it has no other serious military recourse than to rely on the U.S. in confronting the Communists. At the present time the Japanese probably do not contemplate any diplomatic activities which would be positively affected if they were conducted against the background of a national nuclear capability. The three negative pacific arguments
against

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against developing a national nuclear capability are obviously strong in Japanese political life -- probably stronger than in New Delhi. On the other hand, there is no equivalent in Tokyo to the quiet anxieties in Delhi about Pakistan. But the arguments of vulnerability and of possible dilution in the U.S. security commitment are (or will be) quite powerful in Tokyo when the calculus is drawn up and understood.

Israel. In the case of Israel the argument for the development of a national nuclear capability is almost uniquely military; that is, as a reserve deterrent power in a moment of desperate confrontation with Cairo. In particular, the Israelis, with their extraordinarily heightened sense of vulnerability, are worried about an Arab attack conducted so swiftly as to make U.S. or Western support too late to be effective. This narrow but intense anxiety brings the Israelis close to the point of ignoring the negative arguments of a general pacific kind; the possible playback effects of what it does on the decision of Cairo. It does not contemplate a confrontation with one of the superpowers; and, therefore, the relationship with the U.S. and possible damage to that relationship are the only major restraints on proceeding to achieve a national nuclear capability.

Sweden.

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Sweden. The argument in Stockholm is, as in the case of Israel, an almost purely military argument. The intensity of the Swedish sense of vulnerability with respect to the Soviet Union is, however, not as great as that of Israel with respect to Egypt. Moreover, the negative pacific arguments still retain great strength in Swedish political life. The Swedes, given the general acceptance of their special neutral military position, probably do not envision any regional complications in Scandinavia; and, indeed, this factor may shift to the other side of the calculus should Denmark and Norway enter the MLF, leaving Sweden uniquely among the three Scandinavian countries, without a nuclear role. The possibility of a direct bilateral confrontation with Russia is probably more real in the minds of men in Stockholm than it is in London, Paris, or Tokyo where the presence of the U.S. is, in fact, assumed. The serious and sustained Swedish expenditures on civil defense and on its military posture generally attest to this likelihood. Since Stockholm's military policy has long been based on the proposition that it must make an attack on Sweden sufficiently costly for the Russians to set it aside as a rational course of action, this perspective

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perspective does argue, in a nuclear age, for the development of a Swedish force de frappe. Finally, it is probably calculated in Stockholm that Swedish acquisition of a national nuclear capability is not likely to affect greatly -- one way or another -- the U.S. commitment to Swedish defense as a part of the Free World and an essential element in Europe's northern flank.

Some critical questions. What follows from this way of looking at the nuclear proliferation problem?

A. We must mount policies which will weaken the positive and strengthen the negative arguments in each capital. Although some of those policies may be general or applied in quite different quarters of the globe, we require a concentration on the calculus in each capital; for, in an important sense, each case is unique. The country statements made above are, of course, meant to be preliminary and suggestive rather than definitive.

B. With respect to the weakening of positive elements, the following appear to be critical questions with respect to both India and Japan:

-- Can we find

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-- Can we find alternative expressions of national pride in the terrain of modern science and technology and on the world scene (e.g., by UN Security Council membership)?

-- Can we enhance their sense of participation in nuclear matters, in the area of both defense and arms control?

-- Can we enhance their sense of confidence in the relevance of U.S. military power as an effective check on Chinese Communist expansion?

-- Can we -- and especially the U.K. -- use the possible occasion of their entrance in the MLF to persuade the Japanese and the Indians that they regret their earlier commitment to a national nuclear capability and to urge that the wise course -- economically, politically, and militarily -- is to opt for collective security arrangements? (A British move in this direction, tending to make the French and Chicom postures appear demodé, might be quite helpful.)

C. With respect to the strengthening of the negative elements in the calculus of India and Japan, the following are critical questions:

-- Are there any U.S.-Soviet moves in the field of arms control that would suggest that serious movement forward may be possible, thus strengthening the negative pacific arguments?

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(Although this is the classic field for action, it should not be over-estimated,, unless the movement forward is serious. Put another way, barring a serious (not symbolic) breakthrough in the arms control field, we should not count excessively, or for long, on the weight of these negative pacific factors. We must operate on other elements in the calculus.)

-- Can we heighten in Delhi a sense of the danger to India that might come about via the reaction of Pakistan to an Indian nuclear capability?

-- Can we tactfully heighten in Tokyo a sense of the increased vulnerability that a small national nuclear capability might bring, including a dilution of the U.S. nuclear commitment? (The optimum form for this kind of implicit exercise would be to seize with both hands the Japanese invitation to enrich the present bilateral military exchanges on nuclear strategy, deterrence, etc.)

-- Is there any way (aside from holding Laos and South Viet Nam) to heighten India's willingness to rely, implicitly or explicitly, on the U.S. nuclear deterrent. In that connection, can we (or should we) move towards some collective

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collective Asian defense effort -- consultative or operational -- in nuclear and other fields embracing Japan, India, and others willing to join?

D. With respect to Israel, the familiar question is whether there is a combination of stick and carrot, of pressure and reassurance, we can mount without wrecking either our relation to Israel or our tenuous links to the Arabs. A heightening of Israeli anxiety about an Arab nuclear capability is an asset we can and should use.

E. With respect to Sweden, the issue is likely to turn on whether we succeed or fail in all our other efforts to halt nuclear proliferation.

5. A Conclusion. The title of this memorandum is exact. It is designed not to state firm conclusions but to suggest a way systematically and realistically to think about the nuclear proliferation problem. Nevertheless, it immediately poses some interesting perspectives:

-- We must not think of arms control measures (e.g., an all-environment test ban) in the abstract: we must think of their role in the context of each relevant nation's calculus. The pacific negative factors to which they appeal are a real

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are a real (but varying) force in the several capitals; but they are not an overriding force. It is likely, therefore, that successful action on the other elements in the equation will be required before arms control measures will prove acceptable.

-- U.K. participation in the MLF, especially if accompanied by German and Italian non-diffusion declarations, might be turned to good account in Asia and elsewhere, notably if the U.K. government would play in dramatizing the logic of its retreat from a national nuclear capability.

-- Whether we succeed or fail in Southeast Asia will affect the calculus in New Delhi and Tokyo.

-- We ought to be probing more actively for an Asian security grouping larger than SEATO, perhaps narrowly related to the Chicom nuclear capability, including Japan, India, and, hopefully, Pakistan.


-- Lacking serious arms control measures with the USSR, we may have to evoke more toughly something which is true but hard to say properly, so powerful is the threat; namely, that those who build national nuclear forces and claim the independent right to fire thereby circumscribe the U.S. commitment to their defense.

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
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GENEVA FOR LABATT HARE

E.O. 12356: DECL: 10/26/88

TAGS: ELAB, ICFTU, PL

SUBJECT: GERMAN VIEWS ON ILO PROCEDURES ON THE POLAND
CASE

REFS: (A) BRUSSELS 14013 (NOTAL); (B) GENEVA 10529

1. SUMMARY. SENIOR GERMAN GOVERNMENT, TRADE UNION,
AND EMPLOYER REPRESENTATIVES HAVE EXPRESSED PERSONAL
RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE INVOCATION OF AN ILO SPECIAL
COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON POLAND AT THIS TIME.
THEIR REASONING IS MORE OR LESS IDENTICAL WITH THAT
ALREADY EXPRESSED BY KEY TRADE UNION, ILO, AND OTHER
OFFICIALS IN GENEVA AND BRUSSELS (REFTEL). END SUMMARY.

2. DURING THE COURSE OF HIS VISIT TO BONN, VISITING
SPECIAL ASSISTANT WARNOCK (S/IL) ACCOMPANIED BY
LABOR COUNSELOR MET INDIVIDUALLY WITH SENIOR OFFICIALS

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OF THE GERMAN LABOR MINISTRY, THE GERMAN TRADE UNION
FEDERATION (DGB), AND THE CONFEDERATION OF GERMAN
EMPLOYERS ASSOCIATIONS (BDA). IN THE COURSE OF THESE
DISCUSSIONS, THE QUESTION OF THE UTILITY OF ACTIVATING
A SPECIAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY TO CONSIDER THE
COMPLAINTS FILED BY FRENCH AND NORWEGIAN DELEGATES
AGAINST POLAND AT THE LAST ILO CONFERENCE WAS
DISCUSSED IN SOME DETAIL.

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3. ALL THE INDIVIDUALS CONCERNED, INCLUDING HAASE, MILLER, AND HAENDLER (MOL), MUHR AND SIMON (DGB), AND HEINZEMANN (BDA), EXPRESSED STRONG PERSONAL RESERVATIONS ON THE USE OF SUCH A PROCEDURE AT THIS TIME. THEIR REASONING WAS GENERALLY THE SAME AS THAT EXPRESSED IN EARLIER CONVERSATIONS IN GENEVA AND BRUSSELS, BY KEY ILO, INTERNATIONAL LABOR, AND OTHER CONCERNED INDIVIDUALS (REFTELS). SPECIFICALLY, THEY BELIEVE THAT THE CREATION OF A SPECIAL COMMISSION WOULD MEAN THAT ALL OTHER ILO CONSIDERATION OF THE POLISH CASE WOULD BE SUSPENDED UNTIL THAT COMMISSION COMPLETED ITS WORK. THAT, IN EFFECT, WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY MEAN THAT THERE COULD BE, FOR EXAMPLE, NO MEANINGFUL DISCUSSION OF POLAND AT NEXT JUNE'S INTERNATIONAL LABOR CONFERENCE.

4. MOREOVER, HAASE (WHO WILL CONTINUE TO SERVE IN THE ILO DESPITE HIS NEW JOB) AND HAENDLER BOTH NOTED ADDITIONAL ARGUMENTS AS TO WHY IT WOULD SEEM UNWISE TO ESTABLISH A SPECIAL COMMISSION. THESE WERE:
- THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SUCH A BODY NOW COULD BE INTERPRETED AS IMPLYING THAT THE POLISH CASE INVOLVED SOMETHING OTHER THAN THE SUPPRESSION OF A TRADE UNION, AND THEREBY INADVERTENTLY GIVE CREDENCE TO

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THE POLISH CLAIM THAT SOLIDARITY WAS NOT A TRADE UNION BUT A POLITICAL MOVEMENT.

- THE CREATION OF A SPECIAL BODY ON POLAND WOULD LEAD INEVITABLY TO COMPLAINTS BEING FILED AGAINST OTHER STATES (E.G. ISRAEL) COUPLED WITH DEMANDS, FOR THE ADOPTION OF THE SAME KIND OF PROCEDURE AS WAS FOLLOWED IN THE POLISH CASE.

-THERE WOULD BE ENORMOUS DIFFICULTY IN SECURING AGREEMENT ON WHO SHOULD SERVE ON THE COMMISSION.

5. AS IN THE EARLIER CONVERSATIONS IN GENEVA AND BRUSSELS, WARNOCK STATED THAT HE WAS GATHERING INFORMATION AND VIEWS ON THIS ISSUE FOR WASHINGTON'S CONSIDERATION AND REVIEW. AS NOTED ABOVE, THE GERMANS, FOR THEIR PART, STATED THAT THEIR VIEWS WERE PERSONAL, AND EXPLAINED THAT THEIR ORGANIZATIONS HAD NOT YET TAKEN FORMAL POSITIONS ON THE ISSUE.
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1. Make country by country studies of those nations having the capability of undertaking national nuclear weapons programs (including Germany, India, Japan, Israel, Indonesia, the UAR, Sweden, and the ^{Republic} ~~Union~~ of South Africa). ~~seeking to~~ Identify the (1) ^{factor} the political, economic, and military attitudes and ^{factor} tending to advance or inhibit a decision to seek to acquire nuclear weapons, ~~as well as~~ (2) ~~as~~ the incentives, reassurances, guarantees or sanctions which might serve to influence that decision.

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2. Brief analysis of world-wide national positions on adherence to non-dissemination and non-acquisition agreements, and on adherence to a comprehensive all-environments test ban. Give particular attention to the attitudes of countries which might seek to acquire nuclear weapons, and of our principal NATO Allies, and to impact of the Chinese Communist nuclear detonation. Naturally, the terms of possible non-proliferation agreements, and the question of verification for a comprehensive test ban, would make a difference with respect to the position of some countries and should be noted as appropriate.

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3. Summarize the nature and effectiveness of US policy and procedures regarding the export of equipment, materials, and technology directly or indirectly useful for the production of fissionable materials, nuclear weapons, or nuclear delivery systems or for testing nuclear weapons.

Summarize also similar information on the policies and procedures of other nuclear, fissionable materials producing, and major industrial powers, including note of any US efforts to influence them on export controls and safeguards.

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4. Summarize the status of MLF planning and negotiations, including planning and other activities within the US government and formal and informal negotiations and contacts in Washington, London, Paris and elsewhere. (Note attitudes of various NATO countries to MLF.)

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PROFESSOR ROGER FISHER'S COMMENTS ON SELECTED PORTIONS
OF COURSE III

Problem Area 1: Europe and NATO

(a) MLF/ANF.

Convey to the Soviet Union the U.S. policy toward an Allied
Nuclear Force.

Whether or not the details of U.S. policy outlined in NSAM 322 are made public, informing the Soviet Union might ease its position on a non-proliferation treaty at this time.

Open publication of contents of NSAM 322.

A Presidential speech or other official statement could strengthen the international climate against the spread of nuclear weapons.

(b) Alternatives (if ANF fails).

(3) Broader Role for NATO.

So long as the NATO powers behave as though the operation of a nuclear deterrent was the most important problem in the world, other countries will be influenced in a nuclear direction. Greater attention should be directed to conventional weapons. But the NATO community should also look beyond military measures. It seems unlikely that the most important problem facing the U.S. and Europe over the next decade is a Soviet attempt to conquer Western Europe by force of arms. The reasons for re-examining NATO go far beyond non-proliferation; nonetheless, giving NATO broader tasks, for example, in East-West trade, in arms control, and in developing common policies toward Africa, could lessen an existing incentive toward proliferation.

Problem Area 2: Outside Europe

(a) Israel.

(1) Military guarantees against nuclear attack.

The U.S. does not wish to give guarantees that are any more

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explicit than may prove necessary to retain India as a non-nuclear power. India does not want a one-sided guarantee from the U.S. or other Western powers.

The U.S. should be willing to give a fairly explicit guarantee of nuclear retaliation against the use of nuclear weapons, but should not promise to use nuclear weapons to deter conventional attack. If India desires, we should explore the problem of joint guarantees with the Soviet Union.

(2) Push India into leading role in non-spread treaty.

It is important both that India be publicly committed to a non-spread policy and that it gain some world leadership credit as a non-nuclear power. It should be encouraged, alone or in conjunction with, say, Canada or Ireland, to sponsor a non-spread treaty.

(3) Support India for permanent UN Security Council seat.

A proposed amendment to the Charter expanding the Security Council has now been ratified by some 44 members. Rewarding a non-nuclear India should help keep India non-nuclear and offset some of the proliferation inducing consequences of the Chinese test.

(4) Safeguarded scientific assistance to boost prestige.

Far better than prodding India into a space program would be assistance designed to make India a world leader in population control, harvesting food from the sea, or some other wholly peaceful and useful activity meeting real and urgent problems.

(5) Reconsider economic aid.

To the extent deemed effective, we should indicate that this government considers the problem of nuclear spread to be a very serious one and that we might reduce or alter aid programs as a means of influencing national decisions.

Problem Area 3: Multilateral Agreements

(a) Non-Dissemination -- Non-acquisition.

Press now for urgent conclusion of non-spread treaty without waiting for resolution of ANF.

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While supporting a non-proliferation treaty consistent with the MLF proposal, the U.S. has postponed efforts toward the signing of a non-spread treaty until the question of a European nuclear force has been resolved. However, a broad, anti-nuclear treaty seems to be an essential framework for efforts directed at individual countries like India and Japan. Further, the present willingness of Afro-Asian countries to participate in such a treaty may melt away over the next months as China conducts more tests and suggests the availability of nuclear weapons on the side of "people's revolutions."

We should probably first seek a draft treaty which the Soviet Union could support and which would also be consistent with our present policies toward an ANF. (A treaty might, for example, permit bilateral nuclear arrangements by providing that each nuclear power shall reserve the power to prevent the use of every nuclear weapon which it has manufactured, but that this shall not preclude also granting non-nuclear countries a power to prevent the use of nuclear weapons.)

A treaty seems far preferable to more declarations of intent. There are difficult problems in both of scope and of drafting, relating, for example, to an escape or termination clause, and the acceptance of IAEA safeguards on reactors. The Committee might wish to look at some drafts and make more specific recommendations.

Even without Soviet support, should the U.S. press for the broadest acceptance of a non-spread treaty provided India and Japan are willing to sign it?

(b) Comprehensive Test Ban.

Support strongly with reduced number of inspections, recognizing that Plowshare may have to be abandoned.

The complete test ban should be pursued not as an independent measure of major importance to proliferation but as one significant part of a large package of measures to contain the atom.

The U.S. should promptly define as explicitly and narrowly as possible what would constitute adequate rights for "an inspection" in the light of our present knowledge.

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Our past preoccupation with the Soviet Union has resulted in relatively little attention to the inspection procedures desirable to deal with the non-proliferation aspects of a comprehensive test ban.

Plowshare. There are arguments for the U.S. dropping Plowshare wholly independent of a test ban. A legitimate use of nuclear explosives provide a politically acceptable way for countries to justify developing a nuclear capability while denying that they are making weapons. It is almost incredible that a country would conduct a "peaceful" explosion without arranging at the same time to acquire some information of military value.

(c) Nuclear Free Zones.

Support in Latin America and Africa (and for Israel-Arab States); be willing to yield on transit rights, declarations and verification.

U.S. policy has been to be in favor of denuclearized zones provided

(a) all countries concerned were in favor of them, (b) there were some verification procedure, (c) the right of the U.S. to transit nuclear weapons through (or over) the area were preserved, and (d) the U.S. never had to declare whether particular ships or aircraft did or did not have nuclear weapons aboard.

It is suggested that all of these provisos be modified, so that the U.S. urges countries to participate in denuclearized zones with or without verification or transit rights.

The military consequences of the following special points need to be considered:

- Necessity for transit through Panama and a subsequent isthmus canal.
- Necessity for transit through Suez Canal.
- Necessity for overflights of Africa.
- Denuclearization of Guantanamo.

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-- Denuclearization of Puerto Rico, if necessary for a Latin American zone.

-- Consequences of abandoning a "no declarations" policy.

(d) No no-first-use policy.

Despite the desirability for non-proliferation of working toward a no-first-use policy, a multilateral no-first-use treaty seems politically out of the question in the foreseeable future.

(e) U.S. -USSR.

(1) Fissile materials cut-off with reduced verification.

This would require a full treaty with established inspection procedures and Senate ratification.

(2) Strategic delivery vehicle freeze plus significant agreed reductions (e.g. 30%) (verification required).

Of major importance to reducing the incentive in Nth countries to produce nuclear weapons is a general impression that "the corner has been turned" and that the major nuclear powers are reducing their nuclear capability. The "Kennedy buildup" provides the U.S. with missile capability which it can reduce without seriously affecting its military strength.

A cut-back in strategic delivery vehicles of the order of 30% would require a treaty.

(3) Reciprocal halt in ABMs, ICBM launchers, and SDV deployments or transfers (for, e.g., 18 months).

This is suggested as a measure which the U.S. could take on its own, with the hope of some (roughly) reciprocal actions by the Soviet Union.

It has been suggested that the U.S. should try to package as an "arms holiday," the most impressive announcement it could reasonably make in early 1965, combining some special production cut-backs with reductions which will be made in any event.

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In any event, DOD should probably be asked to consider how to get maximum international impact out of programmed curtailments of military production.

Consider having a single inspection quota apply to two or more of above measures.

To have a single quota of inspections apply both to the test ban and to a cut-off in fissile materials production, for example, would simplify the bilateral U.S. -USSR aspects of shifting from prior positions on the test ban and limit the total amount of inspection of the Soviet Union required.

On the other hand, it might unduly complicate matters by mixing a bilateral U.S. -USSR treaty on missiles and/or fissile production with a multilateral test ban treaty involving inspection of many other countries.

Problem Area 4: Peaceful Uses

(a) Euratom:

(1) Exert greater pressure on Euratom to obtain satisfactory U.S. verification of safeguards (including possible use of plutonium sale as leverage).

A major transfer of plutonium to Euratom is now pending. Euratom has been reluctant to implement agreed U.S. verification procedures.

(3) Consider extension of IAEA operational activities to plant operation, for example, international plutonium separation plants.

Independent of Euratom, it seems highly desirable that physical plant operations be arranged to minimize the number of countries which have chemical separation plants and inventories of plutonium with no present use other than weapons.

A number of suggestions have been made for internationally operated or supervised fuel-element fabrication and reprocessing plants, but despite their apparent value, they have not been pressed. IAEA safeguards reduce only the risk of covert development of nuclear weapons.

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An admitted military program (whether undertaken for political reasons or as a military deterrent) would seem to be a far greater risk.

AEC should probably be asked to develop and press urgently physical arrangements which would make normal power production less adaptable to military programs than they will otherwise be.

Related is the question of whether the speedy development of a plutonium-burning reactor would be helpful (by consuming plutonium supplies) or counter-productive (by increasing the justification for separating plutonium from spent fuel elements).

(4) Consider "leasing" rather than local ownership of fuel elements.

A country like India would probably be less likely to steal plutonium belonging to IAEA or Canada for a military program than it would be to use its own plutonium. A system of international leasing of fuel elements from IAEA (or from existing nuclear countries) would thus tend to reduce the risk of proliferation.

Such a scheme might be established initially by a gentleman's agreement among fuel-element producing countries and later under IAEA.

If the U.S. is to consider adopting a lease-only policy toward foreign countries, it should probably refrain, at least for the time being, from implementing the 1964 domestic legislation permitting the sale of enriched uranium to domestic power reactors. (Such sales are apparently desired for reasons of comparative cost and to enable utilities to have more capital in the rate base.)

Both as a deterrent and to put the U.S. in the best possible position in the event of improper use of "peaceful" materials, a legal foundation for action should now be established. The following clauses - which might appear in leases or sales of nuclear material - illustrate one approach:

- a. "In the event that this material falls into unauthorized hands or is used contrary to the undertakings of the buyer, title shall revert to the United States, which shall have the right to repossess the material or to destroy it, using no more force than reasonably necessary to do so."

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b. "Should the leased material or material derived from it ever be diverted to military purposes, it shall be subject to recapture or destruction by the IAEA or by any nation acting on its behalf, provided that any country acting on behalf of the IAEA shall be liable for damages should the International Court of Justice determine that the material had not in fact been diverted or that more force was used than reasonably appeared necessary."

(b) IAEA and Bilaterals.

(1) Increased U.S. efforts to build up IAEA, including broader responsibilities, larger budget and improved technical capabilities.

A great deal of hope is being pinned on IAEA, which is currently little more than a token operation.

Problem Area 5: U.S. Weapons Policies

(a) Overseas deployment.

(1) Push for adoption of revised NATO strategy stressing non-nuclear option and less reliance on tactical weapons followed by reductions in Europe; meanwhile, no further deployments.

Such a policy is under consideration in DOD. Its significance for non-proliferation lies in the reduced prominence of nuclear weapons and as a step toward sharpening the internationally recognized policy that "nuclear weapons are not conventional" and have decreasing relevance even to the military problems of today's world.

(2) Separate nuclear from conventional U.S. forces; publicize.

It seems apparent that to be successful a policy to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons must be publicly identified as a broad policy against nuclear weapons themselves rather than as directed simply against their acquisition by countries now outside the nuclear club. The separation of nuclear forces into special units that are not to be used in anticipated circumstances and which would be less visible than conventional forces should prove helpful.

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(3) Information policies minimizing role and importance of nuclear weapons as foundation for later possible no-first-use policy.

American speeches boasting of nuclear superiority, explicitly or implicitly emphasizing the importance of a nuclear deterrent, or otherwise directing attention to nuclear weapons constitute a continuing inducement to other countries to obtain nuclear weapons for themselves. At the present time the public and leaders of other governments assign a far greater military value to nuclear weapons than does the Secretary of Defense. This artificial value creates a large part of the incentive for nuclear weapons. It would seem desirable to have a clear government information policy directed toward minimizing the importance and value of nuclear weapons.

Non-proliferation would be aided by a world-wide policy outlawing the use of nuclear weapons (except in retaliation for their use). To the extent that it would not induce proliferation in countries like Germany or cause other serious adverse consequences, the U.S. should probably take steps working toward an eventual no-first-use policy.

(b) Physical security.

(1) Continue PAL installation on overseas weapons.

The decision to place Permissive Action Links on overseas nuclear weapons should be speeded up and extended to weapons deployed outside the NATO area.

(c) R&D.

(1) Reorient development of ABM for possible use against limited threats.

Our ballistic missile defense program has heretofore been oriented toward defense against an all-out Soviet attack with sophisticated weapons. Attention should now be directed toward developing the equipment which would best meet the more limited Chinese nuclear capability anticipated in the years ahead.

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(2) Develop TMRBM for potential use in Asia.

The development of a quickly transportable land-based missile has been suggested as one way of implementing a credible military guarantee of India. On the other hand, the development of such equipment may lead to an increasingly wide deployment of nuclear missiles without military advantage. The political "necessity" for local deployment may be created by the technical development of the equipment.

Problem Area 6: Policies Toward Existing Nuclear Powers

(a) France.

(1) Press for international measures to impede French program (prohibitions on overflights, etc. related to tests) unless France accepts partial test ban (conflict with NSAM 322?).

The following measures are among those which ought to be considered. In general, the public lead should not be taken by the U.S. The forces against proliferation will be strengthened to the extent that the non-nuclear powers successfully impose restrictions on the nuclear ones.

In the UN.

(a) A resolution declaring atmospheric testing against existing international law.

The legal foundation for political, economic or military action directed against further atmospheric testing can be laid by a nearly unanimous General Assembly resolution finding that in view of knowledge about fall-out and the overwhelming world consensus that such tests are not justified by reasons of national security, further pollution of the atmosphere is found to be a violation of existing general rules of international law, wholly apart from the test ban treaty.

(b) Recommendations with respect to facilitating future testing.

The UN might call on all members to refrain from providing any possible assistance to future tests. Countries might, for example, be asked to deny overflight, transit or other permissions except to countries which would certify that no portion of the traffic was to implement or provide logistical support for atmospheric nuclear tests.

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(c) Quarantine.

The UN might declare a quarantine around the islands in the Pacific on which the French propose to conduct nuclear tests, and call on all members to help prevent the French from further importing nuclear materials and related facilities.

(d) Action to frustrate tests.

One clause of a UN resolution might call on all members to take "appropriate" action as the occasion warranted to prevent the further conducting of atmospheric tests. Without directly authorizing forceful intervention, such language would provide some legitimacy to possible sabotage or other measures.

(e) Political action toward independence of the French Pacific Islands.

Various UN resolutions could be considered which would open up the political right of France to conduct tests on these colonial islands. Temporary trusteeship might be proposed, a UN conducted plebiscite of the islanders who might be affected by the tests, the invitation to New York of political leaders of native independence movements on the islands, etc.

(f) Authorization for post-test action by UN members.

The UN might recommend that should France conduct future atmospheric tests in violation of international law members should take such measures, including the use of force, as would punish them for doing so.

(g) Other measures.

The UN might suggest stationing ships at test location, jamming French radio related to the test, etc.

Bilateral: Soviet Union - United States.

The U.S. might explore with the Soviet Union its attitude toward continued testing by both France and China. The degree to which vigorous

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action might be undertaken would to some extent depend upon Soviet willingness to participate in some way or another. We might be willing to consider extremely forceful action against France, including a forceful quarantine and demolition of the test site facilities (under appropriate UN resolution, as above) if the Soviet Union would take the lead in exercising similar restraining influences on China.

U.S. action.

(a) Reducing French incentive to test.

The U.S. should explore the possibility of giving France the technical data which it would acquire through a test, thus, avoiding any necessity of a test. This might best be accomplished by a British-French merger of their nuclear forces.

(b) Sabotage of French test facilities and equipment.

Covert operations against French facilities which implemented a general UN resolution declaring further testing illegal might operate as a major deterrent to Nth countries. Although the U.S. would be blamed for a series of accidents and demolitions, the unadmitted nature of the operations might make them politically preferable to open military action. (They might be compared with Israel's illegal capture of Eichmann in Argentina.)

(c) Instigation of action by others.

It might be possible to have Sukarno, perhaps with help from Australia, direct a major effort against the French tests.

(c) Chinese.

High-level intensive study.

China constitutes both the greatest imminent military threat from proliferation and the greatest single inducement to further proliferation; yet, wise policies to pursue toward China are far from clear.

Within a few years China must be expected to have a significant nuclear capability even against the U.S. In the face of a determined

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policy to produce nuclear weapons, forceful measures against existing facilities could be expected, at best, to cause a few years' delay while China relies on other facilities, either hardened or constructed in urban areas where destruction would presumably be morally unjustifiable.

Serious consideration of the destruction of existing Chinese facilities would require careful study of both the physical measures which might accomplish that result and the political and moral basis for such action. It seems fairly clear that should physical measures be employed, the use of nuclear weapons should be avoided.

Any forceful measures should probably be perceived as action enforcing international law. Preliminary political action, such as UN outlawing of further tests, ordering China to stop, and authorizing appropriate measures to implement its resolutions, would be essential. Other moves demonstrating the morality of enforcement action might include the prior destruction of an Indian facility being used for weapons purposes, action against French testing, and an offer to compensate for any excess damage that may have been caused in China. Efforts should be narrowly directed against nuclear testing and not against China as such.

Whatever short-term action might be considered, it seems certain that in the long run U.S. security will depend upon China's becoming an operating member of the international community who has enough at stake in ongoing trade and political friendships throughout the world to cause it to behave with some responsibility and deference to the opinion of mankind. China's very efforts to win Africa will tend to cause it to pay some attention to what Africans think.

While the recognition of China and giving it a seat on the UN Security Council could not be expected to cause any immediate improvement in Chinese policies, such steps seem an essential step toward eventual improvement. Recognition, UN status, reducing of trade and travel restrictions, and similar modest steps toward long-term improvement need not be considered as alternatives to a strict anti-nuclear policy now. The drawbacks of each would be reduced by combining a vigorous policy against further testing with such liberalizing steps.

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PROBLEM AREAS

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1. EUROPE AND NATO

a. MLF/ANF

b. Alternatives (if ANF fails)

2. OUTSIDE EUROPE

a. India

b. Japan

c. Israel/UAR

3. MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS

a. NDNA

b. Comprehensive Test Ban

c. Nuclear Free Zones

d. No-first-use Policy

e. U.S. - USSR

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4. PEACEFUL USES

- a. EURATOM
 - b. IAEA and Bilaterals
-

5. U.S. WEAPONS POLICIES

- a. Overseas Deployments
 - b. Physical Security
 - c. R&D
-

6. POLICIES TOWARD EXISTING
NUCLEAR POWERS

- a. France
- b. U.K.
- c. Chinese
- d. USSR

Probable Consequences

I. (1) An ANF, if established, would probably satisfy FRG nuclear aspirations for near term (though a US insistence on retention of veto would disturb Europeanists). Alternative would be less likely to satisfy the FRG since continuance of UK as well as French deterrent would emphasize FRG inferiority. Eventually (~5 years), the FRG would probably insist on acquiring independent control of nuclear weapons through one means or another.

(2) So long as deGaulle lives, France would probably not join an ANF even were the US to provide technological assistance and withdrew veto; she might, but probably would not, withdraw from NATO. With deGaulle gone, France might well come to terms with whatever, if any, arrangements for nuclear sharing had come into existence.

(3) Soviet attitudes toward Europe might harden; Soviets, in face of ANF, might be able to assert a greater measure of control over satellites; a Warsaw Pact missile "MLF" is possible, but improbable; possibilities for German unification would be diminished for some years.

(4) As proliferation proceeds elsewhere, it would be difficult to curb European appetite. Some (e.g. Benelux) might line up with nuclear powers; others (e.g. Norway) pursue neutrality; others (e.g. FRG, Italy, and Sweden) develop nuclear capabilities.

2. (a) India would probably proceed with a nuclear program. Provided there were adequate US assistance in delivery systems, she probably could effectively counter Chinese capability. In the absence of great power guarantees she might (in 5-10 years) become interested in collective security, perhaps with Japan. Pending the achievement of an adequate Indian nuclear capability, increased US involvement may be inevitable to deter or respond to a preemptive Chinese attack. Assuming an Indian nuclear program, Pakistan would feel gravely threatened and would seek nuclear weapons from the US, Chinese and/or Soviets.

(b) Japan might well attempt to acquire an independent nuclear capability to counter the Chinese. This would be particularly likely if the US in any way encouraged such development or indicated a possible weakening of its commitment. She might outdo and thereby eclipse the Chinese. She might in time assume a lead role in Asian collective security. She could (in 10-15 years) have the capability of seriously injuring the US. Japan might move toward neutrality vis-a-vis the US-Chinese confrontation, possibly without acquiring nuclear weapons.

(c) Israel would probably develop a modest capability. The UAR, feeling menaced, would attempt to obtain weapons from Soviets, and might succeed, especially in the light of the Chinese as a potential alternative source.

(d) Other nations, seeing proliferation proceed, would seek to build or acquire weapons. Indonesia, Australia, and possibly Canada, South Africa, Brazil, and Mexico are possibilities.

3. (a) Without US and Soviet support, the treaty would fail.

(b) Probably no new agreement; and as proliferation proceeded the need to test would cause some nations to withdraw from or violate even the limited ban.

(c) Almost certainly, no agreement in Near East and probably none elsewhere.

(d) None.

(e) While a broader area of common interest between the US and the USSR might develop as independent nuclear states emerge and the US attempts to reduce its own commitments abroad, mutual apprehension might negate the realization of these common interests and lead to a renewed arms race. Lesser powers could play off one against the other in an attempt to get nuclear weapons. The risks of loss of restraint and control would multiply as the centers of nuclear power grow.

4. (a) French and other European nuclear programs would be helped because of participation in Euratom, but these effects would probably not be decisive.

(b) Europe as above; because of competition to supply fissionable material, reactors and other equipment, and the absence of adequate controls, potential Nth countries are likely to have rather easy access to the ingredients necessary for a weapons program. As political inhibitions against nuclear weapons acquisition diminish, pressures to apply available facilities and personnel to weapons production may be irresistible.

5. (a) Initial deployments depend on choices under 1 and 2 above; as proliferation proceeded, deployments and commitments abroad would probably be reduced.

(b) Nth nations might not wish expensive safety devices; U.S. assistance would help somewhat.

(c) 1. No defense system could prevent deaths of millions, even at hands of lesser powers; broad but thin ABMs plus SAMs plus shelters (at cost of \$5-10 billion) might limit potential damage to the US or the USSR from lesser powers to 10-20 million deaths; sophisticated system (at cost of \$30 billion) would do better but might upset US-Soviet stability.

2. Difficult to predict what progress might be made in warning and identification; it will be difficult to bell the Nth nation cat.

6. (a) Enough assistance could possibly draw France into the ANF, but probably would not while de Gaulle lives.

(b) UK would probably merge most of its deterrent into an ANF, but might well reestablish independent capability as proliferation proceeded.

(c) In the near term it is unlikely that the Chinese can be tamed. Early acquisition of Japanese-Indian nuclear capabilities might negate the effect vis-a-vis these two countries and perhaps more broadly.

(d) Soviets' development would proceed as in the past.

Overall

(a) After 15-20 years a number of nations would individually have the capability of destroying at least 5-20 million US lives.

(b) US, Soviets, and other great powers may be increasingly unwilling to undertake military commitments abroad. Chinese, and others more aggressive and irresponsible, may wish to fill the vacuum.

(c) New regional groupings and balances and resulting stability could conceivably ensue, with the probability of neither localized nuclear nor general war substantially increased. But it seems more probable that multiplied nuclear capabilities would increase the probability of nuclear use, heighten the difficulties of control and identification, and increase the danger of escalation to global warfare.

COURSE II

Same as in Course I.

- Without strong leverage, and multilateral cooperation, efforts to establish safeguards will fail. Consequences as in Course I, but at a slower rate.

Substantial reduction in visible weapons deployments could reduce resulting desires, but could also result in decreased credibility of US commitment and consequent incentive for independent capabilities.

No difficulty.

Consequences as in Course I.

France would be slightly delayed, as compared to Course I; would be slightly more irritated; would proceed with planned programs.

UK consequences as in Course I.

In the near term, it is unlikely the Chinese can be tamed.

Soviet consequences as in Course I.

COURSE II

- (1) Same as Course I though we might hold the line on German acquisition of nuclear capabilities a little longer.
- (2) Similar to Course I, though French irritation at controls would be greater and France would be even more likely to stay out of ANF.
- (3) Same as Course I.
- (4) With proliferation slowed slightly elsewhere and some direct US pressure, FRG and other European independent capabilities would be delayed slightly (1-2 years) but would in due time develop.

It is doubtful that generalized US assurances would persuade the Indians from going ahead with a nuclear weapons program within the next few years. Without US assistance on acquiring delivery systems, India would not for some time be able to counter the Chinese nuclear threat. Thus, need for US commitment would be greater than in Course I. Reaction of Pakistan to Indian nuclear capability would be as in Course I.

Japanese move to acquire independent nuclear capability and/or move toward neutrality might be prevented or at least deferred for a longer period than under Course I.

Success with Israel would depend upon the specificity of the guarantees and sanctions. Without substantial pressure she would probably go ahead, with the consequences described under Course I.

Other nations would also proceed, as under Course I, but at a somewhat slower rate.

Soviet opposition to ANF, plus delay (caused by referral to ENDC) and intervening new nuclear capabilities, would probably combine to make agreement impossible.

An agreement might be signed, and would have some effect in slowing proliferation; doubtful that determined nations would forever refrain from testing.

Agreements are possible but not likely; if signed they, too, would slow spread, but some nations would, in time, withdraw.

None.

Modest disarmament measures might lower US-Soviet tension and make more co-operation possible, but would not greatly affect proliferation. Eventually, consequences could be as in Course I.

CONSEQUENCES

COURSE III

1. (a) U.S. pressure and slowed proliferation elsewhere would keep FRG in line for an extra 5-10 years (and perhaps longer). This could be at the cost of amicable U.S.-FRG relations. More hopefully FRG interest in, and progress toward, reunification might reduce pressures for acquisition of nuclear weapons.

(b) Extreme French irritation at U.S. opposition to testing would make withdrawal from NATO more likely; thus, so long as de Gaulle lives, France would be unlikely to join ANF and continuing French resentment might even preclude subsequent participation.

(c) If USSR really was persuaded U.S. was prepared to hold the line on German acquisition of nuclear weapons, progress toward European settlements and German reunification might be possible despite ANF (though realization of peaceful reunification would be impossible with Germany in the ANF and strong NATO).

(c) With proliferation slowed elsewhere, and FRG in check, other European nuclear capabilities would be much delayed.

2. (a) An optimum package including guarantees might stop India from going ahead with a nuclear program for at least 3 to 5 years. This would have desirable effects in Pakistan and elsewhere. A determined stand by India against nuclear proliferation could have a big impact on other countries. Unfortunately, even the present program might not succeed over the long term, and an eventual Indian nuclear decision would result in similar decisions in Pakistan and elsewhere.

(b) Similar results for Japan as in the case of India, but with a greater probability of long-term success, due to greater Japanese industrial strength and organizational capabilities.

(c) Such a program might be able to delay Israel/UAR acquisition indefinitely, assuming no sharply heightened security problems or intervening outside assistance to UAR. All of Africa might remain free of nuclear weapons.

(d) Other nations might be kept in line, the critical factor probably being success with India. Weapons acquisition would probably be delayed at least 5-10 years.

3. (a) Soviets would probably initially insist on abandonment of ANF concept. U.S. would have to face the question very early. If U.S. and Soviets could agree on an NDNA measure, an agreement with most nations other than Chinese and satellites, and perhaps France, would probably result. This agreement, coupled with other measures, could have an increasingly stabilizing effect.

(b) An agreement would probably result if a consensus could be reached with Soviets on inspection, which might also be useful in conjunction with other disarmament measures.

(c) Nuclear Free Zone agreements would probably result in Africa and Latin America and would serve to reinforce other agreements; there would be

a fair chance of extension to the Arab-Israeli area. U.S. could probably adjust at relatively low cost to a curtailment of transit rights.

(d) None.

(e) Modest U.S.-USSR reductions could probably be agreed upon; they would diminish tensions and make greater U.S.-USSR cooperation possible; they might have marginal effect upon proliferation incentives.

4. (a) External safeguards on Euratom would hamper European developments and possibly enhance psychological restrictions on national programs; if controlled to Euratom's collapse, independent programs might arise as substitutes. In either case, French and other European resentment could result, especially during de Gaulle's lifetime. Effective external safeguards on Euratom would remove a significant and notorious exception to the IAEA system.

(b) It will be difficult to obtain enough leverage on Nth nations and their other suppliers to ensure complete success with external controls (France and China will be very unlikely to cooperate and others might not also; IAEA controls may not turn out to be completely effective even if established). Yet even partial success would serve to delay development of basic weapons technology and make decisions to undertake weapons programs more difficult.

5. (a) Reduced emphasis on tactical nuclear weapons will create a Western European need for U.S. (and Soviet) reassurances and (possibly) compensatory Soviet moves. In the absence of such measures and movement toward detente, European incentives for independent nuclear capabilities could increase.

(b) British, and particularly French, might balk at PALs.

(c) (1) No defense system could prevent deaths of millions, even at the hands of lesser powers; broad but thin ABMs plus SAMs plus shelters (at a cost of \$5-10 billion) might limit potential damage to the U.S. or the USSR from lesser powers to 10-20 million deaths; sophisticated system (at a cost of \$30 billion) would do better but might upset U.S.-Soviet stability.

6. (a) France would be furious; would proceed with programs with only modest delays; might withdraw from NATO. Improbable that she would join ANF in de Gaulle's lifetime. The example to Nth nations would be present, but might be marginal unless we went even further.

(b) U.K. would probably cooperate; U.K. White Paper would have a desirable effect but not a very significant one since most countries would have an interest in nuclear capabilities to deal with less sophisticated threats than that of the USSR. U.K. might willingly agree to give up special relationship in an ANF context.

(c) It would be a long time before China would cooperate, and in the meantime, the pressures on India and Japan would continue.

(d) Soviets could prove unwilling to alter policies, such as hostility to any form of ANF, and competition with the Chinese could lead them to even more intractable positions. However, their long-range interests in stopping simultaneous nuclear encirclement by both the Chinese and the Germans might lead to limited but effective cooperation with the U.S.

Overall

This course should succeed in substantially retarding proliferation (bringing a pause of perhaps 10-15 years). Inability to arrive at a non-spread agreement (due to problems with ANF or for other reasons) would substantially reduce possibilities of success. Permanent success would probably depend on subsequent movement toward disarmament which in turn would require bringing France into concert with her neighbors and the eventual growth of responsibility in China. The latter event may be remote.

The principal costs would be:

(1) Temporary (and perhaps indefinite) alienation of France; resentment of FRG, and perhaps India and Israel, over U.S. pressures; and irritation of other Nth nations over controls and pressures for reactor safeguards.

(2) Risk that guarantees to India might involve us in conflict with China.

COURSE IV

(1) FRG would probably be willing to accept neutralization with reunification, particularly if under US pressure. Soviets might or might not agree, and pressures would be required for GDR. If reunification proceeded, German nuclear aspirations would be at best temporarily abated, although a united Germany may not long be willing to remain militarily and politically subordinated if it proved impossible to get weaker powers (e. g., UK and France) to renounce nuclear weapons.

(2) The consequences for France are as in Course III, but even more so; NATO would be radically altered; an Atlantic Alliance of sorts might continue, with or without the absorption of UK and French deterrents.

(3) Soviet security problems would be greatly reduced at first; there would probably be looser Soviet control over the satellites, along with increased Western orientation. Apparent risks include Soviet concern and possible forceful intervention if a united Germany fails to pursue neutrality or carry out agreements restricting armaments if a violent uprising in one or more of the satellites occurs.

(4) Proliferation would probably be halted in Europe, assuming no rearming of Germany and no major proliferation elsewhere.

India would not develop weapons so long as the Chinese capability remained crippled; and might be deterred even thereafter by the Chinese example. India would, however, be under renewed pressure if the Chinese capability were revived and China continued her belligerent course.

Japan would respond similarly to India.

Israel-UAR (and the rest of Africa) could be controlled if we demonstrated our commitment to follow through on our threats and guarantees and if India and Japan stayed in line.

Other nations would follow.

As in Course III, but with greater probability of success.

As in a. above.

As in a. above.

Problems would be similar to those under Course III.

An approach to minimum deterrence would be useful in US-Soviet relations and would have some psychological benefits for proliferation in terms of Great Power self-denial. The risk would be that we might make a first rank deterrent appear easier to obtain.

COURSE IV

Problems would be similar to those under Course III.

As in a. above.

As in Course III.

Would eliminate physical security problems.

Consequences as in Course III, but greater French hostility and possibly increased example value for Nth nations.


Consequences as in Course III.

Might serve as a powerful influence upon Nth nations, and would reduce or eliminate pressures upon India and Japan so long as the capability remained impaired. Risk of nuclear retaliation on US or on Taiwan or elsewhere in Far East, probably extremely small. Risk of conventional response in SEA. Permanent elimination of the capability would be impossible; a single attack could make it more difficult than ever to bring Chinese to responsibility; consolidation of Afro-Asian hostility likely. Lessened tensions with Soviets unless attacks on China made some Soviet response seem appropriate.

Overall

Course IV may offer a substantially greater possibility of halting proliferation in Europe than Course III; but final success there as well as in the Far East and elsewhere may in the end depend upon success with China. Course IV probably has a far greater chance of containing proliferation in Asia, but it is not clear that even this course will succeed there. The principal additional costs and risks of Course IV seem to be these:

- (1) Even greater difficulties with France.
- (2) Danger of instability in Europe arising from a re-united Germany that may intervene in Eastern Europe or that may be unwilling to accept a military status inferior to great powers.
- (3) Risks and political costs of attacking Chinese nuclear facilities as balanced against the necessity of controlling Chinese nuclear capabilities and the unlikelihood of China's voluntary cooperation within the foreseeable future.



PROBLEM AREAS

1. EUROPE AND NATO

a. MLF/ANF

b. Alternatives (if ANF fails)

2. OUTSIDE EUROPE

a. India

b. Japan

c. Israel/UAR

3. MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS

a. NDNA

b. Comprehensive Test Ban

c. Nuclear Free Zones

d. No-first-use Policy

e. U.S. - USSR

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4. PEACEFUL USES

a. EURATOM

b. IAEA and Bilaterals

5. U.S. WEAPONS POLICIES

a. Overseas Deployments

b. Physical Security

c. R&D

6. POLICIES TOWARD EXISTING
NUCLEAR POWERS

a. France

b. U.K.

c. Chinese

d. USSR

COURSE I

(a) MLF/ANF - Build up NATO without independent nuclear forces (NSAM 322). Fold UK deterrent into ANF and leave a place for France.

(b) Alternatives (if ANF fails) - Try to hold the line by:
increased nuclear consultation, including joint planning and targeting;
place FRG on Standing Group; more FRG spaces at SHAPE Omaha.

If these fail, be prepared to accept independent German or French-German nuclear forces.

(a) India - Assist with offensive and defensive nuclear-strategic capabilities; alternatively:

- (1) Assist national nuclear-strategic capability
- (2) Assist national nuclear capability and provide/sell delivery systems (e.g., TFX, MMRBM)
- (3) Provide/sell delivery system and maintain pool of "emergency nuclear weapons"
- (4) Encourage eventual Asian MLF
- (5) Provide/sell ABMs separately or with above actions

(b) Japan - Same alternatives, though not necessarily in parallel; possibility of Japan taking lead in Asian security.

(c) Israel/UAR - Work for reciprocal abstinence; avoid guarantees or sanctions; no direct assistance on nuclear-strategic systems; consider sales of ABMs/SAMs to balance offensive capabilities.

(a) NDNA - Nominal support, but no U.S. initiative. Oppose treaty inconsistent with actions under 1. and 2., above.

(b) Comprehensive Test Ban - No U.S. initiative. Insist on adequate inspections and provisions for Plowshare.

(c) Nuclear Free Zones - Support in Latin America and Africa (including Arab-Israel) only if no restrictions on transit rights affecting friendly or multilateral forces. No U.S. initiative.

(c) No-first-use Policy - None.

(e) U.S. - USSR -

- (1) Maintain strategic forces adequate to deter cumulated Nth nation capabilities and each other
- (2) Attempt to reduce areas of friction between U.S. and USSR while increasing areas of peaceful cooperation
- (3) Strengthen peacekeeping by great powers (e.g., greater role for security council)
- (4) Establish joint warning and identification systems

COURSE II

(a) MLF/ANF - Build up NATO without independent nuclear forces (NSAM 322). Fold U.K. deterrent into ANF and leave a place for France.

(b) Alternatives (if ANF fails) - Try to hold the line by:
increased nuclear consultation, including joint planning and targeting;
place FRG on Standing Group; more FRG spaces at SHAPE-Omaha.

More or better bilateral nuclears (e.g., longer-range missiles under two-key control).

Work to prevent German nuclear capability.

(a) India - Minimum U.S. military commitments; assist alternative prestige projects; no assistance on nuclear-strategic systems; no Asian MLF; continue economic and conventional military assistance; dissuasion.

(b) Japan - Reassert present defense commitments; otherwise, same as India.

(c) Israel/UAR - Work for reciprocal abstinence; mix of guarantees and sanctions; no assistance on nuclear strategic systems.

(a) NDNA - Support actively so long as consistent with NSAM 322 and NATO bi-laterals; defer treaty drafting to ENDC; encourage consistent unilateral declarations.

(b) Comprehensive Test Ban - Possible U.S. initiative; support with adequate verification; Plowshare if possible.

(c) Nuclear Free Zones - Support in Latin America and Africa (and for Israel-Arab States) if no restrictions on transit rights affecting U.S. and friendly forces.

(d) No-first-use Policy - None.

(e) U.S. - USSR - Push fissile materials cut-off (verified);
Push strategic delivery vehicle freeze (verified).

COURSE III

ACTIONS

- (a) MLF/ANF - Build up NATO without independent nuclear forces (NSAM 322). Fold U.K. deterrent into ANF and leave a place for France. Also encourage and support German initiatives toward reunification. Official publication of NSAM 322 contents. Convey to Soviets U.S. intent with regard to U.S. veto and European clause.
- (b) Alternatives (if ANF fails) - Try to block German efforts toward nuclear capability with independent force or in concert with France by:
- (1) Increased nuclear consultation, including joint planning and targeting; place FRG on Standing Group; more FRG spaces at SHAPE-Omaha
 - (2) More or better bilateral nuclears (e.g., longer-range missiles under two-key control)
 - (3) Broader role for NATO, both militarily and in non-military areas
 - (4) Threat of U.S. withdrawal

(a) India -

- (1) Military guarantees against nuclear attack (with Soviets? Under UN or NDNA auspices?)
- (2) Push India into leading role in non-spread treaty
- (3) Support India for permanent UN Security Council seat
- (4) Safeguarded scientific assistance to boost prestige (e.g., space, power reactors, oceanography)
- (5) Reconsider economic aid
- (6) Point out inadequacy of Indian deterrent and way in which it might dilute U.S. or Soviet commitments

(b) Japan -

- (1) Reassert and expand defense commitment
- (2) Joint planning and consultation on U.S. targeting against China
- (3) Mix of incentives, guarantees and implied threats as with India

(c) Israel/UAR - Couple assurances against being overrun by UAR with explicit threats of specific sanctions (e.g., economic, security withdrawal, assistance to UAR) if Israel decides to arm with nuclear weapons. For UAR: Indicate pressures being applied to Israel can succeed only if UAR also avoids nuclear weapons. Make strong efforts to restrain France and FRG missile assistance to Israel/UAR; work for Soviet cooperation in keeping the confrontation non-nuclear.

(a) NDNA - Press for urgent conclusion of non-spread treaty without waiting for resolution of the MLF/ANF issue and recognizing that there may have to be adjustments in the U.S. position on these two objectives.

(b) Comprehensive Test Ban - Support strongly with reduced number of inspections, recognizing that Plowshare may have to be abandoned. Pressure reluctant signers.

(c) Nuclear Free Zones - Support in Latin America and Africa (and for Israel-Arab States); be willing to yield on transit rights, declarations and verification.

(d) No-first-use Policy - None.

(e) U.S. - USSR -

- (1) Fissile materials cut-off with reduced verification
- (2) Strategic delivery vehicle freeze plus significant agreed reductions (e.g., 30%) (verification required)
- (3) Reciprocal halt in ABM, launchers, and SDV deployments or transfers (for, e.g., 18 months)

Consider having single inspection quota apply to two or more of above measures.

COURSE III

(a) Euratom -

COURSE IV

(a) MLF/ANF - German reunification on basis of NATO or U.S. guarantee of Western Soviet boundary, or failing that, neutralization under 4-power guarantees and inspection; Central European nuclear free zone; large reductions of conventional forces (and other East-West arms control and disarmament agreements); if possible, abandonment of U.K. and French independent deterrents or American-British-French ANF.

(a) India -

- (1) Military guarantees (with Soviets? Under UN or NDNA treaty auspices?)
- (2) Push India into leading role in non-spread treaty
- (3) Support India for permanent UN Security Council seat
- (4) Safeguarded scientific assistance to boost prestige (e.g. space, oceanography)
- (5) Threaten cut of economic aid
- (6) Point out inadequacy of Indian deterrent and way in which it might dilute U.S. or Soviet commitments

(b) Japan -

- (1) Reassert and expand defense commitment
- (2) Joint planning and consultation on U.S. targeting against China
- (3) Mix of incentives, guarantees and implied threats as with India

(c) Israel/UAR - Couple assurances against being overrun by UAR with explicit threats of specific sanctions (e.g., economic sanctions, security withdrawal, assistance to UAR). For UAR: Indicate pressures being applied to Israel; that they will succeed if UAR also avoids nuclear weapons; but that if UAR has bombs, Israel must have them too. Make strong efforts to restrain France and FRG missile assistance to Israel/UAR; work for Soviet cooperation in keeping the confrontation non-nuclear.

Use of such additional measures, including force, possibly with Soviet support or under UN auspices, as will preclude (and roll back) proliferation including threats to destroy nuclear weapons facilities, and to abandon new nuclear powers to hostile neighbors.

(a) NDNA - Press for urgent conclusion of non-spread treaty (with precedence over MLF/ANF which should be adjusted to fit).

(b) Comprehensive Test Ban - Support strongly; pressure reluctant signers; abandon Plowshare. Yield on inspection, if necessary.

(c) Nuclear Free Zones - Strongly support Latin America and Africa (and for Israel-Arab States); yield on transit rights if necessary. In addition, negotiations for Nuclear Free Zone in Central Europe and everywhere else except territories of nuclear powers and high seas.

(d) No-first-use Policy - Work for no-first-use agreement. Alternatively, phrase as "outlawing" of nuclear weapons.

(e) U.S. - USSR - Fifty percent SNDV reductions (for West ANF, U.S. only, or both); consider minimum deterrence (China with none); UN Police Force.

- (2) Attempt to reduce areas of peaceful cooperation
(3) Strengthen peacekeeping by great powers (e.g., greater role for security council)
(4) Establish joint warning and identification systems

COURSE I.

- (a) Euratom - Encourage and support without external safeguards.
- (b) IAEA and Bilaterals - No pressure to tighten up on IAEA or other safeguards if such action will impede U.S. transfers or cause U.S. foreign policy problems.
-
- (a) Overseas Deployments - Actions consistent with 1. and 2., above.
- (b) Physical Security - Continue PAL installation on overseas weapons; consider providing PALs, membranes, etc., to others, including USSR.
- (c) R&D -
- (1) Continue development of damage-limiting systems, including broad but thin ABM coverage (possibly a sophisticated system later)
 - (2) Warning and identification systems relevant to Nth nation capabilities
 - (3) Limited range strategic delivery systems (MMRBMs, TFX) for others
-
- (a) France - Withdraw NSAM 294; consider providing test and design data to France subject only to narrowly construed restrictions in partial test ban treaty; tie to European objectives. Encourage merger in ANF.
- (b) U.K. - Encourage merger into ANF.
- (c) Chinese - Deplore, criticize and belittle nuclear capabilities and isolate politically and economically, while building up Indians and Japanese.
- (d) USSR - Maintain technological export controls.

COURSE II

- (a) Euratom - Encourage and support without external safeguards.
 - (b) IAEA and Bilaterals -
 - (1) Urge nations to accept IAEA safeguards
 - (2) Continue conversion of U.S. bilaterals to IAEA
 - (e) Open more U.S. power reactors to IAEA safeguards
-
- (a) Overseas Deployments - Case-by-case review; consider holding line in Europe under revised NATO strategy proposed by Secretary McNamara.
 - (b) Physical Security - Continue PAL installation on overseas weapons.
 - (c) R&D - Consider Chinese threat in ABM decision in 1965 or later.
-
- (a) France - Case-by-case for France (extend to other countries) (narrow interpretation of NSAM 294); encourage merger in ANF.
 - (b) U.K. - Encourage merger into ANF.
 - (c) Chinese - Deplore, criticize and belittle nuclear capabilities, and isolate politically and economically.
 - (d) USSR - Maintain technological export controls.

(2) Strategic delivery vehicle freeze plus significant agreed reductions (e.g., 30%) (verification required)

(3) Reciprocal halt in ABM, launchers, and SDV deployments or transfers (for, e.g., 18 months)

Consider having single inspection quota apply to two or more of above measures.

COURSE III

(a) Euratom -

- (1) Exert greater pressure on Euratom to obtain satisfactory U.S. verification of safeguards (including possible use of plutonium sale as leverage).
- (2) Work toward Euratom acceptance of IAEA safeguard system (including possible conditioning U.S. assistance on Euratom acceptance IAEA safeguards).
- (3) Consider extension of IAEA operational activities to plant operation, for example, international plutonium separation plants.
- (4) Consider "leasing" rather than local ownership of fuel elements

(b) IAEA and Bilaterals -

- (1) Increased U.S. efforts to build up IAEA, including broader responsibilities, larger budget and improved technical capabilities
- (2) Greater pressure on all nations, including supplying nations, to accept IAEA safeguards on all reactors and separation plants with offer in return to extend safeguards to additional U.S. facilities

(a) Overseas Deployments -

- (1) Push for adoption of revised NATO strategy stressing non-nuclear option and less reliance on tactical weapons followed by reductions in Europe; meanwhile, no further deployments
- (2) Separate nuclear from conventional U.S. forces; publicize
- (3) Information policies minimizing role and importance of nuclear weapons as foundation for later possible no-first-use policy

(b) Physical Security -

- (1) Continue PAL installation on overseas weapons
- (2) Improved safeguards against seizure (e.g., self-destructive weapons)

(c) R&D -

- (1) Reorient development of ABM for possible use against limited threats
- (2) Develop TMRBM for potential U.S. use in Asia

(a) France -

- (1) Press for international measures to impede French program (prohibitions on overflights, etc., related to tests) unless France accepts partial test ban (conflict with NSAM 322?)
- (2) Broad interpretation of NSAM 294 (conflict with NSAM 322?)
- (3) Encourage merger with ANF
- (4) Make available technology of PALs and other safeguards

(b) U.K. -

- (1) Urge White Paper on high cost/low yield of nuclear program
- (2) Push for abandonment of independent deterrent
- (3) Consider repeal of 1958 amendment authorizing assistance to advanced nations
- (4) PALs for U.K. weapons

(c) Chinese - High-level intensive study to resolve the dilemma implicit in:

- (1) The need, over the long term, to bring China into arms control agreements, and to recognize her and admit her into the UN;
- (2) The immediate risk of rewarding nuclear accession and thereby impelling India and others toward a nuclear weapons decision

(d) USSR - Consider immediate approaches to Soviets seeking cooperation on a broad basis on non-proliferation and disarmament, and possibly on achieving national and regional stability in areas where respective vital national interests are not involved. Make available technology of PALs and other weapons safeguards.

nuclear powers and high seas.

(d) No-first-use Policy - Work for no-first-use agreement. Alternatively, phrase as "outlawing" of nuclear weapons.

(e) U.S. - USSR - Fifty percent SNDV reductions (for West ANF, U.S. only, both); consider minimum deterrence (China with none); UN Police Force.

COURSE IV

(a) Euratom - No U.S. support for projects without IAEA safeguards.

(b) IAEA and Bilaterals - Strengthen IAEA; no bilaterals; universal application of IAEA safeguards.

(a) Overseas Deployments -

- (1) Selective U.S. withdrawal of nuclears, including major reduction of tactical weapons
- (2) Separation of nuclear from conventional U.S. forces
- (3) Information policies minimizing role and importance of nuclear weapons
- (4) Consider no-first-use policy, possibly with "own soil" or self-defense exceptions

(b) Physical Security -

- (1) PALs for British and French and exchange of information on safety and control techniques with USSR
- (2) Improved safeguards against seizure - e.g., self-destructive weapons

(c) R&D - Consider inspectable limitations on military nuclear R&D.

(a) France - Alternative: Either membership in ANF or renunciation of nuclear force development, supported by sanctions, including physical blockade of test preparations (with tacit Soviet agreement).

(b) U.K. - Membership in ANF and/or renunciation of independent nuclear force.

(c) Chinese - Bomb facilities; follow by offering inducements to normalization, including UN Security Council seat (compensated by addition of Indian seat, too).

(d) USSR - Encourage continuing improvement of relations by all reasonable means, and seek progress in lessening the arms race still further.

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Secretary Baker

Current
Policy
No. 1261

The New Russian Revolution: Toward Democracy in the Soviet Union



United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

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Following are remarks by Secretary Baker before the International Affairs Committee of the Supreme Soviet and the question-and-answer session with members of that committee, Moscow, February 10, 1990.

Members of the committee, ladies and gentlemen: It is a high honor for me and my country to have this opportunity to be with you today. I come before you as a representative of the United States of America. But I also come before you as a witness—a witness testifying on history's behalf. Testifying to you as a witness to a revolution—a revolution among your peoples, a revolution in relations between nations, and a revolution in human consciousness. As President Bush and I have said over and over again: We wish you success in your revolution of *perestroika*, *glasnost*, and, above all, democratization.

For what we are witnessing in this land, and in the lands of central and Eastern Europe, is a transformation of man's understanding of man. Before *perestroika* and the people-power revolutions of 1989, the center ruled ruthlessly and sometimes irrationally, ever fearful that the individual would assert his spirit, ever fearful that reason and the truth would triumph over dogmatism and the lie. Driven by a profound sense of

insecurity, the center egotistically reserved to itself every conceivable decision; in effect, stealing away the peoples' choice. Eventually, this concentration of power impoverished these lands as the center grew more and more bloated and the people became more and more lean.

In this world turned upside down, in this world of darkness at noon, if you will, words lost their honest meaning. Indeed, 54 years ago, the new Soviet Constitution made this body the supreme governmental authority in the land. But while in word, the Supreme Soviet governed the people, we all now sadly know that, indeed, they were ruled by someone else.

But today, things are different. We see words fulfilled. Today, we see reason's return. Today, I come before the Founding Fathers of a new Soviet Union—a new Soviet Union which you are building.

This unprecedented opportunity to appear here today symbolizes what I hope will become an enduring new era, not only in Soviet politics but also in Soviet-American relations. As you—the elected representatives of the Soviet people—assert the peoples' power and make the choices that ultimately belong to them, universal, democratic values are taking root here. And the rooting of these values in institutions like this one is

securing your nation against the insecurities of the past in ways that no single leader, however well-intentioned, can. As I quoted my friend Foreign Minister Shevardnadze when I spoke in Prague on Tuesday: "Only an advanced democracy can give guarantees against the abuse of power and can secure a nation against repression."

Strengthening the power of the Supreme Soviet can be one step forward that advances democracy. It is an essential step, because a working legislature embodies the basic values of democracy: sanctity of the individual; respect for those with different beliefs; the supremacy of the rule of law as reason's triumph over arbitrary rule in political life; and the right of the people to determine their fate through their freely elected representatives. The free exchange of ideas in an open, public legislated debate tempers political passions and encourages the solution of society's problems through dialogue, not through force. In this way, and through its critical oversight functions, a legislature holds the government accountable to the people.

In my country, that is precisely what the Congress does. It holds me accountable to the American people. Repeatedly—far too often for anyone but a

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mathematician to calculate—I am requested to appear before the committees of the House and Senate. Repeatedly, I am questioned on everything from our behavior toward this great nation to the activities of a clerk in a small, remote consulate somewhere in the world. Repeatedly, I travel to Capitol Hill to fulfill my obligation to the people of the United States of America.

This obligation, in my view, firmly underpins our policy toward the Soviet Union. As I noted, President Bush and I have said on several occasions we very much want *perestroika* to succeed. In part, we wish *perestroika* well because *perestroika* and the "new thinking" promise Soviet foreign and defense policies that are fundamentally less threatening to the American people than the hostile Stalinist approaches of the past. This is, of course, in the interest of the American people. But *perestroika*, and especially *glasnost* and democratization, are also creating Soviet internal policies that allow the Soviet people the freedom they deserve. In just 5 short years, your peoples are enjoying freedom and liberty in a way that—at least to a foreign observer—seems unparalleled in Soviet history.

Consequently, the essence of American foreign policy toward the Soviet Union is a search for points of mutual advantage that will create enduring improvements in our mutual relations. We can transform the Soviet-American relationships by moving away from confrontation and through dialogue to cooperation, as Foreign Minister Shevardnadze has phrased it. Let me be clear: Differences and conflicts will remain. But the hostility of the past can be replaced by understanding and even empathy. And even when we disagree, every dispute need not be turned into a crisis and every crisis need not raise the specter of war. In the cold war, every crisis was seen as a very, very dangerous threat. In tomorrow's peace, let us remember that each crisis can be an opportunity—an opportunity to build a better world.

Let me now, if I might, discuss the areas where we believe we can most productively find these points of mutual advantage between the United States and the Soviet Union.

First, in Europe, we would like to work with the Soviet Union and the other countries of the continent to end the unnatural division of Europe, to create a Europe which is both whole and free.

In the revolutions of 1989, President Gorbachev's far-sighted policy of noninterference is an important influence in a very, very turbulent situation. By encouraging peaceful reconciliation in the region, President Gorbachev's actions have played a vital role in supporting creation of legitimate governments. These legitimate governments happen to be the key to stability and the key to peace. As I said in Prague, these are peaceful, democratic revolutions. We should all work together to make sure that they remain so.

One way that this committee of the Supreme Soviet can help, in our opinion, is to take up our proposal to send Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) observer delegations to the elections in central and Eastern Europe this spring. Observer delegations can ensure that the elections are free, that they are fair, and that the elected governments are legitimate in the most basic sense of that word.

Second, in regional conflicts, our diplomacy aims for political and not military settlements to the various disputes that continue to threaten global stability. We are making progress together on some disputes; for example, in southern Africa and Southeast Asia. But we remain especially disturbed by the military shipments that your government continues to send to those seeking military solutions to conflicts in regions that the United States considers vital to us.

Quite frankly, the American people and their congressional representatives have trouble understanding how your government can afford to send billions of rubles of assistance to countries like Cuba and Nicaragua, just so they can support the subversion of our democratically elected neighbors. This is even less comprehensible when it happens at a time when your people clearly need these scarce resources put to good use at home. One of the functions that our Congress exercises most carefully is the review of our foreign aid budget, especially to critical regions. And if you'll permit me to say so, I think it would be good if you did the same with regard to military assistance to Central America.

Third, in arms control, we can make solid progress to control not only nuclear arms but conventional and chemical weapons as well. Much of my time in Moscow this week has been devoted to negotiations on the strategic arms reduction treaty, a treaty whose basic provisions we hope to have agreed by the

time our Presidents next meet in June of this year. We also can find mutual advantage in a conventional forces agreement that will ensure a balance of forces in Europe and that will codify a more stable and predictable strategic relationship there.

On chemical weapons, President Bush has presented a practical proposal that provides the best way for banning the horrific weapons from the face of the earth. I am gratified that today the United States and the Soviet Union have issued a joint announcement embracing the key elements of the President's initiative. We also want to cooperate with your government more effectively on the question of missile proliferation to Third World countries.

Over the longer term, security will be enhanced when our military budgets are open to all. In Prague, I suggested that we look into ways in CSCE to open up the military budgets of all 35 CSCE member states. Legislative committees like this one have a vital role to play, ensuring that the people's money is wisely spent.

Fourth, we may have something to offer you in your attempts to build a state which is based on the rule of law. I do not claim in any way that American democracy is perfect. It is the inherent nature of a democracy that it must always strive to be better. But we do have a great deal of experience to share on some issues, especially translating the protection of individual rights into legal codes and institutionalizing the operation of pluralist political institutions. In our view, the party plenum's repudiation of special political or legal means to preserve the party's monopoly on power was a tremendous step toward democracy in the Soviet Union.

Fifth, we've been exploring with your experts how we can provide technical cooperation in transforming your command-administrative system into one with certain characteristics of a market-based economy. Continuing exchanges will be helpful, but some legal changes need to be made also for cooperation to flourish.

We also need to expand and accelerate our cooperation in combating environmental problems that threaten the welfare of all of us.

In these five areas then, I think we can find points of mutual advantage for both the Soviet and the American people. I cannot promise and, of course, no one can promise that our search for cooperation will always be rewarded. But I can

say this; the American people and the people of the Soviet Union have great respect for each other's achievements. Each of us is heir to great historical and cultural traditions. Yet for over 40 years, we have waged a cold war against one another.

Now is the time, if I might suggest it, to put the legacy of struggle behind us. Today, we face a different struggle, and we face it in a fast changing world. Together, we must try to understand each other. Together, we must try to agree where possible and to work together based on that agreement. And together we must search for opportunities to expand our cooperation.

Now is the time for us to build a new legacy. Now it is time to move beyond the cold war.

Chairman Dzasokhov. I thank you for your interesting statement. I believe that this time, it has been imbued with an interest of further advancing Soviet-U.S. relations and, even though you have touched upon in your statement quite a few important aspects regarding the relationship between our two countries and the assessments of the world situation, I am, nevertheless, sure that my colleagues, People's Deputies, have some questions to ask and they could be asked now.

Deputy Enger. In the framework of expanding friendly relations between our two countries, do you think it would be possible for us to organize joint action, humanitarian action to release Soviet prisoners-of-war who are captured by field commanders of the opposition forces? This is not politics or ideology. It is a question of purely humanitarian aid to be provided to people who are suffering in violation of international law.

A. Let me say that I agree with the conclusion of your statement. It is and would be humanitarian action. When I came to Moscow last May, I met with some newly elected members of the Congress of People's Deputies who raised this question with me. When I went back to the United States, I gave some instructions to pursue this matter, and we have, in fact, done so.

We have made inquiries through associates or allies of certain *mujahadin* elements in Afghanistan to see what we could do to be of assistance in obtaining the release of Soviet prisoners-of-war. And I think that we have had here recently some positive results. In any event, we will continue those efforts because we see them as appropriate, as proper, and as humanitarian efforts.

Deputy Burlatskiy. First of all, I would like to thank you for your very interesting statement and particularly for the political support being provided by President Bush and you personally to our *perestroika* and the changes underway in our country and Eastern Europe.

We have to explain to our public opinion and to the Deputies in the Supreme Soviet what is changing, in this connection, in the policies of the United States of America, and our public gets the impression that these changes are inadequate to our steps and our initiatives. In this connection, I would like to ask you a question concerning the plans that the U.S. Administration has with regard to the well-known Jackson-Vanik amendment and creating favorable conditions for our economic cooperation.

Secondly, as regards changing the limitations superimposed during the cold war on the economic cooperation with the Soviet Union by the United States.

And thirdly, and most importantly, concerning a possibility of radically changing in the foreseeable future the military budget. We keep arguing in the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. and representatives of the Ministry of Defense provide serious arguments to the effect that we reduce our military budget and proceed with conversion, the United States does not match our steps.

A. Let me start at the last point you made and say that the military budget of the United States is coming down in real terms. We are seeing a decline in our military budget. The President himself has submitted a budget that represents a decline over prior years. The rate of growth of our military budget was at its peak some 4 or 5 or 6 years ago.

I think you were assuming that the political situation continues to evolve in the manner in which it is evolving. You

will continue to see this approach by the United States with respect to its military spending.

With respect to general economic cooperation, let me simply say that we are now cooperating, I think, across a broad range of economic matters. We initiated, at the U.S.'s suggestion at our ministerial meeting in Wyoming in the United States last September, a process of technical, economic cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union. We have now actively ongoing, or planned for dates specific in the future, the negotiation of a commercial agreement which is a precondition to our waiving Jackson-Vanik restrictions on most-favored-nation treatment.

But we have made it clear that we would like to see that waiver accomplished as soon as possible. It would be helpful to us in that connection if you could finish passage of the free immigration law that I understand has passed the Supreme Soviet on first reading.

But we are negotiating that commercial agreement. We are negotiating a bilateral investment treaty. We are negotiating a tax treaty. And we have other economic agreements on the drawing board for consideration. We think that this is an area where there can be greatly enhanced cooperation between our two countries.

In the area of technical economic cooperation, we have suggested a whole range of different types of exchanges, both visits and exchanges of information, and we've heard back from the Soviet side with respect to many of those—not all of them. But we really stand ready to cooperate in every way that we can economically in order to assist the progress of economic reform in the Soviet Union.

One final comment that gets back to the general question of what are you doing to enhance this relationship and move it forward. One thing that we know for certain and that is, I think, of particular relevance to this committee, *perestroika*—the success of *perestroika*—would benefit from a stable, international environment, and we are doing what we can in that regard by close consultation with my counterpart; by close consultation, indeed, between President Bush and President Gorbachev with respect to some of the regional conflict issues that have existed between us in the past.

In addition to that, we are making, I think, very good progress across the broad range of the arms control agenda.

We have just concluded what I think is a particularly successful ministerial in that regard—a joint statement, if you will—between the United States and the Soviet Union with respect to the total elimination of, first, the significant drawdown and then, ultimately, the total elimination of chemical weapons. We are now in a position to lead the world jointly toward this goal. I think that's a significant thing.

We are coming closer and closer together with respect to a conventional forces agreement. We are very close on questions of tanks, of artillery, and armored personnel carriers between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The manpower proposal that President Gorbachev gave me yesterday, in my meeting with him, is remarkably close to a similar proposal that President Bush had advanced only a week earlier. We still have some significant differences with respect to aircraft. But if we are able to conclude the Warsaw Pact and NATO—to conclude a conventional forces agreement, this will enable both of us to make savings in defense expenditures and perhaps apply those savings in other areas.

We've made very good progress toward a strategic arms treaty, resolving some issues that existed between us for many, many years. We worked very hard over the course of the last 2 days. We finished last night at midnight. And we're getting some of these issues out of the way.

All of this, I think, will help to continue to move us from a relationship of competition to one of cooperation.

Deputy Neyland. I have three questions for you and I will try to be brief. One, my colleagues and I in the committee are concerned by the statement by the U.S. side concerning the fact that after you have ratified the 1974 and 1976 agreements concerning nuclear testing, you intend to suspend, perhaps for some time, the negotiations with the Soviet Union to get a comprehensive test ban. I am interested in this. What do you intend to do? When the 1974 and 1976 agreements are ratified, will it be a long pause, and so on?

My second question concerns Panama. I do not want to speak about the laws that the United States violated, but I am convinced that, as head of the State Depart-

ment, you must have weighed the positive and the negative aspects in taking these decisions. I would like to inform you of one negative aspect, which you probably didn't take into account.

It is this: In this country, and I am speaking in terms of the American categories—we also have our hawks and doves—and the actions of the United States in Panama provided additional arguments to our hawks, especially after the top summit meeting in Malta when we had the impression that our relations have undergone a qualitative change. And then, all of a sudden—I do not want to characterize your intervention in any terms—your intervention in Panama happened.

There is no question that this will complicate, in our parliament, the consideration of our proposal to proceed along the road of disarmament. Because as it is, there are forces in this country that believe that the Soviet side, and personally Comrade Gorbachev, are doing more than you do.

I would request a third question because I am from a Baltic Republic, and my question concerns a Baltic Republic. President Bush, in late January, spoke about the Baltic Republics and Azerbaijan. I have an article, a leading article from *The Washington Post*, that wrote that [inaudible] by recognizing that that has an internal question of the Soviet Union, Mr. Bush, and I quote: "He was sticking to the road of—he blessed the movement along the peaceful road." This is a basic question because there are very many versions concerning the present position of Washington as regards the Baltic Republics.

A. Let me say that those are three very good questions, and I welcome the opportunity to address them all. Let me start with the Baltic question.

The position of the United States with respect to the Baltic States is, and has been, that they were illegally occupied by Soviet troops in 1939 as a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, and it's our understanding that that pact has, indeed, been criticized by many here in the Soviet Union—acknowledged, in fact, by the Supreme Soviet last year. This forceable seizure, of course, led to the incorporation of the Baltics into the Soviet Union in 1940. We've never recognized that

incorporation. We continue to fail to recognize that incorporation.

We have always felt that the Baltic peoples should have the right to determine their future freely, peacefully, and democratically, and we have urged, and continue to urge, the Soviet Government and the Baltic peoples to seek a peaceful political settlement of this conflict. Now that is the position of the United States with respect to the Baltics. It hasn't changed; it's been the same since 1940.

With respect to the question of a comprehensive test ban agreement, let me simply say that it's the view of the United States that as long as nuclear weapons are necessary to secure peace by deterring aggression, and I do think we have to recognize that the nuclear deterrent has, to some extent at least, been responsible for the fact that we have enjoyed some 40-plus years of peace. But as long as we think nuclear weapons are necessary as a deterrent to maintain the peace, some sort of testing is going to be necessary. If you are going to maintain credibility of that deterrent, it's also needed if you are going to ensure that the weapons you maintain are reliable and safe. You can't be sure of that unless you have some sort of access to testing.

However, having said that, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed in 1987 to a step-by-step approach for limiting nuclear testing. The United States remains committed to that step-by-step approach; we have not changed that. We expect at the June summit to take the next step, which will be the signing of the protocols to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. The United States has not abandoned, as a long-term goal, a comprehensive test ban. That is our position with respect to nuclear testing.

With respect to Panama, let me simply say that we know that that created certain problems here in the Soviet Union, that it created the kinds of problems that you referred to when you say it energized the hawks in the debate that is ongoing in the Soviet Union. But I'd like to make a couple of points about Panama.

Point number one is that Panama is an extraordinarily unique situation. The United States has maintained and continues to maintain by treaty—international agreement recognized by all nations in the world—a military presence in Panama to assure the safe, open, and for conduct of free passage with respect

to the Panama Canal. We have been successful in maintaining that canal free and open to traffic of all nations around the world ever since its existence.

We were faced with a situation where we had a leader of Panama who was an indicted drug-runner—a thug in effect, if you will—who was harassing U.S. citizens—a long period of harassment, not just the killing of our Marine, the arrest of our naval officer, and the sexual harassment of his wife during the course of incarceration—but a long period of harassment of U.S. citizens who were in Panama pursuant to treaty rights.

For 3 years, we had attempted in every way possible to deal with this situation through diplomatic and political means. We had exhausted all remedies in the Organization of American States. Our action in Panama has been overwhelmingly supported by the Panamanian peoples; I think something like 92%, according to some recent poll. The troops that we inserted in Panama will be out by the end of this month—2 months, in and out. And they'll stay out. As a matter of fact, the Panamanian people are telling us, "Don't take your troops out. We want you to stay because we want you to be here to help maintain order."

So, it's not a case of our enforcing our will against the will of the Panamanian people. We took care of Noriega, that's true. And we used force and enforced our will against Noriega, but not against the Panamanian people. I would simply conclude that by making the same proposal that I made yesterday to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: please send a delegation from the Supreme Soviet, and this committee would be the appropriate committee. Go to Panama. Take a look for yourselves. See if you disagree with what I have said about what the Panamanian people want.

One final point. Noriega thwarted the will of the Panamanian people expressed in a free election. I don't know whether you saw it on your television here in the Soviet Union, but after Panama had a free election and Endara and Billy Ford and Calderon were elected, the dictator Noriega would not let the results of the election affect him. Instead, he sent his goon squads out to beat these people up. And there are pictures of the candidates now, who were elected by the Panamanian people, bloody in the streets. The democratic process was aborted and perverted by this man. All of these things I cite in some detail so that you know the reason for what we think was an

extraordinarily unique circumstance. We hope you will go to Panama. We hope that the Supreme Soviet will send a delegation there so that you can see the situation for yourselves.

Deputy Arbatov. It was with satisfaction that I heard your statement in general and that part in particular, where you spoke about the need to get rid of mutual hostility. I thought that very important because during the cold war, we nourished and raised many people on the basis of the enemy image. We taught them to see the enemy on the other side and this still exists today. And I should say it nourishes the military-industrial complex and the cold warriors and also extreme conservatives in both countries.

It seems to me that at this time—and I think we are beginning to sense it, in trying to do—we should bear in mind that when you address your own audience and justify your military requests, the need for reinforcing your alliance, etc., you are heeded not only by people in your own country, but also in foreign countries. Sometimes it leads to interpretations which could hardly be described as helpful for our relationship or for the great cause that we have started.

Now my question; it has to do with disarmament. Frankly speaking, I myself do not believe that through negotiation, we will be able to reach tangible disarmament. I think it is only the decision by the governments of the two countries and their national policies, their restraint, their understanding that no more weapons must be manufactured and that no armaments should be maintained more than necessary can result in such a situation. As to negotiations, they can only consolidate such determination, even though negotiations are important in and by themselves.

So my question is this. Why, so far, some things still remain for the United States to be sacred cows? For example, naval arms, which are untouchable and are not even subject to discussion, because you are a naval power. We are a land power. We have our own sacred cows; namely tanks, but we have

deprived them of this shroud of sacredness. I think you could take the same approach. I'd like to hear your opinion on this.

Do you see any prospect in the foreseeable future for complete withdrawal of Soviet and U.S. troops from Europe?

A. Two questions. One is naval arms control and one is complete withdrawal of U.S. and Soviet troops from Europe.

Let me say with respect to the latter, just so everyone understands. U.S. troop presence in Europe is maintained because our allies ask us to be here, and the minute that ceases to be the situation, U.S. troops will no longer be in Europe. It's not a case of our having a burning desire to do this. We do it because of our commitment to our alliance and our commitment to our allies. And the prospects for a continued U.S. troop presence in Europe is directly related to the attitude of our allies with respect to that question.

Right now, I would tell you that many countries in Western Europe and, in fact, some countries in Eastern Europe and, in fact, I would suspect that the view pertains to some extent here in the Soviet Union, all see the presence of U.S. forces in Europe as a potential source of stability. So that's the best way that I know how to answer your question with respect to the withdrawal of forces.

The question with respect to Soviet forces is one for you to answer. I have said that I do not think that there necessarily should be a linkage between the two. The Soviet Union will have major forces in Europe—that is, in the European part of the Soviet Union, in any event. When American forces go home, if they should go home, they are a long way away across an ocean and getting them back here is much more difficult than seeing the reintroduction of Soviet troops into Europe outside that part of Europe that is in the Soviet Union.

And that takes us right into the next question—the other question you asked which is naval arms control. The reason we have problems with naval arms control is because we are, to some extent, an island nation surrounded on two sides by oceans. Some people say, you are a two-ocean maritime power. You can say that, but the fact of the matter is that throughout the 200-year history of the United States, our links to the rest of the world have been our Navy. It is fundamental to our existence. It is very, very important in maintaining our lines of

communication to everyone else; everyone else save, I suppose, for Canada, perhaps, and Mexico.

Much, if not most, of our naval forces are directed to protecting the far-flung interests of the United States around the world that are completely unrelated to the Soviet Union. And, therefore, we do not see it as an element or component of the East-West dimension. You are to a much greater extent—and you acknowledged it in your question, I think—a land power. You never have relied as heavily on naval forces as has the United States. We do have some useful agreements respecting navies, such as the Agreement on Prevention of Incidents at Sea and things like that.

I hope that answers your question with respect to the problems we have in getting into naval arms control because we don't see our Navy as that much of a factor in the East-West equation. But we see it as absolutely indispensable to us in connection with our relationships with the rest of the world.

Marshal Akhromeyev. My question was originally the same as the other question posed by my colleague Neyland. In view of your explanation that nuclear system testing makes it possible to develop more reliable and safer nuclear systems, I have this question to pose—an additional question. As of today, we know that in the world, there is such a vast nuclear potential that would be enough many times to destroy everything on earth.

My question is this: On the first of August last year, the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. adopted an appeal to the U.S. Congress to declare a moratorium on all nuclear explosions and to ban all systems used in nuclear testing, to be followed by—when our delegation visited the U.S. Congress, our delegation met with Mr. Schifter [Richard Schifter, Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs] and the Helsinki Commission. They clarified to us that that was the prerogative of the State Department of the U.S. Administration. So let me ask you: Do you believe it possible to declare an international agreement that would prohibit all types of nuclear weapons and declare a moratorium on nuclear testing, and when do you think it would be possible to do?

A. To declare a moratorium on all testing and to agree on the elimination of all nuclear weapons, is that the question?

Q. [Clarification in Russian].

A. To remain committed to the agreement between us with respect to the step-by-step approach that is to be followed upon the completion of the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty and the other test ban treaty. Once we complete the verification protocols on those two treaties, we have agreed—the two countries—that we will pursue testing limitations with the ultimate long-term goal of a test ban through a step-by-step process. We remain committed to that.

To do what I think you've suggested would take us far beyond a step-by-step approach and would not be something that I think we would be in a position to agree to now for the reasons that I outlined in my prior answer. That is, as long as you see a need for a nuclear deterrent, there will be need for some type of testing. Only when you concluded that you are going to totally eliminate all nuclear weapons can you conclude, I think, that there can safely no longer be any tests. But I think we have an agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States as to how we are going to approach this issue. We intend to live up to that agreement, and we intend to keep as a long-term goal a comprehensive test ban. But we're not going to get there overnight.

Deputy Kugultinov. I saw the new year in Jerusalem and I remember the words, "At the beginning there was the word." "It had life and light," and I remembered our two great powers, and I am saying this deliberately, the Soviet Union and the United States. In Jerusalem there met representatives of the public of almost all countries of this planet, including Americans. Israelis, the Arabs, everybody spoke about the need for the two states—Israel and Palestine—to coexist together, and we saw a great truth therein. How can we help avert death there?

A. You have highlighted one of the most difficult regional problems that we foreign ministers discuss among ourselves every time we get together. It has been a difficult problem for a long, long time. And it will take a great deal of imagination, ingenuity, good will, and commit-

ment on the part of the parties involved to make progress toward a solution. We have been involved very actively and in some depth for a period of 4 or 5 months in trying to create the conditions necessary to bring about a dialogue between Israelis and Palestinians. Because we think there can be no peace in the Middle East until you have Palestinians and Israelis sitting down and talking to each other.

Prime Minister Shamir several months ago presented a proposal for elections in the occupied territories. We felt that proposal had some merit. And we have been working to try and commence its implementation. We have been working with many, many other countries, and we discussed this in quite some detail yesterday at the ministerial. I am pleased to tell you that Foreign Minister Shevardnadze supports our efforts. He made the point, the Soviet side did, that they would like to see this process move forward toward peace.

I hope that we can make some progress here over the course of the next several weeks or months. But we remain committed to trying to get, for the first time, the Palestinians and the Israelis sitting down at the same table, and we think that the proposal for elections in the territories offers us perhaps a vehicle to do so.

Right now, we are having some difficulty with questions such as the composition of the Palestinian delegation, with questions such as what would be the agenda for the discussion. Would it be primarily the modalities of the elections, or would it go further into questions such as what the permanent status of the territories should be, if there were ever to be complete agreement? So these are the things we are working with and wrestling with.

I expect to have some discussions about this when I return to the United States after the meeting that I will be going to on Monday in Ottawa, Canada, to consider the "open skies" proposal and the conventional forces agreement. Hopefully, sometime toward the latter part of next week, we will be able to reengage in this matter.

Deputy Gulamov. We welcome your visit to our country as the continuation of the major work pursued by the U.S. Administration and the leadership of the Soviet Union to bring our countries closer together in international cooperation and so on.

But I would like to ask you a question. In your preliminary address, you said that there is an attitude in your country to *perestroika*. What is this attitude? Do you really think it to be a revolution? Considering the changes in Eastern Europe, the question of the reunification of Germany is actively discussed. We are concerned by this question because the Soviet people have made great sacrifices and reemergence of new fascists in Germany and their attempts to influence the changes in East Germany worry us. We would like to hear your attitude to these developments in East Germany.

A. Thank you for the question. I will address it. But first let me mention one thing that I would like you to know. We have discussed with your leadership the possible approaches to some of the economic issues facing you, some of the economic problems that are confronting the Soviet Union. At Malta we delivered to the Soviet side a list of economic measures that we thought could be taken, if you would consider taking \$15 billion or so that you spend every year in support of Cuba, Cambodia, Angola, Nicaragua, etc. If you took that \$15 billion and applied it in certain ways—and we gave some examples. I just wanted you to know that we had that discussion with your leadership.

With respect to the question of Germany, which you posed, I discussed this yesterday with President Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. We know of your concern, but let me tell you the U.S. position. First of all, we have supported the goal of German unification for over 40 years. It's a part of our support for the concept of a Europe that is whole and a Europe that is free. I said that I think this issue is proceeding much more rapidly than any of us anticipated. And as recently as last December, the election in the German Democratic Republic (G.D.R.) has been moved up to March 18, so they will have an election. It is my sense that shortly after that election, the two Germanys will begin discussions concerning the internal aspects of unification—economic unification, common currency, parliamentary system, where the capital might be, customs agreement, those kinds of things.

I said it is the U.S. view that, while we supported German unification and have for 40 years, we feel it should take place with due regard for the concerns of

Germany's neighbors. I said we felt it should take place within the context of continued membership in NATO. Although we recognize the need for there to be security guarantees with respect to the nonapplication of NATO forces, or nonextension of NATO forces eastward into that part of Germany that is now represented by the G.D.R.

These are all matters that are going to have to be sorted out and worked at. The United States does not support the concept of a neutral Germany. We support, as I have just said, a Germany as a continued member of NATO. Your government will have its own position with respect to this issue. But I've just outlined for you the position of the United States.

Deputy Primakov. You have called on us to change our policies concerning Cuba and Nicaragua. In this connection, I would like to pose my question. Is the United States ready to undertake a public obligation not to use force in Latin America in the future, provided, of course, that events do not threaten—and I would like to emphasize that I am talking about an almost-raped American woman—I mean not threaten the security of the United States?

A. I would certainly be interested in the language of your commitment to cease your support for Nicaragua and Cuba, because I think there is something there we might be able to reach agreement on. The United States has not used force in Latin America, except for this Panama situation, since 1965, unless you want to talk about Grenada as a use of force. But generally speaking, we foreswear the use of force. I have already explained to you why I think Panama was a unique situation. I have already acknowledged to you that I understand how that was perceived here by your hawks.

But let me tell you, we don't see Cuba as a threat to the United States. We know it's not. For that matter, we don't see Nicaragua as a major threat. But both of them are major threats to democratically elected neighbors around them. And both of them continue to support subversion and revolution in neighboring states. They are very much committed, if I may say so, to the old thinking. They haven't changed their thinking.

As I mentioned in the course of our meetings yesterday, there is only one person in the world Fidel Castro criticizes more than he criticizes President Bush and that is President Gorbachev. So we have difficulty understanding why you continue to send MiG-25 fighter planes to Cuba. Cuba is actively engaged in subverting El Salvador and supporting the insurgency of the FMLN [Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front] in El Salvador. And it is these kinds of activities, close to the shores of the United States, that we simply cannot tolerate.

Admiral Sorokin. I have a question in connection with your reply to People's Deputy Arbatov. The U.S. Administration frequently comments on its unwillingness to engage in naval disarmament talks by saying NATO needs an edge in naval forces to make up for the edge of continental countries to ensure the defense of Western Europe by dislocating armaments from the United States.

Can we, on this basis, draw a conclusion that after this imbalance has been corrected in the conventional armaments of the two alliances in Europe, and after their capability for a surprise attack has been eliminated, to engage in offensive operations has been taken care of, can we conclude that in that situation the United States would be prepared to engage in a process of verification of armaments, including naval forces? We are very worried. The NATO people are very worried by these matters. Concerning the strategic offensive arms treaty, it provides for sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) limitations. One gets the impression that the United States intends to take these, in fact, strategic missiles outside the framework of any binding limitations. My question is: Do you think that sea-launched cruise missiles do not represent a threat to the United States of America despite the long coastline of the United States and the coastal positioning of many facilities, etc?

A. It is our view that sea-launched cruise missiles can and do represent a threat to the United States. That does not argue for the inclusion of sea-launched cruise missiles within the strategic arms reduction agreement for the reason that, in our view, they are not verifiable.

There are major unsolvable verification problems in trying to include them within the treaty. But I think we have made, since I've been here in Moscow, very substantial progress on how we are going to handle the problem of sea-launched cruise missiles.

We have essentially agreed with your side that they will be handled on the basis of a declaratory approach. We will declare our sea-launched missiles and agree to keep that declaration up to date. And you will declare yours. This will then be a politically binding commitment even though it is not in the treaty and not subject to verification because we don't have the measures to verify it.

There is a difference between us now on whether we will declare sea-launched cruise missiles with a range of in excess of 600 kilometers which is what you want, or in excess of 300 kilometers which is what we want. And we want to pick up those SLCMs between 300 kilometers and 600 kilometers because we do think they represent a threat to our long shorelines. You put your finger on it and you have just articulated why we would like to see that 600-kilometer limit rather than the 300-kilometer limit.

With respect to naval arms control, the question is not really one of conventional forces agreement in Europe. I have already indicated that the United States does not accept the concept of "linkage" of forces; that is, that there has to be the same number of Soviet troops in Europe outside the European part of the Soviet Union as there are American troops. We reject that for a number of reasons, not the least of which is that you have extensive troop capacity in the European part of the Soviet Union. When we are gone, we are across the ocean.

As long as we have American troops in Europe—and we'll only have them as long as our allies want them—but as long as we have them, we are going to need that naval capacity to communicate with them. So I would not want to lead you to believe we would be amenable to naval arms control just because we get a conventional arms agreement. Our Navy, again, is our lifeline to the world. It has been throughout our history, and it serves a whole host of functions that are not related to the East-West conflict.

Deputy Ryzhov. What assistance could the United States provide in the computerization of the educational sphere in our country, which we badly need.

And, second, do you believe it possible for the experts of our two countries to join in efforts in shaping a reasonable and effective concept of conversion of the defense industries?

A. With respect to the question of defense industry conversion, we had some discussion of that in our talks over the course of the past few days, and I think generally we agree we could confer and talk about that, that it's not easily done. It is not an easy matter to convert a tank factory into a factory that makes baby cribs and we know that and you know that. And there is no reason why we can't have some discussion of the convertibility of the defense with respect to computers for educational purposes. Our position on that will have to be that that would be something in a general sense we would support but we would have to know that the computers to be sent did not or would not have strategic military application.

I said earlier that we are in the process of reviewing our COCOM [Coordinating Committee of Multilateral Export Controls] policies and restrictions. The general idea is that perhaps we can construct a structure that will build higher walls around fewer products so that some things that are not quite as important from a military or a strategic standpoint would no longer be restricted. But the question of computers for education would really come down to whether or not there would be a strategic or military application for those computers.

Deputy Akhromeyev. I have the impression that the activities of the Soviet Union and the United States in the military sphere are not adequate. The Soviet Union has been reducing, over the past 2 years, its armed forces by half a million; that is to say by 12%. It is reducing its military budget of the past 2 years by 14%. The Soviet Union has revamped its military doctrine by making it defensive, and it is actually restructuring its armed forces, while the United States has virtually not reduced its armed forces.

As to the military budget, it is reducing it just a little bit. I don't think it was accidental that you did not cite any specific figures in your response—figures of military budget reduction.

The negotiations on naval arms reductions is something that you refuse to engage in. Forty-five years ago, you surrounded us with military bases. So far, in spite of all our requests, you are not reducing them. So I have this impression that, indeed, while improving relations with us in the military sphere, you are still continuing to act with respect to the Soviet Union from a position of strength. So I wish to know your personal attitude on this, and, second, I would ask you if you would reply more specifically to the question that was posed by Comrade Primakov—that the people of Cuba are afraid of an aggression from the United States, hence Cuba's desires to reinforce its defenses. Is the United States of America already prepared not to use military force, not to invade Cuba, and if that is the case, how can you let it be known to the entire world public?

A. The best answer I can give you on Cuba is to simply tell you that the situation which exists down there has existed since 1962, and we haven't gone in. If we wanted to do that, I think that we have had, during all those years, the capacity to do that.

The Cubans are very aggressive and hostile to the United States in their attitude. That's not so bad, I suppose, since they don't seriously represent a threat to us, but what is bad is that they continue to try to destabilize their neighbors. This idea of promoting revolution and subversion and armed struggle against freely elected democracies is simply not acceptable to the United States of America. It is contrary to everything we have ever believed in. We are simply not going to tolerate it in our hemisphere to the extent that we can avoid it. If we had wanted to go into Cuba, we have had many, many opportunities over the course of in excess of 38-39 years. That would be my answer to your question on Cuba.

You say the United States continues to act from a position of strength. I think that relations between the Soviet Union and the United States are improving because the peace has been maintained through strength. I think it is important in maintaining peace that people know that you will maintain your resolve.

The United States has never had any hostile intentions to acquire territory or to take, to expand our area of influence

around the world. We haven't done that since the end of the Second World War. We don't plan to do it. At one time, we were the only nation in the world that had nuclear power. We believe in peace. We believe in freedom. We believe in democratic principles. But we cannot tolerate countries that actively try to subvert and overthrow democratically elected neighbors.

I think that the defense budget of the United States is declining, as I said. I don't have the exact number for you, but I would argue that your 14% is subject to question. And not because I challenge your word; your word is good. It's only because I am not at all sure that these numbers have been verified. It's only recently, according to your officials, that you have been keeping numbers that would permit you to say that you are reducing your defense budget by 14%.

But in any event, we are both in the process of seeing declines in our defense budgets and our defense expenditures, seeking to use those funds in better ways. We are doing this because there is, indeed, a spirit of cooperation now between the United States and the Soviet Union, not just competition, but more and more cooperation and trust. That's the reason I think that both defense budgets are declining, and I think that's a very healthy situation.

A few words by way of concluding remarks. Just one final thing. You mentioned also that we have surrounded you with bases and we are not doing anything with any of those. The fact of the matter is we are closing some bases, and we have announced the closing of 10 or 12 bases over the course of the past several weeks.

Chairman Dzasokhov. [Inaudible] put forward the idea of exploring the issue in the interests of eliminating military bases which are located abroad, and of military units in general. I, for my part, wish to say, distinguished deputies, that the agreement about today's meeting in the course of our correspondence was reached very fast. And the meeting today, it seems to me, has confirmed our mutual interests in having further opportunities for such broad exchanges on the substance of Soviet-U.S. meet-

ings on major problems of today's international developments.

We took great satisfaction in learning that preparations for—and the meeting between Comrade Gorbachev and President Bush—are underway successfully and that this summer the meeting will take place. We are confident, Mr. Secretary, and we would ask you to convey this to the U.S. Administration that that meeting in Washington will constitute a new, important milestone in the further advancements of a positive relationship between our two countries.

You may have sensed, Mr. Secretary, the tremendous and sincere interest that members of the Supreme Soviet have in terms of gaining a deeper insight into the contents and sphere of our relationship. You were quite right in pointing out that there may arise questions on which we may not agree immediately. But, today, I think we have demonstrated the will to find answers to those questions.

So I wish to promise you that your interesting statements and the exchange of views here will, for a long time perhaps, be commented upon in the rooms of the Supreme Soviet, and then, perhaps, our interest in pursuing a constructive dialogue will be demonstrated further in a course of future visits to Washington by our deputies and by your congressmen to this country.

So through your presence here today, we would like to say that the role of the Supreme Soviet in dealing with forecasting and implementing foreign policy goals of the Soviet state and the concept of new political thinking keep increasing. We should also like to point out that we have a special interest in seeing to it that, in addition to the priority subject to disarmament, we should be moving slowly and gradually toward accumulating specific questions concerning the expansion of the sphere of our bilateral cooperation,

because the conversion of military questions into the sphere of primarily policy-oriented questions should be borne out, of course, by the accumulation of creative aspects of our cooperation.

We would like to note that the questions you have touched upon with respect to the internal processes underway in this country were illustrated by you in terms of Soviet terminology. I can say that, on one hand, we ourselves are the architects of our *perestroika* processes, but, on the other hand, we are very sensitive—and in that sense we are very grateful whenever our foreign colleagues, specifically from the United States of America, take an understanding attitude of the profound and vitally important process of *perestroika* in all spheres of our life.

I would like once again to thank you on behalf of the People's Deputies who are present in this room and to express the wish that you, in your capacity as Secretary of State at this historic stage—while reflecting that will of the peoples of our two countries and together with your colleagues in the Soviet Union—would move further ahead the cause of Soviet-U.S. relations which, of course, must be based on the principles and opinions of equality, mutual advantage, and mutual respect. All the best to you. Have a happy, safe trip back home. All the best to you, your wife, your colleagues; and for my people, I will say that this meeting today is a result of the sincere desire by the Secretary of State to meet with us because today has extended, as it were, the preplanned days of your stay here. So, on your behalf, I thank once again the Secretary of State.
Bolshoe Spasibo. ■

Published by the United States Department of State • Bureau of Public Affairs
Office of Public Communication
Washington, D.C. • March 1990
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: CU, PGDV, PREL, UR

SUBJECT: SOVIET-CUBA RELATIONS AT THE SUMMIT

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: WE ASSUME THE SUBJECT OF CUBA WILL COME UP AT THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT. CUBA AND CENTRAL AMERICA, SOVIET MILITARY AID TO CUBA, CUBAN HUMAN RIGHTS, AND US-CUBAN RELATIONS WILL PRESUMABLY BE AMONG THE POSSIBLE TOPICS. THE FOLLOWING ANALYSIS OF CURRENT SOVIET-CUBAN RELATIONS AND HOW THE SOVIETS IN HAVANA AT LEAST SEE THESE ISSUES MAY BE HELPFUL IN PREPARING FOR THE TALKS. END SUMMARY.

3. OVER THE PAST MONTH, BOTH THE SOVIETS AND THE CUBANS HAVE BEEN GOING TO GREAT LENGTHS TO REFLECT THE STRENGTH OF THEIR ONGOING, ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND EVEN MILITARY TIES.

4. THE MAJOR EVENTS INCLUDE: THE ABALKIN VISIT, THE BAKLAMOY VISIT, THE ANNOUNCED INCREASE IN TRADE THIS YEAR, THE BRIEFINGS AMBASSADOR PETROV HAS GIVEN US AND OTHER WESTERNERS, THE UNVEILING OF THE MIG-29S, CASTRO'S RECENT REPEATED PRAISE OF CUBAN-SOVIET RELATIONS, THE NEWS THAT CUBA WILL TREAT 10,000 CHERNOBYL CHILDREN (EQUIVALENT TO THE US TREATING 250,000) AS WELL AS HUNDREDS OF WOUNDED SOVIET VETERANS, THE VISIT OF CUBAN CHIEF OF STAFF ROSALES DE TORO TO MOSCOW, THE EFFUSIVE PUBLIC TREATMENT OF RECENT SOVIET PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATION AS WELL AS OF THE ANNIVERSARIES OF THE BEGINNING OF CUBAN-SOVIET RELATIONS AND THE END OF WORLD WAR II, AND FINALLY LONG TV RERUNS OF THE APRIL 1989 GORBACHEV VISIT TO HAVANA.

5. AS OBSERVERS ARE QUICK TO POINT OUT, PROBLEMS REMAIN, NOT THE LEAST OF WHICH WILL BE SOVIET ABILITY TO MEET THEIR COMMITMENTS. BUT MOSCOW AND HAVANA HAVE SOUGHT, WITH SOME SUCCESS WE BELIEVE, TO END SPECULATION THAT THE RELATIONSHIP IS TEETERING ON THE BRINK, THAT ECONOMIC TIES WILL SHARPLY DIMINISH, AND THAT THERE ARE SERIOUS POLITICAL STRAINS OVER PERESTROIKA AND GLASNOST.

6. SEVERAL FACTORS ACCOUNT FOR THIS TURN AROUND IN RHETORIC AND PERCEPTION. ABALKIN, WHO WE UNDERSTAND IS A LEADING SOVIET REFORMER, MADE CLEAR THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE A SUBSTANTIAL STAKE IN THE ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP WITH CUBA, ALTHOUGH THEY INTEND TO REDUCE THEIR NET ANNUAL ECONOMIC COST (WHICH HAS BEEN SUBSTANTIAL BUT PROBABLY IN FACT OVERESTIMATED BY THE WEST). THIS LINE WAS ECHOED A FEW DAYS LATER BY CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER

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BAKLANOV.

7. IN ADDITION, MANY OBSERVERS HERE CONCLUDE THAT DESPITE THE FUNDAMENTAL SHIFT IN WORLD POLITICS THAT IS UNDERWAY, MOSCOW BELIEVES THAT AS A GREAT POWER IT HAS A STRONG POLITICAL INTEREST IN ITS SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH CUBA, WHICH IS NOW ITS MOST IMPORTANT ALLY. THE SOVIET'S REGIONAL, THIRD WORLD, AND INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS REINFORCE MOSCOW'S DESIRE TO HAVE THE CUBAN-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP BE PERCEIVED AS A SUCCESS. AT A MINIMUM, GORBACHEV DOES NOT WISH TO BE SEEN TO BE CURTAILING HIS TIES TO CUBA UNDER US PRESSURE. SOVIET CONSERVATIVES, THE "CUBA LOBBY" AND THE MILITARY-INTELLIGENCE COMPLEX ALSO ARGUE THAT STRATEGICALLY AND IN THE FIELD OF COMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPTS CUBA IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN EVER.

8. FINALLY, FROM HERE ANYWAY, ANOTHER KEY FACTOR IS THE EVIDENT SOVIET CALCULATION THAT AN IMPROVEMENT OF US-CUBAN RELATIONS IS VERY MUCH IN THEIR OWN INTERESTS. SUCH AN IMPROVEMENT WOULD PROMISE TO RELIEVE THE SOVIET ECONOMIC BURDEN IN CUBA AND REMOVE CUBA AS AN ISSUE BETWEEN MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON. THE VIEW HAS APPARENTLY WON OUT IN MOSCOW THAT THE WAY TO ACHIEVE THIS IS TO STRENGTHEN NOT WEAKEN PERCEPTIONS OF A FIRM SOVIET COMMITMENT TO CUBA. ONE LOCAL OBSERVER COMPARED IT TO THE US NEED TO SHOW STRONG SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL IN ORDER TO BRING THE ARABS TO SEEK A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT WITH THAT COUNTRY.

9. MEANWHILE, CASTRO, RECOGNIZING THE SOVIET

TIE AS KEY TO CUBA'S ECONOMY AND ITS MILITARY, HAS POURED ON THE CHARM AND CONVINCED ABALKIN AND OTHER SOVIET INTERLOCUTORS THAT HE IS DOING EVERYTHING HE CAN TO ADJUST TO THE CHANGES IN SOVIET TRADE MECHANISMS AND TO INCREASE CUBAN EXPORTS TO THE USSR; THAT HE IS AWARE OF THE NEED TO INCREASE EFFICIENCY AND PRODUCTIVITY; AND THAT HE IS CONSIDERING CAREFUL EXPERIMENTS WITH INCREASED MATERIAL INCENTIVES AND DECENTRALIZATION.

10. EQUALLY OR MORE IMPORTANTLY, CASTRO HAS CONTINUED TO CONVINCED THE SOVIETS THAT CUBA ITSELF POSES NO OBSTACLE TO SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY, WHETHER IN CENTRAL AMERICA OR IN US-CUBAN RELATIONS. THE CUBANS HAVE APPARENTLY TOLD THE SOVIETS THAT THEY UNDERSTAND "THE NEW SITUATION" IN CENTRAL AMERICA FOLLOWING THE SANDINISTA DEFEAT AND THAT THEY AND THE FMLN HAVE WEAKER HANDS TO PLAY. NEVERTHELESS, THEY STRESS TO THEIR SOVIET COLLEAGUES THAT THEY ARE STILL WILLING TO COOPERATE WITH A PEACE SETTLEMENT IN EL SALVADOR AND WITH A BROADER REGIONAL ACCORD IF THERE IS SOME VEHICLE FOR DOING SO. IN ANY EVENT, THEY HAVE CONVINCED THEM THAT THEY WILL NOT BE THE SPOILER IN CENTRAL AMERICA.

11. IN ADDITION, CASTRO HAS APPARENTLY PERSUADED MOSCOW THAT THERE IS SOMETHING TO HIS CHARGE THAT SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE YEAR, THE US HAS ADAPTED A POLICY OF INCREASING TENSIONS WITH CUBA, HOPING TO BRING ABOUT A COLLAPSE OF THE REGIME. TO SOME SIGNIFICANT EXTENT, AMBASSADOR PETROV HAS SEEMED TO SWALLOW CUBAN CHARGES THAT THE "M.V. HERMANN" AFFAIR, TV MARTI, AND THE THREE RECENT US DEFENSE EXERCISES WERE REFLECTIONS OF THE NEW ALLEGED US POLICY.

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12. AT THE SAME TIME, PETROV NEVER MISSES AN OCCASION
TO INSIST THAT CUBA WANTS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE
US AND WILL MEET US OBJECTIVES VIS A VIS CUBA IN
THE EXTERNAL REALM, IF GIVEN AN HONORABLE WAY TO
DO SO. LIKEWISE, THE SOVIETS WOULD LIKE TO SEE
SOME POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS IN CUBA, BUT
DO NOT BELIEVE THE WAY TO ACHIEVE THIS IS BY
DIRECT PRESSURE. TAYLOR

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, ECON, EC, IT, UR, XF, XC, CU
 SUBJECT: ANDREOTTI'S JULY 26 MOSCOW VISIT

1. ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY

2. PRIME MINISTER ANDREOTTI'S

JULY 26 VISIT FOCUSED LARGELY ON EUROPEAN ISSUES DURING THREE HOURS OF PRIVATE MEETINGS. ANDREOTTI SAID AN EC DECISION ON SOVIET ECONOMIC COOPERATION PROJECTS WOULD BE FORTHCOMING AT THE OCTOBER 27 EC COUNCIL MEETING. SOVIET-ITALIAN BILATERAL PROJECTS HAVE BEEN SLOW GETTING STARTED, BUT A JOINT WORKING GROUP WILL STUDY THE QUESTION AND REPORT TO MINISTERS IN SEPTEMBER. IN EXPANDED SESSIONS, GREATER EC-SOVIET COORDINATION ON MIDDLE EAST POLICY WAS DISCUSSED. SHEVARDNADZE EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR THE RECENT U.S. CHANGE OF POLICY ON CAMBODIA. END SUMMARY.

3. ON JULY 27, PROVIDED DCM AND POLOFF WITH READ-OUT OF EXPANDED MEETINGS HELD DURING ITALIAN PRIME MINISTER ANDREOTTI'S JULY 26 VISIT TO MOSCOW. BULK OF ANDREOTTI'S MEETINGS WERE ONE-ON-ONE WITH GORBACHEV, FOR WHICH NO READ-OUT WAS AVAILABLE. SPECULATED THAT MAJOR QUESTIONS AFFECTING EUROPE WERE COVERED IN THOSE SESSIONS.

SOVIET-ITALIAN BILATERAL COOPERATION

4. SHEVARDNADZE OPENED THE EXPANDED SESSION BY EXPRESSING CONCERN THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF MOST OF THE SOVIET-ITALIAN BILATERAL COOPERATION PROJECTS AGREED DURING GORBACHEV'S NOVEMBER 1989 VISIT TO ROME HAD NOT YET BEGUN. THE SIDES AGREED THAT A WORKING GROUP CHAIRED BY VANI D'ARCHIRAFI (PHONETIC) ON THE ITALIAN SIDE AND SOVIET DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OBMINSKIY WOULD BEGIN WORK IN AUGUST TO STUDY THE SITUATION AND REPORT BACK TO FOREIGN MINISTERS AT THEIR SEPTEMBER 15-17 MEETING, WHICH WOULD BE HELD EITHER IN MOSCOW OR ROME.

MIDDLE EAST

5. DE MICHELIS BEGAN BY SHARING HIS IMPRESSIONS FROM THE RECENT EC TROIKA MEETING AND HIS TRIPS TO JERUSALEM AND TUNIS. HE EXPRESSED CONCERN AT THE LACK OF PROGRESS IN RESOLVING ARAB-ISRAELI PROBLEMS, THE WORSENING SITUATION, AND THE RISK OF NEW CONFLICT; HE SAID HE WOULD BE SHARING THESE VIEWS WITH THE U.S. DE MICHELIS APPEALED TO SHEVARDNADZE TO INTERVENE ON THE ARAB SIDE, IN LIGHT OF SOVIET CREDIBILITY WITH THE ARABS, AND EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT ISRAEL IS WORRIED THAT IT MUST NOT BREAK COMPLETELY WITH EUROPE AND THE USSR. HE CITED TWO CHIEF PRIORITIES:

-- THE U.S. AND THE PLO SHOULD REOPEN THEIR DIALOGUE. ARAFAT SEEMED OPEN TO THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME CONCESSIONS, BUT NEEDED SUPPORT TO OVERCOME ARAB AND PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE.

-- IT WAS IMPORTANT TO AGREE WITH THE U.S. ON SOME FORM OF PRESSURE ON ISRAEL TO OPEN A DIALOGUE WITH THE PLO IN SOME FORM.

DI MICHELIS SAW SOME OPENINGS FOR MOVEMENT AMONG CERTAIN ELEMENTS OF THE SHAMIR CABINET.

6. DI MICHELIS ASKED WHETHER SHEVARDNADZE SAW A POSSIBILITY OF COOPERATING WITH THE EUROPEANS, AND NOTED THE POLITICAL AND "PRESENTATIONAL" VALUE THIS WOULD HAVE; SINCE THE EUROPEANS COORDINATED WITH THE U.S., IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO SHOW THAT THE USSR ALSO WAS IN THE GAME. IF SHEVARDNADZE WAS AGREEABLE, DI MICHELIS OFFERED TO PRESENT THIS POSSIBILITY AT

THE NEXT EC POLITICAL COOPERATION MEETING IN SEPTEMBER.

7. DI MICHELIS NOTED EC AGREEMENT TO SUPPORT THE FUND FOR ARAB RECONSTRUCTION IN LEBANON AND ARAB LEAGUE MEDIATION BETWEEN IRAQ AND KUWAIT. IN AN ASIDE, HE REPORTED THAT ITALY AND SPAIN WOULD PRESENT AN INITIATIVE ON MILITARY COOPERATION IN THE SECURITY AREA AT THE CSCE CONFERENCE.

8. SHEVARDNADZE SAID THE EC COULD INFLUENCE THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION NOT ONLY WITH DECLARATIONS, BUT WITH CONCRETE ACTIONS. HE SAW A NEED TO UNITE THE EC, THE U.S., THE UN, PROGRESSIVE ARABS AND ISRAELIS WHO FAVORED PEACE TO TRY TO RESOLVE THE CONFLICT. HE SAID THE SOVIET UNION WAS OPEN TO ANY OPTION. HE EXPRESSED REGRET THAT THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN FORGOTTEN, AND SAID IT COULD BE REVIVED IN CONSULTATION WITH THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE EC. HE FAVORED THE SELECTION OF A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL WITH REAL AUTHORITY TO ACT.

9. SHEVARDNADZE SAID THE OPENING OF CONSULTATIONS ON THE MIDDLE EAST BETWEEN THE EUROPEANS AND THE USSR MIGHT YIELD GOOD RESULTS AND COULD PROVE IMPORTANT FOR ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN DIALOGUE. HE PROPOSED THAT ISRAEL BE GIVEN TO UNDERSTAND THAT IF THERE WERE NO PROGRESS, THEN THE WHOLE MATTER WOULD BE GIVEN OVER TO THE UN.

10. SHEVARDNADZE REPORTED THAT HE WAS IN CONSTANT CONTACT WITH THE U.S. ON MIDDLE EAST QUESTIONS, AND NOTED THAT THE U.S. HAD LIMITED ABILITY TO INFLUENCE

FOIA Exemptions
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OR CHANGE THE ISRAELI POSITION. HE EXPRESSED SOME REGRET AT THE SHELVEING OF THE BAKER PLAN, WHICH HE THOUGHT HAD BEEN AIRD A BIT TOO SOON. HE FULLY AGREED THAT THE USSR SHOULD COOPERATE BOTH WITH THE U.S. AND THE EC, AND SUGGESTED THAT THIS MIGHT BE DISCUSSED AT THE NEW YORK MEETING WITH THE TWELVE FOREIGN MINISTERS ON THE MARGINS OF THE UNGA.

SOUTHEAST ASIA

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11. DI MICHELIS TOLD SHEVARDNADZE THAT SENATOR VITALONE (PHONETIC) WOULD BE GOING JULY 27 TO JAKARTA FOR THE EC-ASEAN MEETING. HE EXPRESSED SATISFACTION THAT THE U.S. HAD ALTERED ITS STANCE ON CAMBODIA, AND SAID THE EC WOULD DO WHAT IT COULD TO HELP CALM ASEAN WORRIES. HE SAID IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO PREVENT THE KHMER ROUGE FROM PROFITING TOO MUCH FROM THIS NEW SITUATION AND TO KEEP THE PRESSURE ON BEIJING.

12. SHEVARDNADZE SHARED DI MICHELIS' PLEASURE AT THE U.S. DECISION ON CAMBODIA, AND EXPRESSED ASTONISHMENT AT THE VIOLENCE OF THE ASEAN COUNTRIES' REACTION. HE SAID THE SOVIET UNION WAS SEEKING NORMALIZATION OF CHINESE-VIETNAMESE RELATIONS. HE MOSTLY AGREED ON THE NEED TO INTERVENE WITH BEIJING TO TRY TO RESTRAIN THE KHMER ROUGE, BUT SAID HE WAS NOT CONVINCED CHINA HAD MUCH LEVERAGE.

EUROPEAN ISSUES/CFE

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13. SHEVARDNADZE EXPRESSED PLEASURE THAT ITALIAN AND SOVIET VIEWS WERE IDENTICAL REGARDING THE NEED TO ACCELERATE THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS SO THEY COULD BE COMPLETED IN SEPTEMBER, SINCE THIS WAS A CONDITION FOR THE PARIS SUMMIT. DI MICHELIS NOTED SOME MISAPPREHENSION REGARDING A KOHL AGREEMENT ON THE NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT. SHEVARDNADZE DENIED ANY SOVIET-GERMAN AGREEMENT ON THIS, SAYING THE SOVIET CHANGE IN POSITION HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH KOHL'S

VISIT. HE NOTED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY TO RESOLVE ALL CFE ISSUES; SOME COULD BE POSTPONED TO THE SECOND PHASE OF CFE TALKS, BUT THESE SHOULD START SOON AFTER THE COMPLETION OF CFE-I.

14. REGARDING CSCE, SHEVARDNADZE CITED TWO IMPORTANT ISSUES: THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE CSCE PROCESS, AND DEFINING THE CONTENT OF THE TWO ALLIANCES' DECLARATIONS. DI MICHELIS NOTED THE NEED FOR A GOOD BALANCE BETWEEN INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF CSCE AND THE EC INTEGRATION PROCESS. HE SAID MANY EUROPEANS WERE WONDERING ABOUT THE KOHL/GENSCHER STANCE TOWARD A NEW STRENGTHENED CSCE, BECAUSE THIS WOULD GIVE GERMANY A CHANCE TO OSCILLATE BETWEEN THE TWO FORA. HE SAID THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT WAS PREPARING A DOCUMENT ON COORDINATION BETWEEN THE TWO EUROPEAN PROCESSES.

CUBA

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15. IN AN IMPROMPTU INTERVENTION, DI MICHELIS ASKED SHEVARDNADZE HOW LONG HE THOUGHT CASTRO WOULD LAST. SHEVARDNADZE REPLIED THAT THIS WAS NOT FOR HIM, BUT FOR THE CUBANS TO DECIDE. HOWEVER, SHEVARDNADZE CAUTIONED AGAINST PUTTING TOO MUCH CREDENCE IN REPORTS OF THE CASTRO REGIME'S DIFFICULTIES; HE SAID THE REGIME WAS MORE POPULAR THAN WAS GENERALLY

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BELIEVED ABROAD. ITS TROUBLES WERE DUE TO POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS. DI MICHELIS ASKED ABOUT THE EMBASSY CRISES IN HAVANA. SHEVARDNADZE ANTICIPATED THAT THE PARTIES WOULD FIND SOME CIVILIZED WAY OUT OF THE SITUATION. AT THIS POINT THE FOREIGN MINISTERS JOINED GORBACHEV AND ANDREOTTI FOR A TWENTY-MINUTE SESSION.

SOVIET-EC RELATIONS

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16. GORBACHEV SAID THE USSR WAS ON THE EVE OF SOME VERY IMPORTANT ECONOMIC MEASURES TO ENCOURAGE FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND CREATE A NEW CLIMATE FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION. HE ENVISIONED RUBLE CONVERTABILITY IN THE NOT TOO DISTANT FUTURE, AND SAID THE FIRST STEPS MIGHT EVEN OCCUR SOON. HE EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING OF THE CONCERNS OF ITALIAN COMMERCIAL PARTNERS

AND SAID THESE WOULD BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION. GORBACHEV CITED THE AREAS OF COOPERATION THE SOVIETS CONSIDERED IMPORTANT: CHEMICAL INDUSTRY, FOOD INDUSTRY, LIGHT INDUSTRY, ENERGY, AND CAR INDUSTRY, ESPECIALLY WITH FIAT.

17. ANDREOTTI THANKED GORBACHEV FOR HIS FRANKNESS

HE SAID ITALY, BOTH ON ITS OWN BEHALF AND IN ITS CAPACITY AS EC CHAIRMAN, WOULD TRY TO ACCELERATE PLANS FOR COOPERATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION. HE HOPED FOR A DECISION AT THE OCTOBER 27 EC COUNCIL MEETING. AT THE CLOSE OF THE MEETING, GORBACHEV NOTED THAT THIS VISIT WAS NOT A SUBSTITUTE FOR AN OFFICIAL ITALIAN STATE VISIT, PLANNED FOR THIS AUTUMN.

18. IN RESPONSE TO DCM'S QUESTION, ANDREOTTI NOTED THAT ALTHOUGH THIS VISIT HAD BEEN EXPECTED TO HAVE A MULTILATERAL EC FOCUS, HIS IMPRESSION WAS THAT THE TALKS HAD BEEN MOSTLY BILATERAL. ANDREOTTI HAD REPORTED ON THE DUBLIN EC MEETING AND THE HOUSTON MEETING, BUT DELORS HAD PROBABLY COVERED ALL THIS GROUND DURING HIS VISIT THE PREVIOUS WEEK.

CONCRETE PLANS FOR COOPERATION, CREDITS

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19. DCM ASKED WHETHER OCTOBER 27 WAS A TARGET DATE FOR COMPLETION OF THE EC STUDY ON SOVIET-EC COOPERATION, OR WHETHER DECISIONS WOULD ACTUALLY BE TAKEN AT THAT MEETING. ANDREOTTI HAD CLEARLY REFERRED TO DECISIONS, THOUGH THIS COULD BE WISHFUL THINKING. DELORS HAD ALSO HINTED AT DECISIONS ON THAT DATE.

20. DCM ASKED FOR DETAILS ON COOPERATION PROJECTS ON FOOD AND LIGHT INDUSTRY. ANDREOTTI GUESSED THAT SINCE GORBACHEV'S AIM WAS TO FILL THE SHOPS, THESE PROJECTS MIGHT INVOLVE DISTRIBUTION. HE NOTED GORBACHEV'S CANDOR AT THE JULY 26 PRESS CONFERENCE IN SAYING THE USSR NEEDED ALL THE HELP IT COULD GET -- BUT NOT CHARITY -- AND GORBACHEV'S REMARK THAT THIS GREAT COUNTRY COULD SUSTAIN A HIGH LEVEL OF FOREIGN DEBT. HE SAID THE SOVIETS NEEDED ROOM FOR MANEUVER SO PERESTROYKA COULD SUCCEED IN A SHORT TIME.

21. DCM ASKED WHETHER THE U.S. ROLE IN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO THE SOVIET UNION HAD BEEN DISCUSSED

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DURING THE GORBACHEV-ANDREOTTI MEETING. WAS
UNAWARE OF ANY SUCH DISCUSSION, BUT THOUGHT IT WAS
POSSIBLE.

22. IN REPLY TO POLOFF'S QUESTION, [REDACTED] SAID A NEW
AREA OF ITALIAN-SOVIET COOPERATION WAS THE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY, INVOLVING ITALIAN
COMPANIES WITH STATE PARTICIPATION. BGM ASKED
WHETHER CREDITS WOULD BE EXTENDED BILATERALLY OR
THROUGH THE EC. [REDACTED] CITED ANDREOTTI'S STATEMENT AT
THE PRESS CONFERENCE THAT THE NEXT ROME CABINET
MEETING WOULD MENTION BILATERAL CREDITS COMPARABLE TO
THOSE PLANNED BY THE FRG. THESE WOULD HAVE TO BE
APPROVED BY THE ITALIAN PARLIAMENT, HE SAID. [REDACTED]
SAID THERE WAS STRONG PRESSURE FROM ITALIAN COMPANIES
WITH SOVIET CREDITS TO USE PART OF THE ITALIAN LOANS
TO PAY OUTSTANDING CREDITS, AS GERMANY WAS DOING.

SIGNS OF THE TIMES
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23. IN A CLOSING ANECDOTE, [REDACTED] RECOUNTED SOVIET
AIRPORT OFFICIALS' EMBARRASSMENT WHEN, JUST PRIOR TO
HIS DEPARTURE FLIGHT, ANDREOTTI ASKED TO MAKE AN
URGENT PHONECALL TO ROME TO INTERVENE IN AN ONGOING
ITALIAN PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE. SHEVARDNADZE
IMMEDIATELY OFFERED THE USE OF HIS CAR TELEPHONE,
FROM WHICH THE CALL WAS MADE.

24. IN ANOTHER SIGN OF THE TIMES, AT LUNCH GORBACHEV
TOLD ANDREOTTI THE OLD MOSCOW JOKE ABOUT A SOVIET WHO
BECOMES DISGUSTED WAITING IN A LONG LINE TO BUY
CIGARETTES. HE GOES OFF TO THE KREMLIN TO KILL
GORBACHEV AND RETURNS TWO HOURS LATER. ASKED WHETHER
HE HAS SUCCEEDED IN KILLING GORBACHEV, HE REPLIES,
"NO, THE LINE THERE WAS EVEN LONGER." MATLOCK

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TAGS: PFOR, PORG, UY

FOIA Exemptions CLASSIFY as () S or () C Sec.
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SUBJECT: URUGUAYAN POSITION AT SAN JOSE

9501608

FOR AMBASSADOR SIRACUSA FROM AMBASSADOR RYAV

1. PEREZ CALDAS CALLED ON ME UNDER INSTRUCTIONS JULY 9 TO PRESENT MEMORANDUM CONTAINING GOU POSITIONS FOR SAN JOSE MEETING. GOU POSITIONS FOLLOW WHAT EMBASSY HAS REPORTED AND ARE CONSISTENT WITH FONMIN BLANCO'S STATEMENT TO ROGERS AND SECRETARY DURING MAY OAS MEETING. GOU PLACES GREAT IMPORTANCE ON HARMONIOUS MEETING TO ACCOMPLISH REVISIONS OF RIO TREATY, CONSEQUENTLY QUESTION OF CUBA SHOULD NOT BE ADDRESSED. GOU WILL SUPPORT CONVOKING RIO TREATY'S ORGAN ON CONSULTATION.

2. I STATED WE UNDERSTAND GOU POSITION, INCLUDING CUBA, AND REITERATED US POSITION WHICH IS TO SUPPORT SUITABLE "FREEDOM OF ACTION" FORMULA AT SAN JOSE ONCE THE PROTOCOL OF AMENDMENT IS APPROVED. OUR BILATERAL POLICY TOWARD CUBA WOULD NOT CHANGE IN THE NEAR FUTURE BUT SETTLING MULTI-

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LATERAL QUESTION OF OAS CUBAN SANCTIONS COULD FACILITATE OUR WORKING ON OUTSTANDING BILATERAL ISSUES SUCH AS FROZEN ASSETS AND US COMPANIES TRADING WITH CUBA. MEMORANDUM BEING POUCHED.

3. PEREZ CALDAS ALSO MENTIONED POSSIBILITY OF GOU 100,000 TON BEEF SALE TO ISRAEL WHICH IS NOW "IN DISCUSSION STAGE". INGERSOLL

Date Printed: 08/05/1998

DOC NUMBER: 8801400

CHANNEL: n/a

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ACTION NEA-04

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USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//USIA ADVISER
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
AMEMBASSY DHAKA
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

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CORRECTED COPY (TEXT)

FOR NEA, P/M, P/RM, P/FW, P/F, P/P, VOA NEWS/CA
STATE FOR NEA/INS
STATE FOR NSC

E.O.12356:N/A
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION REPORT NO. 11

- BEGIN SUMMARY: MAJOR NEWSPAPERS AND GOI-OWNED
ELECTRONIC MEDIA JANUARY 17 FOCUSED ON WASHINGTON-
DATELINED INDIAN WIRE REPORTS ON PRESIDENT REAGAN
SIGNING THE SYMINGTON AND SOLARZ WAIVERS AND CLEARING
DOLS. 480 MILLION U.S. AID TO PAKISTAN. MEANWHILE, A
GOI SPOKESMAN REPORTEDLY EXPRESSED NEW DELHI'S
APPREHENSIONS, NOTING PAKISTAN WHICH WAS A "SCREW
DRIVER TURN AWAY FROM MAKING A BOMB MIGHT GO AHEAD
WITH IT." EDITORIAL REACTION WAS LIMITED BUT HARSH AS
REFLECTED IN THESE HEADLINES, "OPENLY PARTISAN" ("THE
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HINDUSTAN TIMES") AND "(PAKISTAN'S) MASTERLY
REALPOLITICK" ("THE TIMES OF INDIA"). FOLLOW-UP NEWS
REPORTS NOTED INDIA'S MOVE TO ACQUIRE A SOVIET NUCLEAR
SUBMARINE WILL NOT AFFECT U.S. HIGH-TECH TRANSFER TO
INDIA. MEANWHILE, A "HINDUSTAN TIMES" DEFENSE AFFAIRS
COMMENTATOR SAW A "SHIFT" IN THE GOI POLICY OF NOT
ALLOWING ANY NAVAL SHIP WITH NUCLEAR WARHEADS TO VISIT
INDIAN PORTS. THE ANALYST ALSO COMMENTED ON A STUDY
BY JOSEPH CLARE OF THE U.S. ACDA, UNDER THE HEADLINE,

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Dept of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
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"INDIA, A POOR ARMS EXPORTER." OTHER COMMENT FOCUSED ON DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN, KAMPUCHEA, AND NICARAGUA. END SUMMARY.

- U.S. AID TO PAKISTAN

- PRINT MEDIA AND THE GOI-CONTROLLED TV JANUARY 17 HIGHLIGHTED REPORTS ON PRESIDENT REAGAN SIGNING THE SYMINGTON AND SOLARZ WAIVERS AND CLEARING DOLS. 480 MILLION IN U.S. AID TO PAKISTAN.

- UNI, IN ITS LENGTHY WASHINGTON-DATELINED REPORT, MADE THESE COMMENTS: (1) "PAKISTAN HAS THUS BEEN EXONERATED OF VIOLATING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION LAWS WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN AGREEING WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT ASSESSMENT THAT ISLAMABAD 'HAD TO BE PROVIDED AID DUE TO OVERRIDING NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS'."

- (2) "WHILE NATIONAL SECURITY REASONS HAVE BEEN THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S CONSIDERATION FOR RENEWAL OF AID TO PAKISTAN, IT IS LEARNT FROM OFFICIAL SOURCES THAT THE U.S. WAS PROMPTED TO TAKE ACTION 'FACILITATED BY THE LATEST INDIAN ACQUISITION OF A SOVIET NUCLEAR SUBMARINE'."

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- COVERAGE NOTED THE PRESIDENTIAL DECISION WAS CONVEYED BY UNDER SECSTATE ARMACOST TO THE INDIAN AMBASSADOR P.K. KAUL ON FRIDAY. THE U.S. EXPLANATION, UNI ADDED, "DID NOT CONVINCE INDIAN OBSERVERS WHO POINTED OUT THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD DELIBERATELY GIVEN THE WAIVER AT A TIME WHEN CONGRESS IS NOT IN SESSION."

- --FROM DELHI, PAPERS CARRIED THE GOI REACTION, SAYING THE U.S. ATTITUDE HAD ONLY "EMBOLDENED" PAKISTAN TO "BLATANTLY INDULGE IN THEFTS OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL FROM WESTERN COUNTRIES IN THE BELIEF THAT NOTHING WOULD BE DONE WHEN PAKISTAN'S GOVERNMENT ABETTED AND PARTICIPATED IN VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS OF THESE COUNTRIES" (UNI).

- --GOVERNMENT TV REPORTED: "PRESIDENT REAGAN TODAY SIGNED A WAIVER WHICH CLEARS THE WAY FOR THE FLOW OF AID TO PAKISTAN. THIS IS DESPITE REPORTS THAT ISLAMABAD IS DEVELOPING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. ACCORDING TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT, MR. REAGAN SIGNED THE SYMINGTON AND SOLARZ AMENDMENT WAIVERS WHICH CLEARS DOLS. 480 MILLION U.S. AID TO PAKISTAN. TODAY'S DECISION COMES ONLY TWO DAYS AFTER THE STATE DEPARTMENT SAID THAT

Date Printed: 08/05/1998

DOC NUMBER: 88NEWDE 01400

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PAKISTAN HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN THE ARSHAD PERVEZ ATTEMPT TO SMUGGLE NUCLEAR-WEAPONS MATERIAL OUT OF THE UNITED STATES IN VIOLATION OF THE AMERICAN NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY AND EXPORT CONTROL LAWS. THE DECISION ALSO COMES ONLY ONE DAY AFTER THE WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT ORDERED AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE ALLEGATIONS THAT A WEST GERMAN FIRM IS INVOLVED IN ILLEGAL SHIPMENT OF NUCLEAR-GRADE MATERIALS TO

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USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//USIA ADVISER
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
AMEMBASSY DHAKA
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 04 NEW DELHI 01400

FOR NEA, P/M, P/RM, P/FW, P/F, P/P, VOA NEWS/CA
STATE FOR NEA/INS
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E.O.12356:N/A

SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION REPORT NO. 11

PAKISTAN AND LIBYA."

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CHANNEL: n/a

- TV ALSO CARRIED DEFENSE MINISTER K. C. PANT'S REACTION, SAYING "AMERICAN ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN WILL RESULT IN INCREASING TENSION IN THE REGION AS IT WORSENS THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT OF THIS AREA."

- --EDITORIAL COMMENT WAS LIMITED. "THE HINDUSTAN TIMES" UNDER THE HEADLINE, "OPENLY PARTISAN," SAID PRESIDENT REAGAN'S "CERTIFICATE TO CONGRESS THAT PAKISTAN DOES NOT POSSESS NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND, THEREFORE, QUALIFIES FOR AMERICAN MILITARY AND

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ECONOMIC AID IS A KIND OF CALLOUS DISREGARD OF INDIA'S SUSCEPTIBILITIES TO WHICH THIS NATION IS GETTING USED."

- THE EDITORIAL, IN CONCLUSION, STRESSED INDIA "APPARENTLY HAD BEGUN TO ADJUST ITSELF TO AMERICA'S SOUTH ASIA POLICY, UNDER WHICH PAKISTAN REMAINS A FRONTLINE STATE, WITH OR WITHOUT THE AFGHAN ISSUE. BUT SERIOUS DOUBTS WILL NOW ARISE ABOUT THE LIKELIHOOD, OR EVEN DESIRABILITY, OF SUCH ADJUSTMENTS.... IT IS AMAZING THAT THE U.S. SHOULD BE GRUMBLING ABOUT RAISING THE SOPHISTICATION LEVEL OF THE INDIAN NAVY. IT HAD IGNORED INDIA'S PROTESTS WHEN IT GIFTED TO ISLAMABAD THE F-16 AIRCRAFT, RAISING THE LEVEL OF COMBAT AIRCRAFT IN SOUTH ASIA, OR WHEN IT AGREED TO SUPPLY TO PAKISTAN AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING AND CONTROL SYSTEM. WASHINGTON'S UNCONCEALED DESIRE TO PIN INDIA DOWN TO MILITARY VRVY WITH PAKISEANWM INTRODUCES A BRAZENNESS TO U.S. POLICY FOR TYE REGION OF WHICH INDIA MUST TAKE NOTE."

- --"THE TIMES OF INDIA" EDITORIAL, "MASTERLY REALPOLITIK," SAID: "ISLAMABAD HAS CONSISTENTLY EXPLOITED THE LOOPHOLES AND FISSURES IN THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME BY APPEALING TO THE COMMERCIAL INTERESTS OF PRIVATE FIRMS AND OPERATORS. NOR IS THE SUCCESS OF PAKISTAN'S PURSUIT PREMISED ON THEFT AND DECEPTION ALONE. ABLE, INDEED CONSUMMATE, DIPLOMACY HAS BEEN ITS MAIN UNDERPINNING. OR ELSE, IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO EXPLAIN THAT THROUGH SKILFUL LOBBYING, PAKISTAN WAS ABLE TO TURN THE TABLES ON INDIA IN THE U.S. CONGRESS DURING THE RECENT DEBATE ON THE AID PACKAGE. WHILE A PART OF THE SUCCESS SURELY COMES FROM THE VERY SPECIAL AND CLOSE RELATIONSHIP

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BETWEEN ISLAMABAD AND WASHINGTON, AND THE FORMER'S WILLINGNESS TO MAKE COMPROMISES THAT FAVOR THE LATTER'S DESIGNS, THERE IS JUST NO DENYING THAT GENERAL ZIA HAS PULLED OFF COUP AFTER COUP IN HIS DEALINGS WITH THE U.S., EXPLOITING EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO ADVANCE PAKISTAN'S INTERESTS AND PLANS. IT IS EASY ENOUGH TO CONDEMN ISLAMABAD FOR THE DANGEROUS NUCLEAR COURSE IT HAD ADOPTED, BUT GENERAL ZIA'S RESILIENCE AND ABILITY IS CLEARLY BEYOND DOUBT."

--"THE HINDU" PUBLISHED A STAFFER'S ANALYSIS, "INDIA BUILDING BRIDGES WITH U.S.," WHICH SAID IN PART: "THE LOW-KEY AMERICAN RESPONSE TO THE LEASING OF A SOVIET NUCLEAR-PROPELLED SUBMARINE FOR INDIA AND A SIMILAR INDIAN RESPONSE TO THE WAIVER GIVEN BY U.S. PRESIDENT, MR. REAGAN FOR THE ARMS SUPPLY TO PAKISTAN SEEM TO BE PART OF A NEW STRATEGY OF CLOSENESS WORKED OUT BY INDIAN AND AMERICAN OFFICIALS IN THE PAST TWO YEARS. THE KEY HAS BEEN THE INDIAN INTEREST IN BUILDING BRIDGES WITH THE U.S. FROM THE U.S. SIDE IT HAS MEANT AN INDIAN ACCEPTANCE OF A U.S. ROLE IN ITS DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS FOR BOTH COMMERCIAL AND STRATEGIC REASONS. THE CONTOUR OF THE INDIAN POLICY HAS BEEN MADE AMPLY CLEAR BY THE PRIME MINISTER, MR. RAJIV GANDHI, TO HIS 'LEFT' LEANING ADVISERS AND IT TOOK THE TOLL OF ONE FOREIGN MINISTER AND ONE FOREIGN SECRETARY TO DRIVE THE LESSON HOME.

"NOW, AFTER THE NASTY SURPRISE OF BEING HELD RESPONSIBLE BY A FULL SENATE COMMITTEE FOR PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND HAVING BEEN THREATENED THAT ITS REQUESTS TO THE WORLD BANK AND IMF COULD BE OPPOSED BY

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 USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//USIA ADVISER
 USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
 AMEMBASSY DHAKA
 AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

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FOR NEA, P/M, P/RM, P/FW, P/F, P/P, VOA NEWS/CA
 STATE FOR NEA/INS
 STATE FOR NSC

E.O.12356:N/A

SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION REPORT NO. 11

THE U.S., INDIA IS UNLIKELY TO PUSH ITS POLICY-LINE OF
 THE PAST THREE YEARS OF HOLDING THE U.S. RESPONSIBLE
 FOR CURBING PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM."

- HI-TECH TO INDIA

- LEADING DAILIES JANUARY 17 GAVE PROMINENT
 ATTENTION TO A UNI WASHINGTON REPORT UNDER SUCH
 HEADLINES AS "SOVIET N-SUB LEASE NOT TO HIT U.S.
 HIGH-TECH DEAL," ("THE ECONOMIC TIMES"); "SUB-LEASE
 NOT TO AFFECT U.S. HIGH-TECH TRANSFER" ("INDIAN
 EXPRESS"); AND "U.S. NOT TO STOP HIGH-TECH TRANSFER"
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("THE TIMES OF INDIA").

- THE UNI REPORT SAID IN PART: "THE UNITED STATES
 WOULD NOT ALTER ITS DECISION ON ALLOWING HIGH TECHNO-
 LOGY TRANSFER TO INDIA BECAUSE OF INDIA ACQUIRING A
 NUCLEAR SUBMARINE ON LEASE FROM THE SOVIET UNION.

- "HOWEVER, THE U.S. DISCUSSED WITH THE SOVIET
 SPECIAL NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TASK FORCE OFFICIALS
 THIS WEEK THE LEASING OF A NUCLEAR SUBMARINE TO INDIA.

- "THE STATE DEPARTMENT HERE ON SATURDAY SAID: 'WE
 ARE STUDYING THE CASE, AND ARE IN TOUCH WITH THE

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CHANNEL: n/a

CONCERNED GOVERNMENTS, SOVIET AND INDIAN, ON WHAT THE DETAILS OF THE DEAL ARE'."

- N-WEAPON SHIP VISITS TO INDIA

- "THE HINDUSTAN TIMES" CARRIED DEFENSE AFFAIRS ANALYST MAHENDRA VED'S COLUMN, "N-WEAPON SHIPS VISITING INDIAN PORTS," SAYING "THIRTY NAVAL SHIPS FROM 19 NATIONS CALLED ON INDIAN PORTS, MAINLY BOMBAY AND COCHIN DURING 1987 AS A RESULT OF THE INCREASED MARITIME MOVEMENT IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA."

- OFFICIAL SOURCES, VED WROTE, "DENY THAT THERE HAS BEEN ANY SHIFT IN THE GOVERNMENT POLICY OF NOT ALLOWING ANY NAVAL SHIP WITH NUCLEAR WARHEADS, BUT IT IS APPARENT THAT THE POLICY FORMULATED IN THE TIME OF THE LATE MRS. INDIRA GANDHI HAS BEEN GIVEN A VIRTUAL GO-BY. NO QUESTIONS ARE BEING ASKED ABOUT THE TYPE OF WEAPONRY THAT THE SHIPS CARRY. IT IS TAKEN FOR GRANTED THAT THE VISITING SHIPS, IRRESPECTIVE OF UNCLASSIFIED

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NATIONALITY, ARE AWARE OF INDIA'S SENSITIVENESS TOWARD NUCLEAR WEAPONS."

- VED CONCLUDED: "WHILE THE SOVIET SHIPS HAVE BEEN CALLING ON INDIAN PORTS, AS ELSEWHERE, THE USSR DOES NOT HAVE THE CONCEPT OF 'REST AND RECREATIONS'. CONTRARY TO REPORTS, THEY HAVE BEEN CALLING AT VISAKHAPATNAM. A WELL-PLACED SOURCE EMPHASIZED THAT FOREIGN SHIPS WERE GENERALLY BEING DISCOURAGED FROM CALLING AT VIZAG..."

- INDIAN ARM EXPORTS

- "THE HINDUSTAN TIMES" DEFENSE AFFAIRS WRITER MAHENDRA VED, IN AN ANALYSIS, "INDIA, A POOR ARMS EXPORTER," WROTE: "ALTHOUGH A MAJOR PRODUCER OF MILITARY HARDWARE WITH A POTENTIAL TO AFFECT THE WORLD'S ARMAMENT BUSINESS, INDIA IS A POOR EXPORTER."

- THE ANALYSIS, HE SAID, WAS BASED ON A STUDY BY JOSEPH F. CLARE OF THE U.S. ACDA, WHICH SHOWS THAT THE EXPORTS "PICKED UP DURING THE JANATA ERA, SLUMPED TO ZERO IN 1983, AND HAVE REMAINED AT A FEW MILLION DOLLARS SINCE, BEING A MINISCULE PART OF INDIA'S TOTAL EXPORT EFFORT."

- "YET, THE STUDY NOTED," VED OBSERVED, "THAT INDIA, WITH OVER TWO DECADES' EFFORT AT SELF-SUFFICIENCY, COULD PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE WORLD ARMS MARKET BY ITS MASSIVE INDIGENOUS

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DOC NUMBER: 881400

CHANNEL: n/a

PRODUCTION. IT CAN ALSO BE AMONG THE SELECT THIRD
WORLD COUNTRIES HAVING THE ABILITY TO IMPROVE AND
ADAPT, ABLE TO PROVIDE SERVICES FOR UPGRADATION OF

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USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
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UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 04 NEW DELHI 01400

FOR NEA, P/M, P/RM, P/FW, P/F, P/P, VOA NEWS/CA
STATE FOR NEA/INS
STATE FOR NSC

E.O.12356:N/A
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION REPORT NO. 11

EQUIPMENT ALREADY IN SERVICE. THIS IS SEEN AS AN
ATTRACTIVE PROPOSITION IN A RESOURCE-STARVED THIRD
WORLD. OTHER COUNTRIES IN THIS CATEGORY ARE PAKISTAN,
ISRAEL, BRAZIL, EGYPT AND SINGAPORE. THE STUDY ON
ARMS TRANSFER TO THE THIRD WORLD ANALYSES DATA FOR THE
1976-85 PERIOD AND DOES NOT TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION

Date Printed: 08/05/1998

DOC_NUMBER: 88NEWDE01400

CHANNEL: n/a

THE SUBSEQUENT PERIOD WHICH, IN THE CASE OF INDIA AND ITS NEIGHBORS LIKE PAKISTAN AND CHINA, HAS WITNESSED SIGNIFICANT MILITARY MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS."

- AFGHANISTAN

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- MAJOR NEWSPAPERS JANUARY 18 PROMINENTLY COVERED PM GANDHI'S COMMENT ON AFGHANISTAN DEVELOPMENTS. THE FOCUS WAS ON A UNI REPORT, CREDITED TO THE "NEW YORK TIMES," SAYING, "FOR THE FIRST TIME, PM GANDHI HAS VOICED DISPLEASURE TO AFGHAN LEADERS OVER THEIR UNWILLINGNESS TO YIELD SOME POWER TO THE GUERILLAS." THE DAILY, UNI ADDED, QUOTED DIPLOMATS AS SAYING THE GOI "HAS EVIDENTLY DECIDED THAT A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT CAN SERVE ITS INTERESTS, REASONING THAT ONLY THIS WAY WILL WASHINGTON STOP ARMING PAKISTAN."

- --"THE HINDU" CARRIED NEW DELHI CORRESPONDENT K.K. KATYAL'S VIEW ON INDIA'S "KEY" ROLE IN THE INTERIM SET-UP IN KABUL. HE MAINTAINED THAT WHAT HAPPENS IN AFGHANISTAN IS OF GREATER CONCERN TO INDIA THAN TO EITHER OF THE SUPERPOWERS. RAISING THE QUESTION, WHAT IS NEW DELHI UP TO?, KATYAL WROTE: "SOME SEE BENEATH THE SUDDEN BURST OF ACTIVITY A WELL CONSIDERED PLAN TO LEND A HELPING HAND TO THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHERS IN THE SEARCH FOR AN ACCEPTABLE INTERIM SET-UP IN KABUL AFTER THE SOVIET PULLOUT. ACCORDING TO OTHERS, INDIA SEEKS TO ENSURE THAT THE ELEMENTS CONSTITUTING THE NEW GOVERNMENT ARE WELL DISPOSED TOWARD IT." BOTH THESE THEORIES, KATYAL ARGUED, "ARE PARTLY CORRECT."

- KAMPUCHEA

- A PRESS TRUST OF INDIA (PTI) FEATURE, PUBLISHED IN "PATRIOT" UNDER THE HEADLINE, "KAMPUCHEA MOVING TOWARD A SETTLEMENT," SAID THE MOST IMPORTANT OF ALL KAMPUCHEAN DEVELOPMENTS IS THE FOUR-POINT AGREEMENT BETWEEN PRINCE SIHANOUK AND PM HUN SEN SIGNED LAST

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DECEMBER. THE AGREEMENT, WHICH SUGGESTS, AMONG OTHER THINGS, AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE TO ENSURE PEACE AND STABILITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, "IS A MAJOR BREAKTHROUGH AND THE MOST POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT TO DATE

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ON THE ISSUE. ONE MAY NOW LOOK FORWARD TO AN EARLY
SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM.

- SAN JOSE SUMMIT

- UNDER THE EDITORIAL HEADLINE, "SAN JOSE SUMMIT," THE "HINDUSTAN TIMES" NOTED BY AGREEING TO HAVE DIRECT TALKS WITH THE CONTRA REBELS, PRESIDENT ORTEGA "HAS BROKEN THE DEADLOCK. THE NICARAGUAN PRESIDENT HAS ALSO AGREED TO IMMEDIATELY LIFT THE STATE OF EMERGENCY AND GRANT AMNESTY TO THE REBELS AND REITERATED HIS PROMISE TO HOLD ELECTIONS ON A MULTI-PARTY BASIS AFTER PEACE IS RESTORED. THE BALL IS NOW IN THE AMERICAN COURT. PRESIDENT OSCAR ARIAS SANCHEZ OF COSTA RICA, WHO WON LAST YEAR'S NOBEL PEACE PRIZE FOR AUTHORIZING THE PEACE INITIATIVE, AND THE NICARAGUANS HAVE STRESSED THAT THE PLAN'S SUCCESS IS DEPENDENT ON THE U.S. NOT GIVING ANY MORE AID TO THE CONTRAS. IT IS HOPED THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN, RESPONDING TO THE NICARAGUAN CONCESSIONS, WILL DESIST FROM ASKING CONGRESS TO SANCTION MILITARY AID TO THE CONTRAS." MCGINLEY

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CHANNEL: n/a

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FOR NEA, P/M, P/RM, P/FW, P/F, P/P, VOA NEWS/CA
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USDOC FOR 4530/IEP/ANESA/OSA

E.O.12356: N/A
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION REPORT NO. 33

- BEGIN SUMMARY: NATIONAL DAILIES DURING THE
WEEKEND GAVE WIDESPREAD TREATMENT TO REPORTS ON NEA
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECSTATE ROBERT PECK'S TESTIMONY
REMARKS BEFORE THE HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND
PACIFIC AFFAIRS. STORY EMPHASES AND INTERPRETATIONS
WERE VARIED, DEPENDING ON WIRE AGENCIES' AND
WASHINGTON-BASED INDIAN CORRESPONDENTS' REPORTS, AS
REFLECTED IN SUCH HEADLINES AS "U.S. MOVES ON INDIA,
PAKISTAN N-PLANS" ("INDIAN EXPRESS"); "U.S. NOT TO
PENALIZE PAK" ("THE HINDUSTAN TIMES"); "THREE PAK
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N-REALITIES: U.S. EFFORT TO REVIVE PARITY ISSUE" ("THE
STATESMAN"); "INDIA, PAK NOT MAKING BOMB" ("THE TIMES
OF INDIA"); AND "U.S. DEFENDING MULTI-MILLION AID TO
PAK" ("PATRIOT"). MEANWHILE, DEFENSE SECRETARY
CARLUCCI'S STATEMENTS IN HIS REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE
NEW DEFENSE BUDGET DREW LIMITED COVERAGE, WITH
HEADLINES SAYING "INDO-PAK CONFLICT 'POSSIBLE'"
("INDIAN EXPRESS") AND "U.S. COUNTING ON OPEN PAK
CONFLICT WITH INDIA" ("PATRIOT"). ON THE AFGHANISTAN

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Date 9/28/95 Exemption

ISSUE, THE "TIMES OF INDIA" PUBLISHED HARVEY STOCKWIN'S HONG KONG-DATELINED REPORT, "NEW U.S. CONDITION ON AFGHAN ISSUE LIKELY," BASED ON A USIA WORLDNET INTERVIEW. OTHER ITEMS FOCUSED ON THE SHULTZ-SHERVARDNADZE MOSCOW TALKS, AND PAKISTAN FM NOORANI'S VISIT TO CHINA TO DISCUSS THE AFGHAN ISSUE. NATIONAL DAILIES CARRIED SEVERAL REPORTS ON U.S.-INDIA RELATIONS, INCLUDING A POSSIBLE U.S. CORN SALE. OTHER REPORTS AND COMMENTARIES RELATED TO PRESIDENT REAGAN'S "TROUBLED AIDES"; U.S.-PAKISTAN RELATIONS AND ISLAMABAD'S EFFORTS TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR CAPABILITY; AND U.S. POLICY TOWARD NICARAGUA, THE MID-EAST AND PANAMA. END SUMMARY.

- DAS PECK'S TESTIMONY

- WASHINGTON-BASED INDIAN CORRESPONDENTS MADE THESE OBSERVATIONS: (1) "MR. ROBERT PECK, A SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL, HAS SAID THAT NEITHER INDIA NOR PAKISTAN HAS ACTUALLY TAKEN THE FINAL STEP TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. ACCORDING TO HIM, BOTH THE COUNTRIES HAVE THE TECHNICAL CAPABILITY TO MAKE THE BOMB BUT 'HAVING THE CAPABILITY TO BUILD A NUCLEAR DEVICE IS NOT THE SAME AS ACTUALLY ARMING ONESELF WITH NUCLEAR

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BOMBS'...

- "MR. PECK JUSTIFIED THE PRESIDENTIAL WAIVER OF U.S. NON-PROLIFERATION AMENDMENTS DESPITE PAKISTAN'S ATTEMPTS TO ACQUIRE ILLEGALLY NUCLEAR WEAPONS-RELATED MATERIAL." THE ARTICLE ALSO DEALT WITH PECK'S COMMENTS ON INDIA'S ACQUISITION OF THE SOVIET SUBMARINE AND HIS CALL FOR "INCREASED POLITICAL PRESSURE ... ON BOTH THE COUNTRIES TO REMOVE THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS THREAT POSED BY THE CAPABILITIES THAT THE TWO NATIONS HAD ACQUIRED." (J.N. PARIMOO OF "THE TIMES OF INDIA.")

- (2) "THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION HAS BEGUN 'DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS' WITH CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION TO DISCUSS WAYS IN WHICH BOTH INDIA AND PAKISTAN CAN BE MADE TO ACCEPT INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS ON THEIR NUCLEAR FACILITIES. IT 'CANNOT BE SATISFIED' ANY LONGER WITH THE 'NUCLEAR REALITY' IN SOUTH ASIA. AS THE NUCLEAR PROGRAMS OF BOTH COUNTRIES CONTINUE TO 'EVOLVE', A SENIOR STATE GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL FOR SOUTH ASIA MR. ROBERT PECK DECLARED, THE U.S. 'WILL NOT BE AN IDLE SPECTATOR' TO A SITUATION IN WHICH NEITHER STATE IS BOUND BY ANY INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENT NOT TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR ACCEPT SAFEGUARDS ON THEIR

Date Printed: 08/05/1998

DOC NUMBER: 88NEWDE04457

CHANNEL: n/a

NUCLEAR FACILITIES. CHINA'S NUCLEAR ARSENAL RAISES
 DEEP SECURITY CONCERNS IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN FACES A
 'CURRENT' THREAT FROM THE SOVIET UNION... YET WHEN IT
 COMES TO DEALING DIRECTLY WITH PAKISTAN, THE U.S.
 SINGS A DIFFERENT TUNE." (SHAHNAZ AIYAR OF THE
 "INDIAN EXPRESS").

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- (3) "THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION YESTERDAY ONCE AGAIN DECLARED ITS REGRETS THAT PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES HAD TO BE SUBORDINATED TO THE U.S. NEED FOR PAKISTAN AS ITS SURROGATE AGAINST SOVIET EXPANSION IN SOUTH ASIA--AND ONCE AGAIN TRIED TO EQUATE ANY PAKISTANI EFFORTS AT DEVELOPING A MILITARY NUCLEAR CAPABILITY WITH THOSE OF INDIA.

- "BUT, THIS TIME, MR. PECK QUIETLY INCLUDED THREE UNCLASSIFIED

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DISQUIETING REFERENCES TO PAKISTAN: (1) SHE NOW 'HAS ACQUIRED THE TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES NEEDED TO POSSESS A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE' UNTIL NOW, THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION HAD CONCEDED ONLY THAT PAKISTAN HAD ENRICHED URANIUM BEYOND THE FIVE PER CENT NEEDED FOR PEACEFUL NUCLEAR PURPOSES); (2) PAKISTAN'S DETERMINATION TO SMUGGLE IN EQUIPMENT NEEDED FOR A MILITARY APPLICATION OF THE ATOM (PRESUMABLY FOR A SECOND NUCLEAR FUEL FACILITY) 'GIVES US CAUSE FOR CONTINUING CONCERN'; AND (3) RETIRED PAKISTANI BRIGADIER INAM-UL-HAQ, THE HEAD OF LAHORE'S MYSTERIOUS 'MULTINATIONAL, INC' WHO IS UNDER INDICTMENT BY A U.S. FEDERAL COURT ON CHARGES OF ATTEMPTING TO IMPORT FORBIDDEN U.S. MILITARY NUCLEAR MATERIAL IS--DESPITE ISLAMABAD'S DECLARATION OF HIS HAVING FLED TO PLACES UNKNOWN--'BELIEVED' TO BE STILL IN PAKISTAN. (WARREN UNNA OF "THE STATESMAN").

- --OTHER NATIONAL DAILIES CARRIED WIRE SERVICE REPORTS FROM WASHINGTON. "THE HINDUSTAN TIMES" RAN INDIA ABROAD NEWS SERVICE (IANS) REPORT SAYING IN PART: "A SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL YESTERDAY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT PAKISTAN HAD CLEARLY VIOLATED THE LEGAL PROVISIONS CONCERNING CONTINUING AMERICAN AID BY ILLEGAL PROCUREMENT OF RESTRICTED NUCLEAR MATERIAL BUT DECLARED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE PENALIZED FOR IT.

- "HOWEVER, THE OFFICIAL, MR. ROBERT A. PECK, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR SOUTH ASIA, REFUSED TO PROVIDE CONGRESS WITH A CATEGORICAL ASSURANCE THAT ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN WOULD BE CUT OFF IF ISLAMABAD ENGAGED IN ANY FUTURE CLANDESTINE EFFORTS TO ACQUIRE RESTRICTED NUCLEAR MATERIAL.

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- --PRO-MOSCOW "PATRIOT" CARRIED A JET AND PTI REPORT SAYING: "THE UNITED STATES IS TRYING TO LINK THE INDIAN ACQUISITION OF A LEASED SOVIET NUCLEAR SUBMARINE WITH MULTI-BILLION DOLLAR U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN."

- SECDEF CARLUCCI'S REPORT TO CONGRESS

- A PTI WASHINGTON STORY, CARRIED IN THE "INDIAN EXPRESS" AND "PATRIOT," SAID IN PART: "UNITED STATES DEFENSE SECRETARY FRANK CARLUCCI HAS TOLD THE U.S. CONGRESS THAT PAKISTAN 'MAY BE DEVELOPING' THE ABILITY TO TEST A NUCLEAR DEVICE AND THAT AN OPEN CONFLICT BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN 'IS ALWAYS A POSSIBILITY'.

- "STILL, MR. CARLUCCI INSISTED YESTERDAY, THE U.S. MUST 'EXPAND OUR STRONG SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH PAKISTAN', ADDING, HOWEVER, THAT THE U.S. HOPED TO EXPAND ITS 'MILITARY RELATIONSHIP' WITH INDIA.

- "HE BRACKETED PAKISTAN WITH INDIA AND CHINA AS 'THE MAJOR MILITARY POWERS IN SOUTH ASIA'. HE SAID AN OPEN CONFLICT BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN AS A RESULT OF LONG-STANDING DIFFERENCES WAS ALWAYS A POSSIBILITY.

- --EDITORIALLY, PRO-MOSCOW "PATRIOT" UNDER THE HEADLINE, "ALIBIS FOR CONFLICT?" SAID: "UNITED STATES DEFENSE SECRETARY FRANK CARLUCCI HAS MADE ANOTHER EFFORT IN THE PROPAGANDA OVERKILL HE HAS PLANNED TO PAINT PAKISTAN AS AN IMMINENT VICTIM OF INDIA'S AGGRESSIVE DESIGNS. HIS LATEST REPORT TO THE U.S.

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CHANNEL: n/a

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E.O.12356: N/A

SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION REPORT NO. 33

CONGRESS IN DEFENSE OF HIS BUDGET DEMANDS READS LIKE A
 HAIR-RAISING ADVENTURE STORY WITH INDIA -- THE VILLAIN
 OF THE PIECE -- ACQUIRING ALL MANNER OF WEAPONS TO
 CRUSH THE POOR LAMB, JUNTA-LED PAKISTAN, UNLESS THE
 GOOD SAMARITANS LIKE MR. CARLUCCI OF THE REAGAN
 ADMINISTRATION ARE ALLOWED TO RUSH TO THE JUNTA'S AID
 WITH MORE WEAPONS AND CASH."

- THE EDITORIAL ALSO SAID: "BUT THIS IS NOT AN
 INNOCENT EXERCISE. IT WILL MEAN, IN PLAIN LANGUAGE,
 IMMEDIATE AND LARGE U.S. DEFENSE DEPARTMENT ORDERS FOR
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THE WEAPON MANUFACTURERS WHO HAVE, OF LATE, BEEN
 SENDING SIGNALS TO THE WHITE HOUSE TO WARN THAT
 SEVERAL THOUSAND MORE WOULD BE ADDED TO THE ARMY OF
 U.S. UNEMPLOYED IF THERE IS ANY REAL CUT-BACK IN THE
 MANUFACTURE OF WEAPONS FOR EXPORT. AND HENCE THE NEED
 TO INVEIGLE THE U.S. CONGRESS INTO ACCEPTING THE
 MAKE-BELIEF."

-

AFGHANISTAN

- NEWS REPORTS FEBRUARY 22 FOCUSED ON THE
 SHULTZ-SHERVARDNADZE MOSCOW MEETING WHICH, AMONG OTHER
 THINGS, WILL "SETTLE ON A DATE" FOR THE

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REAGAN-GORBACHEV SUMMIT MEETING, AND PAKISTAN FM NOORANI'S TALKS WITH CHINESE LEADERS ON THE AFGHANISTAN ISSUE.

--"THE TIMES OF INDIA" PUBLISHED HARVEY STOCKWIN'S HONG KONG WORLDNET REPORT, UNDER A FOUR-COLUMN HEADLINE, "NEW U.S. CONDITION ON AFGHAN ISSUE LIKELY," SAYING IN PART: "THE U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE, MR. GEORGE SHULTZ, APPEARED TO ADD A NEW CONDITION TO CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN, AS HE TALKED WITH JOURNALISTS IN TOKYO, SYDNEY AND HONG KONG ON THE U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY'S WORLDNET TELEVISED SATELLITE HOOKUP.

"MR. SHULTZ DISCLOSED THAT HE WOULD BE VISITING ASIA IN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS, 'MAYBE MORE THAN ONCE' WITHOUT INDICATING WHICH CAPITALS WOULD BE ON HIS ITINERARY. HE MAINTAINED THAT THE SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS HAD REACHED A STAGE OF 'MATURITY'...

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"MR. SHULTZ DECLINED TO CONFIRM WHETHER WASHINGTON HAD ALREADY PROMISED MOSCOW IT WOULD STOP ITS ARMS SUPPLIES TO THE GUERRILLAS, WHEN THE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL BEGAN. HE SAID: "WE STAND WITH THE FREEDOM FIGHTERS IN AFGHANISTAN'.

...U.S. MILITARY AID TO THE AFGHANS WILL CONTINUE AS LONG AS THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT COMPLETED THEIR WITHDRAWAL. MR. SHULTZ COULD ALSO HAVE UPPED THE ANTE IN THE DIPLOMATIC BARGAINING, BY LINKING SOVIET AND AMERICAN MILITARY AID, AND DE-LINKING THE U.S. ARMS SUPPLY FROM THE SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWAL. THE RUSSIANS HAVE SO FAR SAID NOTHING ABOUT THEIR AID PROGRAM TO KABUL AFTER THEIR WITHDRAWAL IS COMPLETE.

--"THE HINDUSTAN TIMES" ED-PAGED FORMER FOREIGN SECRETARY MAHARAJAKRISHNA RASGOTRA'S ANALYSIS, "SOVIET PULL-OUT: IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH ASIA." HE DISCUSSED THE WIDE RANGE OF POSSIBLE SCENARIOS IN THE WAKE OF A SOVIET PULL-OUT FROM AFGHANISTAN, SUGGESTED PAKISTAN ASSIST KABUL IN THE REPATRIATION OF AFGHAN REFUGEES, AND ASKED NEW DELHI TO AVOID "NEEDLESS INVOLVEMENT" AND TO EXTEND COOPERATION TO ISLAMABAD. HE COMMENTED: "FOR INDIA IT IS A TIME FOR ABUNDANT CAUTION, FOR AVOIDING UNNECESSARY INVOLVEMENT AND FOR EXTENDING FRIENDLY COUNSEL AND A HAND OF FRIENDSHIP AND CONCILIATION TO OUR NEIGHBOR, PAKISTAN. AS IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SOVIET UNION'S DECISION PROGRESSED, A LOT OF THINGS WILL BEGIN TO CHANGE IN

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DOC NUMBER: 88NEWDE04457

CHANNEL: n/a

THE REGION INCLUDING AMERICA'S SOUTH ASIA POLICIES?
THESE LATTER WERE CONCEIVED LARGELY IN ANTI-SOVIET
TERMS. ONE OF THEIR EFFECTS WAS TO STRENGTHEN

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AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

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FOR NEA, P/M, P/RM, P/FW, P/F, P/P, VOA NEWS/CA
STATE FOR NEA/INS
STATE FOR NSC
USDOC FOR 4530/IEP/ANESA/OSA

E.O.12356: N/A
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION REPORT NO. 33

PAKISTAN VIS-A-VIS INDIA, BUT INDIA'S CAPACITY TO
UNDERMINE THAT OBJECTIVE BY STRENGTHENING ITSELF
CORRESPONDINGLY WAS UNDERRATED BOTH BY PAKISTAN AND
THE UNITED STATES.

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DOC NUMBER: 88NEWDE04457

CHANNEL: n/a

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- "IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, PAKISTAN'S SECURITY DEPENDS ON A GOOD, EASY AND COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH INDIA. IT IS IN FRIENDSHIP WITH INDIA ALONE THAT PAKISTAN CAN HOPE TO STRIKE STABLE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP WITH HER LARGER NEIGHBOR. WILL PAKISTAN

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SINCERELY OPT FOR THAT ALTERNATIVE? THE ANSWER CAN COME ONLY FROM PAKISTAN; BUT INDIA MUST KEEP NUDGING PAKISTAN..."

- U.S.-INDIA BILATERAL RELATIONS

- "THE STATESMAN" AND THE "ECONOMIC TIMES" UNDER HEADLINE "U.S. AID TO INDIA 'MEAGRE'" RAN A BRIEF PTI REPORT ON U.S. AID TO INDIA. THE WIRE SERVICE REPORTED: "INDIA, WITH A GREATER POPULATION THAN ALL THE OTHER COUNTRIES OF SOUTH ASIA PUT TOGETHER AND MORE POOR PEOPLE THAN ANY OF THEM, IS ONLY THE THIRD LARGEST BILATERAL U.S. AID RECIPIENT IN FISCAL 1989 BEGINNING OCTOBER 1, 1988.

- "THE ADMINISTRATION HAS ASKED FOR DOLS. 620.915 MILLION FOR PAKISTAN. BANGLADESH HAS BEEN ALLOCATED DOLS. 130,276 MILLION.

- "INDIA IS TO BE GIVEN DOLS. 117,567 MILLION (DOLS. 35.5 MILLION FOR DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE, DOLS. 81,567 MILLION UNDER PL--480 TITLE II AND DOLS. 500,000 FOR MILITARY TRAINING IN THE U.S.)"

- --H.R. PRASAD, PRESIDENT OF THE INDO-AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE REPORTEDLY SAID THAT THE MOU FOR TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BETWEEN INDIA AND THE U.S. "HAS GIVEN A TREMENDOUS BOOST TO STRENGTHEN THE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES." HE ALSO OBSERVED THAT THOUGH THE TWO-WAY TRADE DURING 1976-86 RECORDED A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE OF MORE THAN 115 PER CENT, THERE WAS "TREMENDOUS SCOPE" FOR ITS EXPANSION SINCE INDIA'S SHARE IN THE TOTAL U.S. WORLD TRADE IS LESS THAN ONE

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PER CENT. ACCORDING TO PRASAD, SOME 500 U.S. COMPANIES ARE "CLOSELY EXAMINING" PROSPECTS FOR ENTRY INTO INDIA.

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Date Printed: 08/05/1998

DOC NUMBER: 88NEWDE04457

CHANNEL: n/a

- --A PTI HYDERABAD-DATELINED REPORT, AS CARRIED IN PRO-GOVERNMENT "NATIONAL HERALD," SAID AN INDO-AMERICAN PROJECT HAS BEEN PLANNED TO STUDY THE FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE 1987 DROUGHT IN INDIA.

- --THE "FINANCIAL EXPRESS" RAN A CHICAGO REPORT ON PROSPECTS OF THE U.S. LANDING A 200,000 TON CORN DEAL WITH INDIA. ITEM SAID TOUGH COMPETITION FROM ARGENTINA AND INDIA'S NEED FOR NUMBER 2 YELLOW CORN CONTAINING A MAXIMUM 14 PER CENT MOISTURE COULD MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR U.S. EXPORTERS TO LAND THE DEAL.

- --"NATIONAL HERALD" FRONT-PAGE REPORT, "DELHI OR PINDI, BOEING IN FIX," REPORTED IN PART: "THE BOEING COMPANY OF THE U.S. WHICH IS THE MAIN CONTRACTOR OF THE HIGHLY SOPHISTICATED E3A AWACS TO PAKISTAN IS NOW FACING THE DILEMMA OF CHOOSING BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN.

- "BOEING HAS BEEN AN OLD AIRCRAFT SUPPLIER OF INDIA AND THIS COUNTRY HAS GIVEN A GREAT DEAL OF BUSINESS TO THE U.S. COMPANY IN THE LAST 30 YEARS. AS THE QUESTION OF BOEING SUPPLYING THE AWACS TO PAKISTAN IS REACHING THE CRUCIAL STAGE OF FIXING DELIVERY SCHEDULES, THE THOUGHT THAT IF THIS IS DONE THE COMPANY MAY LOSE BUSINESS IN INDIA HAS REPORTEDLY OCCURRED TO THE MANAGEMENT OF THE COMPANY.

- "INDEED CERTAIN QUARTERS HAD COVEYED TO THE

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ACTION NEA-04

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Date Printed: 08/05/1998

DOC NUMBER: 88NEWDE04457

CHANNEL: n/a

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FOR NEA, P/M, P/RM, P/FW, P/F, P/P, VOA NEWS/CA
STATE FOR NEA/INS
STATE FOR NSC
USDOC FOR 4530/IEP/ANESA/OSA

E.O.12356: N/A

SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION REPORT NO. 33

COMPANY THE GROWING DISPLEASURE OF THE INDIAN
GOVERNMENT WITH THE BOEING COMPANY AND CAUTIONED THAT
IF THE COMPANY TOOK INDIAN SENTIMENTS FOR GRANTED IT
COULD LOSE BUSINESS. INDIA HAS ON HAND PLANS TO
MODERNIZE ITS CIVIL AVIATION INDUSTRY SPENDING
SOMETHING LIKE RUPEES 1,500 CRORE IN THE NEXT FEW
YEARS. GIVEN THE TRUST INDIA AND BOEING HAD BUILT
OVER THE LAST THREE DECADES IN EACH OTHER, BOEING
COMPANY CAN REASONABLY EXPECT TO GET A GOOD SHARE OF
THIS BUSINESS...

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- "INFACIT AUTHORITATIVE REPORTS SUGGEST THAT THE
COMPANY MAY CALL OFF THE DEAL WITH PAKISTAN
NOTWITHSTANDING THE EXPENSIVE LOBBYING IT HAS
INITIATED IN FAVOR OF IT."

- REAGAN'S AIDES

- "THE STATESMAN" RAN ON ED-PAGE WASHINGTON
CORRESPONDENT WARREN UNNA'S "LETTER FROM AMERICA,"
SAYING AMERICAN POLITICS "ARE REplete WITH
PRESIDENTIAL AIDES CAUSING EMBARRASSMENT," BUT THE
REAGAN ADMINISTRATION "SLEAZINESS SEEMS TO HAVE TAKEN
QUANTUM LEAPS." A "RECURRING EXPLANATION," UNNA
NOTED, "IS THAT ANY PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION IS
EMPOWERED WITH MANY JOBS TO DISPENSE, MANY GOVERNMENT
GREEN LIGHTS TO HELP ITS FRIENDS. BUT TODAY AS THE
20TH CENTURY NEARS ITS END, THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION

Date Printed: 08/05/1998

DOC_NUMBER: 88NEWDE04457

CHANNEL: n/a

IS IN CHARGE OF A BIGGER GOVERNMENT. A GOVERNMENT WITH
HUGE PURCHASE CONTRACTS TO LET OUT, PARTICULARLY IN
ITS INFLATED DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT, AND A GOVERNMENT
WHERE FAVORED CRONIES HAVE BEEN ENPLACED IN BOTH THE
REGULATORY AGENCIES AND THE REGULATORY COURTS TO MAKE
LIFE EASIER FOR THEIR CONSERVATIVE FORMER BUSINESS
ASSOCIATES STILL PLYING THEIR TRADE IN THE WORLD
OUTS
IDE."

- U.S.-PAKISTAN DEFENSE ISSUES

- LEADING DAILIES FEBRUARY 22 PROMINENTLY CARRIED A
PTI NEW YORK REPORT, ATTRIBUTED TO "INSIGHT" MAGAZINE,
SAYING PAKISTAN IS PROVIDING CERTAIN FACILITIES TO THE
AMERICAN NAVY FOR ITS OPERATIONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF,
AN OFFICIAL OF THE U.S. DEFENSE DEPARTMENT HAS SAID.
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THE REPORT ADDED THAT THE PENTAGON OFFICIAL HAS TOLD
"INSIGHT" MAGAZINE THAT PAKISTANIS ARE KIND ENOUGH
"FROM TIME TO TIME, ON A CASE BY CASE REQUEST BASIS,
TO PROVIDE REFUEL AND REST FACILITIES" TO U.S. NAVY
PATROLS HEADED FOR OPERATIONS IN THE GULF. THE ITEM
NOTED THAT PAKISTAN AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S. JAMSHEED
MARKER HAS DENIED THE REPORT.

- --MANY PAPERS CARRIED A UNI REPORT FROM JAMMU
QUOTING LT. GEN. B.C. NANDA AS SAYING PAKISTANI TROOPS
HAVE DEPLOYED NEWLY ACQUIRED AMERICAN HELICOPTERS TO
THE SIACHEN GLACIER BORDER AREA.

- MAJOR NEWSPAPERS FEBRUARY 21 CARRIED A UNI NEW
YORK REPORT, ATTRIBUTED TO "THE NUCLEAR TIMES," SAYING
U.S. AUTHORITIES, INCLUDING CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ, WERE
AWARE OF PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR SMUGGLING ACTIVITY EVEN
BEFORE ARSHAD PERVEZ'S ARREST BLEW IT WIDE OPEN.
QUOTING AN UNNAMED SOURCE, THE ARTICLE SAID SOLARZ WAS
PROMISED BY PAKISTAN'S FORMER FM YAQUB KHAN THAT
ISLAMABAD PLACED THE U.S. "OFF-LIMITS" TO ITS "NUCLEAR
SMUGGLING OPERATIVES."

- --RELATED NEWS TREATMENT INCLUDED A "TIMES OF
INDIA" FEBRUARY 22 ITEM THAT REPORTS OF CLANDESTINE
SUPPLIES OF ENRICHED URANIUM TO PAKISTAN BY GERMAN
COMPANIES "HAVE SO EMBARRASSED THE FRG GOVERNMENT THAT
IT IS LIKELY TO TAKE A FRESH LOOK INTO THE EXISTING
SYSTEM OF ENFORCEMENT OF NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS."

- U.S. AID TO CONTRAS

Date Printed: 08/05/1998

DOC NUMBER: 88NEWDE04457

CHANNEL: n/a

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FOR NEA, P/M, P/RM, P/FW, P/F, P/P, VOA NEWS/CA
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STATE FOR NSC
USDOC FOR 4530/IEP/ANESA/OSA

E.O.12356: N/A
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION REPORT NO. 33

- "THE TIMES OF INDIA" EDITORIALY DECLARED THAT THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES DECISION TO VETO MILITARY AID TO THE CONTRAS WILL BE "WARMLY WELCOMED" BY THOSE WHO WISH THE CENTRAL AMERICAN PEACE SUCCESS. "DESPITE INTENSE LOBBYING," IT SAID, "REAGAN HAS NOT GOT HIS WAY AND HE MUST SEE THIS AS A SERIOUS POLITICAL DEFEAT. BY THE SAME TOKEN, MANAGUA HAS REASON TO BE PLEASED. HOWEVER, IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO BELIEVE

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Date Printed: 08/05/1998

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CHANNEL: n/a

THAT THE AMERICAN PRESIDENT WILL NOW GIVE UP HIS
EFFORTS TO TOPPLE THE SANDINISTA REGIME OR THAT THE
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CONTRAS WILL NO LONGER RECEIVE MILITARY AID... THERE
ARE ENOUGH PRIVATE SOURCES OF FUNDING WHICH ARE FULLY
IN TUNE WITH MR. REAGAN'S THINKING, TO STEP INTO THE
BREACH AS IT WERE, TO MAKE GOOD WHAT THE GOVERNMENT
CAN NO LONGER PROVIDE. THE BIGGEST IMPACT OF THE
CONGRESSIONAL VETO ON THE CONTRAS THEN WILL BE FELT
MUCH MORE AT THE LEVEL OF MORALE THAN MATERIAL. IT IS
CLEAR THAT THE CONTRAS DO NOT ENJOY SUFFICIENT
POLITICAL BACKING FROM EITHER CONGRESS OR THE AMERICAN
PUBLIC TO ENCOURAGE THEM IN THE BELIEF THAT THEY CAN
WIN OUT ON THE BATTLEFIELD. WHAT IS MORE, ANY DIRECT
MILITARY INTERVENTION BY THE U.S. DURING THE REST OF
MR. REAGAN'S TERM CAN PLAUSIBLY BE RULED OUT. THIS
WAS STILL A REAL OPTION ONLY SOME TIME AGO."

- --WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT SHAHNAZ AIYAR WROTE IN
THE "INDIAN EXPRESS": "PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS CLAIMED
THAT AIDING THE CONTRAS, WHO HE CALLS NICARAGUA'S
'FREEDOM FIGHTERS' WILL BOTH OUST A MARXIST REGIME AND
GIVE NICARAGUA DEMOCRACY. THE PRESIDENT'S CLAIM HAS
INCREASINGLY FEWER BUYERS. REAGAN, SO FAR, HAS
DISPLAYED AN UNCANNY ABILITY FOR KEEPING HIS FINGER ON
THE AMERICAN PULSE. IN THIS INSTANCE, HOWEVER, HE HAS
SIMPLY REFUSED TO HEAR WHAT SOME 60 PER CENT OF
AMERICANS ARE SAYING -- A CLEAR 'NO' TO MILITARY AID
FOR THE CONTRAS."

- MID-EAST

- UNDER THE EDITORIAL HEADLINE, "IN SEARCH OF
PEACE," THE "HINDUSTAN TIMES" COMMENTED: "IS THE U.S.
PREPARED TO LET THE SOVIET UNION CO-SPONSOR AN
INTERNATIONAL PEACE CONFERENCE ON WEST ASIA? IF THIS
IS PART OF THE TENTATIVE NEW U.S. PEACE FORMULA IT IS
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CERTAINLY AN ADVANCE OVER WASHINGTON'S EARLIER
POSITION. THE POSITION MAY BECOME CLEAR WITH
SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE SHULTZ LAUNCHING HIS SHUTTLE
DIPLOMACY IN WEST ASIAN CAPITALS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING
A VISIT TO MOSCOW EARLY NEXT WEEK. SO FAR THE
FORMULA, WHICH SEEKS TO END THE ONGOING PALESTINIAN
VIOLENCE ON THE WEST BANK AND IN THE GAZA STRIP BY
MAKING TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS TO IMPROVE THEIR

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LIVING CONDITIONS AND WIDENING THE SCOPE OF SELF-GOVERNMENT IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES WHILE A FINAL SETTLEMENT IS BEING WORKED OUT, HAS NOT BEEN WELL RECEIVED BY ANY OF THE PARTIES. ISRAEL HAS OFFICIALLY REJECTED WHAT IT SEES AS ANOTHER VERSION OF THE 'TERRITORIES FOR PEACE' FORMULA THOUGH FOREIGN MINISTER AND LABOR LEADER SHIMON PERES HAS BACKED SUCH AN APPROACH. THE ARABS GENERALLY ARE SCEPTICAL OF AMERICA'S BONA FIDES AND PLO LEADER YASSER ARAFAT HAS CALLED IT AN EYEWASH, BEING PART OF A U.S. ATTEMPT TO EASE THE SITUATION FOR ISRAEL."

- NORIEGA'S DRUG CONNECTION

- "THE HINDU" EDITORIAL, "THE DRUG CONNECTION," SAID: "LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES IN THE UNITED STATES HAVE IN THE PAST COMPLAINED BITTERLY OF LAXITY OR EVEN OFFICIAL COLLUSION IN SOME LATIN AMERICAN NATIONS WHEN IT COMES TO NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING. AND THE RECENT INDICTMENTS AGAINST PANAMA'S GEN. MANUEL ANTONIO NORIEGA HAVE NOT ONLY SET THE STAGE FOR A POLITICAL REAPPRAISAL IN THAT COUNTRY BUT ALSO RESULTED IN A SERIOUS SETBACK TO BILATERAL RELATIONS." MCGINLEY

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED

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Date Printed: 08/05/1998

CHANNEL: n/a

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AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

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FOR NEA, P/M, P/RM, P/FW, P/F, P/P, VOA NEWS/CA
STATE FOR NEA/INS
STATE FOR NSC

E.O.12356: N/A
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION REPORT NO. 21

- BEGIN SUMMARY: INDIAN PRINT MEDIA CARRIED AP AND
AFP REPORTS ON THE U.S. VETO OF A U.N. MOVE AGAINST
ISRAEL UNDER SUCH HEADLINES AS "U.S. VETOES ANTI-ISRAEL
RESOLUTION" ("THE HINDUSTAN TIMES"), AND "U.S. VETOES UN
RESOLUTION ON OCCUPIED AREAS" ("PATRIOT"). EDITORIALY,
THE "HINDUSTAN TIMES" TERMED THE U.S. VETO "SURPRISING"
AND ASKED WASHINGTON "TO ESTABLISH ITS BONAFIDES IN ITS
SERIOUSNESS ABOUT ITS SEARCH FOR A JUST SOLUTION TO THE
PALESTINIAN PROBLEM." PAPERS CARRIED SEVERAL REPORTS ON
U.S. AID TO INDIA, WITH FOCUS ON A PTI WASHINGTON REPORT
UNDER A TYPICAL HEADLINE, "INDIA WORST HIT BY U.S AID
CUTS" ("INDIAN EXPRESS"). SHAHNAZ AIYAR'S WASHINGTON-
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DATELINED REPORT IN THE "INDIAN EXPRESS" WAS HEADLINED,
"U.S. CUTS DOLS. 34 MILLION IN FAMILY PLANNING AID TO
INDIA." ON U.S.-INDIA RELATIONS, STEPHEN COHEN, A
FORMER MEMBER OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF OF THE STATE
DEPARTMENT, WAS QUOTED AS SAYING IN A "HINDUSTAN TIMES"
STORY THAT THE BILATERAL RELATIONS DURING THE LAST SEVEN
YEARS OF THE REAGAN PRESIDENCY HAVE BEEN "SOUND AND
SUCCESSFUL" PARTICULARLY WHEN COMPARED WITH THAT OF THE
CARTER ADMINISTRATION. "THE TIMES OF INDIA" CARRIED TWO

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Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafield, Dir.
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Date Printed: 08/05/1998

DOC. NUMBER: 88NEWDE02851

CHANNEL: n/a

ANALYSES ON THE CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE REPORT ON SOUTH ASIA NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION ISSUES HEADLINED, "CARNEGIE'S POOR IDEAS IN A GOOD CAUSE" AND "RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS: POSSIBLE USE OF NUCLEAR WASTE." THE ECONOMIC TIMES" AND THE FORTNIGHTLY MAGAZINE "INDIA TODAY" REPORTED THAT THE PROJECTS APPROVAL BOARD OF THE GOI HAS CLEARED THE PEPSICO PROJECT WITH THE CONDITION THAT THE PEPSI BRAND NAME NOT BE USED. PAKISTAN PRESIDENT ZIA IS REPORTED TO HAVE SAID IN A "WASHINGTON POST" INTERVIEW THAT INDIA WANTS TO BECOME A REGIONAL POWER. END SUMMARY.

U.S. AND PALESTINIANS

MAJOR NEWSPAPERS CARRIED AP/AFP REPORTS ON U.S. VETOING A U.N. RESOLUTION CALLING ON ISRAEL "TO RESPECT HUMAN RIGHTS WHEN DEALING WITH PALESTINIAN DEMONSTRATORS IN THE OCCUPIED WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP."

--"THE HINDUSTAN TIMES" EDITORIALY COMMENTING ON THE U.S. VETO SAID IN PART: "THIS IS PARTICULARLY SURPRISING WHEN A POLL HAS INDICATED THAT PERHAPS FOR THE FIRST TIME EVEN A MAJORITY OF AMERICAN JEWS DOES NOT APPROVE OF THE BRUTAL METHODS ISRAEL HAS ADOPTED TO

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SUPPRESS THE ONGOING PALESTINIAN AGITATION. IN THE LIGHT OF THIS STAND AND OF WASHINGTON'S CONTINUING REJECTION OF A UN-SPONSORED PEACE CONFERENCE (PART OF THE VETOED RESOLUTION), LITTLE FAITH CAN BE PLACED IN AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS FOR A 'TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENT' SEEKING TO IMPROVE LIVING CONDITIONS OF THE PALESTINIANS AND WIDENING THE SCOPE OF SELF-GOVERNMENT BEFORE THE TERRITORIES' FINAL LEGAL STATUS IS DECIDED.... THERE IS A NEED FOR WASHINGTON TO ESTABLISH ITS BONAFIDES IN ITS SERIOUSNESS ABOUT ITS SEARCH FOR A JUST SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM."

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"THE HINDUSTAN TIMES," WELCOMING THE INF TREATY SAID ITS IMPORTANCE "LIES IN THE FACT THAT BOTH THE SUPERPOWERS ARE NOW WILLING TO TRUST EACH OTHER'S PRONOUNCEMENTS ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT IN STAGES WITH A RIDER OF RIGOROUS VERIFICATION. THE WASHINGTON REPORT THAT THE TWO COUNTRIES HAVE EVEN AGREED TO CONDUCT JOINT NUCLEAR TESTS TO VERIFY THE SIZE OF NUCLEAR BLASTS MAY AT FIRST APPEAR TO GO AGAINST THE VERY SPIRIT OF THE TREATY. HOWEVER, ON TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS IT IS A RIGHT DECISION. SINCE NUCLEAR TESTS CAN BE CONDUCTED IN ALL SHAPES AND SIZES AND IN ALL MANNER OF PLACES--IN

Date Printed: 08/05/1998

DOC_NUMBER: 88NEWDE02851

CHANNEL: n/a

SPACE, ON THE GROUND, UNDERGROUND AND UNDER THE SEA--IT IS VERY ESSENTIAL FOR THE EXPERTS OF BOTH THE COUNTRIES TO KNOW WHAT THE OTHER SIDE IS CAPABLE OF ACHIEVING OR HIDING IN THE MATTER OF TESTING."

- "THE MOST WELCOME SIGN," THE EDITORIAL ADDED, "IS

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AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

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FOR NEA, P/M, P/RM, P/FW, P/F, P/P, VOA NEWS/CA
STATE FOR NEA/INS
STATE FOR NSC

E.O.12356: N/A

SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION REPORT NO. 21

NOT SO MUCH THE TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF INSPECTION AND
VERIFICATION AS THE CHANGE OF POLITICAL ATTITUDES IN

Date Printed: 08/05/1998

DOC_NUMBER: 88NEWDE02851

CHANNEL: n/a

MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: ALL THIS WHEN AT ONE TIME THE STAR WARS IMBROGLIO NEARLY WRECKED THE SUMMIT TALKS. THIS ALSO AUGURS WELL FOR A SPACE ACCORD BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. THE U.S. SPACE AGENCY AND ITS SOVIET COUNTERPART ARE ANXIOUS TO POOL THEIR RESOURCES FOR JOINT INTERPLANETARY VENTURES IF ONLY THEY GET ASSENT FROM THEIR POLITICAL LEADERS. THE SIGNS FOR A MOSCOW SUMMIT IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES ARE INDEED PROPITIOUS. THE BIG TWO MAY AGREE TO CUT 50 PER CENT OF THEIR STRATEGIC WEAPONS."

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- U.S.A.I.D. IN INDIA

- A PTI WASHINGTON REPORT, CARRIED BRIEFLY IN SEVERAL NEWSPAPERS, SAID, ACCORDING TO THE "INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AGENCY" (SIC), THE CUTS IN THE U.S. DEVELOPMENT AID TO INDIA DURING FY 88 "ARE THE WORST IN SOUTH ASIA." THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION, THE REPORT ADDED, "HAD ORIGINALLY REQUESTED 50 MILLION FOR INDIA, BUT NOW IT HAS BEEN ALLOCATED ONLY DOLS. 24 MILLION AS PER THE FIGURES SUPPLIED BY THE IDA."

- --"INDIAN EXPRESS" FRONT-PAGE REPORT, "U.S. CUTS DOLS. 34 MILLION IN FP AID TO INDIA," BY WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT SHAHNAZ AIYAR SAID IN PART: "BUREAUCRATIC INFIGHTING WITHIN THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH HAS CAUSED THE U.S. TO WITHDRAW DOLS. 34 MILLION FROM FAMILY PLANNING PROGRAMS IN INDIA. PROJECTS WHICH HAVE TWICE RECEIVED THE APPROVAL OF THE PRIME MINISTER HAVE BEEN ABANDONED BECAUSE OF BUREAUCRATIC RESISTANCE. WHILE SOME MONEY HAS BEEN RE-INVESTED INTO OTHER PROGRAMS, OFFICIALS FROM THE U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (AID) STATE THAT THESE PROBLEMS ARE ONE REASON FOR A DOLS. 11 MILLION CUT IN U.S. AID TO INDIA. THE OTHER IS GENERAL BELT TIGHTENING IN FOREIGN AID PROGRAMS AROUND THE WORLD."

- "THESE AID CUTS WILL NOT AFFECT ANY ONGOING PROGRAMS, BUT THEY WILL LOWER THE U.S. AID PIPELINE AT A TIME WHEN MOST OF AID'S PROGRAMS ARE IN A MATURE STATE OF DISBURSEMENT."

- "OVER THE YEARS, SOME DOLS. 1 BILLION IN U.S. AID

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CHANNEL: n/a

HAS BEEN FLOWING INTO FAMILY PLANNING PROGRAMS IN INDIA. THE UMBRELLA PROJECT CALLED FAMILY PLANNING COMMUNICATION AND MARKETING PROJECT HAS AN IMPORTANT COMPONENT WHICH DEALS WITH THE SOCIAL MARKETING OF CONTRACEPTIVE DEVICES. INITIATED IN 1983 WITH U.S. FUNDING OF SOME DOLS. 34 MILLION, THE PROJECT FAILED TO TAKE OFF AND HAS NOW BEEN ABANDONED.

- "ACCORDING TO U.S. AID OFFICIALS THERE IS AN EXCESSIVE 'SENSITIVITY' WITHIN THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH IN MOVING AHEAD 'TOO FAST' WITH FAMILY PLANNING PROGRAMS. THE BACKLASH OF FORCED STERILIZATION CAMPAIGNS DURING THE EMERGENCY YEARS OF 1975-77 HAS MADE THE GOVERNMENT APPROACH THE ISSUE WITH GREAT CAUTION.

- "IN THIS PARTICULAR INSTANCE, THERE WAS TREMENDOUS INTERNAL RESISTANCE WITHIN THE HEALTH MINISTRY TO THE PROPOSAL OF USING NEW NON-GOVERNMENTAL CHANNELS IN MARKETING CONTRACEPTIVE DEVICES."

- "INDIAN EMBASSY OFFICIALS CLAIM," AIYAR CONCLUDED, "THAT ANY U.S. AID CUT IN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS ARE SMALL ENOUGH TO BE ABSORBED BY INDIA. LAST YEAR, THE U.S. CONGRESS CUT OFF SOME DOLS. 15 MILLION IN DEVELOPMENT AID TO INDIA IN PROTEST AGAINST THE INDIAN POLICY OF 'AIDING' NICARAGUA.

- "THIS YEAR THE PROGRAM IS FURTHER DOWN TO DOLS. 24 MILLION BECAUSE AID IS 'RE-STRUCTURING' ITS PROJECTS IN INDIA AND HAS SUGGESTED MOVING AWAY FROM FAMILY PLANNING INTO ASSISTING SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROJECTS, WHICH, IT IS ASSUMED, WILL NOT BE AFFECTED BY SUCH DELAYS. 'THEY ARE A HIGH INTEREST AREAS FOR THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT', THEY SAID."

- --LEADING PAPERS RAN A UNI REPORT, TYPICALLY UNCLASSIFIED

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HEADLINED "SHARP DECLINE IN INDIA'S ODA SHARE"
("FINANCIAL EXPRESS"), SAYING IN PART: "INDIA'S SHARE OF

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DOC_NUMBER: 88NEWDE02851

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ACTION NEA-04

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INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 7079
SECDEF WASHDC
CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//USIA ADVISER
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
AMEMBASSY DHAKA
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

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Date Printed: 08/05/1998

DOC_NUMBER: 88NEWDE02851

CHANNEL: n/a

FOR NEA, P/M, P/RM, P/FW, P/F, P/P, VOA NEWS/CA
STATE FOR NEA/INS
STATE FOR NSC

E.O.12356: N/A

SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION REPORT NO. 21

OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE (ODA) HAS BEEN CUT BY HALF OVER THE PAST 10 YEARS AND ITS RECEIPTS ACCOUNT FOR JUST ONE PER CENT OF ITS GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT, THE LOWEST AMONG THE LOW INCOME COUNTRIES.

- "NOT ONLY HAVE CONTRIBUTIONS FROM DEVELOPED COUNTRIES OF THE WEST FALLEN SINCE 1980, BUT SO HAS AID FROM THE ORGANIZATION OF OIL EXPORTING COUNTRIES, SHARPENING THE DECLINE IN INDIA'S AID SHARE, ACCORDING TO THE 1987 REPORT 'DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION' OF THE ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD).

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- "THE REDUCTION OF OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT AID FLOWS TO INDIA, THE REPORT CONTENTS, MUST BE SEEN AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF 'THE COMPARATIVELY GOOD PERFORMANCE' OF THE ECONOMY, ITS CAPACITY TO ATTRACT PRIVATE LENDING AND THE IMPACT OF THE GREEN REVOLUTION THAT LED TO FOOD SELF-SUFFICIENCY...

- "ACCORDING TO THE OECD ASSESSMENT, ODA FLOWS, WHICH AVERAGED A GROWTH OF TWO PER CENT OVER THE PAST DECADE, WOULD CONTINUE. A LARGER FLOW COULD NOT BE VISUALIZED BECAUSE OF THE BUDGETARY AND EXTERNAL DEFICITS OF THE UNITED STATES."

- U.S.-INDIA RELATIONS

- "THE HINDUSTAN TIMES" CARRIED AN INTERVIEW STORY WITH STEPHEN P. COHEN, A FORMER MEMBER OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT, CURRENTLY A PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS.

- THE STORY QUOTED COHEN, WHO IS VISITING NEW DELHI FOR AN INDO-U.S. SEMINAR, AS SAYING THE INDO-U.S. RELATIONS DURING THE LAST SEVEN YEARS OF THE REAGAN PRESIDENCY HAVE BEEN "SOUND AND SUCCESSFUL" PARTICULARLY WHEN COMPARED WITH THAT OF THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION, "DISPELLING THE MYTH, AMONG THE INDIAN 'ELITE,' THAT AS A RULE INDO-U.S. RELATIONS ARE BETTER OFF UNDER A DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENT THAN A REPUBLICAN ONE."

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- THE ONLY INTRACTABLE FACTOR," HE REPORTEDLY POINTED OUT, IS THE INDIAN MISCONCEPTION OF WHAT IS ESSENTIALLY AN "AMERICAN APATHY" AS "AMERICAN HOSTILITY."

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- ON INDIA'S ACQUISITION OF A SOVIET NUCLEAR SUBMARINE, COHEN CAUTIONED THE MOVE "WILL TARNISH INDIA'S IMAGE ABROAD AS ONE WHICH WAS TRADITIONALLY AGAINST THE INTRODUCTION OF SOPHISTICATED DEFENSE TECHNOLOGIES INTO THE INDIAN OCEAN."

SOUTH ASIA NUCLEAR ISSUES

"THE TIMES OF INDIA" CARRIED COLUMNIST DILIP KERJEE'S REPORT, "CARNEGIE'S POOR IDEAS IN A GOOD AUSE," SAYING IN PART: "IF WISHES WERE HORSES, BEGGARS COULD RIDE. THIS OLD ADAGE APPLIES TO MANY OF THE PROPOSALS, PUT FORWARD LATE LAST MONTH BY A TASK FORCE OF 18 AMERICANS ASSEMBLED BY THE CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, TO PREVENT A NUCLEAR ARMS RACE IN THE SUBCONTINENT. CONCERTED ARM-TWISTING BY GREAT POWERS IS AS UNLIKELY AS INDIA AGREEING TO SHUT DOWN ITS PLUTONIUM REPROCESSING PLANTS TO OBTAIN A SUSPENSION OF PAKISTAN'S ENRICHMENT FACILITY AT KAHUTA.

- "NO CONCEIVABLE EXTERNAL INITIATIVES CAN STOP INDIA OR PAKISTAN IF EITHER IS DETERMINED TO GO AHEAD. GIVEN THE STATE OF THEIR RELATIONS, THERE IS ALSO LITTLE PROSPECT OF ANY BILATERAL AGREEMENTS ON EXPLICIT CURBS. THE ONLY REALISTIC HOPE IS THAT THEY WILL BE ABLE TO DEVISE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES, BUT THESE WILL HAVE TO BE MAINLY OF A NON-NUCLEAR KIND. THE RESULTANT REDUCTION IN TENSIONS WILL REINFORCE THE RESTRAINTS EVIDENT IN INDIA'S NUCLEAR BEHAVIOR SINCE 1974. THIS WILL OBLIGE PAKISTAN TO FOLLOW SUIT: IT IS INCONCEIVABLE THAT IT WILL GO AHEAD UNILATERALLY."

- "ONE MAJOR CONTRIBUTION THE TASK FORCE," MUKERJEE CONCLUDED, "COULD HAVE MADE TO PROMOTE INFORMED DEBATE IS TO LAY OUT THE LIKELY COSTS OF DEVELOPING A WEAPONS OPTION. A BOMB-MAKING CAPABILITY THAT BOTH SIDES NOW

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HAVE IS JUST THE BEGINNING. TOO LITTLE IS KNOWN IN THE SUBCONTINENT ABOUT NUCLEAR WAR-FIGHTING TO PERMIT ITS

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DOC NUMBER: 88NEWDE02851

CHANNEL: n/a

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 SECDEF WASHDC
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 USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//USIA ADVISER
 USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
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FOR NEA, P/M, P/RM, P/FW, P/F, P/P, VOA NEWS/CA
 STATE FOR NEA/INS
 STATE FOR NSC

E.O.12356: N/A

SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION REPORT NO. 21

OWN SCHOLARS TO COME UP WITH ESTIMATES INDEPENDENTLY OF THEIR GOVERNMENTS FOR DELIVERY VEHICLES, COMMAND, CONTROL AND INTELLIGENCE, NUCLEAR PROTECTION AND THE LIKE. THIS LACK COULD HAVE BEEN REMEDIED WITH THE HELP OF THE EXPERTISE THAT CARNEGIE SHOULD HAVE FOUND IT POSSIBLE TO MOBILISE."

- --RELATED COMMENT INCLUDED A "TIMES OF INDIA" ED-PAGE ANALYSIS, "RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS: POSSIBLE USE OF NUCLEAR WASTE," BY K. SUBRAHMANYAM, FORMER DIRECTOR OF THE INDIAN INSTITUTE OF DEFENSE STUDIES AND ANALYSES. HE COMMENTED IN PART: "IT IS ONE OF THE IRONIES OF UNCLASSIFIED

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HISTORY THAT ON THE DAY A SCANDAL BREAKS OUT IN WEST GERMANY, THAT NUCLEAR MATERIALS WHICH COULD HELP TO MAKE A WEAPON HAD BEEN SHIPPED CLANDESTINELY TO PAKISTAN, THE U.S. PRESIDENT CERTIFIES THAT PAKISTAN IS NOT IN POSSESSION OF A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE AND CLEARS MILITARY AID TO PAKISTAN. THIS IS ONLY A LINK IN A CHAIN OF BIZARRE DEVELOPMENTS. THE U.S. CONGRESS CLEARED A TWO-AND-A-HALF-YEAR WAIVER (FROM THE OPERATION OF THE SYMINGTON AMENDMENT) FOR PAKISTAN ON THE DAY THE PAKISTANI-BORN CANADIAN CITIZEN, ARSHAD PERVEZ, WAS FOUND GUILTY OF ATTEMPTING TO SMUGGLE OUT PURE BERYLLIUM NEEDED AS A NEUTRON REFLECTOR IN AN ATOMIC BOMB.

- "AND IT IS NOT ONLY THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION THAT IS BEING PERVERSE IN ITS CERTIFICATION. EVEN AS ARSHAD PERVEZ IS CONVICTED AND, THE GERMAN SCANDAL BREAKS OUT, A GROUP OF AMERICAN ACADEMICIANS AND FORMER POLICY-MAKERS FORMING A TASK FORCE UNDER THE UMBRELLA OF THE CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE COME OUT WITH THEIR DISCOVERY THAT CURRENTLY IT APPEARS THAT

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INDIA AND PAKISTAN HAVE THE ABILITY TO MANUFACTURE ATOMIC WEAPONS (INDIA'S CAPABILITIES BEING CONSIDERABLY GREATER THAN PAKISTAN'S) AND BOTH HAVE TAKEN IMPORTANT STEPS TOWARD DOING SO."

- IN CONCLUSION, THE ANALYST WROTE: "TODAY ISRAEL IS ABLE TO DEFY THE ENTIRE WORLD BECAUSE IT KNOWS THAT NONE DARES TO CHALLENGE IT. THE LESSON IS NOT LIKELY TO BE LOST ON THE OTHERS. FOR DIFFERENT REASONS BOTH ISRAEL AND PAKISTAN ARE EXEMPT FROM ALL PUNISHMENT BY THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES. DOZENS OF CASES OF DIVERSIONS OF NUCLEAR WEAPON RELATED MATERIALS BY PAKISTANI AGENTS HAVE GONE UNPUNISHED. THE IAEA CAN CONTINUE TO CERTIFY UNCLASSIFIED

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THAT THE AMOUNT OF MATERIALS NOT ACCOUNTED FOR ARE WITHIN PERMISSIBLE LIMITS AND THEREBY IGNORE THE VERY EXISTENCE OF THE PROBLEM. AND COBALT 60 DOES NOT EVEN FALL WITHIN ITS JURISDICTION."

- PEPSICO

- "THE ECONOMIC TIMES" RAN ON FRONT PAGE A REPORT, "PAB CLEARS PEPSICO SCHEME, 'NO' TO BRAND NAME USE," SAYING THE PROJECTS APPROVAL BOARD (PAB) "HAS CLEARED THE PEPSICO PROJECT WITH THE TATA AND THE PUNJAB AGRO-INDUSTRIES CORPORATION ON THE CONDITION THAT PEPSICO WILL NOT USE ITS BRAND NAME."

- THE REPORT QUOTED HIGHLY-PLACED SOURCES AS SAYING THE PUNJAB GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN "EXERTING PRESSURE" ON THE GOI FOR CLEARANCE OF THE PROJECT FOR QUITE SOME TIME. "APART FROM THIS," IT ADDED, "THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IS ALSO BELIEVED TO HAVE USED ITS INFLUENCE AT THE DIPLOMATIC LEVEL IN ORDER TO HAVE THE STALLED PROJECT APPROVED AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE."

- --THE REPORT ALSO STATED: "THIS JOINT VENTURE...IS AN INTEGRATED PROJECT FOR FOOD PROCESSING, INCLUDING AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH AND MANUFACTURE OF SOFT DRINK CONCENTRATE. THE MAIN ISSUE IN THE HEATED DEBATE OVER THE PROJECT HAS BEEN WHETHER OR NOT TO ALLOW A MULTINATIONAL TO ENTER INTO NON-PRIORITY AREA LIKE SOFT DRINKS. EVEN ON THE FOOD PROCESSING PART OF THE PROJECT, DOUBTS HAVE BEEN EXPRESSED OVER THE NEED TO UTILIZE FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY IN THIS SECTOR."

- "THE CABINET WILL, THEREFORE, HAVE TO TAKE A DECISION ON...ALLOWING MULTINATIONALS TO ENTER INTO THE CONSUMER PRODUCTS SECTOR. AND THE POLITICAL FALL-OUT FROM SUCH A MOVE WILL ALSO HAVE TO BE TAKEN INTO

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INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 7081
SECDEF WASHDC
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USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//USIA ADVISER
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
AMEMBASSY DHAKA
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

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FOR NEA, P/M, P/RM,
P/FW, P/F, P/P, VOA NEWS/CA
STATE FOR NEA/INS
STATE FOR NSC

E.O.12356: N/A
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION REPORT NO. 21

- --MEANWHILE, FORTNIGHTLY MAGAZINE, "INDIA TODAY,"
CARRIED EDITOR T.N. NINAN'S STORY, "PEPSICO: PUSHING
AHEAD: A FIRMLY-SHUT DOOR IS OPENING."

- ACCORDING TO THE REPORT, "PEPSICO HAS BEEN FORCED
TO AMEND ITS PROJECT PROPOSAL, AND WILL AS A RESULT BE
SADDLED WITH A SERIES OF CONDITIONS THAT WILL LIMIT ITS
MANOEUVRABILITY IN THE MARKET. IT MUST EXPORT HALF THE
TOTAL TURNOVER OF THE INDIAN VENTURE--A STIFF CONDITION
BY ANY YARDSTICK--AND THE SOFT DRINKS BUSINESS SHOULD
NOT AT ANY STAGE FORM MORE THAN A QUARTER OF THE TOTAL
TURNOVER. FINALLY, THE NORMAL GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS
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ARE THAT A PROJECT LIKE THIS CANNOT USE A FOREIGN
BRAND-NAME, WHICH SHOULD RULE OUT THE USE OF THE
PEPSICOLA BRAND IN INDIA. IN ITS APPLICATION TO THE
GOVERNMENT, PUNJAB AGRO-INDUSTRIES HAD, IN FACT,
MENTIONED THAT IT WOULD CREATE ITS OWN INDIAN BRAND-NAME.

- "DESPITE THE CONDITIONS, THE PROJECT PROMOTERS ARE
NOT HIDING THEIR BELATED SATISFACTION. FOR ONE THING,
THE LID PUT ON THE TOTAL SIZE OF THE SOFT DRINKS
BUSINESS LEAVES ROOM FOR PERSL TO AIM FOR MORE THAN A

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QUARTER OF THE TOTAL NATIONAL MARKET. THIS SHOULD MAKE IT THE SECOND-LARGEST VENTURE IN THE FIELD, BEHIND PARLE EXPORTS."

- THE REPORT CONCLUDED: "IF THE CABINET COMMITTEE DOES FINALLY GIVE THE GREEN SIGNAL, THE NATIONAL SOFT DRINKS MARKET IS CERTAIN TO WITNESS ITS BIGGEST SHAKE-UP IN THE DECADE SINCE COCA COLA LEFT INDIA IN 1978. ALTHOUGH SEVERAL FOREIGN BRAND-NAME PRODUCTS LAUNCHED IN THE INDIAN MARKET IN RECENT YEARS HAVE NOT DONE WELL (ROTHMANS IN CIGARETTES, FOR EXAMPLE), PEPSI HAS SO FAR SHOWN THE STAMINA, FLEXIBILITY AND ENTERPRISE TO INDICATE THAT IT IS NOT GOING TO TAKE DEFEAT LIGHTLY."

- ZIA'S "WASHINGTON POST" INTERVIEW

- SEVERAL LEADING DAILIES CARRIED A PTI WASHINGTON REPORT UNDER A TYPICAL HEADLINE, "INDIA WANTS TO BE REGIONAL POWER: ZIA" ("THE TIMES OF INDIA"). THE REPORT, ATTRIBUTED TO COLUMNISTS ROWLAND AND NOVAK INTERVIEW IN THE "WASHINGTON POST," QUOTED THE PAKISTAN PRESIDENT AS SAYING THAT INDIA IS "AMBITIOUS" TO BECOME A "REGIONAL SUPERPOWER" FROM THE GULF TO THE COAST OF CHINA. MCGINLEY
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FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1645
INFO AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMCONSUL KARACHI
AMCONSUL LAHORE
AMCONSUL PESHAWAR

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 18211

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: KNNP, PREL, PK, US
SUBJECT: WHITE PAPER ON U.S. NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY
REF: ISLAMABAD 16885 (NOTAL)

1. SUMMARY. WE APPRECIATE WASHINGTON PROVIDING WHITE PAPER CONVEYED REFTEL. FOR THE MOST PART IT IS WHAT WE NEED AND VERY WELL WRITTEN. WE HAVE, HOWEVER, REVISED THE LAST TWO SECTIONS. IN OUR VIEW THIS IS ESSENTIAL TO HIGHLIGHT OUR SUPPORT FOR REGIONAL SOLUTIONS WHILE EMPHASIZING, WITHOUT UNDUE SPECIFICITY, OUR CONTINUING BILATERAL DIALOGUE WITH PAKISTAN. WE ARE THINKING OF USING IT FIRST WITH SELECTED MEMBERS OF THE PRESS AND PARTICIPANTS IN THE INSTITUTE OF STRATEGIC STUDIES SYMPOSIUM ON NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION BEING HELD IN ISLAMABAD
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SEPTEMBER 1 AND 2. ACCORDINGLY WE NEED RAPID WASHINGTON CLEARANCE OF THE REWRITTEN SECTIONS. FOLLOWING THE CONFERENCE WE MAY PUBLISH THE PAPER IN OUR URDU LANGUAGE NEWSLETTER AS WELL AS BASIC BACKGROUND FOR ALL OUR POSTS IN DEALING WITH THIS QUESTION. FOR THE LATTER REASON WE HAVE INCLUDED ALL OUR CONSULATES AS ADDRESSEES AND REPEATED THE ENTIRE PAPER. THE REWRITTEN SECTIONS ARE THE LAST TWO. END SUMMARY.

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2. BEGIN TEXT OF ~~WHITE PAPER~~

BACKGROUND OF U.S. POLICY

EVER SINCE 1946, THE UNITED STATES HAS BELIEVED THAT PROSPECTS FOR AVOIDING NUCLEAR WAR, ENHANCING INTERNATIONAL STABILITY, AND EVENTUALLY ELIMINATING NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD BE AIDED THROUGH PREVENTING THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO ADDITIONAL COUNTRIES. U.S. NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY HAS EMPHASIZED THE DISSEMINATION OF THE BENEFITS OF THE PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY IN CONJUNCTION WITH VERIFIED COMMITMENTS THAT IT WOULD NOT BE MISUSED FOR MILITARY PURPOSES. UNDER THIS APPROACH, THE U.S. HAS BEEN THE LEADING NATION IN TRANSFERRING NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY TO OTHER COUNTRIES THAT HAVE PROMISED NOT BUILD NUCLEAR WEAPONS. PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS CONTINUED THIS LONG-STANDING AND WIDELY SUPPORTED U.S. APPROACH TO NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY. IN HIS 1981 POLICY STATEMENT ON NON-PROLIFERATION AND PEACEFUL NUCLEAR COOPERATION, PRESIDENT REAGAN MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

PREVENTING THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS A
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FUNDAMENTAL U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVE;
THE U.S. WILL STRONGLY SUPPORT THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT), THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA), AND SAFEGUARDS INSPECTIONS OF THAT UN AGENCY;
THE U.S. WILL SEEK TO DEAL WITH THE LEGITIMATE SECURITY CONCERNS OF OTHER STATES IN ORDER TO REDUCE THEIR MOTIVATIONS TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS;
THE U.S. WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE APPLICATION IAEA SAFEGUARDS ON ALL NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES IN NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES.

INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS

THE VAST MAJORITY OF THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE UNITED NATIONS (135 COUNTRIES) ADHERES TO THE NPT. ALL THE NONNUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES PARTY TO THE NPT HAVE UNDERTAKEN TO ACCEPT IAEA SAFEGUARDS ON ALL THEIR PEACEFUL NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES, AND ALL NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS PARTY TO THE TREATY HAVE AGREED TO REQUIRE IAEA SAFEGUARDS AS A CONDITION OF EXPORTS OF SIGNIFICANT NUCLEAR MATERIAL, EQUIPMENT OR COMPONENTS. THESE SAFEGUARDS PROVIDE POSITIVE ASSURANCE TO ALL STATES THAT NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES ARE DEVOTED TO PEACEFUL PURPOSES. THE VAST MAJORITY OF NATIONS WITH NUCLEAR PROGRAMS - INCLUDING THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES HAVE DEMONSTRATED THAT SUCH

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SAFEGUARDS CAN BE APPLIED WITHOUT DAMAGING NATIONAL
 SOVEREIGNTY OR COMPROMISING TECHNICAL SECRETS.
 U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE NPT

THE UNITED STATES HAS LONG SUPPORTED THE GOAL OF

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	SSO-00	L-03	CTME-00	ACDE-12	TRSE-00	PM-10	PA-02
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O 280616Z AUG 87
 FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1646
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 AMCONSUL KARACHI
 AMCONSUL LAHORE
 AMCONSUL PESHAWAR

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 18211

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: KNNP, PREL, PK, US

SUBJECT: WHITE PAPER ON U.S. NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY

UNIVERSAL ADHERENCE TO THE NPT AS THE BEST WAY TO PREVENT
 THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WE HAVE URGED NON-NPT
 STATES TO BECOME PARTIES TO THE TREATY, INCLUDING FREQUENT

HIGH-LEVEL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENTS OF INDIA, ISRAEL, SOUTH AFRICA, BRAZIL, AND ARGENTINA AS WELL AS PAKISTAN. AS A MATTER OF POLICY, THE UNITED STATES GIVES PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT TO NPT PARTIES IN THE AREA OF CIVIL NUCLEAR COOPERATION.

RELEVANT U.S. LEGISLATION

THE COMMITMENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION IS A FUNDAMENTAL PART OF AMERICAN LAW. OUR LAW PROHIBITS SIGNIFICANT NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH

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STATES THAT DO NOT PLACE ALL OF THEIR PEACEFUL NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS. THIS IS A NON-DISCRIMINATORY REQUIREMENT, WHICH CURRENTLY PROHIBITS NUCLEAR COOPERATION NOT ONLY WITH PAKISTAN, BUT ALSO WITH COUNTRIES SUCH AS INDIA, ISRAEL, SOUTH AFRICA, ARGENTINA, AND BRAZIL. THE U.S. VIGOROUSLY ENFORCES ITS EXPORT CONTROL REGULATIONS WITH REGARD TO ALL SUCH NATIONS. THE PRESIDENT MUST ALSO SEEK A COMMITMENT FROM OTHER NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS TO REQUIRE SAFEGUARDS ON ALL PEACEFUL NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES IN NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES AS A CONDITION OF NUCLEAR SUPPLY.

IN ADDITION, U.S. LAW RESTRICTS ECONOMIC AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES WHICH CARRY OUT CERTAIN NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES WITHOUT ADEQUATE AND VERIFIABLE PEACEFUL USE ASSURANCES. FOR EXAMPLE, NATIONS WHICH TRANSFER, RECEIVE, OR DETONATE NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES OR WHICH ILLEGALLY PROCURE ITEMS FROM THE UNITED STATES FOR A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES PROGRAM MAY NOT RECEIVE ASSISTANCE. UNDER MOST CIRCUMSTANCES, NATIONS WHICH RECEIVE SENSITIVE NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGIES WHICH MAY ASSIST A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES PROGRAM ARE INELIGIBLE FOR AID. THE LAW DOES PERMIT THE PRESIDENT TO WAIVE THESE PROHIBITIONS FOR COMPELLING NATIONAL SECURITY OR NON-PROLIFERATION REASONS. THUS FAR, A WAIVER HAS BEEN EXERCISED FOR ONLY ONE COUNTRY - PAKISTAN.

ADMINISTRATION ACTIONS TO SUPPORT PAKISTAN

THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION IS A STRONG SUPPORTER OF THE U.S.-PAKISTAN SECURITY RELATIONSHIP. IN ORDER TO FURTHER THAT RELATIONSHIP, THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS IN 1982 LIFTED THE PROHIBITION ON U.S. ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN DUE TO ITS NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES UNTIL OCTOBER 1987, AS LONG AS PAKISTAN DID NOT ACQUIRE A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE. THE LAW

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Date Printed: 08/05/1998

DOC_NUMBER: 87ISLAMA18211

CHANNEL: n/a

PROHIBITING ASSISTANCE TO ANY COUNTRY THAT ATTEMPTS TO ACQUIRE ILLEGALLY EQUIPMENT IN THE U.S. FOR AN UNSAFEGUARDED NUCLEAR PROGRAM ALSO HAS NOT BEEN WAIVED FOR PAKISTAN. THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN HAS STATED PUBLICLY THAT IT HAS NO INTENTION OF ACQUIRING NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND WILL NOT ENRICH URANIUM BEYOND LOW LEVELS.

PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS NOW PROPOSED A NEW SIX-YEAR, \$4.02 BILLION ASSISTANCE PACKAGE. THE PRESIDENT ALSO ASKED CONGRESS TO AUTHORIZE ANOTHER SIX-YEAR WAIVER OF THE NUCLEAR PROHIBITIONS ON AID. THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION BELIEVES THAT A WAIVER IS JUSTIFIED BY THE CRITICAL IMPORTANCE OF THE U.S.-PAKISTAN SECURITY PARTNERSHIP. OUR SECURITY ASSISTANCE IS ALSO INTENDED TO HELP PAKISTAN MEET ITS LEGITIMATE SECURITY NEEDS WITHOUT ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THESE ARGUMENTS HAVE BEEN GENERALLY PERSUASIVE IN THE U.S. DESPITE VERY STRONG CONCERNS ABOUT PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES. PRIOR TO RECENT ILLEGAL NUCLEAR PROCUREMENT CASES IN THE U.S., KEY U.S. CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES AGREED TO A TWO YEAR RENEWAL OF THE WAIVER, WITHOUT ADDITIONAL NUCLEAR CONDITIONS. THE PENDING CASE AGAINST ARSHAD Z. PERVEZ AND INAM UL-HAQ

-----"
ON JULY 28, 1987, A FEDERAL GRAND JURY IN THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA RETURNED AN INDICTMENT CHARGING ARSHAD PERVEZ AND BRIG. INAM UL-HAQ WITH CRIMINAL VIOLATIONS ARISING OUT OF AN ATTEMPTED EFFORT TO PROCURE MARAGING 350 STEEL AND BERYLLIUM FOR EXPORT TO PAKISTAN. PERVEZ IS A CANADIAN CITIZEN OF PAKISTANI ORIGIN. INAM IS A RETIRE
D BRIGADIER FROM PAKISTAN. MARAGING 350 STEEL IS A SPECIALTY STEEL WITH A VERY HIGH TENSILE STRENGTH AND OTHER SPECIAL PROPERTIES, USED IN A URANIUM ENRICHMENT PLANT FOR NUCLEAR APPLICATIONS. BERYLLIUM IS ALSO A

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ACTION ACDA-12

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CHANNEL: n/a

INFO LOG-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 INR-10 EUR-00 SS-00 OIC-02
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O 280616Z AUG 87
 FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1647
 INFO AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
 AMCONSUL KARACHI
 AMCONSUL LAHORE
 AMCONSUL PESHAWAR

UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 18211

E.O. 12356: N/A
 TAGS: KNNP, PREL, PK, US
 SUBJECT: WHITE PAPER ON U.S. NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY

SPECIALTY METAL, WHICH ALSO HAS NUCLEAR APPLICATIONS. THE INDICTMENT CHARGES FROM OCTOBER OF 1986 THROUGH JULY 10, 1987, PERVEZ AND INAM CONSPIRED TO DEFRAUD THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE IN ITS IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNITED STATES EXPORT LAWS, WHICH CONTROL THESE COMMODITIES FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AND NON-PROLIFERATION REASONS. ACCORDING TO THE INDICTMENT, WHEN THE DEFENDANTS LEARNED THAT AN EXPORT LICENSE WOULD NOT BE ISSUED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, PERVEZ OFFERED A BRIBE IN ORDER TO OBTAIN THE REQUIRED LICENSE. THE INDICTMENT ALSO CHARGES THAT THE DEFENDANTS SUBMITTED FALSE DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE END USE OF THE MARAGING STEEL IN PAKISTAN. IN TOTAL, PERVEZ COULD BE SENTENCED TO 55 YEARS IN PRISON AND A FINE

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OF AT LEAST \$1,750,000; INAM COULD BE SENTENCED TO 15 YEARS IN PRISON AND A FINE OF AT LEAST \$750,000. THE U.S. WAS SPECIFICALLY ASSURED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN EARLIER THIS YEAR THAT ILLEGAL NUCLEAR PROCUREMENT EFFORTS IN THE U.S. WERE PROHIBITED.

EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A REGIONAL NUCLEAR SOLUTION

-- THE U.S. HAS LONG REALIZED THAT NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION EFFORTS NEED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT REGIONAL ASPIRATIONS AND POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS AS WELL. FOR THIS REASON WE HAVE STRONGLY SUPPORTED REGIONAL EFFORTS TO REDUCE THE RISK OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IN

SOUTH ASIA.

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-- IN PARTICULAR WE REGARD PAKISTAN'S PROPOSALS ON THE NUCLEAR ISSUE AS POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE AND WE HAVE ENDORSED THEM. THESE PROPOSALS HAVE INCLUDED AN OFFER TO JOIN INDIA IN ADHERING TO THE NPT, ACCEPTING FULL SCOPE SAFEGUARDS OR BILATERAL INSPECTION OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES, RENOUNCING TEST, ACQUISITION OR MANUFACTURE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, OR ESTABLISHING A NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE.

-- THE U.S. HAS ALSO MADE DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO ENCOURAGE A SERIOUS INDIA-PAKISTAN NONPROLIFERATION DIALOGUE. WE HAVE URGED INDIA TO RESPOND TO PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR PROPOSALS, OR TO PUT FORWARD PROPOSALS OF ITS OWN.

-- MOST RECENTLY THE U.S. WAS PLEASED TO NOTE THE SUGGESTION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN THAT THE SAARC UNDERTAKE DISCUSSIONS TOWARD THE CREATION OF A REGIONAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE.

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WHAT SHOULD BE DONE IN THE BILATERAL CONTEXT

-- WHILE WE ENDORSE A REGIONAL SOLUTION TO NONPROLIFERATION IN SOUTH ASIA, WE CONTINUE TO SEEK BILATERAL ASSURANCES THAT WILL FURTHER U.S. NONPROLIFERATION OBJECTIVES. IN THE WAKE OF THE PERVEZ CASE AND VARIOUS EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN IN THE UNITED STATES ABOUT THE DIRECTION OF PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM WE ARE WORKING WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN TOWARD TWO MUTUAL GOALS.

-- THE FIRST IS A THOROUGH INVESTIGATION OF THE ILLEGAL PROCUREMENT ACTIVITIES OF PERVEZ AND OTHERS. THE U.S. AND PAKISTAN ARE WORKING TOGETHER TO FIND WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR VIOLATION OF U.S. LAW AND DETERMINE WAYS TO PREVENT SUCH ACTIVITIES IN THE FUTURE.

SECONDLY, WE ARE SEEKING FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN REASSURANCE THAT ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM IS PEACEFUL AND THAT IT IS NOT PRODUCING ENRICHED URANIUM BEYOND A LOW ENRICHMENT LEVEL.

-- THE FACT REMAINS THAT SO LONG AS PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES ARE SHROUDED IN SECRECY AND AMBIGUITY, DOUBTS ARISE ABOUT THEIR ULTIMATE PURPOSE. WE BELIEVE IT IS IN THE INTERESTS OF BOTH NATIONS TO OVERCOME THOSE DOUBTS. IN OUR VIEW, THIS CALLS FOR ACTION BY PAKISTAN TO

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DEMONSTRATE CONCLUSIVELY THE PEACEFUL NATURE OF ITS
NUCLEAR PROGRAM, INVOLVING IDEALLY PAKISTANI ACCEPTANCE OF
THE NPT OR OTHERWISE PLACING ALL ITS NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES
UNDER SAFEGUARDS. THIS WOULD INCREASE THE PRESSURE ON
INDIA TO DO LIKEWISE.

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED

Date Printed: 08/05/1998

DOC_NUMBER: 87ISLAMA16502

CHANNEL: n/a

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ACTION NEA-04

INFO	LOG-00	COPY-01	ADS-00	AID-00	INR-10	SS-00	CIAE-00
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R 041227Z AUG 87
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0661
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMCONSUL KARACHI
AMCONSUL LAHORE
AMCONSUL PESHAWAR

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 16502

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL, PGOV

SUBJECT: URDU PRESS DOMESTIC HIGHLIGHTS, AUGUST 2 -4

1. SUMMARY: URDU PRESS WAS DOMINATED BY PAKISTANI REACTION TO CONGRESSIONAL ACTION TO SUSPEND U.S. ASSISTANCE. EDITORIALS SUPPORTED GOVERNMENT ACTIONS TO RESIST U.S. PRESSURE. THE PRESS SPECULATED THAT LOCAL BODIES ELECTIONS MIGHT BE POSTPONED FOR TWO MONTHS AND COMMENTED ON EVIDENCE OF A GROWING SPLIT BETWEEN PRO- AND ANTI-AMERICAN WINGS OF THE PPP.

2. GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES:

"JANG" AUGUST 2: LOCAL BODIES ELECTIONS MIGHT BE POSTPONED: ACCORDING TO INFORMED SOURCES, THE LOCAL BODIES ELECTIONS MIGHT BE POSTPONED FOR TWO MONTHS. SOURCES SAID PRIME MINISTER JUNEJO DISCUSSED THE LOCAL BODIES ELECTION SCHEDULE WITH SENATORS, AT THE LUNCH
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HOSTED IN THEIR HONOR IN MURREE ON SATURDAY.

3. OPPOSITION ACTIVITIES:

"JANG" AUGUST 4: KHALIQ SPEAKS AGAINST PPP PRO-AMERICAN SLANT: PPP CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER MAKHDOOM KHALIQUZAMAN HAS SAID THAT BENAZIR HAS COMPROMISED WITH THE KILLERS OF HER FATHER. HE SAID HE IS STRONGLY AGAINST THE PARTY'S PRO-AMERICAN SLANT.

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Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret R. Gmfield, Dir.
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Date 9/28/12 Exemption

Date Printed: 08/05/1998

DOC_NUMBER: 87ISLAMA16502

CHANNEL: n/a

4. INTERNAL SECURITY - LAW AND ORDER:

"NAWA-I-WAQT" AUGUST 3: NEW FEDERAL RESERVE POLICE TO BE FORMED: ACCORDING TO INFORMESOURCES, A FEDERAL RESERVE POLICE WILL BE FORMED TO MEET THE LAW AND ORDER SITUATION, REPLACING ARMY AND PARA MILITARY TROOPS.

5. EDITORIALS:

"NAWA-I-WAQT" AUGUST 3: AMERICAN PRESSURE ON PAKISTAN: THE AMERICAN SENATE HAS ASKED PRESIDENT REAGAN TO PROVIDE FRESH GUARANTEES REGARDING PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM. PAKISTAN HAS MADE SINCERE EFFORTS TO KEEP SOUTH ASIA A NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONE. IT HAS MADE VARIOUS PROPOSALS TO INDIA. BUT DESPITE THESE EFFORTS, NEITHER AMERICA NOR OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES PRESSURE INDIA TO ACCEPT THEM. INSTEAD, AMERICA IS TRYING TO CUT BACK AID, USING THE EXCUSE OF OUR NUCLEAR PROGRAM. THE MOTIVE BEHIND THE ARSHAD PERVEZ SCANDAL HAS NOW BEEN FULLY EXPOSED. THOUGH THE ADMINISTRATION HAS REGRETTED THE INCIDENT IT IS NOT ENOUGH TO COOL THE ANGER AND HUMILIATION SUFFERED BY THE PAKISTANI PEOPLE. IF U.S. POLICIES TOWARDS INDIA AND ISRAEL WERE THE SAME, IT WOULD NOT HAVE MATTERED TO US. BUT WHY ARE WE

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DISCRIMINATED AGAINST? ARMACOST'S VISIT TO INDIA BEFORE COMING TO ISLAMABAD EXPOSES THE CONSPIRACY AGAINST PAKISTAN. THE VISIT WAS CERTAINLY AIMED AT GETTING INDIA'S GOODWILL IN CASE OF AID SUSPENSION FOR PAKISTAN. THEREFORE, WE WANT THE GOP TO TALK TO ARMACOST FRANKLY AND TO COMMUNICATE OUR NATIONAL PRIORITIES TO HIM. IT SHOULD CATEGORICALLY STATE THAT PAKISTANIS ARE NOT WILLING TO BE BLACK-MAILED BY AMERICA

"JANG" AUGUST 2: TENSION IN THE GULF: THE GULF SITUATION SPELLS DANGER NOT ONLY FOR THE REGION BUT FOR THE WORLD PEACE. IRAN HAS ALLEGED THAT AMERICA IS SHOWING STRENGTH IN THE GULF TO PREPARE GROUND FOR CONFRONTATION. THE INTERFERENCE OF ONE SUPERPOWER WILL CERTAINLY INVITE THE OTHER. AMERICA DISPLAYED A CAREFUL ATTITUDE WHEN A SHIP WAS HIT BY THE MINES. IT SHOULD DISPLAY THE SAME SPIRIT AND REDUCE ITS PRESENCE IN THE GULF SO THAT IT CAN BE SAVED FROM BECOMING AN ARENA FOR SUPERPOWER CONFRONTATION.

"NAWA-I-WAQT" AUGUST 4:
NUCLEAR POLICY.....NATIONAL CONSENSUS:
ACCORDING TO REPORTS, PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT HAS CATEGORICALLY STATED TO U.S. UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS MICHAEL ARMACOST THAT IT IS NOT IMPATIENT FOR AID AND WILL NOT COMPROMISE ITS NATIONAL

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CHANNEL: n/a

INTERESTS FOR ITS APPROVAL. THE GOV DID NOT HESITATE TO
BE FRANK BECAUSE IT IS NOT INVOLVED IN THE CASE TO WHICH
SUSPENSION OF AID IS LINKED. WE ARE ENCOURAGED BY THE
GOVERNMENT'S FIRM STAND AND THE REACTION OF OPPOSITION
LEADERS. SOME NATIONAL LEADERS HAVE GONE TO THE EXTENT
OF DEMANDING THE GOVERNMENT MAKE AN ATOM BOMB SO THAT WE
CAN BEEF UP OUR DEFENSE AGAINST INDIA. WE WILL LOSE

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INFO	LOG-00	COPY-01	ADS-00	AID-00	INR-10	SS-00	CIAE-00
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	USIE-00	SP-02	SNP-01	C-01	PRS-01	P-02	T-01
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R 041227Z AUG 87
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0662
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMCONSUL KARACHI
AMCONSUL LAHORE
AMCONSUL PESHAWAR

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 16502

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PGOV
SUBJECT: URDU PRESS DOMESTIC HIGHLIGHTS, AUGUST 2 -4

AMERICAN FRIENDSHIP BY DOING SO. BUT IN ORDER TO LIVE
WITH DIGNITY AS AN INDEPENDENT COUNTRY, IT APPEARS THAT
WE WILL HAVE TO THINK SERIOUSLY ON THESE LINES. WE
SHOULD PREPARE OURSELVES FOR TOUGHER TIMES IN CASE
AMERICA STOPS AID IN AN IRRATIONAL DECISION. WE MUST

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CHANNEL: n/a

PREPARE TO LIVE WITHIN OUR OWN RESOURCES.

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED

Date Printed: 08/05/1998

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CHANNEL: n/a

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ACTION NEA-04

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-10 CIAE-00 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 PA-02
INRE-00 SP-02 PRS-01 /019 W

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FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO USINFO WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 5161
SECDEF WASHDC
CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
AMEMBASSY DHAKA
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 NEW DELHI 30597

FOR NEA, P/M, P/RM, P/FW, P/F, P/P, VOA NEWS/CA
STATE FOR NEA/INS
STATE FOR NSC

E.O.12356:N/A

SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION REPORT NO. 221

- BEGIN SUMMARY: PRINT MEDIA DURING THE WEEKEND
FOCUSED ON A UNI WASHINGTON STORY UNDER A TYPICAL
HEADLINE, "U.S. CONGRESS CHOPS AID TO PAKISTAN FOR
1988" ("INDIAN EXPRESS"). COMMENT NOTED, AMONG OTHER
THINGS, THAT NEW DELHI SEES THE MOVE AS "CONTAINING A
MESSAGE FOR ISLAMABAD" AND THAT AMBASSADOR DEAN
"WORKED HARD TO PREVENT WHAT WOULD HAVE BEEN A MAJOR
SETBACK TO THE INDO-U.S. RELATIONS." THE WEEKEND AND
DECEMBER 21 PRESS CARRIED SEVERAL POSITIVE ANALYSES ON
THE OUTCOME OF THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT, STRESSING REAGAN
AND GORBACHEV "HAVE MADE POSSIBLE WHAT LOOKED
IMPOSSIBLE UNTIL THE OTHER DAY." "INDIAN EXPRESS"
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STAFFER LALITA PANICKER, COMMENTING ON THE INDO-U.S.
VACCINE ACTION PROGRAM (VAP), SAID ALTHOUGH SOME
SCIENTISTS EXPRESS FEARS INDIANS "MAY WELL BE USED AS
GUINEA PIGS FOR THE U.S.'S EXPERIMENTS," VAP IS NOT
LIKELY TO BE SHELVED BECAUSE IT IS A PART OF THE
REAGAN-GANDHI SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY INITIATIVE. NEWS
REPORTS ON SOVIET DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER PETROVSKY'S
NEW DELHI PRESS CONFERENCE REMARKS FOCUSED ON HIS
ASSURANCE THAT PROPOSED SOVIET-AIDED NUCLEAR PLANTS IN

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Date 9/28/98 Exempt

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CHANNEL: n/a

INDIA WILL NOT FACE THE FULL PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED IN THE U.S.-AIDED TARAPUR ATOMIC POWER PLANT. MOST PAPERS GAVE FRONTPAGE COVERAGE TO REPORTS THAT INDIAN AUTHORITIES ARE SEARCHING FOR A VISITING 25-YEAR-OLD SOVIET SCIENTIST, WHO WAS REPORTED MISSING WHILE WITH A SOVIET TOUR GROUP IN NEW DELHI. EDITORIAL REACTION UNIFORMLY WELCOMED THE BHOPAL JUDGE'S RULING ASKING UNION CARBIDE TO PAY DOLS. 270 MILLION AS INTERIM RELIEF TO THE GAS VICTIMS. END SUMMARY.

U.S. AID TO PAKISTAN

MAJOR NEWSPAPERS DECEMBER 18 RAN A UNI STORY FROM WASHINGTON ON CUT IN U.S. AID TO PAKISTAN STRESSING, "DESPITE THE NEWS OF ARSHAD PERVEZ BEING CONVICTED BY A FEDERAL GRAND JURY ON FIVE COUNTS OF SMUGGLING NUCLEAR WEAPONS GRADE MATERIAL FOR DESTRUCTIVE USE IN PAKISTAN, CONGRESS COMPROMISED ON ITS NON-PROLIFERATION LAWS AND GAVE PAKISTAN A FREE HAND TO CONTINUE ITS REPORTED NUCLEAR PROGRAM."

--K.K. KATYAL, NEW DELHI CORRESPONDENT OF "THE HINDU," SAID THE SANCTION OF THE CONGRESS "IS SEEN HERE AS CONTAINING A MESSAGE FOR ISLAMABAD. IT IS NOT UNCLASSIFIED

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THE SIZE BUT THE FACT OF THE CUT THAT IS CONSIDERED IMPORTANT. OBVIOUSLY, CONGRESS WOULD LIKE PAKISTAN TO BE HELD IN LEASH IN VIEW OF THAT COUNTRY'S NUCLEAR AMBITIONS. IT IS NOT CLEAR HOW THE INITIAL CUT WILL AFFECT THE TOTAL PACKAGE OF DOLS. 4.02 BILLION TO BE SPREAD OVER SIX YEARS."

"INDIAN OFFICIALS," KATYAL ALSO OBSERVED, "HAVE REASON TO BE SATISFIED WITH SOME ASPECTS OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE HOUSE-SENATE CONFERENCES (WHICH IS THE FINAL VIEW OF CONGRESS), BUT ARE UNHAPPY THAT THE CHECKS ON PAKISTAN, SUGGESTED BY THE HOUSE, HAVE NOT BEEN ACCEPTED."

"AMBASSADOR DEAN," THE CORRESPONDENT WENT ON TO STRESS, "WHO HAD WORKED HARD TO PREVENT WHAT WOULD HAVE BEEN A MAJOR SETBACK TO THE INDO-U.S. RELATIONS DESCRIBED THE RECENT EVENTS AS THE 'GIVE-AND-TAKE' OF THE DEBATE AND SAID, 'WHAT COUNTS, HOWEVER, IS WHAT COMES OUT OF THIS DEMOCRATIC PROCESS, FOR AT THE END OF THE DAY, IT IS THE LANGUAGE WHICH IS FINALLY ENACTED INTO LAW WHICH REPRESENTS THE VIEW OF THE MAJORITY.'"

--PRO-GOVERNMENT "NATIONAL HERALD" EDITORIALY SAID IN PART: "THE PERVEZ CASE SHOULD STRENGTHEN THE

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ARGUMENTS OF THOSE ~~LIKE CONGRESSMEN SOLARZ AND SENATOR~~
GLENN WHO HAVE BEEN TRYING TO IMPRESS ON THE U.S.
ADMINISTRATION THAT IN ITS AID POLICY TOWARD PAKISTAN,
IT SHOULD GO BY THE LOGIC OF THE AMERICAN
NUCLEAR-NONPROLIFERATION REGULATIONS... EVEN IF, FOR
TACTICAL REASONS, PAKISTAN STOPS SHORT OF TURNING THE

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ACTION NEA-04

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	PRS-01	SDEL-03	SART-01	/049 W			

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O 211012Z DEC 87
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO USINFO WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 5162
SECDEF WASHDC
CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
AMEMBASSY DHAKA
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 04 NEW DELHI 30597

FOR NEA, P/M, P/RM, P/FW, P/F, P/P, VOA NEWS/CA
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E.O.12356:N/A
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION REPORT NO. 221

LAST SCREW ON THE BOMB--AND THE ACT COMES TO BE

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KNOWN--AND THERE IS PROGRESS IN THE SUPERPOWER TALKS ON SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN, THE QUALITY OF U.S. AID TO PAKISTAN WILL NOT BE AFFECTED, UNLESS THE ENTIRE U.S. OUTLOOK TOWARD GLOBAL STRATEGY UNDERGOES A CHANGE."

- WASHINGTON SUMMIT

- "INDIAN EXPRESS" STAFFER SUMER KAUL IN HIS ANALYSIS, "THE INF ACCORD IN PERSPECTIVE: A PROMISING UNCLASSIFIED

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PREAMBLE," DECLARED: "GORBACHEV AND REAGAN HAVE MADE POSSIBLE WHAT LOOKED IMPOSSIBLE UNTIL THE OTHER DAY. IF IT EARNS THEM A PAGE EACH IN HISTORY, WHETHER OR NOT THAT WAS THEIR BASIC MOTIVATION, ESPECIALLY REAGAN'S, SO BE IT. THEY DESERVE IT.

- "THE INF ACCORD DOES NOT SPELL THE END OF THE NUCLEAR MADNESS, NOR NECESSARILY EVEN OF DEADLY RIVALRY AND STRIFE. BUT IT DOES TAKE THE HEAT OFF THE COLD WAR -- NOT BY RHETORIC BUT THROUGH CONCRETE ACTION. IF THE TWO LEADERS ALSO PULL OFF AN AGREEMENT ON THE LONG-RANGE MISSILES IN MOSCOW NEXT YEAR, THEY WILL HAVE WRITTEN A PROMISING PREAMBLE TO COMPLETE NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT."

- --"THE HINDU" CARRIED THE VIEW OF FREELANCE WRITER SRIDHAR KRISHNASWAMI THAT THE INF TREATY IS "AN EPOCH-MAKING ACCORD" AND ALSO "THE FIRST STEP TAKEN BY THE TOP POWERS DOWN THE ROAD TO WINDING DOWN THEIR AWESOME NUCLEAR ARSENAL THROUGH SUBSTANTIAL AND DEEP CUTS ON THE OFFENSIVE WEAPONS FRONT."

- --"STATESMAN" STAFFER AMALENDU DAS GUPTA EXPRESSED A DIFFERENT VIEWPOINT: "THE GORBACHEV-REAGAN MARCH TOWARD A NUCLEAR-FREE OR 'LESS-NUCLEAR' WORLD, ASSUMING THAT IT IS NOT A FICTION, WILL NOT FREE THE WORLD FROM REGIONAL TENSIONS AND CONFLICTS IN WHICH THE NUCLEAR THREAT MAY SOMETIMES LOOM LARGE. THE SUPERPOWERS MAY BE UNABLE TO RESOLVE THEM; MORE LIKELY, THEY WILL OFTEN ABET AND INCITE, AS CAN BE SEEN FROM AMERICAN MILITARY AID TO PAKISTAN EVEN AFTER THE LATEST DISCLOSURES ABOUT ITS BOMB PREPARATIONS, OR FROM U.S. POLICY TOWARD ISRAEL OR SOUTH AFRICA. UNCLASSIFIED

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CHANNEL: n/a

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UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 04 NEW DELHI 30
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FOR NEA, P/M, P/RM, P/FW, P/F, P/P, VOA NEWS/CA
 STATE FOR NEA/INS
 STATE FOR NSC

E.O. 12356: N/A

SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION REPORT NO. 221

KOREAS, CHINA AND THE ASEAN NATIONS MADE UP THE RANGE
 OF HIS INTEREST. EVEN AT THE END, WHEN HE WAS
 MENTIONING A FEW PROBLEM SPOTS FOR AMERICAN POLICY, HE
 MENTIONED IRAN-IRAQ, OIL AND AFGHANISTAN. INDIA, IT
 SEEMS, IS NOT EVEN A REAL, WORRISOME PROBLEM IN THE
 AMERICAN SCHEME OF THE THINGS."

- INDO-U.S. VACCINE ACTION PROGRAM

- "INDIAN EXPRESS" STAFFER LALITA PANICKER IN HER
 ANALYSIS, "VACCINE WAR," AFFIRMED THAT THE VAP "WILL
 MAKE NEW AND IMPROVED VACCINES AVAILABLE" TO INDIA.
 BUT, SHE ADDED, SOME SCIENTISTS EXPRESS THE VIEW THAT
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THE PROGRAM "POSES A GRAVE SECURITY RISK AND INDIANS
 MAY BE USED AS GUINEA PIGS FOR THE U.S.'S EXPERIENCES."

- THE GOI, MS. PANICKER WROTE, "HAS AT VARIOUS
 TIMES ENTERED INTO ARRANGEMENTS WITH OTHER DEVELOPED
 COUNTRIES LIKE FRANCE, USSR AND JAPAN FOR VACCINE
 TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT: WHATEVER THE SCIENTIFIC
 COMMUNITY'S RESERVATIONS MAY BE, THE PROGRAM WHICH WAS
 BEGUN AS PART OF THE RONALD REAGAN-INDIRA GANDHI
 SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY INITIATIVE IS NOT LIKELY TO BE
 SHELVED. IN FACT, THE INITIATIVE HAS RECENTLY BEEN
 RENEWED FOR ANOTHER THREE YEARS BEYOND 1988 BY PRIME
 MINISTER RAJIV GANDHI AND PRESIDENT REAGAN. AND WHEN

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THIS PARTICULAR PROGRAM GETS GOING. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT WILL BE ABLE TO EFFECTIVELY MAINTAIN STRICT CHECKS ON TRIALS AND QUALITY CONTROL AND SAFEGUARD HUMAN SUBJECTS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS."

- SOVIET DEPUTY PM'S INDIA VISIT

- NEWS REPORTS DECEMBER 19 ON SOVIET DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER V. PETROVSKY'S NEW DELHI PRESS CONFERENCE RECEIVED SUCH HEADLINES AS "SOVIET AIDED N-PLANTS WON'T FACE PROBLEMS" ("THE HINDUSTAN TIMES"); "SOVIET ASSURANCE ON N-PLANTS FOR INDIA" ("PATRIOT"); AND "SOVIET UNION GOES BEYOND TREATY" ("INDIAN EXPRESS").

- COVERAGE HIGHLIGHTED HIS ASSURANCE THAT THE PROPOSED SOVIET AID FOR INDIA'S NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS WILL NOT FACE PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED IN THE U.S.-AIDED TARAPUR ATOMIC POWER PLANT ("HINDUSTAN TIMES" AND "PATRIOT").

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- PETROVSKY ALSO REPORTEDLY SAID THE FINAL AGREEMENT REACHED ON THE ISSUE WOULD "NEITHER BE DETRIMENTAL TO INDIA'S INTEREST NOR TO THE SOVIET UNION'S INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS REGARDING NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION."

- HE ALSO EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT AT THE U.S. DECISION TO LIFT THE BAN ON THE PRODUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, SAYING IT "WOULD NOT DETER THE SOVIET UNION FROM PURSUING ITS PRESENT POLICY FOR THE ELIMINATION OF MASS DESTRUCTIVE WEAPONS."

- ON PAKISTAN'S EFFORTS TO MAKE A NUCLEAR BOMB, PETROVSKY REPORTEDLY SAID THE SOVIET UNION SUPPORTS NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION.

- SOVIET SCIENTIST MISSING

- PROMINENT COVERAGE WAS GIVEN TO THE WEEKEND NEW DELHI DISAPPEARANCE OF SOVIET SCIENTIST BABI ALEXANDER, WHO WAS VISITING INDIA WITH A GROUP OF SOVIET TOURISTS. A COUNTRY-WIDE SEARCH IS UNDERWAY. "TIMES OF INDIA" REPORTED THAT "POLICE SOURCES FIRMLY BELIEVE" THAT THE CASE IS A DEFECTION. SEVERAL PAPERS REPORTED THAT IN 1985 A SOVIET DIPLOMAT HAD DISAPPEARED IN NEW DELHI AND LATER TURNED UP IN THE U.S. ASKING FOR ASYLUM.

UNION CARBIDE

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- NEWS REPORTS QUOTED BUD HOLMAN, A LAWYER FOR
UNION CARBIDE, AS SAYING UCC DID NOT RULE OUT THE

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UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 04 NEW DELHI 30597

FOR NEA, P/M, P/RM, P/FW, P/F, P/P, VOA NEWS/CA
STATE FOR NEA/INS
STATE FOR NSC

E.O.12356:N/A
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION REPORT NO. 221

POSSIBILITY OF APPEALING THE BHOPAL DISTRICT COURT'S
RULING BEFORE AN AMERICAN APPELLATE COURT IF HE FELT
THAT UCC'S INTEREST WOULD NOT BE PROTECTED BY THE
INDIAN COURT.

- --MEANWHILE, ALL MAJOR NEWSPAPERS EDITORIALY

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WELCOMED THE BHOPAL COURT DECISION AS REFLECTED IN SUCH HEADLINES AS "JUSTICE AT LAST" ("THE TIMES OF INDIA"); "BHOPAL'S LONG WAIT" ("PATRIOT"); "ENDING THE LONG WAIT FOR RELIEF" ("THE HINDU"); "STILL UNWILLING TO PAY" ("THE STATESMAN"); "HOPE FOR BHOPAL" ("THE ECONOMIC TIMES"); AND "MAKE UCC HONOR THE VERDICT" UNCLASSIFIED

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("NATIONAL HERALD").

--COMMENTS IN "THE HINDU" AND "THE ECONOMIC TIMES" WERE TYPICAL. "THE HINDU" SAID THE ORDER "IS A WELCOME BREAKTHROUGH IN WHAT IS ADMITTEDLY AN UNPRECEDENTED LEGAL TANGLE.... IT WOULD BE A REASONABLE HOPE THAT THE UCC WOULD ABIDE BY THE ORDER AND PAVE THE WAY FOR THE EXPEDITIOUS SETTLEMENT OF THE LEGITIMATE CLAIMS...." "THE ECONOMIC TIMES" SAID THE BHOPAL RULING "HAS NOT ONLY ESTABLISHED A LANDMARK PRECEDENT BUT ISSUED A SHARP REBUTTAL TO THE VIEW ENTERTAINED BY MANY... THAT AN OUT-OF-COURT SETTLEMENT WAS THE ONLY WAY TO PROVIDE SPEEDY RELIEF TO THOSE WHO HAD FALLEN A PREY TO THE WORLD'S WORST-EVER INDUSTRIAL DISASTER.... THE RULING HAS RAISED THE HOPE THAT FULL JUSTICE WILL BE DONE TO THE POISON GAS VICTIMS OF BHOPAL. MCGINLEY

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RUESRS/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 188
RUQMDH/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN 7286
RUMJBT/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 141
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RUFHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 557
RUQMHK/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 1633
RUQMTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 756

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SECTION 1 OF 2 JIDDA 7178

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: ENRG, US, XF, TC, SA

SUBJECT: SAUDI MINISTER OF OIL RESTATES POSITION ON OIL PRICES
AND ON CONSUMER/PRODUCER CONFERENCE

REF: A) JIDDA 6603; B) JIDDA 6948

SUMMARY: SAUDI COUNCIL OF MINISTERS HAS OFFICIALLY
DECIDED TO REDUCE EFFECTIVE PRICE OF CRUDE BY DEVICE
OF OFFERING 48 PERCENT OF SAUDI-OWNED OIL AT 92 PERCENT
OF NEW POSTED PRICE. THIS WOULD REDUCE TAKE TO PRE-ABU
DHABI LEVELS. AGREEMENT WITH ARAMCO PARENTS IS,
ACCORDING TO YAMANI, ALMOST CERTAIN AND MAY REDUCE PRICES
OF OIL ALLOTTED THEM. YAMANI DESIRES
U.S. TO DEFER PROCLAIMING DEATH OF OPEC IS IMMINENT
AS RESULT OF THESE SAUDI MOVES. YAMANI WILL GIVE
SPEECHES IN EUROPE, SUGGESTING THAT COMPENSATION FOR
INFLATION AT LEAST THROUGH 1976 HAS ALREADY BEEN RE-
CEIVED BY OIL PRODUCERS. YAMANI WILL ALSO URGE THAT
CONSUMERS PAY ONLY 75 PERCENT IN CASH AND REMAINDER BE
DEFERRED. HE SAYS THAT ALL PROBLEMS CAN BE SOLVED BY

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JIDDA 7178

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NEGOTIATION. HE IS DOUBTFUL HOWEVER ABOUT GOOD FAITH OF U.S. IN LONG RUN AND THINKS ARABS MAY HAVE TO LOOK TO EUROPEANS OR JAPANESE FOR UNDERSTANDING OF THEIR PROBLEMS. DEPARTMENT IS URGED TO RESPOND TO ANY ANNOUNCEMENT ON LOWERING PRICES BY PRAISING SAG AND YAMANI PERSONALLY FOR HIS EFFORTS. END SUMMARY.

1, I TOLD AHMED ZAKI YAMANI, SAUDI MINISTER OF PETROLEUM, DEC 5 JUST BEFORE HE LEFT FOR LONDON THAT THERE WAS WIDESPREAD SKEPTICISM IN THE UNITED STATES AND ELSEWHERE ABOUT SAUDI INTENTIONS TO HOLD BACK OIL PRICE INCREASES. THE ABU DHABI MEETING JUSTIFIED SUCH SKEPTICISM EVEN IF THE INCREASE WERE ONLY 35 CENTS/BARREL AS HE MAINTAINED.

2, YAMANI SAID I HAD MADE THIS POINT TO HIM AND TO OTHER TOP SAUDI GOVERNMENT LEADERS BEFORE (REF A). HE SAID THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS HAD DECREED THAT 40 PERCENT OF THE SAUDI OIL BE SOLD AT 90 PERCENT OF THE NEW POSTED PRICE; HE SHOWED ME A COPY OF THE MINISTERIAL DECREE. (COMMENT: IF IMPLEMENTED THIS WOULD, IN FACT, RESULT IN A GOVERNMENT TAKE OF APPROXIMATELY THE SAME AS BEFORE THE ABU DHABI CONFERENCE.)

3, YAMANI SAID HE WAS SURE HE WOULD REACH AGREEMENT WITH THE ARAMCO PARENTS IN LONDON (REF B). IF HE DOES, THEIR BUY-BACK OIL (OR WHATEVER IT IS TO BE CALLED) WOULD BE AT AN EVEN LOWER PRICE. IN SHORT, HE SAID "IF THERE IS AN AGREEMENT WITH ARAMCO, OIL PRICES WILL GO LOWER; IF THERE IS NOT, PRICES WILL STILL GO LOWER." I SAID WE WOULD WAIT ANXIOUSLY FOR SUCH A DEVELOPMENT. HE SAID HE WOULD BE PLEASED IF WE WOULD WAIT QUIETLY; EVERY TIME A TOP AMERICAN OFFICIAL PROCLAIMS THE IMMINENT DEATH OF OPEC OR THE COLLAPSE OF OIL PRICES, THE ORGANIZATION PULLS TOGETHER AND IT BECOMES MORE DIFFICULT TO RESTRAIN PRICE INCREASES.

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EXDIS

4. I ASKED HIM HIS CURRENT VIEWS ON THE IRANIAN PROPOSAL TO LINK OIL PRICES TO SOME WORLD PRICE INDEX. I TOLD HIM THIS WOULD BE A FORMULA ALMOST GUARANTEEING CONTINUING WORLD INFLATION. HE READ ME EXTRACTS OF SPEECHES HE INTENDS TO GIVE IN LONDON (HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL ALUMNI - OFF THE RECORD) AND ZURICH (A "BUSINESS GROUP" - ON THE RECORD). HE WILL SAY THE OIL PRICE INCREASES OF LAST DECEMBER WERE INEVITABLE AND JUSTIFIED. BUT THEY WENT TOO FAR IN THAT THEY NOT ONLY COMPENSATED FOR WORLD INFLATION FOR THE LAST TWENTY YEARS - WHEN OIL PRICES WERE DECLINING - BUT ALSO COMPENSATED FOR INFLATION "FOR SOME TIME TO COME." HE SAID THIS MEANT THROUGH 1975. I SUGGESTED THY THIS BE AMENDED TO READ "AT LEAST THROUGH 1976." HE AGREED AND CHANGED THE TEXT.

5. IN THE SPEECHES HE WILL ALSO SAY THAT SAUDI ARABIA UNDERSTANDS THE CONCERNS OF CONSUMERS AT THE HIGH OIL PRICES AND WILL PROPOSE "AS A SAUDI

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IDEA" THAT CONSUMERS PAY CASH FOR SEVENTY-FIVE PERCENT OF THEIR OIL WITH THE OTHER TWENTY-FIVE PERCENT DEFERRED. HE WILL ALSO SAY HE UNDERSTANDS THE ALARM OF HAVING MUCH OF THE OIL CAPITAL ACCUMULATED IN A SINGLE AREA. HE WILL GO ON TO SAY ALL THE PROBLEMS ARE SOLUBLE THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS - NOT BY BLUSTERING AND THREATS AND WILL MAKE ANOTHER STRONG PLEA FOR A CONSUMER/PRODUCER MEETING.

6. YAMANI SAID ALL OF OPEC, INCLUDING IRAQ, NOW SUPPORTS THE IDEA OF A CONSUMER/PRODUCER CONFERENCE; THE UNDER-DEVELOPED WORLD IS ALSO STRONGLY IN FAVOR AND FRANCE HAS BEEN AT LEAST PARTIALLY SUCCESSFUL IN MOVING ITS EUROPEAN PARTNERS TOWARD THE MEETING. HE ASKED WHY THE U.S. WAS SO STRONGLY OPPOSED. I TOLD HIM WE WERE NOT. SECRETARIES KISSINGER AND SIMON HAD ALREADY GONE ON RECORD AS FAVORING THE CONFERENCE AS SOON AS WE ARE ADEQUATELY PREPARED FOR IT. HE SAID HE HAD READ THEIR STATEMENTS AND HAD CONCLUDED THAT IT WOULD BE YEARS BEFORE SUCH PRECONDITIONS FOR A CONFERENCE COULD BE MET.

7. YAMANI SAID REPEATEDLY THAT HE ADMIRERED THE UNITED STATES AND THAT HE SAW SAUDI FUTURE BEST SECURED THROUGH COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES. YET AMERICAN THREATS TO THE ARABS AND THE EVIDENT AMERICAN INCA...ITY TO MOVE ISRAEL OUT OF THE CONQUERED ARAB LANDS MADE HIM WONDER IF COOPERATION WITH THE U.S. WAS REALLY POSSIBLE. HE THOUGHT THE ARABS SHOULD BE LOOKING MORE TO THE EUROPEANS AND THE JAPANESE WHO SEEM TO UNDERSTAND THE ARABS' PROBLEMS AND WHO CERTAINLY WOULD OPPOSE ANY AMERICAN PROPOSALS LEADING TO CONFRONTATION OR WAR.

8. COMMENT: I HAVE NO DOUBTS ABOUT THE DECISION OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS TO REDUCE OIL PRICES. YAMANI WOULD NOT HAVE GONE TO SUCH ELABORATE RUSE TO PREPARE A PAPER BASED ON A NONEXISTENT DECISION. I EQUALLY HAVE NO DOUBT THAT HE WILL TRY TO REACH AN AGREEMENT WITH THE ARAMCO PARENTS. I'M NOT AS SURE AS TO WHAT HE WILL SAY IN EITHER LONDON OR ZURICH ABOUT PRICE INCREASES, PRICE ROLLBACKS OR THE CONSUMER/PRODUCER CONFERENCE. THE EFFORT TO

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DECREASE PRICES WOULD BE AN OPEN CHALLENGE TO OPEC (SOMETHING HE HAS REPEATEDLY SAID HE WOULD NOT DO). AND IF OTHER OPEC COUNTRIES WOULD NOT SUPPORT HIS POSITION, IT'S DOUBTFUL IF HE COULD SUSTAIN IT FOR VERY LONG.
9. ACTION REQUESTED: THAT THE DEPARTMENT RESPOND QUICKLY TO THE YAMANI SPEECHES, IF THEY ARE AS CONCILIATORY AS HE SAID THEY WOULD BE, AND IF THEY PROMISE TO BRING DOWN OIL PRICES, OR AT LEAST FREEZE THEM IN CURRENT DOLLARS FOR TWO YEARS - THAT WE COMMEND HIM. AKINS

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EUROPE

NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING

The 51st Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, held in Copenhagen June 14-15, reflected a broad measure of Allied cohesion on the key issues of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR), the linkage between CSCE and MBFR, and the US proposal for a review of Atlantic relations.

The Ministers welcomed a reiteration of the US pledge to maintain and improve US forces in Europe, provided the Allies do likewise, and not to reduce them in the absence of reciprocal reductions by the other side. From the US point of view, this was the most successful NATO Ministerial in years. It was agreed that the next meeting will be held in Brussels December 10-11. (For discussions on the UK-Icelandic fisheries dispute see article below.)

Examination of NATO Relations

Noting that profound changes are taking place in every field of international activity, the Ministers agreed to examine their relationships in the light of these changes "in a spirit of solidarity and by a common effort." This represented a compromise following a tough statement by French Foreign Minister Jobert taking issue with the US initiative on this subject. Most other Ministers generally supported US current objectives and specifically proposed that NATO formulate a new declaration of principles. Thus, the stage is set for later talks by the US with its Allies on the next steps in developing a set of common objectives and principles.

Agreements on CSCE

The Ministers all expressed satisfaction with the results of the multilateral preparatory talks on a CSCE. None expected the second (i.e., commission) phase of the Conference to begin

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substantive discussions before September. Many called for further Allied efforts over the summer to refine Allied positions for use in the second phase. It was generally agreed that a decision on the level of participation in the third phase should be taken in the light of progress in the second phase. The Ministers agreed that the second phase should not proceed under any artificial time limitations, and that they would inform the Finnish Government of their acceptance of July 3 as the date for the beginning of the first phase of the Conference.

Agreements on MBFR

The Ministers unanimously agreed on the paramount importance of maintaining Allied cohesion during negotiations on MBFR. They also agreed that Allied security should remain undiminished--with no change in the relative military balance between East and West--and that present NATO strategy should not be affected. There was strong support for an initial reduction in US and Soviet forces--within a general focus on stationed forces--leaving open the option of later reductions of other stationed and of indigenous forces. Only Germany pressed for guidelines allowing flexibility in dealing simultaneously with stationed and indigenous forces.

MBFR-CSCE Timing

Despite earlier indications that the Netherlands, Canada, and to a lesser degree Belgium would insist on tying the opening date for CSCE to Soviet agreement to begin negotiations on MBFR by October 30, the US approach on this issue was accepted--the Allies agreed after some debate that the two sets of talks should move ahead in parallel but not be explicitly linked. Accordingly, the communique placed the onus clearly on the Soviets to accept the October 30 date for MBFR, as the Allies upheld their part of the bargain by agreeing to begin the CSCE July 3, on schedule. (The Russians previously proposed that negotiations on MBFR should begin by the end of the year, with the precise date being fixed later by the direct participants, and Allied representatives in Vienna reacted negatively to this proposal.)

US Statements on Talks with the Soviets

In his address at the meeting, Secretary Rogers said that we did not expect the talks with Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev during his visit to the US to have the dramatic ground-breaking

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character of the US-Soviet summit meeting in Moscow last year, but that we expected them to be significant, and that we looked for a series of agreements on bilateral cooperation similar to those that were signed in Moscow in May 1972. He pointed out that we seek concrete results and not just grandiose generalities.

The Secretary noted that the implementation of the Moscow agreements has proceeded in a generally satisfactory manner, and that in addition to renewal of the US-Soviet exchanges agreement, we are now negotiating other possible agreements--e.g., on agriculture, oceanography, transportation, peaceful uses of atomic energy, and taxes. He assured the Council that there would be no decisions taken or agreements reached that would be detrimental to the Atlantic Allies, and that we would keep the NATO Allies advised as actively and fully as possible.

US View of CSCE

The Secretary pointed out to the Ministers that we have approached the CSCE with skepticism about the value of purely symbolic acts and with determination to press for progress on specific issues. He expressed our view that the initial meeting of Foreign Ministers in the CSCE should be brief--ideally no longer than a week--and that such a meeting is not the appropriate forum to carry out any extensive negotiations on points of substance. He expressed our opposition to any artificial timetable for the CSCE, stating that when we agreed to enter these talks, we agreed on the basis that we would insist on concrete results, and any artificial timetable would make it much more difficult to achieve such results.

The Secretary expressed our belief that the initial CSCE meeting of Ministers would not be the appropriate occasion to discuss drafts of any final CSCE documents which might be tabled by the Eastern powers or to seek agreement on the level of representation in the final stage of the conference.

US Views on MBFR/CSCE Linkage

In discussing MBFR, the Secretary reiterated our view that MBFR should focus initially on stationed forces and that indigenous force reductions, if any, should come in a subsequent phase. He also expressed our belief that it is important for negotiations on MBFR to begin on or before October 30. He pointed out that

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we would be willing to see the first stage of the CSCE begin on schedule early in July, but that we have also told the Soviets in the strongest possible terms that we expect them to uphold their end of the agreement to begin MBFR negotiations no later than October 30.

US Stresses Need for NATO Strength

The Secretary told the Council that as we move toward negotiations on MBFR, it is more important than ever that NATO maintain its strength and that we not be misled by any euphoria about detente. He pointed out that there can be no doubt that improved relations with the USSR have come about because of the strength of the Atlantic Alliance.

* * *

NATO MINISTERS DISCUSS UK-ICELANDIC DISPUTE

In discussions at the NATO Ministerial meeting in Copenhagen June 14-15, the UK and Icelandic Foreign Ministers presented their respective positions on the fisheries dispute between their countries. A round of statements by other Foreign Ministers urged an early resolution of the dispute. Secretary Rogers took the lead in urging that a clear distinction be made between the issue of the US base at Keflavik and the UK-Icelandic problem.

Neither Iceland nor the UK showed signs of yielding its current position, but the Icelandic Foreign Minister admitted that the fisheries and base issues are separate. NATO Secretary General Luns indicated that he would continue his behind-the-scenes efforts to bring about a withdrawal of British naval vessels from the fisheries zone claimed by Iceland and subsequent cessation of harassment of UK trawlers by Iceland.

Iceland's Case

Icelandic Foreign Minister Agustsson argued that the UK had provoked Iceland by sending warships to the area, and that the

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*Iceland's Agustsson--
UK Provocation
Requires UK Withdrawal*

first step to resolve the dispute should be immediate UK withdrawal. He indicated that following UK withdrawal, talks between the two countries could be resumed. He expressed concern that no progress had been made toward resolution of the issue in two weeks following an Icelandic request for NATO assistance, and he concluded that the Icelandic people would find it necessary to reassess their participation in the Atlantic Alliance if NATO could not help.

Agustsson said that a request for review of the US-Icelandic Defense Agreement under Article VII of the Agreement would be submitted to the North Atlantic Council later this month. (Article VII provides that either government may request the North Atlantic Council to "review the continued necessity" for the defense facilities in Iceland and make recommendations to the

two governments; that if no understanding between the two governments is reached within six months after such a request, either government may give notice of its intention to terminate the agreement; and that the agreement will then cease to be in force twelve months after such notice.)

British Rebuttal

In a rebuttal of the Icelandic argument, British Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home recalled that he and the previous Icelandic Foreign Minister had agreed in 1961 that any future disagreements would be referred to the International Court of Justice. He said that Iceland had reneged on this agreed procedure in the current phase of the dispute, but that the International Court had nevertheless given a judgment on what a fair catch for the UK would be. He added that the UK had indicated a willingness to shave the catch to even less than the Court's judgment in an attempt to conciliate the Icelanders, but that the Icelandic harassment of UK trawlers which began 18 months ago had not ceased, and that the British Government had not been able to refuse a request of its fishermen for protection. He promised that British warships could be withdrawn if Iceland could "find some way to assure us" that the harassment would cease.

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Norwegian, Danish, and Canadian Comments

The Norwegian Foreign Minister expressed concern about the effect of the dispute on the Alliance and appealed to the UK to make the first move by withdrawing its warships so as to pave the way for renewed negotiations. The Danish Foreign Minister took the same line, admitting that the UK had a right to stay in international waters but could nevertheless make a useful gesture by withdrawing. The Canadian Foreign Minister advised the Icelanders not to bargain economics for security by linking the base and fisheries issues, but he balanced his statement by expressing the hope that the UK would take the initiative to break the impasse.

US Position

Secretary Rogers stressed that there was no need for the Icelanders to associate the base issue with the fisheries issue, pointing out that discussions on the base had begun 18 months ago--well before the current fisheries dispute--and had been proceeding in a friendly atmosphere. He said that the US for its part would continue to ensure that the base was not a source of difficulty for the Icelanders. He expressed the hope that the Icelanders would not invoke Article VII of the US-Icelandic Defense Agreement until a *modus vivendi* could be worked out.

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Secretary Rogers--Making a Clear Distinction between the Keflavik Base Issue and UK-Icelandic Problems

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MBFR EXPLORATORY TALKS JUNE 9-15

MBFR Communique

Allied and Eastern representatives in Vienna reached *ad referendum* agreement on the text of a final communique for the exploratory talks, with only the date of the negotiations yet to be specified. The draft communique:

- specifies Vienna as the site of the negotiations;
- provides on agreed designation for the negotiations-- namely, "mutual reduction of forces and armaments and associated measures in Central Europe;"
- indicates that an agenda for the negotiations has been discussed but not agreed on;
- describes the purpose of the negotiations as the strengthening of peace and security in all of Europe;
- acknowledges the principle of undiminished security as the premise of the negotiations;
- establishes the right of the direct participants to introduce into the negotiations any topic relevant to the subject matter.

Although the Soviets refused to agree to the use of the term "balanced" or its equivalent in the description of the talks or elsewhere in the communique, they did agree to a reference to "associated measures." This would permit raising constraints as a topic for negotiation. The Allies in the Ad Hoc Group were on the whole satisfied with the draft communique and reported on it positively to the North Atlantic Council. According to the Soviet representative in Vienna, the text is also likely to be satisfactory to Moscow.

German Presentation to DPC

In a forthright statement of the current German position on MBFR negotiations to the NATO Defense Ministers at the meeting of the

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NATO Defense Planning Committee in Brussels, German Defense Minister Leber formally enunciated his government's support for MBFR negotiations that would include both stationed and indigenous reductions.

Leber pointed out that reductions of stationed forces alone could have an impact on German public opinion which would force the German government unilaterally to reduce the Bundeswehr. Only if there were an agreement on an eventual reduction in German forces, even if implemented "some years later" than stationed reductions, would it be possible for a German government to maintain its forces at their present level in the immediate future and to sustain the current level of defense spending. Most other Defense Ministers, however, reiterated their governments' view that initial negotiations should concentrate on US and Soviet forces.

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INTER - AMERICAN AFFAIRS

RESOLVING THE COLORADO RIVER SALINITY PROBLEM

Secretary Rogers presented to the Mexican Government on May 13, 1973 a new proposal for a definitive and just solution to the Colorado River salinity problem with Mexico.

Moving To Improve the Quality of Water Delivered to Mexico

When President Nixon and President Echeverria of Mexico met in June 1972, President Nixon announced that the United States would take steps immediately to improve the quality of the water delivered to Mexico, and that he would appoint a Special Representative to find a permanent, definitive, and just solution to the problem.



Mexican President Echeverria: The US Is Meeting His Concerns about the Colorado River Salinity Problem.

Under Minute No. 241, an agreement of the International Boundary and Water Commission, the salinity of the water made available to Mexico at its principal diversion point was promptly reduced by more than 100 parts per million. The former Attorney General, Herbert Brownell, subsequently took up the task of the Special Representative. He submitted his report and recommendations on December 29, 1972, and the new US proposal of May 13 is based on his recommendations.

\$70 Million for Public Works Construction?

The US proposal would provide for the eventual elimination from the water delivered to Mexico of all adverse effects from the saline drainage waters of the Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation District of Arizona. The introduction of these drainage waters

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occasioned the salinity problem in 1961, and the removal of their adverse effect, together with other related undertakings and understandings, would constitute the proposed solution.

Assuming that agreement can be reached with Mexico on this basis, the solution would entail the construction and later operation and maintenance by the Federal Government of extensive public works, including the construction of the world's largest desalting plant. The estimated construction cost of these works is \$70 million, and annual operation and maintenance would exceed \$6 million. A construction program for these works will be presented to the Congress for authorization and funding as soon as an agreement is concluded.



Mr. Brownell met with Mexican officials during the week of June 11 to discuss the US proposal with them. Officials of both governments are now considering the proposal further for the purpose of accommodating the remaining divergent views. They expect to resume their discussion July 3 in Washington.

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VENEZUELA CHALLENGES OAS CUBA POLICY--THEN BACKS AWAY

In the first week of June, Venezuela's Ambassador to the OAS let it be known among his Permanent Council colleagues that he had instructions to request a special Council meeting on June 11 to discuss OAS policy toward Cuba. He indicated that Venezuela would put forward a draft resolution tied to the principle of "plurality of ideologies" and affirming the right of each member government to establish relations with Cuba whenever it judged it convenient.

Such a resolution, he explained, would not remove the diplomatic and trade sanctions applied against Cuba by OAS Foreign Ministers

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in 1964, but would merely allow each member government to assess the present Cuban threat in terms of its own interests. Presumably, the sanctions policy would remain in force, but its implementation would be left to the judgment of each government.

Venezuela Shelves Its Own Proposal

Before the week ended, however, the Venezuelan Ambassador clearly got cold feet and was uncertain as to just when the Council should meet to discuss his proposal. He appears to have judged initially that he had the votes necessary for its approval by a simple majority (12 votes), only to discover afterward that at least one supporter--perhaps Costa Rica--had defected after having second thoughts about its juridical implications. Not willing to settle for the "moral" victory claimed by Peru after a similar go-round last summer, Venezuela decided finally to put its proposal on ice for awhile.

US Position

As in the case of Peru's very similar proposal last year, the United States opposed Venezuela's initiative as being both juridically unsound and politically unwise. We could not accept the specious argument that a Council resolution which flatly contradicted the "obligatory" character of sanctions adopted under the Rio Treaty "did not alter" present OAS policy toward Cuba. Nor could we agree that the Council was free to take such action by simple majority vote, when its mandate according to the 1964 decision is limited to lifting sanctions by two-thirds vote when Cuba no longer threatens hemispheric peace and security.

In our view, the "plurality of ideologies" principle sheds no new light on the question, since it is Cuba's interventionism--not its ideology--which accounts for the present sanctions policy. So long as Cuba persists in supporting violent revolution in other countries, we believe that any relaxation of the sanctions policy would be politically unwise.

We are gratified that Venezuela's proposal was abandoned without being tested in the Permanent Council, due to lack of sufficient votes to ensure its passage. We note nevertheless that the "freedom-of-action" concept has garnered significant additional support since it was first advanced by Peru and rejected by the Council last year (7 for, 13 against, 3 abstentions). Argentina, Barbados and Venezuela have clearly moved from the abstention to the affirmative column, while the opposition of Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala and Uruguay seems to have weakened significantly.

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OAS Special Committee To Meet in Lima


Commencing June 20th, the Special Committee established by the OAS General Assembly in Washington last April will meet in Lima to study possible reforms in the inter-American system. Whether Venezuela will attempt to use this occasion to resume its efforts on the Cuban question or await some other occasion is not clear. In any event the United States will continue to work with like-minded allies, such as Brazil, to oppose any present change, recognizing that despite our best efforts, our opponents may soon gain at least majority support for the Venezuelan proposal.

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NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO SELL PHANTOMS TO SAUDI ARABIA*The F-4 Phantom Jet*

One of the principal US policies in the Persian Gulf since the British ended their protective treaty relationship has been to encourage friendly states in the area to assume increasing responsibility for collective security in this region. In the Gulf, the security of this area is being shared primarily by Iran and Saudi Arabia. In the Arabian Peninsula, Saudi Arabia must bear the primary responsibility for its own defense and to assist its smaller Peninsular neighbors. It is in this context that we have responded positively in the past to Saudi requests for the sale of military equipment and services and on which we based our agreement in principle to the sale of F-4 Phantom aircraft. These responses have been weighed in light of Saudi Arabia's limited manpower availabilities.

Background

Saudi Arabia recently requested US agreement in principle to sell F-4 Phantoms as a follow-on to shorter range Northrop F-5B and

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F-5E aircraft they are now acquiring from the US. Saudi concerns have been stimulated by the growing supply of Soviet arms into South Yemen and Iraq. In South Yemen, the Soviets have stepped up their deliveries of sophisticated weapons and aircraft.

The Saudis justifiably view the radical regime in Aden as representing a military threat to: (1) North Yemen, which is practically defenseless and which depends largely on Saudi Arabia for help in maintaining its security; (2) Oman because South Yemen continues to provide the base for the communist-led insurgency in Oman's western province of Dhofar; and (3) Saudi Arabia itself--last March, South Yemeni MIG's hit a Saudi border post. The Saudis are also concerned with the threat from Iraq, which has a substantial Soviet-equipped military force including MIG 21's.

The Saudis justify the need for a longer-range aircraft to protect the wide expanse of the Kingdom and to avoid building more air bases that would be required with only the shorter-range aircraft in their inventory. Even with the F-5's they are acquiring, they cannot provide satisfactory coverage to all parts of Saudi territory. The Saudis are also looking at the latest French Mirage F-1 as an alternative.

Political/Economic Background

The US has major and vital interests in Saudi Arabia because of the need of the Western world, and now including the US, for access to the Kingdom's vast oil resources. Saudi Arabia has become the world's largest oil exporter and soon will be the largest producer. Over the next seven to ten years, it will be the only country in the world capable of expanding its production enough to cover the anticipated increase in world energy requirements. It is also a major trading partner where we have enjoyed significant balance of payments benefits (over \$1 billion a year) because of our large trade surplus, remittances received from sales of services, and oil income which ARAMCO returns to the United States. We have had close relations with Saudi Arabia since World War II, and American companies have played a major role in its development. Its leadership has been moderate and constructive with most of its attention in recent years directed at developing its human and material resources and building up an infrastructure for this vast and lightly-populated country.

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Military Relationship

The US has had an ongoing military supply relationship with Saudi Arabia since 1951. Over the past several years this has involved sales programs related to air defense systems to give Saudi Arabia an interceptor and airlift capability, to develop a modest naval force composed of small vessels, to have a modern logistical and vehicle repair system, and to modernize its internal security forces. These programs, which involve the sales of goods and services both on a government-to-government basis and through private American contractors, are expected to continue for a number of years because of the need for training numerous manpower skills.

Principal Considerations

In reaching agreement in principle to the sale of F-4 aircraft, the decision was taken after weighing the following factors:

- (1) US interests and those of the Middle East will be best served if the US remains as the principal supplier of arms to Saudi Arabia. By responding positively now to the F-4's, it should ensure that aircraft in the post-1975 period will be of US origin and compatible with equipment now in or soon to enter the Saudi inventory.
- (2) Saudi Arabia, if it acquires this aircraft will be dependent almost indefinitely on American contract support personnel. This factor plus our requirement that these aircraft cannot be transferred to third parties without our prior consent, will give us a considerable element of influence over their use.
- (3) The Saudis have pointed out that US interests in the area are of growing importance, and we cannot appear to slight these interests without risking harm to our relations with Saudi Arabia.
- (4) Responding positively will enable a moderate Arab regime to demonstrate the benefits of friendship with the US and bolster its ability to resist radical pressures to weaken its ties with the US.
- (5) The request by the Saudis has not been made in the Arab-Israeli context (and it would be a mistake to look at it that way), but in terms of real Saudi concerns which are focused on the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf. Saudi Arabia is a vast

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country, and the Saudis have found that even with the F-5 aircraft (and its planned air-to-air refueling capacity) now entering their inventory they will have trouble providing air defense and air cover to Saudi forces along its frontiers. The Saudis have twice been attacked by South Yemeni forces and both times have found difficulty in supporting their frontier forces who are stationed several hundred miles from the nearest Saudi air base. The Saudis thus consider a longer-range aircraft a military necessity.

(6) The time frame for delivery and numbers involved have not yet been determined. These will be worked out after a final Saudi decision to choose the F-4 has been made. (The Saudis are also considering the French Mirage.) Even then, it will be several years before the aircraft are manufactured and the Saudi manpower to operate and maintain them is trained and in place.

(7) In making a decision on F-4's, we took into account the impact this sale might have on the Middle East balance of power. We concluded to our satisfaction that if the sale is consummated, it would not destabilize the military balance between Israel and the Arab states in the latter 1970's.

US Policy Interests

We have kept in close touch with the Israelis about our interests in the Gulf. While the Israelis are in general agreement with the strategic importance of the region, they have expressed concern about the sale of arms to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, especially the F-4. We can understand these concerns, but do not think they override our broader policy interest of doing what we think is necessary to support Saudi Arabia, which has major security responsibilities in the Peninsula and the Gulf and whose continued close friendship is very important to us. Our positive response reflects the very high value which the US places on this policy interest.

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
US MILITARY SALES PROPOSALS FOR KUWAIT

Our willingness to help Kuwait with its military defenses has been based on our desire to discourage political pressure or an actual military threat from Iraq in order that: (1) our valuable economic interests in Kuwait can be protected, and (2) to assure Kuwait's continued ability to remain a major world oil supplier. While we realize that Kuwait would not be able to defend itself in the face of a large-scale invasion by an outside power, Kuwait has the capability of building up a force large enough to hold off an aggressor for a few days until help comes from other sources. Although Kuwait, unlike Iran and Saudi Arabia, does not have regional security responsibilities, we have encouraged Kuwait to work closely with Saudi Arabia and Iran and to acquire US military equipment comparable to that found in Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Background

In January 1971 Kuwait was made eligible for Foreign Military Sales. Later that year Kuwait asked for an in-depth analysis of its defense requirements, and a Department of Defense Survey Team arrived in February 1972. Although not making specific recommendations, the conclusions of the Survey Team report pointed to Kuwait's acquiring F-5E aircraft, TOW anti-tank missiles, Hawk anti-aircraft batteries, and an integrated air defense/command system with reasonable radar, communications, and related equipment. In February 1973 a Kuwaiti team visited US installations in Europe to look at F-5 and F-4 aircraft, improved Hawk, and command/control systems.

In April 1973, following the March 20 border skirmish with Iraq, we sent a team in response to Kuwait's request to present a comprehensive program based on the survey



The Hawk Missile

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report plus Kuwait's priority need for new motor vehicles, tanks, and some very quickly attainable air cover. In response to Kuwait's request, we demonstrated the F-8H and K Navy Crusaders. Since the F-8 is a used aircraft, which could be made available in six months, but which can be effectively used for only three or four more years, the Kuwaitis asked about a follow-on aircraft--either the "Lightweight Fighter" or the Phantom F-4 or appropriate new generation aircraft. The Kuwaitis have clearly indicated they do not desire the F-5.

While Iraqi troops have withdrawn from the Al Samitah post occupied on March 20, they still remain in other disputed areas along the frontier which Kuwait considers its territory. The Kuwaitis remain highly apprehensive because Iraqi inflexibility so far does not give them much hope for a mutually-agreed border settlement. In this emergency and over the near term, Kuwait has decided to upgrade its defensive capability and has turned to the US for assistance.

US Effort

The Defense Department team sent to Kuwait in April agreed in principle to provide equipment, training, and construction totalling \$560 million. A little over half of the total is for equipment and training, and the balance is for construction. A new US sales team arrived in Kuwait on May 31 for further negotiations. No contracts on any of the offers have yet been concluded. No FMS credit is involved.

We do not expect a Kuwaiti decision on this program for several months. If a program of this nature is implemented, it is expected to take at least five years to allow for the necessary training and modest augmentation of Kuwait's armed forces which now total about 8,500. [REDACTED]

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INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS EXTENDED

On June 15 the Security Council by a vote of 14 (US) to 0, with the PRC abstaining, adopted a resolution on Cyprus virtually identical with those that have been adopted at six-month intervals in recent years.

Once Again, Six More Months

The resolution urged the parties concerned to act with the utmost restraint and to cooperate to achieve the objectives of the Security Council, and extended the stationing of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for a further six months ending December 15 "in the expectation that by then sufficient progress towards a final solution will make possible a withdrawal or substantial reduction of the Force."

The Council's consideration of the question was relatively routine and the resolution itself was agreed to through consultations before the meeting opened. Following the vote the representatives of Cyprus, Turkey, and Greece spoke, all taking a conciliatory line. All Council members except the PRC also spoke, generally indicating their support for UNFICYP's extension in order to preserve the climate necessary for continued progress in the intercommunal talks.

US Supports a Reorganization of UNFICYP

The United States has sought over the past few months support for a reorganization of UNFICYP, both to help



*Cyprus: Generally Calm,
but Peace Force Still
Needed*

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eliminate the deficit--estimated soon to reach \$18.9 million--and to bring UNFICYP's size and structure into line with the functions it is actually performing.

Noting that the military situation had remained calm during the reporting period, the US Representative, Ambassador Scali, expressed "cautious optimism" about the possibilities for substantial progress and strongly urged "all sides to take full advantage of this promising atmosphere." He stressed UNFICYP's financial difficulties and regretted that effective support for it had been left to "a small number of states who continue to contribute more generously than their own interests or responsibilities would dictate."

Scali concluded by strongly supporting the Secretary-General's intention to study ways and means of reducing the UN financial and manpower commitment and make "appropriate recommendations" in his next report to the Council, and suggested that this study include creating alternative force models "based on hypothetical reductions in the neighborhood of 25 percent, 50 percent, and 75 percent of UNFICYP's current strength" of 3,144 men.

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SECURITY COUNCIL MEETS ON MIDDLE EAST

At the request of Egypt the Security Council held ten meetings during June 6-14 to discuss the situation in the Middle East. On June 14 the President of the Council read a statement expressing the sense of the Council that the meetings should be suspended until mid-July.

Attention focused principally on a report submitted by the Secretary-General summarizing UN efforts in dealing with particular aspects of the Middle East situation (e.g., maintenance of the cease-fire, status of Jerusalem, refugees) and reviewing progress in the search for a settlement under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring in accordance with resolution 242 of November 22, 1967.

Representatives of 32 countries, including 9 foreign ministers or equivalent, participated in the debate. No strikingly new ideas or proposals were set forth, and the positions of the

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parties were largely predictable. The debate was by and large serious and moderate, and threats of resort to military force or action against western interests, particularly oil, were muted and indirect.

Egyptian Statement

The Egyptian Foreign Minister opened the debate indicating he would at a later date comment on the Secretary-General's report. With regard to the current situation, he said that his government had requested the Council to examine the question "after six years of effort and endurance have failed to put an end to the Israeli military occupation of our land." He noted that Egypt had called for the Council meetings that resulted in adoption of resolution 242 and said that at that time they had "called for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Israeli forces from all territories invaded in June 1967." He characterized Israel's posture since then as a demand to meet the vanquished and dictate its terms and declared that all UN resolutions on the subject "remained mere documents."

Zayyat's statement in his speech that Egypt accepted talks "without prior conditions" attracted particular attention during the debate. His subsequent explanation made clear, however, that Egypt still seeks a prior Israeli commitment to total withdrawal from occupied territories and considers Israel's refusal to give such a commitment to be an Israeli precondition to negotiations. He further stated that resolution 242's affirmation of "secure and recognized boundaries" for all did not mean that these should be established for Israel inside Egypt or Syria.

In conclusion, Zayyat announced Egypt's readiness to continue Jarring's talks with a view to achieving a just and lasting peace. "The price, however, has not been and shall not be the betrayal of our territorial integrity or the abandonment of the inalienable right of the Palestinians as a nation to live in peace within recognized and secure boundaries." He declared that a partial or interim settlement was completely unacceptable.

Israeli Position

Israel's Ambassador Tekoah spoke immediately after the Egyptian Foreign Minister. He stated that his government had repeatedly declared that it did not wish to freeze the existing situation and enumerated Israeli efforts to reach agreement which had been rebuffed by Egypt. He also asked, as a basic question, whether

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Egypt had abandoned the ultimate objective of bringing about Israel's destruction as an independent state.

With regard to the "secure and recognized boundaries" affirmed in resolution 242, Tekoah stated that the boundaries were not defined in the resolution but were subject to negotiation and agreement. In response to Mr. Zayyat's statement that Egypt accepted direct negotiations without prior conditions he stated that "Israel is prepared to enter into any free negotiations without preconditions." He ended with a call to Egypt to join Israel in building peace together.



The Suez Canal: Wider Than an Ocean

Egyptian Questions

On June 12 the Egyptian Foreign Minister put three queries to the Secretary-General, to which the latter replied on the 14th.

(1) Did the Special Representative intend to prepare aides memoires for Jordan and Syria in addition to his aide memoire of February 8, 1971, to Egypt and Israel on elements of a settlement? The Secretary-General responded that Ambassador Jarring had in 1971 indicated his intention of submitting an aide memoire relating to Israel and Jordan. Further, if Syria were to accept resolution 242 Jarring might also submit an aide memoire relating to Syria.

(2) Was the absence of reference to Gaza in the February 8 aide memoire without prejudice to the status of the strip as an

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"Arab territory" which "should be de-occupied"? The Secretary-General replied that this was in essence correct.

(3) Would the Secretary-General confirm that the US Permanent Representative, in his capacity as chairman of the Four Power meeting of June 24, 1971, did inform him that the Four "welcomed and supported" the February 8, 1971, initiative of the Special Representative and believed that Jarring was acting fully in accordance with the terms of his mandate under resolution 242? The Secretary-General confirmed that this conferred the general sense of that meeting.

US Position

Ambassador John Scali addressed the Council on June 14. His theme was the need to start a genuine negotiating process between Arab and Israeli. He described this meeting as a challenge to deal responsibly with the problem of the Middle East and an opportunity to reaffirm that the Council does not consider the present situation in the area either natural or permanent.

Ambassador Scali reaffirmed the US position that resolution 242 remains the landmark it was at its adoption. It recognized that peace in the Middle East must be based on a just settlement not only of the problems arising out of the hostilities of June 1967, but also of the underlying causes of the Arab-Israeli conflict. He enumerated the essential elements with which the UN began the search for peace in 1967: (1) The Council had not addressed the question of who was responsible for the outbreak of the fighting in June 1967, nor did it call for unconditional Israeli withdrawal. (2) Resolution 242 did not define the terms of settlement; it defined a set of "provisions and principles" which constitute a framework for the terms of a final settlement.

After recalling the main provisions and principles of resolution 242 Ambassador Scali noted in conclusion that it called for agreement and said the United States had never seen how such agreement was possible without an ongoing, serious negotiating process, either direct or indirect, which engaged the parties themselves.

Dismissing allegations of US partisanship in the dispute, he stated the overriding interest of the US was in peace to end the fear and uncertainty of the past quarter century. The parties must come to grips with the issues of sovereignty and security. The question of boundaries must be resolved as part of an overall agreement for a new relationship among the parties re-

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placing that defined in the 1949 armistice agreements. He went on to say:-

"But the fact is that resolution 242 is silent on the specific question of where the final border should be located. It neither endorses nor precludes--let me repeat: neither endorses nor precludes--the armistice lines, which existed between Israel, Egypt, Jordan and Syria on June 4, 1967, as the final secure and recognized boundaries."

He concluded by restating US determination to preserve the basis for agreement which resolution 242 represents, and to try to move forward with renewed energy. [REDACTED]

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INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

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COMMUNIST ECONOMIC AID TO THE LDCs STILL A FRACTION OF WESTERN EFFORTS

In recent years Communist countries have placed increasing emphasis on foreign economic assistance as a major instrument for strengthening their political and commercial interests in the less developed countries (LDCs) of the non-Communist world. Direct comparisons between Communist and Western aid flow can be misleading--not the least of the difficulties being the definitional problem of what actually constitutes foreign aid, and the absence in Communist countries of any distinction between government and private sector activities.

Nevertheless, the orders of magnitude of available data clearly show that Communist aid efforts still represent only a small fraction of the Official Flows extended to the LDCs by the 16 member nations of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC), however qualified direct comparisons must be. (Communist aid includes provision of goods and services, either as grants or on deferred payment terms. Credits allowing five years or more for repayment are included.)

DAC aid flows comprise Official Development Assistance (ODA) and Other Official Flows (OOF). ODA is defined as "all contributions which are administered with the promotion of economic welfare of developing countries as the main objective and whose financial terms are intended to be concessional in character." OOF includes official export credits, and debt relief and contributions to multilateral institutions which are not sufficiently concessional

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to classify as ODA.

Aid Commitments--Communist Aid Dwarfed by US Totals Alone

Since 1954, Communist economic credits and grants to the LDCs--grants constituting only about 5 percent of the total--have amounted to \$15 billion. Almost 45 percent of these commitments were extended during the last six years. Even so, these 1967-72 Communist commitments represented less than one-tenth of the official commitments made to the LDCs over the same period by DAC members. Commitments by the US alone were more than 4-1/2 times total Communist aid commitments in the 1967-72 period.

(billions of dollars)

	DAC Commitments			Communist Economic Commitments	Communist Commitments As % of DAC Commitments	US Commitments		
	ODA	OOF	Total			ODA	OOF	Total
1967	8.4	1.3	9.7	.4	4.2 %	4.5	1.0	5.5
1968	8.1	1.1	9.2	.6	6.4 %	4.0	.8	4.8
1969	7.7	1.5	9.2	.9	9.7 %	3.3	.6	3.9
1970	8.2	2.5	10.7	1.1	10.2 %	3.3	.8	4.1
1971	9.7	3.2	12.9	1.7	13.3 %	3.9	1.1	5.0
1972	11.3	4.5*	15.8	1.7	10.9 %	4.5	1.9*	6.4
	53.4	14.1	67.5	6.4	9.5 %	23.5	6.2	29.7

*Estimate

Aid Drawings

Communist economic aid performance is even less impressive when drawings of Communist aid by the LDCs are compared with gross disbursements of official assistance by the DAC member countries. Over half of the drawings on Communist aid for the period 1954-72 occurred in the last six years. In these six years (1967-72), drawings on Communist aid averaged only about 5.5 percent of the gross disbursements effectuated by the DAC member countries.

Terms

The terms of Soviet and East European aid are generally harder than those extended by DAC member countries in their ODA programs, although they compare more favorably with DAC country OOF terms. Approximately 60 percent of 1971 DAC ODA commitments were grants, while the terms on ODA loans averaged 28.7 years, had an average interest rate of 2.8 percent, and carried an average grace period of 6.5 years. Interest rates approximating 6 percent are common in OOF transactions.

Soviet grants are the rare exception, and the terms of Soviet development credits average about 12 years with 2.5 percent

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interest. Soviet commercial credits--about one-fifth of Soviet aid in 1972--average from 8-10 years with 3-3.5 percent interest--possibly slightly higher interest in some commercial transactions --although in 1972 some credits were for 10-12 year periods, and some carried an interest rate of 2.5 percent.

(billions of dollars)				
	DAC Disbursements			Communist Economic Aid Drawn by the LDCs
	ODA	OOF	Total	
1967	7.2	1.1	8.3	.5
1968	7.1	1.4	8.5	.5
1969	7.2	1.5	8.7	.5
1970	7.5	2.4	9.9	.5
1971	8.8	2.8	11.6	.7
1972	9.8	3.2*	13.0	.6
	47.8	12.4	60.0	3.3

*Estimate

The financial terms of Chinese economic aid are more generous than those of the Soviets or East Europeans. Grants account for over one-third of Chinese aid, with the remainder consisting of interest-free credits with repayment terms that average 10-20 years after a 5-10 year grace period.

Net Flow

About three-fifths of Communist disbursements in the 1967-72 period were attributable to Soviet aid. The net outflow of Soviet aid, however, is significantly reduced by a rising level of repayments. In 1972, for example, economic aid drawings of \$400 million were only \$140 million higher than repayments made by the LDCs to the USSR for past aid. Several LDCs are now experiencing, or are approaching, a net outflow to the USSR.

Debt service payments have had less impact on the net transfer of DAC members' ODA, although they significantly reduce the net transfer of OOF. In 1971 gross ODA disbursements totaled \$8.8 billion. Amortization and interest payments on past loans totaled \$1.6 billion, leaving a net transfer of \$7.2 billion to the LDCs. Gross OOF disbursements in 1971 were \$2.8 billion, although amortization and interest payments of \$1.9 billion reduced the net transfer to \$0.9 billion.

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1971 DAC Official Flows
(billions of dollars)

	Disbursements Gross Flow	- Amortization	= NET FLOW	- Interest	= NET TRANSFER
Bilateral ODA Grants	3.6	-	3.6	-	3.6
Bilateral ODA Loans	3.9	1.1	2.8	.5	2.3
Multilateral ODA	1.3	-	1.3	-	1.3
Total ODA	8.8	1.1	7.7	.5	7.2
Total OOF	2.8	1.5*	1.3	.4*	.9
ODA + OOF	11.6	2.6	9.0	.9	8.1

*Estimate

The combined ODA and OOF gross flow of \$11.6 billion in 1971 was accompanied by amortization and interest payments of \$3.5 billion which reduced the net transfer by about 30 percent to \$8.1 billion. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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INDOCHINA: NO PEACE AT HAND?



*"...in the Eye of
the Beholder"*

Hanoi's and Saigon's initial public commentary on the Joint Communique signed in Paris on June 13, 1973, shows some significant divergence in the way they interpret the meaning of the latest Vietnam agreement. While both the Communists and the Saigon government use the occasion to reaffirm their intentions to comply fully with this and the earlier Paris agreement on Vietnam, there is no evidence that they are any closer to agreement on the causes of the continuing hostility or on the major issues still dividing them. Their rhetoric alone does not bode well for a quick or early solution to the conflict.

Hanoi Sees an Important Victory

A DRV Foreign Ministry statement of June 14 describes the latest Vietnam agreement as "an important victory" for the Vietnamese people. Predictably, Communist media blame the "very serious and systematic violations of the cease-fire" by the US and GVN for the continued fighting and argue that the only correct way to maintain peace is to implement

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scrupulously the Paris Agreement. More significantly, the DRV Foreign Ministry statement argues that this mean strict termination of US military involvement and interference in South Vietnam and the solution of the internal problems of South Vietnam on the basis of the recognition that there exist in reality in South Vietnam two administrations, two armies, two zones of control, and three political forces.

Of the Communique's 14 points, Communist media stress the importance of four provisions regarding South Vietnam: the delineation of the territory controlled by each side, the release of arrested and detained Vietnamese civilians, the formation of the Council of National Reconciliation and Concord, and the provision of democratic liberties. Of these, Hanoi clearly considers the proposed modalities to determine control of territory as being the most important to its side. On the issue of Cambodia and Laos, the Foreign Ministry statement merely repeats the language of the Communique while reaffirming Hanoi's stand that the internal affairs of Laos and Cambodia must be settled by the people of Laos and Cambodia without foreign interference.

Saigon Claims Reaffirmation of Paris Agreement Position

Initial South Vietnamese commentary indicates that they view the June 13 Communique as a reaffirmation of their previous position on the Paris Agreement. Of special note is the South Vietnamese claim that the Communique confirms that the GVN is the only legal government and that the Army of the Republic of Vietnam is the only legitimate army in South Vietnam. In this context Saigon stresses that Communist-controlled areas are only under temporary military control pending a political settlement. Saigon further sees the Communique as reaffirming that the implementation of "democratic liberties" is conditional on compliance with the in-place cease-fire. With regard to general elections, the South Vietnamese emphasize that the procedures for holding elections must be agreed upon before the implementation of the other political provisions of the Paris Agreement, such as the establishment of "democratic freedoms," the formation of the National Council of Reconciliation and Concord, and settlement of the problems related to the Vietnamese armed forces in South Vietnam.

Saigon insists that the Communique primarily means that the Communists must stop violating the cease-fire, immediately end land-grabbing operations, and cooperate with the GVN in determining zones of control. The GVN also emphasizes those provisions calling for the Communists to cease infiltration of men and supplies from the North and to withdraw their forces from Cambodia and Laos. With the exception of a few minor concessions--such as the agree-

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ment to allow the PRG delegation to the Two-Party Joint Military Commission to move into downtown Saigon--the GVN apparently sees the Communique as requiring no adjustments in its own basic position on military and political questions. [REDACTED]

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GUATEMALA 12376

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E.O. 12356 DECL: OADR

TAGS: PHUM, GT

SUBJ: LIST OF DEAD AND DISAPPEARED FROM PATZUN

REF: GUATEMALA 12319

1. A COMPARISON OF THE OAS INTERAMERICAN COMMISSION
OF HUMAN RIGHTS LIST OF 52 ALLEGEDLY DISAPPEARED PEOPLE
FROM PATZUN AND PATZUN TOWN RECORDS FOR THE MONTHS OF
JANUARY THROUGH JUNE 1985 CONFIRM 7 OF THE 52 AS DEAD
AND 15 AS DISAPPEARED (REFTEL). WE HAVE NO INFORMATION
ABOUT THE REST OF THE PEOPLE LISTED.

2. THE DEAD ARE:

SANTOS COY
MARCELO JOCHOLA
JUSTO MORALES
SINFOROSO SIPAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/CR/IR Date: 1/28/98
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EDUARDO PULUC
ROBERTO YOS
ABEL QUECHE

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3. THE DISAPPEARED ARE:

MARCELINO COLON	JOSE SEBASTIAN COY MUCXA
JUAN COLON	ANDRES MAGZTUL
SIMON UPUM	JOAQUIN MAGZTUL
RAIMUNDO RAVARIC	BERNADINO XINICIO
LUCAS JOCHOLA	VIRGILIO XINICIO
SANTOS JOCHOLA	PEDRO SINCAL
JOSE JOCHOLA	
ISRAEL JOCHOLA	
BENITO SALVADOR A.	

SOME OF THE PEOPLE ON THE LIST ALLEGEDLY DISAPPEARED IN 1984. WE DO NOT HAVE TOWN RECORDS OF DEAD AND DISAPPEARE FOR THIS YEAR. HOWEVER, ONE OF THE DISAPPEARED, EDUARDO PULUC, LISTED BY INTERAMERICAN COMMISSION FOR HUMAN RIGH AS DISAPPEARED IN APRIL 1984, IS LISTED IN TOWN RECORDS AS KILLED SOMETIME DURING FIRST SIX MONTHS OF 1985.

4. ALSO, THE FIRST 12 NAMES ON THE LIST SUPPOSEDLY COME FROM THE VILLAGE OF CHIJCHIJLA. ACCORDING TO A LIST OF VILLAGES AND HAMLETS PROVIDED EMBOFFS BY THE PATZUN TOWN SECRETARY, THIS IS NOT PART OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF PATZUN.

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification ***

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SECTION 01 OF 04 GUATEMALA 12319

E.O. 12356 DECL: OADR
TAGS: PHUM, GT
SUBJ: PATZUN: NO MASSACRES BUT PLENTY OF DISAPPEARANCES

REF: (A) GUATEMALA 2297 (B) GUATEMALA 4630
- (C) GUATEMALA 5617 (D) GUATEMALA 7658
- (E) GUATEMALA 8654

SUMMARY

1. EMBOFFS VISITED PATZUN, CHIMALTENANGO, NOVEMBER 22 TO FOLLOW UP OUR EARLIER INQUIRIES INTO ALLEGED MASSACRES

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BY GOG SECURITY FORCES. TOWN OFFICIALS CLAIMED THAT NO MASSACRES HAD OCCURRED IN PATZUN OR ANY OF ITS ELEVEN VILLAGES. ACCORDING TO FIGURES PROVIDED BY THE LOCAL

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JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, TEN PEOPLE WERE KILLED IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF PATZUN BETWEEN JANUARY AND JUNE 1985. HOWEVER, TOWN OFFICIALS SAID THAT 42 PEOPLE "DISAPPEARED" DURING THIS PERIOD. OF THESE 42, AT LEAST TEN HAVE REAPPEARED. TOWNSPEOPLE ACCUSE THE THEN COMMANDER OF THE LOCAL GOG ARMY DETACHMENT OF MASTERMINDING THE DISAPPEARANCES. HE WAS TRANSFERRED FROM PATZUN ON JULY 4, AND VILLAGERS CLAIM THE DISAPPEARANCES ENDED WITH HIS EXIT. HOWEVER, THE OFFICER SECOND-IN-COMMAND DURING THAT PERIOD RETURNED TO PATZUN FOR ONE WEEK IN NOVEMBER, DURING WHICH FIVE MORE PEOPLE WERE REPORTED DISAPPEARED.

NOTE: TOWN RECORDS WHICH SHOW TEN PEOPLE KILLED BETWEEN JANUARY AND JULY 1985, DO NOT SQUARE WITH EARLIER EMBASSY REPORTING WHICH INDICATE 22 KILLED DURING THE SAME PERIOD.

END SUMMARY

2. EMBOFFS VISITED PATZUN (CHIMALTENANGO) NOVEMBER 22 TO FOLLOW UP EARLIER EMBASSY INQUIRIES OF ALLEGED MASSACRES BY GOG SECURITY FORCES (REFTELS). ACCORDING TO REPORTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS, UP TO 60 PEOPLE WERE KILLED BY THE ARMY IN AND AROUND PATZUN BETWEEN JANUARY AND JUNE 1985. TOWN OFFICIALS DENIED THAT ANY MASSACRES HAD TAKEN PLACE IN PATZUN OR ANY OF ITS ELEVEN VILLAGES AND 16 HAMLETS. ACCORDING TO PATZUN MAYOR LAUREANO CHULUC YOS, WHO IS ALSO THE LOCAL MAGISTRATE, TEN PEOPLE WERE KILLED IN THE MUNICIPALITY DURING THE FIRST SIX MONTHS OF 1985. ONE OF THESE, MARIO FILBERTO

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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MELGAR JUAREZ, A MILITARY COMMISSIONER, PROBABLY WAS ASSASSINATED BY INSURGENTS (REF A).

3. HOWEVER, TOWN RECORDS SHOW THAT 42 PEOPLE WERE REPORTED "DISAPPEARED" IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF PATZUN BETWEEN JANUARY AND JUNE 1985. (NOTE: SEE PARA 14 FOR LIST OF DISAPPEARED.) OF THESE 42, TEN REAPPEARED IN JULY 1985, AT THE MILITARY ZONE HEADQUARTERS IN CHIMALTENANGO. ACCORDING TO TOWN OFFICIALS, THE TEN WERE RELEASED BY THE MILITARY AFTER RECEIVING AMNESTY FOR INVOLVEMENT IN THE SUBVERSION. PATZUN POLICE CHIEF NAJARRO CLAIMED THE TEN WERE SANTIAGO TO CHIRIX, LEONA SICAJAN BAC, ALEJANDRO YOS PUN, ESTEBAN PEREZ TUJAL,

MARIA ANA AJSIP COYOTE, DANIEL TAQUIRA MUJ, JUAN TZAY BAJAN, JUAN PABLO CHIRIX, EUGENIA YOS MUJ, FLORENCIA YOS AJAP. WE HAVE RECEIVED CREDIBLE REPORTS THAT THREE DISAPPEARED BROTHERS FROM PATZUN, SANTOS AJZALAN MUJ, VICTORIANO AJZALAN MUJ, AND PEDRO AJZALAN MUJ, HAVE ALSO REAPPEARED (REF E).

4. TOWNSPEOPLE LAY THE BLAME FOR THE DISAPPEARANCES IN PATZUN ON THE COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE LOCAL ARMY DETACHMENT, LT. CABRERA, WHO WAS REMOVED FROM HIS POST ON JULY 4, 1985. MAYOR CHULUC DESCRIBED CABRERA AS THE "MALDITO" (ACCURSED). CHULUC SAID CABRERA WAS A "PARANOID" WHO WAS QUICK TO LABEL PEOPLE "SUBVERSIVES" AND ACT AGAINST THEM. THE MAYOR CLAIMED THAT SOME PEOPLE IN THE AREA SAW IN CABRERA AN OPPORTUNITY TO SETTLE OLD SCORES WITH RIVALS, AND QUICKLY DENOUNCED THEIR COMPETITORS AND ENEMIES TO THE MILITARY AS "GUERRILLAS". CHULUC POINTED OUT THAT DISPUTES OVER "LAND AND WOMEN" BREED INTENSE PERSONAL ANIMOSITIES IN VILLAGES AROUND

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INFO AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
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AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA
USIA WASHDC 3711
USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PN

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SECTION 02 OF 04 GUATEMALA 12319

E.O. 12356 DECL: OADR

TAGS: PHUM, GT

SUBJ: PATZUN: NO MASSACRES BUT PLENTY OF DISAPPEARANCES
PATZUN, AND THAT VILLAGERS OFTEN RESORT TO VIOLENCE,
OR FALSE ACCUSATION, TO SETTLE THEIR DISPUTES.

5. ALTHOUGH CHULUC ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SOME OF THE DIS-
APPEARED PROBABLY WERE ACTIVE IN THE INSURGENCY, HE
INSISTED THAT MANY WERE NOT. HE CLAIMED THAT SEVERAL
VILLAGERS CAME TO HIM AND PLEADED FOR HELP AFTER LEARNING
THAT THEY HAD BEEN DENOUNCED TO CABRERA AS SUBVERSIVES.
THE MAYOR SAID HE APPROACHED CABRERA AND "TRIED TO REASON
WITH HIM". "I TOLD HIM," CHULUC SAID, "THAT I KNEW THESE
MEN, AND THAT THEY WERE NOT GUERRILLAS". ACCORDING TO
CHULUC, CABRERA REPLIED, "IF YOU KNOW THEM, THEN YOU ARE
A SUBVERSIVE TOO". THE MAYOR SAID THAT AFTER THIS
ENCOUNTER IT BECAME IMPOSSIBLE TO WORK WITH CABRERA.

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CHULUC SAID HE FEARED FOR HIS LIFE DURING THIS TIME, AND
PURSUED A POLICY OF TENDING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE
TOWN, NOT INVOLVING HIMSELF IN "SECURITY" ISSUES.

6. DURING HIS SIX MONTH REIGN, APPARENTLY OF TERROR,
IN PATZUN, CABRERA BECAME A NEAR LEGENDARY FIGURE.
THE FEAR HE STRUCK IN PEOPLE IS STILL PALPABLE, EVEN THE
POLICE CHIEF SPOKE OF HIM ONLY IN A WHISPER. ACCORDING
TO SOME VILLAGERS, CABRERA INSISTED ON BEING CALLED
"GENERAL", AND USED ARMY DAY TO STRUT AROUND PATZUN LIKE
A CONQUERING HERO. OTHER VILLAGERS CLAIMED THAT CABRERA
RAN A "MURDER FOR HIRE" RACKET IN PATZUN. ACCORDING TO
THESE RUMORS, CABRERA COMMANDEERED PRIVATE AUTOMOBILES
AND PICK-UPS AS TRANSPORT AND USED HIS SOLDIERS AS HIT

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MEN.

7. MAYOR CHULUC SAID THREE VILLAGES WERE HIT HARDEST BY THE DISAPPEARANCES: CHIPIACUL, XATZAN AND CHUIQUEL. THESE VILLAGES LIE ROUGHLY DUE WEST OF PATZUN, NEAR LAKE ATITLAN, AN AREA OF ORPA GUERRILLA ACTIVITY. THIS IS ALSO AN AREA AFFLICTED BY COMMON BANDITRY. LAST AUGUST, THE HONORARY DANISHCONSUL'S GRANDDAUGHTER AND A FRIEND WERE ROBBED AND SHOT TO DEATH WHILE DRIVING BETWEEN PATZUN AND PANAJACHEL (REF E).

8. THOUGH MANY OF THE DISAPPEARED CAME FROM VILLAGES AROUND PATZUN, TOWNSPEOPLE CLAIMED THAT SEVERAL WERE HELD IN A "PIT" IN THE MILITARY OUTPOST IN PATZUN. ONE WOMAN REPORTEDLY WAS HELD IN THE MILITARY DETACHMENT FOR SEVERAL WEEKS, AND RECALLED HEARING VOICES OF NEIGHBORS AND FRIENDS PLEADING WITH CABRERA FOR INFORMA-

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TION ABOUT HER. EMBOFFS VISITED THE DETACHMENT AND SPOKE WITH THE COMMANDING OFFICER, LT. JAIME MARTINEZ. MARTINEZ DENIED THAT THERE WAS A "PIT" OR ANY OTHER DETENTION FACILITIES IN THE DETACHMENT. THE MILITARY OUTPOST IS SMALL, APPROXIMATELY 40 METERS BY 25 METERS, AND HAS SEVERAL LONG BUILDINGS WHICH RUN ALONG THREE OF ITS SIDES. MARTINEZ WAS HESITANT TO GIVE EMBOFFS A "TOUR" OF HIS COMMAND, AND WOULD NOT ALLOW THEM INTO SEVERAL BUILDINGS IN THE BACK OF THE OUTPOST. EMBOFFS NOTICED SEVERAL WELL-ARMED MEN IN CIVILIAN CLOTHING IN THE OUTPOST.

9. BOTH MAYOR CHULUC AND POLICE CHIEF NAJARRO STATED THAT PEOPLE HAVE BEEN DETAINED AT THE MILITARY DETACHMENT. ACCORDING TO NAJARRO, LAST JULY THE ARMY ARRESTED A MAN IN CHIPIACUL FOR IMPERSONATING A MILITARY INTELLIGENCE OFFICER AND TRYING TO EXTORT MONEY FROM RELATIVES OF SOME OF THE DISAPPEARED. THE IMPOSTER WAS HELD AT THE MILITARY OUTPOST UNTIL HE STOLE A RIFLE ONE MORNING AND ESCAPED FROM THE DETACHMENT. HE WAS SHOT TO DEATH DURING A PITCHED GUN BATTLE IN THE STREETS OF PATZUN. THE POLICE CHIEF ALSO CLAIMED THAT A CAPTURED "ORPA LIEUTENANT" WAS HELD AT THE OUTPOST UNTIL HE COULD BE TRANSPORTED TO THE MILITARY ZONE HEADQUARTERS IN CHIMALTENANGO.

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10. MAYOR CHULUC CLAIMED THAT THE DISAPPEARANCES STOPPED AFTER CABRERA WAS REPLACED IN JULY. CHULUC SAID THAT "CAPTAIN SOLORZANO" TOOK OVER COMMAND OF THE MILITARY OUTPOST. TOWNSPEOPLE SPOKE WELL OF SOLORZANO WITH AS MUCH VIGOR AND PASSION AS THEY SPOKE POORLY OF CABRERA.

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AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA
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SECTION 03 OF 04 GUATEMALA 12319

E.O. 12356 DECL: OADR

TAGS: PHUM, GT

SUBJ: PATZUN: NO MASSACRES BUT PLENTY OF DISAPPEARANCES
SOLORZANO WAS DESCRIBED AS A "CHRISTIAN" AND A "GOOD MAN"
WHO RETURNED LIFE TO "NORMAL" IN PATZUN. SEVERAL
VILLAGERS NOTED THAT PEOPLE COULD GO OUT ON THE STREETS A
NIGHT AFTER SOLORZANO TOOK OVER, AND PEOPLE LOST MUCH OF
THEIR FEAR OF SOLDIERS. IN FACT, WHEN SOLORZANO WAS
ROTATED OUT OF PATZUN IN EARLY NOVEMBER, SEVERAL TOWNS-
PEOPLE REPORTEDLY ASKED THE MILITARY ZONE COMMANDER IN
CHIMALTENANGO TO KEEP SOLORZANO ON AS HEAD OF THE MILITAR
OUTPOST IN PATZUN.

11. SOLORZANO WAS REPLACED BY "LT. ALDANA", THE FORMER
DEPUTY COMMANDER OF THE DETACHMENT UNDER CABRERA. ALDANA
COMMANDED THE OUTPOST FOR ONLY SIX DAYS, NOVEMBER 11-16.
HOWEVER, ACCORDING TO CHULUC AND THE LOCAL POLICE CHIEF,

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FIVE PEOPLE WERE REPORTED DISAPPEARED DURING THIS PERIOD.
CITY RECORDS SHOW THAT CELESTINO TZAY COY, SECUNDINO
MAGTZUL TUCUBAL, MASARIO CHIRIX EJCALAN, RUMULDO BAJAN
MAJTZUL, AND JOSE YOS SINICAL WERE ABDUCTED NOVEMBER 14
FROM THE VILLAGE OF MOCOLIXOT BY HEAVILY ARMED MEN.

12. LT. ALDANA LEFT PATZUN ON NOVEMBER 16, AND IS NOW
SAID TO BE HEAD OF THE MILITARY DETACHMENT IN SAN JOSE
POAQUIL, CHIMALTENANGO. POLICE CHIEF NAJARRO SAID THAT
FOUR PEOPLE HAVE BEEN REPORTED DISAPPEARED IN POAQUIL
SINCE THE ARRIVAL OF ALDANA.

13. ALDANA WAS REPLACED IN PATZUN BY LT. JAIME MARTINEZ,
WHO CLAIMED HE HAD BEEN TRANSFERRED FROM THE MILITARY
ZONE HEADQUARTERS IN CHIMALTENANGO. MARTINEZ DENIED THAT
THE MILITARY HAD PARTICIPATED IN ANY DISAPPEARANCES IN
PATZUN. MARTINEZ SAID THE INSURGENTS WERE TO BLAME,
ADDING THAT "MILITARY COMMISSIONERS AND OTHERS WHO HAVE
COLLABORATED WITH US ARE THE ONES WHO HAVE DISAPPEARED".
WHEN QUESTIONED ABOUT THE ALLEGED EXISTENCE OF A PIT IN
WHICH CABRERA HAD REPORTEDLY HELD 18 PEOPLE, MARTINEZ
SAID, "WE DON'T HAVE ANYTHING LIKE THAT HERE". THEN,
POINTING TO THE CEMETERY BEHIND THE OUTPOST, HE CONTINUED
"BUT THERE MUST BE MORE THAN 100 PEOPLE BACK THERE".
AFTER TOURING THE CEMETERY, EMBOFFS REALIZED THAT THIS

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MACABRE COMMENT WAS MARTINEZ'S IDEA OF A JOKE.

14. THE NAMES OF THE 42 PEOPLE REPORTED DISAPPEARED
IN PATZUN BETWEEN JANUARY AND JUNE 1985 ARE AS FOLLOWS:

MARCELION COCON COCON

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JUAN COCON COCON
LEON ZINICO GOMEZ
NICOLAS UPUN XINICO
SIMON UPUN SIPAC
RAMON RAVARIC SIPAC
JUAN CHIRIX COCON
BENITO SALVADOR AJUCHAN
SEBASTIAN COY MUCIA
LUCAS JOCHOLA SUQUEN
JOSE JOCHOLA AJU
ISRAEL JOCHOLA AJU
LUCAS JOCHOLA AJU
SANTOS JOCHOLA AJU
FRANCISCO JAVIER CUXIL SAPUT
PEDRO SINCAL YOS
CRUZ BERNARDINO XINICO CUJCUJ
VIRGILIO DE JESUS XINICO CUJCUJ
ANDRES TZAY MAGZTUL
JUAN HERNANDEZ SINCAL
AURELIO RAQUEC
MARIA ANA AJCIP COYOTE
FLORINDA YOS AJCIP
MARIA ISABEL YOS AJCIP
ESTEBAN PEREZ TUJAL
LEONA SICAJAN LEBON
JUAN PABLO CHIRIX
ENCARNACION BAY SAGUACH
SANTIAGO TOJ CHIRIX
EUSTAQUIO TOJ CHIRIX
AUSTINO CHAJON AQUINO
SANTOS AJZALAM MUJ
PEDRO AJZALAN MUH

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AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA
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SECTION 04 OF 04 GUATEMALA 12319

E.O. 12356 DECL: OADR
TAGS: PHUM, GT
SUBJ: PATZUN: NO MASSACRES BUT PLENTY OF DISAPPEARANCES
VICTORIANO AJZALAN MUJ
FRANCISCO SIR TOJ
GABINO SIR PATAL
DANIEL TAQUIRA MUJ
ALEJANDRO YOS CUM
EUGENIA YOS MUJ
JUAN TZAY BARAN
NICOLAS EJCALON MAGTZUL
JOAQUIN TZAY MAGZTUL

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COMMENT

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15. EXACT OR NOT, THE INCIDENCE OF DISAPPEARANCES IN

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PATZUN CLASSIFY IT AS ONE OF THE TRAGIC PATCHES OF CONCEN-
TRATED AGONY ON THIS PLANET. WE CANNOT BE SANGUINE THAT
THE FULL TRUTH ABOUT THE CRIMES IN PATZUN WILL EVER BE
KNOWN OR ADEQUATE JUSTICE DONE. IF PAINFULLY TAUGHT, HOW-
EVER, THERE IS A LESSON HERE ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS IN GUATE-
MALA, AND IT HAS TWO PARTS: (1) HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
ARE TODAY FAR MORE CLEARLY A MATTER OF INDIVIDUAL
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY THAN OF STATE POLICY, AS THEY ONCE WERE,
(2) THEY CAN STILL BE CARRIED OUT WITH RELATIVE IMPUNITY
IF ONE IS A MEMBER OF THE OFFICER CASTE. ☐

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APPROVED BY: SS-0:MROBINSON
SS-0:CSMITH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Date: 11/10/97

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☐ CLASSIFY as ☐ S or ☐ C Sec.

☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or ☐ C

STATE 184064 TOSEC 070297

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EXDIS

FOLLOWING JERUSALEM 2389 DTD 30 JUN SENT ACTION STATE
INFO TEL AVIV BEIRUT DAMASCUS JIDDA CAIRO AMMAN BEING
REPEATED FOR YOUR INFO:

QUOTE JERUSALEM 2389

EXDIS

FROM HABIB: DEPT PLEASE PASS TO SECRETARY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, US, LE, SY, XF, IS

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: DISCUSSIONS IN LEBANON, JUNE 29-30

1. ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY: GEMAYEL AND HIS ADVISERS, INCLUDING PRIME
MINISTER WAZZAN, WERE FIRMLY OPPOSED TO A PARTIAL IDF
WITHDRAWAL OR REDEPLOYMENT UNLESS IT OCCURRED WITHIN THE

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CONTEXT OF A PROGRAM FOR TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF THE ISRAELIS,

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THE SYRIANS, AND THE PLO. THEY WERE DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE INTERPRETED AS PARTITION AND AS GIVING ONE LEBANESE GROUP ADVANTAGES OVER OTHERS. THEY FEARED THAT THEIR FRAGILE POLITICAL CONSENSUS WOULD BEGIN TO FALL APART. WHETHER OR NOT FACED WITH A UNILATERAL ISRAELI MOVE, THEY WILL NOT EXCHANGE INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION. SALEM WAS ASTONISHED AT THE CHANGES IN POSITION AS CONVEYED TO ME WHEN CONTRASTED TO WHAT HAD SAID TO HIM AND WAZZAN ONLY A FEW WEEKS AGO.

ALTHOUGH WAZZAN REPORTEDLY WAS SOMEWHAT ATTRACTED TO IDEAS FOR "POSTPONEMENT" OF TALKS ON NORMALIZATION, GEMAYEL, SALEM, AND HADDAD IN PRIVATE TALKS AGREED THAT THE IDEA WAS A NON-STARTER. THE LEBANESE MADE CLEAR THAT THEY INTENDED TO HONOR AND STICK TO THE ISRAELI-LEBANESE AGREEMENT. HAVING SATISFIED MYSELF THAT LEBANESE OPPOSITION TO A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL WAS INDEED FIRM, AND AFTER HAVING BEEN PRESSED FOR SPECIFIC ALTERNATE U.S. PROPOSALS, I OUTLINED IN CONFIDENCE ONLY TO GEMAYEL, SALEM, AND HADDAD OUR CONCEPT OF SEPARATING THE WITHDRAWALS FROM THE AGREEMENT WHILE KEEPING THE AGREEMENT FOR LATER STAGED AND FULL IMPLEMENTATION; THIS COULD BE IN COMBINATION WITH A FACE-SAVING FORMULA FOR THE SYRIANS. GEMAYEL AGREED TO SUPPORT THIS APPROACH, HAVING UNDERSTOOD FULLY MY CAUTIONARY COMMENTS THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE NEGATIVE TO MY INITIAL SOUNDINGS AND THAT, IF THIS APPROACH FAILED, WE WOULD HAVE TO TRY OTHER CONCEPTS. GEMAYEL ALSO MADE CLEAR HE BADLY NEEDS SOMETHING CONCRETE AND POSITIVE BEFORE OR DURING HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON. END SUMMARY.

3. ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADORS DRAPER AND FAIRBANKS, AND ROSS, I MET WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL, FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM, AND NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER HADDAD FOR TWO HOURS

[REDACTED]

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JUNE 29. THIS FOLLOWED THREE HOURS OF PREPARATORY MEETINGS WITH SALEM AND HADDAD, AT WHICH CHARGE PUGHWAS ALSO PRESENT. AS IN MY PREVIOUS STOPS, I SHARED OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION AND EXPLORED OPTIONS FOR MOVING AHEAD TOWARDS THE THREE GOALS ENUNCIATED AND REITERATED BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY.

4. U.S. GOALS AND COMMITMENT: AFTER CONVEYING THE GREETINGS OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY TO GEMAYEL, I REVIEWED THE RESULTS OF OUR WASHINGTON MEETINGS. I MADE

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

IT ABSOLUTELY CLEAR THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD DIRECTED THAT OUR POLICY GOALS REMAIN (A) TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES, (B) RESTORATION OF LEBANON'S NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY, AND (C) ASSURANCE OF SECURITY FOR NORTHERN ISRAEL. THE PRESIDENT WAS FULLY COMMITTED TO THESE OBJECTIVES, AND WE WOULD STAY INVOLVED. THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF PULLING AWAY OR DISENGAGING OURSELVES, AS SOME QUARTERS WERE SUGGESTING MIGHT HAPPEN.

5. ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT SITUATION: I SHARED OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT SITUATION IN ITS BROAD CONTEXT:

-- RE SYRIA: THE SYRIANS ARE GIVING NO INDICATION OF BEING WILLING, IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, TO WITHDRAW SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE ISRAELIS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT. THE SYRIANS HAD HARDENED THEIR POSITION, AS ALL THE DISCUSSIONS THAT WE AND THE OTHERS HAD RECENTLY HAD WITH THEM SHOWED. IN PARTICULAR HAD TOLD US THAT THE SYRIANS VIEWED THE AGREEMENT AS IMPOSED BY FORCE AND THAT THEIR EARLIER STATEMENTS OF WILLINGNESS TO WITHDRAW MAY HAVE BEEN BASED ON WRONG IMPRESSIONS AND POSSIBLY EVEN MISLEADING LEBANESE DESCRIPTIONS OF WHAT WAS IN THE AGREEMENT. MEANWHILE, THE SOVIET UNION HAD REENTERED THE PICTURE, MAKING IT POSSIBLE FOR THE SYRIANS TO STRENGTHEN THEIR POSITION ON THE GROUND AND THEIR CONFIDENCE THAT THEY COULD WITHSTAND A LIMITED

[REDACTED]

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CONFLICT AND, INDEED, INFLICT DAMAGE ON THE ISRAELIS. AT A MINIMUM, THE SOVIETS HAD PROMISED TO RESUPPLY AND PROVIDE AIR DEFENSE IN THE EVENT THE SYRIANS GOT INTO REAL TROUBLE AND INTO FIGHTING IN SYRIA PROPER (OR ITS AIRSPACE). IN ANY CASE, ASSAD JUDGED THAT THE SUPERPOWERS WOULD, AS IN THE PAST, INTERVENE TO PUT AN END TO ANY CONFLICT THAT THREATENED TO GET OUT OF HAND.

-- RE THE SOVIET UNION: THE SOVIETS WERE PROBABLY ENCOURAGING THE SYRIANS TO RESIST THE AGREEMENT. THEY WANTED BOTH TO BUILD A ROLE FOR THEMSELVES IN THE REGION AND TO LIMIT THE U.S. ROLE. THE SYRIAN CONNECTION WAS, FOR THEM, THE ONLY REALISTIC ENTREE INTO THE MIDDLE EAST GAME TODAY. THEY WERE THEREFORE STRENGTHENING SYRIAN INTRANSIGENCE, AND MANY ARAB REGIMES WERE NOW MORE AFRAID OF ASSAD.

[REDACTED]

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-- OUR CONCLUSION: ALL OF THIS ADDED UP TO A CLEAR PROBLEM. OUR ORIGINAL SCENARIO OF SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWALS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE AGREEMENT WAS BLOCKED. THE QUESTION WAS WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT.

6. ISRAELI INTERIM SOLUTION: PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL

-- THE ISRAELIS, I TOLD GEMAYEL, WERE PUSHING AN INTERIM ALTERNATIVE TO OUR ORIGINAL SCENARIO: IDEALLY, PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL IMMEDIATELY AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE AGREEMENT, BOTH TO REDUCE CASUALTIES AND TO BUY TIME VIS-A-VIS THE PRESSURES OF THEIR PUBLIC OPINION. THEY ALSO BELIEVED THAT THIS ULTIMATELY WOULD PUT FURTHER PRESSURE ON THE SYRIANS BY DEMONSTRATING THE IRREVERSIBLE NATURE OF LEBANESE-ISRAELI-U.S. COOPERATION.

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-- IT WAS QUITE CLEAR, I SAID, THAT THE ISRAELIS DID NOT FULLY UNDERSTAND THE LEBANESE POSITION ON PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL. PARTLY BECAUSE THEY WERE TALKING TO A NUMBER OF PERHAPS SELF-APPOINTED SPOKESMEN. IN THEIR OFFICIAL EXCHANGES WITH THE LEBANESE (TANNOUS-LEVY) ON THE ISSUE OF PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL, THEY CLAIMED THEY HAD SENSED NO SERIOUS LEBANESE OBJECTIONS TO THE IDEA. THEY VIEWED THEMSELVES AS HAVING OPENED CONSULTATIONS ON THE SUBJECT WITH BOTH LEBANON AND THE U.S., AND THEY ASSUMED THAT THE LAF AND THE MNF WOULD BE HELPFUL. LEBANESE POSITION TO BE ABSOLUTELY CLEAR: LEBANON IS INTERESTED ONLY IN FULL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL IN THE CONTEXT OF THE AGREEMENT. ITS POSITION OF OPPOSITION TO PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL HAS BEEN CLEAR "FROM THE BEGINNING." LEBANON CANNOT DISCUSS ANY FORM OF PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL AS AN END IN ITSELF, BUT ONLY IN THE CONTEXT OF A FULL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES. (SALEM HAD EARLIER SAID THAT IT WAS THE OFFICIAL POSITION OF HIS GOVERNMENT THAT ANY PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL NOT IN THE CONTEXT OF AGREEMENT ON FULL WITHDRAWAL WOULD ENCOURAGE SYRIAN INTRANSIGENCE, DEMORALIZE THE LEBANESE POPULATION, CREATE THE IMPRESSION OF U.S. COLLUSION WITH ISRAEL ON PARTITION, AND BRING A BROAD SPECTRUM OF LEBANESE POLITICIANS DOWN ON GEMAYEL'S HEAD.) WAZZAN THE FOLLOWING DAY INDEPENDENTLY ADDED THAT IT WOULD BE VIEWED AS PROVIDING ADVANTAGES TO ONE GROUP

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[REDACTED]
(CHRISTIANS) OVER OTHERS.

7. SOLUTION: "POSTPONEMENT" OF NORMALIZATION

-- I DESCRIBED BRIEFLY FOR GEMAYEL [REDACTED] IDEAS ON HOW TO GET FULL WITHDRAWALS NOW THAT OUR ORIGINAL SCENARIO WAS BLOCKED. EARLIER, I HAD BRIEFED SALEM AND HADDAD ON THESE IDEAS MORE FULLY ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES:

-- [REDACTED] HAD A "PROPOSAL" THAT HE THOUGHT WAS, ON THE BASIS OF DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SYRIANS, ACCEPTABLE TO THEM,
[REDACTED]

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AND HE WAS PREPARED TO SUPPORT IT. THIS CONSISTED OF (A) POSTPONEMENT OF "DISCUSSION" AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NORMALIZATION ASPECTS OF THE AGREEMENT, BROADLY DEFINED TO INCLUDE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PERSONS, LIAISON OFFICE, ETC., FOR A PERIOD OF, SAY, SIX MONTHS AFTER WITHDRAWAL, (B) SIMULTANEOUS ISRAELI AND SYRIAN WITHDRAWALS, AND (C) IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE TIME FRAME, BUT PERHAPS NOT IN THE MANNER, FORESEEN IN THE AGREEMENT. IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS THE ACCEPTED WERE THOSE OF THE EXISTING AGREEMENT OR SOMETHING ELSE. ON NORMALIZATION, IT APPEARED THAT THE WANTED DISCUSSION TO BE REOPENED ENTIRELY AFTER SIX MONTHS, I.E., WHEN THE LEBANESE WOULD BE LARGELY FREE OF COERCION. IN ANY EVENT, THE BELIEVED THEY COULD SELL THIS PROPOSAL TO THE SYRIANS AND LOOKED TO US TO SELL IT TO THE ISRAELIS.

-- I DESCRIBED MY RESPONSE TO [REDACTED] FOR SALEM AND HADDAD: I HAD SAID THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT TO SEE WHAT ASSURANCE THERE WAS THAT THE SYRIANS WOULD IN FACT WITHDRAW EVEN UNDER HIS SCENARIO. LIKEWISE, IT WAS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT THE ISRAELIS COULD BE BROUGHT TO ACCEPT WHAT WAS IN FACT AN ABROGATION OF PARTS OF THE AGREEMENT, NOT JUST A POSTPONEMENT. I HAD TOLD [REDACTED] THAT THE AGREEMENT WAS A REALITY THAT COULD NOT BE DISCARDED. ONE COULD PERHAPS WORK AROUND IT, HOWEVER.

-- SALEM AND HADDAD PROFESSED AMAZEMENT AT PROPOSAL, WHICH THEY SAW AS A REGRESSION FROM THE POSITION HE HAD TAKEN WITH SALEM AT THEIR LAST MEETING (THE AGREEMENT COULD STAND, BUT SHOULD BE INTERPRETED NARROWLY).
[REDACTED]

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SALEM SAID THAT, AS AN HONORABLE MAN, HE COULD NOT ACCEPT ANYTHING AFFECTING OR AMENDING THE AGREEMENT BEYOND AN

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INFORMAL UNDERSTANDING ON ITS INTERPRETATION.

-- I ATTEMPTED TO MAKE IT CLEAR TO SALEM AND HADDAD, WHO HAD BECOME QUITE DISTRACTED OVER "PROPOSAL," THAT I HAD NOT INDICATED ANY ACCEPTANCE. I DID NOT WANT TO BE TRAPPED WITHOUT KNOWING WHAT POSITION WE AS A GOVERNMENT MIGHT TAKE. HADDAD AND SALEM CONCLUDED THE IDEA WAS A NON-STARTER.

-- SALEM ARGUED IT WOULD BE MORE PRODUCTIVE TO WORK FOR A JOINT LEBANESE-U.S.-SAUDI PLAN BASED ON THE CONTINUED EXISTENCE OF THE AGREEMENT, PROPERLY INTERPRETED. (I COUNTERED THAT WE SHOULD NOT DISCOUNT THE POSSIBILITY OF WORKING AROUND IT, SEPARATING WITHDRAWAL ELEMENTS COSMETICALLY AND IN TERMS OF TIME FROM IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT IN ALL ITS PARTS.) HE POSITED THAT ASSAD DID NOT REALLY CARE ABOUT THE AGREEMENT ONE WAY OR THE OTHER. WHAT HE WANTS IS GAINS FOR HIMSELF, AND HE WAS JUST USING THE AGREEMENT AS A PRAGMATIC TOOL FOR GETTING THE BEST PRICE -- SECURITY FOR HIS REGIME, ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, GUARANTEES ON SYRIA'S POLITICAL ROLE IN LEBANON, AND SOME MOVEMENT ON THE GOLAN ISSUE.

B. U.S. IDEAS:

-- UNDER STRONG PRESSURE FROM GEMAYEL (AND FROM SALEM AND HADDAD EARLIER) TO GET DOWN TO "CONCRETE" COURSES OF ACTION, I OUTLINED FOR HIM SOME OF OUR THOUGHTS ON A POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE, STRESSING THE DISCUSSION HAD TO STAY ONLY AMONG THE PERSONS IN THE ROOM BECAUSE OF PRESENT ISRAELI SENSITIVITIES ABOUT RAISING THIS ALTERNATIVE WITH ANYONE.

-- DESCRIBING THE GENERAL APPROACH, I POSTULATED AGAIN THAT ONE WAY TO DEAL WITH THE PRESENT IMPASSE WAS TO SEPARATE WITHDRAWALS FROM THE AGREEMENT WITHOUT SAC-

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[REDACTED]

RIFICING IT, BUT MERELY FREEZING IT. WE WOULD THEN WORK TO GET THE VARIOUS PARTIES TO AGREE TO WITHDRAWALS (NOT NECESSARILY SIMULTANEOUS) BY DATES CERTAIN. THE AGREEMENT WOULD NOT HAVE TO BE RENEGOTIATED; THE TIMING OF CERTAIN OF ITS PROVISIONS WOULD MERELY HAVE TO BE ADJUSTED. THE U.S. MIGHT PROVIDE CERTAIN ASSURANCES TO THE PARTIES, AND THE SAUDIS MIGHT ADD A SUPPLEMENTARY CARROT IN THE FORM OF FINANCIAL INDUCEMENTS FOR SYRIA. THE SECRETARY CONTINUED TO BE PREPARED TO STOP IN THE REGION IF HIS PRESENCE COULD HELP. HIS DECISION WOULD DEPEND IN PART ON MY REPORT TO HIM.

-- GEMAYEL COMMENTED THAT THE U.S. "IDEA" I HAD PRESENTED WAS INTERESTING, BUT NEEDED MORE CLARITY AND PRECISION. THE SYRIANS WERE VERY COMFORTABLE WHERE THEY WERE, AND THE SITUATION WOULD ONLY GET MORE DANGEROUS OVER TIME. ALREADY, MANY CHRISTIANS AND MUSLIMS WERE PREPARING FOR AND EXPECTING DE FACTO PARTITION. LEBANON WANTED TO CONSIDER THE U.S. "PROPOSAL" SERIOUSLY, BUT IT COULD NOT "BUY A FISH THAT'S STILL SWIMMING IN THE SEA" (I.E., SIGHT UNSEEN).

-- I STRESSED THAT I WAS NOT PRESENTING A "PROPOSAL" BUT MERELY SOME IDEAS FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION. THESE INVOLVED (A) TOTAL ISRAELI AND TOTAL SYRIAN AND PLO WITHDRAWALS, WITH THE ISRAELIS PERHAPS BEGINNING THE FIRST AND THE SYRIANS FOLLOWING IN AN OVERLAPPING WAY, (B) STRICT VERIFICATION MEASURES, (C) GUARANTEES OF SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL, BOTH BY OBTAINING A SYRIAN COMMITMENT PREFERABLY IN WRITING, AND BY DANGLING A LARGE FINANCIAL INDUCEMENT, (D) LEBANESE

[REDACTED]

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GUARANTEES TO SYRIA IN AREAS WHERE IT WANTED SOMETHING FROM LEBANON THAT REASONABLY COULD BE GIVEN, AND (E) NO CHANGE IN THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT, ONLY AN ADJUSTMENT OF THE TIMING OF ITS VARIOUS PROVISIONS.

-- SALEM ASKED WHAT THE SYRIANS WOULD GET OUT OF OUR IDEAS IF THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT WAS MERELY POSTPONED (THIS CONTRADICTED HIS EARLIER ASSERTION THAT THE

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[REDACTED]

AGREEMENT MEANT NOTHING TO SYRIA). I RESPONDED THAT, UNDER THE ABOVE SCENARIO, ASSAD TECHNICALLY WOULD BE ABLE TO SAY HE WAS WITHDRAWING ON THE BASIS OF AN AGREEMENT WITH LEBANON, NOT BECAUSE OF THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT. HE MIGHT TRY TO GET MORE FROM THE LEBANESE, FOR INSTANCE A PROMISE TO ALTER THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT. HE WOULD HAVE TO BE TOLD THAT THIS AGREEMENT WAS NOT HIS CONCERN. HERE THE SAUDIS' FINANCIAL INDUCEMENT COULD HELP. IT REMAINED TRUE, HOWEVER, THAT ASSAD HIMSELF MIGHT NOT BUY OUR IDEAS, EVEN IF THE ISRAELIS WERE CONVINCED TO DO SO.

-- HADDAD ASKED WHY WE DID NOT GO TO THE SOVIETS AND ALLOW THEM IN THE PEACE PROCESS IN RETURN FOR THEIR PRESSING SYRIA TO WITHDRAW. I REPLIED THAT THEIR LIKELY PRESENT GOAL WAS AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, WHICH WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO US. WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO POINT OUT TO THEM THAT OUR IDEAS IN EFFECT DID NO DAMAGE TO THE POSITION OF THEIR CLIENT IN THE AREA, BUT WE WOULD DO NOTHING MORE.

-- I TOLD GEMAYEL THAT, IF THESE IDEAS DID NOT WORK WITH THE ISRAELIS WE WOULD TRY SOMETHING ELSE IN CONSULTATION WITH THE LEBANESE. WE WOULD PERSEVERE UNTIL A SOLUTION WAS FOUND.

-- GEMAYEL SAID HE WAS READY TO FOLLOW THIS COURSE OF ACTION. HE STILL WANTED MORE SPECIFICS, HOWEVER. HE ALSO WANTED "SOMETHING" TO BE ACCOMPLISHED BEFORE HIS TRIP TO WASHINGTON. OTHERWISE, HE WOULD BE LIABLE TO MUCH

[REDACTED]

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CRITICISM. LIKewise, HE HAD TO RETURN FROM WASHINGTON "WITH RESULTS." AN ABSENCE OF RESULTS WOULD BE DANGEROUS.

9. FOLLOW-UP TALKS: ON JUNE 30, WE DISCUSSED WITH SALEM AND HADDAD TACTICS WITH SYRIA IF ISRAEL COULD BE PERSUADED TO COOPERATE IN THIS OR SIMILAR APPROACHES. WE ALSO TALKED TO WAZZAN, WHO DELIBERATELY HAS BEEN KEPT IN THE DARK ABOUT OUR "IDEA." WAZZAN - IN OPPOSING PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL - SAID HE WAS PUTTING ALL HIS SUPPORT IN THE "PACKAGE DEAL" NEGOTIATED WITH ISRAEL WITH U.S. HELP. HE ADMITTED, HOWEVER, BEING INTRIGUED WITH SOME ASPECTS OF PROPOSAL. HE ENCOURAGED THE U.S. TO PERSEVERE WITH EFFORTS TOWARDS TOTAL WITHDRAWAL.

KEENE UNQUOTE DAM

[REDACTED]

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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Date: 11/10/97

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FROM HABIB: PASS TO SECRETARY IN NEW YORK

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3 6/18/92 (HABIB, PHILIP)
TAGS: MILI, MOPS, PEPR, PGOV, PINT, LE, IS, US
SUBJ: HABIB MISSION: SITUATION AS OF JUNE 18

2. HERE IS THE POLITICAL SITUATION AS OF 1100 HOURS LOCAL
FRIDAY, JUNE 18:

--LAST NIGHT WAZZAN AND I WERE IN TOUCH. HE SAID THAT
THE PLO POSITION HAD HARDENED. ARAFAT WAS NOT WILLING -
AT LEAST AT THIS TIME - TO GO FORWARD WITH THE 48-HOUR
STAND STILL DURING WHICH PLO-GOL NEGOTIATIONS WOULD
PROCEED. THIS IS THE CONCEPT WHICH I HAD EARLIER

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[REDACTED]

--CERTAINLY, THE PROSPECT OF LAF DEPLOYMENT INTO WEST BEIRUT WILL NOT OCCUR WITHOUT AN ARRANGEMENT OF THE SORT PROPOSED. HOWEVER, IN LEBANON CIRCUMSTANCES CAN CHANGE ALMOST OVER NIGHT. WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS ISRAEL FOR SATISFACTORY ASSURANCES SO THAT WE CAN GO FORWARD IF THE GOL SAYS IT IS FEASIBLE. WE NEED TO KEEP THE DOOR OPEN IF PLO AND LEBANESE CAN STRIKE A DEAL.

--SARKIS IS STILL HAVING TROUBLE NAILING DOWN A NATIONAL SALVATION COMMITTEE AND HIS ADVISORS ARE CONSIDERING OTHER ALTERNATIVES

[REDACTED]

--I AM THIS MORNING SENDING THE WORD TO WAZZAN THAT HE SHOULD IN TURN SAY TO ARAFAT THAT - IF ARAFAT REALLY WANTS A 48-HOUR PERIOD IN WHICH TO NEGOTIATE ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE GOL - HE SHOULD LET US KNOW THROUGH WAZZAN AND MAKE A CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT TO THIS EFFECT. THIS MAY BE THE ONLY WAY TO NAIL HIM DOWN.

--AS FOR THE MILITARY SITUATION, THE IDF BUILDUP IN THE BEIRUT AREA CONTINUES. EMBASSY OFFICERS REPORT THAT IDF HAS TAKEN OUT - WITH ARTILLERY - A SYRIAN CHECKPOINT AND BUILDING HOUSING PLA REPEAT PLA UNITS AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03

BEIRUT 04259 181041Z

[REDACTED] ESTIMATE IS THAT THE IDF WILL NOT NECESSARILY GO INTO THE PALESTINIAN CAMPS AND CONCENTRATIONS IN WEST BEIRUT WITHIN THE NEXT 24 HOURS, BUT THAT THEY ARE LIKELY DO SO SOON, AND PERHAPS REPEAT PERHAPS WITH BASHIR GENAYEL'S HELP. HE CLAIMS THATE ARE STILL 10,000 FIGHTERS WHO HAVE FANNED OUT THROUGHOUT WEST BEIRUT FROM THE CAMPS, WHO WILL COME DOWN TO ONLY 4,000 EFFECTIVES IF THE IDF ATTACKS. HE ALSO CLAIMS THEY ARE SOMEHOW STILL RECEIVING ARMS SUPPLIES

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[REDACTED]
FROM SYRIANS THROUGH A NETWORK OF BACK ROADS
DESPITE IDF INTERDICTION.

3. DEPENDING ON COMMUNICATIONS AND RESOURCE
CONSTRAINTS, DETAILS BY SEPTEL. PASS THIS
TO SECRETARY IN TIME FOR BREAKFAST MEETING WITH BEGIN.
DILLON

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED TO SECRETARY IN NEW YORK.

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ACTION SS-25

EXCISE

INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 SSO-01 /027 W
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USELO RIYADH PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Date: 11/10/97

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SECTION 01 OF 05 AMMAN 06260

DECAPTIONED

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.), JO, US

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN:

- JULY 7

1

2. SUMMARY: SECRETARY SHULTZ MET WITH KING HUSSEIN FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE AND A HALF HOURS JULY 7. RECEIVED CORDIALLY BY THE KING, THE SECRETARY, AMBASSADOR HABIB AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY VELIOTES BRIEFED HUSSEIN ON THE RESULTS OF THE TALKS IN SAUDI ARABIA, SYRIA, LEBANON AND ISRAEL AND SOUGHT THE KING'S VIEWS ABOUT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN LEBANON AND THE PEACE PROCESS. PAINTING A GLOOMY PICTURE, THE KING SAID HE FINDS THE CURRENT SITUATION THE WORST JORDAN HAS FACED IN THIRTY YEARS. THE SOVIETS ARE INSISTING ON A ROLE IN THE AREA.

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END SUMMARY.

3. THE SECRETARY MET WITH KING HUSSEIN FOR AN HOUR AND A HALF JULY 7 TO REVIEW THE RESULTS OF VISITS TO SAUDI ARABIA, SYRIA, LEBANON AND ISRAEL. WITH THE SECRETARY WERE HABIB, VIETS, VELIOTES, FAIRBANKS, DRAPER, KEMP, SEITZ, HUGHES AND COLLINS (EMBASSY NOTETAKER). THE KING WAS JOINED BY PRIME MINISTER BADRAN, ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER ABU ODEH, CHIEF OF DIWAN LOZI, COURT MINISTER KHAMMASH, MFA SECRETARY GENERAL TASH AND TWO NOTETAKERS. FOLLOWING A CORDIAL WELCOME BY HUSSEIN THE SECRETARY EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR HUSSEIN'S WILLINGNESS TO RECEIVE HIM ON SHORT NOTICE. THE SECRETARY SAID HE FELT IT IMPORTANT TO HAVE THE VIEWS OF KEY LEADERS IN THE AREA BEFORE HE SEES THE PRESIDENT. HE SUGGESTED THAT AMBASSADORS HABIB AND VELIOTES BRIEF THE KING ON THE TALKS IN SAUDI ARABIA, SYRIA, LEBANON AND ISRAEL. THE KING AGREED.

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[REDACTED]

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SAUDI ARABIA

4. AMBASSADOR HABIB SAID THE FOCUS IN SAUDI ARABIA WAS MAINLY ON LEBANON, ALTHOUGH THE PEACE PROCESS, THE PLO'S PROBLEMS AND SYRIA WERE ALSO DISCUSSED. ON LEBANON KING FAHD HAD SHOWN DETERMINATION TO STAY ENGAGED; THAT DETERMINATION WAS SHARED BY THE SENIOR PRINCES. ALTHOUGH THE SAUDIS CLEARLY DISTINGUISHED BETWEEN THE ISRAELI AND SYRIAN ROLES IN LEBANON, THEY MADE CLEAR THEY CONTINUE TO SHARE U.S. OBJECTIVES REGARDING LEBANON: THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES, THE RESTORATION OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE EXTENSION OF LEBANESE GOVERNMENT CONTROL OVER ALL OF LEBANON. AT PRESENT THE SAUDIS ARE AMBIGUOUS ABOUT THE LEBANON-ISRAEL AGREEMENT, BUT THEY ARE WORKING TO FIND A WAY TO ADJUST IT TO MEET SYRIAN OBJECTIONS. SAUDI CONTACTS WITH THE SYRIANS HAVE PRODUCED NO FORMULA SO FAR: THEY KNOW THE SYRIANS REJECT THE AGREEMENT: BUT THEY ARE LOOKING FOR A FORMULA THAT WILL GET THE SYRIANS TO WITHDRAW AND ARE NOT PULLING BACK. THAT IS IMPORTANT. THE LEBANESE AND THE U.S. WILL SEEK TO ENLIST FURTHER SAUDI SUPPORT, AND IT SEEMS

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CLEAR THAT SUPPORT WILL BE THERE.

5. IN DISCUSSION ABOUT THE PLO, THE SAUDIS SHOWED
CLEAR UNHAPPINESS WITH THE PRESENT TURMOIL AND ARE
WORRIED BY IT. THEY INDICATED THEY ARE WORKING

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ACTION SS-25

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AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY
USELO RIYADH PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY

SECTION 02 OF 05 AMMAN 06260

EXDIS

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.), JO, US
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN:

WITH ARAFAT TO RESTORE PLO UNITY. THE SAUDIS CLEARLY
DO NOT CONSIDER ARAFAT OUT OF THE PICTURE AND SEE
SYRIAN ACTIONS AS A NAKED POWER PLAY TO DOMINATE
THE PLO. IT WAS EVIDENT THAT THE SAUDIS HOPE TO

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SALVAGE THE SITUATION BY WORKING WITH OTHER MODERATE ARABS TO BRING INFLUENCE TO BEAR ON SYRIA. THE SECRETARY SAID THE SAUDIS ON THEIR INITIATIVE ALSO BROUGHT UP JORDAN AND THE NEED TO SUPPORT KING HUSSEIN. HABIB ADDED THAT THEY EXPRESSED WARM AND GENUINE SUPPORT FOR WHAT THE KING HAS DONE AND IS TRYING TO DO AND THE SECRETARY STRONGLY SUPPORTED JORDAN'S NEED FOR FIRM BACKING FROM THE SAUDIS. FINALLY, FOLLOWING A SAUDI PRESENTATION CRITICAL OF U.S. SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL, THE SAUDIS URGED THE U.S. TO

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[REDACTED]

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PURSUE A DIALOGUE WITH SYRIA. THEY WERE ASSURED THAT THE U.S. WOULD DO THE BEST IT COULD.

SYRIA

6. ASSISTANT SECRETARY VELIOTES SAID THE TONE OF THE SYRIA VISIT HAD BEEN ONE OF CORDIALITY AND HOSPITALITY. KHADDAM HAD HOSTED A DINNER FOR THE SECRETARY WHICH ESTABLISHED A WARM ATMOSPHERE FOR THE ONE AND A HALF HOUR MEETING WITH KHADDAM AND FIVE HOUR SESSION WITH ASSAD WHICH FOLLOWED THE NEXT DAY.

7. THE SUBSTANCE OF THE MEETINGS--FOCUSSED ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY ON LEBANON--WAS, HOWEVER, "TOTALLY NEGATIVE." THE SYRIANS REJECTED THE LEBANON-ISRAEL AGREEMENT TOTALLY. THERE WAS NO INDICATION OF INTEREST IN OPENING A DIALOGUE WITH THE LEBANESE. RATHER THERE WERE HINTS ABOUT THE ILLEGITIMATE NATURE OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE SECRETARY SAID, ASSAD STATED HIS SUPPORT FOR A SOVEREIGN, FREE, INDEPENDENT LEBANON WITH CONTROL OVER ALL ITS TERRITORY. VELIOTES NOTED IN ADDITION THAT ASSAD HAD SAID IT WAS CLEAR "WHERE WE WANT TO GO, BUT ALL ROADS ARE CLOSED." WHEN THE SECRETARY HAD RAISED THE DANGERS OF RENEWED CONFLICT NEITHER KHADDAM NOR ASSAD HAD SEEMED OVERLY CONCERNED ALTHOUGH ASSAD SEEMED SLIGHTLY LESS SURE. INDEED, THEY EXUDED A MOOD OF CONFIDENCE THAT TIME IS ON SYRIA'S SIDE. THE SECRETARY CONCLUDED THAT THE SYRIANS SEEM TO BE SAYING "NO" TO A CHANCE TO GET THE ISRAELIS OUT OF LEBANON. THEY ARE TRYING TO DOMINATE THE PLO WHILE KEEPING ARAFAT ON AS A NOMINAL LEADER. IN

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SHORT, ASSAD SEEMS INTENT ON PORTRAYING SYRIA AS KEY TO EVERYTHING IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE SYRIAN REJECTION OF WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON UNLESS ISRAEL WITHDRAWS UNCONDITIONALLY IS SIMPLY UNREALISTIC. IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO COME AWAY FROM DAMASCUS WITH A GOOD FEELING ABOUT THE VISIT.

LEBANON

8. SAYING HE HAS DEVELOPED GREAT ADMIRATION FOR PRESIDENT GEMAYEL, WHO HAS ACCOMPLISHED A GREAT DEAL IN THE FACE OF THREATS AND INTIMIDATION, THE SECRETARY ASKED AMBASSADOR HABIB TO DISCUSS THE LEBANON STOP. HABIB SAID THE MOOD IN BEIRUT IS ONE OF FRUSTRATION AT LACK OF PROGRESS. THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT HAS IMPROVED ITS ARMED FORCES, AND ITS GOVERNMENT'S ABILITY TO TAKE ON ADDITIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES. YET THEY ARE BEING THWARTED BY A SYRIAN HARD LINE POSITION AND FACE HARASSMENT AND EFFORTS AT DESTABILIZATION TO BOOT. AT THE SAME TIME, THE GOL FEELS CAUGHT IN THE MIDDLE BY THE ISRAELIS WHO INSIST ON THE ONE HAND THERE WILL BE NO WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON UNLESS THE SYRIANS LEAVE AND ON THE OTHER INSIST ON THE NEED FOR A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL. PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL IS A POLITICAL PROBLEM FOR THE LEBANESE BECAUSE THE SHIA AND OTHERS IN THE SOUTH OPPOSE IT, INSISTING A PARTIAL IDF PULLBACK WILL LEAD TO DE FACTO PARTITION. PRESIDENT GEMAYEL, MEANWHILE, FEELS

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INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
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AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY
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SECTION

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EXDIS

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.), JO, US
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN:

A SENSE OF URGENCY IN GETTING OUT OF THE PRESENT
IMPASSE BECAUSE HE FACES EROSION OF HIS POSITION
AND OF THE NATIONAL CONSENSUS WHICH HAS HELD UP
TO NOW.

9. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES GEMAYEL IS TURNING TO
THE U.S. AND TO THE ARABS FOR HELP. HOWEVER, HE IS
FRUSTRATED THAT THE ARABS (NOT JORDAN, WHICH HAS BEEN
SUPPORTIVE) ARE LETTING HIM DOWN. ALTHOUGH
THE ARABS PRIVATELY EXPRESS SUPPORT, THEY ARE DOING
"NOTHING" OR WORSE. GEMAYEL IS, FOR EXAMPLE,
FURIOUS WITH KING HASSAN FOR AGREEING PUBLICLY
WITH QADHAFFI THAT THE LEBANON-ISRAEL AGREEMENT
IS "NO GOOD." AT THIS STAGE, HABIB SAID, THERE

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IS A DANGER THAT THE SITUATION MAY BLOW UP.
ALTHOUGH GEMAYEL CONTINUES TO DO QUITE WELL,
HE IS, FOR EXAMPLE, UNABLE TO FIND A WAY OUT
OF THE DRUZE-MARONITE CONFRONTATION. THIS
CONFLICT COULD ERUPT AT ANY TIME WITH GREAT
DANGERS FOR THE BROADER SITUATION. GEMAYEL
BELIEVES WALID JUMBLATT IS ASKING TOO MUCH.
ALL THIS, HABIB STRESSED, FURTHER UNDERSCORES
THE NEED FOR ARAB SUPPORT FOR THE LEBANESE
GOVERNMENT. THEY HAVE THE BACKING OF THE U.S.
AND THE EUROPEANS. BUT THEY NEED THE SAME KIND
OF UNAMBIGUOUS SUPPORT FROM THE OTHER ARABS
FOR THEIR EFFORTS.

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10. VELIOTES EXPLAINED THAT THEY PURPOSE OF THE ISRAEL VISIT WAS TO DISCUSS LEBANON AND TO DO SOME ADVANCE WORK IN PREPARATION FOR BEGIN'S UPCOMING VISIT TO WASHINGTON. WE DO NOT WANT THE BEGIN VISIT TO BE DOMINATED BY LEBANON. THERE ARE OTHER IMPORTANT ISSUES TO DISCUSS SUCH AS THE PEACE PROCESS, AND THE SITUATION OF PALESTINIANS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. IN THE TALKS IN ISRAEL LEBANON WAS, HOWEVER, THE MAJOR FOCUS. HAVING HEARD THE U.S. ASSESSMENT OF SYRIA'S POSITION, THE ISRAELIS BECAME IF ANYTHING MORE INSISTENT THAT THEY MUST CARRY OUT A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL. AT THE SAME TIME, THEY MADE CLEAR THEIR INTEREST IN ACCOMPLISHING A "REDEPLOYMENT" IN A WAY THAT WILL AVOID CHAOS. THEY PRESSED HARD FOR THE U.S. TO EXPLAIN TO THE LEBANESE WHY A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE A USEFUL STEP.

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WE, HOWEVER, BELIEVE THAT IN THE FIRST INSTANCE THIS IS A MATTER FOR THE LEBANESE AND ISRAELIS TO GRAPPLE WITH AND THAT THE TWO PARTIES MOST IMMEDIATELY CONCERNED COORDINATE CLOSELY IN SEEKING A RESOLUTION. ONE ELEMENT IN THE THINKING OF BOTH PARTIES WHICH IS DIFFICULT FOR US IS THE EXPECTATION THAT U.S. MARINES WILL GET INVOLVED IN ANY AREA AFFECTED BY AN IDF WITHDRAWAL. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT THIS ISSUE IS DIFFICULT BECAUSE PUTTING U.S. MARINES INTO A HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT WOULD BE HARD TO DEFEND TO THE CONGRESS. IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO SHAPE A CONVINCING ARGUMENT TO EXPLAIN WHY MARINES SHO-LD TAKE OVER IN AREAS WHERE THE GOL OR IDF CANNOT CONTROL THE SITUATION.

11. VELIOTES SAID THE ISRAELIS ALSO ARE CONCERNED THAT SOVIET SUPPORT FOR THE SYRIANS IS BEGINNING TO MAKE THEM BELIEVE THEY ARE TEN FEET TALL. THE ISRAELIS ARE INCLINED TO THINK SYRIA NEEDS TO BE BROUGHT BACK DOWN TO EARTH, AND THERE ARE NOW INDICATIONS THAT THE IDF HAS MOVED TO A "POLICY OF RETALIATION." THE SECRETARY SAID THIS DEVELOPMENT IS NOT SURPRISING. THE ISRAELIS, AFTER MONTHS OF RESTRAINT NOW BELIEVE THEY MUST REACT TO DHAL-GENGES. IT IS THEREFORE LIKELY THAT THERE WILL BE "CONTAINED OCCURRENCES" ALTHOUGH A LARGE CONFLICT IS NOT LIKELY. NEVERTHELESS, THE SITUATION IS VOLATILE AND ESCALATION CANNOT BE RULED OUT.

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HUSSEIN'S VIEWS

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ACTION SS-25

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EXDIS

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.), JO, US
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN:

12. THE KING THANKED THE SECRETARY FOR THE OPPORTUNITY
TO HEAR U.S. VIEWS. HE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT JORDAN
AND THE U.S. WILL CONTINUE TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH AND
EXCHANGE VIEWS CANDIDLY AND ASKED THAT THE SECRETARY
CONVEY HIS DEEP RESPECT AND BEST WISHES TO THE
PRESIDENT. HE THEN SAID THAT THE RECENT PERIOD HAS

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BEEN CONFUSING, SAD AND DISTRESSING; THE WORST IN THIRTY YEARS. POLICIES AND POSITIONS IN THE AREA ARE CHARACTERIZED BY AN ABSENCE OF LOGIC. IT IS FREQUENTLY SAID THE HISTORY OF THE AREA HAS BEEN ONE OF LOST OPPORTUNITIES; THE RECENT PAST HAS BEEN NO EXCEPTION, ESPECIALLY FOR THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE

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WHO ARE MORE IN DANGER TODAY THAN AT ANY TIME IN THE PAST. YET, IT IS HARD AT THIS POINT TO SEE HOW EVENTS CAN BE BROUGHT TOWARD A MORE RATIONAL COURSE.

THE SOVIETS AND SYRIA

13. THE KING SAID THE SOVIETS ARE SAYING THEY ARE IN THE AREA AND WILL NOT BE IGNORED. JORDAN CAN DO LITTLE ABOUT THEM; THIS IS AN AREA THE U.S. MUST COPE WITH. C

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LEBANON

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USELO RIYADH PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY

SECTION 05 OF 05 AMMAN 06260

EXDIS

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.), JO, US

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN:

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19. FOREGOING MEMCON HAS BEEN CLEARED BY THE DEPARTMENT.

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THE LAST STANDING

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(LIMITED WITHDRAWAL). HE SAID ISRAEL WOULD GO AHEAD UNILATERALLY IF THE LEBANESE DID NOT CHOOSE TO DISCUSS AND COORDINATE REDEPLOYMENT, AND EVEN MENTIONED IN PASSING A JULY 15 DATE, WHICH HE LATER INDICATED WAS AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE OF ISRAEL'S THINKING ABOUT TIMING. I EXPLAINED THE VERY DEEP LEBANESE RESERVATIONS ABOUT REDEPLOYMENT AND THE PROBLEMS IT WOULD CREATE FOR THE GEMAYEL REGIME BECAUSE OF OPPOSITION FROM THE SHIA AND SUNNI COMMUNITIES, AND PERHAPS EVEN THE DRUZE. THE ISRAELIS URGED THAT WE PRESS MORE VIGOROUSLY FOR HIGH-LEVEL ISRAELI-LEBANESE CONTACTS, SAYING THAT THE EXISTING CHANNELS WERE INSUFFICIENT. I EXPLAINED WHAT I HAD TRIED TO DO IN THIS REGARD WITH THE LEBANESE; I WOULD TRY AGAIN, BUT URGED THE ISRAELIS TO CONTINUE TO USE THE EXISTING CHANNELS FOR THE MOMENT. END SUMMARY.

3. JOINED BY AMBASSADORS LEWIS, DRAPER, AND FAIRBANKS, AND HARE, I MET WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN, FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR, AND DEFENSE MINISTER ARENS, AND YOSSIE AHARON (NOTETAKER) FOR MORE THAN ONE AND A HALF HOURS THE MORNING OF JULY 1, AT THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE.

4. AT THE OUTSET, I APOLOGIZED TO BEGIN FOR THE PRESS

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LEAK OUT OF WASHINGTON ON THE CONCEPT WHICH I HAD PRESENTED TO HIM AND HIS COLLEAGUES LAST MONDAY, WHICH IS NOW THE LEAD STORY IN THE ISRAELI MEDIA THIS MORNING. I SAID THAT THIS LEAK WAS VERY BAD AND IT APPEARED TO ME THAT IT CAME FROM AMERICAN SOURCES. WHILE THE PRESS STORIES WERE LARGELY ACCURATE, THEY WERE TWISTED IN CERTAIN RESPECTS. HOWEVER, I CONTINUED, WE HAD TO PLOW AHEAD. BEGIN CONFINED HIS INITIAL COMMENT TO SAYING THAT THE LEAK WAS "VERY SERIOUS."

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PAGE 01 JERUSA 02411 02 OF 05 011602Z
ACTION SS-25

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USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

SECTION 02 OF 05 JERUSALEM 02411

EXDIS

FROM HABIB

DEPT PASS USDEL SECRETARY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, IS, LE, US
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER

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8. BEGIN IMMEDIATELY RETURNED TO THE QUESTION OF THE LEAK AND WHAT COULD BE DONE TO REPAIR THE DAMAGE. HE WAS ESPECIALLY CONCERNED THAT THE PRESS STORIES HAD HIGHLIGHTED THAT THE U.S. HAD ABANDONED THE PRINCIPLE OF SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL WHICH, HE SAID, HAD BEEN SUCH AN IMPORTANT COMPONENT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE LAST MONTHS. THIS WAS A BASIC ISSUE. I THEN READ OUT THE PLANNED STATE DEPARTMENT PRESS STATEMENT OF YESTERDAY, BUT THE ISRAELI MINISTERS INTERPRETED OUR STATEMENT AS SIMPLY CONFIRMING THE STORY. I REPLIED THAT WE COULD NOT SIMPLY DENY THE LEAK, SINCE WE HAD PUT CERTAIN IDEAS ALONG THESE LINES ON THE TABLE, BUT THAT WE WOULD SEEK GUIDANCE FROM WASHINGTON. IT WAS IMPORTANT NOW, I CONTINUED, TO WORK AROUND THIS PROBLEM AND TO SEE WHAT COULD BE DONE TO BREAK DOWN THE OBSTACLES TO SYRIA/PLO WITHDRAWALS. UNLESS THIS WERE DONE, WE WOULD FACE CONTINUED SYRIAN OCCUPATION OF LARGE PARTS OF LEBANON AND A RADICALIZED PLO UNDER SYRIAN CONTROL. THIS REPRESENTED A MAJOR PROBLEM. I ALSO EXPLAINED THAT OUR PROPOSAL DID NOT

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CALL FOR UNILATERAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, BUT RATHER TO ESTABLISH DATES CERTAIN -- UNDER A PRECISE AND VERIFIABLE SCHEDULE -- FOR SYRIAN AND ISRAELI WITHDRAWALS. IN OTHER WDRDS, WE WERE SEEKING SIMULTANEOUS AGREEMENT, THOUGH THE DEPARTURE SCHEDULES WOULD NOT BE SIMULTANEOUS.

9. I SAID THAT IF ISRAEL WENT THROUGH WITH ITS PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL SCENARIO, IT WAS OUR VIEW THAT THE SYRIANS WOULD HARDEN THEIR RESOLVE TO SIMPLY STAY IN LEBANON. I HAD SPOKEN TO OUR AMBASSADOR IN DAMASCUS, AND HE DEFINITELY THOUGHT THE SYRIANS WOULD STAY PUT UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES. BEGIN SAID THAT, IN ANY EVENT, THE SYRIANS WOULD REFUSE TO WITHDRAW, EVEN IF ONE PURSUED OUR CONCEPT. ASSAD HAD SWORN UNDER OATH THAT SYRIA WOULD NEVER WITHDRAW (IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ISRAELI-LEBANESE AGREEMENT).

10. I SAID THAT THE LEBANESE FELT VERY STRONGLY ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF FULL WITHDRAWALS FROM LEBANON. OTHERWISE, THEY SAW AN IRREVERSIBLE MOMENTUM TOWARD THE PARTITION OF THEIR COUNTRY. IF FULL WITHDRAWALS WERE ATTAINED, THE LEBANESE WERE CONFIDENT OF THEIR CAPABILITY TO CONSTRUCT A VIABLE AND INTEGRAL STATE, WHICH WOULD BE TO OUR COMMON ADVANTAGE. THE ALTERNATIVE WAS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ANOTHER "FATAHLAND" IN NORTHERN LEBANON.

11. BEGIN SAID HE WISHED TO POSE A BLUNT QUESTION: IF OUR EARLIER PREMISE OF SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWALS COULD NOT BE REALIZED, WHAT COULD BE THE OBJECTION TO CHANGING ISRAEL'S FORWARD LINES IN LEBANON? HE STRESSED THAT ISRAEL DID NOT WANT TO SEE A PARTITION

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AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

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EXDIS

FROM HABIB

DEPT PASS USDEL SECRETARY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, IS, LE, US
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER

OF LEBANON. ARENS ARGUED THAT THE PRESENT OPPORTUNITY
FOR LEBANON HAD RESULTED FROM ISRAELI ACTIONS BADLY
HURTING THE PLO AND SYRIA. THE QUESTION NOW WAS
WHERE TO GO FROM HERE. HE SAID THAT NOBODY, INCLUDING
ISRAEL, WAS TALKING ABOUT OR CONTEMPLATING THOSE KINDS
OF FORCEFUL MEASURES WHICH HAD ULTIMATELY BEEN REQUIRED
TO REMOVE THE SA-5'S IN THE BEKAA VALLEY AFTER OUR
DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS HAD FAILED. ISRAEL DID NOT WANT
WAR. HE SAID THE SYRIANS WOULD NOT, MOREOVER, MOVE

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OUT OF LEBANON BY SIMPLY ADJUSTING OUR DIPLOMATIC
FORMULAS. WHILE, AS A GENERAL PROPOSITION, HE
FAVORED PUTTING ALL IDEAS ON THE TABLE AND DEBATING
THEM, IN THIS CASE HE THOUGHT OUR IDEA PRESENTED VERY
CLEAR DANGERS. IT WAS DESTRUCTIVE TO OUR PURPOSES,
AND TODAY HE WAS EVEN MORE PESSIMISTIC ABOUT OUR
POSSIBILITIES FOLLOWING THE PRESS LEAK IN WASHINGTON.

12. I AGAIN EXPLAINED THE BACKGROUND TO OUR DECISION
TO PURSUE THE CONCEPT AND EXPLAINED THAT IT WAS NOT
INTENDED TO BE A COUNTER TO PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL.
BASICALLY, WE WERE NONCOMMITTAL ABOUT THAT PROPOSAL
PER SE, ALTHOUGH WE HAD STRONG RESERVATIONS ABOUT

AN EXPANDED MNF ROLE; BUT, IN ANY CASE, THE LEBANESE WERE ADAMANTLY OPPOSED.

13. ARENS SAID HE STILL COULD NOT UNDERSTAND HOW WE HAD COME UP WITH SUCH A "NON-STARTER" AND THAT OUR PROBLEM NOW WAS TO CONTAIN THE DAMAGE. HE ARGUED THAT OUR CONCEPT (FOR SEPARATING WITHDRAWALS FROM IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT) COULD LEAD TO THE DOWNFALL OF THE GEMAYEL GOVERNMENT, BUT, ON THE OTHER HAND, REDEPLOYMENT PROVIDED A WAY FOR THE CENTRAL LEBANESE GOVERNMENT TO EXTEND FURTHER ITS AUTHORITY. I REPLIED THAT I WAS NOT GOING TO NEGOTIATE FOR THE LEBANESE, BUT INDICATED THAT THE LEBANESE DISAGREED WITH THE ISRAELI PREMISES. UNDER PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL, THEY BELIEVED THE SYRIANS WOULD NOT ONLY SIT TIGHT BUT WOULD BECOME MORE THREATENING. THEY FEARED THE RESULT WOULD BE PARTITION OR A SYRIAN-ISRAELI CONDOMINIUM. GEMAYEL AND WAZZAN WERE ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT HOW PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL WOULD AFFECT THE MUSLIMS, WHO WOULD INTERPRET IT AS A FORMULA WHICH WOULD

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PRODUCE A FREE CHRISTIAN AREA WHILE THE SHIITES AND MANY SUNNIS WOULD REMAIN UNDER SYRIAN OR ISRAELI OCCUPATION.

14. I THEN MADE ANOTHER STAB AT ARGUING THE MERITS OF OUR PROPOSAL. I SAID THAT THE RESPECTIVE SYRIAN, PLO, AND ISRAELI TIMETABLES FOR WITHDRAWALS COULD OVERLAP OR, ALTERNATIVELY, THERE COULD BE THE SHORTEST POSSIBLE INTERVAL BETWEEN SYRIAN AND ISRAELI WITHDRAWALS. THESE TACTICAL ISSUES WOULD HAVE TO BE PURSUED AND NEGOTIATED. I ALSO SAID THAT A SAUDI FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION MIGHT HELP MAKE THIS MORE ATTRACTIVE FOR THE SYRIANS. IN ANY EVENT, I ARGUED, IT WAS WORTH PROBING TO SEE IF THIS INITIATIVE COULD SUCCEED; IF IT DID NOT, WE WOULD NOT HAVE LOST ANYTHING.

15. SHAMIR STATED THAT THE SITUATION WAS NOW WORSE THAN BEFORE; HE DID NOT BELIEVE THE SYRIANS WOULD BE INCLINED TO ANY SUCH WITHDRAWAL PLAN NOW THAT THE CONCEPT HAD BEEN LEAKED. IT WAS, THEREFORE, NECESSARY FIRST TO RESTORE THE FORMER SITUATION BY HAVING THE U.S. ISSUE A STATEMENT INDICATING WE STILL STOOD BY THE PRINCIPLE OF SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWALS. BEGIN ADDED THAT THE VARIOUS STATEMENTS ISSUED BY DAMASCUS WERE ABSOLUTELY CATEGORICAL, AND IF WE DID NOT TAKE THEM SERIOUSLY INTO CONSIDERATION, WE WERE FORGETTING REALITY. HE SAID THAT ONCE ASSAD READ THE PRESS STORIES HE WOULD BE EVEN LESS INCLINED TO CHANGE HIS MIND ABOUT HIS CURRENT TACTICS.

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16. AFTER ARGUING THE CASE FURTHER WITHOUT SUCCESS,
I TOLD BEGIN THAT I WAS SORRY ABOUT THE ISRAELI

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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

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EXDIS

FROM HABIB

DEPT PASS USDEL SECRETARY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, IS, LE, US
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER

REACTION. I BELIEVED A HASTY DECISION WAS BEING MADE
ON A POSSIBILITY WHICH HAD SOME PROMISE. BEGIN SIMPLY
REITERATED THAT ISRAEL HAD NEGOTIATED ON THE BASIS OF

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THE CONCEPT OF SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL. I CONTINUED THAT I WOULD REPORT THE RESULTS OF MY MEETING TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE SECRETARY, WHO HAD BOTH BELIEVED THAT WE HAD HAD AN EXCELLENT CHANCE TO MOVE AHEAD IN ACHIEVING OUR COMMON OBJECTIVES IN LEBANON. (AT THIS POINT BEGIN HAD TO LEAVE THE MEETING.)

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17. AFTER BEGIN'S DEPARTURE, SHAMIR RAISED AGAIN THE QUESTION OF HOW WE WOULD TREAT THE PRESS LEAK PUBLICLY, AND RENEWED HIS PROPOSAL FOR A FORTHCOMING U.S. STATEMENT ON SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWALS. I SUGGESTED THAT ISRAEL SHOULD SAY AS LITTLE AS POSSIBLE, BUT COULD RESTATE ITS OWN POSITION. WASHINGTON WOULD HAVE TO SPEAK FOR ITSELF. LEWIS ADDED THAT THE ISRAELIS COULD SAY THAT WE HAD NOT DISCUSSED IDEAS FOR AN UNCONDITIONAL UNILATERAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON. THIS NEGATIVE TWIST ON THE LEAK HAD BEEN INACCURATELY REFLECTED IN VARIOUS PRESS STORIES. LEWIS SAID WE WERE IN A TRICKY SITUATION SINCE THE CONCEPT HAD BEEN PRESENTED TO ISRAEL ON BEHALF OF THE PRESIDENT.

18. ARENS THEN RAISED THE ISSUE OF REDEPLOYMENT, SAYING THIS WAS THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM. HE ASKED IF WE WERE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE MATTER. I REPLIED THAT THIS MATTER WAS UNDER CONSIDERATION, BUT EMPHASIZED THAT THE LEBANESE DECISION WOULD BE TAKEN AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL. GEMAYEL HAD SO STATED VIGOROUSLY AND WAS, I REPEATED, OPPOSED. SHAMIR INTERJECTED THAT GEMAYEL WAS NOT TELLING THE TRUTH. WAZZAN, I CONTINUED, HAD ALSO SAID THAT THE CABINET WAS OPPOSED.

19. WITH RESPECT TO THE ROLE OF THE MNF, I SAID THAT THIS WOULD HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED BY THE TROOP CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES ONCE THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT PRESENTED A FORMAL PROPOSAL. IN OUR CASE, IT WOULD REQUIRE A PRESIDENTIAL DECISION AND CONSULTATIONS WITH CONGRESS. SHAMIR ASKED WHETHER THE FRENCH WOULD BE WILLING TO SERVE IN THE SHUF. I REPLIED THAT THERE

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APPEARED TO BE SOME FRENCH SENTIMENT IN FAVOR OF THIS IDEA BUT THAT THERE WERE ALSO SPLIT OPINIONS IN THE GOVERNMENT.

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20. ARENS SAID THAT WHILE NOBODY COULD DICTATE TO THE SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON, THEY HAD ESSENTIALLY TWO CHOICES -- EITHER TO COORDINATE ON ISRAELI REDEPLOYMENT, OR TO BOARD OUR SIXTH FLEET VESSELS TO MAKE THEIR OWN DEPARTURE. HE BELIEVED THAT WE SHOULD STRONGLY URGE THE LEBANESE TO ADOPT THE FIRST COURSE. IF ALL PARTIES WORKED TOGETHER, ARENS BELIEVED PROGRESS COULD BE MADE, INCLUDING IN ARRANGING A POLITICAL ACCOMMODATION WITH THE DRUZE WHICH WOULD LEAVE THE SHUF PEACEFUL.

21. I SAID THAT THE LEBANESE WERE CONCERNED ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES OF REDEPLOYMENT BUT WOULD BE QUITE HAPPY IF IT WAS PART OF A PROGRAMMED, FULL WITHDRAWAL. ARENS REPLIED THAT ISRAEL'S INTENTION WAS TO WITHDRAW COMPLETELY, THOUGH THIS WOULD NATURALLY DEPEND ON LEBANESE CAPABILITIES TO TAKE OVER TERRITORIES EVACUATED BY THE IDF. I SAID THAT THE LEBANESE WANTED AN IRREVERSIBLE PROCESS TO BE INITIATED; OTHERWISE, THEY FELT IT WOULD GUARANTEE A PARTITION OR EVEN THE CONDOMINIUM OF LEBANON. THE LEBANESE SAW THE DISTINCT POSSIBILITY OF THE ISRAELIS WITHDRAWING SOMEWHAT AND THEN CONSOLIDATING THEIR LINES.

22. ARENS SAID HE WAS CONVINCED THAT REDEPLOYMENT COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT INITIATING ANOTHER ROUND OF ANARCHY. IT WAS INCUMBENT UPON THE UNITED STATES TO TELL THE LEBANESE IN A FORTHRIGHT FASHION THAT

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USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE
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EXDIS

FROM HABIB

DEPT PASS USDEL SECRETARY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, IS, LE, US
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER

WE SUPPORTED ISRAELI REDEPLOYMENT AND AN EXCHANGE OF THE INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION. I REPLIED THAT THE LEBANESE MAY DECIDE TO DO IT "IN THEIR OWN WAY," WHICH WOULD NOT NECESSARILY INVOLVE ANY COORDINATION WITH THE ISRAELIS. THE LEBANESE WERE DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT SYRIAN AND SYRIAN-CONTROLLED FORCES WHICH WERE IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE SHUF AND METN AREAS. GEMAYEL FEARED THAT REDEPLOYMENT COULD NOT BE SUCCESSFULLY ACCOMPLISHED IN THE FACE OF SYRIAN OPPOSITION.

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23. LEWIS ASKED WHETHER, IF ONE ASSUMED REDEPLOYMENT TOOK PLACE, THE ISRAELIS COULD CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF DISCUSSING OUR CONCEPT LATER. ARENS TERSELY REPLIED THAT THE MORE THAT THIS CONCEPT WAS PURSUED, THE WORSE OFF WE WOULD ALL BE.

24. AS THE MEETING WAS DRAWING TO A CLOSE, LEWIS RAISED THE QUESTION OF DIRECT CONTACTS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON. I SAID THAT I HAD IMPRESSED UPON THE LEBANESE THE IMPORTANCE OF ESTABLISHING MINISTERIAL OR SENIOR LEVEL CONTACTS, BUT HAD RECEIVED THE ANSWER THAT THIS WAS NOT THE MOMENT FOR SUCH MEETINGS. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, I SUGGESTED THAT THE ISRAELIS SHOULD USE THE THREE EXISTING MECHANISMS, NAMELY, THE TANNUS-LEVY, KIMCHE-FATTAL, AND MILITARY LIAISON CHANNELS. ARENS SAID THAT THESE CHANNELS WERE NOT

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SUFFICIENTLY AUTHORITATIVE, AND REPEATED THAT ISRAEL WOULD HAVE TO REDEPLOY IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE. HE SAID THAT UNDER THE PRESENT FORMAT, DISCUSSIONS COULD EASILY DRAG ON BEYOND JULY 15. I SAID I WOULD EXPLORE THE ISSUE AGAIN WITH THE LEBANESE, BUT URGED THAT ISRAEL NOT DROP THESE PRESENT CHANNELS.

25. AFTER THE MEETING, LEWIS ASKED ARENS IF JULY 15 WAS, IN FACT, THE TARGET DATE FOR ISRAELI REDEPLOYMENT. ARENS REPLIED THAT REDEPLOYMENT WOULD HAVE TO TAKE PLACE IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE AND HE HAD USED THE JULY 15 DATE AS AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE OF ISRAELI THINKING ABOUT TIMING.

26. MINIMIZE BEIRUT CONSIDERED.
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EXD **DECAPTIONED**

FROM HABIB

NEW DELHI FOR SECDEL

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MARR, SA, US, SY, LE, IS, EG, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH KAMAL HASSAN ALI,
JUNE 28, 19831. **ENTIRE TEXT**

2. PLEASE PASS THIS MESSAGE TO SECRETARY.

3. SUMMARY: ON JUNE 28, I PROVIDED KAMAL HASSAN
ALI WITH OUR ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT EFFORTS TO
RESOLVE THE LEBANON-SYRIA IMPASSE, MAKING CLEAR

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THAT WE ARE AS DETERMINED AS EVER TO RESOLVE IT IN
THE INTERESTS OF OURSELVES AND THE VARIOUS PARTIES
CONCERNED, AND IN THE INTEREST OF FUTURE PROGRESS
TOWARD MIDEAST PEACE. I ALSO BRIEFED ALI SELECTIVELY
ON MY RECENT CONVERSATIONS WITH THE ISRAELIS AND
KING FAHD. IN SO DOING, I TRIED TO ELICIT EGYPT'S
OWN ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION, ALONG WITH A
READOUT ON THE GOE'S CONTACTS WITH THE SARG AND
IDEAS ABOUT WHAT ELSE MIGHT BE DONE TO PERSUADE

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OR IMPEL THE SYRIANS TO COOPERATE. ALI'S ASSESSMENTS TALLIED LARGELY WITH OUR OWN. I COULD ELICIT FROM ALI NO EVIDENCE THAT EGYPT'S CONTACTS WITH DAMASCUS, CITED [REDACTED] AS THE MAIN REASON FOR POSTPONING THE RETURN OF EGYPT'S AMBASSADOR TO ISRAEL, HAVE INVOLVED ANYTHING OF SUBSTANCE. (ATHERTON AND I TOOK THE OCCASION TO REGISTER THE USG'S DISAPPOINTMENT OVER EGYPT'S PERFORMANCE ON THE AMBASSADORIAL ISSUE.) THE ONLY EGYPTIAN IDEA THAT SURFACED FROM OUR DISCUSSION WAS THAT OF SOMEHOW CONVENING A CONFERENCE OF ARAB NATIONS WITH THE OBJECT OF (A) SOLIDIFYING MODERATE ARAB BACKING FOR ARAFAT AND THE PLO MODERATES AGAINST SYRIA AND THE PLO RADICALS (THUS BEGINNING A STRATEGY THAT MIGHT EVENTUALLY COOPT MODERATE PALESTINIANS -- PERHAPS INCLUDING ARAFAT AND MANY OF HIS FATAH FOLLOWERS -- INTO THE PEACE PROCESS), AND (B) DEMONSTRATING TO THE SYRIANS, VIA AN INTER-ARAB REVIEW OF THE MANDATE FOR THEIR PRESENCE IN LEBANON, THE EXTENT OF THEIR ISOLATION IN THE ARAB WORLD. I POINTED OUT THE RISKS AND UNPREDICTABLES SURROUNDING THIS IDEA, BUT SAID WE WOULD REFLECT ON IT. AT THE END OF OUR MEETING, ALI SUMMED UP THE AVAILABLE OPTIONS AS [REDACTED]

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(B), SEEKING TO WIN SYRIAN COOPERATION THROUGH AN ISRAELI SHOW OF FLEXIBILITY ABOUT NEGOTIATING OVER THE GOLAN HEIGHTS, (C) MODIFYING THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT, OR (D) UNILATERAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. ALI THEN KNOCKED DOWN OPTION (C) HIMSELF, AND I POINTED OUT THE PROBLEMS POSED BY (B) AND (D).
END SUMMARY.

4. I MET WITH DEPUTY PRIMIN AND FORMIN KAMAL HASSAN ALI FOR AN HOUR AND THREE-QUARTERS ON TUESDAY EVENING, JUNE 28. ACCOMPANYING HIM WERE MFA UNDER-SECRETARY SHAFEI ABDEL HAMID AND MFA INFORMATION (INR) DIRECTOR SALAH BASSIOUNI, AS WELL AS MINISTERIAL AIDES GHONEIM, ABUL GHAITH AND ABU ZAYD. WITH ME WERE AMBASSADOR ATHERTON, AMBASSADORS DRAPER AND FAIRBANKS, AND POL COUNSELOR CAROLAN.

5. AFTER NOTING THAT I HAD ALREADY BRIEFED AMBASSADOR GHORBAL IN WASHINGTON ABOUT THE PURPOSE OF MY CURRENT TRIP TO THE AREA, I PROCEEDED TO OUTLINE OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE LEBANON-ISRAEL-SYRIA SITUATION, AND OUR CONTINUED DETERMINATION TO RESOLVE IT, IN MUCH THE SAME TERMS AS I HAD USED EARLIER (#) TALKING TO KING FAHD (PARAS 5-7 OF CAIRO 18800). I NOTED OUR APPRE-

CIATION FOR EGYPT'S CONTINUING SUPPORT OF OUR EFFORTS
AND WHAT WE HAVE ACHIEVED TO DATE, AND I MENTIONED
THAT THE GOL LEADERSHIP IS ALSO GRATEFUL FOR WHAT
THE GOE HAS BEEN DOING TO INSPIRE CALM AND COHESION
AMONG VARIOUS LEBANESE DOMESTIC CONSTITUENCIES. THE
QUESTION BEFORE US NOW, I SAID, IS HOW WE MIGHT EXPAND
THE ACTIVITY IN WHICH WE HAVE BEEN ENGAGED OVER THE

NOTE BY OC/T: (#) OMISSION. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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AMEMBASSY AMMAN NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS NIACT IMMEDIATE

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EXDIS

FROM HABIB

NEW DELHI FOR SECDEL

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MARR, SA, US, SY, LE, IS, EG, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH KAMAL HASSAN ALI,
PAST MANY WEEKS, PARTICULARLY SINCE THE SIGNING OF
THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT IN MAY.

6. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] I SAID I WOULD THEREFORE LIKE TO HEAR
EGYPT'S ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION, PARTICULARLY
SINCE I UNDERSTOOD THE GOE HAS BEEN CONDUCTING ITS
OWN CONTACTS WITH THE SYRIANS IN THE HOPE OF BEING
HELPFUL.

7. ALI DEFERRED THIS ASSESSMENT UNTIL HE GOT ME
TO ANSWER TWO QUESTIONS AND PROVIDE A "CLARIFICATION".
FIRST, HE WANTED TO KNOW, TO WHAT DEGREE HAVE THE
[REDACTED] SUCCEEDED IN "CONVINCING" THE SYRIANS? HAD
WE NOTICED ANY SIGNS OF PROGRESS IN THAT REGARD FOLLOWING
VISITS BY [REDACTED] AND OTHERS TO DAMASCUS? I
REPLIED THAT BOTH [REDACTED] FOUND THE SYRIANS
OBJECTING TO VARIOUS (BUT NOT NECESSARILY ALL)
SECURITY ASPECTS OF THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT.
THEY OPPOSE MOST STRONGLY, HOWEVER, THE NORMALIZATION
CONCEPTS THAT ARE EMBODIED THEREIN. THEY HAD PRESSED
ON THE [REDACTED] THEIR NEED TO HAVE THE LATTER SET ASIDE,

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FOR THE TIME BEING AT LEAST. THE ONLY ELEMENT OF THE AGREEMENT THAT THE SARG FINDS WHOLLY ACCEPTABLE IS THE PART THAT PERTAINS TO ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, PERHAPS IN THE CONTEXT OF SOME "REASONABLE" SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS ALONG ISRAEL'S NORTHERN BORDER. (THE SYRIANS ARE A LITTLE VAGUE ON THE LATTER POINT, I NOTED.) THE SARG ALSO APPEARS BENT ON MISINTERPRETING CERTAIN NORMALIZATION ASPECTS OF THE AGREEMENT -- PROFESSING TO FEAR, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT ISRAELI GOODS WOULD FLOW THROUGH LEBANON INTO OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES, EVEN THOUGH SUCH ACTIVITY IS NOT CALLED FOR IN THE AGREEMENT AND, IN ANY CASE, IS SOMETHING THE LEBANESE COULD CONTROL. IN ADDITION, THE SYRIAN PERCEPTION THAT LEBANON HAS MOVED IN THE DIRECTION FIRST CHARTED BY EGYPT JANGLES A LOT OF NERVES IN DAMASCUS. ASSAD IS REPORTED TO HAVE SAID THAT, IF HE WERE TO ACCEPT THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT, HE WOULD ALSO HAVE TO PRAY FOR FORGIVENESS AT SADAT'S TOMB. (THIS IDEA CLEARLY AMUSED ALI AND HIS COMPANIONS.)

8. ALI'S SECOND QUESTION HAD TO DO WITH THE EXCHANGE OF INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION. I EXPLAINED THE LEBANESE POSITION, NOTING THAT THE GOL IS NOT UNREASONABLE IN DECLINING TO PUT THE AGREEMENT, AND ALL THAT FLOWS FROM IT, INTO FORCE UNTIL WE ALL HAVE A CLEARER IDEA OF WHAT THE FOLLOW-ON CONSEQUENCES WOULD BE. THE ISRAELIS, ON THE OTHER HAND, ARGUE THAT STARTING THE PROCESS PROVIDED FOR IN THE AGREEMENT WOULD INCREASE THE PRESSURE ON THE SYRIANS. A CONCLUSION THAT WE THINK IS DEBATABLE. IT COULD CAUSE THE SARG TO BEHAVE EVEN MORE NEGATIVELY THAN IT HAS TO DATE.

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EXDIS

FROM HABIB

NEW DELHI FOR SECDEL

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MARR, SA, US, SY, LE, IS, EG, XF
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH
AMAL HASSAN ALI,

9. BY WAY OF CLARIFICATION, ALI ASKED WHETHER THE
USG IS IN DIRECT OR MERELY INDIRECT CONTACT WITH
THE SARG. I REPLIED THAT THE SYRIANS CERTAINLY WANT
TO HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH ME (AND WITH YASSER ARAFAT,
IT WOULD APPEAR). OUR AMBASSADOR TALKS TO THE SYRIANS,
AND WE HAVE LOTS OF OTHER PEOPLE WHO CAN TALK TO THEM,

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BUT WE FIRST NEED TO ESTABLISH THAT THERE IS SOME
REASON FOR TALKING, OR A BASIS ON WHICH TO TALK.
THE SECRETARY HAS NOT RULED OUT ANOTHER VISIT TO
DAMASCUS IF IT WOULD BE USEFUL. HOWEVER, WE HAVE
HAD NO SIGNALS OF THAT SORT FROM THE SYRIANS, AND THE
SECRETARY IS NOT PREPARED TO TRAVEL THERE MERELY
TO PASS THE TIME OF DAY. I ADDED THAT MY CURRENT
MISSION IS TO HOLD DISCUSSIONS WITH OUR FRIENDS IN
THE AREA, REVIEW AND ASSESS THE RESULTS, AND PROVIDE
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STRATEGY TO THE SECRETARY
BY THE TIME HE COMPLETES HIS ASIA TRIP AROUND JULY 4.

10. ALI REMARKED THAT HE WAS GLAD TO HEAR THE U.S.

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POSITION ON LEBANON AND HAD NOT CHANGED. HE HOPED THE SAME WAS TRUE WITH REGARD TO OUR POSITION ON ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. HE WONDERED IF THIS SUBJECT HAD FIGURED IN MY MOST RECENT CONSULTATIONS IN WASHINGTON. WITH MORE THAN A TOUCH OF EXASPERATION, I REPLIED THAT WE CONTINUE TO REGARD SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY AS AN OBSTACLE TO PEACE, THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S RECENT COMMENTS ON THAT SUBJECT HAD BEEN REPORTED OUT OF CONTEXT, THAT THE EGYPTIANS CERTAINLY HAVE HEARD ALL THIS FROM ROY ATHERTON ALREADY, AND THAT THEY OUGHT TO STOP BUGGING US ABOUT PRESIDENT REAGAN, I WENT ON, IS NOT THE KIND OF MAN WHO CHANGES HIS MIND LIGHTLY, AND HE IS NOT ABOUT TO FROM HIS JUST AND REASONABLE POSITION ON THE SETTLEMENTS QUESTION.

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AMCONSUL JERUSALEM NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS NIACT IMMEDIATE

SECTION 04 OF 06 CAIRO 18926

EXDIS

FROM HABIB

NEW DELHI FOR SECDEL

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MARR, SA, US, SY, LE, IS, EG, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH KAMAL HASSAN ALI,

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I NOTED THAT ARAFAT HAS ALREADY LOST MUCH GROUND BECAUSE OF HIS INSISTENCE ON "UNITY" AND BEING ALL THINGS TO ALL MEN. NOW HE IS FACED WITH THE SARG'S DEMAND TO "REFORM" THE PLO UNDER A COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP THAT WOULD TAKE NO DECISIONS WITHOUT DAMASCUS' APPROVAL. AT THE SAME TIME, ARAFAT STILL STANDS FOR SOMETHING; HE RETAINS A FOLLOWING, ESPECIALLY ON THE WEST BANK. HIS "CONVERSION" MIGHT BE TURNED TO THE ADVANTAGE OF THE PEACE PROCESS, IF THE OTHER ARABS COULD BE INDUCED TO RALLY BEHIND HIM.

13. I WONDERED ALOUD WHAT, IN EGYPT'S VIEW, IT WOULD TAKE TO PRODUCE SUCH A "CONVERSION" OF ARAFAT. ALI REPLIED: "SOMETHING FROM THE ISRAELIS REGARDING THE GOLAN HEIGHTS." I ASKED HIM IF HE SERIOUSLY THOUGHT THE USG HAS IT WITHIN ITS POWER TO INSPIRE ISRAELI FLEXIBILITY ON THIS SUBJECT, AND AN INCONCLUSIVE GENERAL DISCUSSION FOLLOWED -- WITH THE EGYPTIANS CLINGING TO THE HOPE THAT TIME AND "CHANGE-

PAGE 03 CAIRO 18926 04 OF 06 300841Z

ING CIRCUMSTANCES" MIGHT RENDER THE IMPOSSIBLE POSSIBLE. IT WAS FOR THIS REASON, ALI SAID, THAT HE HAD RECENTLY SENT A MESSAGE TO FORMIN SHAMIR, APPEALING FOR GREATER ISRAELI FLEXIBILITY WITH REGARD TO THE FUTURE

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PAGE 01 CAIRO 18926 05 OF 06 300842Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-01
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O 300805Z JUN 83 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 5491
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS NIACT IMMEDIATE

SECTION 05 OF 06 CAIRO 18926

EXDIS

FROM HABIB

NEW DELHI FOR SECDEL

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MARR, SA, US, SY, LE, IS, EG, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH KAMAL HASSAN ALI,

"NEGOTIABILITY" OF THE GOLAN.

14. ALI THEN ASKED WHETHER THERE IS ANY PROSPECT OF A
UNILATERAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON. I SAID
ISRAEL HAS GOOD REASONS FOR CONSIDERING SUCH A MOVE,
BUT IT IS NOT AT ALL CLEAR TO US THAT THE END RESULT WOULD
BE FULL WITHDRAWAL. THE ISRAELIS BELIEVE IT COULD BE TWO
TO THREE YEARS BEFORE THE LEBANESE FORCES CAN FULLY CON-

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TROL THE AREAS NOW HELD BY THE ISRAELIS. LEBANESE CON-
TROL WOULD BE INTRODUCED MORE EASILY AND MORE EFFECTIVELY
IF IT OCCURS IN THE CONTEXT OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL, SINCE SUCH IMPLEMENTATION IS PRE-
DICATED ON THE EXISTENCE OF A NON-HOSTILE SITUATION. IN
AN UNSETTLED SITUATION -- I.E., A SITUATION IN WHICH
ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL MIGHT LEAVE A VACUUM TO BE
PLO ELEMENTS OR THE SYRIANS -- THE ABILITY OF THE GOL TO
CONTROL THE SITUATION WOULD BE SEVERELY TESTED. THE ULTI-
MATE RESULT IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES COULD WELL BE THAT THE
ISRAELIS MIGHT DECIDE TO REMAIN IN PARTS OF LEBANON. THE
DANGER, THUS, IS THAT IF UNILATERAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL
SHOULD END UP AS SOMETHING LESS THAN TOTAL WITHDRAWAL,
THE SITUATION BECOMES TANTAMOUNT TO DE FACTO PARTITION.
IN THIS CASE, LEBANON WOULD CEASE TO EXIST AS A NATION,
ITS POPULATION WOULD BE EXPOSED TO DISASTER, AND ITS
TERRITORY WOULD CONTINUE TO SERVE AS A TINDERBOX FOR CON-
STANT INSTABILITY IN THE REGION.

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15. [

[] SO IT IS
IN RETURN FOR SUCH UNPRODUCTIVE CONTACTS, I SUGGESTED,
THAT EGYPT HAS DEFERRED THE RETURN OF ITS AMBASSADOR TO
TEL AVIV? ALI REPLIED, SOMEWHAT LAMELY, THAT THE GOE IS
AWAITING ANOTHER MESSAGE FROM DAMASCUS. I AGAIN
QUESTIONED WHETHER THESE EXCHANGES WERE OF SUCH VALUE
AS TO IMMOBILIZE EGYPT'S FREEDOM OF ACTION ON THE AMBASSA-
DORIAL ISSUE. ATHERTON INTERJECTED THAT WE OWED IT TO THE
EGYPTIANS TO POINT OUT THAT THERE IS A GREAT DEAL OF
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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DISAPPOINTMENT IN WASHINGTON ON THIS ISSUE. I CONFIRMED
THIS, NOTING HOW IMPORTANT IT IS FOR ALL OF US TO DO WHAT
WE SAY WE WILL DO. I REMINDED ALI THAT I HAD BEEN THE
ONE TO CARRY EGYPT'S DECISION ABOUT THE RETURN OF ITS
AMBASSADOR TO THE GOI IN JUNE. ALI VENTURED THAT THE
REAGAN STATEMENT ON SETTLEMENTS AND THE WEINBERGER
COMMENTS ON THE U.S.-ISRAELI MOU, COMING AT A TIME WHEN
EGYPT WAS TRYING TO EXERT A POSITIVE INFLUENCE ON THE
SARG, HAD CREATED AN ATMOSPHERE OF "UNREST". IN THOSE
CIRCUMSTANCES, HE SAID, THE GOE WAS FORCED TO RETHINK
THE TIMING OF THE RETURN OF ITS AMBASSADOR. I SAID THAT
WE THOUGHT THE EGYPTIANS HAD ALREADY DONE THAT AND HAD
MADE UP THEIR MINDS TO SEND HIM BACK TO ISRAEL ONCE
AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED ON A TIMETABLE FOR ISRAEL'S
WITHDRAWAL. IT WOULD HAVE BEEN EASIER TO TAKE THAT STEP
IN LATE MAY OR EARLY JUNE THAN IT WILL BE AS TIME GOES
ON. IN ANY EVENT, I SAID, THE EGYPTIANS BY NOW MUST
CLEARLY UNDERSTAND OUR POSITION; WE HAVE HEARD THEIRS,
BUT I WAS NOT SURE WE UNDERSTAND IT.

16. IN SUM, I SAID, THE END RESULT OF EGYPTIAN-SYRIAN
CONTACTS TO DATE HAS BEEN AN EGYPTIAN EXPECTATION THAT
A "GREAT VOICE FROM ABOVE" WILL EVENTUALLY AWAKEN ASSAD'S
COMMON SENSE AND PROMPT HIM TO COOPERATE. ALI AND HIS
ADVISORS []

[]
NOTE THAT ISRAEL'S DEPUTY FORMIN BEN MEIR, IN A RECENT
NEWSWEEK INTERVIEW, HAD APPEARED TO DESCRIBE ISRAEL'S
POSITION REGARDING THE GOLAN AS "NEGOTIABLE". (I SAID
I WOULD TRY TO LEARN WHAT BEN MEIR MEANT WHEN I NEXT SEE
HIM.)

17. ATHERTON SAID HE HAD A DIFFERENT IDEA. EVEN ACCORD--

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-01
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O 300805Z JUN 83 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 5493
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS NIACT IMMEDIATE

SECTION 07 OF 07 CAIRO 18926

EXDIS

FROM HABIB

NEW DELHI FOR SECDEL

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MARR, SA, US, SY, LE, IS, EG, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH KAMAL HASSAN ALI,

HE SPECULATED THAT SAUDI ARABIA AND ALGERIA MIGHT BE
PERSUADED TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN CONVENING SUCH A

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CONFERENCE. EGYPT IS NOT IN A POSITION TO SWING WEIGHT IN THIS REGARD, ALI SAID, AND IT HAS NO KN OF HOW THE SAUDIS MIGHT REACT TO IT. KING HUSSEI HAS TOLD THE GOE HE THINKS THE ARABS SHOULD MEET. PERHAPS THE ALGERIANS COULD BE PERSUADED TO BRING ALONG THE MAGHREB, WHILE THE SAUDIS MIGHT COLLECT THE MODERATES FROM THE

~~_____~~

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EAST. I REITERATED THAT THIS IDEA COULD BE WORTH LOOKING AT. HAD THE GOE DISCUSSED IT WITH THE LEBANESE AS YET? ALI SAID NO, JUST WITH THE PLO. I NOTED THAT THE RISK OF SUCH A MEETING IS THAT, IN DISCUSSING THE PLO MESS, EVERYONE WOULD FORGET ABOUT LEBANON, OR THAT, INSTEAD OF ISOLATING THE SYRIANS, THEY MIGHT ALLOW THEMSELVES TO BE SHIFTED INTO RADICAL GEAR BY SYRIAN DOUBLETALK. IN ANY CASE, I SAID WE ARE LOOKING FOR IDEAS AND WILL REFLECT ON THIS ONE.

20. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. ATHERTON

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PAGE 01 STATE 175609
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EXCISE

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APPROVED BY NEA: DTSCHNEIDER
NEA/EGY:WLLOYD
S/S-O:GUSREY

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY
USELO RIYADH PRIORITY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/CR/IR Date: 11/10/97
☒ RELEASE ☐ DECLASSIFY
☒ EXCISE ☒ DECLASSIFY EO Citations
☐ DENY IN PART

FOIA Exemptions: B1 TS authority to
PA Exemptions: ☐ CLASSIFY as ☐ S or ☐ C Sec.
☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or ☐ C

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STATE 175609
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, EG, IS, SY, SA
SUBJECT: GHORBAL MEETINGS WITH HABIB AND VELIOTES
REF: STATE 174447✓

1. ~~REDACTED~~
2. EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR GHORBAL MET SEPARATELY WITH AMBASSADOR HABIB AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY VELIOTES JUNE 23. HABIB OUTLINED PLANS TO TRAVEL TO THE MIDEAST (AS DESCRIBED REF A), ADDING THAT HE EXPECTS TO STOP IN CAIRO EN ROUTE EITHER TO OR FROM SAUDI ARABIA AND WOULD BRIEF GOE ON THE RESULTS OF HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH ISRAELIS AND
~~REDACTED~~
~~REDACTED~~

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SAUDIS. HABIB INDICATED THAT HE WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH AMBASSADOR ATHERTON REGARDING A POSSIBLE VISIT AS HIS PLANS DEVELOP.

3. GHORBAL DISCUSSED PRESS REVELATIONS ABOUT SITE MIKE WITH VELIOTES. GHORBAL READ AND CONCURRED WITH PRESS GUIDANCE PREPARED FOR THE JUNE 23 NOON BRIEFING. GHORBAL DESCRIBED THE REACTIONS OF MINSTATE BOUTROS GHALI AND DEFMIN ABU GHAZALA TO THE REVELATIONS. GHALI WAS.

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"NERVOUS" AND HIS FIRST REACTION WAS TO REPLY "NO COMMENT" TO ALL QUESTIONS; ABU GHAZALA'S INCLINATION WAS SIMPLY TO DENY EVERYTHING. GHORBAL SAID HE ARGUED FOR THE KIND OF GUIDANCE THE U.S. HAD PREPARED WHICH STICKS TO THE FACTS -- I.E. TO DENY THAT THE U.S. HAS ANY BASES IN EGYPT OR THAT ANY "SECRET AGREEMENTS" EXIST, BUT ADMIT WHAT IS ALREADY PUBLIC ABOUT JOINT EXERCISES, USE OF AWACS, TRAINING OF PERSONNEL, ETC.

4. VELIOTES RESTATED U.S. REGRET OVER EGYPT'S DECISION TO DELAY THE RETURN OF THE EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR TO ISRAEL. GHORBAL SAID THAT EGYPT IS NOT TRYING TO RUN AWAY FROM ITS COMMITMENT TO RETURN THE AMBASSADOR AND CITED THE "THOROUGH EXERCISE" UNDERWAY IN CAIRO TO SELECT A SUCCESSOR FOR MORTADA. A PROBLEM WHICH HAS COME UP WITH TWO LEADING CANDIDATES FOR THE JOB (OMAR SIRRI AND TAHSIN BASHIR, CURRENTLY EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR TO CANADA) IS THAT BOTH RETIRE WITHIN TWO YEARS. HE EMPHASIZED THAT EGYPT WOULD DO A DISSERVICE TO THE CAUSE OF SECURING SYRIAN COOPERATION ON LEBANON IF IT WERE PREMATURELY TO RETURN ITS AMBASSADOR. FOLLOWING UP WITH GHORBAL, VELIOTES SAID IT WOULD BE USEFUL IN CONNECTION WITH HABIB'S UPCOMING TRIP TO THE REGION AND THE SECRETARY'S TRAVELS TO KNOW WHAT THE EGYPTIANS HAVE DONE VIS-A-VIS

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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THE SYRIANS AND WHAT RESULTS HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED. GHORBAL PROFESSED NOT TO KNOW.

5. REFERRING TO TALKS ON RAS BANAS THEN UNDERWAY, GHORBAL SAID THE EGYPTIAN DELEGATION WOULD BE PRESENTING A PAPER WITH SPECIFICS ABOUT FUNDING EARMARKED FOR EGYPTIAN CONSTRUCTION, DETAILS ON WORK THAT NEEDS TO BE DONE AT THE BASE, AND SUGGESTIONS ABOUT WHAT THE U.S. MIGHT DO TO ASSIST. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE U.S. SHOULD TRY TO PRESERVE THE DOLLARS 91 MILLION SET ASIDE FOR RAS BANAS; NOT TO CONTRIBUTE SOME FUNDS WOULD BE POLITICALLY "DAMAGING." NOTING THAT EGYPT WILL BE USING FUNDS FOR RAS BANAS WHICH WOULD OTHERWISE WOULD BE USED FOR MILITARY PROCUREMENT, GHORBAL URGED THE ADMINISTRATION TO SUPPORT FY 84 FMS ADD-ONS AMOUNTING TO DOLLARS 91 MILLION. GHORBAL SAID THAT HE HAS DISCUSSED THIS ON THE HILL, BUT URGED VELIOTES TO BACK THE IDEA, AS WELL. VELIOTES WAS NON-COMMITTAL, NOTING THAT IT WOULD REQUIRE THOROUGH VETTING BY OMB AND OTHERS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION TO SUPPORT SUCH ADDITIONS.

6. VELIOTES BRIEFED GHORBAL IN GENERAL TERMS ON HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH BANDAR. VELIOTES NOTED THAT

[REDACTED]

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THEY FEAR THAT UNLESS SOMETHING NEW HAPPENS, HOSTILITIES MAY RESULT. THIS WOULD HAVE TERRIBLE CONSEQUENCES, PARTICULARLY IN TERMS OF GREATER SOVIET INVOLVEMENT. VELIOTES ALSO NOTED SAUDI CONCERN ABOUT ARAFAT.

7. LOOKING FORWARD TO THE SECRETARY'S UPCOMING TRAVELS, GHORBAL URGED THAT THE SECRETARY STOP IN DAMASCUS AND

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ELSEWHERE ON HIS RETURN FROM SOUTH ASIA. VELIOTES INDICATED THAT THE SECRETARY'S FOLLOW-ON TRAVEL PLANS REMAIN VERY MUCH IN THE AIR. DAM

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSCE-00 NSAE-00
SSO-01 INRE-00 /027 W

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O 071606Z JUN 83
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0895

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IM/IPS/CR/IR

Date: 11/10/97

☒ RELEASE
☒ EXCISE
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☒ DECLASSIFY
☒ DECLASSIFY
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SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 06462

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TS authority
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DEPT. ALSO FOR AMBS. HABIB AND DRAPER FROM ROSS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, XF, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US
SUBJECT: LEBANON MISSION: GEMAYEL LETTER ON AGREEMENT

9302566

2. PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER TUENI HAS PROVIDED A COURTESY
COPY OF THE LETTER SENT BY PRESIDENT GEMAYEL TO PRESIDENT
REAGAN VIA THE LEBANESE EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON THE EVENING
OF JUNE 6 OR THE MORNING OF JUNE 7. THE TEXT FOLLOWS
BELOW (THE ENGLISH IS ORIGINAL):

3. ,BEGIN TEXT.

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSCE-00 NSAE-00
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-----146036 071629Z /51

O 071606Z JUN 83
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0896

SECTION 02 OF 02 BEIRUT 06462



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-
END TEXT.

4. COMMENT: THE FINAL TEXT OF THIS LETTER IS VERY CLOSE TO THE DRAFT THAT TUENI HAD EARLIER SHARED, ALTHOUGH TUENI INSISTS GEMAYEL HIMSELF MADE IT "BOTH MORE GENERAL AND MORE SPECIFIC" IN THE FINAL REVISION. THE MESSAGE COMES THROUGH LOUD AND CLEAR: LEBANON IS FULFILLING ITS OBLIGATIONS IN MOVING TO RATIFY THE

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AGREEMENT IN SPITE OF DOMESTIC AND REGIONAL OPPOSITION. THE U.S. MUST NOW DO ITS PART TO ENSURE IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATION BY CONVINCING ISRAEL TO DROP ITS PRIOR CONDITIONS. THE LEBANESE ARGUMENTS FOR THIS HAVE ALREADY BEEN SHARED WITH US (PARA 8 OF BEIRUT 6410). A CLOSE READING OF THOSE ARGUMENTS GIVES GROUNDS TO BELIEVE THAT, IF ISRAEL CANNOT BE CONVINCED TO DROP ITS PRIOR CONDITIONS AND BEGIN IMPLEMENTING A TOTAL UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL, LEBANON WILL PUT OFF THE EXCHANGE OF THE INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION WHICH PUTS THE AGREEMENT INTO FORCE ("INITIATION OF ITS IMPLEMENTATION WILL BE MEANINGLESS," IN THE WORDS OF THE LEBANESE ARGUMENTATION). END COMMENT.

5. DEPARTMENT REPEAT AS DESIRED. PUGH


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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0854

INFO AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY

USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/CR/IR Date: 11/10/97
☐ RELEASE ☐ DECLASSIFY
☒ EXCISE ☒ DECLASSIFY EO Citations
☐ DENY IN PARTFOIA Exemptions B1 TS authority to
PA Exemptions ☐ CLASSIFY as ☐ S or ☐ C Sec.
☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or ☐ C

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SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 06399

EXD **DECAPTIONED**

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, XF, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US, UR, AL-1

SUBJECT: LEBANON MISSION: JUNE 3 REVIEW WITH AMB. TUENI

DEPARTMENT PASS AMBS. HABIB AND DRAPER AND JCS FOR J-5

FROM ROSS

'2. PRESIDENTIAL COUNSELOR TUENI AND ROSS MET JUNE 3 FOR THE FIRST OF WHAT ARE INTENDED TO BE FREQUENT MEETINGS TO COORDINATE ACTION AND COMPARE NOTES ON SYRIAN AND PLO WITHDRAWAL. ROSS BRIEFED TUENI ON THE GENERAL MOOD IN

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ISRAEL (TEL AVIV 07344 NOTAL), AMB. HABIB'S MEETINGS WITH KIMCHE AND BEGIN (TEL AVIV 07501 AND 07505 NOTAL), AND AMB. HARTMAN'S MEETING WITH GROMYKO (STATE 152359 NOTAL).

3. AFTER ABSENTING HIMSELF TO MEET WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL, TUENI RETURNED WITH A NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS, SUMMARIZED BELOW.

4. WASHINGTON "REVIEW": TUENI INDICATED THE LEBANESE

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GOVERNMENT WAS ANXIOUS TO LEARN MORE ABOUT THE "REVIEW" OR "REASSESSMENT" OF U.S. POLICY MENTIONED BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY VELIOTES BEFORE A CONGRESSIONAL SUBCOMMITTEE. LOCAL PRESS ACCOUNTS WERE CALLING IT "A REVIEW OF THE SITUATION IN THE REGION" (AN-NAHAR) AND "A NEW EVALUATION OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD LEBANON" (LE REVEIL). MEANWHILE, LEBANESE AMBASSADOR ABU HABIB, REPORTING ON DISCUSSIONS WITH SENIOR OFFICIALS IN WASHINGTON (NFI), HAD TOLD HIS GOVERNMENT OF A "REASSESSMENT." ALL THIS HAD THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT PUZZLED AND SOMEWHAT WORRIED, SINCE HABIB HAD MENTIONED NO SUCH "REVIEW" IN DEPARTING. ROSS CAUTIONED TUENI NOT TO READ TOO MUCH INTO THE PRESS ACCOUNTS, EXPRESSING THE PRELIMINARY JUDGEMENT THAT THE "REVIEW" MIGHT WELL BE THE NORMAL PROCESS OF CONSULTATION THAT OCCURRED WHENEVER HABIB OR DRAPER RETURNED TO THE U.S. ROSS DID UNDERTAKE TO OBTAIN CLARIFICATION FROM WASHINGTON, HOWEVER. (COMMENT: THE JUNE 3 DEPARTMENT PRESS BRIEFING PROVIDES THE NECESSARY CLARIFICATION, AND NO FURTHER ACTION IS REQUIRED.)

5. HABIB TALKS IN ISRAEL: TUENI SAID HE WAS DISAPPOINTED THAT HABIB HAD NOT, "AS ASKED," RAISED THE ISSUE OF UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL WITH THE ISRAELIS. ROSS REMINDED HIM THAT HABIB HAD TOLD GEMAYEL HE PROBABLY WOULD NOT

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TAKE THE INITIATIVE TO RAISE THIS ISSUE IN ISRAEL, AND TUENI PUSHED NO FURTHER. IT IS CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT TUENI, AT LEAST, TOOK GEMAYEL'S HALF-JOKING MENTION OF "TOTAL UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL" TO HABIB AS A SERIOUS AGENDA ITEM.

6. SOVIET-AMERICAN EXCHANGES: FOLLOWING ROSS' REPORT ON THE HARTMAN-GROMYKO DISCUSSION MAY 31, TUENI REMARKED THAT THE SOVIETS WERE OBVIOUSLY ANGLING FOR HIGHER-LEVEL EXCHANGES ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND ASKED WHETHER WE INTENDED TO INITIATE SUCH EXCHANGES. ROSS REPLIED THAT WE WOULD CONTINUE TO CONDUCT OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIETS AT THE APPROPRIATE LEVEL. COMMENTING ON THE CRITICISM OF THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT VOICED BY GROMYKO TO HARTMAN, TUENI QUESTIONED THE SOURCES AND JUDGEMENT OF THE LEBANESE AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW, WHO, IN A RECENT CABLE TO BEIRUT, HAD REPORTED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD ACCEPTED THE AGREEMENT AS A "FAIT ACCOMPLI."

7. ARAB INITIATIVES. TUENI TOLD ROSS THAT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WAS CAREFULLY MANAGING THE 24-HOUR VISIT OF ARAB LEAGUE SECRETARY-GENERAL KLIBI JUNE 3-4 --- WHICH TUENI DESCRIBED PARTLY AS AN ATTEMPT TO SHOW "THE WORLD" (I.E., THE U.S.) THAT LEBANON WAS NOT JUST SITTING ON ITS HANDS -- TO BALANCE (A) THE NEED TO KEEP THE ARAB

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LEAGUE POSSIBILITY ALIVE, AT LEAST IN THE MINDS OF THE SYRIANS, AND (B) THE NEED TO AVOID PRECIPITATE ACTION IN THAT FORUM, SINCE THIS MIGHT INTERFERE WITH ONGOING SAUDI EFFORTS. ACCORDING TO TUENI, THE LEBANESE WOULD PLAY KLIBI'S VISIT AS A CHANCE FOR GEMAYEL TO RECEIVE HIM IN

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 06399 02 OF 02 040837Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 SSO-01 /027 W
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O 040819Z JUN 83
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0855
INFO AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY

SECTION 02 OF 02 BEIRUT 06399

EXDIS

LEBANON FOR THE FIRST TIME. FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM, WHO WAS LEAVING FOR SAUDI ARABIA, WOULD DELIBERATELY NOT POSTPONE HIS DEPARTURE, BUT WOULD SEE KLIBI BRIEFLY AT THE AIRPORT. (COMMENT: THE JUNE 3-4 PRESS BELIES

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TUENI'S STATEMENTS, SINCE EVEN HIS OWN NEWSPAPER, AN-NAHAR, REPORTS THAT A MAJOR PURPOSE OF KLIBI'S VISIT IS TO DISCUSS A SUMMIT.)

8. SYRIAN INTENTIONS: IN A SEPARATE CONVERSATION DURING TUENI'S ABSENCE IN GEMAYEL'S OFFICE, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] EXPOUNDED HIS THEORY OF SYRIAN INTENTIONS FOR [REDACTED]

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ROSS' BENEFIT. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IT IS LIKELY THIS THEORY IS BEING HEARD AND PERHAPS ACCEPTED AMONG LEBANESE LEADERS. BRIEFLY PUT, IT RUNS AS FOLLOWS:

-- SYRIA AND THE SOVIET UNION, FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS, WANT TO MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO IN THE BIQA'. FAILING THAT, THEY FAVOR DISENGAGEMENT AND PARTIAL WITHDRAWALS. NEITHER CAN ACCEPT FULL WITHDRAWAL UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES FOR SEVERAL REASONS: ASSAD'S REGIME WOULD BE GREATLY WEAKENED BY WHAT KEY SYRIAN GROUPS WOULD SEE AS A SEVERE REVERSAL; THE PLO "CARD" WOULD, WITH THE DISPERSAL OF THE REMAINING PLO FIGHTERS TO THE FOUR CORNERS OF THE ARAB WORLD, BE LOST TO BOTH SYRIANS AND SOVIETS; BOTH COUNTRIES WOULD LOSE MUCH OF THEIR ABILITY TO INFLUENCE LEBANESE POLITICS AND KEEP THE REGION UNSTABLE; AND, THE SYRIANS COULD NO LONGER POSE AS THE DEFENDERS OF THE ARAB CAUSE.

-- THE U.S. SEEKS FULL WITHDRAWALS. FAILING THAT, IT WOULD ACCEPT PARTIAL WITHDRAWALS.

-- ISRAEL SEEKS FULL WITHDRAWALS AS WELL. FAILING THAT, IT LIKewise WOULD ACCEPT PARTIAL WITHDRAWALS.

-- THE INTERPLAY OF THE ABOVE MAKES THE PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL SCENARIO MOST LIKELY. THE ONLY QUESTION IS WHETHER THIS WILL BE ACHIEVED QUIETLY (I.E., IF THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET PRECOOK IT) OR BY FORCE (I.E., IF THE U.S. REFUSES TO PRECOOK IT, AND ISRAEL ENDS UP "PUNCHING" THE SYRIANS). IN EITHER CASE, SYRIAN AND ISRAELI FORCES WOULD WITHDRAW "A FEW KILOMETERS" TO CREATE A BUFFER ZONE, IN WHICH UNITED NATIONS OR MULTINATIONAL FORCES WOULD THEN BE [REDACTED]

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9. TUENI RETURNED TO THE ROOM BEFORE ROSS HAD A CHANCE TO QUESTION [REDACTED] ON HIS THEORY. HOWEVER, ADDRESSEES WHO HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING UNIFIL AFFAIRS WILL RECOGNIZE IN THE LAST TICK ABOVE A POSSIBLE EXPLANATION FOR LEBANESE WAFFLING ON A CLEAR DEFINITION OF A NEW UNIFIL MANDATE. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT AT LEAST SOME LEBANESE ARE HOPING TO BE ABLE TO USE UNIFIL IN CONJUNCTION WITH A DISENGAGEMENT SCENARIO AS WELL AS WITH THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMPS IF -- RPT IF -- FULL WITHDRAWALS ARE NOT ACHIEVED. PUGH

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*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

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AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY

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EXDUS
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, IS, LE, US, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN
- JUNE 1

2. SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR HABIB MET WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN JUNE 1 TO REPORT ON ACTIONS UNDER WAY TO RATIFY AND IMPLEMENT THE LEBANON-ISRAEL AGREEMENT. HABIB TOLD BEGIN THAT PRESIDENT AMIN GEMAYEL IS FIRM IN HIS DETERMINATION TO PROCEED, ALTHOUGH THERE MAY BE SOME DELAY IN THE RATIFICATION PROCESS. HE SAID GEMAYEL STILL HAS KEY SUNNI SUPPORT, AND HE IS CONVINCED HE HAS THE VOTES IN THE PARLIAMENT TO RATIFY. HABIB WARNED, HOWEVER, THAT THE LEBANESE

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CONSENSUS MAY NOT LAST LONG. HABIB ADDED THAT OUR EFFORTS AND THE LEBANESE EFFORTS-NOW FOCUS ON THE ARAB FORUM, ESPECIALLY SAUDI ARABIA AND ALGERIA, IN ORDER TO CREATE A CLIMATE OF SUPPORT FOR LEBANON AND TO PRESS THE SYRIANS INTO DIALOGUE WITH LEBANON AND THE UNITED STATES. THE PRIME MINISTER NOTED SADLY THAT THE PLO IS RETURNING IN FORCE TO THE BEKAA AND HE EXPRESSED SURPRISE AND DISAPPOINTMENT THAT THE SYRIANS WERE NOT LIVING UP TO THEIR COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAW. AMBASSADOR LEWIS SAID THE SYRIANS

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HAVE BACKED AWAY FROM CATEGORIC STATEMENTS BEFORE, AND THAT WE WOULD CONTINUE TO CONSULT CLOSELY WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL AS WE PURSUE EFFORTS TO GAIN RATIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT. END SUMMARY.

3. AMBASSADOR HABIB MET WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN FOR ONE HOUR EVENING OF JUNE 1. BEGIN WAS ACCOMPANIED ONLY BY CABINET SECRETARY DAN MERIDOR AND FOREIGN POLICY ADVISER YEHUDA AVNER. HABIB WAS ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR LEWIS AND DCM FLATEN.

4. THE PRIME MINISTER OPENED THE MEETING SIMPLY BY TELLING HABIB HE WAS EAGER TO HEAR FROM HIM. HABIB SAID HE HAD COME TO REPORT TO THE PRIME MINISTER FOLLOWING SEVERAL MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT AMIN GEMAYEL, INCLUDING A MEETING THE MORNING OF JUNE 1. HE SAID HE HAD BEEN IN BEIRUT FOR SEVERAL DAYS TO COORDINATE STRATEGIES WITH THE LEBANESE AND INFLUENCE THEIR POLICY AS THEY WORK TOWARD RATIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT. HE REPORTED THAT THE PREVIOUS NIGHT THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON HAD FORMALLY SUBMITTED THE AGREEMENT TO THE PARLIAMENT. HABIB REPORTED THAT PRESIDENT GEMAYEL STRONGLY SUPPORTS THE AGREEMENT AND CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT HE HAS THE VOTES FOR RATIFICATION; HOWEVER, THE PROCESS MAY TAKE LONGER THAN HE HAD

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ORIGINALLY THOUGHT. FIRST THE AGREEMENT MUST BE SUBMITTED TO PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES AND THEN TO THE FULL PARLIAMENT. THIS MAY TAKE PLACE NEXT WEEK OR IT MAY TAKE A LITTLE LONGER. THE IMPORTANT THING, HOWEVER, IS THAT GEMAYEL IS FIRMLY DETERMINED TO GO AHEAD. SOME OF HIS COLLEAGUES HAD SUGGESTED IN THE JUNE 1 MEETING THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON MIGHT HOLD OFF A BIT. HABIB TOLD THEM THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE WISE, AND PRESIDENT GEMAYEL HAD AGREED WITH HABIB.

5. HABIB SAID THAT THE FOCUS AT THE PRESENT TIME IS TO GET ENOUGH ARAB SUPPORT TO GET A DIALOGUE STARTED WITH SYRIA. HABIB SAID THE SYRIANS SEEM TO BE RENEGING AT THIS POINT ON ASSURANCES THEY MADE BOTH TO THE UNITED STATES, TO THE SAUDIS, AND TO THE LEBANESE, ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT ARE NOT ACCEPTABLE. THE SYRIANS ARE TRYING TO PRESSURE LEBANON, INCLUDING PHYSICAL THREATS TO LEBANESE LEADERS. AMIN GEMAYEL IS NOT COWED AND HE BELIEVES THAT THE PARLIAMENT IS ALSO STANDING FIRM. THE FOCAL POINT OF THE EFFORT NOW TO GAIN ARAB SUPPORT IS WITH THE SAUDIS. KING FAHD HAS SENT A PRINCE (BANDAR) TO WASHINGTON AND THE CROWN PRINCE TO SEVERAL ARAB STATES. THE LEBANESE HAVE SENT FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM TO SAUDI ARABIA THIS WEEK; HE WILL THEN GO ON TO ALGERIA. THE ALGERIANS HAVE BEEN FAIRLY SUPPORTIVE OF LEBANON DURING THIS MOST RECENT

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PERIOD. WE AND THE LEBANESE ARE TRYING TO GET SYRIA TO ABIDE BY ITS COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAW AND TO GET THE ARAB STATES TO PRESS SYRIA FOR NEGOTIATIONS OVER WITHDRAWAL. THE SAUDIS ARE PRESSING FOR A DIALOGUE BETWEEN LEBANON AND SYRIA AND BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SYRIA. HABIB DOUBTED THAT THE SAUDIS WILL TAKE A DIRECT LEAD, BUT THEY ARE FIRM IN THEIR BELIEF THAT ALL FORCES SHOULD WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON. IT IS NOT CLEAR HOW MUCH THE SAUDIS CAN DO,

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BUT ONE SUGGESTION HAS BEEN THAT THE SAUDIS PLAY THE SAME ROLE OF "PARTICIPANT" IN THE SYRIA/LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS AS THE U.S. DID IN THE ISRAEL/LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS.

6. THE PRIME MINISTER INTERRUPTED TO NOTE THAT ACCORDING

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TO INFORMATION THAT HE HAS THE SAUDIS HAVE EXPRESSED
RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE AGREEMENT. [

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7. HABIB TOLD THE PRIME MINISTER THAT HE CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT THE INTERNAL CONSENSUS WITHIN LEBANON REMAINS INTACT. HE SAID THE SUNNI LEADERS, ESPECIALLY SAEB SALAAM AND WAZZAN, CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE AGREEMENT, SO THERE WILL BE ENOUGH VOTES FOR PARLIAMENTARY APPROVAL. HE REPORTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN A PRIVATE POLL IN MOSLEM WEST BEIRUT ON MAY 30 SHOWING 95 PERCENT IN FAVOR OF THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION. HE SAID THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD SIGNED THE DECREE SENDING THE AGREEMENT TO PARLIAMENT EVEN THOUGH HE HAD BEEN UNDER TREMENDOUS PRESSURE.

8. HABIB SAID THAT THE SYRIANS ARE NOW THREATENING LEBANON WITH THE CREATION OF AN ALTERNATIVE "GOVERNMENT" SOMEHOW GROUPING TOGETHER KARAMI, FRANJIYAH, JUMBLATT, AND NALI BARRI. HABIB SAID THAT JUMBLATT OPPOSES THE AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL, BUT HE IS NOT PREPARED TO JOIN THE SYRIAN SCHEME. JUMBLATT SENT WORD TO PRESIDENT GEMAYEL THAT HE IS PREPARED TO MAKE A DEAL ON THE SHOUF AND WOULD NOT "TAKE

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ACTION" AGAINST THE AGREEMENT EVEN THOUGH HE OPPOSED IT. THE SHI'A LEADER AND FRANJIYAH HAVE ALSO THUS FAR HELD THEMSELVES ALOOF FROM THE SYRIAN PLOT. HABIB SAID THAT THE SYRIANS HAVE ALSO BROUGHT THE PLO BACK INTO THE BEKAA. THE PRIME MINISTER RESPONDED THAT THE RETURN OF THE PLO TO THE BEKAA WAS A BREACH OF THE AGREEMENT THAT HAD BEEN WORKED OUT IN AUGUST. HABIB AGREED, AND THEN OFFERED CONDOLENCES TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL FOR THOSE SOLDIERS WHO HAD BEEN LOST AS A RESULT OF THE RENEWED PLO ACTIONS. HABIB ADDED THAT THE LEBANESE HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH ARAFAT WHO HAS SAID THAT HE WILL WITHDRAW WITH THE SYRIANS, BUT ARAFAT MAY NO LONGER BE IN CONTROL. THE SPLIT IN THE PLO SEEMS TO BE A VERY IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENT. IT HAS HAPPENED NOT ONLY IN THE BEKAA BUT ALSO IN DAMASCUS. IT SEEMS TO BE AN ATTEMPT TO RADICALIZE THE PLO UNDER SYRIAN CONTROL.

9. HABIB THEN REPORTED TO THE PRIME MINISTER ON THE DRAMATIC APPEARANCE OF PRESIDENT GEMAYEL BEFORE 20,000 SUNNI MOSLEMS IN WEST BEIRUT. HE SAID THAT GEMAYEL SPOKE IN FRONT OF THAT GROUP ABOUT HOW THE AGREEMENT WAS GOOD FOR

LEBANON AND HE NOTED THAT IT WAS LEBANON'S INTENTION TO STAY A PART OF THE ARAB WORLD, BUT LEBANON WOULD DECIDE IN WHAT WAY TO DO SO. HABIB SAID THAT GEMAYEL WAS MUCH ENCOURAGED BY THE ENTHUSIASM WITH WHICH THIS DRAMATIC PUBLIC APPEARANCE IN WEST BEIRUT WAS ACCLAIMED.

10. HABIB NOTED THAT EVERYONE IN LEBANON HAS AGREED THAT THE FOREIGN FORCES SHOULD WITHDRAW AND THEREFORE THERE WAS FULL SUPPORT NOW FOR THE AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL. HOWEVER, HABIB ADDED, THE SUPPORT IS FRAGILE AND WITH THE CONTINUING EFFORTS OF THE SYRIANS TO UNDERCUT HIM, TIME MAY BE AGAINST PRESIDENT GEMAYEL. AMIN GEMAYEL IS NOT DISSATISFIED WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE OTHER ARABS, ESPECIALLY EGYPT, WHICH HAS BEEN VERY ACTIVE AND HELPFUL RECENTLY ON THE GROUND IN LEBANON WITH THE SUNNIS BY WAY OF ITS INTERESTS SECTION IN

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11. TO SUM UP HABIB SAID THAT THE FORUM FOR ACTION NOW IS AN ARAB FORUM, ESPECIALLY FOCUSSED ON THE SAUDIS AND THE ALGERIANS. THE SAUDIS WANT TO SEE A U.S.-SYRIAN DIALOGUE, BUT HABIB SAID "IT WILL NOT INCLUDE ME" SINCE THE SYRIANS HAVE SAID THAT HABIB IS THE AMERICAN "MOST HOSTILE TO ARAB INTERESTS."

12. THE PRIME MINISTER NOTED WITH DEEP SADNESS THAT THE SITUATION IS DIFFICULT. THE PLO IS BACK, NOT ALL OF THEM, BUT A SERIOUS SEGMENT, AND THE ISRAELIS ARE TAKING CASUALTIES. THE PRIME MINISTER THANKED HABIB FOR HIS CONDOLENCES ON THE LOSSES AND ASKED WHAT CAN BE DONE TO GET SYRIAN AND PLO WITHDRAWAL. HABIB NOTED THAT

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13. BEGIN NOTED THAT PRESIDENT ASSAD WAS PRESENTLY IN LIBYA. HABIB NOTED THAT ASSAD IS OFF LINING UP THE LUNATICS AND IF THAT IS ALL HE GETS, WE MAY BE BETTER OFF. HE SAID THE OTHER ARABS ARE STILL SYMPATHETIC TO LEBANON. THE KEY PLAYERS AT THIS MOMENT ARE SAUDI ARABIA AND ALGERIA. HE ADDED THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS SENT EMISSARIES TO ALGERIA, TUNISIA AND MOROCCO.

14. HABIB NOTED THAT THE LEBANESE HAVE IN MIND AS A FALL-BACK TAKING THE ISSUE TO THE ARAB LEAGUE TO PRESS SYRIA TO NEGOTIATE TO WITHDRAW. THEY BELIEVE THAT WITHDRAWAL WAS AGREED ON AT FEZ IN CONNECTION WITH THE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND THAT THEY WOULD HAVE A STRONG CASE TO PRESENT TO THE ARAB LEAGUE, ESPECIALLY RIGHT NOW AS THE SYRIANS SEEM TO BE EVEN QUESTIONING THE LEGITIMACY OF THE AMIN GEMAYEL GOVERNMENT. HABIB REPORTED THAT ONE OF GEMAYEL'S AIDES HAD ASKED HIM IF RATIFICATION NOW WOULD JEOPARDIZE THE LEVEL OF SAUDI SUPPORT FOR THE AGREEMENT. HABIB SAID THAT HE HAD REPLIED THAT IT WOULD NOT. HE SAID THE SAUDIS WERE SUPPORTING THE AGREEMENT ACCORDING TO THE TYPE OF LEBANON THEY WANT TO SEE. AMIN GEMAYEL AGREED WITH HABIB, AND IS PRESSING FORWARD WITH RATIFICATION.

15. THE PRIME MINISTER ASKED IF THERE HAS BEEN ANY SYRIAN

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REPLY TO THE U.S. DEMARCHE. AMBASSADOR LEWIS NOTED THAT FOREIGN MINISTER KHADDAM HAD NOT LIKED IT, THAT THERE HAD BEEN A TOUGH CONVERSATION FOLLOWING THE DELIVERY OF THE NOTE, BUT THERE HAD NOT YET BEEN A FORMAL REPLY FROM SYRIA.

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HE SAID THAT KHADDAM HAD DENIED THAT SYRIAN MILITARY MOVEMENTS HAD ANY AGGRESSIVE INTENT.

16. THE PRIME MINISTER THEN ASKED IF IT WASN'T A SURPRISE TO HABIB THAT THE SYRIANS HAVE SAID THEY WON'T WITHDRAW. HE SAID THAT HE HAD HEARD FROM AMERICANS ALL THESE MONTHS THAT SYRIA WOULD GET OUT. HABIB REPLIED THAT THE SYRIANS HAD TOLD US AND THEY HAD TOLD THE LEBANESE THAT THEY WOULD WITHDRAW. [

AMBASSADOR LEWIS POINTED OUT THAT THE SYRIANS MAY NEVER HAVE BELIEVED THAT AGREEMENT WOULD BE REACHED. THEREFORE, PERHAPS THEY HAD FELT THAT THEIR ASSURANCES OF WILLINGNESS TO WITHDRAW WERE THEORETICAL. THEY HAD ASSUMED THERE WOULD BE A DEADLOCK, BUT THE FACT THAT THE AGREEMENT HAD BEEN SIGNED HAD GIVEN THE LEBANESE A CHANCE TO GET A HEAD START TO MAKE THEIR CASE BEFORE THE ARAB WORLD, BEFORE THE SYRIANS GOT ACTIVE.]

17. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM HAD GONE TO DAMASCUS AND HAD RECEIVED A NEGATIVE RESPONSE FROM THE SYRIANS. AMBASSADOR LEWIS REPLIED THAT THAT VERY RESPONSE MAY HAVE ENCOURAGED THE SYRIANS TO BELIEVE, ON THE BASIS OF THEIR PAST HISTORY OF INFLUENCE IN LEBANON, THAT THE AGREEMENT WOULD BE TURNED OFF FOLLOWING THEIR ADVICE TO SALEM.

18. THE PRIME MINISTER ASKED IF WE HAD ANY MORE INFORMATION ON SYRIAN MILITARY INTENTIONS TOWARD ISRAEL. AMBASSADOR LEWIS NOTED THAT AS FAR AS MAJOR MILITARY MOVES ARE CONCERNED, WE AGREE WITH THE CURRENT ISRAELI ASSESSMENT THAT

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSCE-00 NSAE-00
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FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4029

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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
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THE RECENT SYRIAN EXERCISE WAS NOT A SCREEN FOR OFFENSIVE ACTION. THE PRESENT SYRIAN DEPLOYMENTS IN LEBANON DO NOT PUT THEM IN A GOOD POSITION FOR ANY OFFENSIVE ACTION, AT LEAST IN THE SHORT TERM. WE BELIEVE THEY ARE NOT READY FOR A SERIOUS WAR, BUT ARE PROBABLY PERMITTING CERTAIN PLO OPERATIONS WHICH MIGHT PROVOKE ISRAEL TO RESPOND IN WAYS THAT WOULD GIVE SYRIA A PROPAGANDA ADVANTAGE AND AT THE SAME TIME DISRUPT THE LEBANESE POLITICAL CONSENSUS.

19. PRIME MINISTER BEGIN NOTED THAT ASSAD HAD SAID IN LIBYA THAT HE WOULD FIGHT THE AGREEMENT TOOTH AND NAIL UNTIL IT WAS BEATEN. AMBASSADOR LEWIS NOTED THAT ASSAD HAS MADE SIMILAR STATEMENTS IN THE PAST WHICH HE HAD EVENTUALLY FOUND IT NECESSARY TO CHANGE. HABIB POINTED OUT THAT WE WERE DOING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO GET A DIA-

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LOGUE GOING WITH THE SYRIANS. THE LEBANESE ARE THINKING OF GOING TO THE ARAB LEAGUE IF THEIR EFFORTS WITH THE SAUDIS AND THE ALGERIANS ARE NOT FULLY SUCCESSFUL. THE ALGERIANS ARE PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT, HE SAID, BECAUSE OF THEIR PAST CLOSENESS WITH THE SYRIANS. LEWIS ADDED THAT THE ALGERIAN CREDENTIALS IN THE ARAB WORLD ARE EXCELLENT, AND ALGERIAN SUPPORT FOR LEBANON WOULD HELP PREVENT THE SYRIANS FROM GETTING BROAD-BASED ARAB SUPPORT FOR THEIR REJECTION OF THE AGREEMENT. LEWIS REMINDED THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ALGERIANS AS INTER-MEDIARIES IN THE AMERICAN CRISIS WITH IRAN. HABIB ADDED THAT HE HAD URGED THE LEBANESE TO WORK CAREFULLY WITH THE ALGERIANS.

20. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID BUT FOR THE TIME BEING "WE DON'T SEE LAND." LEWIS REPLIED THAT FOR THE TIME BEING WE MUST JUST KEEP SENDING OUT THE DOVES IN SEARCH OF SOME DRY LAND.

21. THE PRIME MINISTER ASKED AGAIN WHAT WE CAN DO TO GET

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THE SYRIANS TO KEEP THEIR COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAW. LEWIS AND HABIB THEN DESCRIBED THE EFFORTS THAT WE HAVE MADE WITH THE EUROPEANS AND NOTED THE FRENCH DESIRE TO BE HELPFUL. LEWIS NOTED THIS IS A TIME FOR COOL NERVES AND GOOD DIPLOMACY.

22. THE PRIME MINISTER NOTED THAT IN THE MEANTIME THE LEBANESE MINISTER OF EDUCATION HAS PUBLISHED A MAP ON WHICH THE NAME OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL HAS BEEN ERASED. SO, WHILE THEY ARE TRYING TO SELL THE AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL TO OTHER ARABS, THE LEBANESE DO NOT HESITATE TO TAKE "ANTI-ISRAEL ACTS." HABIB SAID HE WISHED HE HAD KNOWN OF THIS MOVE. HE SAID HE WOULD HAVE RAISED THIS "STUPID ACTION" WITH THE

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LEBANESE IN BEIRUT. HE SAID THESE ACTS HAVE NO PLACE IN THE PRESENT RELATIONSHIP, BUT ADDED HE DID NOT KNOW THE MINISTER OF EDUCATION WHO IS NOT PART OF THE MAINSTREAM OF LEBANESE POLICY MAKING AT THE PRESENT TIME.

23. THE PRIME MINISTER CONCLUDED THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL IS QUITE WORRIED. HE SAID ISRAELIS WILL NOT LOSE THEIR NERVE BUT THE PROBLEM IS THAT "THE MAIN EXPECTATIONS OF ALL OF US DIDN'T COME TRUE." LEWIS SAID WE WILL CONTINUE TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH, THAT WE WILL INFORM THE GOI OF EVENTS AS THEY TAKE PLACE. THE PRIME MINISTER CONCLUDED THE MEETING BY THANKING HABIB FOR ALL THE EFFORTS HE HAS MADE.

24. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. LEWIS

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FROM AMBASSADOR HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MILI, IS, LE, US, SY, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH KIMCHE, JUNE 1

2. SUMMARY: I EXPLAINED TO KIMCHE THAT THE LEBANON-ISRAEL AGREEMENT WAS NOW BEFORE THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND THAT IT MIGHT BE VOTED ON BEFORE THE END OF NEXT WEEK, THOUGH THIS COULD STRETCH OUT. GEMAYEL THOUGHT HE COULD SECURE SIXTY VOTES. THE LEBANESE ALSO INTENDED TO EXCHANGE THE INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION BUT THE TIMING WOULD DEPEND ON THEIR ASSESSMENT OF THE

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SITUATION. THE ISRAELIS IN TURN STATED IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT TO HAVE AN EARLY EXCHANGE OF INSTRUMENTS. I SAID THE FOCAL POINT OF OUR EFFORT WAS NOW TO MARSHALL ARAB SUPPORT IN SUPPORT OF A U.S./SYRIAN AND LEBANESE/SYRIAN DIALOGUE. FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM INTENDED TO VISIT SAUDI ARABIA AND ALGERIA SHORTLY TO PROMOTE THIS OBJECTIVE. KIMCHE

DESCRIBED FRENCH PESSIMISM ABOUT

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LEBANON'S INTERNAL CONSENSUS. I REPLIED THAT GEMAYEL STILL FELT HE HAD BROAD BACKING BUT THE NEXT FEW WEEKS WOULD BE IMPORTANT. KIMCHE POINTEDLY ASKED ABOUT LEBANESE VIEWS TOWARD A UNILATERAL ISRAELI PULLBACK. I SAID THAT GEMAYEL WAS STILL OPPOSED. END SUMMARY.

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3. I MET WITH DAVID KIMCHE AND OTHER MFA OFFICIALS FOR OVER AN HOUR AFTERNOON JUNE 1 TO REVIEW DEVELOPMENTS PRIOR TO MY MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN (SEPTTEL). I WAS JOINED BY AMBASSADOR LEWIS, DCM FLATEN AND HARE. AT THE OUTSET, I DESCRIBED THE STATE OF PLAY IN LEBANON WITH RESPECT TO RATIFICATION OF THE ISRAEL-LEBANON AGREEMENT, NAMELY, THAT THE GOVERNMENT DECREE HAD BEEN HANDED TO THE SPEAKER OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY LAST NIGHT (MAY 31). THE AGREEMENT WOULD BE FIRST DISCUSSED, I EXPLAINED, BY THE PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES; AFTER WHICH IT IS EXPECTED THAT THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WILL CONVENE IN EXTRAORDINARY SESSION TO VOTE ON THE AGREEMENT. WHILE WE HAD ORIGINALLY ANTICIPATED A MUCH QUICKER PROCESS, I THOUGHT THAT THE AGREEMENT COULD BE VOTED ON BY THE END OF NEXT WEEK, BUT PERHAPS IT WOULD STRETCH BEYOND THAT TIME. IN ANY EVENT, I SAID THAT PRESIDENT GEMAYEL HAD TAKEN AN IMPORTANT STEP AND WE HAD TO ACCEPT

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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LEBANESE JUDGMENT ON HOW BEST TO HANDLE THE SITUATION.

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4. KIMCHE ASKED WHAT THE LEBANESE VIEW WAS WITH RESPECT TO THE EXCHANGE OF THE INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION. I REPLIED THAT I HAD BEEN TOLD THAT LEBANON CERTAINLY HAD NO INTENTION NOT TO EXCHANGE INSTRUMENTS, BUT THAT THEY WOULD CONSIDER THIS QUESTION IN LIGHT OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH PREVAILED AT THE TIME. THE LEBANESE INTENTION, I SAID, WAS SOLID. LATER IN THE DISCUSSION, LEGAL ADVISER RUBENSTEIN SAID THAT ISRAEL HAD CONSIDERED THE PROS AND CONS OF HAVING AN EARLY EXCHANGE OF THE INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION AND HAD CONCLUDED THAT AN EARLY EXCHANGE WAS IMPORTANT.

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5. I STATED THAT THE FOCAL POINT OF THE ACTION NOW WAS TO ENGAGE AND MOVE THE ARAB CONSENSUS IN SUPPORT OF THE AGREEMENT AND IN PROMOTING A LEBANESE AND AMERICAN DIALOGUE WITH SYRIA. WE WERE DOING THIS IN TANDEM WITH THE LEBANESE. FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM WAS PLANNING TO GO TO SAUDI ARABIA THIS SATURDAY AND PLANNED TO GO TO ALGERIA. FOLLOWING THESE VISITS, HE WOULD VISIT THE UNITED STATES, AND WOULD ALSO SEE THE SECRETARY GENERAL. MEANWHILE, THE LEBANESE INTENDED TO SEND OTHER EMISSARIES TO VARIOUS ARAB CAPITALS. I SAID THAT THE ARAB HAND, AND PARTICULARLY THE SAUDI, AND POSSIBLY ALGERIAN, ROLES,

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HAD TO BE PLAYED. THIS DID NOT NECESSARILY MEAN THAT THE PROCESS WOULD BE DRAWN OUT: WE SHOULD HAVE A BETTER FIX ON WHAT WAS POSSIBLE IN THE NEXT TEN DAYS OR SO.

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6. THE LEBANESE HAD ASKED, I SAID, IF THE AGREEMENT SHOULD BE PUT BEFORE THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AT THIS

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4020
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AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
USELO RIYADH PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
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TIME, IN VIEW OF ITS POSSIBLE NEGATIVE EFFECT ON THE SAUDIS. I HAD TOLD THE LEBANESE THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO PROCEED WITH THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND MAINTAIN COMMITMENTS, AND THAT I THOUGHT SAUDI POLICY WAS STILL SOLIDLY BASED ON SUPPORTING A SOVEREIGN LEBANON AND

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SECURING THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL EXTERNAL FORCES FROM LEBANON. PRESIDENT GEMAYEL HAD NODDED HIS HEAD IN RESPONSE TO MY ARGUMENTS, THOUGH I NOTED IT COULD NOT BE EXCLUDED THAT THE ARAB FACTOR COULD AFFECT THE LEBANESE SENSE OF TIMING IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY.

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7. I REFERRED TO PRESIDENT GEMAYEL'S INTERVIEW WITH GULF JOURNALISTS DURING WHICH GEMAYEL HAD RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF TAKING THE MATTER TO THE ARAB LEAGUE. GEMAYEL HAD DISCUSSED THIS CONCEPT WITH ME. I EXPLAINED

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THE CONCEPT WAS TWO-FOLD, -- TO SECURE ARAB SUPPORT FIRST THROUGH THE SAUDIS AND THEN THROUGH THE ARAB LEAGUE. KIMCHE QUICKLY ASKED IF THIS WOULD NOT BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE IN VIEW OF PAST LEAGUE PERFORMANCE. I SAID THAT I HAD ALSO RAISED POSSIBLE NEGATIVE REPERCUSSIONS, BUT GEMAYEL THOUGHT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT LEBANON TAKE THE INITIATIVE. MOREOVER, HE WAS NOT THINKING OF A FULL SUMMIT. IN THE LEBANESE VIEW, THE FEZ SUMMIT, WHICH HAD SPOKEN OF SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL "IN THE LIGHT OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL," GAVE BASIC JUSTIFICATION TO THE LEBANESE POSITION. I SAID THAT PRESIDENT GEMAYEL WOULD OBVIOUSLY NOT GO TO THE ARAB LEAGUE UNTIL HE HAD SECURED THE NECESSARY SAUDI SUPPORT BUT THAT, IN THE MEANTIME, HE FELT IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR LEBANON TO BE ABLE TO THREATEN TO TAKE THE MATTER TO THE ARAB LEAGUE. THE ISRAELIS WERE OBVIOUSLY CONCERNED THAT THIS GAMBIT COULD BACKFIRE.

8. AFTER LISTENING TO MY OPENING PRESENTATION, KIMCHE SAID [

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9. KIMCHE ALSO EXPLAINED THAT DURING HIS VISIT TO PARIS EARLIER IN THE WEEK, THE FRENCH HAD GIVEN THE CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT PRESIDENT GEMAYEL'S CONSENSUS WAS IN DANGER AND THIS WAS A MAJOR REASON FOR FRENCH HESITANCY AT THIS STAGE. I ANSWERED THAT IN MY OPINION THIS ASSESSMENT WAS NOT VALID. GEMAYEL HIMSELF STILL FELT HE HAD A BROAD

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CONSENSUS, THOUGH HE ADMITTED IT WAS FRAGILE. FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM HAD ALSO COMMENTED THAT IF SOMETHING DID NOT MOVE IN THE NEXT TWO WEEKS TO ONE MONTH, LEBANON'S CONSENSUS WOULD BEGIN TO UNRAVEL. I EMPHASIZED SA'AB SALAM WAS STILL HOLDING FIRM AND THAT HE HAD TOLD ME HE WOULD VOTE IN FAVOR OF THE AGREEMENT. KIMCHE AGREED THAT THIS WAS VERY IMPORTANT. I ADDED THAT THE EGYPTIANS WERE BEING VERY HELPFUL AND ACTIVE WITH THE SUNNI COMMUNITY IN BEIRUT.

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10. KIMCHE SAID HE HAD GAINED THE IMPRESSION THAT THE FRENCH WERE EAGER TO GET INTO THE ACT AND BELIEVED THAT THEY COULD HELP WITH THE SYRIANS. I SAID I WAS CONCERNED THE FRENCH MIGHT TRY TO COME UP WITH AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH. I SAW VIRTUALLY NO POSSIBILITY THAT THE FRENCH COULD EFFECTIVELY MEDIATE BETWEEN SYRIA AND LEBANON. KIMCHE SAID HE WAS SUSPICIOUS OF FRENCH INTENTIONS. HE RELATED HOW GUTMANN HAD TOLD HIM IN PARIS THAT WHILE HE THOUGHT IT WAS A GOOD AGREEMENT, HE COULD NOT SAY THIS OUT LOUD FOR FEAR OF SPOILING FRANCE'S ACT WITH THE SYRIANS. I SAID THAT GEMAYEL WOULD NOT SHUT THE FRENCH DOOR, THOUGH HE WOULD ONLY USE IT IF HE THOUGHT WE DID NOT KNOW WHAT WE WERE DOING. I ADDED THAT I DID NOT HAVE A READOUT ON THE WILLIAMSBURG SUMMIT AND HOW THE SUMMIT MIGHT HAVE AFFECTED EUROPEAN AND FRENCH ATTITUDES.

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11. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION ON SYRIAN ACTIVITIES IN LEBANON, I SAID THAT I WAS AWARE OF SYRIAN THREATS AGAINST SPECIFIC LEBANESE PARLIAMENTARIANS

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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
USELO RIYADH PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE

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EXDIS

IF THEY VOTED IN FAVOR OF THE AGREEMENT. I WAS ALSO AWARE THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD BEEN DIRECTLY THREATENED, BUT STRESSED THAT WAZZAN HAD NEVERTHELESS STAYED ON COURSE. I ALSO DESCRIBED THE SYRIAN INITIATIVE IN PROMOTING A PRESIDENTIAL COUNCIL WHICH WOULD DIVIDE UP AND CONTROL THOSE AREAS UNDER SYRIAN INFLUENCE. THE CONCEPT WAS CLEARLY TO CHALLENGE THE CENTRAL AUTHORITY BOTH IN THE MILITARY AND CIVILIAN REALMS. HOWEVER, WHILE KARAMI WAS INTERESTED, I OBSERVED FRANJIYAH WAS PLAYING HARD TO GET AND BARRI AND JUMBLATT WERE NOT INTERESTED.

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12. I EMPHASIZED THAT WALID JUMBLATT WAS THE IMPORTANT DRUZE LEADER. JUMBLATT WANTED TO GET

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BACK INTO THE LEBANESE FRAMEWORK, BUT WAS DETERMINED NOT TO LET THE PHALANGE TAKE OVER THE SHOUF. HE HAD PUT FORWARD AN EIGHT-POINT PROGRAM AND I SAID JUMBLATT MIGHT COME TO LEBANON IN THE NEXT SEVERAL DAYS TO TALK TO AND NEGOTIATE WITH THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES. I THOUGHT IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT A POLITICAL DEAL COULD BE STRUCK. WITH RESPECT TO THE SHIITES, GEMAYEL WAS TRYING TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THEY COULD GET MORE FROM THE GOVERNMENT THAN ELSEWHERE.

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13. I WAS ASKED WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF WE WERE STILL STUCK AFTER TWO WEEKS, THE ISRAELIS FEAR

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CLEARLY BEING THAT THE CONTINUING STALEMATE COULD LEAD TO A FURTHER DELAY IN THE RATIFICATION OF THE AGREEMENT BY THE PARLIAMENT. I REPLIED THAT PRESIDENT GEMAYEL WAS STEADY AND THOUGHT THAT HE COULD GET SIXTY VOTES IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. I STRESSED THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO CUT AND RUN.

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14. RUBENSTEIN READ FROM A RECENT WAZZAN INTERVIEW IN LE MONDE, COMMENTING THAT WAZZAN WAS ACTING CONTRARY TO THE UNDERSTANDINGS ON HOW THE AGREEMENT WOULD BE DESCRIBED PUBLICLY. HE THOUGHT WAZZAN'S ANTI-ISRAELI SALESMANSHIP OF THE AGREEMENT WAS NOT HELPFUL, AND KIMCHE ADDED THAT A RED LINE HAD TO BE DRAWN AT SOME POINT. I EXPLAINED THAT WAZZAN HAD TO DEMONSTRATE SOME RELUCTANCE ON BEING EMBRACED BY ISRAEL AND THAT WE SHOULD FOCUS ON THE FACT THAT WAZZAN HAD JOINED IN SIGNING THE DECREE WHICH HAD JUST GONE TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY.

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15. KIMCHE SAID THAT HE HAD RECEIVED DIFFERENT EVALUATIONS OF LEBANESE ATTITUDES ON A UNILATERAL ISRAELI PULLBACK IN LEBANON. I EXPLAINED THAT THERE WERE INDEED DIFFERENT VIEWS IN LEBANON. SOME BELIEVED THAT IF THE IDF GOT OUT OF THE SHOUF, THE LEBANESE ARMY WOULD BE ABLE TO ENSURE ORDER AND QUIET. OTHERS, HOWEVER, BELIEVED THAT THIS WOULD SET THE STAGE FOR PARTITION AND WOULD LEAD TO FURTHER SYRIAN ENCROACHMENTS. GEMAYEL, I EXPLAINED, WAS OPPOSED TO A UNILATERAL PULLBACK; HE BELIEVED IT WAS NECESSARY TO STICK TO THE OBJECTIVE OF FULL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL EXTERNAL FORCES. WHILE REGISTERING MILD SURPRISE ABOUT GEMAYEL'S POSITION, KIMCHE MERELY STATED THAT ISRAEL WAS CONTINUING TO HAVE DISCUSSIONS ON THIS SUBJECT AND POINTED TO THE POSITIVE ADVANTAGE WHICH A PARTIAL PULLBACK COULD HAVE ON ISRAELI CASUALTIES. I SAID I WAS SOMEWHAT SKEPTICAL ON THE LATTER POINT.

16. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. LEWIS

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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY

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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE

USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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DECAPTIONED

JERUSALEM/TEL AVIV PASS AMB. HABIB FROM ROSS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PINT, MOPS, MARR, XF, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH GEMAYEL ET AL
JUNE 1

1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY. IN PREPARATION FOR HIS DEPARTURE FOR ISRAEL AND THE U.S., AMB. HABIB MET WITH GEMAYEL AND HIS TEAM JUNE 1 TO REVIEW THE STATE OF PLAY ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON. BRIEFING GEMAYEL IN PRELIMINARY FASHION ON BANDAR'S DISCUSSIONS IN WASHINGTON, HABIB DESCRIBED THE NEXT MONTH AS A KEY PERIOD IN LEBANESE AND U.S. EFFORTS TO BUILD ARAB PRESSURE ON THE SYRIANS. LOOKING AHEAD TO HIS VISIT TO ISRAEL, HABIB TOLD GEMAYEL THAT BEGIN MIGHT WELL RAISE THE POSSIBILITY

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OF PARTIAL WITHDRAWALS, AS WELL AS ISRAELI UNHAPPINESS WITH THE RETURN OF PLO FIGHTERS TO THE BIQA'. GEMAYEL HAD NO PARTICULAR MESSAGE TO CONVEY TO BEGIN, ALTHOUGH HE HALF-JOKINGLY SUGGESTED THAT HABIB RAISE TOTAL UNILATERAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WITH HIM. HABIB POINTED OUT THE DIFFICULTY AND DANGERS OF SUCH A SCENARIO. IN FURTHER DISCUSSION OF ITS IMPLICATIONS, TUENI CONFIRMED THAT THE LEBANESE INTENDED TO IMPLEMENT THE AGREEMENT COME WHAT MAY. APPROVAL BY THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES WOULD OCCUR

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"AS SOON AS FEASIBLE," ALTHOUGH PRESIDENTIAL PROMULGATION MIGHT BE DELAYED UNTIL IT WAS CLEAR THE ISRAELIS WOULD IMPLEMENT THE AGREEMENT. HABIB URGED RATIFICATION AS CONFIRMATION BOTH OF LEBANESE SUPPORT FOR THIS AGREEMENT AND OF LEBANESE INTENTIONS TOWARD ISRAEL. IN SUMMING UP, GEMAYEL REITERATED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE U.S. ROLE IN GETTING THE AGREEMENT IMPLEMENTED. TUENI REVEALED THAT LEBANON WOULD NOT PUSH ITS ARAB LEAGUE PROPOSAL AS LONG AS SAUDI ARABIA REMAINED ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN SEEKING A WAY OUT OF THE IMPASSE. END SUMMARY.

3. AMB. HABIB, ACCOMPANIED BY CHARGE PUGH AND ROSS, MET WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AND HIS TEAM (FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER HADDAD, PRESIDENTIAL COUNSELOR TUENI, SPECIAL EMISSARY 'UBAYD, AND BG FARIS) FOR ONE HOUR JUNE 1 TO REVIEW THE STATE OF PLAY ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON IN PREPARATION FOR HIS DEPARTURE FOR ISRAEL AND THE U.S.

4. HABIB OPENED THE SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION BY GIVING THE LEBANESE A PRELIMINARY REPORT ON PRINCE BANDAR'S MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON TO DATE. PENDING BANDAR'S MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY, WE HAD LEARNED THAT [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] WOULD BE TRAVELLING TO SEVERAL ARAB CAPITALS, INCLUDING DAMASCUS, AND IT WAS POSSIBLE HE MIGHT BE BACK IN RIYADH FOR SALEM'S VISIT ON JUNE 4. BANDAR HAD TOLD US THAT THE SAUDIS WERE ANXIOUS, WITH SYRIAN AGREEMENT, TO REOPEN THE SYRIAN DIALOGUE WITH THE U.S. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IN ANY CASE, IT WAS CLEAR FROM EVERYTHING THE SAUDIS WERE TELLING US THAT THEY REMAINED FULLY COMMITTED TO LEBANESE INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY AND TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON.

5. HABIB EXPRESSED THE JUDGEMENT, BASED IN PART ON OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH BANDAR, THAT THE NEXT MONTH WOULD BE KEY. WE AND THE LEBANESE HAD EMBARKED ON AN INITIATIVE DESIGNED TO BUILD ARAB PRESSURE ON THE SYRIANS. WHILE A NUMBER OF ARAB STATES COULD CONTRIBUTE TO OUR EFFORTS, OUR ATTENTION SHOULD REMAIN FOCUSED IN LARGE MEASURE ON THE SAUDIS, ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THEY COULD BRING THE SYRIANS TO OPEN A DIALOGUE WITH BOTH LEBANON AND THE U.S. IT WAS ESSENTIAL FOR OUR MUTUAL EFFORTS THAT OUR APPROACH BE PRECISE AND COORDINATED. SALEM'S IMPENDING TRIP TO THE U.S. COULD PLAY A USEFUL PART IN ENSURING THIS. MEANWHILE, ROSS WOULD BE IN DAILY TOUCH WITH THE

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LEBANESE TEAM TO MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM AND COMPARE NOTES.

6. TURNING TO HIS MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN, SCHEDULED FOR LATER IN THE DAY, HABIB SAID IT WAS QUITE POSSIBLE BEGIN WOULD RAISE THE ISSUE OF PARTIAL WITHDRAWALS. IT WAS ALSO LIKELY HE WOULD EXPRESS ISRAELI

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AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

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EXDIS

JERUSALEM/TEL AVIV PASS AMB. HABIB FROM ROSS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PINT, MOPS, MARR, XF, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH GEMAYEL ET AL

UNHAPPINESS OVER THE RETURN OF SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS OF

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Date Printed: 10/22/1998

DOC NUMBER: 83BEIRUT06293

CHANNEL: n/a

PALESTINIANS TO THE BIQA' IN VIOLATION OF THE UNDER-
STANDINGS REACHED IN 1982. [

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7. HABIB ASKED GEMAYEL WHAT HE MIGHT LIKE SAID TO BEGIN. JOKINGLY, GEMAYEL SAID, "GIVE HIM MY BEST REGARDS." ONLY HALF-JOKINGLY, HE SAID, "ASK HIM ABOUT TOTAL UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL." HABIB, POINTING OUT THE OBVIOUS DIFFICULTY OF SUCH A PROPOSAL, AS WELL AS THE DANGER THAT IT MIGHT ENCOURAGE PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL AND LONG-TERM OCCUPATION, TOLD GEMAYEL HE PROBABLY WOULD NOT RAISE IT IF IT DID COME UP TODAY OR IN THE FUTURE, HOWEVER, IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO KNOW WHETHER THE LEBANESE INTENDED TO IMPLEMENT THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT IF PARTIAL OR UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL OCCURRED. TUENI, ANSWERING FOR THE LEBANESE, SAID THAT THE AGREEMENT WOULD BE IMPLEMENTED. GEMAYEL HAD "INVESTED HIMSELF" ALL THE WAY. THE AGREEMENT WOULD NOT BE AFFECTED; ONLY THE ISRAELI SIDE LETTER LINKING ISRAELI AND SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL WOULD HAVE TO BE PUT ASIDE. HABIB REITERATED THAT SUCH A SCENARIO WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN.

8. TUENI, RETURNING TO THE THEME OF LEBANON'S GOOD FAITH, STRESSED THAT THE AGREEMENT (NOW BEFORE THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES) WOULD BE APPROVED "AS SOON AS FEASIBLE." (COMMENT: HE REFUSED TO BE PINNED DOWN ON EXACTLY WHAT PERIOD OF TIME THIS MEANT, ALTHOUGH HE DID SAY THAT THE CHAMBER'S ACTION WOULD AUTHORIZE THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE THE AGREEMENT. PROMULGATION WAS A DISCRETION-

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ARY ACT TO BE TAKEN IN THE LIGHT OF A LEBANESE JUDGEMENT ON WHETHER THE ISRAELIS WOULD IN FACT IMPLEMENT THE AGREEMENT.) 'UBAYD LATER FOLLOWED UP TO ASK WHETHER APPROVAL BY THE CHAMBER WOULD HELP OR HINDER EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH A DIALOGUE WITH SYRIA. HABIB REPLIED THAT SYRIAN ATTITUDES WOULD NOT BE SHAPED BY THE CHAMBER'S ACTION. RATIFICATION WAS NECESSARY, HOWEVER, AS A SYMBOL OF UNEQUIVOCAL LEBANESE SUPPORT FOR THE AGREEMENT AND AS A MEASURE OF LEBANESE INTENTIONS AND CREDIBILITY VIS A VIS THE ISRAELIS. IT WOULD BE NECESSARY IF ISRAEL WERE TO BE EXPECTED TO ACT CONSTRUCTIVELY.

9. IN CLOSING, HABIB INVITED GEMAYEL TO BRIEF HIM ON THOSE ASPECTS OF THE LEBANESE DELIBERATIONS OF THAT MORNING (WHICH WE HAD BEEN TOLD WOULD FOCUS ON COURSES OF ACTION IN THE FUTURE) THAT MIGHT BE HELPFUL IN ISRAEL OR IN WASHINGTON. GEMAYEL LIMITED HIS ANSWER TO A RE-AFFIRMATION THAT LEBANON WOULD RATIFY THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT BUT EXPECTED THE U.S. TO FULFILL ITS "DUTY" ON IMPLEMENTATION (I.E., GET THE SYRIANS OUT) AND REMAIN FULLY INVOLVED. HABIB'S PROBES ON EFFORTS WITH THE ARABS BROUGHT CONFIRMATION THAT THE LEBANESE WOULD CONTINUE THEIR CONTACTS WITH THE SAUDIS. AS LONG AS SAUDI ARABIA REMAINED ACTIVELY ENGAGED, SAID TUENI, LEBANON WOULD NOT PUSH ITS ARAB LEAGUE PROPOSAL, WHICH HAD BEEN MADE AS A TRIAL BALLON.

10. COMMENT: AS THE ABOVE CONVERSATION AND THE EARLIER ONE WITH TUENI (SEPTTEL) DEMONSTRATE, THE LEBANESE DO NOT SEE THEMSELVES AS HOLDING MANY CARDS IN THE CURRENT PHASE. THEY VIEW THEIR LOBBYING EFFORTS WITH THE ARABS AS SOME-

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 AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
 USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE
 AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

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EXDIS

JERUSALEM/TEL AVIV PASS AMB. HABIB FROM ROSS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, PINT, MOPS, MARR, XF, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US
 SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH GEMAYEL ET AL

THING THEY CAN AND MUST DO, BUT THEY SEE NO OTHER WAY
 TO GET THE SYRIANS OUT UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES IF
 THOSE EFFORTS FAIL. HENCE THEIR TWO-FOLD INTEREST IN
 UNILATERAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL -- FIRST, AS A WAY OF
 STRENGTHENING THE PERSUASIVENESS OF THEIR LOBBYING EFFORTS
 AMONG THE ARABS; SECOND, AS A WAY OF CHANGING THE CIRCUM-
 STANCES FOR SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. WE HAVE WARNED THEM OF
 THE DIFFICULTIES INHERENT IN ANY SUCH STRATEGY. WHATEVER
 EVOLVES, IT IS CLEAR THAT GEMAYEL AND HIS TEAM CONTINUE
 TO LOOK TO THE U.S. FOR STRONG SUPPORT IN THEIR CONTINUING
 EFFORTS TO GET ALL FOREIGN FORCES OUT OF THEIR COUNTRY.

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11. THIS MESSAGE WAS PREPARED FOLLOWING AMB. HABIB'S
 DEPARTURE FROM BEIRUT. PUGH

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3. TUENI SAID GEMAYEL'S POLICY ADVISERS, INCLUDING HIMSELF, ELI SALEM, WADI' HADDAD AND JEAN OBEID, PLAN A TWO-HOUR SESSION WITH THE PRESIDENT MORNING JUNE 1, AT WHICH DECISIONS WILL BE MADE ON WHAT TO DO AND WHEN.

5. THE FIRST OPTION, ALREADY UNDER WAY, IS THE LEBANESE DIPLOMATIC CAMPAIGN OSTENSIBLY AIMED AT CONVENING AN

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Date Printed: 10/22/1996

DOC_NUMBER: 83BEIRUT06290

CHANNEL: n/a

ARAB SUMMIT. THE REAL PURPOSE IS TO MOBILIZE RELUCTANT ARAB MODERATES INTO PRACTICAL SUPPORT FOR THE GOL. AS DESCRIBED IN PREVIOUS MESSAGES, ULTIMATE GOL GOAL IS A MINI-SUMMIT REGROUPING THE FEZ HEADS OF STATE: MOROCCO (CHAIRMAN), SYRIA, SAUDI ARABIA, JORDAN, PLO, KUWAIT, AND HOPEFULLY ALGERIA AND TUNISIA.

6. LEBANON, TUENI EMPHASIZED, IS ALREADY WORKING HARD ON THIS POLICY. HE AND OTHERS ARE PROVIDING A STREAM OF INTERVIEWS TO ARAB-WIDE MEDIA: NEW GOL EMISSARIES WILL TOUR MIDDLE EAST; ARAB LEAGUE SYG KLIBI WILL BE BRIEFED ON GOL'S CALL FOR "SUMMIT."

7. SECOND, SHOULD THIS STRATEGY FAIL, THE GOL WILL MAKE ANOTHER MAJOR PUSH TOWARD THE SAME END, EMPLOYING SUCH HIGHLY VISIBLE DEVICES AS, FOR EXAMPLE, AN UNANNOUNCED GEMAYEL VISIT TO FAHD OR HASSAN.

8. I TOLD TUENI THAT LEBANON, NOT USG, MUST CARRY THE MAIN BURDEN WITH THE MODERATE ARABS AND WARNED THAT CURRENT EROSION OF ARAB SUPPORT SUGGESTS EFFORTS MUST BE CONSIDERABLY HASTENED. HE INSISTED GOL IS PURSUING ARAB DIPLOMACY ENERGETICALLY. IN ADDITION TO SUMMIT SCENARIO, HE HINTED AT GOL DISCUSSIONS WITH ARAFAT IN

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TRIPOLI AND REFEPRED TO "CONTACTS" WITH SARG IN LEBANON, CONTACTS WHICH HAVE CONVINCED THE LEBANESE THAT THEIR BILATERAL POSSIBILITIES OF NEUTRALIZING SYRIA HAVE NOW BEEN EXHAUSTED: "SARG WILL NOT WITHDRAW ON STRICTLY LEBANESE GROUNDS" BUT SEES SETTLEMENT IN THE BROADER CONTEXT. GOL, HE ASSERTED, WILL BE PPEPARED TO NEGOTIATE WITH SYRIA ON CERTAIN POINTS PARALLEL TO THOSE IN THE AGREEMENT,

9. IN TUENI'S VIEW, CURRENT SYRIAN EFFORTS TO INCAPACITAT ARAFAT POLITICALLY ARE YET ANOTHER INDICATION OF SYPIA'S REAL OPTIMUM GOAL, I.E., A NEW GENEVA NEGOTIATING FORUM (THUS CUTTING IN THE SOVIETS AND A SARG-DOMINATED PLO). A STRONG LEBANON, HE INSISTED, WILL BE ANTI-SYRIAN AND WILL, THEREFORE, NEVER BE A SYRIAN DESIDERATUM. NEVER-THELESS, HE THOUGHT WE HAVE A CARD OR TWO TO PLAY.

10. ALSO IN THE ARAB CONTEXT, TUENI VOLUNTEERED THAT THE GOL HAS ENCOURAGED THE EGYPTIANS TO RESUME THEIR LONG SUSPENDED ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE LEBANESE SUNNI COMMUNITY, AND THAT THE EGYPTIANS HAVE FALLEN EAGEPLY TO THE TASK.

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11. I AGAIN UNDERSCORED MY CONCERN THAT GOL EFFORTS IN THE ARAB FIELD ARE TAKING TOO LONG AND MAY BE SO CONVOLUTED AS TO ULTIMATELY LACK PUNCH. CONCENTRATION SHOULD BE WHERE REAL INFLUENCE RESIDES -- SAUDI ARABIA AND PERHAPS ALGERIA.

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INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSCE-00 NSAE-00
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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
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AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY •
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE

SECTION 02 OF 02 BEIRUT 06290

EXDIS

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, PINS, LE, US, SY
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: PROPOSED LEBANESE PLAN OF ACTION

12. I TOLD TUENI I HOPED TO HAVE A READ-OUT FOR HIM

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ON BANDAR'S WASHINGTON TALKS BEFORE MY DEPARTURE JUNE 1, AND OBSERVED THAT WE UNDERSTAND THE SAUDIS MAY PROPOSE THAT THEY MEDIATE SARG/GOL DISCUSSIONS. (HE SAID GOL HAD SO PROPOSED TO FAHD EARLIER AND SAG HAD REFUSED.) I OFFERED MY STRONG VIEW THAT IF THE SAUDIS HAVE IN MIND SEEKING CHANGES IN, FOR EXAMPLE, THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS, THE AGREEMENT WILL BE LOST.

13. TURNING TO THE THIRD COURSE OF ACTION BEING CONSIDERED BY GOL, TUENI POSTULATED UNILATERAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL,

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WITH THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE AND OTHER SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN PLACE. GOL WOULD THEN SEEK SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL THROUGH THE ARAB LEAGUE, WHICH HAS ALREADY PRO-ANNOUNCED IN FAVOR OF FULL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES. THE GOL WOULD THUS SEEK TO IMPALE SYRIA ON PREVIOUS ARAB LEAGUE COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS: ISRAEL IS OUT, SO SYRIA MUST WITHDRAW FORTHWITH. I EXPRESSED SKEPTICISM THAT ISRAEL WOULD BE A WILLING ACTOR IN THIS SCENARIO.

14. THE FOURTH STRATEGY OPTION PRESENTED BY TUENI ASSUMES MILITARY ESCALATION IN THE BIQ'A. HE FLOATED THE IDEA THAT THE GOL REPORT TO THE UNSC A THREAT TO LEBANESE NATIONAL SECURITY AND REQUEST, ON THE BASIS OF RES 520 DISPATCH OF UN FORCES TO SEPARATE THE SIDES. I POINTED OUT THAT ANY SUCH RESOLUTION IS LIKELY TO BE VETOED AND THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO PUT TOGETHER SUCH A UN FORCE.

15. FINALLY, TUENIE SAID THE GOL WILL REVIEW OTHER MINOR OPTIONS IN ADDITION TO THE FOUR ABOVE, INCLUDING UNSPECIFIED ACTION BY THE FRENCH. HE DID NOT DEMUR WHEN I SAID THE GOL DOES NOT SEEM TO KNOW WHERE OR HOW IT CAN HELP TO OBTAIN OUR REAL OBJECTIVE OF ACHIEVING FULL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FORCES. TUENIS ALSO NOTED GOL IS TALKING TO THE PAKISTANIS ABOUT THE UNSC POSSIBILITY, TO EASTERN EUROPEANS (UNNAMED-ROMANIANS?), BUT NOT TO THE SOVIETS.

16. I REITERATED MY CAUTION TO TUENI AGAINST ELABORATE SCENARIOS WHICH DO NOT CONTRIBUTE DIRECTLY TO PRESSURE ON THE SYRIANS AND WHICH MIGHT INADVERTENTLY PROVIDE THE SOVIETS WITH A PRETEXT TO CALL FOR A REPLAY OF THE GENEVA SCHEME. HE AGREED THAT SOVIETS WILL BE ACTIVELY SEEKING SUCH A PRETEXT. SYRIAN TACTICS WILL HAVE TO BE CONSTANTLY

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** EXDIS
*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

Date Printed: 10/22/1996

DOC NUMBER: 83BEIRUT06184

CHANNEL: n/a

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ACTION SS-25

EXCISE

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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0740
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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/PS OR/IR ED Date: 11/10/97
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PA Exemptions () CLASSIFY as () S or () C Sec.
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EX-13 **DECAPIIONED**

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, PINT, LE, SY, US
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: MAY 29 MEETING WITH PRESIDENT
- GEMAYEL

1. ~~ENTIRE PART~~
2. I MET WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AND FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM FOR SEVERAL HOURS MAY 29, GEMAYEL HAD JUST RETURNED FROM HIS APPEARANCE AT A WEST BEIRUT MUSLIM RALLY WHERE HE HAD SPOKEN TO AN AUDIENCE OF 20,000 PEOPLE. IN HIS SPEECH (WHICH IS REPORTED SEPARATELY) HE DEFENDED IN STRONG TERMS THE GOVERNMENT'S ARABISM, AS WELL AS THE AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL. IN HIS MEETING WITH ME HE EX-

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PRESSED EXTREME SATISFACTION AT THE TUMULTUOUS WELCOME THAT HE HAD RECEIVED IN THE HEARTLAND OF SUNNI MUSLIMS. HE SAW IN THIS AN INDICATION OF THE OVERWHELMING DESIRE FOR THE LEBANESE TO SEE THEIR COUNTRY FREE FROM EXTERNAL FORCES AND THE READINESS TO SUPPORT CENTRAL AUTHORITY AFTER THE YEARS OF DISARRAY.

3. WE WENT OVER THE PLANS FOR RATIFICATION WHICH REMAIN AS REPORTED PREVIOUSLY. SALEM REAFFIRMED THAT HE WOULD

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PRESENT THE DECREE TO THE PARLIAMENT ON MAY 30. THE INTENTION WAS TO COMPLETE THE RATIFICATION PROCESS THIS WEEK.

4. I DISCUSSED UNIFIL WITH THE PRESIDENT AND WE AGREED THAT FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM WOULD MEET WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL DURING HIS FORTHCOMING VISIT TO THE U.S. TO PRESENT IN AS MUCH DETAIL AS POSSIBLE LEBANESE VIEWS ON THE FUTURE OF UNIFIL. AT THE PRESIDENT'S REQUEST AND IN HIS PRESENCE I SPOKE TO GHASSAN TUENI ON THE TELEPHONE. TUENI WILL TELEPHONE BRYAN UQUHART AT THE UN TO GO OVER LEBANESE PRELIMINARY VIEWS AND TO KEEP THE CHANNE TO THE UN SECRETARIAT OPEN AND RESPONSIVE.

5. THE PRESIDENT EXPRESSED HIS DEEP CONCERN OVER CONTINUED INTRANSIGENCE OF THE SYRIANS WITH REGARD TO WITHDRAWAL AND THE ISRAELI-LEBANESE AGREEMENT. HE ASKED THAT I CONTINUE TO KEEP HIM INFORMED ABOUT SAUDI AND OTHER VIEWS. I TOLD HIM THAT I WAS EXPECTING A BETTER IDEA OF WHAT THE SAUDI'S HAD IN MIND AFTER PRINCE BANDAR MEETS WITH THE SECRETARY (I WILL NEED AS FULL A REPORT AS POSSIBLE OF THE SAUDI POSITION). HE WAS DISAPPOINTED IN THE VOTE OF THE KUWAITI PARLIAMENT AGAINST THE AGREEMENT AND SAW THIS AS A SIGN THAT ARAB APPROVAL WAS FRAGILE

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EVEN TO THE LIMITED EXTENT THAT HAD BEEN OBTAINED.

6. GEMAYEL SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE FOR US TO DISCUSS ALTERNATIVES TO GAINING SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL IF THE EFFORTS THROUGH ARAB CONSENSUS WERE GETTING NOWHER LEBANON COULD NOT AFFORD A PROTRACTED IMPASSE. IF THE PRESENT SITUATION WERE TO CONTINUE FOR VERY LONG HIS INTERNAL CONSENSUS WOULD BEGIN TO DISINTEGRATE. IT WOULD BE INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO GOVERN WHEN HIS AUTHORITY WAS LIMITED TO BEIRUT AND ITS NEAR SUBURBS. HE SUGGESTED THAT I DESIGNATE SOMEONE TO SIT WITH ONE OF HIS PEOPLE TO TALK ABOUT THIS QUESTION OF ALTERNATIVES. WE AGREED THAT WHEN CHRIS ROSS RETURNED HE WOULD SIT WITH GHASSAN TUENI AND UNDER THE GUIDANCE OF ELI SALEM AND MYSELF THERE COULD BE A THOROUGH REVIEW OF WAYS TO BETTER IMPRESS UPON THE SYRIANS THE NEED FOR WITHDRAWAL AND TO LOOK AT THE OPTIONS IF THIS DID NOT COME ABOUT.

7. FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM SUGGESTED THAT WE HAD TO SEE SOME MOVEMENT THAT HELD PROMISE OF SUCCESS BY JUNE 15 OR THE POSITION OF THE GOVERNMENT WOULD DETERIORATE. I URGED HIM NOT TO SET DEADLINES BUT TO EXAMINE THE CIRCUMSTANCES AS THEY UNFOLDED. I WAS CONCERNED THAT SETTING DEADLINES WOULD GENERATE PREMATURE OR UNNECESSARY MOVES.

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8. DURING THE CONVERSATION WE DISCUSSED BRIEFLY THE MILITARY SITUATION IN THE BEKA'A, WHICH GAVE ME THE OPPORTUNITY TO INFORM THE PRESIDENT OF THE MEASURES WE HAD TAKEN AND THE STATEMENTS WE HAD MADE. I TOLD HIM THAT I WOULD HOPE THAT, AS A RESULT, THE DANGER OF A BLOW-UP WOULD BE AVERTED. HE DID NOT SEEM TO BE OVERLY

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSCE-00 NSAE-00
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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
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AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE

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EXDIS

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, PINT, LE, SY, US
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: MAY 29 MEETING WITH PRESIDENT
CONCERNED OR WELL INFORMED ABOUT THE SITUATION. 

Date Printed: 10/22/1996

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DOC NUMBER: 83BEIRUT06184

CHANNEL: n/a

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** EXDIS
*** Current Classification *** ~~SECRET~~

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Date Printed: 10/22/1996

DOC NUMBER: 83BEIRUT06219

CHANNEL: n/a

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EXCISE

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSCE-00 NSAE-00
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O 311122Z MAY 83

FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0758

INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE

USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Date: 11/10/97

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BEIRUT 06219

EXCISE DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, LE, SA, US

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: LEBANESE FOREIGN MINISTER TO
SAUDI ARABIA

2. FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM TOLD ME THAT HE WILL BE
VISITING SAUDI ARABIA JUNE 1. HE WILL BE MEETING WITH
FOREIGN MINISTER PRINCE SAUD, AND PROBABLY WITH KING FAHD.

3. SALEM HAS RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM []
[] REPORTING A CONVERSATION WITH []
[] REPORTEDLY SAID THAT THE SYRIANS HAVE
PROPOSED THAT SAUDI ARABIA ACT AS THE INTERMEDIARY IN

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LEBANESE-SYRIAN NEGOTIATIONS IN THE SAME MANNER AS THE
U.S. ACTED IN THE ISRAELI-LEBANESE NEGOTIATIONS. SALEM
WAS NOT SURE WHETHER THIS MEANT THAT THERE WOULD BE A
FORMAL NEGOTIATION IN THE SAME SENSE AS THOSE WITH ISRAEL
IN WHICH THE U.S. SAT AT THE TABLE OP THAT SAUDI ARABIA
WOULD MERELY MEDIATE BETWEEN EACH OF THE TWO SEPARATELY.
FURTHER, [] SAID THAT THE SYRIANS HAD RAISED A
QUESTION AS TO CHANGES IN SEVERAL OF THE ARTICLES IN THE
ISRAELI-LEBANON AGREEMENT. SALEM IS NOT SURE WHETHER

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THIS MEANS THEY WOULD WANT THEM TO BE RENEGOTIATED OR THIS WAS A DEMAND THAT LEBANON PROVIDE ASSURANCES THAT CERTAIN ARTICLES WOULD NOT BE IMPLEMENTED. HE HAD BEEN GIVEN NO IDEA AS TO WHICH ARTICLES WEPE INVOLVED. SALEM IS WELL AWARE THAT ISRAEL WOULD OBJECT STRENUOUSLY AT ANY ATTEMPT OF RENEGOTIATION OF THE AGREEMENT.

4. SALEM READS INTO THE BRIEF AND INCOMPLETE MESSAGE FROM [REDACTED] A SYRIAN INTENTION TO BEGIN BARGAINING WITH THE LEBANESE AT A TIME OF THEIR CHOOSING; ON THE OTHER HAND, HE MAINTAINS A GENERAL SUSPICION THAT THE BASIC SYRIAN PURPOSE IS THE DESTTUCTINN OF THE AGREEMENT. THERE HAS BEEN NO DIRECT SIGNAL TO THE LEBANESE FROM THE SYRIANS CONCERNING ANY DESIPE TO MEET AND DISCUSS THEIR OPPOSITION. SALEM HOPES THROUGH HIS VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA TO ENGAGE THE SAUDIS MORE DEEPLY ON THE SIDE OF THE LEBANESE IN THE EFFORT TO BRING THE SYRIANS AROUND TO THE POINT WHERE THEY ARE WILLING TO DISCUSS THEIR WITHDRAWAL IN THE CONTEXT OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL IN THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT.

5. SALEM WILL NOT BE ACCOMPANIED BY SAEB SALAM ON HIS VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA. SAEB WAS ASKED TO GO ALONG BUT DECLINED. INSTEAD, SAEB PROPOSED THAT HE GO TO SAUDI [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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ARABIA AT A LATER DATE RATHER THAN WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER. PUGH

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EXCISE

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 38
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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY
USELO RIYADH PRIORITY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/CR/IR Date: 11/10/97
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☐ DENY IN PART

FOIA Exemptions *B1* TS authority to
PA Exemptions ☐ CLASSIFY as ☐ S or ☐ C Sec.
☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or ☐ C

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EX DECAPTIONED

BEIRUT FOR AMBASSADOR HABIB
FROM DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, IS, LE, US, XF
SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: MEETING WITH KIMCHE,
MAY 24

2. SUMMARY: I TOLD KIMCHE THAT PRESIDENT GEMAYEL
WAS GOING TO SUBMIT THE LEBANON-ISRAEL AGREEMENT TO
PARLIAMENT AND EXPECTED THE PROCESS TO BE COMPLETED
IN TEN DAYS. HOWEVER, HE HAD NOT MADE UP HIS MIND
ABOUT EXCHANGING INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION, FEARING
THAT COMPLICATIONS MIGHT ENSUE IF PARTS OF THE
AGREEMENT CAME INTO FORCE WITHOUT ITS WITHDRAWAL
PROVISIONS BEING PINNED DOWN. KIMCHE WAS VERY

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ENCOURAGED BY GEMAYEL'S DECISION TO TAKE THE AGREEMENT
TO PARLIAMENT, AND SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO REFLECT
FURTHER ON THE QUESTION OF THE EXCHANGE OF INSTRUMENTS
BEFORE OFFERING A REACTION. HE UNDERSTANDS THIS IS
A COMPLICATED MATTER. KIMCHE IS DISAPPOINTED BY THE
EUROPEAN REACTION TO DATE AND BELIEVES MORE NEEDS
TO BE DONE TO SHORE UP INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE
AGREEMENT AS A WAY OF APPLYING PRESSURE ON THE
SYRIANS AND SOVIETS. KIMCHE LISTENED ATTENTIVELY TO

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MY EXPLANATION OF LEBANESE CONCERN ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A UNILATERAL PARTIAL ISRAELI PULLBACK. WE ALSO HAD A GENERAL REVIEW OF ARAB POSITIONS, UNIFIL, AND LEBANON'S INTERNAL CONSENSUS E AFTERMATH OF THE SIGNING. END SUMMARY.

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3. JOINED BY AMBASSADOR LEWIS AND HARE, I MET WITH KIMCHE AND HIS MFA COLLEAGUES FOR ONE AND A HALF HOURS MORNING MAY 24. I TOLD KIMCHE THAT I WOULD BE RETURNING TO WASHINGTON TOMORROW (MAY 25) FOR CONSULTATIONS, THOUGH PHIL HABIB WAS PLANNING, AT LEAST FOR NOW, TO REMAIN IN THE AREA. PRESIDENT GEMAYEL HAD ASKED HABIB TO SPEND SOME TIME WITH VARIOUS LEBANESE POLITICIANS AND, I NOTED, LEBANON NEEDED THIS KIND OF SUPPORT AND PRESENCE AT THIS TIME. KIMCHE WAS OBVIOUSLY RELIEVED THAT HABIB WAS NOT PLANNING TO LEAVE THE STAGE AT THIS MOMENT.

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4. I SAID THAT GEMAYEL INTENDED TO SUBMIT THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT TO THE LEBANESE PARLIAMENT RIGHT AWAY. HE HAD TOLD FOREIGN MINISTER SALIM IN OUR PRESENCE SUNDAY EVENING TO GET TOGETHER WITH SPEAKER ASSAD AND TO SEND THE CABINET DECREE TO THE PARLIAMENT'S FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE. THE ENTIRE PROCESS WAS EXPECTED TO

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TAKE TEN DAYS AND WOULD INCLUDE SOME FORM OF PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE. I OBSERVED THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT GET 80 VOTES, AS HAD OCCURRED JUST PRIOR TO THE SIGNING OWING TO SA'AB SALAM'S CLEVER PARLIAMENTARY MANEUVERING, BUT GEMAYEL WAS EXPECTING TO RECEIVE MAJORITY SUPPORT FOR THE AGREEMENT. KIMCHE WAS VERY MUCH ENCOURAGED BY THIS NEWS.

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5. CONTINUING, I SAID GEMAYEL WAS STILL THINKING ABOUT THE QUESTION OF THE EXCHANGE OF THE INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION. HE HAD NOT YET MADE UP HIS MIND, BUT WAS OBVIOUSLY CONCERNED ABOUT POSSIBLE NEGATIVE, EVEN COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE, ASPECTS IF PARTS OF THE AGREEMENT (JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE, ETC.) CAME INTO FORCE AND THE WITHDRAWAL PROVISIONS WERE STILL NOT PINNED DOWN. I STRESSED, HOWEVER, THAT GEMAYEL SEEMED QUITE RELAXED ABOUT HAVING INFORMAL MEETINGS BETWEEN KIMCHE AND FATTAL IN THE MEANTIME AND, IN FACT, INTENDED TO DISCUSS THIS FURTHER WITH FATTAL TODAY (MAY I TOLD KIMCHE THAT PHIL HABIB AND I HAD NOT OFFERED ANY DIRECT COMMENT ON GEMAYEL'S MUSINGS ABOUT THE EXCHANGE OF THE INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION. WE HAD THOUGHT IT BEST THAT THE LEBANESE TALK TO ISRAELIS DIRECTLY, ONCE THEY HAD DECIDED ON THE BEST COURSE TO FOLLOW.

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Date Printed: 10/22/1996

DOC_NUMBER: 83TELAV07009

CHANNEL: n/a

6. KIMCHE SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO CONSIDER THE QUESTION OF THE EXCHANGE OF INSTRUMENTS FURTHER BEFORE OFFERING A REACTION. HE COULD SEE (RUBINSTEIN AGREED) THAT THE ISSUE COULD CUT BOTH WAYS. AMBASSADOR LEWIS COMMENTED THAT IT WAS NOT A CLEAR-CUT ISSUE. IF LEBANON WERE INVOLVED IN PROTRACTED NEGOTIATIONS WITH SYRIA, THE

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ACTION SS-25

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FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3802
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY
USELO RIYADH PRIORITY

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COMING INTO FORCE OF THE AGREEMENT COULD BECOME A COMPLICATING FACTOR. I ALSO ALLUDED TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT LEBANON WOULD NOT WANT TO BE IN A POSITION OF HAVING TO SUSPEND ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE AGREEMENT; I INFERRED THIS COULD POSSIBLY COME INTO PLAY IN THE CONTEXT OF SYRIAN-LEBANESE NEGOTIATIONS. I EMPHASIZED, HOWEVER, GEMAYEL'S COMMITMENT TO HAVING THE AGREEMENT

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BROUGHT TO THE PARLIAMENT, EVEN THOUGH THIS MIGHT NOT BE TECHNICALLY NECESSARY. KIMCHE AGREED THIS WAS THE IMPORTANT POINT.

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7. WE REVIEWED SALIM'S VISIT TO EUROPE AND OUR OWN CONTACTS WITH THE BRITISH, FRENCH, ITALIANS, AND GERMANS. I NOTED THAT PYM HAD SENT A MESSAGE TO KHADDAM AND CITED KHADDAM'S HARD-LINE RESPONSE TO THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR IN DAAASCUS WHEN THE MESSAGE WAS DELIVERED. THE ITLIANS HAD ALSO BEEN HELPFUL AND COLOMBO CONTINUED

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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TO PLAY A VERY CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE. CHEYSSON THOUGHT THE FRENCH COULD DO SOMETHING USEFUL WITH THE SYRIANS AND WAS CONSIDERING SENDING AN EMISSARY TO DAMASCUS, THOUGH HE WANTED TO DISCUSS THIS FURTHER WITH THE SECRETARY. THE GERMANS WERE A BIT CAUTIOUS, THOUGH THEY INTENDED TO WORK THROUGH THE EC-10. PRESIDENT GEMAYEL, I OBSERVED, WAS ON THE WHOLE FAIRLY PLEASED WITH THE EUROPEAN SUPPORT FOR LEBANON AND THEIR EFFORT TO PROMOTE SYREBANESE TALKS.

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8. KIMCHE WAS LESS SATISFIED AND SAID THAT THE EUROPEANS GAVE AN APPEARANCE OF HOLDING BACK. HE THOUGHT IT WAS OF THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE FOR OUR GOVERNMENTS TO OBTAIN MAXIMUM SUPPORT FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY -- CITING THE CANADIANS, JAPANESE, AND AUSTRALIANS, AMONG OTHERS -- IN ORDER TO APPLY PRESSURE ON THE SYRIANS. AMBASSADOR LEWIS RELATED THAT THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR HAD TOLD HIM YESTERDAY (MAY 23) THAT THEIR FOREIGN MINISTRY HAD CALLED IN THE SYRIAN AMBASSADOR IN TOKYO TO URGE SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. THE SYRIAN AMBASSADOR WAS APPARENTLY QUITE UPSET. KIMCHE COMMENTED MORE FOREIGN MINISTRIES AROUND THE WORLD SHOULD BE DOING PRECISELY THE SAME THING. AMBASSADOR LEWIS AND I SAID WE WERE QUITE SURE THAT LEBANON WOULD FIGURE IMPORTANTLY ON THE SIDE AT THE WILLIAMSBURG SUMMIT; KIMCHE SAID THIS WOULD BE VERY IMPORTANT.

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9. GEMAYEL ALSO FELT, I SAID, THAT THE ARAB REACTION HAD BEEN PRETTY GOOD THUS FAR, THOUGH HE WAS SOMEWHAT DISAPPOINTED THAT SAUDI ARABIA HAD NOT TAKEN A STRONGER POSITION. PHIL HABIB WAS PREPARED TO GO BACK TO SAUDI ARABIA IF IT WOULD MAKE SENSE. I EXPLAINED THAT THE VISIT OF INFORMATION MINISTER ISKANDAR TO SAUDI ARABIA

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Date Printed: 10/22/1996

DOC_NUMBER: 83TELAV07009

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THE LEBANESE WERE, I CONTINUED, CONCERNED THAT THE ARAB POSITION COULD ERODE, AS WE WERE ALSO. THEY STILL HOPED THAT A COMBINATION OF FORCES WOULD INDUCE THE SYRIANS TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS AND THOUGHT THE NEXT SEVERAL WEEKS WOULD BE CRITICAL.

10. THE LEBANESE WERE ALSO CONCERNED THAT ISRAEL MIGHT UNDERTAKE A UNILATERAL PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL. KIMCHE ASKED IF THIS WOULD BE THE CASE EVEN IF IT WERE DONE SYSTEMATICALLY AND IN COMPLETE COOPERATION WITH THE LEBANESE AND THE MNF TO AVOID VACUUMS. I REPLIED THAT WHILE THE LEBANESE KNEW SUCTEP WOULD NOT BE TAKEN WITHOUT CONSULTATION AND TOOK SOME ENCOURAGEMENT ON THIS SCORE, THEY WERE STILL CONCERNED. AMONG OTHER THINGS, FOREIGN MINISTER SALIM HAD BEEN TOLD BY ASSAD THAT IF THE ISRAELIS OFFERED TO WITHDRAW TO THE AAWALI RIVER, LEBANON SHOULD SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY. THIS NATURALLY MADE THE LEBANESE SUSPICIOUS. THERE WAS ALSO THE QUESTION OF POSSIBLE SYRIAN ENCROACHMENTS SHOULD THE ISRAELIS WITHDRAW FROM CERTAIN AREAS OF THE SHOUF.

11. KIMCHE ASKED IF RIFAAT ASSAD HAD TURNED UP IN WASHINGTON. I SAID I DID NOT THINK SO BUT, IF HE DID, WE INTENDED TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE OPPORTUNITY AND MIGHT EVEN HAVE A LEBANESE EMISSARY COME TO WASHINGTON. I ALSO MENTIONED THAT WE HAD ASKED GEMAYEL IF HE HAD ANY SECRET TALKS WITH THE SYRIANS; GEMAYEL HAD RESPONDED NEGATIVELY AND HABIB HAD SUGGESTED HE SHOULD THINK ALONG THESE LINES. I STATED THAT THE LEBANESE WERE STILL INCLINED TO BELIEVE THAT SYRIA WAS NOT OUT TO

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DESTROY THE AGREEMENT AND THEY WERE PREPARED TO MAKE CERTAIN CONCESSIONS IF NEGOTIATIONS BEGAN, POSSIBLY BY AGREEING TO HAVING SOMEBODY IN THE CABINET WHO WAS PRO-SYRIAN. I ADDED THAT I THOUGHT WE HAD SUCCESSFULLY STOPPED ANY UNILATERAL LEBANESE INITIATIVE WITH THE SOVIETS, AND THAT WE HAD FULLY REVIEWED OUR OWN EXCHANGES WITH THE SOVIETS WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL.

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12. THE LEBANESE WERE ADDRESSING, I SAID, THE UNIFIL QUESTION AND WERE MOVING TO COORDINATE THEIR POSITIONS WITH THE UN SECRETARIAT. IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL OR BRIAN URQUEHART MIGHT COME TO LEBANON. KIMCHE THOUGHT IT WOULD ALSO BE IMPORTANT FOR THE UN TO TOUCH BASE WITH ISRAEL IN THAT CASE. WE DISCUSSED THE GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR A NEW UNIFIL MANDATE AGAINST THE JULY 19 DEADLINE FOR UNIFIL'S RENEWAL. AMBASSADOR LEWIS CAUTIONED THAT, IF THE

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SYRIANS WERE STILL STALLING AT THAT TIME, THE SOVIETS COULD VERY WELL VETO ANY ATTEMPT TO CHANGE UNIFIL'S MANDATE; IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO SEEK A SIMPLE EXTENSION OF UNIFIL'S TERM. KIMCHE AGREED THAT THIS WOULD HAVE TO BE PLAYED BY EAR.

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13. AS THE MEETING WAS DRAWING TO A CLOSE, I POINTED TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT LEBANON'S CONSENSUS WAS BEGINNING TO FRAY. AMBASSADOR LEWIS AND I SAID THAT THE PROBLEM WAS NOT SO MUCH AGREEMENT PER SE, BUT MUSLIM APPREHENSION OF MARONITE EFFORTS TO DOMINATE LEBANON. THERE WAS A FEAR THAT THE LEBANESE FORCES WOULD RUN WILD, AND I CITED SEVERAL WORRISOME

INCIDENTS TO UNDERSCORE THIS POINT. KIMCHE AGREED THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO PRESERVE LEBANON'S CONSENSUS, AND I WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED IF ISRAEL WILL TRY TO INFLUENCE PHALANGE BEHAVIOR. HOWEVER, HE SHARED MY ASSESSMENT THAT FADI FRAM WAS NOT IN FULL CONTROL OF THE SITUATION. LEWIS

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Date Printed: 10/22/1996

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AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY

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DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, LE, SY, UNSC

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: FORNMIN SALEM AND GHASSAN
TUENI VIEWS ON UNIFIL AND NEXT STEPS WITH SYRIANS

1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY: GOL IS GRADUALLY FORMULATING A PLAN OF
ACTION WHICH INCLUDES RATIFICATION OF AGREEMENT, NEU-
TRALIZING SYRIAN SUPPORT AMONG THE ARABS, MOBILIZING
SAUDI INFLUENCE AND MAINTAINING AN INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE
VIA UNIFIL. THEIR OBJECTIVE REMAIN TO SECURE A LEBANESE-
SYRIAN DIALOGUE CONCERNING WITHDRAWAL. END SUMMARY.

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3. I MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM AND GHASSAN TUENI
MAY 24 TO REVIEW THE SITUATION. FOR STARTERS, I PRESSED
HARD FOR TUENI TO CALL URQUHART AT THE UN TO EXPLAIN
THEIR IDEAS ON UNIFIL AND REASONS FOR GEMAYEL'S INVITA-
TION TO DE CUELLAR. THEY SEE UTILITY OF UN ROLE IN PART
TO KEEP INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE FOR SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL.
THEY ARE ALSO THINKING ABOUT AN EVENTUAL UNSC ACTION
BASED ON RESOLUTION 520. I EXPRESSED SKEPTICISM BUT SAID

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WE WOULD EXAMINE THEIR IDEAS WHEN THEY DEVELOPED THEM FURTHER. (I WOULD APPRECIATE DEPARTMENTAL AND USUN VIEWS ON THIS.) THEY ADMITTED THEY HAD TO THINK FURTHER ABOUT WHAT THEY WANT FROM UN. IN MEANTIME, THEY AGREED THAT TUENI SHOULD PHONE URQUHART AND SALEM SHOULD RECEIVE GENERAL CALLAHAN FOLLOWING ALREADY SCHEDULED MEETING BETWEEN THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND AMBASSADORS OF UNIFIL CONTRIBUTORS REPRESENTED IN BEIRUT.

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4. TURNING TO LEBANESE-SYRIAN CONTACTS I ASKED ABOUT VISIT TO DAMASCUS OF SYRIAN BUSINESSMAN ANWAR SHALLAH. SALEM SAID SHALLAH HAD BROACHED IDEA, SO HE HAD ASKED HIM TO TELL PRESIDENT ASSAD THAT GOL WANTS TO TALK. SHALLAH HAS NOT YET RETURNED. I ASKED WHY SALEM WAS OPTIMISTIC THAT ASSAD WOULD EVENTUALLY TALK RATHER THAN JUST DESTROY AGREEMENT BY DOING NOTHING. SALEM SAID THAT HE RELIES ON ASSAD'S QUESTIONS IN THEIR PRIVATE MEETING. ASSAD ASKED WHETHER GOL WAS READY TO DISCUSS SYRIAN SECURITY CONCERNS AND THE FUTURE OF SYRIA'S CLIENTS IN LEBANON. WHEN SALEM TOLD ASSAD THAT GOL WAS READY TO DISCUSS THESE ISSUES, ASSAD JUST NODDED, LEAVING IMPRESSION THAT HE WOULD PICK UP THE OFFER WHEN HE WAS READY. ASSAD ALSO ASKED WHETHER GOL WOULD AGREE TO POINTS IN CONTRADICTION TO THOSE IN ISRAELI AGREEMENT,
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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TO WHICH SALEM REPLIED THAT GOL WOULD NOT BUT WAS PREPARED TO DEAL FULLY WITH SYRIA'S CONCERNS. I ASKED HIM WHAT THIS MEANT IN CONCRETE TERMS, AND SALEM SAID IT MEANT GUARANTEES AGAINST ANTI-SYRIAN ACTIVITY OF IRAQI BAAATH AND MUSLIM BROTHERS. [REDACTED]

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5. CONVERSATION TURNED TO NEED TO CHECK SYRIAN EFFORTS TO GAIN ARAB SUPPORT. WE AGREED THAT ALGERIANS WERE MOST IMPORTANT PLAYERS, ASIDE FROM THE SAUDIS. MANY, INCLUDING THE SAUDIS, HAD URGED THE NECESSITY OF KEEPING ALGERIA OUT OF ITS FORMER ALLIANCE WITH SYRIA TO WEAKEN THE LATTER'S IDEOLOGICAL APPEAL. TUENI EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT SYRIANS ARE AT A DISADVANTAGE IN CURRENT ARAB ALIGNMENT IF GOL TAKES THE OFFENSIVE. HE PROPOSES CALLING A MEETING OF THE ARAB LEAGUE COUNCIL BUT NOT ACTIVELY PUSHING FOR IT. GOL SHOULD MAINTAIN THE FIRM, CONFIDENT IMAGE PROJECTED BY GEMAYEL AND SALEM. RESULT WOULD BE ARAB DESIRE TO AVOID SHOWDOWN IN ARAB LEAGUE WHERE GOL WOULD STAND ON HIGH GROUND OF OPPOSING OCCUPATION BY ANOTHER ARAB COUNTRY. THEY WERE NOT CONCERNED THAT ACTION IN ARAB LEAGUE TO BRING SANCTIONS AGAINST LEBANON WOULD SUCCEED. APPROACH TO THE ARAB LEAGUE COULD TRANSLATE INTO SOME KIND OF ARAB MEDIATION EFFORT TO GET SYRIA

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TALKING TO LEBANON, AND, EVENTUALLY, A MECHANISM TO COVER SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. TALKING AMONG THEMSELVES, TUENI AND SALEM AGREED TO WORK ON ALGERIANS AND ON AL SYG KLIBI TO MOVE TOWARD SUCH A SCENARIO.

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AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY
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FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, LE, SY, UNSC
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: FORNMIN SALEM AND GHASSAN

THEY BOTH EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT SYRIANS WERE CURRENTLY ENGAGED IN AN EFFORT TO BRING DOWN THE CABINET AND REPLACE IT WITH ONE MORE ACCEPTABLE TO SYRIA AND UNFAVORABLY DISPOSED TOWARD ISRAELI LEBANESE AGREEMENT.

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7. TUENI SPOKE ABOUT RECENT KILLINGS IN THE SHUF, HINTING THAT ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE MAY HAVE HAD A HAND IN ORDERING THESE KILLINGS TO UPSET A GEMAYEL-BROKERED AGREEMENT FOR THE MUTUAL RELEASE OF HOSTAGES. I STRONGLY REBUTTED THIS IDEA, SAYING ISRAEL HAD NO INTEREST IN RAISING TENSIONS IN THE SHUF. TUENI SAID THAT PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AND DRUZE LEADER JUMBLATT HAD PHONE CONVERSATION YESTERDAY IN EFFORT TO CALM TEMPER. IT WAS IN PART A GOOD CALL, BUT THEY ALSO SHOUTED A LOT AT ONE ANOTHER. LEBANESE EXPECT US TO GET ISRAELIS TO MAINTAIN BETTER SECURITY, SINCE NEITHER GEMAYEL NOR JUMBLATT HAVE CONTROL OVER EXTREMISTS IN THEIR RESPECTIVE COMMUNITIES WHO OPERATE IN AREA UNDER ISRAELI CONTROL. TUENI THOUGHT THAT ISRAEL COULD HELP BY GETTING OUT OF THE SHUF IN A COORDINATED FASHION AND ALLOWING GOL TO PUT ITS OWN FORCES INTO THE AREA IN ORDER TO DEMONSTRATE ITS CREDIBILITY TO BOTH DRUSE AND CHRISTIANS. WE TALKED ABOUT UNILATERAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL TO THE AWALI, BUT IT WAS NOTED THAT EVEN IF ISRAEL DECIDED TO MAKE THIS MOVE IT MIGHT SIMPLY SOLIDIFY OCCUPATION OF THE BEKAA AND SOUTH LEBANON. I ASSURED THEM THAT ISRAEL HAD AGREED IN ANY CASE TO CONSULT FURTHER WITH THEM BEFORE MAKING ANY WITHDRAWALS. I ALSO EXPRESSED MY CONCERN THAT SYRIAN OR MOORE LIKELY THE PLO, WOULD MOVE INTO ANY AREA VACATED BY WITHDRAWING ISRAELI TROOPS. I REMINDED THEM OF THE NECESSITY OF ENGAGING THE PLO IN NEGOTIATIONS ON WITHDRAWAL, A POINT WHICH THEY SEEMED TO UNDERSTAND. IN THEIR MOST RECENT TALK WITH THE PLO THEY HAD BEEN TOLD THE PLO WOULD GO WHEN THE SYRIANS GO.

8. I THEN BRIEFED SALEM AND TUENI ON MURPHY'S LAST REPORT FROM JIDDA

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[] WE WOULD RECONVENE TO DRAW UP A SCHEDULE OF WHAT EACH OF US WOULD BE DOING IN THE WAY OF FURTHER CONTACTS WITH AREA GOVERNMENTS.

9. IN THE MIDDLE OF OUR CONVERSATION I WAS INTERRUPTED BY A CALL FROM SAEB SALAM. HE ASKED ME WHETHER HE SHOULD SUPPORT EARLY RATIFICATION OF THE AGREEMENT, AND I TOLD HIM HE SHOULD. HE ALSO TOLD ME THAT HE HAD FOLLOWED MY ADVICE AND HAD ASKED TO SEE THE PRESIDENT, WITH WHOM HE WAS ABOUT TO MEET. WHEN I DESCRIBED THIS CONVERSATION TO FONMIN SALEM AND TUENI, THEY SAID IT WOULD TAKE ABOUT TEN DAYS FOR PARLIAMENT TO RATIFY. THEY CONFIRMED MY IMPRESSION THAT GOL INTENDS TO SEEK RATIFICATION SOON BUT WILL HOLD UP ON THE EXCHANGE OF RATIFICATION DOCUMENTS PENDING DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION WITH SYRIA. PUGH

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Date Printed: 10/22/1996

DOC. NUMBER: 83 TELAV06937

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EXD **DECAPTIONED**

BEIRUT FOR HABIB

JERUSALEM FOR DRAPER

CAIRO FOR ATHERTON

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS. PREL, IS, LE, SY, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER

- SHAMIR, MAY 22, 1983

REF: A) CAIRO 14848 (NOTAL), B) CAIRO 14982 (NOTAL),

- C) BEIRUT 5912 (NOTAL)

2. SUMMARY: AMBASSADORS HABIB AND LEWIS MET WITH FOREIGN

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MINISTER SHAMIR AND MEMBERS OF HIS STAFF FOR FORTY-FIVE MINUTES MAY 22 TO BRIEF THEM ON HIS RECENT TALKS IN BEIRUT, DHAHRAN, AND CAIRO. HABIB SAID THE LEBANESE REMAINED FIRM THAT THEIR DECISION TO SIGN THE AGREEMENT WAS THE RIGHT ONE. PRESIDENT GEMAYEL HAD SAID THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO PAY THE SYRIAN PRICE FOR WITHDRAWAL IF HE COULD AFFORD IT. KING FAHD HAD STRESSED THAT SAUDI ARABIA SUPPORTS LEBANON'S SOVEREIGNTY, **L**

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HABIB DESCRIBED PRESIDENT MUBARAK'S SUPPORT OF THE AGREEMENT AND LEBANON'S RIGHT TO SIGN IT AS SOLID.

IN RESPONSE TO A CONFUSED REPORT SHAMIR RECEIVED DURING THE MEETING, AMBASSADORS HABIB AND LEWIS STRESSED THAT PRESIDENT GEMAYEL HAD INVITED THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL TO COME TO LEBANON TO TALK ABOUT UNIFIL, NOT TO MEDIATE BETWEEN LEBANON AND SYRIA. END SUMMARY.

3. AMBASSADOR HABIB MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR FOR FORTY-FIVE MINUTES MORNING OF MAY 22 TO BRIEF HIM ON HIS VISITS TO LEBANON, SAUDI ARABIA AND EGYPT TO URGE SUPPORT FOR THE ISRAEL/LEBANON AGREEMENT. SHAMIR WAS ACCOMPANIED BY DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER BEN-MEIR, MFA DIRECTOR GENERAL KIMCHE, DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL BAR-ON, LEGAL ADVISOR RUBINSTEIN, AND SPOKESMAN PAZNER. HABIB WAS ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR LEWIS AND POLOFF SCOTT (NOTETAKER). FOLLOW-

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ING THE LARGE MEETING, HABIB AND LEWIS MET ALONE WITH SHAMIR, AND SUBSEQUENTLY WITH KIMCHE AND BAR-ON FOR ABOUT THIRTY MINUTES. (THIS MESSAGE SUMMARIZES THE HIGHLIGHTS OF ALL THREE MEETINGS.)

4. HABIB OPENED THE BRIEFING BY STRESSING THAT HIS EFFORTS HAD BEEN DIRECTED AT BUILDING SUPPORT IN THE ARAB WORLD FOR SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON AND FOR THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. BECAUSE THE SYRIANS WERE CHALLENGING THE LEBANESE DECISION TO SIGN THE AGREEMENT, HE HAD BEEN UNDERSCORING THE IMPORTANCE OF LETTING THE SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON SET ITS OWN POLICY AND OF OTHER ARAB GOVERNMENTS SUPPORTING LEBANON IN THAT DECISION.

5. HABIB DESCRIBED THE SYRIANS' REFUSAL TO SEE HIM AS AN EFFORT TO UNDERSCORE THEIR DISPLEASURE WITH THE LEBANON/ISRAEL AGREEMENT. HE SAID THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO LEBANESE FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM AFTER HIS RETURN FROM DAMASCUS, AND ADDED THAT THE SYRIANS HAD GIVEN SALEM A ROUGH TIME. THEIR MESSAGE TO SALEM HAD BEEN THAT LEBANON SHOULD "FIGHT THROUGH" THIS PERIOD, AND THE SYRIANS HAD LEFT SALEM IN NO DOUBT THAT THEY WEREN'T GOING ALONG WITH THE AGREEMENT.

6. IN SPITE OF SALEM'S RECEPTION, HABIB CONTINUED, PRESIDENT GEMAYEL REMAINED FIRM IN THE BELIEF THAT SIGNING THE

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AGREEMENT WAS THE RIGHT THING TO DO. HE HAD DISPATCHED ENVOYS TO A NUMBER OF ARAB STATES AND TO EUROPE SEEKING SUPPORT FOR LEBANON'S DECISION. HABIB ADDED THAT THE LEBANESE HAD DISCUSSED WITH HIM WHAT LEBANON EXPECTED OF THE UNITED STATES NOW THAT THE AGREEMENT HAD BEEN SIGNED, AND FRANKLY THEIR EXPECTATIONS WERE LARGE.

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9. HABIB SAID THAT SO FAR IT APPEARED THE SYRIANS WERE NOT INTERESTED IN TALKING WITH ANYONE ABOUT THE AGREEMENT. THEY HAVE NOT AGREED TO MEET WITH THE CABINET COMMITTEE SET UP BY GEMAYEL FOR THAT PURPOSE. NONETHELESS, PRESIDENT GEMAYEL HAD TOLD HIM THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO PAY THE SYRIAN PRICE FOR WITHDRAWAL IF HE COULD AFFORD IT. HABIB SAID THAT, BECAUSE IT APPEARED THE SYRIANS' PRICE WOULD BE HIGH, HE HAD ATTEMPTED TO KEEP THE CONVERSATIONS IN LEBANON FOCUSSED ON GETTING TALKS STARTED AND ON WITHDRAWAL ITSELF, RATHER THAN ON THE PRICE TAG.

10. HABIB SAID HE HAD MET WITH KING FAHD IN DHAHRAN

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13. WITH RESPECT TO THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL, HABIB SAID HE HAD BEEN TOLD THAT ALL GCC COUNTRIES WOULD SUPPORT THE SAUDI POSITION. THEY WOULD NOT CRITICIZE THE AGREEMENT, BUT WOULD CONCENTRATE THEIR STATEMENTS ON SUPPORT OF LEBANON'S RIGHT AS A SOVEREIGN STATE TO DO AS IT WISHED.

14. TURNING TO HIS STOP IN EGYPT, HABIB DESCRIBED PRESIDENT MUBARAK'S SUPPORT OF LEBANON, THE AGREEMENT, AND THE SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL AS "SOLID."

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15. FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR WAS HANDED A CABLE TOWARD THE
END OF THE MEETING, WHICH HE SAID WAS A MESSAGE FROM HIS
MISSION IN NEW YORK INDICATING THAT PRESIDENT GEMAYEL HAD
ASKED UN SECRETARY GENERAL PEREZ DE CUELLAR TO COME TO THE
AREA TO MEDIATE BETWEEN SYRIA AND LEBANON. AMBASSADORS
HABIB AND LEWIS SAID THAT THE INFORMATION WAS NOT CORRECT.
GEMAYEL HAD INVITED THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL OR HIS DEPUTY
TO COME TO LEBANON TO TALK ABOUT UNIFIL. THE UN HAS BEEN
ANGRY WITH THE LEBANESE BECAUSE THEY BELIEVE THEY HAVE NOT
BEEN KEPT INFORMED ABOUT THE AGREEMENT. THE LEBANESE WANT
TO MAKE PEACE WITH THE UN AND TO DISCUSS THE FUTURE ROLE OF
UNIFIL. THEY DO NOT WANT TO TALK ABOUT A UN MEDIATION
EFFORT.

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18. IN THE FOLLOW-ON MEETING WITH KIMCHE AND BAR-ON, HABIB DISCUSSED THE WAY IN WHICH INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION WOULD BE EXCHANGED, WITH KIMCHE MAKING CLEAR THAT THE ISRAELIS DID NOT DESIRE ANY CEREMONY FOR THE EXCHANGE. ISRAEL WAS PREPARED TO MAKE THE EXCHANGE QUIETLY, EITHER IN ISRAEL OR IN LEBANON, AS THE LEBANESE DESIRE. HABIB PROMISED TO FIND OUT WHAT THE CURRENT THINKING WAS IN BEIRUT ABOUT THE QUESTION OF A FURTHER PARLIAMENTARY ACTION INVOLVING RATIFICATION. HE SAID HE WOULD REPORT BACK EITHER DIRECTLY OR THROUGH AMBASSADOR LEWIS AFTER HE HAD BEEN IN BEIRUT.

19. KIMCHE ALSO STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF GETTING THE
[REDACTED]
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JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE FUNCTIONING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THERE WAS ALSO A DISCUSSION OF THE CONFUSION ABOUT UNIFIL'S FUTURE WHICH HABIB HAD ALREADY MENTIONED TO SHAMIR, THE CONSIDERABLE PROBLEM POSED FOR OUR DIPLOMATIC POSTURE IN SUPPORT OF THE AGREEMENT RESULTING FROM LEAKS IN ISRAEL OF CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE U.S. AND ISRAEL, AND OTHER RELATED SUBJECTS.

20. HABIB CONCLUDED BY DESCRIBING HIS OWN PROBABLE TRAVEL PLANS TO KIMCHE AND ASSURING HIM THAT, ALTHOUGH HE MAY GO BACK TO THE UNITED STATES FOR A TIME, IT WOULD BE HIS INTENTION TO RETURN TO THE AREA WITHIN TWO OR THREE WEEKS TO HELP PUSH THE PROCESS ALONG FURTHER.

21. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. LEWIS

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Date Printed: 10/22/1996

DOC NUMBER: 83CAIRO14849

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSCE-00 NSAE-00
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INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
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AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY
USELO RIYADH PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, EG, LE
SUBJECT: HABIB BRIEFS MUBARAK ON TROOP WITHDRAWAL
AGREEMENT

2. AMBASSADOR HABIB MET WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK AND
KAMAL HASSAN ALI FOR JUST OVER ONE HOUR ON MAY 21.
HABIB WAS ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR ATHERTON AND
POLOFF BALTIMORE. THE MEETING HAD ORIGINALLY BEEN
SCHEDULED WITH ALI, AND WAS SHIFTED TO THE PRESIDENT
AT GOE INITIATIVE. THE FACT THAT MUBARAK WANTED
TO MEET PERSONALLY WITH HABIB, EVEN THOUGH BY HIS
OWN ADMISSION SOMEWHAT UNDER THE WEATHER, REFLECTS
BOTH THE GOE'S INTENSE INTEREST IN THE SUCCESS OF
THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT AND ITS DESIRE TO

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PLAY - AND TO BE SEEN TO BE PLAYING - AN IMPORTANT
SUPPORTIVE ROLE.

3. TROOP WITHDRAWAL AGREEMENT: MUBARAK OPENED
THE SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION BY SAYING THAT HABIB
REVIEWED THE FINAL NEGOTIATIONS OVER CLARIFICATIONS
WITH THE ISRAELIS AND HANDED MUBARAK A COPY OF THE
TEXT, ANNEX, AGREED MINUTES AND APPENDIX. MUBARAK

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BALANCED THE DOCUMENT IN HIS HAND AND EXCLAIMED "IT'S A BOOK." HABIB EXPLAINED THAT THE LEBANESE HAVE SAID THAT IF ISRAEL DOES NOT WITHDRAW ITS TROOPS, THE AGREEMENT REMAINS IN SUSPENSE AND THAT ISRAEL WILL NOT DO SO UNLESS SYRIA AND THE PLO WITHDRAW AT THE SAME TIME. HABIB STRESSED THAT THE PROBLEM NOW IS HOW TO MAKE SYRIA TAKE THE AGREEMENT SERIOUSLY AND EMPHASIZED THAT THERE MUST BE DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN LEBANON AND SYRIA.

4. HABIB BRIEFED THE PRESIDENT ON HIS LATEST TALKS IN LEBANON AND STRESSED THAT THE LEBANESE ARE ANXIOUS TO START A DIALOGUE WITH THE SYRIANS. HE NOTED THAT WHEN SALEM WENT TO DAMASCUS THE WEEK BEFORE, THE SYRIANS GAVE HIM A VERY ROUGH TIME.

5. [REDACTED]
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USELO RIYADH PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, EG, LE
SUBJECT: HABIB BRIEFS MUBARAK ON TROOP WITHDRAWAL

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9. NEXT STEPS: ON THE QUESTION OF WHAT ROLE THE U.S. WILL PLAY IN FOSTERING SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL, HABIB SAID THE FIRST PRIORITY IS TO GET THE SYRIANS AND LEBANESE TALKING TO EACH OTHER AND ASKED MUBARAK'S VIEWS ABOUT THE IDEA OF INVITING A SYRIAN TO PAY AN UNPUBLICIZED VISIT TO WASHINGTON. [

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11. THIS MESSAGE HAS NOT BEEN SEEN BY AMBASSADOR HABIB.

12. DEPARTMENT PASS OTHER ADDRESSEES AS DESIRED.

13. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. ATHERTON

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SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 05913

DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIB

E.O.12356: OADR: DECL

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, US, IS, XF

SUBJECT: HABI/DRAPER MISSION: MAY 22 MEETING WITH
GEMAYEL AND SALEM

2. SUMMARY: IN A TWO-HOUR MEETING WITH GEMAYEL AND
SALEM ON SUNDAY EVENING, MAY 22.

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I ALSO REVIEWED IN DETAIL OUR PRESENT EFFORTS WITH THE
EUROPEANS AND WITH THE NORTH AFRICAN COUNTRIES THROUGH
THE VISIT OF AMBASSADOR WALTERS, AS WELL AS THE RECENT
HISTORY OF US-SOVIET EXCHANGES INVOLVING THE LEBANESE
SITUATION. GEMAYEL FOR HIS PART SAID THAT LEBANON WOULD
BE PROCEEDING WITH RATIFICATION WITHIN TEN DAYS, AND
WOULD BEGIN THE PROCESS BY SUBMITTING A DECREE FOR REVIEW
BY THE PARLIAMENTARY FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE EARLY

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NEXT WEEK. ON THE OTHER HAND, GEMAYEL WAS NOT SURE WHETHER HE WOULD IMMEDIATELY EXCHANGE THE INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION FOLLOWING THE DOMESTIC RATIFICATION PROCESS. HE SENSED IT MIGHT BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO START THE CLOCK TICKING ON SOME OF THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI ARRANGEMENTS INCLUDING FORMATION OF TWO STANDING COMMITTEES, AS LONG AS THE ARGUMENT WITH SYRIA HAD NOT BEEN RESOLVED. HE WILL BE GIVING FURTHER THOUGHT TO THIS QUESTION. GEMAYEL, HOWEVER, APPROVED THE CONCEPT OF INFORMAL MEETINGS FROM TIME TO TIME BETWEEN KIMCHE AND FATTAL IN THIS INTERIM PERIOD. SALEM DESCRIBED BRIEFLY HIS TALKS WITH EUROPEAN LEADERS OVER THE WEEKEND, STRESSING THAT THE FRENCH APPEARED READY TO MAKE A SPECIAL, UNILATERAL EFFORT WHICH CHEYSSON WOULD DESCRIBE TO SECRETARY SHULTZ. THIS FRENCH EFFORT WOULD BE IN ADDITION TO A PLANNED EC-10 STATEMENT ON TUESDAY SUPPORTING THE LEBANESE POSITION. AS FOR UNIFIL, GEMAYEL THOUGHT THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD VISIT LEBANON NEXT WEEK, BUT HE AGREED THAT TUENI SHOULD TELEPHONE URQUHART ON MONDAY TO SOOTHE POSSIBLE RUFFLED FEELINGS. END SUMMARY.

3. JOINED BY DRAPER AND CHARGE PUGH, I MET FOR MORE THAN TWO HOURS WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AND SALEM SUNDAY

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EVENING, MAY 22. C

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USELO RIYADH PRIORITY
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EXDIS

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: OADR: DECL
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, US, IS, XF
SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: MAY 22 MEETING WITH
GEMAYEL AND SALEM

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8. I THEN DESCRIBED MY MEETINGS EARLIER IN THE DAY WITH SHAMIR AND KIMCHE AND NOTED THAT THE ISRAELI CABINET HAD RATIFIED THE AGREEMENT. THIS LED NATURALLY INTO A DISCUSSION OF LEBANESE PLANS FOR RATIFICATION. GEMAYEL SAID THAT HE PLANNED TO MOVE AHEAD WITH RATIFICATION AND COMPLETE THE PROCESS WITHIN TEN DAYS. HE TURNED TO SALEM AND SAID THAT HE, SALEM, SHOULD WORK WITH THE SPEAKER OF THE PARLIAMENT, AL-ASSAD, TO TAKE CARE OF SENDING THE CABINET DECREE FOR REVIEW INITIALLY BY THE PARLIAMENTARY FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE. GEMAYEL SAID HE THOUGHT THAT THIS INITIAL STAGE IN THE PROCESS COULD BE STARTED WITHIN TWO OR THREE DAYS, OR BY THE MIDDLE OF THE WEEK. HE EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT THERE WOULD BE NO PROBLEM IN GETTING PARLIAMENTARY RATIFICATION.

9. ON THE OTHER HAND, GEMAYEL QUESTIONED WHETHER IT WOULD BE WISE TO MOVE AHEAD WITH THE EXCHANGE OF INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION RIGHT AWAY. HE SAID HE WANTED TO THINK THIS OVER CAREFULLY, BUT HE SAID IT COULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE, PARTICULARLY IN TERMS OF WHAT THE LEBANESE HOPE TO DO WITH THE SYRIANS IN THE WEEKS IMMEDIATELY AHEAD. ONCE THE INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION WERE

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EXCHANGED, THE CLOCK WOULD BEGIN TICKING ON SEVERAL ISRAELI-LEBANESE UNDERSTANDINGS INCLUDING THE FORMATION OF TWO STANDING COMMITTEES. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, ISRAEL WITHDRAWAL WOULD NOT BEGIN UNLESS THE SYRIANS AND PLO WERE READY TO COOPERATE IN A SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL.

10. I MENTIONED IN THIS CONNECTION THAT KIMCHE HAD SUGGESTED THE DESIRABILITY OF MEETINGS WITH FATTAL TO TAKE PLACE AT REGULAR INTERVALS PENDING FORMATION OF THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE. JOINED BY DRAPER, I SUGGESTED RETAINING ISRAELI CONFIDENCE, PARTICULARLY IN THE EVENT THAT THE EXCHANGE OF INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION DID NOT TAKE PLACE RIGHT AWAY. GEMAYEL AGREED THAT KIMCHE AND FATTAL COULD MEET INFORMALLY IN THIS INTERIM PERIOD AHEAD.

11. I STRESSED AT THIS POINT IN THE CONVERSATION THAT THE U.S. WAS AS DETERMINED AS LEBANON THAT THE SYRIAN-IMPOSED IMPASSE NOT BE ALLOWED TO DOMINATE EVENTS AHEAD. I SAID, AS WE ALL KNEW, THERE WAS A SERIOUS RISK THAT ISRAEL MIGHT DECIDE ON A UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL TO THE AWALI RIVER LINE. THIS COULD TURN OUT TO BE A DE FACTO PARTITION. I SAID THAT I HAD STRESSED IN MY TALK WITH SHAM IR THAT ISRAEL MUST CONSULT (WITH THE U.S. AND LEBANON) AS A RESULT OF THE SYRIAN REFUSAL TO WITHDRAW AND OTHERWISE COOPERATE.

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FROM HABIB

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12. EXPANDING ON THIS POINT, I DESCRIBED IN SOME DETAIL CURRENT US EFFORTS TO BE HELPFUL. I MENTIONED THE REPRESENTATIONS WE ARE MAKING TO THE EUROPEANS IN SUPPORT OF THE OVERALL LEBANESE POSITION AND WITH THE AIM OF PROMOTING A SYRIAN-LEBANESE DIALOGUE. I DESCRIBED THE EFFORTS WE WERE MAKING WITH TUNISIA, MOROCCO AND ALGERIA ALTHOUGH I EXPRESSED DOUBTS THAT KING HASSAN'S IDEA OF SENDING THE THREE FORMINISTERS FROM THOSE COUNTRIES TO SHUTTLE BETWEEN DAMASCUS AND BEIRUT WOULD EVER MATERIALIZE. I REVIEWED BRIEFLY THE MEETINGS AMB WALTERS HAD IN TUNIS. THEN, DRAWING ON THE DEPT'S GUIDANCE, I DESCRIBED THE CONTENT OF RECENT US-SOVIET EXCHANGES ON THE LEBANESE SITUATION, MENTIONING IN THIS CONNECTION THAT IT WAS OUR BELIEF THAT THE SOVIETS WERE ADVISING CAUTION ON THE SYRIANS, AT

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LEAST AS REGARDS ANY MILITARY ADVENTURES. AT THE SAME TIME, IT WAS OUR CONCLUSION, I SAID, THAT SOVIET POLICY WAS NOT DOMINATING SYRIAN DECISIONS. THE SYRIANS WERE PROBABLY MAKING DECISIONS REGARDING LEBANON ON THEIR OWN. IT WAS APPARENT, HOWEVER, THAT THE SOVIETS WERE USING THE SITUATION AS A MEANS TO FINDING THEIR WAY BACK AS A MAJOR ACTOR ON THE MIDDLE EAST SCENE.

13. SALEM DESCRIBED BRIEFLY HIS TALKS WITH THE FORMINS OF ITALY, FRANCE GERMANY AND UK. THEY HAD ALL INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO SUPPORT THE LEBANESE POSITION. CHEYSSON HAD SAID THAT FRANCE WOULD SUPPORT THE ISSUANCE OF AN EC10 STATEMENT, WHICH PROBABLY WILL EMERGE ON TUESDAY. THE STATEMENT SHOULD BE SUPPORTIVE OF THE LEBANESE POSITION. IN ADDITION, HOWEVER, CHEYSSON HAD SAID THAT FRANCE WAS THE ONLY EUROPEAN STATE WITH ANY REAL INFLUENCE IN SYRIA. FRANCE WAS PREPARED TO TAKE A UNILATERAL EFFORT GOING BEYOND THE EC10 STATEMENT. CHEYSSON INTENDED TO SEND AN EMISSARY TO DAMASCUS TO START THE PROCESS. CHEYSSON WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH SEC SHULTZ AT WILLIAMSBURG ABOUT THE UNILATERAL FRENCH EFFORT, NOT TO GET US APPROVAL BUT TO KEEP THE SECRETARY INFORMED.

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FROM HABIB

14. FINALLY, WE TURNED TO UNIFIL. I STRESSED THAT THE LEBANESE HAD TO GET THEIR ACT IN ORDER, NOT ONLY WITH THE UN SECRETARIAT BUT ALSO WITH THE UNIFIL TROOP CONTRIBUTORS. GEMAYEL SAID HE THOUGHT THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD BE VISITING LEBANON NEXT WEEK. I SAID THERE COULD HAVE BEEN SOME MISUNDERSTANDINGS. I PRESSED GEMAYEL TO HAVE TUENI TELEPHONE URQUHART TO SOOTHE ANY RUFFLED FEELINGS AND TO PREPARE THE WAY FOR EFFECTIVE LEBANESE-UN COOPERATION ON EFFORTS TO CREATE A NEW UNIFIL MANDATE. GEMAYEL AGREED THAT THIS SHOULD BE DONE.

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15. THE REST OF THE CONVERSATION WAS DEVOTED TO THE GRAVE PROBLEMS FACING GEMAYEL AS A RESULT OF DEVELOPMENTS

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IN LEBANON ITSELF. GEMAYEL IS DEEPLY CONCERNED, AND UNDERSTANDABLE SO, BY THE CONTINUING VIOLENCE IN THE SHUF AND ALAY AREAS. THE REPEATED THAT HE COULD NOT SNED THE LEBANESE ARMY IN TO CONTROL THESE AREAS WHILE THE ISRAELIS REMAINED THERE.

16. GEMAYEL ASKED ME TO ASSIST HIM BY PAYING CALLS ON SOME KEY LEBANESE LEADERS. I AGREED TO DO SO. I SAID, HOWEVER, THAT I WAS THINKING OF LEAVING FOR THE U.S. LATER IN THE WEEK FOLLOWING A POSSIBLE VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA, AND THAT I MIGHT RETURN TO THE AREA AFTER ABOUT TEN DAYS TO TWO WEEKS. THERE DID NOT SEEM TO BE MUCH MORE THAT COULD BE DONE AT THIS STAGE. FOR THE MOMENT, WE HAD TO LET MATTERS EVOLVE. WE HAD SECURED A BROAD FRONT OF SUPPORT IN THE ARAB WORLD AND WITH THE EUROPEANS. WE HAD TO HOPE THAT SOME OF THE EFFORTS WE HAD SET IN MOTION WOULD PRODUCE RESULTS. GEMAYEL AGREED BUT STRESSED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO KEEP UP MOMENTUM. PUGH

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Date Printed: 10/22/1996

DOC_NUMBER: 83JIDDA04101

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EXCISE
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, SA, US, SY, LE, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: HABIB MEETING WITH KING
FAHD ON LEBANON MAY 19

ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY. FAHD EXPRESSED OPTIMISM THAT SYRIA AND LEBANON
COULD BE BROUGHT TOGETHER DESPITE CURRENT DIFFICULTIES.
HE WOULD ASK ASSAD TO SEND AN EMISSARY TO RIYADH ON MAY 21
AND IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT SYRIAN-LEBANESE TALKS BE ARRANGED.

HABIB EMPHASIZED THE DANGERS OF

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THE CURRENT IMPASSE AND STRESSED THAT THE LEBANESE HAD
OBTAINED AN AFFORDABLE PRICE FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WHICH
WAS ESSENTIAL TO LEBANON'S SURVIVAL. HE WENT OVER THE PRO-
VISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT IN DETAIL, GIVING FAHD THE TEXT,
IN ORDER TO CLARIFY AND TO MEET FAHD'S CONTINUING UNEASE
ABOUT ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND FOR
SECURITY. FAHD REITERATED HIS COMMITMENT TO THE WITHDRAWAL
OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES AND HIS SUPPORT FOR GEMAYEL PERSONAL-
LY. RECALLING HIS PAST SUCCESSFUL COLLABORATION WITH HABIB

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TWO YEARS AGO, HE REPEATED HIS OPTIMISM THAT OUR COMMON EFFORTS WOULD SUCCEED IN THE END. END SUMMARY.

3. AMBASSADOR HABIB, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR MURPHY AND POLCOUNS NEWTON (NOTETAKER) MET WITH KING FAHD AT HIS EASTERN PROVINCE SEASIDE VILLA MAY 19. FONMIN SAUD AND MIN INFO SHAIR (FORMER AMBASSADOR TO LEBANON) JOINED CONVERSATION.

4. FAHD WAS IN A RELAXED AND OPTIMISTIC MOOD. HE OPENED THE CONVERSATION BY EXPRESSING OPTIMISM THAT THE MIDDLE EAST/LEBANON SITUATION WOULD IMPROVE IN THE COMING YEAR. HE FELT SURE THAT REASON EVENTUALLY WOULD PREVAIL OVER LEBANON; THE QUESTION WAS WHEN WOULD THAT PROCESS OF REASONING START. [

5. HABIB SAID HE WAS DISAPPOINTED IN DEVELOPMENTS SINCE HE HAD SEEN FAHD TWO WEEKS PREVIOUSLY WITH THE SECRETARY. HE HAD REMINDED GEMAYEL, WAZZAN, AND SALEM THE PREVIOUS DAY THAT FOR MORE THAN A YEAR FAHD HAD REITERATED TO HIM KING'S SUPPORT FOR SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE. ALL THREE ACKNOWLEDGED THEIR APPRECIATION FOR THE CONSTANT

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SAG SUPPORT, BUT SAID FAHD SHOULD KNOW THAT THE SITUATION HAD BECOME VERY DIFFICULT. HABIB HAD TOLD THEM THAT THE TIME HAD COME FOR ALL SIDES TO BE VERY SPECIFIC ABOUT LEBANON. A WAY HAD BEEN FOUND TO GET THE ISRAELIS TO WITHDRAW, AS A START ON THE ROAD TO RESTORING THE INTEGRITY OF LEBANON, BUT THE SYRIANS WERE NOT HAPPY AND SEEMED DETERMINED TO DESTROY THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT. IT WAS NOW VERY IMPORTANT TO GET THE SYRIANS AND LEBANESE TALKING TOGETHER. UNFORTUNATELY SALEM HAD RECEIVED A VERY TOUGH ANSWER LAST WEEK IN DAMASCUS AND THE SYRIANS WERE NOW EXPLICITLY REFUSING TO RECEIVE A LEBANESE CABINET COMMITTEE FORMED TO HOLD SUCH DISCUSSIONS. THE LEBANESE ARE READY TO TALK AND TO MAKE PROPER ARRANGEMENTS TO MEET SYRIAN CONCERNS, BUT THE SYRIANS SEEM INAPPRECIATIVE OF THE REASONS WHY THE LEBANESE ARRIVED AT AN AGREEMENT. THEY APPEAR EVEN TO REJECT THE VERY CONCEPT OF AN AGREEMENT.

6. [

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Date Printed: 10/22/1996

DOC NUMBER 13 JIDDA 04101

CHANNEL: n/a

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7. HABIB RESPONDED THAT "OPEN BORDERS" WAS NOT REALLY THE
CORRECT PHRASE. THERE WOULD BE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE AND
GOODS BUT ON A CONTROLLED AND CASE BY CASE BASIS SUBJECT
TO UNANIMOUS APPROVAL BY THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE.
THIS PROCESS WOULD NOT START UNTIL AFTER THE LAST ISRAELI
SOLDIER HAD LEFT AND THERE WOULD BE SPECIAL PROTECTION

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PROVIDED SO THAT NO ISRAELI GOODS COULD COME IN THAT
LEBANON ITSELF PRODUCED FOR EXPORT OR THAT WERE COMPETITIVE
WITH LEBANON'S OWN PRODUCTS. LEBANON HAD BEEN OBLIGED TO
PAY A PRICE FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, BUT IT WAS A MINIMUM
PRICE COMPARED TO WHAT ISRAEL HAD WANTED. THE AGREEMENT
WIDELY ACCEPTED IN LEBANESE CIRCLES AS SOMETHING THAT
HAD TO BE DONE. NOW LEBANON IS IN THE MIDDLE, WANTING
EVERYONE TO LEAVE BUT LACKING THE MEANS TO ACHIEVE THIS.
THE USG WAS TRYING HARD TO HELP THE LEBANESE ACHIEVE WITH-
DRAWAL, TALKING TO THE ARAB COUNTRIES AND OUR EUROPEAN

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FRIENDS. THE LEBANESE HAVE ALSO BEEN DRUMMING UP SUPPORT,
EMPHASIZING THAT THEY WANT TO REMAIN PART OF THE ARAB
WORLD.

8. []

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9. RESPONDING TO FAHD'S IMPLICATION THAT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN NICE HAD IT BEEN POSSIBLE TO RENEGOTIATE SOME ASPECTS OF THE AGREEMENT OBJECTIONABLE TO SYRIA, HABIB SAID THAT ISRAEL WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY REFUSE, BUT THERE WAS NOTHING TO PREVENT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT INWAYS THAT WERE NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SYRIA'S EXAGGERATED FEARS. HE REITERATED THE LIMITATIONS AND CONTROLS ON THE MOVEMENTS OF GOODS. []

HABIB STRESSED THAT LEBANON WAS NOT A NATURALLY ATTRACTIVE MARKET FOR ISRAELI GOODS. IT WAS NOT LIKELY THAT THERE WOULD BE MUCH TRADE; THE LEBANESE WOULD IMPORT ONLY WHAT THEY WANT AND THIS WOULD INCLUDE NOTHING FOR RE-EXPORT. THE BORDER WOULD NOT BE CLOSED, AN OUTCOME ISRAEL WOULD []

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NOT ACCEPT, BUT THE LEBANESE WOULD CONTROL TRADE CAREFULLY.

10. GOING BACK TO FAHD'S STATEMENT ON ISRAELI UNWILLINGNESS TO WITHDRAW, HABIB POINTED OUT THIS IS PRECISELY WHAT WHAT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED, WITHDRAWAL FROM WHAT OTHERWISE MIGHT HAVE BECOME A "NORTH BANK". WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE QUICK; EIGHT TO TWELVE WEEKS IS THE PERIOD SPECIFIED. OUR FIRST PRIORITY HAD CONSISTENTLY BEEN TOTAL WITHDRAWAL AND WE HAVE GIVEN MAJOR ASSISTANCE TO LEBANON TO DEVELOP THE CAPABILITY TO RE-ESTABLISH THE SECURITY OF THE COUNTRY. LEBANON COULD NOT SURVIVE CONTINUED OCCUPATION. IN RESPONSE TO FAHD'S POINT THAT OCCUPIERS SHOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO SET THEIR CONDITIONS OF THEIR WITHDRAWAL, A VERY DANGEROUS INTERNATIONAL PRECEDENT, HABIB REPLIED THAT WHILE HE WAS NOT JUSTIFYING THE ISRAEL OCCUPATION, THE SITUATION IN LEBANON HAD BEEN UNNATURAL WITH VARIOUS GROUPS

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ENJOYING EXTRATERRITORIALITY. NOW A WAY HAS BEEN OPENED, VISIBLE TO ALL, TO RESTORE LEBANESE SOVERIGNTY ON TERMS LEBANON HAS DECIDED IT CAN AFFORD.

11. TURNING TO SYRIAN CONCERNS [] THAT THE SECURITY ZONE WOULD EXTEND TO THE BORDER, HABIB EXPLAINED THE LIMITATIONS ON THE JOINT LEBANESE-COMMANDED SUPERVISORY TEAMS WHICH WERE NOT PATROLS AND HAD NO OPERATIONAL FUNCTION. THEY WOULD VERIFY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT AND WOULD FUNCTION UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE JOINT SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS COMMITTEE WHICH OPERATED UNDER THE PRINCIPLE OF UNANIMITY. ONLY LEBANESE FORCES, TWO BRIGADES, WOULD OPERATE IN THE SECURITY ZONE. THE SOUTHERN

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BRIGADE WOULD INTEGRATE SAAD HADDAD'S MEN LEBANESE REGU-
TIONS BUT THEY WOULD FORM ONLY ABOUT THIRTY PERCENT OF THE
BRIGADE AND ABOUT HALF WERE FORMER LAF SOLDIERS. HABIB
EXPLAINED THE UNDERSTANDING ON HADDAD HIMSELF AND THE AS-
SUMPTION THAT HE WOULD MOVE ON TO SOMETHING ELSE BY HIS
OWN WISH AFTER SOME TIME. THE SOUTHERNBRIGADE COMMANDER
IS AN EXCELLENT PROFESSIONAL MUSLIM OFFICER (SHAIR CON-
CURRED) AND HABIB BELIEVED THAT CONTROL OF THE AREA WOULD
BE TRULY LEBANESE. [

12. IN CLOSING HABIB SAID [

[IF THE SITUATION
CONTINUED THERE WILL EITHER BE INCIDENTS LEADING TO ESCLA-
[

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TION OR ISRAEL WILL PULL BACK PART WAY AND CONSOLIDATE
THEIR OCCUPATION. THE MAJORITY OF LEBANESE GROUPS WERE
STILL WITH THE GOVERNMENT BUT SYRIA WAS BUSILY ORGANIZING
OPPOSITION AND STIRRING UP THE SITUATION. ALL RESPONSIBLE
LEADERS WERE, HOWEVER, HOLDING FIRM INCLUDING SUNNIS AND
SHIA. GEMAYEL IS DOING HIS BEST BUT HIS GOVERNMENT IS
WEAK. MEANWHILE THE USG WAS WORKING HARD TO BUILD UP THE
SECURITY FORCES. WE WERE WORKING OUT THE NEW UNIFIL MAN-
DATE AND WOULD NOT HURRY TO REMOVE THE MNF.

13. [

[HABIB OUTLINED
HIS IMMEDIATE TRAVEL PLANS AND STRESSED THAT HE WAS READY
TO RETURN TO SEE FAHD AT ANY TIME. HE REITERATED THAT
GEMAYEL WAS READY TO PAY A REASONABLE PRICE TO ARRANGE
SYRIAN/PLO WITHDRAWAL; FAHD'S ROLE IN BRINGING SYRIA AND
LEBANON TOGETHER WOULD BE KEY AS USUAL. FAHD REITERATED
THAT SAUDI ARABIA MUST HELP LEBANON. HE RESPECTED GEMAYEL
AS A PERSON AND AS A LEADER OF LEBANON. HE WAS OPTIMISTIC
THEN IN THE END SAUDI AND U.S. EFFORTS WOULD SUCCEED.
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FOR HAUBIB FROM DRAPER

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TAGS: PREL' IS, LE, MOPS, XF, SY

SUBJ: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: 24 APRIL MEETING WITH GEMAYEL

~~TEXT~~

2. SUMMARY: HABIB AND DRAPER MET TODAY, APRIL 24, FOR SOME 90 MINUTES WITH PRES GEMAYEL, WHO WAS ALONE. IN PART THE DISCUSSION FOCUSED ON THE THRUST OF THE COMMENTS MADE BY DAVID KIMCHE DURING OUR MEETING WITH HIM IN TEL AVIV ON APR 23, DURING WHICH KIMCHE EXPRESSED HIS GOVT'S SHOCK OVER GEMAHIEL'S PRESS STATEMENT OF APR 22. GEMAYEL WAS UNAPOLEGETIC ABOUT HIS PRESS STATEMENT ALTHOUGH HE ADMITTED MANY COMMENTS WERE BASICALLY EXTEMPORANEOUS AND SPONTANEOUS. HE SAID HE FELT THAT ISRAEL AND LEBANON WERE NATURAL ALLIES AND SHOULD ESTABLISH A COMMON STRATEGY, BUT LEBANON COULD NOT ACCEPT THE DEGREE OF NORMALIZATION SOUGHT BY ISRAEL NOR COULD IT HURT ITS SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE BY ACCEDING TO A SOLUTION ON HADDAD IMPOSED BY ISRAEL. IN ADDITION, HE EXPLAINED HIS DEEP RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS, CONSIDERING THEM A DE FACTO RESIDUAL PRESENCE.

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3. HABIB STRESSED THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE CONCERNED DEEPLY THAT LEBANON WAS RETREATING FROM POSITIONS ALREADY AGREED TO. HABIB EXPLORED - ON THE BASIS OF KIMCHE'S HINTS - WHETHER HADDAD COULD BE GIVEN SOME SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER AN "ADJUSTED" MODEL FORMULA. GEMAYEL DID NOT WANT TO DISCUSS THE SUBJECT AND FELT HE HAD A BETTER SOLUTION FOR ISRAEL'S CONCERNS THROUGH THE APPOINTMENT OF LAF OFFICERS OF SUPERIOR MILITARY ABILITY IN SOUTH LEBANON. AS FOR THE JOINT

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TEAMS, HABIB AND DRAPER STRESSED THAT THE MILITARY COMMITTEE SHOULD BE GIVEN RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR MANAGEMENT, WHERE AND WHEN, AND TO WHICH AIMS THEY WOULD BE USED. **E**

WE
SECURED GEMAYEL'S AGREEMENT THAT, WHATEVER THE OUTCOME OF THE SUNDAY CABINET MEETING IN ISRAEL, LEBANON WOULD DO NOTHING TO SUSPEND OR BREAK OFF NEGOTIATIONS. END SUMMARY

4. DURING GEMAYEL'S MEETING WITH US ON APRIL 24, HE ASKED ABOUT PLANS FOR THE SEC'S VISITS TO BEIRUT. HABIB SAID THAT THE SECRETARY WOULD PROBABLY WANT TO COME TO BEIRUT ON THURSDAY MORNING FOR WORKING MEETINGS. WHILE EXACT ARRANGEMENTS WOULD HAVE TO BE COMPLETED WITH AMB DILLON, HABIB SAID HE SUSPECTED THAT THE SECRETARY WOULD NOT REMAIN OVERNIGHT BUT MIGHT WELL RETURN ON SATURDAY, FOLLOWING FRIDAY'S SESSIONS IN ISRAEL, AND CONCEIVABLY CONTINUE A SHUTTLE THEREAFTER. THE FOCUS OF HIS ME TRIP, HABIB STRESSED, WAS THE SITUATION IN LEBANON.

5. HABIB SAID THAT HE, DRAPER, AND AMB LEWIS HAD MET WITH KIMCHE ON FRIDAY, AND THAT KIMCHE HAD EXPRESSED HIS GOVT'S SHOCK OVER THE THRUST OF GEMAYEL'S APRIL 22 STATEMENT TO EDITORS. GEMAYEL WAS UNAPOLEGETIC. WHILE HE HAD MADE EXTEMPORANEOUS STATEMENTS THAT REFLECTED HIS VIEWS ACCURATELY, HE HAD

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GENUINELY SERIOUS PROBLEMS. NEVERTHELESS, HE CONSIDERED ISRAEL AND LEBANON AS NATURAL ALLIES. THE TWO COUNTRIES SHOULD ESTABLISH A COMMON STRATEGY. ISRAEL HAD TO UNDERSTAND, HOWEVER, THAT LEBANON COULD NOT ACCEPT THE DEGREE OF NORMALIZATION SOUGHT BY ISRAEL, SINCE THE ARAB WORLD WOULD THEN BOYCOTT LEBANON. OVER THE LONG RUN, HE ADDED, LEBANON WOULD, OF COURSE, BE ABLE TO ARRANGE TRADE AND INTERCOURSE ALONG LINES MORE ACCEPTABLE TO ISRAEL.

6. CONTINUING, GEMAYEL SAID THAT ISRAEL'S ATTEMPTS TO IMPOSE ITS OWN SOLUTION AS REGARDS HADDAD WAS AN ATTACK ON LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE, AND ALSO WOULD WORK AGAINST THE MORALE AND EFFICIENCY OF THE LAF. ISRAEL'S CONCEPT OF THE JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS WAS IN THE SAME CATEGORY, HE SAID. LEBANON COULD NOT TOLERATE A RESIDUAL IDF PRESENCE. SUMMING UP, HE SAID THAT THESE ISSUES WERE LEBANESE PROBLEMS; THEY DID NOT REFLECT AN ARAB WORLD POSITION AS SUCH. HE WANTED TO AVOID A SITUATION WHICH WOULD PROVOKE POPULAR LEBANESE OPPOSITION AGAINST THE ISRAELIS.

7. HABIB SAID THAT THE ISRAELIS, AS OF FRIDAY, DID NOT HAVE THE EXACT TEXT OF GEMAYEL'S REMARKS TO THE PRESS. HAVING READ THEM JUST BEFORE THIS MEETING, HE SAID QHE THOUGHT THAT GEMAYEL'S VIEWS WERE NOT AS NEGATIVE TOWARDS THE ISRAELI POSITIONS AS HE HAD BEEN TOLD. HE THEN REVIEWED THE MEETING WITH KIMCHE IN

SOME DETAIL DURING WHICH HE HAD URGED KIMCHE NOT TO CONSIDER BREAKING OFF THE NEGOTIATIONS THIS WEEK. HE HAD EXPLAINED TO KIMCHE THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN "OPERATIONAL PATROLS" AND "SUPERVISORY TEAMS", STRESSING THE NEED TO RETAIN THE COSMETICS OF THE UNDERSTANDINGS. THEN AND LATER, GEMAYEL MADE CLEAR THAT LEBANON WOULD NOT BREAK OFF NEGOTIATIONS.

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FOR HABIB FROM DRAPER

8. AT BOTTOM, HABBIB SAID THE ISRAELIS DEEPLY FEARED THAT THE LEBANESE WERE REVERSING THE PATH ON WHICH THEY HAD UNDERTAKEN THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE ISRAELIS FEARED THAT THE LEBANESE WERE BACKING AWAY FROM POSITIONS THEY HAD ALREADY AGREED TO. THAT WAS WHY IT WAS VITALLY IMPORTANT THAT LEBANON CONTINUE TO ACCEPT IN PRINCIPLE SUCH CONCEPTS AS JOINT SUPERVISORY PATROLS WHILE WORKING IN THE NEGOTIATIONS TO LIMIT THEIR SCOPE, WHEN NECESSARY, AND THEIR VISIBILITY.

9. IN A DEFENSIVE WAY, GEMAYEL SAID THAT BEGIN AND ARENS HAD MADE ALL KINDS OF CAUSTIC STATEMENTS ABOUT LEBANON AND LEBANON'SK

CAPACITY. THERE WAS NO REASON WHY LEBANON'S LEADERS, LIKE HIMSELF, SHOULD NOT CLARIFY THEIR OWN POSITIONS. HADDAD WAS A GOOD CASE IN POINT. HADDAD BASICALLY WAS A PROBLEM FOR LEBANON ALONE, HE STRESSED, ALTHOUGH HE WAS READY FOR A REASONABLE SOLUTION WITHIN A BROAD PACKAGE PLAN. RETURNING TO THE JOINT TEAMS, HE STRESSED THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD AGAIN STRESSED THE CONCEPT OF "HOT PURSUIT" AND "JOINT OPERATIONS". HE COULD NOT LIVE WITH SUCH CONCEPTS. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE HAD JUSTIFIED SOME OF THE EXISTING LEBANESE POSITIONS IN HIS PRESS COMMENTARY BY LIKENING THE PROPOSED MILITARY COMMITTEE TO THE MIXED

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ARMISTICE COMMISSION. HABIB REMARKED THAT MENTION OF A MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION WAS A RED FLAG TO THE ISRAELIS. GEMAYEL SAID HE WOULD NOT WILLINGLY AGREE TO FURTHER CONCESSIONS TO THE ISRAELIS, EXCEPT WITHIN A PACKAGE PLAN. THIS INCLUDED THE USE OF APC'S BY THE TEAMS.

10. CITING SOME OF WHAT HAS ALREADY COME OUT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, HABIB AND DRAPER STRESSED THE SAFETY FEATURES OF ALLOWING THE MILITARY COMMITTEE TO MAKE THE DECISIONS ON THE USE OF THE TEAMS, THEIR NUMBER, SCOPE OF ACTIVITY, ETC.

11. HABIB PROPOSED GEMAYEL HARD ABOUT A NEW KIND OF SOLUTION FOR THE HADDAD PROBLEM, BASED ON HIS COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS ON HINTS GIVEN THE DAY PREVIOUSLY BY KIMCHE TO THE EFFECT THAT A NEW "MODEL FORMULA" MIGHT BE CONSIDERED IN AN OPEN-MINDED WAY. HABIB SUGGESTED THAT THE ISRAELIS MIGHT BE ENTRANCED IF HADDAD HAD SOME OPERATIONAL AS OPPOSED TO THE STAFF RESPONSIBILITY. COULD HADDAD'S PROPOSED ROLE AS A BIGADE DEPCOMMANDER IN CHARGE OF G-2 BE MANIPULATED SO AS TO GIVE HIM CONTROL OVER SOME LIMITED STRIKE FORCE, FOR EXAMPLE?

12. GEMAYEL DID NOT WANT TO TALK FURTHER ABOUT HADDAD. HE SAID THAT HE AND GEN TANNOUS HAD SOME OFFICERS IN MIND FOR LEADERSHIP ROLES IN SOUTHERN LEBANON, BUT HE WAS AFRAID THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD CAUSE EMBARRASMENTS IF THESE NAMES WERE GIVEN TO THE ISRAELIS NOW. THESE MEN, HOWEVER, GEMAYEL SAID, WERE MORE EFFICIENT MILITARILY THAN HADDAD. THIS WAS THE SOLUTION. GEMAYEL WENT ON TO VOICE SUSPICIONS OF ISRAEL'S MOTIVATIONS ABOUT HADDAD, WHO HE CLAIMED WAS IN EFFECT A PRISONER OF THE ISRAELIS. RATHER THAN GIVE IN TO THE ISRAELIS ON THIS MATTER, HE SAID HE WOULD PREFER TO LET THEM STAY IN SOUTH LEBANON.

13. HABIB SAID THAT HE COULD NOT LET GEMAYEL STOP WORKING

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FOR A SOLUTION TO HADDAD AND OTHER PROBLEMS. GEMAYEL SAID THE PROBLEM FOR HIM AND LEBANON WAS "TO BE OR NOT TO BE." THE TEST WAS SOUTH LEBANON. IF LEBANON COULD NOT SECURE A GOOD SOLUTION IN THE SOUTH, AND MAINTAIN ITS CREDIBILITY, THEN THERE WOULD BE IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER PARTS OF THE COUNTRY, WHILE THE IRANIANS, SYRIANS, COMMUNISITS AND THE PLO TRIED TO TAKE ADVANTAGUE.

14. AFTER FURTHER EXCAHNGE OF VIEWS TO IMPROVE WAYS TO PERSUADE TWHE ISRAELIS TO A MORE ACCOMMODATING POSITION VIS-A-VIS LEBANON, [

15. THE MEETING CONCLUDED WITH AGREEMENT THAT WE SHOULD REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH, PARTICULARLY THROUGHOUT THE FORTHCOMING VIQSITS OF THE SECRETARY TO ISRAEL AND LEBANON. GEMAYEL RETURNED TO THE THEME THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE INSISTENT ON MAINTAINING A MILITARY PRESENCE IN SOUTHERN LEBANON "ON THE GROUND." THIS ISRAELI DESIRE, IF SATISFIED, WOULD INEVITABLY CRKEATE STRONG ANTI-ISRAELI SENTIMENTT AND ATTITUDES, WHILE ALSO PROVOKING THE SYRIANS TO RETREAT FROM THEIR PREVIOUS UNDERSTANDINGS. THE REAL SOLUTION FOR ISRAEL WAS TO LOWER ITS PRESENCE AND CUT BACK ON ITS DEMANDS SO THAT ISRAEL AND LEBANON COULD WORK COOPERATIVELY IN A QUIET ATMOSPHERE FOR THE OBJECTIVES THEY BOTH SOUGHT. DILLON

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EXCISE - MAINTAINED AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

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SUBJ: HABIB-DRAPER MISSION: MILITARY WORKING GROUP
MEETING, KHALDE, APRIL 21, 1983

2. SUMMARY. THE MILITARY WORKING GROUP BEGAN ITS APRIL 21
SESSION IN KHALDE BY RETURNING TO THE QUESTION OF INTEGRATION
OF THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE. GENERAL HAMDAN PRESENTED A
PROPOSAL WHICH WOULD PERMIT "EXISTING LOCAL UNITS" TO BE
INTEGRATED AS SUCH INTO THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE. GEN. EINAN
STUCK TO HIS PREVIOUS DEMAND THAT THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE

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"WILL CONSIST OF THE EXISTING LOCAL BRIGADE" (HADDAD'S FORCES).
THE U.S. DELEGATION DID NOT SUCCEED IN ITS EFFORT TO BRIDGE
THE TWO POSITIONS. COL. RUHAYYIM SUBMITTED PROPOSED MINUTES
CONCERNING NAVY OPERATIONS FOR DISCUSSION. BOTH SIDES AGREED
AD REFERENDUM THAT THE AREA ALONG THE MARITIME BOUNDARY
BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL WHICH IS CURRENTLY CLOSED TO
CIVIL NAVIGATION WILL BE MAINTAINED BY LEBANON. EINAN
AGREED THAT THERE WILL BE CONTINUOUS COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN
THE LEBANESE NAVY'S SOUTHERN COMMAND AND THE ISRAELI NAVY

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AND THAT IN EMERGENCY CASES, THERE WILL BE DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN VESSELS. THE ISSUE OF NAVAL HOT PURSUIT IN THE SECURITY REGION REMAINED BRACKETED BUT EINAN CLARIFIED ISRAEL'S INTERPRETATION OF THE SECURITY REGION STATING THAT IT EXTENDS SEAWARD FROM THE COAST FOR SIX MILES. HAMDAN SAID HE COULD NOT ACCEPT ANY FORMULATION [REDACTED] THAT WOULD ALLOW ISRAELI VESSELS TO OPERATE IN LEBANESE TERRITORIAL WATERS. THE U.S. DELEGATION STRONGLY SUPPORTED LEBANON'S POSITION. EINAN REFUSED TO DISCUSS THE ARTICLE ON REFERRAL OF DISPUTES IN THE MILITARY COMMITTEE TO THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE BECAUSE IT WAS LINKED TO U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE MILITARY COMMITTEE. HAMDAN AND EINAN AGREED NOT TO DISCUSS THE PROPOSED DRAFT ON UNIFIL. EINAN SAID UNIFIL WILL BE HANDLED AS PART OF THE "PACKAGE DEAL". THE LAST AND MOST EXPLOSIVE ISSUE DISCUSSED WAS THE JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS. RATHER THAN REVIEW THE LIST OF "AGREED" UNDERSTANDINGS ON THE JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS (AS INTERPRETED BY ISRAEL) THAT THE ISRAELI DELEGATION PASSED OUT AT THE END OF THE PREVIOUS SESSION, HAMDAN SAID LEBANON WOULD PREFER TO RETURN TO THE IDEA OF "THREE TO FIVE TEAMS OF THREE TO FIVE MEN FROM BOTH SIDES" OPERATING FOR A PERIOD NOT TO EXCEED TWO YEARS. EINAN IMMEDIATELY SAID THAT THERE WAS NO NEED TO CONTINUE THE DISCUSSION AND THAT HE DOUBTED LEBANON'S SINCERITY TO REACH

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AN AGREEMENT. HAMDAN SAID LEBANON WOULD PREFER TO INCREASE INTELLIGENCE COORDINATION AND REDUCE THE NUMBER OF TEAMS AND IDF VISIBILITY WITHIN LEBANON THAN ACCEPT ISRAEL'S INTERPRETATION OF WHAT WAS AGREED UPON IN THE LIST OF UNDERSTANDINGS. AS THE SESSION ADJOURNED FOR LUNCH, EINAN SAID HE WOULD RECOMMEND TO KIMCHE THAT THE GROUP CANCEL THE AFTERNOON SESSION. END SUMMARY.

3. THE MILITARY WORKING GROUP'S SESSION OF APRIL 21 IN KHALDE BEGAN BY DISCUSSION THE FORMATION OF THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE. GEN. HAMDAN REPORTED THAT HIS AUTHORITIES COULD NOT ACCEPT THE PREVIOUS PROPOSAL ON INTEGRATION AND HE THEN PRESENTED A NEW DRAFT WHICH STATED THAT EXISTING LOCAL UNITS IN THIS AREA WILL BE INTEGRATED AS SUCH INTO THIS TERRITORIAL BRIGADE. HAMDAN SAID LEBANON CANNOT ACCEPT AN ISRAELI-FORMED BRIGADE INTO THE LEBANESE ARMY. GEN. EINAN SAID ISRAEL WOULD NOT ACCEPT THIS FORMULATION AND THAT ISRAEL INSISTS ON SPECIFIC MENTION OF THE EXISTING LOCAL BRIGADE IN THE TEXT. GEN. COOLEY INTERVENED AND VERIFIED THAT THE CONCEPT OF INTEGRATION WAS ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH PARTIES AND STRESSED THAT THE MILITARY COMMITTEE WILL SUPERVISE THE INTEGRATION PROCEDURES TO INSURE ISRAELI SECURITY CONCERNS ARE MET. EINAN VOICED CONCERN THAT UNITS OF THE 3D BRIGADE (LAF) WOULD BE USED TO ROUND-OUT THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE. THE

U.S. DELEGATION PROPOSED SOME BRIDGING LANGUAGE, BUT BOTH PARTIES DECIDED TO LEAVE THE ARTICLE IN BRACKETS.

4. EINAN AGREED THAT LEBANON WOULD MAINTAIN AN AREA CLOSED TO CIVIL NAVIGATION FOR RAS BAYAADA TO THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER AND EXTENDING SIX MILES SEAWARD. BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT THERE WILL BE CONTINUOUS COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE LEBANESE NAVY'S SOUTHERN COMMAND AND THE ISRAELI NAVY IN ORDER TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION CONCERNING SUSPECTED VESSELS, AND THAT THE LEBANESE NAVY WILL ACT PROMPTLY IN ORDER TO ASCERTAIN

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THE IDENTITY OF SUSPECTED VESSELS. HAMDAN CONCEDED TO DIRECT COMMUNICATION BETWEEN VESSELS IN EMERGENCY CASES. IT WAS ALSO AGREED THAT THE MILITARY COMMITTEE

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EXDIS - MILITARY TREAT AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

WOULD ESTABLISH PROCEDURES ON THE EXCHANGE OF
INFORMATION. THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT ON THE QUESTION
OF HOT PURSUIT IN LEBANESE TERRITORIAL WATERS WHICH
ISRAEL DEMANDED.

COOLEY STATED
THAT THE U.S. WOULD NOT SUPPORT ANY PRINCIPLE WHICH
VIOLATES LEBANON'S SOVEREIGNTY. EINAN CLARIFIED
ISRAEL'S CONCEPTION OF THE SECURITY REGION BY SAYING
THAT IT EXTENDS SIX MILES SEAWARD.

5. COOLEY SUGGESTED THAT THE WORKING GROUP DISCUSS

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THE ARTICLE ON REFERRAL OF DISPUTES IN THE MILITARY COMMITTEE TO THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE. BUT EINAN REFUSED TO DISCUSS THIS ARTICLE BECAUSE ISRAEL'S POSITION ON IT DEPENDS ON RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE OF U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE MILITARY COMMITTEE. BOTH PARTIES PREFERRED NOT TO DISCUSS UNIFIL AND EINAN STATED THAT THE UNIFIL QUESTION WOULD BE RESOLVED AS PART OF THE "PACKAGE DEAL".

6. RATHER THAN REVIEW THE ISRAELI VERSION OF "AGREED" UNDERSTANDINGS ON THE JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS THAT LTC ZINGER PASSED OUT AT THE PREVIOUS SESSION, HAMDAN SAID LEBANON WOULD PREFER TO RETURN TO THE U.S. PROPOSAL OF THREE TO FIVE TEAMS WITH THREE TO FIVE PERSONS FROM EACH SIDE PER TEAM WHICH WOULD OPERATE FOR A PERIOD NOT TO EXCEED TWO YEARS. HAMDAN SAID THE JOINT TEAMS ARE A SENSITIVE AND DANGEROUS ISSUE AND THREATEN RATIFICATION OF OUR AGREEMENT IN PARLIAMENT. HE SAID THAT HIS AUTHORITIES DO NOT UNDERSTAND THE MILITARY NECESSITY FOR SUCH IDF PRESENCE IN ANY OTHER WAY THAN AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR THE STATIONS. HE SAID INTELLIGENCE COORDINATION COULD BE INCREASED AS A MEANS OF VERIFICATION AND HELIBORNE TEAMS COULD BE USED. LEBANON CONSIDERS THREE TO FIVE TEAMS SUFFICIENT FOR GROUND VERIFICATION. HAMDAN SAID LEBANON COULD NOT ACCEPT THE TEAMS AS INTERPRETED IN THE LIST PASSED OUT BY ZINGER. EINAN SAID AFTER ANOTHER CHANGE IN POSITION ON THE PART OF LEBANON, IT WAS APPARENT THAT LEBANON DOESN'T WANT AN AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL. HE SAID THAT THERE WAS NO NEED TO RESUME THE DISCUSSION IN THE AFTERNOON SESSION AND THAT WOULD BE HIS RECOMMENDATION TO KIMCHE.

7. AFTERNOON SESSION WAS CONDUCTED WITH PARTICIPATION BY

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HEADS OF DELEGATION AND SENIOR MILREPS REPORTED SEPTEL.

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USELO RIYADH
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*9302566***UNCLASSIFIED** SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 11604**DECAPTIONED**

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, EG, IS, LE, JO, US
SUBJECT: HABIB MEETING WITH MUBARAK: PEACE PROCESS

1. **UNCLASSIFIED** (TEXT)

2. SUMMARY. HABIB TOLD PRESIDENT MUBARAK THAT ARAFAT OVERPLAYED HIS HAND, BUT WOULD BE CRAZY NOT TO JOIN THE PEACE PROCESS. MUBARAK AGREED, NOTING THAT EGYPT IS TRYING TO INFLUENCE THE PLO

HABIB SAID THERE SHOULD BE NO DIRECT LINKAGE BETWEEN LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS AND THE PEACE PROCESS BECAUSE THIS WOULD GIVE ISRAEL AND SYRIA A VETO OVER NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE. END SUMMARY.

3. AMBASSADOR HABIB, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR AND POLOFF KEENE, MET WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK, DEPRIMIN

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AND FORMIN KAMAL HASSAN ALI AND CHIEF OF PRESIDENT'S POLITICAL BUREAU OSAMA EL BAZ FOR AN HOUR AND TWENTY MINUTES ON APRIL 16. FOLLOWING HABIB'S BRIEFING ON LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS (SEPTTEL), CONVERSATION TURNED TO NEXT STAGES IN THE PEACE PROCESS. MUBARAK ASKED FOR HABIB'S ASSESSMENT OF RECENT PALESTINIAN MANEUVERING. HABIB REPLIED THAT IN HIS VIEW ARAFAT HAD OVERPLAYED HIS HAND AND KING HUSSEIN HAD CALLED HIS BLUFF. THE PLO WILL NOW HAVE TO REGROUP. ARAFAT'S

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TRAVELS PROBABLY REFLECT THIS; THEY ARE A PSYCHOLOGICAL PLOY -- THE NEED TO BE SEEN TO BE "STILL IN BUSINESS."

4. REFERRING TO HIS PHONE CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN, MUBARAK SAID EGYPT IS TRYING TO MAKE THE PALESTINIANS BEHAVE SENSIBLY.

THE PLO WANTED THE SUMMIT TO BELL THE SAUDI CAT, MUBARAK SAID. HE HAD MET WITH A SAUDI REPRESENTATIVE IN ISLAMABAD AND HAD TOLD HIM THAT THE PLO WANTED THE SUMMIT IN RIYADH TO:

- REAFFIRM THE PLO AS THE SOLE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE;
- REJECT THE REAGAN INITIATIVE;
- CONFIRM THE FEZ PLAN; AND
- REAFFIRM THE PNC RESOLUTIONS.

5. THE SAUDIS, MUBARAK SAID, HAD COME TO UNDERSTAND

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THAT A SUMMIT WOULD PUT THEM UNDER PRESSURE TO SUPPORT POSITIONS THAT WOULD BLOCK THE REAGAN INITIATIVE. HABIB SAID THE REAGAN INITIATIVE IS NOT DEAD. THE PLO IS CRAZY NOT TO PARTICIPATE AS THE INITIATIVE IS ITS ONLY HOPE. MUBARAK SAID IT IS THE PLO'S LAST HOPE. IF NEGOTIATIONS DO NOT GET UNDERWAY BY OCTOBER THEN THE U.S. WILL BECOME PREOCCUPIED WITH ELECTIONS. HABIB TOOK EXCEPTION TO THIS, POINTING OUT THAT WE HAVE TO HAVE A PEACE PROCESS. WE HAVE A REAL PROBLEM AND WE MUST DEAL WITH IT. MUBARAK CONCEDED THAT IF SOME PROGRESS IS MADE, THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD, OF COURSE, FOLLOW IT UP. HABIB SAID EVEN OLAF PALME HAD TOLD ARAFAT THERE WAS ONLY ONE GAME IN TOWN -- THE REAGAN INITIATIVE -- AND THAT ARAFAT WOULD BE A FOOL IF HE DID NOT PARTICIPATE. MUBARAK AGREED, NOTING THAT FRENCH FORMIN CHEYSSON HAD TOLD THE EGYPTIANS HE RECOGNIZED THAT THE FRANCO-EGYPTIAN UNSC RESOLUTION AND OTHER EUROPEAN INITIATIVES ARE "JUST SO MUCH TALK." HABIB SAID ARAFAT WILL HAVE TO BREAK WITH THE RADICALS. MUBARAK AGREED, SAYING THE SOVIETS WILL NEVER SUPPORT THE PLO EXCEPT ON THE BASIS OF THEIR "FOUR NO'S", ABOUT WHICH A PALESTINIAN SOURCE HAD INFORMED THE GOE:

- NO TO THE REAGAN INITIATIVE;

-- NO SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF THE MIDDLE EAST
WITHOUT PARTICIPATION BY MOSCOW;

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, EG, IS, LE, JO, US
SUBJECT: HABIB MEETING WITH MUBARAK: PEACE PROCESS

-- NO PALESTINIAN ACTIVITY EXCEPT THROUGH SYRIA; AND

-- NO MIDDLE EAST SOLUTION EXCEPT THROUGH AN INTER-
NATIONAL CONFERENCE.

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6. ASKED IF A BREAKTHROUGH IN THE LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS WOULD LEAD TO PROGRESS ON THE REAGAN INITIATIVE, HABIB SAID ALL THE PARTIES ARE USING LEBANON AS AN EXCUSE. LEBANON, PER SE, HAS LITTLE TO DO WITH THE PEACE PROCESS. MUBARAK SAID IT IS INDEED IMPORTANT AS A SIGN TO THE OTHER ARABS THAT THE U.S. CAN INFLUENCE ISRAEL. HABIB AGREED THAT LEBANON IS IMPORTANT SYMBOLICALLY, BUT ARGUED FORCEFULLY THAT LINKING LEBANON TO THE PEACE PROCESS GIVES BOTH ISRAEL AND

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SYRIA A VETO OVER THE PEACE PROCESS. WE CANNOT ALLOW ANYONE TO MANUFACTURE A VETO ON AN EXTRANEIOUS ISSUE. THE EGYPTIANS TOOK THE POINT. ATHERTON

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ate Printed: 10/22/1996

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CHANNEL: n/a

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EXCISE

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INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-01
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TUNIS FOR UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER; DEPT FOR DRAPER

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MOPS, MARR, PREL, LE, IS, US, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER
MINISTER SHAMIR, APRIL 12

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2. SUMMARY. I HAD AN INTENSIVE REVIEW OF OUTSTAND-
ING SECURITY AND NORMALIZATION ISSUES WITH FOREIGN
MINISTER SHAMIR AND COLLEAGUES TUESDAY EVENING,
APRIL 12. I FLOATED VARIOUS POSSIBILITIES ON HOW
THE HADDAD ISSUE AND UNIFIL DEPLOYMENT IN THE

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SECURITY REGION--THE TWO KEY STICKING POINTS IN THE
SECURITY REGION--MIGHT BE HANDLED. THE ISRAELIS
CONTINUE TO INSIST THAT HADDAD SHOULD HAVE A COMMAND
ROLE AND ARE CLEARLY NEGATIVE ON THE LEBANESE
PROPOSAL THAT HE REMAIN IN A "G-2" (INTELLIGENCE)
POSITION IN THE SOUTH, BELIEVING THIS WOULD RELEGATE
HADDAD TO A STAFF FUNCTION. SHAMIR DID NOT
REACT ONE WAY OR ANOTHER TO MY COMPROMISE FORMULA
ON UNIFIL. KIMCHE ALSO REVIEWED OTHER OUTSTANDING

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MAJOR SECURITY ISSUES, PRINCIPALLY THE MANNER IN WHICH HADDAD'S FORCES WOULD BE INTEGRATED INTO THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE, LIAISON OFFICERS, THE NUMBER AND LOCATION OF OPERATIONS CENTERS, AND "FOR THE RECORD" ISRAEL'S STILL-STANDING PROPOSAL FOR FIVE OBSERVATOSTS.

3. KIMCHE ALSO CITED FOUR SECONDARY SECURITY ISSUES WHICH NEED TO BE RESOLVED. THEY INCLUDE THE LIMITATION ON LEBANESE ARMS, DEFINITION OF THE SECURITY ZONE, AMERICAN PARTICIPATION IN THE MILITARY COMMITTEE, AND A SEPARATE AND INDEPENDENT OFFICE FOR THE MILITARY COMMITTEE.

4. AFTER REVIEWING TEN ISRAELI RESERVATIONS ON THE LEBANESE DRAFT "COVERING AGREEMENT," KIMCHE ALSO DESCRIBED THE NEED TO PINPOINT AGREEMENT FOR THE INTERIM PERIOD ON THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS, TELECOM-MUNICATIONS, AND TRANSPORTATION. THESE ISSUES WILL BE EXAMINED DURING THE WEDNESDAY/THURSDAY MEETINGS IN KHALDAH.

5. THIS WAS A VERY USEFUL, IN-DEPTH REVIEW OF THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE ISRAELIS BELIEVE THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE MOVING TO A CONCLUSION, THOUGH THE FUTURE STATUS OF HADDAD OBVIOUSLY REMAINS THEIR PRINCIPAL CONCERN. HOWEVER, AS THE ISRAELI

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DESCRIPTION OF THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES REVEALS, THERE ARE A NUMBER OF OTHER IMPORTANT SUBJECTS TO BE RESOLVED. I SHALL EXPLORE LEBANESE LIMITS ON HADDAD AND OTHER AREAS WHEN I GO TO LEBANON APRIL 13. END SUMMARY.

6. I MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR FOR CLOSE TO TWO HOURS EVENING OF TUESDAY, APRIL 12 FOR A COMPLETE REVIEW OF THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER BEN MEIR, KIMCHE, OTHER MFA, IDF, AND SHIN BET REPRESENTATIVES ATTENDED. I WAS ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR LEWIS, ROSS, COOLEY, KOZAK AND HARE. THE OVERALL TONE OF THE MEETING WAS CONSTRUCTIVE, THOUGH LITTLE NEW GROUND WAS BROKEN.

7. AT THE OUTSET, SHAMIR COMMENTED THAT "WE ARE CLOSE TO THE END OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THOUGH IT IS NOT CLEAR IF WE ARE CLOSE TO AN AGREEMENT," AND IT WAS NECESSARY TO MAKE A MAJOR EFFORT IN THE NEXT ONE OR TWO WEEKS TO OVERCOME THE REMAINING DIFFICULTIES. HE ADDED IT WAS ALSO IMPORTANT TO SEE WHAT WILL HAPPEN WITH RESPECT TO PLO AND SYRIAN WITHDRAWALS ALSO TO WORK ON "SOME PAPER (I.E., ASSURANCES) BETWEEN THE U.S. AND ISRAEL. HE SUGGESTED THAT WE WOULD BE IN A BETTER POSITION TO DETERMINE HOW TO PROCEED AFTER MY MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN

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TOMORROW MORNING.

8. I REPLIED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO STAY ON THE COURSE WHICH HAD BEEN FOLLOWED AT TODAY'S MEETING IN NETANYA, WHICH I HAD ATTENDED. THE LEBANESE AND ISRAELIS HAD PUT CERTAIN POSITIONS ON THE TABLE WITH RESPECT TO THE DRAFT AGREEMENT. I THOUGHT THAT THIS WAS A BUSINESSLIKE WAY TO PROCEED. IT WAS QUITE

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EXDIS

TUNIS FOR UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER; DEPT FOR DRAPER

OBVIOUS, I SAID, THAT THERE WOULD BE TWO OR THREE ISSUES WHICH COULD ONLY BE DECIDED AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL. THIS WOULD PERMIT THE OTHER OUTSTANDING ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED QUICKLY IN THE TRIPARTITE MEETINGS.

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FINALLY, IN RESPONDING TO SHAMIR'S OPENING REMARKS, I NOTED THAT WE HAD RECEIVED THE ISRAELI'S THOUGHTS ON WHAT MIGHT BE CONTAINED IN THE "PAPERS" (ASSURANCES) AND THAT THIS WOULD OBVIOUSLY REQUIRE CAREFUL WASHINGTON CONSIDERATION. (COMMENT: IN THE EVENT THAT THE ISRAELI EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON APPROACHES THE DEPARTMENT ON THESE ASSURANCES, THE SAME LANGUAGE SHOULD BE USED. I WILL BE SUBMITTING A DRAFT LETTER ON ASSURANCES FOR WASHINGTON CONSIDERATION.)

9. ON THE PRINCIPAL NEGOTIATING ISSUES, I SAID

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IT WAS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT ISRAEL STILL OWED A FORMAL ANSWER TO THE LEBANESE PROPOSAL CONCERNING MAJOR HADDAD, BUT I CAUTIONED THAT IT MIGHT BE BETTER IF A FORMAL RESPONSE WERE NOT MADE AT THIS PARTICULAR JUNCTURE. KIMCHE INTERVENED TO SAY THAT HE HAD MADE CLEAR TO THE LEBANESE THAT ISRAEL BELIEVED THAT THERE WERE TWO POSSIBLE COMMAND POSTS FOR HADDAD; HE DID NOT BELIEVE THE LEBANESE WERE UNDER ANY ILLUSIONS ON THIS POINT. I THEN IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF I TALKED TO PRESIDENT GEMAYEL FURTHER ON THIS SUBJECT AND TRIED TO REACH AN UNDERSTANDING WHICH COULD SATISFY ISRAEL, DEPENDING OF COURSE ON WHAT THE LEBANESE THOUGHT WAS POSSIBLE. I COMMENTED THAT, AS I UNDERSTOOD THE ISRAELI POSITION, THE IMPORTANT ISSUE WAS TO DEFINE A COMMAND POSITION FOR HADDAD IN WHICH HE WOULD HAVE OPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES. THE DEFINITION OF A COMMAND POST, I NOTED, COULD VARY, SINCE THE IMPORTANT QUESTION WAS TO BE IN A POSITION OF CONTROLLING THE TROOPS. I ASKED IF MY READING OF THE ISRAELI POSITION WAS CORRECT.

10. SHAMIR REPLIED THAT HADDAD HAD TO BE THE COMMANDER OF THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE--THE MILITARY BOSS OF THE AREA--AND TO HAVE TROOPS AT HIS DISPOSAL. GEN. TAMIR SAID THERE WERE TWO POSSIBILITIES: COMMANDER OF THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE OR COMMANDER OF THE SECURITY REGION. HE DID, HOWEVER, HINT AT "SOME OTHER" POSSIBILITIES. THE ESSENTIAL IDEA, HE CONTINUED, WAS FOR HADDAD TO BE IN COMMAND AND HAVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INTERNAL SECURITY. I REPLIED I UNDERSTOOD THAT IN ESSENCE ISRAEL DID NOT WANT HADDAD IN A STAFF POSITION ONLY. SHAMIR REMARKED THAT ISRAEL WOULD HAVE TO TALK WITH HADDAD BEFORE

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FINALLY DECIDING WHAT WILL HAPPEN TO HIM PERSONALLY. ISRAEL WOULD NOT DO SO UNTIL THE LEBANESE POSITION WAS FULLY CLARIFIED.

11. I FLOATED SOME POSSIBLE COMPROMISE SOLUTIONS FOR THE OTHER OUTSTANDING SECURITY ISSUE--UNIFIL IN THE SECURITY REGION. I SAID THAT, DEPENDING ON WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN WITH RESPECT TO HADDAD, IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO ARRIVE AT A COMPROMISE. I SUGGESTED THE POSSIBILITY THAT UNIFIL MIGHT BE DEPLOYED TO SIDON BUT NOT TYRE, WHICH WAS CLOSE TO THE BORDER AND POSED PARTICULAR PROBLEMS TO ISRAEL. IF SUCH A COMPROMISE COULD BE REACHED, IT WOULD AMONG OTHER THINGS FACILITATE UNIFIL DEPLOYMENT IN OTHER PARTS OF LEBANON. SHAMIR DID NOT DIRECTLY RE.

(COMMENT: I INTEND TO FLOAT COMPROMISE FORMULAS ON UNIFIL DURING MY MEETING WITH BEGIN WEDNESDAY MORNING.)

12. AFTER THIS DISCUSSION OF THE PRINCIPAL SECURITY ISSUES, SHAMIR ASKED KIMCHE TO PRESENT AN INVENTORY OF THE REMAINING OUTSTANDING ISSUES. AFTER CITING THE HADDAD AND UNIFIL ISSUES, KIMCHE NOTED THE QUESTION OF HOW THE HADDAD FORCES WOULD BE INTEGRATED INTO THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE. GEN. EINAN SAID THAT SOME PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE ON THIS ISSUE AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT IT MIGHT BE CLEARED UP BY THE END OF THE WEEK. HE SAID THAT THE LEBANESE HAD INFORMED ISRAEL OUTSIDE OF THE MILITARY SUB-COMMITTEE MEETING THAT LEBANON WAS NOT GOING TO PUT THE THIRD BRIGADE INTO THE SOUTHERN ZONE BUT WAS GOING TO ESTABLISH A NEW BRIGADE (I.E., THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE INSTEAD). THE LEBANESE WERE TO PROVIDE FURTHER DETAILS TO THE ISRAELI SIDE THIS WEEK ON HOW THE INTEGRATION WOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED. EINAN

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Date Printed: 10/22/1996 DOC NUMBER: 83BEIRUT04007

CHANNEL: n/a

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EXDIS

TUNIS FOR UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER; DEPT FOR DRAPER

COMMENTED THAT THIS WAS A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT, BUT ISRAEL WOULD HAVE TO SEE WHAT THE LEBANESE ACTUALLY PUT ON PAPER. TAMIR SAID THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE FOR LEBANON AND ISRAEL TO BUILD THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE AFTER THE AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED AND BEFORE THE FINAL WITHDRAWAL WAS COMPLETED. GEN. COOLEY INTERJECTED THAT THE LAF HAD SIGNED A GENERAL ORDER CREATING THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE ON APRIL 6, SO IT NOW EXISTS ON THE BOOKS, AND THE LAF HAS THE LEGAL AUTHORITY TO BUILD ON IT.

13. KIMCHE SAID THE FOURTH OUTSTANDING SECURITY ISSUE WAS LIAISON OFFICERS, AND NOTED THAT THE LEBANESE HAD REJECTED LIAISON OFFICERS AT ANY LEVEL. COOLEY COMMENTED THAT THE LEBANESE VIEWED

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LIAISON OFFICERS AS CONSTITUTING A RESIDUAL ISRAELI PRESENCE AND BELIEVED THE OTHER SUPERVISORY AND COORDINATING MECHANISMS WERE SUFFICIENT FOR LIAISON PURPOSES. THE LEBANESE HAD ALSO NOT SHOWN ANY ENTHUSIASM FOR THE RECIPROCAL BASING OF LIAISON OFFICERS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE BORDER. TAMIR SAID THAT, IN ADDITION TO THE VARIOUS SUPERVISORY MECHANISMS, SUCH AS THE JOINT TEAMS AND THE MILITARY COMMITTEE, IT WAS IMPORTANT TO HAVE THE LIAISON OFFICER SYSTEM TO DEAL WITH IMMEDIATE SECURITY THREATS ON THE BORDER.

14. THE FIFTH SECURITY ISSUE WAS TO COMPLETE

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ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE OPERATIONS CENTERS, NOW CALLED SUPERVISORY CENTERS. THE ISRAELI MILITARY NOTED THAT THE FUNCTIONS OF THE CENTERS HAVE BEEN AGREED, BUT THE LOCATIONS AND NUMBER OF CENTERS WERE STILL UNDECIDED. EINAN SAID THAT ISRAEL HAD PROPOSED THREE CENTERS AND THAT GEN. HAMDAN HAD AGREED TO TWO CENTERS, ONE IN HASBAYAH AND THE SECOND IN TIBNIN, CLOSE TO THE BORDER. EINAN CATEGORICALLY ASSERTED THAT THE TIBNIN CENTER WOULD BE USELESS. TAMIR ALSO CLAIMED THAT THE LEBANESE OBJECTION TO THE SUPERVISORY TEAMS STAYING OVERNIGHT AT THE CENTERS WAS "RIDICULOUS". COOLEY SAID THAT HAMDAN HAD VERY SIGNIFICANTLY AGREED THAT, WHEN THE SUPERVISORY TEAMS WERE ENGAGED IN OPERATIONAL MISSIONS AT THE DIRECTION OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE, THEY COULD STAY INSIDE THE SECURITY ZONE AS LONG AS 36 HOURS. HOWEVER, THEY COULD NOT STAY OVERNIGHT AT THE CENTERS, BUT ONLY "IN THE FIELD". COOLEY ALSO MENTIONED THAT HE WAS GOING TO SUGGEST THAT THE DECISION ON WHERE THE CENTERS WERE TO BE LOCATED

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[REDACTED]

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SHOULD BE DECIDED UPON BY THE MILITARY COMMITTEE, BASED ON OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS.

15. WITH SOME EMBARRASSMENT, KIMCHE ALSO SUGGESTED THAT THE FIVE OBSERVATION POSTS WERE STILL AN OUTSTANDING AGENDA ITEM. I RIPOSTED THAT WE HAD TO OPERATE ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT, IF ALTERNATIVE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WERE SATISFACTORY, THE OBSERVATION POSTS WOULD BE A MOOT ISSUE.

16. SHAMIR INTERJECTED AT THIS POINT THAT IT WAS ALSO IMPORTANT TO CONFIRM UNDERSTANDINGS REACHED

[REDACTED]

17. KIMCHE TURNED TO WHAT HE DBED AS SECONDARY, THOUGH STILL IMPORTANT, SECURITY ISSUES. THESE INCLUDED AGREEMENT ON LIMITATION OF CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF ARMS INSIDE AND OUTSIDE OF THE SECURITY ZONE. I SAID THAT IN DISCUSSING THIS SUBJECT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO AVOID INDULGING IN STERILE EXERCISES ABOUT HYPOTHETICAL POSSIBILITIES. THERE WERE CERTAIN WEAPONS THAT LEBANON DID NOT HAVE AND WOULD NEVER HAVE, AND IT WAS IMPORTANT TO DISPLAY A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF COMMON SENSE IN REACHING AN AGREEMENT.

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18. THE SECOND SECONDARY SECURITY ISSUE WAS DELINEATING THE BOUNDARY OF THE SECURITY ZONE. KIMCHE NOTED THAT THE QUESTION OF WHETHER JABAL BARUK WAS INCLUDED

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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2959
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY
USELO RIYADH PRIORITY
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY.

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EXDIS

TUNIS FOR UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER; DEPT FOR DRAPER

N THE SECURITY ZONE, OR IF THE ZONE EXTENDED ABOVE THE AWWALI RIVER, WAS STILL UNRESOLVED.

19. KIMCHE THEN RAISED A THIRD ISSUE--THAT OF AMERICAN PARTICIPATION IN THE MILITARY COMMITTEE--AND RESTATED FAMILIAR ISRAELI THEMES ON THIS POINT. I SAID THAT WE HAD NO DESIRE TO BE ON THE MILITARY COMMITTEE BUT THE LEBANESE FELT THAT IT WAS

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IMPORTANT FOR THE U.S. TO BE ABLE TO PARTICIPATE. THERE SURELY GUGHT TO BE SOME WAY TO COMPROMISE BY ALLOWING FOR AMERICAN PARTICIPATION ON A GIVEN ISSUE IF IT WAS SO DESIRED. TAMIR NOTED THAT ISRAEL HAD ALREADY AGREED THAT THE MILITARY COMMITTEE WOULD OPERATE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE

[REDACTED]

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JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE, IN WHICH THE U.S. WOULD PARTICIPATE. THIS PROVIDED ADEQUATE SUPERVISION OVER WHAT THE MILITARY COMMITTEE WOULD DO. I REPLIED THAT IT WOULD BE MOST UNFORTUNATE IF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE BEGAN TO REFER VARIOUS ISSUES TO THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE UNNECESSARILY FOR RESOLUTION. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO ARRIVE AT PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS. I SAID THAT I WOULD TAKE THIS MATTER UP WITH THE LEBANESE AGAIN BUT, IN THE EVENT I WAS NOT SUCCESSFUL, WE SHOULD TRY TO ARRIVE AT ANOTHER FORMULA. LEWIS SUGGESTED IT MIGHT POSSIBLY BE AGREED THAT AN OBSERVER FROM THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE COULD SIT IN ON REQUEST ON SESSIONS OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE.

20. FINALLY, KIMCHE SAID THAT ISRAEL BELIEVED THAT THE MILITARY COMMITTEE SHOULD HAVE AN INDEPENDENT AND SEPARATE OFFICE APART FROM THE OPERATIONS CENTER. THIS OFFICE COULD POSSIBLY BE LOCATED IN TYRE OR SIDON. HOWEVER, LEBANON DID NOT WANT SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT AND PREFERRED THAT THE OFFICE OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE BE ATTACHED TO AN OPERATIONS CENTER. I COMMENTED THAT I COULD SEE WHY LEBANON DID NOT WANT TO MULTIPLY THE NUMBER OF OFFICES AND CENTERS IN THE SECURITY ZONE.

21. KIMCHE THEN BRIEFLY RAN THROUGH VARIOUS ISRAELI RESERVATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE LEBANESE "DRAFT COVERING AGREEMENT". THESE INCLUDED:

-- SIGNATURE BY THE FOREIGN MINISTERS.

-- INCLUSION OF THE WORD "RECOGNIZE" IN ARTICLE I OF

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THE AGREEMENT.

-- REORDERING OF THE ARTICLES OF THE AGREEMENT.

-- SPECIFIC PROVISION THAT LAWS AND REGULATIONS WILL BE AMENDED AS THEY RELATE TO ACTIONS AGAINST ISRAELIS

OR A CLEAR STATEMENT BY LEBANON THAT ITS PENAL CODE
WILL APPLY TO CRIMINAL ACTS AGAINST ISRAELIS.

-- ABROGATION OF LAWS, ESPECIALLY AS THEY RELATE TO
THE BOYCOTT ISSUE.

-- ELIMINATION OF THE "CLAIMS" ARTICLE PROPOSED BY
LEBANON.

-- AGREEMENT WILL REMAIN IN FORCE UNTIL A "FORMAL",
"COMPLETE", OR "FULL" PEACE TREATY IS ACHIEVED.

-- REVISIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES.

-- THE RELATION OF THE LIAISON OFFICE IN BEIRUT TO
THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE.

-- A SPECIFIC PROVISION THAT BOTH PARTIES WILL
REFRAIN FROM ACTIONS WHICH WOULD HARM THE WELFARE OR
ECONOMY OF THE OTHER PARTY.

22. TURNING TO THE INTERIM PERIOD, KIMCHE SAID THAT
THE LEBANESE HAD TO REPLY TO THE LATEST ISRAELI
DRAFT CONCERNING THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS. KIMCHE
STRESSED THAT ISRAEL COULD GREE TO THE LATEST
LEBANESE FORMULATION, WHICH WOULD PRECLUDE THE

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2960

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INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
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USELO RIYADH PRIORITY
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY

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EXDIS

TUNIS FOR UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER; DEPT FOR DRAPER

IMPORTATION OF GOODS FROM ISRAEL IN CATEGORIES WHICH LEBANON EXPORTED TO THE ARAB WORLD. HE ALSO SAID THE QUESTION OF TRANSPORT HAD TO BE AGREED TO, NOTING THAT LEBANON HAD AGREED TO LAND, BUT NOT SEA OR AIR, TRANSPORT DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD. IT WAS ALSO IMPORTANT FOR AGREEMENT TO BE REACHED ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF VARIOUS TELECOMMUNICATIONS LINKS. FINALLY, KIMCHE NOTED LEBANON HAD WITHDRAWN ITS ORIGINAL POSITION WHICH WOULD HAVE MENTIONED IN THE AGREEMENT ITSELF THAT LEBANESE RESERVATIONS WITH RESPECT TO MULTINATIONAL CONVENTIONS WOULD BE ELIMINATED. I REPLIED THAT KHARMA HAD GIVEN EXAMPLES TODAY OF HOW THESE RESERVATIONS WOULD BE ELIMINATED AS PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS WERE IMPLE-

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MENTED ON THE GROUND. RUBINSTEIN HEATEDLY STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF REFERRING TO THIS POINT IN THE COVERING AGREEMENT.

23. KIMCHE SAID IT WAS ALSO IMPORTANT FOR ISRAEL TO HAVE A CLEAR PICTURE OF WHAT WILL GO INTO THE FINAL AGREEMENT ON MUTUAL RELATIONS TO BE NEGOTIATED BEGINNING NO LATER THAN SIX MONTHS AFTER THE SIGNING OF THE AGREEMENT. I SUGGESTED THAT ANY ISRAELI IDEAS ON THIS MATTER SHOULD BE CONVEYED TO AND DISCUSSED WITH THE LEBANESE. K

ALSO SAID IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT TO SPELL OUT WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IN THE EVENT THAT THE SYRIANS DID NOT WITHDRAW. SHAMIR THOUGHT IT WAS NECESSARY TO HAVE A WRITTEN DOCUMENT CONCERNING ARRANGEMENTS ESTABLISHED BETWEEN SECURITY SERVICES. BEN-DOR DEMURRED, SAYING THAT GREAT PROBLEMS WOULD ARISE IF THIS WAS MENTIONED IN ANY WAY IN THE AGREEMENT ITSELF. I FULLY AGREED.

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Date Printed: 10/22/1996

DOC_NUMBER: 83BEIRUT04007

CHANNEL: n/a

24. LOOKING AHEAD, SHAMIR THEN ASKED WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF WE REACHED AN AGREEMENT IN TWO WEEKS' TIME. I SAID THAT THE LEBANESE INTENDED TO TALK AT A HIGH LEVEL WITH THE SYRIANS AS SOON AS WE WERE CLOSE TO REACHING AN AGREEMENT IN ORDER TO VERIFY THAT THE SYRIANS AND THE PLO WOULD LEAVE. THE LEBANESE DID NOT BELIEVE THE SYRIANS WOULD ENGAGE IN DETAILED NEGOTIATIONS, THOUGH THIS REMAINED TO BE SEEN. HOWEVER, THE LEBANESE INTENDED BEFORE RATIFYING THE AGREEMENT, TO MAKE SURE THAT THE SYRIAN/PLO WITHDRAWAL WOULD ACTUALLY TAKE PLACE SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. IN THIS CONTEXT, IT IS INTERESTING THAT THE ISRAELIS ACQUIRED THAT THE PLO COULD TAKE ALL OF THEIR ARMS

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WHEN THEY WITHDRAW. THEY ALSO DID NOT RESTATE THEIR STANDARD POSITION THAT ALL THE PLO WOULD HAVE TO WITHDRAW BEFORE THE SYRIANS AND ISRAELIS WITHDREW.

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25. AS WE WERE CONCLUDING OUR DISCUSSION, I SAID I WOULD BE GOING TO BEIRUT TOMORROW TO PARTICIPATE IN THE MEETINGS AT KHALDAH AND ALSO TO DRAW VARIOUS OUTSTANDING ISSUES TO THE URGENT ATTENTION OF PRESIDENT GEMAYEL. MY PURPOSE WOULD BE TO KEEP THE PROCESS MOVING AHEAD RAPIDLY. SHAMIR MENTIONED THAT IT WOULD BE VERY GOOD IF IT WERE POSSIBLE FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO WITNESS THE SIGNING OF THE AGREEMENT BY FOREIGN MINISTERS. I SAID THIS MIGHT BE DIFFICULT TO ARRANGE; SHAMIR STATED THAT IT WAS NOT AN INDISPENSABLE REQUIREMENT FOR THE SECRETARY TO PARTICIPATE. DILLON

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EXD DECAPTIONED

FROM DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, US, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: INFORMAL TALK WITH
KIMCHE

2. I HAD AN INTERESTING TALK ALONE WITH DAVID KIMCHE THIS MORNING, APRIL 1. HE SAID HE WAS A LITTLE BIT MORE OPTIMISTIC THAN HE HAD BEEN AS A RESULT OF YESTERDAY'S GOOD SESSION AT KIRYAT SHEMONA, FOR WHICH HE HEAPED PRAISE ON THE U.S. SIDE. FOLLOWING ARE THE MORE SIGNIFICANT COMMENTS HE THEN MADE:

-- KIMCHE REVEALED THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE ON THE VERGE OF SENDING A MESSAGE TO THE SECRETARY BUT

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THAT THE ARRIVAL TODAY OF THE SECRETARY'S MESSAGE HAD PREEMPTED THAT PLAN. HE OBSERVED WRYLY THAT "IT IS TOO BAD WE DID NOT GET OFF OUR MESSAGE". HE SAID THAT A REPLY WOULD BE SENT, PROBABLY WITHIN 24 HOURS, WHICH WOULD PROBABLY INCORPORATE MOST OF WHAT HAD BEEN PLANNED TO SAY PREVIOUSLY.

-- AS HE HAD PROMISED, KIMCHE REVIEWED YESTERDAY'S TRIPARTITE SESSION WITH SHAMIR, BUT ONLY VERY

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BRIEFLY. HE DID NOT, HOWEVER, RAISE WITH SHAMIR THE CONCEPT OF RECIPROCITY OF LIAISON OFFICERS WHICH I DISCUSSED WITH HIM YESTERDAY, PERHAPS FOR ANOTHER REASON (SEE BELOW). THE MAIN POINT KIMCHE STRESSED WAS THAT SHAMIR IS TRULY "DUG IN" ON HADDAD; THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO GIVE. KIMCHE THAT SHAMIR HAS VERY SERIOUS-POLITICAL PROBLEMS WITHIN THE CABINET AND IS NOT ABOUT TO GO OUT ON A LIMB FOR SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS THAT ARE LESS THAN PERFECT. THE STATEMENT OF PERES IN SUPPORT OF HADDAD'S CONTINUED PRESENCE WAS ANOTHER REASON FOR SHAMIR'S STICKING SO HARD ON HADDAD. I ASKED ABOUT THE POSITION OF ARENS, ASSUMING WE COULD CONVINCE HIM THAT GOOD SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WERE POSSIBLE, AND KIMCHE SAID HE STILL WAS NOT SURE HOW STRONGLY ARENS FELT ABOUT HADDAD, BEYOND WHAT WE HAVE ALL HEARD.

-- KIMCHE, HOWEVER, IS OBVIOUSLY THINKING HARD ABOUT HABIB'S SUGGESTION THAT PERHAPS HADDAD-- UNDER THE HONORABLE SOLUTION--COULD RETURN TO MARJAYOUN AFTER WITHDRAWAL, SPEND SIX OR SO MONTHS THERE AND THEN TAKE AN IMPORTANT JOB. KIMCHE MUSED ABOUT THE U.S. OFFERING A GUARANTEE

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THAT HADDAD WOULD BE GIVEN THE JOB OF GOVERNOR IN THE SOUTH SIX MONTHS AFTER WITHDRAWAL. I ENCOURAGED HIM TO THINK OVER THIS OR OTHER VARIATIONS, BUT STRESSED THAT WE WOULD NOT WANT TO PUSH FOR SUCH AN IDEA IF THE ISRAELI CABINET IN THE END TURNED IT DOWN. KIMCHE SAID HE COULD NOT BE SURE, BUT EMPHASIZED THERE WILL HAVE TO BE A FACE-SAVING FORMULA FOR THE ISRAELIS ON HADDAD.

-- IN THIS CONTEXT, KIMCHE LET HIS HAIR DOWN AND RUEFULLY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ISRAEL HAD PAINTED ITSELF INTO A CORNER NOT ONLY ON HADDAD BUT ON VARIOUS SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. HE SAID THAT EVEN IF THE ISRAELIS HAD MADE A MISTAKE, THE U.S. HAD TO REALIZE IT WAS A FACT OF LIFE.

-- WHILE REVIEWING HOW WE WOULD DEAL WITH NEXT TUESDAY'S INTENSIVE SESSION, WE TOGETHER AGREED THAT WE SHOULD LEAVE BOTH THE UNIFIL AND HADDAD ISSUES TO THE END.

-- I ASKED ABOUT THE ISRAELI REACTION TO THE LIST OF 16 LEBANESE OFFICERS WHO WOULD TAKE OVER THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE. KIMCHE SAID MOST WERE ALRIGHT, BUT A FEW WOULD NOT BE SATISFACTORY BECAUSE OF THEIR

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REPORTED RECORD ELABORATION WITH THE SYRIANS
(NOT THE PLO). I REMINDED HIM OF THE PROMISE OF
TANNOUS TO PICK AND CHOOSE OTHER OFFICERS IF THOSE
PROPOSED WERE NOT ACCEPTABLE.
-- WE REVIEWED THE UNDERSTANDINGS REACHED YESTERDAY
ON SUPERVISORY TEAMS. KIMCHE CAUTIONED THAT THE

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EXDIS

ISSUE OF THE VEHICLES TO BE USED BY THE TEAMS WAS
MOST SIGNIFICANT. HE THEN CONFIRMED EXPLICITLY
WHAT WE HAVE ALL KNOWN PREVIOUSLY: THE ISRAELIS
WANT A VISIBLE IDF "PRESENCE" IN THE REGION,
REGARDLESS OF THE SECURITY RISKS. THEY VIEW THIS
AS PSYCHOLOGICALLY IMPORTANT NOT ONLY TO THE
ISRAELIS BUT TO THE PEOPLE THERE, WHO MIGHT THEREBY
BE ABLE TO SAY THAT THE ISRAELIS MIGHT RETURN IN
HEAVY FORCE IF TERRORISM RESUMED. THIS COULD BE AN

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CHANNEL: n/a

IMPORTANT DETERRENT, HE ARGUED. AS FAR AS ISRAELI PSYCHOLOGY WAS CONCERNED, KIMCHE STRESSED IT WAS IDF MILITARY DOCTRINE NOT TO BE BEHOLDEN TO ANYONE. THAT WAS WHY THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO INSIST TO HAVE SOME ISRAELI TROOPS TO PROTECT THEIR OFFICERS AND VEHICLES THAT THEY WOULD MAINTAIN AND DRIVE THEMSELVES. THE COLORS OF THE VEHICLES, HOWEVER, COULD BE PAINTED IN THE LEBANESE FASHION, ALTHOUGH THEY WOULD PREFER TO HAVE SOMETHING DISTINCTIVE AND SOME SYMBOL ATTACHED TO THE VEHICLES IDENTIFYING THEM AS

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BELONGING TO JOINT TEAMS.

-- KIMCHE REPORTED THAT [REDACTED] HAD DRAWN GEN. EINAN ASIDE AT THE END OF YESTERDAY'S SESSION TO SAY THAT THE LEBANESE "MIGHT" BE ABLE TO GO ALONG WITH THE IDEA OF HAVING ISRAELI LIAISON OFFICERS ASSIGNED TO THE MILITARY COMMITTEE, WHO WOULD THEN CARRY OUT THE SUPPLEMENTARY RSIBILITY OF CONDUCTING LIAISON WITH THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE DOWN TO THE BATTALION LEVEL. THIS WOULD BE ON CONDITION, [REDACTED] SAID, THAT LEBANESE LIAISON OFFICERS WERE ALSO ASSIGNED TO THE MILITARY COMMITTEE, BUT [REDACTED] DID NOT SPECIFY HAVING THOSE LEBANESE OFFICERS ASSIGNED TO LIAISON DUTIES WITH THE IDF NORTHERN COMMAND. (HABIB WILL RECALL THE SURFACING OF THIS IDEA IN EMBRYONIC FORM.) I SAID TO KIMCHE THAT THIS LOOKED LIKE AN ACCEPTABLE COMPROMISE, PARTICULARLY IF THE ISRAELI SIDE COULD HONOR LEBANESE WISHES FOR SOME FORM OF RECIPROCITY. HE SAID THIS MIGHT BE POSSIBLE.

-- I REPEATED MY ASTONISHMENT THAT RUBINSTEIN WOULD TURN DOWN FATTAL'S PROPOSAL FOR A FORMULATION IN THE COVERING AGREEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT "THIS AGREEMENT SHALL REMAIN IN FORCE UNTIL THE CONCLUSION OF A TREATY OF PEACE, WHICH IS A COMMON OBJECTIVE OF THE PARTIES." I SAID I WAS UNSURE WHETHER THE LEBANESE LEADERSHIP WOULD BE ABLE TO ACCEPT SUCH A FORTHCOMING PROPOSAL, EVEN IF FATTAL SUPPORTED IT, AND THAT THE ISRAELIS OUGHT TO TAKE SUCH IDEAS WHEN OFFERED WITHOUT QUIBBLING. KIMCHE SAID HE HAD NOT DISCUSSED THE PROBLEM YET WITH RUBINSTEIN.

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-- IN WHAT MAY TURN OUT TO BE THE MOST SIGNIFICANT STATEMENT, KIMCHE SAID THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD AN INTELLIGENCE REPORT ON THE CURRENT SAUDI ANALYSIS OF THE SCENE IN LEBANON. THE SAUDI CONCLUSION, HE SAID, WAS THAT GEMAYAL REMAINED A WEAK FIGURE. HE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO KEEP THE COUNTRY UNIFIED EVEN AFTER WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES. ON THE CONTRARY, THE COUNTRY WAS LIKELY TO FALL AGAIN INTO CHAOS. ACCORDING TO KIMCHE, THE SAUDI ANALYSIS THEN WENT ON TO SUGGEST THAT IT WAS marginally IN OVERALL SAUDI INTERESTS THAT A MODICUM OF STABILITY BE MAINTAINED IN LEBANON, EVEN IF THIS MEANT PAYING THE PRICE OF A CONTINUED SYRIAN AND ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF PARTS OF THE COUNTRY. I ASKED KIMCHE WHICH QUARTER OF THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT THIS ALLEGED ANALYSIS MIGHT HAVE COME. HE SAID HE DID NOT KNOW BUT HAD BEEN TOLD THAT THE ANALYSIS ITSELF WAS AUTHENTIC. I SAID I STRONGLY DOUBTED THAT THE SAUDI LEADERSHIP WOULD SUPPORT SUCH A THESIS, BUT KIMCHE CLEARLY WAS TAKING IT SERIOUSLY. GROVE

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USELO RIYADH PRIORITY
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EXCISE DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIB/DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, US, IS, XF
SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: MEETING WITH FONMIN
SHAMIR AND DEFMIN ARENS, MARCH 30

1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY: AT OUR MARCH 30 MEETING WITH SHAMIR AND ARENS, I DESCRIBED FULLY AND EXPLICITLY THE STRENGTH OF LEBANESE OPPOSITION ACROSS THE BOARD TO THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF HADDAD IN SOUTHERN LEBANON AFTER ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, MAKING IT CLEAR THAT I HAD TOUCHED BASE WITH LEADERS WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT AND OUTSIDE THE GOVERNMENT. WHATEVER HAD BEEN SAID

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BY SOME PEOPLE CLOSE TO AMIN GEMAYEL LAST SUMMER ABOUT A GOVERNOR'S JOB FOR HADDAD IN THE SOUTH, I STRESSED IT REMAINED MY JUDGMENT THAT THE LEBANESE LEADERSHIP WOULD NOT CHANGE THEIR VIEW. AT THE SAME TIME, I WENT INTO MORE DETAIL THAN HAS BEEN MY HABIT AS REGARDS THE NATURE OF THE "HONORABLE SOLUTION" THE LEBANESE HAVE IN MIND FOR HADDAD. I MADE THIS PRESENTATION IN THE CONTEXT OF A POINTED QUESTION AS TO WHETHER THE ISRAELIS HAD SOME REASONABLE ALTER-

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NATIVES THAT WOULD SATISFY THEIR LEGITIMATE SECURITY CONCERNS WHILE FORESTALLING THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL PROBLEMS WHICH WOULD BE CREATED FOR LEBANON IF HADDAD AND ISRAELI OPERATIONAL MISSIONS WERE ALLOWED. THE ONLY ISRAELI COUNTER-SUGGESTION WAS TO REVIVE THE FIVE WATCH STATIONS. I ALSO CONFIRMED THAT THE LEBANESE WERE READY TO HAVE MEETINGS BETWEEN THE ARMY CHIEFS OF STAFF.

3. DRAPER AND I WENT BACK OVER THE SECURITY PACKAGE WHICH LEBANON WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT. I STRESSED REPEATEDLY THE IMPORTANCE OF A STRONG U.S. ROLE IN ENSURING SUCH COOPERATIVE ARRANGEMENTS WOULD WORK, INCLUDING THROUGH THE REVIEW PROCESSES WE HAD PROPOSED. I ALSO CONVEYED MY IMPRESSION THAT THERE WERE EMERGING SIGNS THAT GEMAYEL'S INTERNAL CONSENSUS WOULD ERODE IF THE NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUED TO DRAG OUT.

4. I RESURFACED THE EARLIER LEBANESE IDEA OF DEPLOYING AN MNF--INCLUDING WITH U.S. FORCES-- INTO SOUTHERN LEBANON AS A FURTHER ASSURANCE FOR ISRAELI SECURITY. SHAMIR AND ARENS FLATLY REJECTED THIS CONCEPT IN THE CLEAREST POSSIBLE TERMS, WITH SHAMIR ADDING THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD NOT WANT TO TAKE

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ANY RISK OF HURTING U.S. MARINES. THIS REMAINS A TOTAL NON-STARTER WITH THE ISRAELIS.

5. I ALSO SEIZED THE OPPORTUNITY TO QUESTION THE IDEA OF A UNILATERAL, PARTIAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL TO THE AWALI RIVER, WHICH HAS BEEN ADVOCATED BY SOME MINISTERS IN THE ISRAELI CABINET. SHAMIR ADMITTED THAT THE IDEA HAD BEEN SURFACED, AND KIMCHE SAID THAT ISRAEL MAY HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO CONSIDER SUCH CONCEPTS IF THE NEGOTIATIONS REACH A STALEMATE. I PAINTED A BLEAK PICTURE OF CONTINUED SYRIAN AND PLO PRESENCE WITH PERHAPS SOME ENCROACHMENTS IF ISRAEL TOOK THIS STEP IN LIEU OF MAKING AN AGREEMENT WHICH PROVIDED FOR A FINAL AND COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL.

6. PERHAPS FOR THE FIRST TIME, THE ISRAELIS FULLY UNDERSTOOD THAT LEBANON WILL NOT ACCEPT THE RETENTION OF HADDAD IN A POSITION OF RESPONSIBILITY IN SOUTHERN LEBANON UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES, BUT THEY DID NOT TALK SERIOUSLY OF ALTERNATIVES. FOR NOW, THEY REMAIN FIRMLY ATTACHED TO BOTH HADDAD AND AN IDF OPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN SOUTHERN LEBANON.

END SUMMARY.

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ate Printed: 10/22/1996

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7. I MET WITH SHAMIR AND ARENS FOR ONE AND A HALF HOURS WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON, MARCH 30, TO REVIEW MY DISCUSSIONS WITH THE LEBANESE AND TO EXPLORE HOW WE COULD OVERCOME THE HADDAD OBSTACLE. MFA, IDF AND SHIN BET REPRESENTATIVES ALSO ATTENDED. I WAS ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADORS DRAPER AND LEWIS,

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USELO RIYADH PRIORITY
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY

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EXDIS

KRECZKO AND HARE.

8. AT THE OUTSET, I REPORTED ON MY DISCUSSIONS IN BEIRUT WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL, FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM, AND OTHER LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL PERSONS. I SAID I HAD EXPLORED EVERY

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POSSIBLE AVENUE ON THE ISSUE OF HADDAD AND HAD RUN INTO A STONE WALL. THE LEBANESE COULD NOT ACCEPT HADDAD IN A COMMAND POSITION IN SOUTH LEBANON FOR TWO REASONS: (A) IT WOULD FRACTURE THE FRAGILE INTERNAL CONSENSUS THAT PRESIDENT GEMAYEL WAS TRYING TO CREATE; AND (B) IT WOULD NOT LEAD TO A SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL SINCE HADDAD'S CONTINUING ROLE IN LEBANON WOULD BE CONSIDERED TO BE EQUIVALENT TO A RESIDUAL ISRAELI PRESENCE. I SAID I HAD EVEN SPOKEN TO PRESIDENT GEMAYEL ALONE TO PROBE IF THERE WAS ANY

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FLEXIBILITY ON HADDAD BUT HAD RECEIVED THE SAME UNEQUIVOCAL ANSWER, THOUGH GEMAYEL HAD REITERATED HIS INTENTION TO FIND AN HONORABLE AND RESPECTABLE SOLUTION FOR HADDAD'S PERSONAL POSITION.

9. I ASKED IF IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO THINK OF ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS TO THIS PROBLEM. I SAID QUITE FRANKLY AND REPEATEDLY THAT IF ISRAEL CONTINUED TO PRESENT THE SOUTHERN BRIGADE CONCEPT WITH HADDAD AS ITS HEAD, THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NO CHANCE OF ITS BEING ACCEPTED BY LEBANON. THE LEBANESE HAD QUESTIONED, I ADDED, WHY ONE MAN WAS SO IMPORTANT TO ISRAEL. WHILE I HAD SAID THAT THE ISRAELIS REQUIRED CONFIDENCE IN THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, THE LEBANESE HAD REPLIED THAT HADDAD'S FORCES WERE NOT THAT EFFECTIVE IN ANY EVENT.

10. IN ADDITION, THE LEBANESE SAID THEY BELIEVED HADDAD WAS PREPARED TO LEAVE HIS PRESENT POSITION BUT THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT ALLOW THIS TO HAPPEN. GEMAYEL HAD TOLD ME IF HE TRIED TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT HADDAD UNILATERALLY, IT WOULD BE INTERPRETED AS A "DECLARATION OF WAR" ON ISRAEL. I STRESSED THAT THE VIEWS ON HADDAD PRESENTED BY THE GOVERNMENT WERE ALSO REFLECTED IN VIRTUALLY ALL OF MY CONVERSATIONS WITH OTHER LEBANESE POLITICAL PERSONALITIES. THERE WAS A CLEAR CONSENSUS ON THIS SUBJECT.

11. I ADDED THAT FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM HAD INDICATED THAT IF OUR "NON-PAPER" WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO THE ISRAELIS, HE THOUGHT LEBANON OUGHT TO CONSIDER GOING BACK TO ITS PREVIOUS POSITIONS. I HAD EMPHATICALLY REPLIED THAT THE NON-PAPER HAD TO STAY ON THE TABLE

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AND VERY SERIOUSLY RESISTED ANY OTHER LEBANESE MANEUVERS TO RETREAT FROM THE PAPER. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, I SAID THAT PRESIDENT GEMAYEL HAD AGREED THAT THE CONCEPTS PRESENTED IN THE "NON-PAPER" SHOULD REMAIN ON THE TABLE.

12. [

] THE LEBANESE HAD QUESTIONED THE VALUE OF HAVING CHIEF OF STAFF MEETINGS, I OBSERVED, IN VIEW OF THE ISRAELI POSITIONS ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, BUT IN THE END THEY HAD AGREED TO A MEETING. I HAD STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TWO SIDES GETTING TOGETHER IN ORDER TO BUILD CONFIDENCE AND TRUST ON THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WOULD BE IMPLEMENTED IN THE SECURITY ZONE.

13. IN CONCLUDING MY REPORT, I SAID THAT IF WE WERE TO MOVE FROM THE PRESENT IMPASSE, THIS WAS THE TIME TO MAKE CONCRETE SUGGESTIONS ON ALTERNATIVES. I HAD SIMILARLY TOLD THE LEBANESE THAT IF THERE WAS ANY POSSIBILITY OF THEIR CHANGING POSITIONS ON HADDAD, THIS WAS THE MOMENT TO MOVE. HOWEVER, AS I PREVIOUSLY NOTED, I HAD RECEIVED A FLAT, NEGATIVE DECISION ON HADDAD. THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NO GIVE.

14. SHAMIR REPLIED THAT WE AND THE LEBANESE ALREADY HAD THE ISRAELI PROPOSALS IN HAND, AND SAID THE LEBANESE HAD NOT GIVEN IN ON ANY POINT. HE ALSO QUESTIONED THE LEBANESE ATTITUDE TOWARD HIGH-LEVEL MILITARY MEETINGS WHEN THEY HAD QUESTIONED, AS I HAD REPORTED, WHAT COULD POSSIBLY EMERGE FROM SUCH

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A MEETING. HE IMPLIED THIS WAS A NEGATIVE DEVELOPMENT. SHAMIR STRESSED THE NEED FOR ISRAEL TO HAVE GUARANTEES "ON THE GROUND" SO THAT ISRAEL AND LEBANON COULD "WALK TOGETHER" BUT, HE COMMENTED, THEY NEITHER ACCEPTED THE CONCEPT OF JOINT OPERATIONS NOR OF VIABLE ISRAELI-LEBANESE COOPERATION.

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15. I ARGUED THAT THE LEBANESE HAD ACCEPTED A NUMBER OF MEASURES FOR VERIFICATION AND CHECKING OF THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND. I LISTED THE WELL-KNOWN POINTS OF COOPERATION. HOWEVER, THE LEBANESE DID OBJECT, I NOTED, TO HAVING THREE OPERATIONS CENTERS IN THE SECURITY ZONE AND TO HAVING TEN JOINT TEAMS COMPOSED OF TEN MEN FROM EACH SIDE. THE LEBANESE STATED THAT THESE PROPOSALS POSED REAL PROBLEMS OF POLITICAL VISIBILITY AND THAT THEY FELT THEY HAD

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ALREADY STRETCHED THEIR POSITION ON THE QUESTION OF ISRAELI PRESENCE TO ITS OUTER LIMITS BY AGREEING TO THE CONCEPTS OUTLINED IN THE NON-PAPER. ON THE ISSUE OF JOINT OPERATIONS, I STATED THAT THE LEBANESE WERE ADAMNANT IN SAYING THAT THIS WAS THEIR RESPONSIBILITY, THOUGH THEY AGREED THAT ISRAEL SHOULD BE ABLE TO MONITOR THE SITUATION THROUGH THE VARIOUS SUPERVISORY MECHANISMS.

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16. ARENS SAID THAT THE LEBANESE HAD TO RECOGNIZE AN ELEMENT OF UNCERTAINTY OF WHAT WOULD PREVAIL IN SOUTH LEBANON AFTER WITHDRAWAL, EVEN THOUGH THEY WOULD NATURALLY BE MORE OPTIMISTIC THAN ISRAEL

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ABOUT LEBANESE CAPABILITIES TO CONTROL THE SITUATION. I REPLIED THAT THE LEBANESE BELIEVED IT WAS IN THEIR NATIONAL INTEREST TO ENSURE STABILITY IN THE SECURITY ZONE. MOREOVER, THEY ARGUED THAT ONCE ALL SYRIAN AND PLO FORCES LEFT LEBANON, IT WOULD BE EASIER TO CONTROL INFILTRATION ROUTES INTO THE SOUTH AND TO OTHERWISE PREVENT TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. IN THEIR VIEW, IT ALSO HAD TO BE RECOGNIZED THAT THE SITUATION IN THE SOUTH WOULD NOT CHANGE OVERNIGHT AND IN THE MEANTIME THE LEBANESE WERE PREPARED TO HAVE FULL COOPERATION BETWEEN THE SECURITY SERVICES TO PREVENT ANY THREAT FROM RE-EMERGING.

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17. SHAMIR SAID THAT LEBANON DID NOT EVEN ACCEPT THE CONCEPT OF AN OPERATIONS CENTER, BUT ONLY ENVISAGED A ROOM FOR COMMITTEE MEETINGS. DRAPER DEMURRED AND WENT BACK OVER IN DETAIL THE SPECIFIC DETAILS WHICH LEBANON HAD ACCEPTED CONCERNING THE OPERATIONS CENTER, INCLUDING A 24-HOURS ISRAELI PRESENCE, COMMUNICATIONS, ETC. (COMMENT: THIS IS NOT THE

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FIRST TIME THAT SHAMIR HAS GROSSLY MISSTATED THE LEBANESE POSITION. HE IS EITHER BEING BRIEFED POORLY ON THE NEGOTIATIONS, OR ELSE DELIBERATELY CHOOSES TO IGNORE SOME RATHER IMPORTANT DETAILS.)

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18. ARENS ARGUED THAT WHILE HE COULD UNDERSTAND THE LEBANESE ESTIMATE, THEY STILL HAD TO ADMIT THAT THINGS COULD GO WRONG. I SAID THAT THE LEBANESE BELIEVED THAT THEY WERE IN A BETTER POSITION THAN ISRAEL TO CONTROL THE SITUATION BECAUSE OF THE DEGREE OF CONFIDENCE WHICH EXISTED BETWEEN THE PEOPLE AND THEIR GOVERNMENT. I ADDED THAT OUR CONCEPTS ALSO PROVIDED FOR A FULL REVIEW OF THE SECURITY MEASURES AFTER THREE MONTHS, WHICH WAS ANOTHER SAFETY VALVE, AS WAS ALSO OUR ASSOCIATION WITH THE AGREEMENT. SHAMIR STATED QUIETLY BUT WITH UNMISTAKEABLE FIRMNESS THAT NO ONE IN ISRAEL COULD TAKE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF WITHDRAWING FROM LEBANON WITHOUT ENSURING SOMEONE WAS IN PLACE IN WHOM ISRAEL COULD TRUST. HE CITED HADDAD, ISRAEL ADVISERS TO THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE, AND THE OPERATIONS CENTERS AND ASSOCIATED SUPERVISORY MECHANISMS AS TANGIBLE MEASURES WHICH COULD REINFORCE ISRAELI CONFIDENCE. CONTINUING, SHAMIR ADDED GLOOMILY THAT ALL LEBANON WANTED WAS TO REMOVE THE ISRAELI PRESENCE. ONCE THAT WAS ACCOMPLISHED, LEBANON WOULD NOT BE CONCERNED IF ROCKETS ONCE AGAIN FELL ON ISRAELI SOIL. I REPLIED THAT THIS WAS AN UNFAIR SUMMATION OF THE LEBANESE POSITION.

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19. I ASKED IF THERE WERE ANY OTHER WAYS IN WHICH ISRAELI CONCERNS COULD BE MET AND THE HADDAD ISSUE OVERCOME. AS AN EXAMPLE, IF LEBANON WAS PREPARED

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TO ACCEPT MORE THAN ONE OPERATIONS CENTER, WOULD THIS, I ASKED, MAKE IT EASIER TO FIND A WAY OUT OF THE DILEMMA. SHAMIR ONLY REPLIED THIS MIGHT BE POSSIBLE IF LEBANON COULD ACCEPT ISRAEL'S PREVIOUS POSITION OF HAVING FIVE OBSERVATION POSTS IN SOUTH LEBANON. KIMCHE REFERRED BACK TO PREVIOUS LEBANESE POSITIONS ON HADDAD IN WHICH, HE ALLEGED, THE LEBANESE HAD RAISED THE SUGGESTION THAT HADDAD COULD BE THE GOVERNOR OF THE SOUTH. I REPLIED THAT GEMAYEL HAD TOLD ME FLATLY THAT THIS WAS NEVER

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HIS POSITION, BUT KIMCHE AND SHAMIR BOTH INSISTED THAT THE IDEA HAD BEEN RAISED (WELL BEFORE THE TRIPARTITE NEGOTIATIONS BEGAN) IN THEIR PRESENCE, THOUGH PERHAPS BY OTHER LEBANESE PRESENT RATHER THAN BY GEMAYEL HIMSELF.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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20. ARENS ASKED WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF NORTHERN ISRAEL WAS ONCE AGAIN SHELLED AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL. I REPLIED THAT THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE AN IMMEDIATE MEETING OF THE LIAISON COMMITTEE TO REVIEW THE SITUATION AND TO TAKE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS. ARENS AND SHAMIR PRESSED FOR THE AMERICAN POSITION IN THAT EVENTUALITY. I REPLIED THAT WE WOULD BE DEDICATED TO MAKING THE SECURITY ZONE AS EFFECTIVE AS POSSIBLE, WHILE RECOGNIZING THAT THERE WAS ALWAYS AN ELEMENT OF RISK. ARENS ASKED IF ADDITIONAL SECURITY MEASURES, SUCH AS AUGMENTED TEAMS AND PATROLS, COULD BE AGREED TO IN THE EVENT OF FAILURE. I SAID THAT ONCE ALL FOREIGN FORCES WERE REMOVED, THE SITUATION WOULD BE DIFFERENT AND THAT OTHER MEASURES, NOT ACCEPTABLE NOW, MIGHT BE POSSIBLE IN THE POST-WITHDRAWAL PERIOD. THE SAME RATIONALE ALSO APPLIED, I SAID, TO EXPANDED NORMALIZATION ACTIVITIES AFTER WITHDRAWAL. I STATED THAT I WAS VERY CONCERNED BY THE EROSION AND DETERIORATION WHICH WOULD TAKE PLACE IF THE PRESENT IMPASSE CONTINUED. AMONG OTHER THINGS, I WAS CONVINCED THAT TERRORISM IN SOUTH LEBANON WOULD INCREASE.

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21. SHAMIR REFERRED ELLIPTICALLY TO THE DISCUSSION IN ISRAEL ABOUT THE IDEA THAT ISRAEL MIGHT WITHDRAW TO A SMALLER AREA IN SOUTHERN LEBANON, PRESUMABLY IF THE IMPASSE CONTINUED. I QUICKLY AND EMPHATICALLY REPLIED THAT A UNILATERAL, PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL WOULD LEAD TO PARTITION. IT WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE. MOREOVER, IT WOULD LEAVE THE SYRIANS AND THE PLO IN LEBANON AND MIGHT EVEN GIVE THEM THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXPAND THE AREA OF THEIR OPERATIONS. ARENS (BACKED BY KIMCHE) REPLIED THAT,

[REDACTED]

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IF NECESSARY, ISRAEL COULD MAKE THE CONCEPT OF A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL WORK, HOWEVER UNPALATABLE IT MAY BE.

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22. [

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23. I CONTINUED TO PRESS FOR ALTERNATIVES TO HADDAD.
I SPECIFICALLY RAISED THE POSSIBILITY MENTIONED
BY LEBANON ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS OF HAVING AN [

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MNF DEPLOYED IN THE SECURITY ZONE, INCLUDING WITH U.S. TROOPS. SHAMIR AND ARENS CATEGORICALLY REJECTED THIS PROPOSAL, SAYING THIS FORCE COULD NOT ACT AS AN EFFECTIVE DETERRENT TO A RESURGENCE OF TERRORISM. SHAMIR WAS ALSO CONCERNED THAT AN MNF DEPLOYMENT COULD LEAD TO INCIDENTS BETWEEN THE MARINES AND THE IDF. THE ISRAELIS GAVE NO INDICATION, IN SHORT, THAT THE MNF (OR UNIFIL) COULD PLAY A USEFUL ROLE IN THE SOUTH.

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24. I SUGGESTED LOOKING AT THE POSSIBILITY OF INCREASING THE NUMBER OF OPERATIONS CENTERS AND ALSO TO CONSIDER POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE COMMANDERS TO HADDAD. IN THIS CONTEXT, I RESTATED IN EMPHATIC TERMS THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS DEDICATED TO A TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON AND

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FOR CREATING A SOVEREIGN AND INTEGRAL LEBANON. A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL WOULD NOT, I EMPHASIZED, FURTHER THESE OBJECTIVES. CONTINUING, I SAID I WOULD LIKE TO REPORT ON MY RETURN TO WASHINGTON THAT ISRAEL HAS NOT TOTALLY CLOSED OUT ALL ALTERNATIVES TO HADDAD'S CONTINUING PRESENCE IN THE SOUTH. SHAMIR QUICKLY RESPONDED THAT HADDAD WAS "VERY IMPORTANT, INDEED ESSENTIAL" TO ISRAEL AND THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE TO HADDAD WAS A CONTINUING ISRAELI PRESENCE IN SOUTH LEBANON.

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25. I TRIED TACKLING THE HADDAD ISSUE ANOTHER WAY BY SUPPOSING THAT HADDAD, AS A LEBANESE PATRIOT, WOULD AGREE TO LEAVE SOUTH LEBANON FOR ABOUT THREE MONTHS. AFTER THIS INTERVAL, HE MIGHT RETURN TO THE SOUTH AND FIND A RESPECTABLE AND HONORABLE POSITION THERE, POSSIBLY AS A MEMBER OF THE

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NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. AGAIN, SHAMIR REPLIED THAT HADDAD WAS NEEDED FOR SECURITY REASONS AND THAT HE HAD TO STAY IN SOUTH LEBANON. I THEN SUGGESTED THE HADDAD PROBLEM MIGHT BE OVERCOME IF ONE OR TWO NON-UNIFORMED ISRAELIS MIGHT BE ATTACHED TO THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE, AND NOT THE 27 ADVISERS PROPOSED BY THE ISRAELIS. SHAMIR LACONICALLY REPLIED THAT LEBANON MIGHT PROPOSE 25, INSTEAD OF 27 ADVISERS. I CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT IT WAS IMPERATIVE TO LOOK AT THE ENTIRE PACKAGE AND THAT IN THE FUTURE MEETINGS, WITHIN THE TRIPARTITE FORUM AND AT THE MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE LEVELS, ALTERNATIVES TO HADDAD MUST BE EXPLORED. SHAMIR DID NOT DIRECTLY RESPOND.

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EXDTS
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FROM HABIB AND DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, US, IS, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: MEETING WITH LEBANESE

FONMIN SALEM, MARCH 28

1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY. I REVIEWED THE RESULTS OF MY RECENT TALKS IN ISRAEL WITH LEBANESE FONMIN SALEM AND HIS COLLEAGUES ON MARCH 28. I TOLD HIM THAT I HAD PRESENTED THE FULL SECURITY PACKAGE WHICH LEBANON WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT. I HAD EXPLAINED TO THE ISRAELIS THAT, WHILE LEBANON WAS WILLING TO DO THE MAXIMUM POSSIBLE TO ASSURE ISRAEL'S SECURITY, THERE WERE

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CERTAIN LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY THE NEED TO PRESERVE ITS INTERNAL CONSENSUS AND SECURE SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. SPECIFICALLY, LEBANON COULD NOT ACCEPT THE RETENTION OF HADDAD AS COMMANDER OR AN OPERATIONAL IDF RESPONSIBILITY IN THE SOUTH. I REPORTED THAT, DESPITE MY PRESENTATION, ISRAEL REMAINED FIRM IN ITS INSISTENCE ON THESE TWO POINTS. I PROBED SALEM ON WHETHER THERE WAS ANY FLEXIBILITY CONCERNING HADDAD. HE SAID THERE WAS NOT.

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3. SALEM ASKED SEVERAL TIMES WHAT WE PROPOSED TO GET OVER THE IMPASSE. I ENCOURAGED HIM TO MOVE FORWARD RAPIDLY ON THE MILITARY MEETINGS WHICH HAD NOW BEEN AGREED. HOWEVER, HE KEPT COMING BACK TO THE QUESTION OF WHAT THE U.S. WOULD DO TO BREAK THE IMPASSE. HE EMPHASIZED THAT HE HAD BEEN IN PARLIAMENT RECENTLY AND THAT THE MOOD WAS TURNING UGLY. PEOPLE WERE QUESTIONING THE U.S. COMMITMENT. HE SAID SUPPORT FOR AN AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL COULD QUICKLY ERODE. HE SAID THAT LEBANON WAS BEGINNING TO ANALYZE THE OPTIONS "IF NOTHING CHANGED IN TWO WEEKS". PRESIDENTIAL COUNSELOR HADDAD SAID THAT WE SHOULD FULLY UNDERSTAND THAT LEBANON WAS QUESTIONING WHETHER THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL OR WHETHER ISRAEL WAS ACTUALLY SEEKING A STALEMATE. END SUMMARY.

4. DRAPER AND I MET WITH FONMIN SALEM THE EVENING OF MARCH 28 TO GO OVER THE RESULTS OF MY DISCUSSIONS IN ISRAEL. SALEM WAS JOINED BY PRESIDENTIAL COUNSELORS HADDAD AND TUENI, FATTAL, HAMDAN, AND QASSIS (DIRECTOR, G-2). WE WERE JOINED BY KRECKO AND DAVIES.

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5. BEFORE SALEM ARRIVED, I MENTIONED TO GENERAL HAMDAN THAT GENERAL DRORI HAD TOLD ME, IN THE PRESENCE OF DEFMIN ARENS, THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT OBJECT IF LEBANON WANTED TO ROTATE ITS UNITS OUT OF SOUTHERN LEBANON FOR TRAINING AND RE-EQUIPING AND THEN RE-INTRODUCE THEM. HAMDAN SAID THAT THIS WAS A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT. HE SAID THAT THIS MORNING, ISRAEL HAD AGREED TO ALLOW THE LAF UNIT AT RASHAYYA TO LEAVE, AND HE WAS GLAD TO HEAR THAT THIS APPLIED AS WELL TO THE LAF UNITS IN SAIDA AND IN THE UNIFIL AREA. I SAID THAT I HAD ONLY SPOKEN SPECIFICALLY IN TERMS OF LAF UNITS AT SAIDA AND RASHAYYA BECAUSE I DID NOT KNOW THE STATUS OF THE BATTALION IN THE UNIFIL AREA (ARMUN). HOWEVER, I ASSUMED DRORI'S REMARK APPLIED TO ALL OF THE LAF UNITS.

6. WHEN SALEM ENTERED, I SUMMARIZED MY TALKS WITH SHAMIR AND ARENS, WHICH HAD BEEN DEVOTED PRIMARILY TO SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. I SAID I HAD EMPHASIZED ALL THAT LEBANON WAS PREPARED TO DO (JOINT VERIFICATION, SECURITY ZONE, ETC.). I HAD ALSO CONVEYED WHAT THE LEBANESE HAD SAID THEY COULD NOT DO: NAMELY, TO RETAIN HADDAD AS COMMANDER IN THE SOUTH OR TO ACCEPT IDF

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OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY IN THE SOUTH. I HAD EXPLAINED THAT THE GOL WAS CONVINCED THAT EITHER PROPOSAL WOULD THREATEN THE INTERNAL CONSENSUS AND JEOPARDIZE SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL.

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7. SHAMIR AND ARENS HAD RESPONDED, I CONTINUED, THAT THEY STILL LACKED CONFIDENCE IN THE LAF TO PROVIDE SECURITY IN SOUTHERN LEBANON. THEIR SOLUTION REMAINED THE RETENTION OF HADDAD, IN WHOM THEY HAD CONFIDENCE, AND AGREEMENT ON SUCH PROPOSALS AS JOINT OPERATIONAL PATROLS. WE HAD GONE BACK AND

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FORTH ON THESE TWO ISSUES, BUT THEY REMAINED FIRM.

8. I ALSO RELATED ISRAELI COMPLAINTS CONCERNING LEBANESE BACKSLIDING ON "AGREED" TEXTS AT RECENT NEGOTIATING SESSIONS. FATTAL SAID THAT IT HAD BEEN AGREED AT THE BEGINNING THAT TEXTS AGREED TO AD REFERENDUM AT THE SUBCOMMITTEE LEVEL WOULD HAVE TO BE APPROVED AT THE PLENARY BEFORE THEY COULD BE SAID TO BE IN FORMAL FORM. SALEM ARGUED THAT ISRAEL ALSO HAD RETREATED ON IMPORTANT ISSUES. HAMDAN GAVE

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AS AN EXAMPLE TAMIR'S ALLEGED STATEMENTS THAT ISRAEL WOULD IN THE END NOT INSIST ON RETENTION OF HADDAD. DRAPER AND I POINTED OUT THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR FATTAL TO CLEAR THE AIR ON THIS ISSUE AT THE NEXT NEGOTIATING SESSION. DRAPER SAID THAT REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE LEBANESE HAD TECHNICALLY ACCEPTED CERTAIN TEXTS, THEY HAD CREATED THAT IMPRESSION BY ALLOWING SO MUCH TIME TO PASS BETWEEN SEEMING ACQUIESCENCE AND SUDDEN NEW CLARIFICATIONS DIRECTED BY THE LEBANESE STEERING COMMITTEE, (E.G., THE NEW PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE PASSAGE OF GOODS). SALEM SAID HE THOUGHT THE ISRAELIS HAD AGREED TO THE NEW PRINCIPLES. DRAPER SAID THAT WAS NOT CORRECT. ISRAEL WOULD NEVER AGREE TO FLAT RESTRICTIONS ON CATEGORIES OF GOODS WHICH LEBANON RE-EXPORTS TO ARAB COUNTRIES. TUENI ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THEY WERE PERHAPS NOT PROMPT ENOUGH IN SETTING THEIR NEGOTIATING TEAM STRAIGHT ON WHAT WAS ACCEPTABLE.

9. I REPORTED THAT ISRAEL ACCEPTED DIRECT MEETINGS BETWEEN [] THE MILITARY CHIEFS OF STAFF (TANNOUS AND LEVY) WHICH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL HAD AUTHORIZED ME TO SUGGEST. IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR LEBANON TO SET THESE MEETINGS UP QUICKLY. I WAS CONVINCED THAT THE MEETINGS WOULD BE USEFUL IN PERSUADING ISRAEL OF LEBANESE INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES, AS WELL AS LIMITATIONS ON HOW FAR LEBANON COULD GO IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. SALEM AGREED THAT THE MEETINGS WOULD TAKE PLACE PROMPTLY.

10. I SUMMED UP BY SAYING THAT WE APPEARED TO BE AT AN IMPASSE ON THE TWO MAJOR SECURITY ISSUES, AND PARTICULARLY HADDAD. I HAD TOLD SHAMIR THAT

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LEBANON MIGHT TRY TO TAKE CARE OF THIS PROBLEM BY PERSUADING HADDAD TO LEAVE ON HIS OWN; SHAMIR'S RESPONSE WAS THAT ISRAEL WOULD TRY TO "PERSUADE" HIM TO STAY. I NOTED THAT HADDAD HAD SAID PUBLICLY MARCH 27 THAT HE WOULD NOT BE THE LAST OBSTACLE TO AN AGREEMENT AND WOULD LEAVE IF THAT WAS WHAT WAS REQUIRED. I SAID THAT THE LEBANESE SHOULD KEEP THIS OPTION IN MIND AND PURSUE CONTACT WITH HADDAD. WADIA HADDAD SAID MAJOR HADDAD'S PUBLIC STATEMENT WAS CLEVER. HE SAID HE WOULD NOT BE AN OBSTACLE, BUT HE HAD ALSO SAID THAT THOSE WHO THOUGHT OF HIM AS AN OBSTACLE WERE WRONG.

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11. FATTAL ASKED ME WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF SYRIA DID NOT WITHDRAW. I SAID THAT SHAMIR HAD ASKED THE SAME THING. I HAD TOLD SHAMIR THAT WE HAD ASSURANCES THAT SYRIA ACCEPTED THE CONCEPT OF SYRIA WITHDRAWAL. I ALSO SAID I HAD TOLD SHAMIR THAT IF SYRIA DID NOT WITHDRAW, IT WAS UNDERSTOOD THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT WITHDRAW. FATTAL SAID THIS WAS ACCURATE BUT THE SYRIANS COULD INSIST ON LEBANON NOT MAKING CERTAIN CONCESSIONS TO THE ISRAELIS AS A PRICE FOR SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL, IN WHICH CASE THE AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE TO BE RENEGOTIATED. I SAID THAT WAS A WRONG CONCLUSION. LEBANON HAD TO DECIDE ITS OWN LIMITS, AND COULD NOT GRANT SYRIA A VETO OVER ITS NEGOTIATING POSITIONS. I PRESUMED THAT LEBANON WAS IN CONTACT WITH SYRIA TO MAKE SURE THAT SYRIA DID NOT BALK AT THE LAST MINUTE. HADDAD SAID THAT THIS WAS THE CASE. WE ALL ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE SYRIAN FACTOR REMAINED UNCERTAIN.

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12. SALEM ASKED HOW WE WOULD GET OVER THE TWO "RED LINES" OF HADDAD AND OPERATIONAL PATROLS. I SAID THAT I HOPED THE CHIEF-OF-STAFF MEETINGS WOULD DEMONSTRATE LEBANESE CAPABILITIES AND BUILD CONFIDENCE, SO THAT ISRAEL WOULD CHANGE ITS POSITION. SALEM SAID THAT THE WASHINGTON MEETINGS SHOULD HAVE DEMONSTRATED THIS. I AGREED THAT WE BELIEVED THE WASHINGTON NON-PAPER PRESENTED AN ADEQUATE SET OF SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. HOWEVER, THE ISRAELIS DID NOT AGREE. I PRESSED SALEM ON THE HADDAD QUESTION, AND WHETHER SOME INTERIM ARRANGEMENT WAS POSSIBLE WHICH COULD KEEP HIM IN THE SOUTH. I SAID THAT IF LEBANON WAS GOING TO CONCEDE ON THIS ISSUE, I SHOULD KNOW NOW. SALEM SAID LEBANON WOULD NOT CHANGE ITS POSITION.

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13. SALEM AND HADDAD THEN PRESSED ME HARDER THAN ON ANY PREVIOUS OCCASION ON WHAT THE UNITED STATES WAS GOING TO DO TO BREAK THE IMPASSE. SALEM SAID THAT HE HAD JUST BEEN TO THE PARLIAMENT ON SATURDAY. THE MOOD WAS RESTLESS. CONFIDENCE IN THE U.S. COMMITMENT WAS ERODING, AND FURTHER DELAY WOULD BRING MORE EROSION. THE LONGER THE DELAY, THE MORE REBELLIOUS PARLIAMENT WILL BECOME, TO THE POINT OF REFUSING TO ACCEPT AN AGREEMENT. PARLIAMENT WAS ALREADY BEGINNING TO "ZERO IN" ON WAZZAN AND SALEM FOR CRITICISM. MEMBERS ABSOLUTELY COULD NOT BELIEVE THAT THE U.S. COULD NOT PRODUCE ISRAELI AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE TWO REMAINING ISSUES. SALEM

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NOTED THAT SHIA LEADER BARRI HAD THREATENED CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IF ISRAEL DID NOT RELEASE SHAYKH HARB. WHEN I ASKED WHETHER THIS WOULD BE CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE DIRECTED AT THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES AS WELL AS AT THE ISRAELI OCCUPATION, SALEM SHRUGGED. SALEM SAID THAT ISRAEL MUST UNDERSTAND FROM THE HIGHEST LEVELS IN WASHINGTON THAT LEBANON CANNOT GIVE ON EITHER HADDAD OR IDF OPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES AND THAT THERE WILL BE SERIOUS EROSION IN GEMAYEL'S CONSENSUS FOR A GOOD AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL IF THERE IS FURTHER DELAY. SALEM SAID THAT HIS REFERENCE TO A TWO-WEEK DEADLINE HAD BEEN UNINTENTIONAL, BUT THAT HE NOW BELIEVED IT WAS NOT FAR FROM THE MARK.

--

14. SALEM PRESSED, "WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?" HE SAID THAT LEBANON WAS BEGINNING TO ANALYZE WHAT IT SHOULD DO IF NOTHING CHANGES BY, SAY, MID-APRIL. SALEM NOTED SARCASTICALLY THAT SAUDI ARABIA--ONE OF THE GREATEST FRIENDS OF THE U.S.--

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WAS THE FIRST TO THROW STONES AT LEBANON. A LEBANESE "LOSS OF FACE" IS A LOSS OF FACE FOR THE U.S. WADIA HADDAD ADDED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT WE FULLY UNDERSTAND THAT LEBANON WAS CONCERNED THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT NOT BE WORKING AND THAT ISRAEL WAS ACTUALLY SEEKING A STALEMATE.

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15. I SAID THAT I HAD NOTICED INCREASING ISRAELI PRESS SPECULATION ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL, THIS TIME TO THE AWALI RIVER. GEMAYEL HAD CONFIRMED TO ME THAT THIS WAS NOT AN ACCEPTABLE OUTCOME AND THIS WAS ALSO THE U.S. POSITION. SALEM SAID THIS WOULD MEAN PARTITION. ALTHOUGH THERE WERE PRESS REPORTS THAT SEVERAL JUNIOR CABINET MEMBERS HAD RECOMMENDED A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL, I REPORTED THAT NO ISRAELI MINISTER HAD RAISED THIS PROSPECT WITH ME.

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16. FINALLY, I DID SOME FURTHER PROBING ABOUT A MINISTERIAL-LEVEL MEETING. I SAID THAT SHAMIR AND ARENS WERE ANXIOUS FOR TALKS WITH SALEM. I SAID THAT I THOUGHT SUCH TALKS WOULD BE USEFUL AND STOOD A REASONABLE CHANCE OF REMAINING CONFIDENTIAL. HOWEVER, IT WAS UP TO LEBANON TO DECIDE WHEN SUCH MEETINGS MIGHT BE POSSIBLE, AND I URGED SALEM TO DISCUSS THIS AGAIN WITH GEMAYEL. SALEM WAS THOUGHTFUL BUT NON-COMMITTAL. HADDAD WAS STRONGLY NEGATIVE SAYING A LEAK COULD DO IRREPARABLE DAMAGE. DILLON

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Date Printed: 10/22/1996

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DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, US, IS, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: MEETING WITH FONMIN

SHAMIR, MARCH 27

1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY. MARCH 27 MEETING WITH FONMIN SHAMIR
BEGAN WITH A VERY GLOOMY REVIEW BY THE ISRAELI NEGOTIAT-
ING TEAM OF THE PREVIOUS NEGOTIATING SESSIONS AT
NETANYA. THEY WERE VERY DISAPPOINTED NOT ONLY BY
LEBANESE FONMIN SALEM'S "THREAT" THAT LEBANON WOULD
EXPLORE ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF PRODUCING WITHDRAWALS
IN TWO WEEKS, BUT ALSO BY SOME LEBANESE BACKSLIDING

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ON WHAT THE ISRAELIS HAD THOUGHT WERE AGREED TEXTS.
I EXPLAINED SALEM'S STATEMENT AS AN ATTEMPT TO IM-
PART A SENSE OF URGENCY, NOT AN ULTIMATUM. DRAPER
GAVE A MORE COMPLETE PICTURE OF WHAT HAD BEEN
ACCOMPLISHED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS TO DATE. WE DID,
HOWEVER, ACKNOWLEDGE THAT LEBANESE NEGOTIATORS DID
NOT ALWAYS HAVE CLEAR INSTRUCTIONS AND THAT THEIR
SUGGESTIONS WERE THEREFORE SOMETIMES OVERRULED.

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3. I THEN GAVE AN ASSESSMENT OF WHERE THINGS WERE FOLLOWING MY MOST RECENT TALKS IN LEBANON, WITH EMPHASIS ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. I MADE UNMISTAKABLY CLEAR THAT LEBANON COULD NOT ACCEPT EITHER HADDAD AS MILITARY COMMANDER OR AN OPERATIONAL ISRAELI ROLE IN THE SOUTH. IF ISRAEL INSISTED ON THESE POSITIONS, WE WERE IN FOR A PROLONGED IMPASSE, WHICH I WAS CONVINCED WAS IN NO ONE'S INTEREST. SHAMIR'S RESPONSE WAS THE FAMILIAR ONE: ISRAEL NEEDED GUARANTEES THAT THE PLO WOULD NOT RETURN TO SOUTHERN LEBANON. ISRAEL HAD ORIGINALLY SUGGESTED FIVE WARNING STATIONS AND THEN UNILATERAL ISRAELI PATROLS AS GUARANTEES, BUT EACH WAS REJECTED. NOW, ISRAEL WAS SUGGESTING JOINT PATROLS AND HADDAD AND THIS ALSO WAS BEING REJECTED. SHAMIR SAID THAT ISRAEL COULD NOT BE CONVINCED THAT LEBANON WOULD BE READY IN EIGHT WEEKS TO TAKE ON THE SECURITY FUNCTION ALONE.

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4. I RE-EXPLAINED THAT THE NEED TO PRODUCE SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL AND MAINTAIN LEBANESE INTERNAL CONSENSUS MADE BOTH ISRAELI SUGGESTIONS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE LEBANESE. DRAPER AND I THEN WENT BACK OVER THE FULL

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SECURITY PACKAGE WHICH WE WERE SUGGESTING--NOT JUST THE LAF, BUT CLOSE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE LAF AND THE IDF, WITH HADDAD'S FORCES FULLY INTEGRATED, AND FULL U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT. IN THIS CONTEXT, I REPORTED GEMAYEL'S WILLINGNESS TO HAVE IMMEDIATE MEETINGS BETWEEN CHIEFS OF STAFF [] WHILE WELCOMING THESE MEETINGS, SHAMIR SAID THE ENTIRE PACKAGE CONSISTED OF PROMISES, WHILE ISRAEL NEEDED GUARANTEES.

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5. I ALSO PASSED ON GEMAYEL'S COMMENTS ON THE NEED FOR AN URGENT RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM, IN ORDER TO AVOID EROSION IN HIS INTERNAL SUPPORT FOR A GOOD AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL. SHAMIR SAID ISRAEL IS READY FOR A QUICK AGREEMENT, BUT ITS BASIC SECURITY NEEDS MUST BE MET. END SUMMARY.

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6. I MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR FOR TWO HOURS SUNDAY, MARCH 27, TO REVIEW MY DISCUSSIONS IN BEIRUT. MFA REPRESENTATIVES AND GENERAL EINAN AND COL. ELON ATTENDED ON THE ISRAELI SIDE. I WAS ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR DRAPER, DCM FLATEN, KRECZKO AND HARE. THE MEETING AFFORDED AN OPPORTUNITY FOR A FULL AND BUSINESSLIKE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS THOUGH NO SUBSTANTIVE

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RESULTS WERE ACHIEVED.

REVIEW OF THE FRIDAY TRIPARTITE MEETING IN NETANYA

7. KIMCHE SAID THAT THE FRIDAY TRIPARTITE MEETING IN NETANYA UNFORTUNATELY HAD NOT RESULTED IN ANY BREAKTHROUGHS. HE SAID THAT THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS WAS "FRUSTRATING" AND WAS GOING VERY SLOWLY. HE OBSERVED THAT EVERY TIME AN AD REFERENDUM DRAFT WAS

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FROM HABIB

AGREED, THE LEBANESE SUBSEQUENTLY BACKSLIDED. HE CITED IN PARTICULAR THE PROBLEM WHICH HAD ARISEN AT THE LAST MEETING OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON MUTUAL RELATIONS, WHERE AMB. KHARMA HAD INTRODUCED NEW IDEAS

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CONCERNING THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD (NAMELY, THAT LEBANON WOULD NOT IMPORT FROM ISRAEL GOODS WHICH IT EXPORTED TO OTHER ARAB STATES). WHILE KHARMA HAD EXPLAINED THE NEED TO PRECLUDE AN ARAB BOYCOTT, THE ISRAELI SIDE HAD QUICKLY NOTED THAT THE LEBANESE GUIDELINE COULD EFFECTIVELY PREVENT ANY TRADE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON. KIMCHE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT PREVIOUSLY THERE HAD BEEN AN AGREEMENT ON WITHDRAWING LEBANESE RESERVATIONS WITH RESPECT TO ISRAEL ON VARIOUS MULTINATIONAL CONVEN-

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TIONS. BUT NOW, KIMCHE SAID, KHARMA HAD EXPLAINED THAT LEBANON WOULD ONLY CANCEL THESE RESERVATIONS AS SPECIFIC LINKS, SUCH AS IN THE AREA OF POSTAL EXCHANGES, WERE ESTABLISHED.

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8. KIMCHE SAID THE LEBANESE WERE "CONSTANTLY WHITTLED DOWN THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT TO THE BAREST MINIMUM". ISRAEL WAS TRYING TO BE POSITIVE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. BUT THE LEBANESE, HE CLAIMED, WERE SEEKING TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THIS FLEXIBILITY. ELI RUBINSTEIN SAID THE SAME ATMOSPHERE HAD PREVAILED IN HIS SUBCOMMITTEE (ON DRAFTING THE ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT) LAST FRIDAY AND THAT IN HIS VIEW THE AGREEMENT WAS LOOKING MORE AND MORE LIKE A "NEW ARMISTICE AGREEMENT". KIMCHE CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT HE THOUGHT ISRAELIS WOULD HAVE TO PUT A LIMIT ON THEIR CONCESSIONS AND NOT BUDGE ANY MORE IN VIEW OF THE LEBANESE TACTICS.

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9. DRAPER SAID THAT THE LEBANESE SEEMED TO HAVE A DIFFERENT CONCEPT OF WHAT AD REFERENDUM MEANT. WE AGREED THEY COULD BE FRUSTRATING. ONE OF THE PROBLEMS WAS THAT THE LEBANESE DID NOT ALWAYS HAVE A FULLY COORDINATED POSITION. HE THOUGHT, HOWEVER, THAT KIMCHE'S STRONG REJOINDER TO THE LEBANESE POSITIONS PROPOSED ON FRIDAY MIGHT HAVE AN EFFECT. ON THE POSITIVE SIDE, DRAPER NOTED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE LEBANESE AGREEMENT TO MEETINGS OF EXPERTS, AND THAT THE LEBANESE DID NOT HAVE ANY PROBLEM WITH SUCH MEETINGS BEING PUBLICIZED. THIS WAS A GOOD SIGN IN TERMS OF ESTABLISHING A SOLID BASIS FOR THE INTERIM PERIOD AND BEYOND, DRAPER OBSERVED. I SAID THAT I HAD TOLD THE LEBANESE THAT ONCE THEY HAD PUT SOME-

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THING ON THE TABLE AND IT HAD BEEN AGREED TO, IT SHOULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO FURTHER REVIEW. I TOLD SHAMIR THAT I WOULD CONTINUE TO WORK ON THIS PROBLEM WITH THE LEBANESE.

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10. IN COMMENTING ON THE MILITARY SUBCOMMITTEE, GEN. EINAN SAID THE ATMOSPHERE WAS NOT SO BAD BUT THERE HAD BEEN NO PROGRESS OR AGREEMENT ON ANY SUBJECT. HE SAID THAT UNDER THE LEBANESE CONCEPT, HADDAD'S FORCES WOULD BE A SMALL PROPORTION OF THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE; ISRAELI LIAISON OFFICERS WOULD NOT BE ATTACHED TO THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE; SPECIAL GATES WOULD NOT BE OPENED FOR THE MOVEMENT OF ISRAELI PERSONNEL ACROSS THE BORDER; AND THE OPERATIONS CENTERS WOULD ONLY SERVE AS A PLACE FOR COMMITTEE MEETINGS. EINAN SAID HE HAD OTHER EXAMPLES, BUT THESE SUFFICED TO SHOW "NEGATIVE" LEBANESE ATTITUDES.

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11. DRAPER CLARIFIED SOME OF THE POINTS OF DISCUSSION ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS DURING THE FRIDAY MEETING IN NETANYA. HE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THE LEBANESE POSITION ON "GATES" WAS DIFFERENT FROM THAT DESCRIBED BY EINAN. HE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THE LEBANESE HAD MADE CLEAR THAT THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE WOULD BE BASED ON THE INTEGRATION OF HADDAD'S PERSONNEL AND THAT THESE ELEMENTS WOULD IN FACT CONSTITUTE THE NUCLEUS OF THE BRIGADE. FURTHERMORE, THE LEBANESE HAD ACCEPTED THE PRINCIPLE THAT OFFICERS AND RECRUITS INTO THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE WOULD COME FROM THE SOUTH. DRAPER ALSO EXPLAINED THAT, WHILE IT WAS PERHAPS NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR, THERE WAS LEBANESE BASIC AGREEMENT TO HAVING THE OPERATION CENTER MANNED ON A 24-HOUR BASIS. I REINFORCED THE POINT

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EXDIS

FROM HABIB

THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION THAT THE OPERATIONS
CENTER WOULD OPERATE AROUND THE CLOCK.

LEBANESE "RED LINES"

12. I SAID THAT THERE WERE A NUMBER OF POINTS ON
WHICH THERE WAS AGREEMENT IN THE AREA OF SECURITY
ARRANGEMENTS. THESE INCLUDED: A SUBSTANTIAL
SECURITY ZONE (FAR BEYOND THOSE NOTED IN THE ARMIS-
TICE AGREEMENT); LIMITATIONS ON WEAPONS AND
MANPOWER WITHIN THE ZONE; A SOLID SET OF SUPER-
VISORY MECHANISMS, INCLUDING THE MILITARY COMMITTEE
AND TEAMS; INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION; ON-THE-GROUND,
FACE-TO-FACE CONTACTS AND EXERCISES; INTEGRATION OF

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HADDAD'S FORCES INTO THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE; AND
AERIAL SURVEILLANCE. WHEN YOU PUT THIS PACKAGE TO-
GETHER, AND ADDED THE AMERICAN COMMITMENT TO ITS
IMPLEMENTATION, I SAID THAT IT PROVIDED FOR A
SOLID SYSTEM FOR VERIFICATION AND CHECKING THE SITUA-
TION IN THE SECURITY ZONE. I THEN NOTED THAT THERE
WERE BASICALLY TWO SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCES IN THE
LEBANESE AND ISRAELI CONCEPTS. THE FIRST CENTERED
ON SA'AD HADDAD AND HIS COMMAND OF THE TERRITORIAL
BRIGADE. I TOLD SHAMIR EMPHATICALLY THAT THIS WAS
A LEBANESE "RED LINE", ON WHICH I DID NOT EXPECT
ANY LEBANESE GIVE. THIS HAD BEEN CONFIRMED TO ME
AT ALL LEVELS, INCLUDING EVEN BY THOSE LEBANESE

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WHO WERE PERSONALLY FRIENDLY WITH HADDAD. I ALSO POINTEDLY MENTIONED SEVERAL TIMES THAT THE LEBANESE WERE CONVINCED HADDAD, AS A LEBANESE PATRIOT, WAS PREPARED TO RELINQUISH HIS POST BUT WAS CONSTRAINED BY THE ISRAELIS. SHAMIR DID NOT EXPLICITLY SAY THAT HADDAD WAS A "RED LINE" FOR ISRAEL BUT RESTATED ISRAEL'S POSITION THAT HIS CONTINUED PRESENCE IN THE SOUTH WAS "VERY IMPORTANT" TO ISRAEL. WHEN I NOTED SHAMIR HAD TOLD THE SECRETARY THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT FORCE HADDAD TO REMAIN, SHAMIR REVEALINGLY REPLIED THAT ISRAEL WOULD THEN HAVE "TO CONVINCE HADDAD TO STAY IN HIS PRESENT POSITION".

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13. SECOND, THE LEBANESE COULD NOT AGREE TO A VISIBLE RESIDUAL ISRAELI PRESENCE IN SOUTH LEBANON AND ALSO COULD NOT ACCEPT THAT THE JOINT ISRAELI-LEBANESE TEAMS WOULD HAVE OPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES. I SAID THAT THE NUMBERS AND SIZES OF THE TEAMS COULD BE NEGOTIATED BUT THERE WAS A CLEAR DIFFERENCE BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL ON THE FUNCTION OF THESE TEAMS.

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I MADE IT CATEGORICALLY CLEAR THAT THE LEBANESE COULD NOT ACCEPT AN OPERATIONAL FUNCTION. SHAMIR AGREED THERE WAS A DEFINITE DIFFERENCE ON THIS POINT, BUT THOUGHT THE SECRETARY HAD DURING THE WASHINGTON DISCUSSIONS AGREED TO THE CONCEPT OF JOINT PATROLS, EVEN IF THEY WERE NOT SO IDENTIFIED. I SAID THAT WHILE THE SECRETARY HAD SUPPORTED JOINT TEAMS TO VERIFY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT AND MAXIMUM IDF/LAF COOPERATION, HE HAD NOT ENDORSED JOINT OPERATIONS AGAINST THE PLO.

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MILITARY [HIGH-LEVEL CONTACTS

14. [

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15. I ALSO SAID THAT I THOUGHT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO HAVE MEETINGS AT THE CHIEF-OF-STAFF LEVEL AND STATED GEMAYEL HAD ALSO AGREED THAT MEETINGS SHOULD TAKE PLACE BETWEEN GENERALS TANNOUS AND LEVY TO TALK

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ABOUT THE MILITARY PROBLEMS. WHILE SHAMIR AGREED THAT SUCH MEETINGS WOULD BE USEFUL, HE CAREFULLY NOTED THAT ONE SHOULD NOT ANTICIPATE CONCRETE RESULTS AS LDNG AS THE SECURITY CONCEPTS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON WERE SO FAR APART. SHAMIR

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FROM HABIB

PREDICTABLY STRESSED THE NEED FOR SECURITY GUARANTEES IN THE SOUTH, ESPECIALLY AS LEBANON AND THE UNITED STATES HAD REJECTED PREVIOUS ISRAELI PROPOSALS, I.E. OBSERVATION POSTS AND ISRAELI PATROLS. I ARGUED IT WAS STILL IMPORTANT TO BUILD CONFIDENCE AND UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE PARTIES AT THE PROFESSIONAL LEVEL.

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16. SHAMIR TOOK THIS OCCASION TO SAY THAT IT WOULD ALSO BE HELPFUL TO HAVE MEETINGS AT A POLITICAL LEVEL. I TOLD SHAMIR THAT I HAD RAISED THIS ISSUE WITH THE LEBANESE BUT THEY WERE CONCERNED THAT SUCH A MEETING WOULD BE LEAKED. THE LEBANESE HAD CITED THE PREVIOUS EXAMPLES OF AMIN GEMAYEL'S WORKING

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PAPER WITH SHARON AND BASHIR GEMAYEL'S MEETINGS WITH THE ISRAELI LEADERSHIP AS AN INDICATION OF THIS CONCERN. THE ISRAELIS THEN ASKED WHY WAS IT NECESSARY TO KEEP SUCH A MEETING SECRET IN ANY EVENT. I REPLIED THAT THERE WERE OBVIOUS LEBANESE POLITICAL CDNSTRAINTS AT THIS TIME. HOWEVER, I SAID I FELT THAT SUCH A MEETING COULD BE ARRANGED LATER, BUT THAT THIS WAS NOT THE MOMENT.

--
SALEM'S ULTIMATUM

17. AT VARIOUS POINTS IN THE CONVERSATION, THE ISRAELIS DESCRIBED THE NEGATIVE ATTITUDE OF THE LEBANESE LEADERSHIP, FOCUSING PARTICULARLY ON GHASSAN TUENI BUT ALSO REFERRING TO SALEM'S PUBLIC "ULTIMATUM". I SAID THAT I HAD DISCUSSED THIS MATTER WITH SALEM AND HAD EMPHASIZED TO HIM THAT I DID NOT PERSONALLY LIKE THE IDEA OF SETTING DEAD-LINES. SALEM HAD RESPONDED THAT HE HAD BEEN SPEAK-ING EXTEMPORANEOUSLY AND THAT HE HAD NOT MEANT TO ISSUE AN ULTIMATUM. WHAT HE WAS TRYING TO SAY WAS THAT IF THERE WAS NO PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, THERE WOULD BE A DETERIORATION IN THE SITUATION. KIMCHE SPECIFICALLY ASKED WHAT SALEM HAD MEANT BY RESORTING TO "ALTERNATIVE MEANS". I REPLIED THAT I HAD AVOIDED ASKING SALEM WHAT HE MEANT BY THAT PHRASE AND HAD INSTEAD FOCUSED ON THE NEED TO AVOID SET-TING DEADLINES PUBLICLY. THIS WAS A TIME, I EMPHASIZED, FOR QUIET DIPLOMACY BEHIND THE SCENES.

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SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL

18. SHAMIR ASKED WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF THE SYRIANS

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DID NOT LEAVE AFTER AN AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON. I RESPONDED THAT IT HAD BEEN UNDERSTOOD ALL ALONG THAT IF THERE WAS NO SYRIAN AND PLO WITHDRAWAL, THERE WOULD BE NO ISRAELI

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DOC NUMBER: 83JERUSA01097

CHANNEL: n/a

WITHDRAWAL. THE LEBANESE FULLY UNDERSTOOD THAT RETURN OF POWS/MIAS/AND MISSING, AS WELL AS PLO AND SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL, WERE A SINE QUA NON TO THE AGREEMENT.

--

ISRAELI POWS

19. I TOLD SHAMIR THAT I HAD SEEN AMBASSADOR PAGANELLI IN BEIRUT ON FRIDAY TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE OF ISRAELI POWS, INCLUDING PARTICULARLY THEIR TREATMENT AS HAD BEEN DESCRIBED TO ME BY DEFENSE MINISTER ARENS EARLIER THIS WEEK. I ASSURED SHAMIR THAT PAGANELLI WOULD BE RAISING THIS ISSUE AGAIN WITH THE SYRIANS, AND WITH THE ICRC REPRESENTATIVE WHO WAS NOT PRESENTLY IN DAMASCUS. I ALSO SAID THAT FORMER PRESIDENT CARTER HAD RAISED THE POW AND MIA ISSUES WITH PRESIDENT ASSAD DIRECTLY. COVEY

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*** Current Classification ***

UNCLASSIFIED

Date Printed: 10/22/1996

DOC NUMBER: 83LONDON05972

CHANNEL: n/a

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EXCISE

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EXD **DECAPTIONED**

CAIRO PASS TO AS VELIOTES; ROME PASS TO AMB DRAPER

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, US, IS, XF

SUBJ: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH LEBANESE FONMIN

- SALEM, MARCH 19

ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY: FONMIN SALEM PROVIDED ME MARCH 19 WITH
A READ-OUT ON HIS TALKS WITH HUSSEIN, PYM, KHADDAM AND
PALESTINIAN WALID KHALIDI OVER THE PAST TWO DAYS.

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HIS TALK WITH HUSSEIN WAS BRIEF AND GENERAL, ALTHOUGH
HE DESCRIBED IN VERY POSITIVE TERMS TO HUSSEIN THE
US SUPPORT FOR LEBANON IN THE RECENT WASHINGTON SESSIONS.
HE SAID HUSSEIN APPEARED PLEASED BY WHAT HE HEARD.
SALEM PROVIDED PYM WITH A MUCH MORE THOROUGH BRIEFING
OF THE STATUS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, INCLUDING AGAIN A
POSITIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE WASHINGTON TALKS. IN
DISCUSSIONS OF THE BROADER PEACE PROCESS, PYM HAD LEFT
SALEM WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT THE UK BELIEVED THE US

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WAS PUSHING HUSSEIN "TOO FAR, TOO FAST". ACCORDING TO SALEM, PYM WAS VERY PROTECTIVE OF HUSSEIN AND QUESTIONED WHETHER HUSSEIN SHOULD STEP FORWARD WITHOUT SOMETHING MORE TANGIBLE IN HAND.

3. SALEM HAD A MUCH MORE SUBSTANTIVE, AND USEFUL, EXCHANGE WITH SYRIAN FONMIN KHADDAM. KHADDAM REPEATED UNAMBIGUOUSLY AND EMPHATICALLY THAT SYRIA WILL WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH ISRAEL. KHADDAM REFUSED TO COMMENT ON PLO WITHDRAWAL, SAYING IT WAS MATTER EXCLUSIVELY FOR ARAFAT. KHADDAM ADDED THAT SYRIA WILL NOT TAKE ANY PLO FIGHTERS. SALEM HAD ALSO USED THE MEETING TO STRESS THAT LEBANON MUST MAKE ITS OWN DECISIONS IN THE ISRAEL/LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS IN ORDER TO ACCOMPLISH ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. HE PROVIDED KHADDAM WITH A VERY GENERAL READ-OUT OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND KHADDAM DID NOT RAISE ANY OBJECTIONS. SALEM ALSO RAISED THE PRISONER ISSUE, BUT KHADDAM DID NOT COMMENT. A SEPARATE CONVERSATION WITH PALESTINIAN WALID KHALIDI PRODUCED, IN SALEM'S WORDS, "NOTHING NEW". KHALIDI REPEATED THAT THE PALESTINIAN FIGHTERS ARE PREPARED TO LEAVE LEBANON, BUT HE DID NOT HAVE ANY ADDITIONAL DETAILS.

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4. I PROVIDED SALEM WITH A BRIEF SUMMARY OF EVENTS IN WASHINGTON SINCE HIS DEPARTURE. I SAID THAT WE HAD RECEIVED A PRELIMINARY ISRAELI RESPONSE TO OUR NON-PAPER, AND THAT ISRAEL CONTINUED TO SEEK SOME RESIDUAL ISRAELI PRESENCE AND THE RETENTION OF HADDAD IN SOUTHERN LEBANON. WE HAD ALREADY RESPONDED IN A PRELIMINARY FASHION WHICH INDICATED THE UNACCEPTABILITY OF EACH OF THESE, AND I WOULD DISCUSS THE ISSUES IN MORE DETAIL WITH THE ISRAELIS. I SAID OUR FOCUS WOULD REMAIN THE SECURITY PROPOSALS DEVELOPED IN WASHINGTON, WHICH SALEM CONFIRMED ARE ACCEPTABLE TO LEBANON. END SUMMARY.

5. I MET WITH FONMIN SALEM FOR ONE AND A HALF HOURS, MARCH 19 IN ORDER TO HEAR HIS ACCOUNT OF HIS MEETINGS IN LEBANON AND TO BRIEF HIM ON EVENTS IN WASHINGTON FOLLOWING HIS DEPARTURE. SALEM WAS ACCOMPANIED BY LEBANON'S AMBASSADOR IN LONDON, AND HIS PERSONAL ASSISTANT. AMBASSADOR VIETS, KRECKO AND HOOPER WERE WITH ME.

6. HUSSEIN. SALEM MET BRIEFLY WITH KING HUSSEIN ON MARCH 18 IN ORDER TO BRIEF HIM ON THE STATUS OF THE ISRAEL/LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS AND THE RECENT MEETINGS IN

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WASHINGTON. SALEM KEPT HIS BRIEFING OF HUSSEIN VERY GENERAL. HE WAS VERY POSITIVE IN HIS DESCRIPTION OF THE MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON, AND SAID THAT THE US PROPOSALS, WHICH WERE DESIGNED TO SUBSTITUTE FOR ANY RESIDUAL ISRAELI PRESENCE IN LEBANON, WERE AIMED AT INCREASING THE COMPETENCE AND CREDIBILITY OF THE LAF.

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EXDIS

CAIRO PASS TO AS VELIOTES; ROME PASS TO AMB DRAPER

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

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TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, US, IS, XF
SUBJ: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH LEBANESE FONMIN

7. UK. SALEM ALSO MET WITH UK FOREIGN SECRETARY PYM ON MARCH 18. HE PROVIDED PYM WITH A DETAILED BRIEFING OF THE TALKS IN WASHINGTON AND THE STATUS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE HAD THANKED THE UK FOR ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THE MNF, BUT HAD NOT REQUESTED AN ENLARGEMENT OR EXTENSION OF THE CONTINGENT. SALEM BELIEVED THAT IN VIEW OF THE UK'S DIFFICULTY IN

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DECIDING WHETHER TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE MNF, IT WAS BETTER TO WAIT UNTIL IT WAS CLOSER TO THE TIME FOR A UK DECISION AND THERE WAS DEMONSTRABLE PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE ASKING FOR AN EXTENSION IN THE UK CONTRIBUTION.

8. SALEM ALSO DISCUSSED THE PROSPECTS FOR KING HUSSEIN'S ENTRY INTO THE PEACE PROCESS WITH PYM. ACCORDING TO SALEM, PYM'S MAIN CONCERN WAS THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS PUSHING HUSSEIN TOO HARD, TOO FAST. PYM HAD SUGGESTED THAT HUSSEIN SHOULD ASK FOR SOME QUID FROM ISRAEL IN ADVANCE OF JOINING THE NEGOTIATIONS. IN GENERAL, SALEM SAID THAT PYM'S ATTITUDE WAS VERY PROTECTIVE OF HUSSEIN. (COMMENT: AS REPORTED SEPTEL, I PROBED, SOMETIMES RATHER BLUNTLY, WITH SIR JOHN LEAHY FOR CONFIRMATION OF THIS UK ATTITUDE. LEAHY MAINTAINED THAT UK SUPPORT FOR THE REAGAN INITIATIVE WAS SOLID AND IN PARTICULAR THAT THE UK WAS CONSISTENTLY TELLING THE ARABS THAT THEY COULD NOT EXPECT ANY CHANGES, SUCH AS ENDORSEMENT OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION, IN THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE. END COMMENT.)

9. SYRIA. SALEM MET WITH SYRIAN FONMIN KHADDAM THIS MORNING. SALEM DESCRIBED THE MEETING AS VERY GOOD. HE HAD CONCENTRATED ON TWO GENERAL PRINCIPLES CONCERNING THE ISRAEL/LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS. FIRST, SALEM TOLD KHADDAM THAT THE ISRAEL/LEBANON NEGOTIATION IS EXCLUSIVELY A LEBANESE MATTER. AFTER EIGHT YEARS OF HAVING THE ARABS TAKE DECISIONS IN LEBANON, LEBANON WOULD DECIDE ITS OWN FUTURE. LEBANON WOULD GO AS FAR AS IT JUDGED NECESSARY TO END THE OCCUPATION OF ITS COUNTRY. SECOND, SALEM TOLD KHADDAM THAT NEVERTHELESS,

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LEBANON WOULD KEEP SYRIA'S INTERESTS IN MIND AND WOULD NOT DO ANYTHING WHICH WOULD THREATEN SYRIAN SECURITY. SALEM SAID THAT KHADDAM CONCEDED THAT SECURITY WAS SYRIA'S SOLE LEGITIMATE INTEREST. SALEM DID NOT DETAIL THE CONTENTS OF US SECURITY PROPOSALS, DESPITE KHADDAM'S REPEATED QUESTIONS. SALEM STUCK TO THE GENERAL LINE THAT THE US PROPOSALS WERE DESIGNED TO STRENGTHEN THE COMPETENCE OF THE LAF IN SOUTHERN LEBANON IN ORDER TO RENDER ANY RESIDUAL ISRAELI PRESENCE UNNECESSARY. SALEM ALSO TOLD KHADDAM THAT THE US HAD BEEN VERY SUPPORTIVE IN THE WASHINGTON MEETINGS OF LEBANON'S POSITION THAT ISRAELI BASES IN LEBANON AND RETENTION OF HADDAD IN SOTHERN LEBANON WERE EACH UNACCEPTABLE.

10. SALEM ASKED KHADDAM IN VERY STRAIGHTFORWARD TERMS ABOUT SYRIA'S WILLINGNESS TO WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON. KHADDAM WAS UNAMBIGUOUS AND EMPHATIC: ONCE LEBANON AND ISRAEL REACH AGREEMENT CONCERNING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, SYRIA WILL DECIDE "WITHIN ONE-HALF HOUR" TO WITHDRAW. SYRIA WILL WITHDRAW SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH ISRAEL, AND NOT "IN LIGHT OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL" AS CONTEMPLATED IN THE FEZ COMMUNIQUE. (SALEM SAID THAT HE PRESSED KHADDAM TO REPEAT THIS AND THAT KHADDAM DID NOT HESITATE TO DO SO.) SYRIA WILL WITHDRAW AND IS EAGER TO DO SO. WHEREAS SYRIA'S ORIGINAL PRESENCE IN LEBANON HAD BEEN WELCOMED BY THE LEBANESE, THIS WAS NO LONGER THE CASE. NEITHER SYRIA NOR ANY OTHER ARAB STATE WOULD DO ANYTHING WHICH WOULD PROVIDE AN EXCUSE FOR ISRAEL TO REMAIN IN OCCUPATION OF

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EXDIS

CAIRO PASS TO AS VELIOTES; ROME PASS TO AMB DRAPER
FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL
, MOPS, MARR, LE, US, IS, XF

SUBJ: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH LEBANESE FONMIN
LEBANON.

11. SALEM ASKED KHADDAM ABOUT THE PLO'S WILLINGNESS
TO WITHDRAW. KHADDAM RESPONDED THAT THIS DECISION
WAS EXCLUSIVELY ARAFAT'S. KHADDAM
SAID THAT SYRIA WOULD NOT ACCEPT ANY

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OF THE PLO FIGHTERS FROM LEBANON. ACCORDING TO
KHADDAM, LEBANON WOULD HAVE TO MAKE A PRESENT OF THESE
INDIVIDUALS TO SOME OF "HABIB'S FRIENDS".

12. I ASKED IF SALEM HAD BRIEFED KHADDAM ON THE
MUTUAL RELATIONS ASPECT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. SALEM
SAID THAT HE HAD TOLD KHADDAM THAT THE WASHINGTON
MEETINGS CONCENTRATED PRIMARILY ON SECURITY MATTERS,
SINCE THIS NOW SEEMED TO BE THE PREDOMINANT ISRAELI
CONCERN. ON MUTUAL RELATIONS, SALEM HAD EXPLAINED
THE CONCEPT OF A SIX MONTH DEFERRAL OF THE NEGOTIATION
OF ANY FORMAL AGREEMENT AND OF ITS NEGOTIATION IN A
TRIPARTITE COMMITTEE (US/ISRAEL/LEBANON). KHADDAM WAS

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CHANNEL: n/a

VERY CURIOUS ABOUT THE TRIPARTITE COMMITTEE; SALEM HAD SAID US PRESENCE WAS NECESSARY TO OFFSET ISRAELI DEMANDS AND HAD COMPARED THE STRUCTURE TO THE MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSIONS. SALEM HAD ALSO EXPLAINED THAT LEBANON'S POSITION IN THE FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS IN SIX MONTHS WILL DEPEND UPON EVENTS IN THE AREA. LEBANON WILL EXPAND OR CONTRACT ITS POSITIONS IN VIEW OF THE REGIONAL ENVIRONMENT. SALEM DID NOT REPEAT NOT INFORM KHADDAM OF THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS AND GOODS.

13. SALEM SAID THAT KHADDAM DID NOT OBJECT TO ANYTHING WHICH SALEM SAID. SALEM'S GENERAL IMPRESSION WAS THAT SYRIA WILL BE UNDERSTANDING OF LEBANON'S DECISIONS, UNLESS THOSE DECISIONS INTERFERED WITH THE STRATEGIC BALANCE IN THE AREA. IN SALEM'S VIEW, SYRIA WILL ONLY OBJECT IF THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS EXPOSE SYRIAN DEFENSES. SALEM SAID THAT THE ONLY ARRANGEMENT UNDER CONSIDERATION WHICH MIGHT BE INTERPRETED TO DO SO WOULD BE ISRAEL/LEBANON INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION,

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BUT SALEM STRESSED THAT THIS WAS ONLY HIS OWN GUESS AND THAT IT HAD NOT BEEN RAISED BY KHADDAM.

14. I AGREED THAT THE MEETING HAD BEEN VERY USEFUL. IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR LEBANON TO CAREFULLY INFORM SYRIA OF THE GENERAL CONTENTS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL, SO THAT SYRIA WOULD NOT HAVE ANY EXCUSES CONCERNING WITHDRAWAL. I ASKED IF SALEM HAD RAISED THE ISSUE OF ISRAELI PRISONERS AND BODIES HELD BY THE SYRIANS OR PLO. SALEM SAID THAT HE HAD, THAT KHADDAM WAS AWARE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUE, BUT THAT HE HAD GOTTEN NO REAL COMMENT FROM KHADDAM (OTHER THAN TO DERIDE PLO EFFORTS TO NEGOTIATE A PALESTINIAN STATE IN EXCHANGE FOR THE ISRAELI PRISONERS WHICH THEY HELD).

15. PALESTINIANS. SALEM ALSO HAD A BRIEF MEETING WITH WALID KHALIDI, WHICH HE SAID PRODUCED NOTHING NEW. KHALIDI SAID THAT THE GEMAYEL/ARAFAT MEETING HAD BEEN GOOD. KHALIDI THOUGHT THAT THE PALESTINIANS WERE READY TO LEAVE LEBANON. SALEM ALSO DREW MY ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT KHALIDI WAS PUTTING A VERY POSITIVE FACE ON THE ALGIERS MEETING, INCLUDING PUBLICLY. SALEM REFERRED TO KHALIDI'S MARCH 18 INTERVIEW ON BBC, IN WHICH KHALIDI HAD SAID THAT THE PALESTINIANS ACCEPTED THE NOTION OF CONFEDERATION AT ALGIERS AND ALSO OBJECTED TO PARTS OF THE REAGAN INITIATIVE, WITHOUT REJECTING IT.

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16. I THEN GAVE SALEM A VERY BRIEF SUMMARY OF EVENTS
IN WASHINGTON SINCE HIS DEPARTURE. I SAID THAT WE HAD

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EXDIS

CAIRO PASS TO AS VELIOTES; ROME PASS TO AMB DRAPER
FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, US, IS, XF

SUBJ: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH LEBANESE FONMIN

RECEIVED PRELIMINARY ISRAELI COMMENTS ON THE NON-PAPER WHICH WE HAD PROVIDED SALEM. THIS PRELIMINARY RESPONSE HAD AGAIN SUGGESTED RETENTION OF HADDAD IN SOUTHERN LEBANON AND SOME ISRAELI PRESENCE THERE. E HAD RESPONDED IN A PRELIMINARY FASHION AND CLEARLY STATED THAT BOTH THE RETENTION OF HADDAD AND A RESIDUAL

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ISRAELI PRESENCE WERE UNACCEPTABLE. I WOULD ARRIVE IN ISRAEL EVENING OF MARCH 20 TO GIVE THE ISRAELIS MORE DETAILED COMMENTS ON THEIR PRELIMINARY RESPONSE. I EMPHASIZED THAT THE NON-PAPER WHICH WE PUT FORWARD IN WASHINGTON, REMAINED THE PROPOSALS WHICH WE WOULD DISCUSS. SALEM RECONFIRMED THAT THESE PROPOSALS WERE ACCEPTABLE TO LEBANON. I SAID THAT WE WOULD DISCUSS ANY DEVIATIONS IN THESE PROPOSALS WITH LEBANON AND THAT I EXPECTED TO BE IN LEBANON ON MONDAY OR TUESDAY, FOLLOWING MY INITIAL ROUND OF TALKS IN ISRAEL.

17. I MENTIONED TO SALEM THAT TUENI HAD RAISED WITH ROSS THE POSSIBILITY OF CANCELING MONDAY'S SCHEDULED NEGOTIATIONS IN NETANYA. SALEM AGREED WITH OUR JUDGMENT THAT THIS WOULD BE A MISTAKE, AND UNDERTOOK TO SO INFORM HIS GOVERNMENT.

18. SALEM ENDED THE MEETING BY SAYING THAT HE WAS VERY PLEASED BY THE EXTENT OF US SUPPORT FOR LEBANON WHICH HAD BEEN DEMONSTRATED IN WASHINGTON. HOWEVER, IF THE LATEST US PROPOSALS WERE NOT ACCEPTED BY ISRAEL, HE PERSONALLY WOULD HAVE TO CONCLUDE THAT SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IS NOT THE REAL ISSUE, AND THAT ISRAEL IS STALLING FOR "OTHER REASONS". STREATOR

ate Printed: 10/22/1996

DOC NUMBER: 83CAIRO06441

CHANNEL: n/a

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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY

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EX **DECAPTIONED**

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, EG, IS, LE, US, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB MEETING WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK,
- MARCH 2

REF: (A) TEL AVIV 2862; (B) CAIRO 6439

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. AMBASSADOR HABIB, ACCOMPANIED BY DCM (AMBASSADOR WAS WITH FORMER PRESIDENT CARTER), MET WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK AND PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR OSAMA EL-BAZ FOR ABOUT FORTY MINUTES MARCH 2. HABIB EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD COME TO CAIRO TO BRIEF PRESIDENT CARTER AND WANTED TO TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO BRING MUBARAK UP-TO-DATE ON THE STATUS OF LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS.

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3. HABIB THEN PROCEEDED TO BRIEF MUBARAK IN A FRANK AND COMPLETE MANNER ALONG THE LINES OF REFTELS. THROUGHOUT THE CONVERSATION MUBARAK LISTENED INTENTLY, OFFERED SOME QUESTIONS AND SUPPORTIVE COMMENTS, AND AGREED WITHOUT RESERVATION OR ANY TRACE OF CRITICISM WITH THE APPROACH HABIB DESCRIBED HE WAS TAKING AND HABIB'S ASSESSMENT OF THE POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES. THE ATMOSPHERE WAS EXCELLENT -- A MEETING OF FRIENDS WHO SHARE COMMON OBJECTIVES. ONLY ONCE DURING THE

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MEETING DID OSAMA ASK IF THE ISRAELIS UNDERSTOOD THE CRUCIAL NATURE OF THE "TIME ELEMENT." HABIB MADE PLAIN THE USG DID AND THERE WAS NONE OF THE USUAL EGYPTIAN ARGUMENT THAT WE MUST PUSH HARDER AND FASTER WITH THE ISRAELIS.

4. AFTER HIS REVIEW OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, HABIB TOLD MUBARAK THAT THERE WAS ONE IMPORTANT SERVICE EGYPT COULD PROVIDE TO THE PROCESS: IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY USEFUL IF EGYPT COULD URGE THE SAUDIS TO RECOGNIZE AND SUPPORT THE LEBANESE REQUIREMENT FOR FLEXIBILITY IN REACHING AN UNDERSTANDING WITH THE ISRAELIS ON NORMALIZATION, ESPECIALLY THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS. FAHD HAD TOLD HABIB THAT SAUDI ARABIA COULD SUPPORT LEBANESE CONCESSIONS ON SECURITY QUESTIONS, BUT INDICATED THE SAUDIS WOULD BE INFLEXIBLE IN INSISTING ON A TOUGH LEBANESE STAND AGAINST NORMALIZATION WITH ISRAEL. MUBARAK SAID PRINCE BANDAR HAD BEEN TO SEE HIM RECENTLY AND HE WAS EXPECTING ANOTHER SAUDI REPRESENTATIVE TO RETURN TO CAIRO BEFORE MUBARAK'S DEPARTURE FOR THE NAM SUMMIT IN NEW DELHI. IT WAS POSSIBLE HE WOULD ALSO SEE PRINCE SAUD IN NEW DELHI. HE READILY AGREED TO ATTEMPT TO PERSUADE THE SAUDIS TO BE MORE UNDERSTANDING OF THE LEBANESE SITUATION. HE OFFERED NO ASSURANCES, HOWEVER,

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THAT THE SAUDIS WOULD BE RECEPTIVE TO HIS ADVICE.

HE SAID.

5. SEVERAL TIMES IN THE CONVERSATION, MUBARAK EMPHASIZED HIS FULL SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENT GEMAYEL. EGYPT UNDERSTOOD GEMAYEL'S DIFFICULT TASK OF BUILDING A LEBANESE CONSENSUS AND THOUGHT HE WAS PROCEEDING WELL. MUBARAK WAS SCATHING, HOWEVER, IN HIS CRITICISM OF PRIME MINISTER WAZZAN. OSAMA INTERJECTED THAT HE HAD REFUSED TO MEET WITH WAZZAN DURING HIS SECOND TRIP TO BEIRUT BECAUSE WAZZAN HAD APPEARED "SURPRISED" BY OSAMA'S FIRST VISIT. MUBARAK WAS ESPECIALLY UNHAPPY WITH WAZZAN'S RECENT STATEMENT THAT LEBANON WOULD NOT MOVE TOWARDS EGYPT UNTIL THERE WAS AN ARAB CONSENSUS ON THE REINTEGRATION OF EGYPT. "WHO ASKED HIM FOR RELATIONS ANYWAY," MUBARAK SAID. "WE ARE RUNNING OUR OWN AFFAIRS AND WE HAVE NO NEED OF ADVICE FROM LEBANESE LIKE WAZZAN." ON THE OTHER HAND, MUBARAK AND OSAMA SAID EGYPT HAD GOOD RELATIONS WITH SAAB SALEM AND OTHER SUNNI, SHIA AND DRUZE LEADERS. OSAMA SAID HE HAD MET RECENTLY WITH JUMBLATT AND THAT SAAB SALEM WOULD BE COMING SOON TO EGYPT. HABIB COMMENTED THAT PRESIDENT GEMAYEL SEEMED VERY PLEASED WITH THE SUPPORT HE WAS GETTING FROM EGYPT.

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6. AT THE END OF THE CONVERSATION, MUBARAK RETURNED TO A REMARK HABIB HAD MADE TO THE EFFECT THAT THE ISRAELI LEADERSHIP WAS VERY UNHAPPY WITH EGYPT. "WHAT DO THEY SAY ABOUT US?" MUBARAK ASKED. HABIB INDICATED THAT THE ISRAELIS BELIEVE THAT EGYPT WAS NOT CARRYING OUT ITS COMMITMENTS AS FAR AS NORMALIZATION WAS CONCERNED. THE

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 USELO RIYADH PRIORITY

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EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, EG, IS, LE, US, XF
 SUBJECT: HABIB MEETING WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK,

EGYPTIANS WERE IMPOSING RESTRICTIONS ON TRADE, THE ISRAELIS COMPLAINED. AS HE HAS CONSISTENTLY MAINTAINED, MUBARAK REPLIED FORCEFULLY, "WE ARE TREATING THEM JUST

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LIKE ANY OTHER NATION. WE DO NOT BUY APPLES OR BANANAS FROM ANYONE AND WE ARE NOT MAKING AN EXCEPTION FOR ISRAEL." HABIB NOTED THAT WE WERE PLEASED THAT THE ISRAELIS AND EGYPTIANS WERE MEETING ON TABA SO THEY COULD DISCUSS THEIR DIFFERENCES DIRECTLY RATHER THAN THROUGH US. OSAMA COMMENTED THAT EGYPT HAD AGREED TO THE FORMULA OF TABA TALKS/TRADE TALKS BECAUSE THE U.S. HAD INSISTED AND EGYPT "WANTED TO DO US A FAVOR." BOTH MUBARAK AND OSAMA READILY AGREED WITH HABIB, HOWEVER, THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO HAVE A PROCESS FOR DISCUSSION

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OF THE TABA ISSUE CONTINUING AND THAT BOTH SIDES SHOULD BE CAREFUL TO ASSURE THAT THE NEWLY STARTED PROCESS DID NOT BREAK DOWN. ATHERTON

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Date Printed: 10/22/1996

DOC_NUMBER: 83JERUSA00697

CHANNEL: n/a

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EXCISE

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AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY

USELO RIYADH PRIORITY

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EO Citations

FOIA Exemptions
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EXCISE DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIB/DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, US, IS, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: HOW THE ISRAELI-LEBANESE
SCENARIO IS UNFOLDING

2. IN THIS MESSAGE, WE WILL ATTEMPT TO OUTLINE IN
BROAD TERMS OUR BASIC NEGOTIATING STRATEGY OVER
THE DAYS IMMEDIATELY AHEAD, WHILE ALSO POINTING
OUT THE MAJOR OBSTACLES AND PITFALLS IN OUR PATH.

3. WE RETURNED TO ISRAEL FROM LEBANON AFTER
HAVING SECURED SOME SIGNIFICANT LEBANESE CONCES-
SIONS IN THE TWO KEY AREAS OF (A) SECURITY ARRANGE-

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MENTS AND (B) MUTUAL RELATIONS (NORMALIZATION).
WE ALSO HELPED THE LEBANESE TO PREPARE A DRAFT
COVERING AGREEMENT AND A DRAFT MILITARY ANNEX AND
APPENDIX, AS A BASIS FOR MMRE DETAILED NEGOTIATIONS.
WITH THE ADDITION OF SOME REASONABLE ISRAELI-
PROPOSED LANGUAGE WHICH HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN PRE-
SENTED, WE BELIEVE THAT THE LEBANESE DRAFT COULD
COME CLOSE TO THE ULTIMATE SHAPE OF THE FINAL DOCU-
MENT WHICH WOULD BE SIGNED BY ISRAEL AND LEBANON.

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WHEN COMBINED WITH APPROPRIATE SIDE ARRANGEMENTS, TO WHICH LEBANON WOULD BE COMMITTED, AN AGREEMENT ALONG THESE LINES WOULD BE SATISFACTORY; AND IT WOULD CONTAIN A STRONG ANNEX LAYING OUT SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. IN OUR OPINION, THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS ARE SUFFICIENT TO PROTECT AGAINST HOSTILE ACTION AGAINST ISRAEL FROM LEBANESE TERRITORY, ARE WITHIN THE CAPACITY OF THE LEBANESE TO IMPLEMENT, AND GIVE THE ISRAELIS ENOUGH SAFEGUARDS THROUGH PARTICIPATION AND SURVEILLANCE WITHOUT THE NEED FOR A RESIDUAL PRESENCE.

4. THE CONCEPTS WHICH HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED TO DEAL WITH MUTUAL RELATIONS IN THE INTERIM PERIOD ARE BASED UPON THE DESIRABILITY OF HAVING SOME DEGREE OF NORMALIZATION IN THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PEOPLE ON THE DAY AFTER ISRAELI TROOPS HAVE WITHDRAWN. THE LONGER RANGE IN THIS REGARD WOULD BE HANDLED BY BEGINNING NEGOTIATIONS WITHIN SIX MONTHS ON A FORMAL AGREEMENT ON MUTUAL RELATIONS. MEANWHILE, INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE PLACED INTO EFFECT. THESE PROVIDE FOR THE DE FACTO CLOSE-TO-NORMAL MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE UNDER A SYSTEM CONTROLLED BY THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE. THIS IS ACCEPTABLE

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TO THE LEBANESE AND ALLOWS FOR ISRAELI PARTICIPATION IN THE PROCESS, THROUGH ITS MEMBERSHIP IN THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE. TRADE IS TO BE GOVERNED IN THE INTERIM PERIOD BY A SYSTEM OF CONTROLS, ALSO PROCESSED THROUGH THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE, DESIGNED TO LIMIT THE OVERALL AMOUNT OF TRADE TO A LEVEL AGREED TO BE REASONABLE, AND TO PREVENT ISRAELI GOODS FROM OVERWHELMING LEBANESE PRODUCERS. THE LEBANESE CONCEPT OF INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS FOR LIMITED TRADE IS ALSO DESIGNED TO AVOID DISASTROUS RETALIATION BY ARAB NATIONS, UPON WHOM LEBANON IS TOTALLY DEPENDENT ECONOMICALLY.

5. THE INITIAL ISRAELI REACTION TO THESE PAPERS AND CONCEPTS, INCLUDING FROM SHAMIR, WAS PREDICTABLY RESERVED AND EVEN SHARPLY NEGATIVE IN SOME RESPECTS. THEY HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT THEY WILL SEEK SIGNIFICANT ADJUSTMENTS TO AND REINFORCEMENT OF SOME OF THE LEBANESE-APPROVED CONCEPTS.

6. IN THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FIELD, THERE ARE TWO EXTREMELY TROUBLESOME ISSUES TO OVERCOME. THE FIRST IS LEBANESE INSISTENCE THAT JABAL BARUK NOT RPT NOT BE PART OF THE SECURITY ZONE, BECAUSE OF ITS POLITICAL SENSITIVITY AND SYMBOLIC

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IMPORTANCE. THE ISRAELIS, HOWEVER, ARE EQUALLY INSISTENT THAT JABAL BARUK BE INCLUDED IN THE SECURITY ZONE, NOT FOR ANY REALISTIC MILITARY REASON BUT, RATHER, IN ORDER TO MAKE CLEAR TO THE ISRAELI PUBLIC THAT "MOST" OF THE SECURITY ZONE IS AT LEAST 45 KILOMETERS DISTANT FROM METULLA IN

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EXDIS

THE GALILEE REGION.

7. A REAL DANGER SIGN AGAIN EMERGED TODAY IN TALKS WITH SHAMIR, WHEN HE RESURFACED THE IDEAS-- WHICH HE HAD HOPED HAD LONG BEEN ABANDONED--THAT IDF SQUADS ACCOMPANY THE JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS ON THEIR TRAVELS IN THE SECURITY ZONE AND THAT

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CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO JOINT IDF-LAF MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST TERRORISTS AND OTHER TARGETS IN THE AREA. THERE IS NO WAY THAT THE LEBANESE--OR THE U.S.--SHOULD EVER AGREE TO SUCH IDEAS. THE CONCEPT OF JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS IS SENSITIVE ENOUGH, EVEN THOUGH IT IS ENVISAGED THAT IDF REPRESENTATIVES ON THESE TEAMS WOULD NOT REMAIN OVERNIGHT IN LEBANON AND WOULD TRAVEL FROM ISRAEL PROPER TO JOIN THEIR LEBANESE COLLEAGUES WHEN TEAMS ARE SENT OUT. WITH SUPERVISORY TEAMS, WE HAVE

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BEEN SKIRTING THE VERY EDGE OF WHAT IS PRACTICALLY POSSIBLE, AND WHAT COULD BE DEFENDED AS NO RESIDUAL IDF PRESENCE. TO GO FURTHER WOULD BE TO COURT A HIGH RISK OF A SYRIAN REFUSAL TO WITHDRAW.

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8. AS FOR MUTUAL RELATIONS IN THE INTERIM PERIOD, SHAMIR TODAY SUGGESTED THAT IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE LEBANESE A FULL-SCALE COMMERCIAL AGREEMENT IN ADVANCE OF THE COMING INTO FORCE OF THE OVERALL AGREEMENT, WITH THE IDEA THAT THIS AGREEMENT COULD BE HELD IN ABEYANCE FOR SOME SIX MONTHS. THIS IS ANOTHER NON-STARTER, ALTHOUGH THE IDEA REFLECTS GENUINE ISRAELI DISSATISFACTION WITH THE COMPLICATED ARRANGEMENTS AS REGARDS THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS AND GOODS WHICH THE LEBANESE HAVE PROPOSED.

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9. SOME OF THE PROBLEMS INVOLVING INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS DURING THE PERIOD PRIOR TO CONCLUSION OF A MORE FORMAL ARRANGEMENT FOR MUTUAL RELATIONS STEM FROM EXTREME ISRAELI SENSITIVITY OVER THE LEBANESE PLACING THE ISRAELIS IN A SPECIAL AND DIFFERENT CATEGORY. THE ISRAELIS WANT MAXIMUM DE FACTO NORMALIZATION, AND HAVE BECOME UPSET OVER LEBANESE-AGREED ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WOULD CALL ON THE LEBANESE TO MAKE DECISIONS ON A "CASE-BY-CASE" BASIS, AMONG OTHER EXAMPLES. THE LEBANESE ON THE OTHER HAND DO NOT WISH TO MOVE FURTHER THAN THEY THINK WILL ALLOW THEM TO MAINTAIN THEIR INTERNAL CONSENSUS AND THEIR RELATIONS WITH ARAB NATIONS. RECENT HARSH SAUDI COMMERCIAL RESTRICTIONS AND SYRIAN THREATS HAVE LED THE LEBANESE TO BE EXTREMELY WARY OF MAKING A SUDDEN JUMP TO SUBSTANTIAL ACTIONS

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DEFINED AS NORMALIZATION. THEIR ECONOMY IS TOTALLY VULNERABLE IN ITS DEPENDENCE ON TRADE AND FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE ARABS.

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10. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT SHAMIR'S NEGATIVE RE-ACTIONS TODAY (SEPTTEL), IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE CABINET STEERING COMMITTEE WILL WIPE ALL THE DIFFICULT ISRAELI POSITIONS OFF THE BOARD IN ONE SWOOP. WE MUST EXPECT INSTEAD THAT THERE WILL BE FURTHER BARGAINING AND COUNTER-PROPOSALS WHICH--WE ARE SORRY TO REPORT--COULD SLOW THE PROCESS OF SECURING WHAT WE WANT TO ACHIEVE. NEVERTHELESS, WE INTEND TO AWAIT THE RESULTS OF THE ISRAELI STEERING CDM-MITTEE MEETING, WHICH WE HOPE WILL BE IN MID-WEEK. DEPENDING UPON THE NATURE OF THE ISRAELI RESPONSE, WE WILL DECIDE WHETHER TO MOVE TO A QUICK TRY AT A COMPLETE DRAFT WITH THE ISRAELIS BEFORE GOING BACK TO THE LEBANESE. IF THAT IS NOT POSSIBLE, WE WOULD CONSIDER GOING BACK TO THE LEBANESE TO IMPROVE FURTHER THE PRESENT VERSION OF THEIR DRAFT AGREEMENT. ONE WAY OR ANOTHER, WE NEED TO GET A REASONABLE DRAFT ON THE TABLE SOON, THAT WE CAN SUPPORT.

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11. MEANWHILE, WE WILL USE THE OVERT ISRAELI-LEBANESE NEGOTIATIONS TO NARROW DIFFERENCES. FOLLOWING IS A CHECKLIST OF THE MOST TROUBLESOME ISSUES LYING IN OUR PATH:

-- THE LEBANESE DESIRE TO LIMIT AND CONTROL THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD. THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS APPEARS TO BE A SMALLER PROBLEM;

-- EXCLUSION OR INCLUSION OF JABAL BARUK IN THE

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EXDIS

SECURITY ZONE;

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-- A POSSIBLE ISRAELI REQUEST TO HAVE "PATROLS"
OPER
ATING IN CONJUNCTION WITH SUPERVISORY TEAMS,
OR TO HAVE THE IDF JOIN WITH THE LAF IN CERTAIN
OPERATIONAL MILITARY MEASURES;

-- ISRAELI INSISTENCE THAT HADDAD BE A MILITARY
COMMANDER OR MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE SOUTH,
DESPITE LEBANESE WILLINGNESS TO FIND AN ALTERNATE,
HONORABLE SOLUTION REGARDING HIS FUTURE;

-- THE ISRAELI PRECONDITION THAT ALL PLO COMBATANTS
WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON PRIOR TO ANY IDF MOVE,
CONTRASTED TO THE APPARENT PLO WILLINGNESS TO
WITHDRAW SOME OF THEIR FORCES JUST PRIOR TO THE
SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE

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BULK OF THE PLO WOULD GO OUT AT THE SAME TIME AS
THE SYRIANS;

-- ISRAELI INSISTENCE THAT ANY SIDE UNDERSTANDINGS
WITH THE LEBANESE, INCLUDING ORAL LEBANESE COMMIT-
MENTS, BE PUBLISHED, AT LEAST AT THE TIME THE
AGREEMENT IS PRESENTED TO THE KNESSET;

-- A UNIFIL PRESENCE IN THE SECURITY ZONE IN CON-
NECTION WITH SECURITY FOR PALESTINIAN CAMPS.

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EXCISE

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EXCISE
DECAPTIONED

FROM AMBASSADOR HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, US, IS, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: MEETING WITH FON-
MIN SHAMIR FEBRUARY 28

1. ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY: OUR FEBRUARY 28 MEETING WITH FONMIN SHAMIR WAS DISAPPOINTING, WITH SHAMIR EVINCING LITTLE APPRECIATION FOR THE EXTENT THE LEBANESE HAD MOVED ON MUTUAL RELATIONS AND NO APPARENT WILLINGNESS TO DROP INSISTENCE ON A RESIDUAL IDF PRESENCE IN LEBANON FOLLOWING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. I BEGAN BY REVIEWING MY TALKS IN LEBANON, WITH

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PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON THE BROAD CONSENSUS WHICH GEMAYEL HAD DEVELOPED FOR AN AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL CONCERNING MUTUAL RELATIONS AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. I SAID THAT I THOUGHT THAT THE POSITIONS WHICH WE HAD DEVELOPED THROUGH FOUR DAYS OF INTENSIVE TALKS WITH THE LEBANESE SATISFIED MOST OF THE ISRAELI NEEDS.

3. SHAMIR SAID THE PROPOSAL ON INTERIM ARRANGE-

EXCISE

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MENTS FOR THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PERSONS "MADE A JOKE" OF MUTUAL RELATIONS. I ARGUED THAT LEBANON WAS OFFERING DE FACTO ARRANGEMENTS FOR CLOSE TO NORMAL MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE. SHAMIR NITPICKED THE LANGUAGE AND THE PROCEDURES, SAYING THEY CONSTITUTED DISCRIMINATION AGAINST ISRAELIS. SHAMIR WAS ALSO NEGATIVE ON THE PROPOSALS CONCERNING TRADE. WHILE SHAMIR COULD UNDERSTAND LEBANON'S DESIRE TO DEFER A FORMAL TRADE AND MUTUAL RELATIONS AGREEMENT FOR SIX MONTHS, HE THOUGHT THE TRADE AGREEMENT SHOULD BE NEGOTIATED NOW AND IMPLEMENTED DE FACTO FOR SIX MONTHS, WHEN IT WOULD BE SIGNED. I TOLD SHAMIR BLUNTLY THIS WAS IMPOSSIBLE. THE LEBANESE NEEDED TO DEVELOP COMMERCIAL RELATIONS GRADUALLY, IN VIEW OF THEIR DEPENDENCE ON ARAB TRADE. THEIR WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT ANY TRADE AT ALL BEFORE SIX MONTHS WAS A MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENT. SHAMIR REPEATED THAT ISRAEL'S VIEW OF INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS WAS FULL NORMALIZATION, ALTHOUGH ON A DE FACTO BASIS.

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4. SHAMIR ALSO CRITICIZED THE PROPOSED SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, ALTHOUGH HE SAID HE COULD NOT DISCUSS THEM IN DETAIL. HE SAID INTEGRATIDN OF HADDAD'S FORCES WAS INSUFFICIENT, UNLESS HADDAD WERE RETAINED

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AS THEIR COMMANDER. I SAID THIS WAS A NON-STARTER. HE ALSO WANTED EACH JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAM TO BE PROTECTED BY IDF SOLDIERS UP TO THE STRENGTH OF A SQUAD. HE ALSO SPOKE OF JOINT IDF-LAF OPERATIONS. I TOTALLY REJECTED SUCH CONCEPTS. SHAMIR REJOINED THAT SOME ISRAELI PRESENCE WOULD BE NEEDED FOR A CERTAIN PERIOD TO PREVENT RETURN OF THE PLO. I MADE CLEAR THIS WAS OUT OF THE QUESTION, FROM THE LEBANESE AND U.S. VIEWPOINT. THE SYRIANS WOULD REFUSE TO WITHDRAW IF THERE WAS A RESIDUAL ISRAELI PRESENCE OF THE SORT PROPOSED.

--
5. FOLLOWING OUR SESSION, I MET BRIEFLY WITH SHAMIR TO URGE AGAIN THAT ISRAEL DRDP ITS INSISTENCE ON A RESIDUAL ISRAELI PRESENCE AND TO GO ALONG WITH THE THRUST OF LEBANESE PROPOSALS CONCERNING MUTUAL RELATIONS IN THE INTERIM PERIOD. IF THAT WERE DONE, I WAS PREPARED TO SIT WITH ISRAELI OFFICIALS THIS WEEK TO PREPARE A DRAFT AGREEMENT "FROM A TO Z". SHAMIR SAID THAT HE WOULD ASK BEGIN TO CONVENE A MEETING OF THE STEERING COMMITTEE TO CONSIDER MY SUGGESTION. END SUMMARY.

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6. I MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR AND HIS FOREIGN MINISTRY COLLEAGUES FOR ABOUT TWO HOURS

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Date Printed: 10/22/1998

DOC NUMBER: 83JERUSA00696

CHANNEL: n/a

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 28. I WAS ACCOMPANIED BY AMBAS-
SADORS DRAPER AND LEWIS, GENERAL COOLEY, HARE, AND
KRECZKO. FOLLOWING THE MEETING, DRAPER AND LEWIS
JOINED ME FOR A SHORT PRIVATE SESSION WITH SHAMIR
AND KIMCHE.

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EXDIS

SETTING THE SCENE

7. AT THE OUTSET, I DESCRIBED IN SOME DETAIL THE
CURRENT LEBANESE MOOD TOWARDS THE NEGOTIATIONS. I
TOLD SHAMIR THAT GEMAYEL HAD SKILLFULLY BUILT UP A
LEBANESE CONSENSUS, INCLUDING WITH THE SUNNIS AND

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SHIITES, WHICH AUGURED WELL FOR THE FUTURE OF ANY AGREEMENT THAT WAS REACHED. GEMAYEL, I STRESSED, WANTS TO BUILD A SOLID RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL, THOUGH NATURALLY THERE ARE LIMITS ON WHAT IS POSSIBLE, ESPECIALLY DURING THE PERIOD IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO AND AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL. I ALSO WENT OVER WHERE MATTERS STOOD IN RELATIONSHIP TO SYRIAN AND THE PLO POSITIONS ON WITHDRAWAL. IN SUMMING UP, I SAID THAT THE "LEBANESE MOOD IS GOOD; THEIR DIRECTION IS GOOD; THE PROMISE IS GOOD; AND THE

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OPPORTUNITY TO BUILD LEBANESE CONFIDENCE IN ISRAEL IS GOOD." I TOLD SHAMIR THAT WHILE THE LEBANESE POSITION DID NOT IN EVERY RESPECT MEET ISRAELI DEMANDS, THEY HAD NEVERTHELESS GONE A LONG WAY. MOST ISRAELI REQUIREMENTS HAD BEEN MET SUBSTANTIALLY. IT WOULD BE TRAGIC, I ADDED, IF THE PRESENT OPPORTUNITY WAS FRITTERED AWAY AND LOST.

MUTUAL RELATIONS (NORMALIZATION)

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8. WE THEN TURNED TO THE LEBANESE DRAFT PAPER ON INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS WHICH HAD BEEN DISCUSSED WITH KIMCHE AT YESTERDAY'S MEETING (SEPTTEL). HE SAID THAT THE PAPER MADE THE ISSUE OF MUTUAL RELATIONS A "JOKE". I IMMEDIATELY REJOINED THAT THE LEBANESE HAD GONE A LONG WAY AT OUR URGING TO ENSURE THAT THERE WOULD BE A MOVEMENT OF GOODS ON THE DAY AFTER WITHDRAWAL. THEIR INITIAL POSITION HAD BEEN TO CLOSE THE BORDER TO ANY MOVEMENT OF GOODS FOR A THREE-MONTH PERIOD, BUT IN THE END THEY HAD AGREED TO A PLAN FOR A "LIMITED" MOVEMENT OF GOODS. I SAID THE CONCEPT ALSO PROVIDED FOR A REVIEW OF TRADE ON A CONTINUING BASIS UNTIL TRADE RELATIONS WERE FORMALIZED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WOULD BEGIN SIX MONTHS AFTER WITHDRAWAL. SHAMIR REPLIED THAT HE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT LEBANESE DO NOT WANT TO HAVE MUTUAL RELATIONS AND WERE ONLY MAKING A SYMBOLIC GESTURE. MOREOVER, THE TRADE REGIME WAS DISCRIMINATORY, WAS NOT BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF FREE TRADE. HE SAID WE SHOULD NOW DRAFT A COMPLETE DE FACTO AGREEMENT WHICH IN ALL RESPECTS WOULD BE A FORMAL AGREEMENT. AFTER SIX MONTHS, IT COULD, HE SUGGESTED, BE SIGNED AND TURNED INTO A FORMAL

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AGREEMENT. KIMCHE ALSO SAID THAT THE DRAFT INTERIM PROPOSALS ON TRADE DID NOT MEASURE UP TO WHAT KHARMA HAD PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED, NAMELY THAT TRADE WOULD BE BASED ON WHAT THE TRAFFIC WILL BEAR AND PURELY ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS. KIMCHE SAID THAT KHARMA, FOR EXAMPLE, HAD NEVER MENTIONED SETTING CEILINGS ON TRADE.

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9. I REPLIED VIGOROUSLY THAT THE ISRAELI POSITIONS WERE UNREALISTIC. IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN A FULL TRADE AGREEMENT NOW. THIS WAS GOING FAR BEYOND WHAT THE LEBANESE CAN ACCEPT AND WOULD IMPERIL THEIR ECONOMY WHICH WAS SO HEAVILY DEPENDENT ON THE ARAB WORLD. FOR THE LEBANESE, I SAID, THIS WAS A "MATTER OF LIFE AND DEATH". DESPITE MY ARGUMENTS, SHAMIR KEPT COMING BACK TO HIS VIEW THAT THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD PROVIDE FOR "DE FACTO NORMALIZATION".

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10. ON THE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE, I SAID THAT THE LEBANESE INTERIM PROPOSALS WOULD LAY THE BASIS FOR A NORMAL MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE ON A DE FACTO BASIS, IN CONTRAST TO THE MORE LIMITED NATURE OF THEIR PROPOSALS ON TRADE. SHAMIR SAID THEY WERE NOT "NORMAL". HE TOOK EXCEPTION TO THE FACT THAT IT WAS NOT SPECIFIED THAT "ANY" ISRAELI CITIZEN WOULD BE AUTHORIZED TO TRAVEL TO LEBANON SUBJECT TO RECEIVING APPROPRIATE AUTHORIZATION AND THAT THE DRAFT DISTINGUISHED BETWEEN ISRAELIS GOING TO LEBANON AND LEBANESE COMING TO ISRAEL. HE ALSO TOOK EXCEPTION TO SOME OTHER LANGUAGE IN THE LEBANESE DRAFT. SHAMIR STATED THAT LEBANON WANTED TO REMAIN "HOSTILE" TO ISRAEL. WHAT HE WANTED WERE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH

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EXDIS

WOULD PROVIDE FOR NORMAL MOVEMENT OF PERSONS WITHOUT
DISCRIMINATION, SUCH AS EXISTS BETWEEN
FRANCE AND
LEBANON. LEWIS POINTED OUT THAT THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS
DID NOT DISCRIMINATE AMONG ISRAELIS BUT THAT,
IN THE ABSENCE OF PEACE AND DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS,
IT HAD TO BE UNDERSTOOD THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT BE
TREATED IN THE SAME WAY AS SOME OTHER COUNTRIES.
SHAMIR SAID HE WANTED A DE FACTO PEACE AND WAS NOT
SATISFIED. THERE WAS A GAP, HE SAID, AND THE
LEBANESE WOULD HAVE TO CHANGE THEIR MINDS.

SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

--
11. SHAMIR SAID THAT WHILE HE WOULD NOT DISCUSS
THE LEBANESE DRAFT SECURITY ANNEX IN DETAIL, HE
DID WANT TO COMMENT ON A FEW MAJOR ISSUES.

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12. JABAL BARUK. SHAMIR SAID THAT LEBANON WAS
RAISING A NEW OBSTACLE BY SAYING THAT JABAL BARUK
COULD NOT BE IN THE SECURITY ZONE, AND HE ASKED
WHY THIS WAS SO IMPORTANT. I SAID THAT THIS WAS
NOT A NEW ISSUE, SINCE THE LEBANESE HAD NEVER
ACCEPTED ANY SECURITY LINE PROPOSED BY ISRAEL WHICH
INCLUDED JABAL BARUK. I RELATED TO SHAMIR AT SOME
LENGTH THE REMARKS WHICH VARIOUS LEBANESE OFFICIALS--

--
HAD MADE CONCERNING THE PROFOUND POLITICAL AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF JABAL BARUK, IN-
CLUDING WAZZAN'S COMMENT THAT HE COULD NOT SUBMIT

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THE AGREEMENT TO PARLIAMENT IF JABAL BARUK WERE INCLUDED IN THE SECURITY REGION. FOR THE LEBANESE, THE JABAL BARUK PEAK IS THE "HEART OF LEBANON". I POINTED OUT THAT DRAPER AND COOLEY HAD MANAGED TO GET LEBANESE AGREEMENT THAT THE SLOPES OF JABAL BARUK, INCLUDING THE KAFRIAH PASS (WHICH HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN USED FOR INFILTRATION), WOULD BE IN THE SECURITY REGION. I TOLD SHAMIR THAT THE IMPORTANT THING WAS THAT THE LEBANESE HAD ACCEPTED A SECURITY REGION OF SUFFICIENT DEPTH AND WITH SUFFICIENT LIMITATIONS, AND THAT LAF/IDF RELATIONSHIPS MET 99 PERCENT OF THE ISRAELI CONCERNS. IN VIEW OF THIS, THERE WAS NO NEED FOR ISRAEL TO INSIST ON THE INCLUSION OF THE PEAK OF JABAL BARUK IN THE SECURITY REGION.

13. KIMCHE WEAKLY REPLIED THAT JABAL BARUK WAS THE DOMINANT MILITARY POINT AND THAT LONG-RANGE ARTILLERY COULD REACH ISRAEL FROM IT. COOLEY POINTED OUT THE DIFFICULTY OF PLACING A 24-TON

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ARTILLERY PIECE ON THE PEAK OF JABAL BARUK, ALONG WITH THE CREW, AND KEEPING IT HIDDEN, MUCH LESS FINDING A WAY TO HIT TARGETS ANYWHERE IN ISRAEL WITH IT. SHAMIR SAID THAT HE WOULD NEED TO REFER THE QUESTION TO EXPERTS; I URGED HIM TO UNDERSTAND THE STRONG POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THIS QUESTION FOR LEBANON AND THAT THIS WAS NOT AN ISSUE FOR EXPERTS TO RESOLVE. A POLITICIAN (WITH VISION) WAS NEEDED TO RESOLVE SUCH MATTERS.

14. ISRAELI-MANNED OBSERVATION POSTS. SHAMIR ASKED WHAT WOULD BE THE SUBSTITUTE FOR ISRAELI OBSERVATION POSTS. I EMPHASIZED TO SHAMIR THAT THERE COULD BE NO RESIDUAL ISRAELI PRESENCE IN LEBANON. LEBANON WOULD NOT ACCEPT IT; AND SYRIA WOULD NOT WITHDRAW IF LEBANON DID. DRAPER AND I THEN CATALOGUED THE DIFFERENT THINGS WHICH LEBANON WAS PREPARED TO DO TO GIVE ISRAEL CONFIDENCE CONCERNING THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS: INTEGRATION OF HADDAD'S FORCES; JOINT ISRAELI/LEBANESE SUPERVISORY TEAMS; INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION; DIRECT CONTACT BETWEEN COMMANDERS; AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE; AND THE MILITARY COMMITTEE, IN WHICH ISRAEL WOULD PARTICIPATE. SHAMIR SAID THAT IN VIEW OF ISRAEL'S COSTS IN THE LEBANON, IT MUST BE ASSURED THAT THE PLO WOULD NOT RETURN. HE THEN WENT ON TO QUESTION THE EFFICACY OF MANY OF THE PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS WHICH COULD SUBSTITUTE FOR A RESIDUAL ISRAELI PRESENCE.

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15. JOINT TEAMS. SHAMIR ASKED WHAT THE JOINT TEAMS WOULD DO. I EXPLAINED THAT WHERE THERE WERE REPORTS OF PLO PRESENCE OR OTHER VIOLATIONS

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USELO RIYADH PRIORITY
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY.

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EXDIS

OF THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS (PERHAPS PROVIDED THROUGH ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE), THE LAF WOULD REMOVE THE VIOLATION AND THE JOINT TEAMS WOULD VERIFY THE FACT. SHAMIR ASKED IF THEY WOULD BE JOINT "PATROLS". I SAID THAT THEY WOULD HAVE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT, ALTHOUGH THEY WOULD TRAVEL IN LEBANESE VEHICLES. I ALSO SAID THAT THEY WOULD BE SMALL AND MOBILE.

16. SHAMIR SAID THAT IT WAS NOT SUFFICIENT THAT THERE BE A "COUPLE OF ISRAELI OFFICERS" ON EACH

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TEAM. KIMCHE ADDED THAT THE OFFICERS WOULD NOT BE SAFE, AND SAID A "SQUAD" OF ISRAELIS MIGHT BE REQUIRED TO PROVIDE PROTECTION. I SAID "NO", AND REPEATED IT EMPHATICALLY SEVERAL TIMES. I SAID THE ISRAELI SUGGESTION AMOUNTED TO A RESIDUAL ISRAELI PRESENCE AND COULD NOT BE ACCEPTED.

[REDACTED]

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SHAMIR ALSO MADE A REFERENCE TO THE POSSIBILITY OF JOINT LAF-IDF "OPERATIONS" AGAINST TERRORIST TARGETS, A SUGGESTION WHICH I TOTALLY REJECTED WITH EQUAL FORCE. I SAID THAT IF PLO ELEMENTS ENTERED THE SOUTH, IT WOULD BE UP TO THE LAF ONLY TO NEUTRALIZE THEM. THIS COULD NOT BE THE JOB OF THE IDF.

--
17. [

[REDACTED]

18. HADDAD. SHAMIR SAID THAT IT WAS NOT ENOUGH THAT HADDAD'S FORCES BE INTEGRATED INTO THE LAF-- THEY MUST BE INTEGRATED AS A UNIT. HE ASKED ABOUT THE FUTURE OF HADDAD. I SAID THAT I HAD DISCUSSED THIS WITH GEMAYEL, WHO HAD ASSURED ME THIS WOULD BE WORKED OUT DIRECTLY BY LEBANON WITH HADDAD AND THAT THE SOLUTION WOULD BE HONORABLE. SHAMIR WAS NOT SATISFIED. HE SAID THAT AN HONORABLE SOLUTION WOULD MEET ISRAEL'S MORAL OBLIGATION TO HADDAD, BUT WOULD NOT SATISFY ITS SECURITY REQUIREMENTS. ISRAEL

[REDACTED]

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WANTS HADDAD AS THE COMMANDING OFFICER IN THE SOUTH FOR A CERTAIN PERIOD SO THAT THEY CAN HAVE CONFIDENCE IN THE ARRANGEMENTS THERE. I TOLD SHAMIR FLATLY THAT IN MY OPINION THERE WAS NO WAY THIS

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COULD HAPPEN.

19. RESIDUAL ISRAELI PRESENCE. AFTER THIS EXCHANGE, SHAMIR CAME BACK TO THE ARGUMENT THAT, FOR A CERTAIN TIME, THERE MUST BE SOME ISRAELI PRESENCE IN SOUTHERN LEBANON TO PREVENT RE-INFILTRATION OF THE PLO. I REPEATED THAT THIS WAS INCONSISTENT WITH ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND ALSO WOULD PRECLUDE SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. I REITERATED OUR BELIEF THAT THE LEBANESE HAD COME A LONG WAY IN DEVELOPING SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WOULD PREVENT REESTABLISHMENT OF THE PLO. DRAPER EMPHASIZED THAT ACCEPTANCE OF JOINT TEAMS WAS A MAJOR CONCESSION BY LEBANON. I TOLD SHAMIR THAT ISRAEL HAD LEBANON ON ITS SIDE AT THE PRESENT MOMENT IN TERMS OF CONCEPT AND SPECIFIC SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. THE GOL HAD NO INTEREST IN RENEWED PLO ACTIVITY. I URGED SHAMIR NOT TO LOSE THIS LEBANESE SUPPORT. WE CONCLUDED THE DISCUSSION WITH SHAMIR SAYING--IN A VERY DISCOURAGING MANNER-- THAT HE WOULD DISCUSS THE SECURITY CONCEPTS WITH THE EXPERTS.

PRIVATE MEETING

20. DRAPER, LEWIS AND I MET BRIEFLY FOLLOWING THE MEETING WITH SHAMIR AND KIMCHE. I TOLD SHAMIR THAT THE LEBANESE HAD BEEN PLEASED BY RECENT SECRET CONTACTS WITH SENIOR ISRAELIS. ALTHOUGH THEY HAD BEEN DIFFICULT FOR LEBANON TO ACCEPT INITIALLY,

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USELO RIYADH PRIORITY
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY

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THEY HAD FOUND THE MEETINGS HELPFUL. REGARDING THE POSSIBILITY OF A SECRET SHAMIR/SALEM MEETING (WITH U.S. PRESENT), I SAID THAT I THOUGHT SUCH A MEETING COULD BE ARRANGED AS SOON AS THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON ON THE MAJOR ISSUES HAD BEEN FURTHER NARROWED.

21. I THEN PRESSED SHAMIR HARD ON THE NECESSITY THAT ISRAEL DROP ITS POSITION ON ISRAELI-MANNED OBSERVATION POSTS. IT WAS NECESSARY FOR ISRAEL TO DECIDE ITS POSITION IN AN EARLY MEETING OF THE CABINET STEERING COMMITTEE. IF THAT WERE DONE, I WOULD BE WILLING TO SIT WITH THE ISRAELIS LATER IN THE WEEK AND GO THROUGH A DRAFT "FROM A TO Z", WHICH THEN COULD BE TABLED AT KHALDAH OR KIRYAT SHEMONA AND QUICKLY ACCEPTED. I SAID THAT

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I WANTED TO PRODUCE THIS DRAFT THIS WEEK, AND URGED SHAMIR TO SEEK A MEETING OF THE CABINET STEERING COMMITTEE RIGHT AWAY TO AUTHORIZE A CHANGE IN THE ISRAELI POSITION, NOT ONLY ON A RESTRICTED IDF PRESENCE BUT ALSO IN ORDER TO ACCEPT THE THRUST OF THE LEBANESE POSITION ON INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS.

22. SHAMIR RESPONDED THAT THERE WERE STILL BIG GAPS BETWEEN THE POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES, THAT A LOT OF CHANGES WERE REQUIRED IN THE IDEAS WHICH I HAD BROUGHT FROM LEBANON, AND THAT THESE THINGS COULD TAKE TIME. NEVERTHELESS, HE UNDERTOOK TO ASK THE PRIME MINISTER TO CALL A MEETING TO DISCUSS MY SUGGESTIONS. GROVE

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Date Printed: 10/22/1996

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EXCISE

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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, LE, IS, US, IT

SUBJECT: LEBANON: AMBASSADOR HABIB'S DISCUSSION WITH
ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER COLOMBO

2. SUMMARY: ON FEBRUARY 7, AMBASSADOR HABIB MET WITH
FOREIGN MINISTER COLOMBO FOR A ONE-HOUR EXCHANGE ON
THE SITUATION IN LEBANON AND THE STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS.
HABIB STRESSED PRESIDENT REAGAN'S COMMITMENT TO AN
EARLY SOLUTION AND THIS ADMINISTRATION'S BELIEF THAT THE
GAP BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON, ALTHOUGH WIDE, COULD BE
BRIDGED. HABIB AND COLOMBO AGREED THAT IF PARTIAL WITH-
DRAWAL OF ISRAELI TROOPS WERE TO OCCUR, THIS COULD ONLY
BE IN THE CONTEXT OF AN OVERALL ACCORD. THEY ALSO

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AGREED ON THE NEED FOR CLOSE CONSULTATION AS REGARDS AN
EXPANDED ROLE FOR MNF. [

HE ALSO REVIEWED FOR HABIB HIS
DISCUSSION THAT SAME DAY WITH TUNISIAN FOREIGN MINISTER
CAID ESSEBSI, WHO CONVEYED TO COLOMBO ARAFAT'S CONCERNS
ON LEBANON AND ON THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL MEET-

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ING SCHEDULED FOR FEBRUARY 14 IN ALGIERS. COLOMBO AGREED TO HABIB'S SUGGESTION THAT THE ITALIANS APPROACH THE VATICAN WITH A VIEW TO HAVING THE NEWLY-NAMED LEBANESE CARDINAL INTERVENE WITH THE CHRISTIANS TO GET THEM TO TEMPER THEIR BEHAVIOR. END SUMMARY.

3. AFTER BRINGING COLOMBO UP TO DATE ON THE STATE OF PLAY IN THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI NEGOTIATING EFFORT, HABIB UNDERScoreD PRESIDENT REAGAN'S STRONG SUPPORT FOR A POLICY OF A) TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES; B) RESTORATION OF THE INTEGRITY AND POLITICAL SOVEREIGNTY OF LEBANON; C) MEASURES TO PROVIDE SECURITY ALONG THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER. THE U.S. WOULD NOT SUPPORT A RESIDUAL ISRAELI PRESENCE IN LEBANON. WE HAVE BEEN AFFIRMING THE READINESS OF THE PALESTINIANS AND THE SYRIANS TO WITHDRAW. HABIB SAID HE WOULD BE SEEING PRIME MINISTER BEGIN IN AN ATTEMPT TO MOVE THE TALKS FORWARD TOWARD AN EARLY AGREEMENT.

4. HABIB NOTED THAT THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES ARE LARGELY IN SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND THE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS. IN THIS CONTEXT, LEBANON

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IS UNABLE TO EXCEED CERTAIN LIMITS. GEMAYEL WILL GO ALONG WITH SIGNIFICANT AGREEMENTS, INCLUDING SUCH THINGS AS BORDER PASSAGE, BUT CERTAIN DEMANDS OF THE ISRAELIS HE FINDS UNACCEPTABLE. THESE INCLUDE FULL FREE ACCESS OF PEOPLE AND GOODS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF RELATIONS THAT STOP JUST SHORT OF BEING NORMAL. BOTH SIDES DIFFER IN THEIR VIEWS OF A SECURITY ZONE; THE LEBANESE DESIRE AN INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE AND EXCLUDE RESIDUAL ISRAELI FORCES, WHILE THE ISRAELIS ARE PUSHING FOR FIVE SEPARATE ISRAELI SECURITY POSITIONS AND A SECURITY ZONE UP TO 45-50 KILOMETERS FROM THE BOODER AND EXCLUDE ANY INTERNATIONAL FORCES. THE ISRAELIS ARE WILLING TO LEAVE SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE SYRIANS BUT CALL FOR PRIOR PALESTINIAN DEPARTURE.

5. DESPITE THESE DIFFICULTIES, THE U.S. BELIEVES THAT GAPS COULD BE BRIDGED, BUT THERE MUST BE CONCESSIONS FROM BOTH SIDES. THE LEBANESE ARE UNDER STRONG PRESSURE FROM CERTAIN ARABS NOT TO CONCEDE TO ISRAELI DEMANDS; THEY HAVE THREATENED LEBANON THAT IT WILL BE OSTRACIZED IF THINGS GO TOO FAR. THE MOST SERIOUS WARNING IS FROM THE SYRIANS, WHO MIGHT CLOSE THE BORDER IF ECONOMIC AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL GO TOO FAR. HABIB REMINDED COLOMBO HERE OF LEBANON'S STRONG

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ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE ON THE OTHER ARABS.

6. HABIB NOTED THAT THE LONGER THE PROCESS TAKES, THE MORE OCCASIONS THERE ARE FOR TROUBLE AND FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF UNHELPFUL PROPOSALS. HERE HABIB REFERRED

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AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

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EXDIS

TO THE ISRAELI CONCEPT OF PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL, WHICH THE U.S. HAS REJECTED, BECAUSE IT WOULD OPEN THE DOOR TO UNDUE PROTRACTION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND TO A DE FACTO PARTITION OF LEBANON. (COLOMBO INTERJECTED TO UNDERScore ITALIAN AND FRENCH REJECTION OF THE IDEA OF PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL WITHOUT A FULL ACCORD.)

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7. COLOMBO SAID HE WAS GLAD HABIB WAS RETURNING TO THE AREA, SINCE THAT WOULD HOPEFULLY SPEED UP THE NEGOTIATIONS. [

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8. COLOMBO BELIEVES THAT THE SITUATION IS DETERIORATING RAPIDLY. OCCUPYING FORCES ARE MOVING ABOUT THE COUNTRY AT WILL, LOCAL CONFLICTS ARE ERUPTING BETWEEN MARONITES AND THE DRUZE INSTIGATED, SOME SAY, BY THE ISRAELIS. COLOMBO ADMITTED HE COULD NOT COMMENT ON WHETHER THIS LAST ACCUSATION WAS TRUE, BUT THE LEBANESE HAD SAID SUCH TO THE ITALIANS RECENTLY. FURTHERMORE, GEMAYEL'S AUTHORITY HAS DIMINISHED, AND HIS FUNCTION AS A SYMBOL OF HOPE FOR THE UNITY OF LEBANON HAS FALLEN. THIS OVERALL DETERIORATION RISKS MOVING LEBANON BACK TO FORMER CRISES AND DESTROYING CHANCES FOR SUCCESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

9. COLOMBO THEN RECOUNTED HIS CONVERSATION THAT SAME MORNING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER CAID ESSEBSI OF TUNISIA, IN WHICH ESSEBSI REVIEWED HIS RECENT CONVERSATION WITH ARAFAT. ARAFAT APPARENTLY EXPRESSED HIS WILLINGNESS TO WITHDRAW PLO TROOPS IF THE ISRAELIS THEMSELVES WITHDRAW BEFORE THE SYRIANS. ARAFAT HIMSELF IS CONCERNED ABOUT THE DETERIORATION IN THE SECURITY SITUATION; THIS COULD HAVE AN UNHELPFUL EFFECT ON THE FORTHCOMING PALESTINIAN NATIONAL COUNCIL MEETING IN ALGIERS, ESPECIALLY IF THERE HAS BEEN NO FORWARD MOVEMENT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

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10. WHILE REAFFIRMING ITALIAN PREFERENCE FOR A UN PRESENCE IN LEBANON, COLOMBO DECLARED THAT WHEN SUCH APPEARED MANIFESTLY IMPOSSIBLE, ITALY AGREED TO PARTICIPATE IN MNF. ITALY HAS NO REGRETS ON THIS SCORE, BUT THE TASK OF MNF IN BEIRUT IS BECOMING MORE DIFFICULT. (COMMENT: FRESH IN COLOMBO'S MIND MUST HAVE BEEN THE SERIOUS INJURY FROM A BOMB EXPLOSION SUFFERED BY AN ITALIAN SOLDIER IN BEIRUT OVER THE WEEKEND.) COLOMBO UNDERScoreD THE STRONG NECESSITY FOR A FULL ACCORD AMONG THE U.S., ITALY AND FRANCE -- AND BETWEEN THESE THREE AND THE LEBANESE -- AS REGARDS EXPANSION OF MNF'S ROLE. CONCERNING ENLARGEMENT, ITALY IS IN FAVOR, BUT SUCH ENLARGEMENT MUST BE ALLIED TO THE OVERALL PEACE PROCESS, INCLUDING THE WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS AND THE RESTORATION OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY.

11. HABIB AGREED THAT ONLY IN THESE TERMS IS IT POSSIBLE TO TALK OF MNF AND AN EXPANSION OF ITS ROLE. HE NOTED, FOR EXAMPLE, THE POSSIBILITY OF EXPANDING MNF'S ROLE ALONG THE BEIRUT-DAMASCUS HIGHWAY. AS REGARDS UNIFIL, THE U.S. BELIEVES ITS PRESENCE IN LEBANON SHOULD BE PRESERVED, BUT WITH A MORE CLEARLY-DEFINED ROLE.

12. HABIB SAID THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN DID NOT WANT THINGS TO DRAG ON; THE WHITE HOUSE EXPECTS VISIBLE PROGRESS WITHIN THE COMING MONTH. PERHAPS THE ISRAELIS

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AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

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EXDIS

WOULD REALIZE IT IS IN THEIR BEST INTERESTS TO TAKE
WHAT IS OFFERED NOW AND PURSUE LONG-TERM NORMALIZATION
OF RELATIONS WITH LEBANON IN AN EVOLUTIONARY MANNER.
HABIB DIFFERED SLIGHTLY WITH COLOMBO'S PERCEPTION OF
A LAPSE IN GEMAYEL'S PRESTIGE

HE HAD MAINTAINED GOOD
CONTACT AND A CERTAIN CONSENSUS WITH THE MUSLIM
COMMUNITIES, AND HE WAS BEGINNING TO BRING THE MILITANT
CHRISTIANS UNDER SOME CONTROL. HE PROMISED TO ENSURE
THAT COLOMBO BE KEPT INFORMED OF THE STATE OF
NEGOTIATIONS.

13. AT THIS POINT COLOMBO INTERVENED TO NOTE THAT
GEMAYEL HAD "JUST GOT HIMSELF A CARDINAL." HABIB
TOOK OCCASION TO SUGGEST THAT THE ITALIANS MIGHT
WISH TO SUGGEST TO THE VATICAN THAT THE CARDINAL
BRING A MESSAGE OF PEACE AND CONCILIATION TO THE

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LEBANESE CHRISTIANS. COLOMBO SAID HE WOULD TRY TO
MAKE SUCH AN APPROACH TO THE VATICAN.

14. THIS MESSAGE HAS BEEN CLEARED BY AMBASSADOR
HABIB. RABB

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ENCLOSURE= n/a

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LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= AGENDA, PEACE, NEGOTIATION

TAGS= PREL, LE, IS, US, SY, (DRAPER, MORRIS)

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AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, LE, IS, US, SY
SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: SUPPORTING THE LEBANESE
POSITION ON AGENDA: SYRIAN REPLY TO JANUARY 17 DEMARCHE

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REF: (A) DAMASCUS 383, (B) STATE 13070

1 [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY: ON FEBRUARY 2, SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY GAVE
AMBASSADOR AN OFFICIAL RESPONSE TO OUR JANUARY 17 DEMARCHE
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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ON THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS. RESPONSE REITERATED SYRIAN REJECTION OF ANY AGREEMENT THAT PREJUDICES LEBANESE INDEPENDENCE OR SOVEREIGNTY, OR SECURITY OF SYRIA OR ARAB STATES, AND IT REPEATS FAMILIAR SYRIAN REFUSAL TO EQUATE ISRAELI WITH SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. RESPONSE ALSO OBJECTS TO IDEA OF ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW RELATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON, SAYING THIS CONTRAVENES PREVIOUS U.S. ASSURANCES THAT WE REJECT IMPOSITION OF A PEACE TREATY. AMBASSADOR REPLIED INFORMALLY TO ALL THE POINTS IN THE SYRIAN STATEMENT, PENDING A FORMAL RESPONSE BY DEPARTMENT. STATEMENT INDICATES GREAT SYRIAN SENSITIVITY TO CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS. END SUMMARY.

3. AMBASSADOR WAS SUMMONED TO FOREIGN MINISTRY FEBRUARY 2 TO RECEIVE OFFICIAL SYRIAN RESPONSE TO U.S. DEMARCHE OF JANUARY 17 (REFTELS) IN SUPPORT OF THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT ON A NEGOTIATING AGENDA. DIRECTOR OO AMERICAN AFFAIRS AT MINISTRY, DR. SAMI GLAIEL, GAVE AMBASSADOR A TEXT IN ARABIC WITH AN UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION IN ENGLISH. FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH CONTAINS AN EMBASSY TRANSLATION OF THIS SARG STATEMENT (WHICH IS ONLY SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT FROM THE MFA'S TRANSLATION).

4. BEGIN EMBASSY TRANSLATION:

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AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
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[REDACTED] END TRANSLATION.

5. AFTER READING THE SYRIAN STATEMENT, AMBASSADOR SAID THAT HE WOULD TRANSMIT IT TO WASHINGTON AND REQUEST AN OFFICIAL U.S. RESPONSE, BUT MEANWHILE WOULD LIKE TO OFFER HIS OWN INFORMAL OBSERVATIONS ON IT. AMBASSADOR SAID THAT THE SYRIAN STATEMENT APPEARED TO BE BASED ON A MISUNDERSTANDING OF U.S. POLICY. HE SAID THAT, FOR EXAMPLE, THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF THE SYRIAN STATEMENT CONTAINS A POSITION WHICH CORRESPONDS WITH THE CONSISTENT U.S. POSITION OF SUPPORT FOR LEBANON'S INDEPENDENCE ET AL., AND

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SECURITY OF SYRIA AND OTHER ARAB STATES SO IN THAT THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SYRIA AND THE UNITED STATES.

6. CONTINUING, THE AMBASSADOR COMMENTED THAT AS FOR PARAGRAPH TWO OF THE SYRIAN STATEMENT, THE UNITED STATES FULLY UNDERSTANDS THE SYRIAN POSITION WHICH HAS BEEN EXPLAINED MANY TIMES ON THIS ISSUE, AND THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT, REPEAT NOT, EQUATE THE SYRIAN PRESENCE IN LEBANON WITH THE ISRAELI PRESENCE IN LEBANON. THE U.S. UNDERSTANDS FROM A NUMBER OF USG-SYRIAN CONVERSATIONS THAT THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT IS PREPARED TO WITHDRAW ITS FORCES FROM LEBANON ON THE BASIS OF DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE LEBANESE

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GOVERNMENT. THEREFORE, THIS SECOND ITEM IS ALSO NOT A PROBLEM FOR US.

7. ON THE THIRD POINT OF THE SYRIAN STATEMENT, THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT IDEALLY THE U.S. FAVORS PEACE TREATIES BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ALL OF THE ARAB STATES; HOWEVER, THE U.S. DOES NOT FAVOR AN IMPOSED PEACE. THE AMBASSADOR POINTED OUT THAT THE UNITED STATES IS PARTICIPATING IN THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL, KNOWS FULL WELL THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON HAS STATED THAT A PEACE TREATY IS NOT POSSIBLE AT THIS TIME, AND WE ARE CLEARLY ON RECORD IN OPPOSITION TO AN IMPOSED PEACE TREATY. AMBASSADOR SUGGESTED THAT THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT SHOULD REVIEW CAREFULLY PREVIOUS STATEMENTS BY U.S. OFFICIALS INCLUDING THOSE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE, AND SCRUTINIZE THE CAREFUL LANGUAGE THAT WE USED WITH REGARD TO THIS ISSUE.

8. FINALLY, WITH REGARD TO THE ALLEGATION IN PART FOUR OF THE SYRIAN STATEMENT, THE AMBASSADOR OBSERVED THAT HIS EXPLANATIONS ON THE OTHER THREE POINTS SHOULD MAKE CLEAR

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THAT THERE ARE NO CONTRADICTIONS BETWEEN THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE POSITIONS OF THE UNITED STATES. HE REITERATED THAT ENTIRE SYRIAN STATEMENT APPEARS TO BE BASED ON A MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE U.S. POSITION.

9. MR. GLAIEL RESPONDED BRIEFLY TO THE AMBASSADOR'S PRESENTATION BY SAYING THAT HE WAS PLEASED TO HEAR THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS ADHERING TO ITS PREVIOUSLY STATED POSITIONS ON LEBANON AND WOULD CONVEY THE AMBASSADOR'S COMMENTS TO HIS GOVERNMENT. IN CONCLUDING THIS PORTION OF DISCUSSION, THE AMBASSADOR RE-EMPHASIZED HIS EXPLANATION OF THE U.S. ATTITUDE TOWARD A PEACE TREATY BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON, SAYING THAT WE REGARD THE IDEAL AS A PEACE TREATY, BUT AT THE SAME TIME WE DO NOT

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SUPPORT AN IMPOSED PEACE TREATY BECAUSE THAT WOULD BE UNWORKABLE.

10. COMMENT: WE BELIEVE THE SYRIANS HAVE MISUNDERSTOOD OUR POSITION ON THE CURRENT LEBANESE-ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS AS CONVEYED TO THEM IN DEMARCHE REPORTED IN DAMASCUS 383. NEVERTHELESS, THIS OFFICIAL RESPONSE TO OUR JANUARY 17 DEMARCHE, WHICH DID NOT REQUIRE REPLY, INDICATES THE HIGH DEGREE OF SENSITIVITY THAT THESE ISRAELI-LEBANESE NEGOTIATIONS HOLD FOR THE SYRIAN LEADERSHIP, AND THE DEEP DISTRUST AND SUSPICION THAT THEY HAVE TOWARD US IN OUR MEDIATING ROLE. (SARG-CONTROLLED MEDIA HAVE BEEN MAINTAINING DRUMFIRE OF HARSH CRITICISM OF U.S. POLICY IN LEBANON AND AREA REFLECTING THIS SUSPICION AND DISTRUST

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OF U.S. INTENTIONS.)

11. COMMINT (CONT.): THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT CERTAINLY
HAS NOT ONLY READ BUT CAREFULLY STUDIED ALL U.S. STATE-
MENTS ON THE LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS, YET THE SYRIANS REMAIN
DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES ARE
TRYING TO IMPOSE CONDITIONS ON A WEAK LEBANON THAT
THREATEN VITAL SYRIAN INTERESTS. IT MAY WELL BE THAT THE
SYRIAN GOVERNMENT DECIDED TO TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY OF OUR
DEMARCHÉ TO GIVE US ANOTHER WARNING SIGNAL THAT THEY WILL



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NOT TOLERATE THE VIOLATION OF LEBANESE INDEPENDENCE,
SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR THE SECURITY AND
INTERESTS OF SYRIA AND THE ARAB STATES.

12. ACTION REQUESTED: SYRIAN STATEMENT WARRANTS DEPART-
MENT RESPONSE. REQUEST DEPARTMENT PROVIDE THIS IN FORM
WE CAN LEAVE AS NON-PAPER AT MFA AND ALONG LINES OF
AMBASSADOR'S INFORMAL REMARKS. PAGANELLI

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TAGS: PREL, SA, US, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH KING FAHD

2. SUMMARY: HABIB BRIEFED FAHD ON HIS RECENT NEGOTIATING EFFORTS, CITING HIS SUCCESS IN SPEEDING UP THE ISRAELI-LEBANESE TALKS, BUT NOTING THE WIDE SUBSTANTITIVE GAP SEPARATING THE TWO PARTIES. HE EMPHASIZED THAT SPEED WAS ESSENTIAL AND THAT IT WAS IN THE ARAB AND LEBANESE INTEREST THAT GEMAYEL MAKE SOME MINIMAL CONCESSIONS, LEST THE TALKS BECOME PROTRACTED. GEMAYEL WAS WALKING A NARROW LINE BETWEEN ISRAELI DEMANDS AND DOMESTIC AND ARAB REQUIREMENTS AND THE USG FULLY SUPPORTED HIS EFFORTS. GEMAYEL APPRECIATES SAUDI BACKING AND NEEDS BOTH

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U.S. AND MODERATE ARAB SUPPORT IF HE IS TO SUCCEED. HABIB SAID HE WOULD WORK PERSISTENTLY FOR AN EQUITABLE AND FAIR SOLUTION, WOULD KEEP FAHD FULLY INFORMED, AND HOPED THE KING WOULD "LET US SEE WHAT WE CAN DO". FAHD RESPONDED WITH STRONG SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN'S AND HABIB'S EFFORTS. [

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PLO FIGHTERS INTO THE SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL IN ORDER NOT TO GIVE THE PLO LEVERAGE THAT COULD STALL THE WITHDRAWAL. ALTHOUGH HE REITERATED HIS BACKING FOR GEMAYEL, HE SAID THAT ALLOWING ISRAEL TO EXTRACT A POLITICAL PRICE FOR ITS WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE A "GROSS INJUSTICE". HE STRESSED THAT THE ARABS WOULD NOT ACCEPT AN ISRAELI COMMERCIAL AND POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP WITH LEBANON AND WOULD BOYCOTT IT. LEBANON'S CONSENSUS WOULD BE SPLIT BY SUCH CONCESSIONS AND GEMAYEL WOULD BE FORCED TO RESIGN. ONLY THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BENEFIT. FAHD DOES NOT APPEAR TO WANT HIS ARDUOUS EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE SYRIAN AND PLO WITHDRAWAL JEOPARDIZED. WHILE HE STRONGLY SUPPORTS OUR BASIC OBJECTIVES, HE HAS LAID DOWN A MARKER ON LEBANESE-ISRAELI RELATIONS AND IS NOT WILLING, AT LEAST AT THIS STAGE WHILE ISRAELI DEMANDS ARE HIGH, TO COMMIT HIMSELF EVEN IN PRINCIPLE TO APPROVING GOL CONCESSIONS. END SUMMARY.

3. AMBASSADOR HABIB CALLED ON KING FAHD EVENING OF JANUARY 22, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR MURPHY, DCM SUDDARTH, AND POLCOUNS NEWTON. FAHD, WHO HAD ONLY AN INTERPRETER WITH HIM, WAS CLEARLY LOOKING FORWARD TO A BRIEFING ON THE HABIB/DRAPER EFFORTS AND

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RESPONDED WITH A SUMMARY OF HIS OWN DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS AND OF THE SAG POSITION ON LEBANON.

4. HABIB OPENED BY STRESSING THE PRESIDENT'S DESIRE THAT FAHD SHOULD BE KEPT FULLY INFORMED, NOTING THE LEADING ROLE SAUDI ARABIA HAD PLAYED IN MIDDLE EAST EVENTS IN THE PAST TWO YEARS. HE THEN SUMMARIZED FOR THE KING DEVELOPMENTS CONCERNING LEBANON OF PAST FEW WEEKS. HE HAD BEEN CHARGED BY THE PRESIDENT TO ACCELERATE THE PACE OF NEGOTIATIONS AND TO SEE IF THE U.S. COULD BRIDGE THE GAP BETWEEN THE ISRAELI AND LEBANESE POSITIONS. HABIB SAID HE HAD ACHIEVED THE FORMER: SERIOUS TALKS WERE NOW UNDERWAY; THE VENUE AND AGENDA WERE SET; BUT VERY SUBSTANTIAL WORK REMAINED TO BE DONE ON THE ISSUES.

5. HABIB THEN OUTLINED THE THREE MAIN ISSUES: 1) SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, 2) WITHDRAWAL ARRANGEMENTS, AND 3) THE QUESTION OF MUTUAL RELATIONS, STRESSING THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF THE THREE AND THE NEED TO KEEP EACH IN BALANCE WITH THE OTHERS. THE LEBANESE, HE NOTED, WERE INTERESTED MAINLY IN WITHDRAWAL, FOLLOWED BY SECURITY; THE ISRAELIS FOCUSED CHIEFLY ON MUTUAL RELATIONS, THEN SECURITY. THE LEBANESE, IN THIS NEGOTIATING PROCESS AND PARTICULARLY

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IN MAINTAINING HIS CONSENSUS AND STARTING A DIALOGUE WITH THE ISRAELIS, BUT HE IS UNDER GREAT PRESSURE AND IS FEELING A LITTLE HARASSED.

6. HABIB THEN DISCUSSED THE ISRAELI POSITION AS REVEALED BY HIS TRIP TO ISRAEL. HIS PURPOSE IN VISITING HAD BEEN TO LEARN AS MUCH DETAIL OF THE ISRAELI POSITION AS POSSIBLE AND TO TRY TO FIND A BRIDGE BETWEEN THE LEBANESE AND ISRAELI POSITIONS. HE HAD DISCOVERED THAT THE GAP WAS VERY WIDE AND

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WOULD BE HARD TO BRIDGE. ISRAELIS, HE SAID, WERE WILLING TO WITHDRAW BUT ONLY IF THE PLO FIGHTERS LEFT FIRST AND THE SYRIAN FORCES LEFT SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE ISRAELIS (FAHD FOCUSED ON THIS TIMING AND ASKED THAT THE FORMULATION BE REPEATED). OTHERWISE, THEY ARGUE THAT NO FIGHTERS WILL REINFILTRATE INTO THE SOUTH AS OTHERS WITHDRAW. HABIB OUTLINED THE ISRAELI DESIRE FOR THREE OBSERVATION STATIONS WITHIN A ROUGHLY 45-KILOMETER DEEP SECURITY ZONE. (THE LEBANESE, HE NOTED, ACCEPT THE CONCEPT OF A ZONE OF SOME SIZE, BUT NOT ISRAELI-MANNED WARNING SITES.) HABIB OBSERVED THAT THE REMAINING OF RESIDUAL FORCES WOULD BE A BASICALLY UNSATISFACTORY SITUATION BECAUSE IT WOULD NOT ACHIEVE THE USG POSITION ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL EXTERNAL FORCES. THE ISRAELIS ALSO REJECTED IDEA OF ANY INTERNATIONAL FORCE IN THE SOUTH. ON MUTUAL RELATIONS. THE LEBANESE SAY THERE IS NO STATE OF WAR. THEY ARE WILLING TO TALK ABOUT OPEN BORDERS AND RECOGNIZE THAT CERTAIN THINGS EXIST DE FACTO, BUT ARE NOT PREPARED TO FORMALIZE THEM OR ENGAGE IN COMPLETE OPEN BORDER ARRANGEMENTS. THEY ARE PREPARED TO DEAL WITH THE QUESTION OF RELATIONS IN AN EVOLUTIONARY WAY AS PART OF THE GENERAL TREND TOWARD MIDDLE EAST PEACE, BUT CANNOT CONCLUDE A PEACE TREATY. GEMAYEL SAYS HE IS NOT SADAT; LEBANON IS A SMALL COUNTRY, NOT EGYPT; BUT SOME MINIMUM STEPS CAN BE TAKEN BECAUSE LEBANON IS NOT AT WAR AND WANTS ISRAEL OUT.

7. HABIB STRESSED THAT HE AGREED WITH GEMAYEL'S POSITION ON THE NECESSITY OF ACCEPTING MINIMUM MEASURES IN THE CATEGORY OF RELATIONS. GEMAYEL CANNOT AFFORD PROTRACTED NEGOTIATIONS BECAUSE THERE

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WILL BE MORE SECURITY INCIDENTS AND FACTIONAL PROBLEMS. EVENTS IN THE REGION AND THE DELIBERATE ACTIONS BY OPPONENTS WOULD HARM THE CHANCES FOR PEACE IN LEBANON. THE SOVIETS, IN PARTICULAR, ARE TRYING TO MANIPULATE THE LEBANESE SITUATION TO CREATE PROBLEMS FOR THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS. HABIB SAID THAT HE HAD MADE CLEAR TO THE ISRAELIS THEIR DEMANDS WERE EXCESSIVE. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE HAD TOLD GEMAYEL THAT HE MUST MOVE QUICKLY AND MAKE CERTAIN MINIMUM CONCESSIONS TO EXPEDITE THE PROCESS. GEMAYEL UNDERSTANDS BUT FEARS JEOPARDIZING HIS CONSENSUS. HABIB SAID HE HAD TALKED WITH LEBANESE MUSLIM LEADERS AND WAS SURE THEY WOULD SUPPORT GEMAYEL. GEMAYEL, HE NOTED, WAS VERY APPRECIATIVE OF SAUDI BACKING AND NEEDS THE SUPPORT OF ARAB MODERATES TO PROTECT GEMAYEL FROM THE RADICALS. HABIB, STRESSING THE DANGERS OF NOT MOVING QUICKLY, EXPRESSED STRONG HOPE THAT SAUDI ARABIA AND THE MODERATES WOULD UNDERSTAND THE MINIMUM PRICE GEMAYEL MUST PAY IN THE INTEREST OF SPEED. HE WOULD SUCCEED IF HE HAS MODERATE ARAB AS WELL AS USG SUPPORT. HABIB, STRESSING TO FAHD HOW MUCH HE HAD PRESSED ISRAELIS ON NEED TO MOVE QUICKLY, SAID THAT HE WOULD RETURN TO THE U.S. TO CONSULT WITH THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY AND WOULD BE BACK IN THE REGION WITHIN A WEEK TO PRESS FOR FURTHER ACTION. AT THAT TIME HE WOULD NEED FAHD'S INFLUENCE ON SYRIA AND THE PLO AND HIS SUPPORT FOR GEMAYEL.

8. FAHD, AFTER STRESSING HIS APPRECIATION FOR USG EFFORTS, RESPONDED WITH A DISCUSSION OF HIS EFFORTS WITH THE SYRIANS AND WITH ARAFAT. HE AFFIRMED THAT THE LEBANESE HAVE THE RIGHT TO ASK FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES AND ALL THE ARABS HAVE THE

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OBLIGATION TO FACILITATE THAT WITHDRAWAL. SAUDI ARABIA WAS A TRUE FRIEND AND WOULD HELP GEMAYEL KEEP MATTERS ON TRACK. FAHD THEN FOCUSED ON TWO ASPECTS OF HABIB'S PRESENTATION (ASSERTING "THIS IS THE FIRST TIME I HAVE HEARD OF THEM"): 1) THE REQUIREMENT FOR PRIOR PLO WITHDRAWAL AND 2) THE PRICE ISRAEL WANTED FOR ITS WITHDRAWAL (HABIB STRESSED THAT HE HAD BEEN DESCRIBING THE OPENING ISRAELI POSITION, NOT THE USG ONE). FAHD DWELT AT LENGTH ON THE WEAKNESS OF THE PLO POSITION IN LEBANON. [

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10. THE KING THEN TURNED TO THE SECOND "NEW" ASPECT OF HABIB'S PRESENTATION--THE PROSPECT OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL ONLY AT THE PRICE OF OTHER CONCESSIONS -- CALLING IT -- AS A GROSS INJUSTICE TO LEBANON. ISRAEL, HE

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SAID, HAD A LEGITIMATE RIGHT TO ASK FOR SECURITY GUARANTEES. THERE WAS ALSO NO OBJECTION TO STATIONING AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE SOLELY ON LEBANESE TERRITORY. BUT ANY OTHER CONCESSIONS ISRAEL EXTRACTED WOULD BE BY FORCE. THIS WOULD MAKE SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL DIFFICULT, OPEN THE WAY FOR FIGHTING AMONG LEBANESE FACTIONS, AND GIVE SCOPE TO HOSTILE OUTSIDE FORCES. BOTH THE LEBANESE PEOPLE AND THE OTHER ARABS WOULD REJECT THE ISRAELI POSITION. NO ONE COULD FORCE THE ARABS TO ACCEPT ISRAELI COMMERCIAL OR POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH LEBANON; THE ARABS WOULD BOYCOTT LEBANON, JUST AS THEY BOYCOTTED EGYPT, A MUCH LARGER AND STRONGER COUNTRY. FAHD ACCUSED ISRAEL OF WANTING TO IMPROVE ITS TRADE BALANCE BY EXPORTING TO THE ARAB WORLD THROUGH LEBANON. ARABS, HE SAID, REJECT THIS; HOW WOULD THE LEBANESE THEN SURVIVE? HOWEVER, THE LEBANESE CONSENSUS WOULD NEVER ACCEPT ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL TIES WITH ISRAEL. LEBANON'S INTEREST IS WITH THE ARABS; IF GEMAYEL WERE FORCED TO ACCEPT COMMERCIAL TIES AND AN ISRAELI PRESENCE, HE WOULD BE OBLIGED TO RESIGN. GEMAYEL IS A VIGOROUS PRESIDENT SUPPORTED BY LEBANESE MUSLIMS AND CHRISTIANS AND WHO ENJOYS THE RESPECT OF THE ARABS. IF HE WERE FORCED TO LEAVE, THERE WOULD BE NO SUCCESSOR WHO WOULD ENJOY THE SAME SUPPORT AND RESPECT. IF ISRAEL EXAMINED ITS FUTURE, IT WOULD REALIZE THAT IT WILL NEED GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE ARABS. FORCING LEBANON TO BREAK WITH OTHER ARABS WAS NOT IN ITS INTEREST AND WOULD BENEFIT ONLY THE SOVIET UNION WHOSE DWINDLING INFLUENCE IN

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LEBANON WOULD THEN REVIVE.

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11. STRESSING THAT THE ATMOSPHERE WAS NOW RIPE FOR SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL AS THE RESULT OF SAUDI EFFORTS,

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FAHD APPEALED FOR A CLEAR USG STATEMENT THAT LEBANON SHOULD BE LEFT FREE OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES. FAHD SAID THAT HE WANTED TO SUPPORT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S EFFORTS AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE AND TO PRESERVE THE BEST POSSIBLE U.S.-ARAB RELATIONS. SAUDI ARABIA HAD A LONG RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S. AND SHARED MANY COMMON INTERESTS. IT WOULD NEVER HELP ANYONE TO WORK AGAINST THE U.S. HE KNEW THAT THE PRESIDENT LISTENED TO HIS VIEWS AND TOOK SAUDI ARABIA SERIOUSLY. IT WAS THE DUTY OF THE U.S. AND SAUDI ARABIA WORKING TOGETHER TO BRING PEACE TO THE REGION.

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13. HABIB SUMMARIZED THAT HE HAD WANTED FAHD TO KNOW THE PROBLEMS WE FACE. HE DID NOT NECESSARILY AGREE WITH ALL THE POSITIONS EXPRESSED BUT HE BELIEVED THAT GEMAYEL WOULD, WITHOUT AGREEING TOTALLY TO ISRAELI DEMANDS, HAVE TO TAKE SOME STEPS, ESPECIALLY IN THE AREA OF FUTURE RELATIONS, TO ENSURE THE ESSENTIAL SPEEDY WITHDRAWAL. HABIB WOULD WORK FOR A FAIR AND EQUITABLE SOLUTION AND WOULD KEEP FAHD INFORMED; HE HOPED THAT FAHD WOULD "LET US SEE WHAT WE COULD DO". THE U.S. APPRECIATED THE KING'S SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN AND FOR A SOLUTION IN LEBANON; THE KING'S SUPPORT COULD MAKE THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SUCCESS AND FAILURE.

14. COMMENT: [

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SUCH AS EGYPT, TO CONVINCE OTHER MODERATE AND
SENSIBLE ARABS THAT THE GOL MUST CONCEDE SOMETHING
IN ORDER TO OBTAIN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL.

6. EL-BAZ SAID THE GOL HAS TOLD CAIRO THAT THE USG IS
TAKING A "BACKSEAT" IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. (THE GOE
HAD REPLIED THAT A LOW-KEY U.S. APPROACH IS "IN THE
NATURE OF NEGOTIATIONS OF THIS KIND IN THEIR EARLY
STAGES.") EL-BAZ THEN SUGGESTED THAT THE LEBANESE
MAY REALLY WANT THE USG TO DO THEIR NEGOTIATING
FOR THEM. HABIB THOUGHT THIS IS NOT ENTIRELY
TRUE RIGHT NOW, ALTHOUGH THE GOL WOULD PROBABLY
NOT BE UNHAPPY TO SEE MATTERS EVOLVE IN THAT
DIRECTION AS TIME GOES ON. HE TENDED TO SYMPATHIZE
WITH PRIMIN WAZZAN'S WORRIES ABOUT ARAB REACTION,
WHICH HAD PROMPTED HIM TO PLEAD WITH HABIB

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TO "DO IT LIKE YOU DID LAST SUMMER . . . JUST TELL
US WHAT WE HAVE TO ACCEPT." HABIB DID NOT RULE
OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF THE USG ACTING ON THE GOL'S BEHALF
AT SOME POINT. HE EMPHASIZED, HOWEVER, THAT THERE MUST
FIRST BE A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF BILATERAL GIVE-AND-TAKE IN
THE NEGOTIATIONS -- IF ONLY TO LEND AN AURA OF BILATERAL-

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ISM TO THE PROCESS, A CONCEPT THE ISRAELIS
(ESPECIALLY SHARON) REGARD AS IMPORTANT.

7. UP TO NOW, SAID HABIB, ISRAEL'S DEMANDS IN ALL THREE SUBSTANTIVE AREAS HAVE BEEN SO SWEEPING AS TO LEAVE THE LEBANESE ALMOST PARALYZED BY THEIR FEARS OF ARAB REACTION. HE HAD MADE CLEAR TO THE ISRAELIS THE POINTS ON WHICH WE BELIEVE THEIR DEMANDS ARE UNREALISTIC OR GO TOO FAR (E.G., EARLY WARNING STATIONS AND OTHER MANIFESTATIONS OF A RESIDUAL IDF PRESENCE ON LEBANESE SOIL, THE RETENTION OF A ROLE FOR HADDAD'S FORCES IN THE SOUTH, "MOST-FAVORED-NATION" TREATMENT WITH REGARD TO ALL KINDS OF ECONOMIC AND HUMAN INTERCOURSE, ETC.). HE HAD SINCE OBTAINED GEMAYEL'S OWN, SIMILAR REACTION TO THESE ISRAELI DEMANDS AND WOULD CONFIRM THEM TO THE GOI LEADERSHIP IN THE NEXT DAY OR TWO BEFORE RETURNING TO WASHINGTON TO CONSULT WITH THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY SHULTZ.

8. HABIB NOTED THAT DESPITE HIS EFFORTS TO PORTRAY TO THE ISRAELIS THE VERY THIN LINE THAT GEMAYEL MUST WALK IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, THEY ARE NOT AT ALL SYMPATHETIC TO THE GOL'S PREDICAMENT VIS-A-VIS THE OTHER ARABS. IN HABIB'S VIEW, THE GOI IS NOT LIKELY TO BUDGE MUCH FROM THE EXTREME POSITIONS IT HAS TAKEN. THE CURRENT PROSPECT, THEREFORE, IS THAT (A) THE PARTIES WILL REMAIN VERY FAR

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APART ON VARIOUS KEY ISSUES, (B) THE NEGOTIATIONS COULD DRAG ON FOR MONTHS, (C) THE ISRAELIS AND SYRIANS COULD CONSOLIDATE THEIR GRIP ON THE PARTS OF LEBANON THEY NOW OCCUPY, (D) THE PROSPECT OF WITHDRAWAL BY ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON WOULD RECEDE, (E) THE DANGEROUS POTENTIAL FOR INCIDENTS AND MILITARY ESCALATION BETWEEN ISRAEL AND SYRIA WOULD PERSIST, AND, MOST DISTRESSING OF ALL, (F) THE REAGAN INITIATIVE AND OUR HOPES FOR EARLY RESUMPTION OF THE OVER-MIDEAST PEACE PROCESS WOULD STAGNATE. [

[HABIB REPLIED THAT FOR ALL THESE REASONS WE CANNOT AFFORD PROTRACTED NEGOTIATIONS OVER LEBANON. HE SAID PRESIDENT REAGAN IS WELL AWARE OF THIS AND REMAINS DETERMINED TO ACCELERATE THE PACE OF A NEGOTIATED WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON. MUBARAK COULD EXPECT TO HEAR THESE VIEWS DIRECTLY FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN NEXT WEEK IN WASHINGTON.

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☐ HABIB SAID GEMAYEL AIMS TO ESTABLISH

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AN INTEGRAL, INDEPENDENT LEBANON THAT WILL BE LINKED TO
BOTH THE ARAB WORLD AND THE WEST, BUT HE NEEDS
TO MAKE A DEAL TO RID LEBANON OF THE SYRIAN AND ISRAELI
PRESENCE BEFORE HE CAN ACCOMPLISH THIS. THE ARABS

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SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT GEMAYEL'S AMBITION MUST BE SUPPORTED, NOT FRUSTRATED BY MAXIMALIST PRESSURES, AND THAT, IF GEMAYEL AND WE FAIL, LEBANON MAY END UP BEING EFFECTIVELY PARTITIONED WSYRIA AND ISRAEL.

EL-BAZ ECHOED THIS VIEW, STATING FLATLY THAT "THERE HAS TO BE A QUID PRO QUO

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FOR WITHDRAWAL." KAMAL HASSAN ALI AGREED, BUT SAID THE GOE DEFINES "LIMITED" CONCESSIONS AS THOSE "NOT AFFECTING LAND OR LEBANON'S SOVEREIGNTY." TO HABIB'S SUGGESTION THAT THE EGYPTIANS WOULD DO WELL TO CONVEY SUCH VIEWS TO THE GOL DIRECTLY, EL-BAZ RESPONDED THAT HE AND BOUTROS GHALI HAD DONE THIS IN THE COURSE OF THEIR VISIT TO BEIRUT LAST MONTH. GEMAYEL'S ANSWER, HE RECALLED, HAD BEEN TO THE EFFECT THAT "LEBANON IS NOT EGYPT" -- I.E., THAT THE GOL WAS TOO WEAK TO BRAVE ARAB REACTION TO CONCESSIONS TO ISRAEL AS EGYPT HAD DONE. EL-BAZ ADDED THAT HE AND GHALI HAD ALSO EXPRESSED TO GEMAYEL THE GOE'S READINESS TO SHARE ITS POLITICAL AND PRACTICAL EXPERTISE IN DEALING WITH THE ISRAELIS WITH REGARD TO "DIFFERENT FORMULAS, ASPECTS, DOSES AND STAGES" REGARDING TO NORMALIZATION AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. THE GOL HAD NOT TAKEN THE EGYPTIANS UP ON THIS OFFER TO DATE, HE SAID, "BUT WE KNEW IT WOULD BE HARD FOR AMIN TO CONSULT WITH US WHILE NEGOTIATIONS ARE IN PROGRESS." OPINED THAT THE TASK OF HELPING THE GOL DEFINE THE "REASONABLE LIMITS" OF CONCESSIONS OUGHT IN THE FIRST INSTANCE TO FALL TO THE USG. HABIB SAID HE IS PREPARED TO PERFORM THIS ROLE AT THE PROPER TIME (NOT RIGHT NOW) AND THAT HE ALREADY HAS BEEN GIVING SOME THOUGHT TO WHAT IT MIGHT ENTAIL.

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12. HABIB TOOK OCCASION TO CONFIRM HIS IMPRESSION
THAT THE GOE'S DECISION TO RETAIN THE PRESENCE OF
UNTSO OBSERVERS ON EGYPTIAN TERRITORY
HAD BEEN A UNILATERAL ONE. KAMAL HASSAN ALI INDICATED

SOLELY WITH THE AGREEMENT OF THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL

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IND HAD NOT INVOLVED THE UNSC IN ANY WAY. HABIB AND THE EGYPTIAN LEADERS AGREED THAT THIS EGYPTIAN-UNTSO PRECEDENT MIGHT PROVE TO BE INSTRUCTIVE FOR THE LEBANESE.

13. HABIB OBSERVED PARENTHETICALLY THAT HIS CURRENT PREOCCUPATION WITH THE LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS HAS FORCED HIM TO BE OUT OF TOUCH WITH THE ONGOING CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN ARAFAT AND KING HUSSEIN. THIS SUBJECT WOULD BE COVERED IN WASHINGTON. HE GATHERED THAT THE EXCHANGES APPEARED TO BE HEADING GENERALLY IN A POSITIVE DIRECTION AND THAT ARAFAT ANTICIPATES USING NEXT MONTH'S PNC SESSIONS AT ALGIERS TO OBTAIN ENDORSEMENT OF HIS DECISION TO COME TO AN "ARRANGEMENT" WITH THE GOJ.

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14. HABIB NOTED ALSO THAT HE SEES NO USEFUL PURPOSE IN VISITING DAMASCUS AGAIN UNTIL HE HAS A BETTER VIEW OF THE POSSIBILITIES OF MOVEMENT IN THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS. ASKED ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR THE DEPARTURE OF THE ESTIMATED 8,000 - 12,000 PLO FIGHTERS STILL LOCATED IN NORTH AND NORTHEAST LEBANON, HE SAID ARAFAT HAS WRITTEN TO GEMAYEL PROFESSING HIS DESIRE TO COOPERATE WITH THE GOL IN THIS AND OTHER RESPECTS. HABIB BELIEVED THE PLO CHAIRMAN IS WELL AWARE THAT HIS PEOPLE'S INTEREST WILL BE BEST SERVED BY "GETTING THEM OUT OF THERE." AT THIS POINT IN THE CONVERSATION, HABIB'S HALF-FACETIOUS SUGGESTION TO MUBARAK THAT EGYPT MIGHT BE INCLINED TO GIVE HAVEN TO "A FEW -- MAYBE 4,000" PLO EFFECTIVES NEXT TIME AROUND BROUGHT A PREDICTABLE, VIGOROUS AND UNMASTIKABLY NEGATIVE REACTION FROM THE PRESIDENT.

15. RIYADH PLEASE PASS TO AMBASSADOR HABIB.

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DECAPTIONED

FROM DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, IS, US, LE, PLO, SA, SY, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: GEMAYEL DISCOURAGED OVER

-- PRESENT SITUATION

1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY: GEMAYEL IS DEEPLY DISCOURAGED AND CONCERNED
BY REACTIONS IN THE ARAB WORLD TO THE PRESENT NEGOTIATING
SITUATION. HE IS PARTICULARLY DISAPPOINTED BY THE

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SHARP SAUDI REACTION. "IF THE SAUDIS ARE NOT IN BACK
OF US, IT WILL BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT," HE SAID TO US.
WHILE AMBASSADOR HABIB HOPES TO GO TO SAUDI ARABIA
SOON TO SEE FAHD, IT WILL BE IMPORTANT IN THE MEANTIME
TO CULTIVATE BROADER UNDERSTANDING FOR WHAT WE AND THE
LEBANESE ARE TRYING TO ACHIEVE, NOT ONLY WITH FAHD
BUT WITH OTHER MODERATE ARAB LEADERS. END SUMMARY.3. IN ACCORD WITH ARRANGEMENTS WORKED OUT PREVIOUSLY,
I SAW GEMAYEL FOR MORE THAN AN HOUR ON MONDAY EVENING,

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JANUARY 17, FOLLOWING THE ISRAELI/LEBANESE NEGOTIATING SESSION AT KHALDAH. AMBASSADOR DILLON AND ROSS WERE WITH ME; GEMAYEL WAS ALONE. I BRIEFED HIM ABOUT HABIB'S INITIAL SESSION WITH THE ISRAELI TEAM ON JANUARY 16.

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4. ACCEPTING THE FACT THAT WE WERE NOW IN SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS ON THIS PARALLEL TRACK, GEMAYEL APPEARED DISAPPOINTED THAT A GIANT STEP HAD NOT TAKEN PLACE IN THIS INITIAL GO-AROUND. AS BECAME CLEAR, HE HAD OTHER PREOCCUPATIONS ON HIS MIND. HE WAS MORE DOWNCAST AND DISCOURAGED THAN I HAVE SEEN HIM FOR SOME MONTHS, AND HE COMPLAINED BITTERLY THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO REAL PROGRESS IN THIS TIME PERIOD. AT ONE POINT, HE OBSERVED THAT SHARON WAS TOTALLY CORRECT IN SAYING THAT HE WAS PRESIDENT ONLY OVER A FEW SQUARE MILES AROUND THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE IN YARZE.

5. GEMAYEL THEN DESCRIBED A SERIES OF NEGATIVE DEVELOPMENTS. HIS EMISSARY TO THE SAUDIS, PIERRE HELOU, HAS REPORTED THAT FAHD AND THE SAUDIS HAD SAID THAT LEBANON COULD GO A LONG WAY ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE ISRAELIS, BUT COULD NOT DO THE SAME ON NORMALIZATION. THE SAUDIS WERE DEEPLY FEARFUL OF THE CONCEPT OF "OPEN BORDERS" BETWEEN

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ISRAEL AND LEBANON. FAHD AND THE SAUDIS HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEY COULD NOT SUPPORT LEBANON IF IT ACCEPTED NORMALIZATION, AND PARTICULARLY THE OPEN BORDERS, AND HAD GONE ON TO ADD THAT SAUDI ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE COULD NOT BE MADE AVAILABLE IN THAT EVENT. GEMAYEL SAID THAT FAHD'S MESSAGE WAS EASILY THE STRONGEST OF ALL THE WARNINGS HE HAD BEEN RECEIVING, INCLUDING FROM THE SYRIANS.

6. HE SAID THAT THE SAUDIS WERE NOT HELPING LEBANON. IT WAS ESSENTIAL, HE SAID, THAT THE US DO SOMETHING WITH THE SAUDIS -- NOW, TO GET THE SAUDIS IN BACK OF LEBANON. IF THE SAUDIS ARE NOT WITH US, IT WILL BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT, GEMAYEL SAID. HE NEEDED THE STRONG SUPPORT OF AT LEAST ONE MAJOR ARAB COUNTRY, AND THAT WAS SAUDI ARABIA.

7. HE SAID HE WAS NOT SURE WHAT WE COULD DO IF FURTHER SAUDI WARNINGS CAME ABOUT THE OPENING OF THE BORDERS, NOTING THAT HE PERSONALLY WAS READY TO OPEN THE BORDERS WITH ISRAEL IN A WAY THAT WAS SHORT OF FULL-SCALE NORMALIZATION.

8. GEMAYEL THEN TURNED TO REPORTS OF THE TALKS HIS EMISSARY, JEAN OBEID, HAD HAD WITH ASSAD OF SYRIA ON THE 15TH. THE SYRIANS HAD TOLD OBEID THAT LEBANON AT THIS TIME SHOULD NOT HAVE A MARSHAL

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PETAÏN OR A LAVAL. THE LEBANESE NEEDED A DE GAULLE.
ASSAD HAD DESCRIBED THE ISRAELI/LEBANESE AGENDA FOR
THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS AS THE FIRST STEP IN
LEBANESE CAPITULATION TO THE ISRAELIS. THE SYRIANS

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SAID THEY WERE AGAINST A PEACE TREATY OR NORMALIZATION.

9. OBEID, GEMAYEL CONTINUED, HAD DISCUSSED WITH THE SYRIANS THE PRESENT HABIB MISSION AND GENERAL U.S. RELATIONS WITH SYRIA. HE CONVEYED LEBANESE REGRETS THAT ASSAD HAD NOT RECEIVED HABIB ON THE LATTER'S LAST TRIP TO DAMASCUS, AND MADE CLEAR THAT LEBANDN WOULD LIKE TD SEE SYRIA HAVE CLOSER RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. OBEID APPARENTLY ARGUED THAT THE SYRIANS SHOULD DEVELOP A BETTER

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RELATIONSHIP, NOT SIMPLY BECAUSE OF THE LEBANESE SITUATION BUT ALSO IN ORDER TD ASSIST THE REAGAN PLAN.

10. GEMAYEL SAID THAT HE COULD NOT BE SURE, BUT HE SUSPECTED THAT HABIB WOULD BE RECEIVED BY ASSAD IF OUR EMBASSY IN DAMASCUS STARTED PROMOTING ARRANGEMENTS NOW.

11. I ASKED GEMAYEL -- IN LIGHT OF THIS SYRIAN ATTITUDE -- IF HE WOULD PROCEED WITH HIS PLANNED TRIP TO DAMASCUS. GEMAYEL REPLIED THAT HE HAD CHANGED HIS MIND AND WOULD POSTPONE SUCH A TRIP UNTIL HE WAS MORE CERTAIN OF BEING ABLE TO RETURN TO BEIRUT WITH SOMETHING USEFUL IN HIS POCKET.

12. I SAID I HAD HEARD STORIES THAT KING HASSAN OF MOROCCO WAS PROMOTING A SUMMIT CONFERENCE ON LEBANON, AND STRESSED THAT I THOUGHT THIS WAS A GRAVE MISTAKE, IF TRUE. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] GEMAYEL SAID THAT HASSAN HAD SENT HIM A THREE-PART MESSAGE, ADVISING HIM TO "BE CAREFUL," REITERATING THAT MOROCCO WAS READY TO HELP LEBANON, AND THAT HE, HASSAN, WAS READY TO CONVENE A SUMMIT CONFERENCE ON LEBANON. GEMAYEL SAID THAT HE HAD TURNED DOWN THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE IDEA AND HAD TOLD HASSAN THAT IT WOULD BE A COMPLICATING FACTOR AT THIS TIME.

13. BY THIS TIME IN THE CONVERSATION, GEMAYEL WAS SAYING THAT HE WAS GETTING NO HELP WHATSOEVER FROM THE ARAB WORLD, ALTHOUGH HE ADDED LATER THAT EGYPT HAD NOT BEEN A PROBLEM IN THIS RESPECT. "ALL THE ARAB WORLD IS WAITING TO SEE WHAT WE GIVE UP AT KIRYAT SHEMONA," HE NOTED. IN THIS

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CONNECTION, HE SAID HE HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE SAUDIS ON THE NIGHT OF JANUARY 16-17, IN HOPES THAT HE COULD JOIN FAHD AND KING HUSSEIN AT THEIR MEETING AND GAIN THEIR SUPPORT; HE HAD MADE A PLANE READY FOR A QUICK TRIP TO RIYADH. UNFORTUNATELY, HE CONTINUED, THE WDRD HAD COME BACK THAT HUSSEIN WAS NOT REMAINING IN SAUDI ARABIA FOR TALKS ON THE MORNING OF JANUARY 17 AND THAT IT WAS THEREFORE NOT APPROPRIATE FOR GEMAYEL TO COME. GEMAYEL CLEARLY WAS HOPING FOR A MINI-SUMMIT EXPRESSION OF SUPPORT AND SOLIDARITY.

14. I OBSERVED TO GEMAYEL THAT HE APPEARED UNUSUALLY DISCOURAGED. I ASKED HIM TO KEEP HIS SPIRITS UP; THERE WERE BOUND TO BE BAD PATCHES OF THIS KIND. I SAID THAT WE WOULD CONTINUE TO DO OUR BEST TO REINFORCE MODERATE ARAB SUPPORT FOR HIS POSITION. GEMAYEL INSISTED THAT HE WAS NOT ALL THAT DISCOURAGED, BUT THEN WENT ON TO RECITE OTHER NEGATIVE DEVELOPMENTS, INCLUDING HIS FEAR THAT THE ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY FOR BEIRUT WOULD BE CUT OFF SOON IF THE ISRAELIS FAILED TO COOPERATE IN ALLOWING LEBANESE REPAIR CREWS TO DO SDME WORK IN ISRAELI-CONTROLLED TERRITORY. HE MENTIONED THAT FADI FREM, THE COMMANDER OF THE LEBANESE FORCES, HAD MADE AN INTERVIEW WITH THE MAGAZINE, MONDAY MORNING, WHICH HAD CALLED FOR A PEACE TREATY WITH ISRAEL, AMONG OTHER THINGS. THIS ARTICLE HAD BEEN REPRINTED WIDELY IN THE PRESS. FREM WAS SEEKING NOTHING MORE THAN AN ISRAELI PROTECTORATE OVER LEBANON, HE SAID, AND ALSO EXPRESSED HIS FEARS THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE NOW PRESSING THE SO-CALLED "LEBANESE

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FORCES" TO JOIN HANDS WITH HADDAD IN SOUTHERN
LEBANON.

15. IT CLEARLY WAS A BAD DAY FOR GEMAYEL.
16. COMMENT: AMBASSADOR HABIB HOPES TO GO TO
SAUDI ARABIA SOON TO SEE FAHD, PERHAPS AS EARLY
AS THIS WEEKEND. HE WILL OF COURSE TRY TO ENCOURAGE
FIRMER SUPPORT FOR LEBANON, AS WELL AS PATIENCE
AND UNDERSTANDING FOR WHATEVER THE NEGOTIATING
PROCESS PRODUCES. AT THIS CRITICAL TIME IN THE

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NEGOTIATIONS, IT WILL BE IMPORTANT THAT WE MAKE
SIMILIAR EFFORTS NOT ONLY WITH THE SAUDIS BUT
ALSO OTHERS IN THE ARAB WORLD. LEBANESE
FLEXIBILITY WILL BE REQUIRED IF PROGRESS IS TO BE
ACHIEVED IN GETTING ALL FOREIGN FORCES OUT OF
LEBANON, INCLUDING ISRAELI FORCES. THE ISRAELI/
LEBANESE NEGOTIATIONS, HOWEVER, REMAIN THE
FOUNDATION STONE FOR OUR EFFORT, AND THE ARAB
WORLD SHOULD NOT JUMP TO CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THEIR
OUTCOME. GROVE

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DECAPTIONED

FROM DRAPER MISSION (ROSS)

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, PINT, MOPS, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US

SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: CALL ON NABIH BARRI,
- DECEMBER 6

2. SUMMARY: NABIH BARRI, LEADER OF SHI'ITE "AMAL" MOVEMENT, EXPRESSED GREAT CONCERN THAT LACK OF RAPID PROGRESS IN OBTAINING WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON COULD DESTROY THAT COUNTRY, AS WELL AS US MIDDLE EAST POLICY INITIATIVES, IN DECEMBER 6 MEETING WITH ROSS AND CROCKER. REPEATEDLY, HE ASSERTED THAT US CREDIBILITY WAS AT STAKE AND THAT THERE COULD BE BE NO PROGRESS ON PRESIDENT'S MIDDLE EAST PEACE

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INITIATIVE UNTIL US HAD DEMONSTRATED TO ARABS ITS ABILITY TO GET RESULTS IN LEBANON. HE WARNED THAT "AMAL" WOULD TAKE UP ARMED RESISTANCE IF OCCUPATION OF SOUTH LEBANON CONTINUED INDEFINITELY. HE EXPRESSED CONCERN FOR ISRAELI ACTIVITIES AMONG "AMAL" MEMBERS AND PALESTINIANS AND FOR IRANIAN ACTIVITIES IN BIQA'. HE LAMENTED GEMAYEL'S WEAKNESS VIS A VIS "LEBANESE FORCES" AND CALLED FOR "NATIONAL CONFERENCE" OF "ACTIVE LEADERS." ROSS STRESSED CONTINUING US COMMITMENT TO RAPID AND

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FULL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES, NEED TO BREAK PROCEDURAL IMPASSE AND MOVE TO SUBSTANCE, INCLUDING SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, NEED FOR ALL LEBANESE TO SUPPORT GEMAYEL AT THIS CRITICAL TIME, AND US REFUSAL TO ACQUIESCE IN PARTIAL PULLBACK RESULTING IN PROLONGED OCCUPATION OF SOUTH LEBANON. COMMENT: BARRI SEEMS PREPARED TO BE PATIENT A WHILE LONGER, BUT CANNOT RESIST PRESSURES TO GO INTO OPEN OPPOSITION FOREVER. HE IS PARTICULARLY ANNOYED BY GEMAYEL'S COURTING OF RIVAL SHI'ITE LEADER KAMIL AL'AS'AD AT HIS EXPENSE. END SUMMARY.

3. ROSS AND CROCKER CALLED ON NABIH BARRI, LEADER OF THE SHI'ITE "AMAL" MOVEMENT, DECEMBER 6. AMBASSADOR DRAPER, WHO HAD ORIGINALLY BEEN SCHEDULED TO MEET WITH BARRI, WAS PREVENTED FROM DOING SO BY HIS DEPARTURE SCHEDULE.

4. THE PURPOSE OF THE VISIT WAS TO REINFORCE PREVIOUS VISITS BY AMBASSADORS DRAPER AND DILLON. IT SOUGHT TO PROMOTE FURTHER UNDERSTANDING FOR US EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES, AS WELL AS CONTINUED DOMESTIC SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENT GEMAYEL, ON THE PART OF AN IMPORTANT SHI'ITE LEADER WITH STRONG

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TIES TO SOUTH LEBANON. THE VISIT CAME AT A TIME OF INCREASED UNEASINESS OVER THE US COMMITMENT TO A RAPID SOLUTION IN LEBANON AND NASCENT DOUBTS ABOUT PRESIDENT GEMAYEL'S ABILITY TO DEAL WITH THE HOST OF DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN ISSUES HIS GOVERNMENT FACES.

5. IN THE COURSE OF A ONE-HOUR EXCHANGE, ROSS STRESSED:

THE US CONTINUES TO BE FIRMLY COMMITTED TO A RAPID AND FULL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON ON THE BASIS OF A NEGOTIATING PROCESS WHOSE RESULTS WILL NOT HARM LEBANON'S DOMESTIC CONSENSUS OR ARAB CREDENTIALS. THIS IS IMPORTANT FOR BOTH LEBANON AND THE US.

-- IN THIS FRAMEWORK, THERE APPEARS TO BE A SIGNIFICANT MEASURE OF COMMON GROUND AMONG MODERATES IN BOTH LEBANON AND ISRAEL ON THE MAJOR ISSUES OF SUBSTANCE, INCLUDING THOSE RELATED TO THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS NECESSARY FOR WITHDRAWALS.

-- THE PRESENT IMPASSE MUST BE BROKEN PROMPTLY TO PERMIT THE RAPID RESULTS THAT BOTH THE US AND LEBANON SEEK. AMBASSADORS HABIB AND DRAPER WILL, IN THE COURSE OF THEIR WASHINGTON CONSULTATIONS, BE EXAMINING HOW BEST TO

PROCEED.

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-- PRESIDENT GEMAYEL NEEDS THE SUPPORT OF ALL LEBANESE AS HE CONFRONTS THE MANY PROBLEMS OF DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY THAT CONFRONT HIM. THIS IS A TIME FOR PATIENCE AND TRUST, AND THE US HAS NOTED BARRI'S RESPONSIBLE STAND SINCE GEMAYEL'S ELECTION.

-- PRESIDENT GEMAYEL HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT ANY PARTIAL

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PULLBACKS THAT MAY BE ARRANGED SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN THE CONTEXT OF A COMPREHENSIVE PROCESS LEADING TO THE FULL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES. THE US WILL NOT ACQUIESCE IN A PROLONGED OCCUPATION OF SOUTHERN LEBANON.

6. BARRI, WHILE HE DID NOT OPENLY CAST DOUBT ON US ABILITY TO ACHIEVE ITS OBJECTIVES, DID EXPRESS GREAT

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CONCERN THAT THE LACK OF RAPID PROGRESS COULD DESTROY LEBANON AND US POLICY INITIATIVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST. REPEATEDLY, HE ASSERTED THAT US CREDIBILITY WAS AT STAKE AND THAT THERE COULD BE NO PROGRESS ON PRESIDENT REAGAN'S MIDDLE EAST PEACE INITIATIVE UNTIL THE US HAD DEMONSTRATED TO THE ARABS THAT IT COULD ACHIEVE ITS DECLARED GOALS IN LEBANON. AMONG HIS OTHER MAJOR POINTS:

-- BARRI IS DETERMINED THAT THE ISRAELIS MUST LEAVE

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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LEBANON. HE DESCRIBED HIMSELF AS AN "EXTREMIST" ON THIS POINT. HE FAVORS A PROCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS AND THE AMERICAN OPTION, BUT -- IF THIS DOES NOT WORK OUT -- HE CAN PROMISE THAT THE "AMAL" MOVEMENT WILL BEGIN ARMED RESISTANCE TO THE OCCUPATION. HE NOTED THAT SUCH A STEP WOULD NOT BE JUST HIS DECISION; HIS FOLLOWERS WOULD INSIST ON IT.

-- BARRI HAS RECEIVED WORD OVER THE LAST FEW DAYS THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE ATTEMPTING TO PERSUADE "AMAL" MEMBERS IN SOUTH LEBANON TO TAKE UP ARMS AGAIN, ESTABLISH CHECKPOINTS, ETC. HE SAID IT SEEMS CLEAR TO HIM THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE TRYING TO DO IN SOUTH LEBANON WHAT, ACCORDING TO HIM, THEY DID IN THE SHUF -- I.E., TO PROMOTE CONFLICT AMONG LEBANESE. AS OF THE MOMENT, HIS FOLLOWERS ARE NOT COOPERATING. IF SEVERAL ARE KILLED BY THE PHALANGE, HOWEVER, HE CANNOT GUARANTEE THAT THEY WOULD NOT CHANGE THEIR ATTITUDE.

-- EQUALLY DISQUIETING ARE REPORTS THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE REARMING THE PALESTINIANS IN THE SOUTH. AT THE CAMP OF 'AYN AL-HILWAH, THE ISRAELIS HAVE EVEN ALLOWED FATAH TO REOPEN AN OFFICE WITH "ONE HUNDRED ARMED MEN." (COMMENT: IN A LATER EXCHANGE WITH LAF INTELLIGENCE CHIEF COL. JOHNNY ABDU, ROSS ASKED HIM WHAT HE THOUGHT OF THIS ASSERTION. ABDU SAID IT IS TRUE THAT THE ISRAELIS HAVE DISTRIBUTED ARMS TO PALESTINIANS AT 'AYN AL-HILWAH TO PREVENT ANOTHER MASSACRE BY CHRISTIAN FORCES, BUT THE NUMBER OF ARMED MEN IS MORE LIKE 35 TO 50.)

-- THE SITUATION IN THE BIQA' IS EQUALLY BAD. THE IRANIANS ARE NUMERICALLY UNIMPORTANT, WITH ONLY 350

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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TO 500 IN THE AREA. THE DANGER IS THAT THEIR EXTREMIST PHILOSOPHY MAY HAVE A LASTING EFFECT ON THE SHI'ITE COMMUNITY IF THEIR PRESENCE IS PROLONGED. BARRI IS READY TO PRESS HAFIZ AL-ASSAD ON THE PRESENCE OF THE IRANIANS, BUT CANNOT DO SO BEFORE THERE IS SOME MOVEMENT ON NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ISRAELIS. THE CONTINUING ISRAELI OCCUPATION PLAYS INTO THE HANDS OF RADICALS IN LEBANON AND IN THE ARAB WORLD.

-- BARRI EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE EVENTS IN THE SHUF MIGHT SOON BE REFLECTED IN BEIRUT. THE ATTEMPT ON WALID JUMBLATT COULD LEAD TO ATTEMPTS ON OTHERS, INCLUDING HIMSELF. BARRI TOUCHED ON THE PRINCIPAL THEME OF HIS DECEMBER 3 CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR DILLON: THE THREAT POSED BY THE "LEBANESE FORCES." PRESIDENT GEMAYEL'S FIRST PROJECT, THE UNIFICATION OF BEIRUT UNDER THE CONTROL OF LEBANESE MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES, HAD BEEN PUT OFF BECAUSE OF OPPOSITION FROM THE "LEBANESE FORCES." AS A RESULT OF THE FOREIGN OCCUPATION, PARTICULARLY THE ISRAELIS, AND CONTINUED "LEBANESE FORCES" ACTIVITY, GEMAYEL IS NOT THE PMM84QPMT O LEBANON, BUT THE GOVERNOR OF WEST BEIRUT.

-- BARRI SUGGESTS THE STRENGTHENING OF NATIONAL UNITY THROUGH A "NATIONAL CONFERENCE" OF ALL OF LEBANON'S "ACTIVE LEADERS" AT THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE. HE MENTIONED HIMSELF, THE "LEBANESE FORCES," AND WALID JUMBLATT, AND EVEN OBSERVED THAT HE WOULD NOT OBJECT TO THE PRESENCE OF KAMIL AL-AS'AD, SINCE GEMAYEL OBVIOUSLY CONSIDERS HIM A VERY IMPORTANT SHI'ITE

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LEADER. HOWEVER, GEMAYEL IS AT PRESENT ISOLATED FROM ALL BUT THE "FEUDAL" LEADERS AND NEEDS TO TALK TO THOSE IN DIRECT TOUCH WITH "THE PEOPLE."

7. FOLLOWING THE MEETING, BARRI RELEASED A LENGTHY PRESS STATEMENT SETTING FORTH HIS OWN VIEWS:

-- AMBASSADOR DRAPER'S RETURN TO WASHINGTON INDICATES THAT HIS MISSION HAS REACHED A DIFFICULT POINT, IF NOT AN IMPASSE, THANKS TO THE ISRAELI CONDITIONS AND TO THE CONTRADICTIONS THAT EXIST AMONG LEBANESE.

-- THE US IS RESPONSIBLE FOR OBTAINING A FULL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STATEMENTS OF ITS PRESIDENT. THE OBSTACLES THAT ISRAEL HAS PLACED IN THE WAY OF THIS WITHDRAWAL HARM THE REPUTATION OF THE US IN LEBANON, THE ARAB WORLD, AND THE INTERNATIONAL

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COMMUNITY. THE US MUST TAKE A DECISIVE, FIRM POSITION IN SUPPORT OF LEBANON'S SOVEREIGNTY.

8. COMMENT: BARRI SEEMS PREPARED TO BE PATIENT A WHILE LONGER, BUT CANNOT RESIST PRESSURES TO GO INTO OPEN OPPOSITION FOREVER. HE IS PARTICULARLY PIQUED BY GEMAYEL'S CULTIVATION OF HIS SHI'ITE RIVAL, HOUSE SPEAKER KAMIL AL-AS'AD. (BARRI HIMSELF HAS HAD ONLY ONE MEETING WITH GEMAYEL.)

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FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, US, XF, SA

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH KING FAHD

1. [REDACTED]
2. SUMMARY. DURING TWO-HOUR MEETING WITH KING FAHD NOVEMBER 30 AT IFRANE, HE INDICATED UNDERSTANDING AND AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE ON KEY ASPECTS OF THE PEACE PROCESS: [REDACTED]

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3. [REDACTED] KING WAS ACCOMPANIED BY PRINCE BANDAR, WHO INTERPRETED, AND NOTE-TAKER. MURPHY, FAIRBANKS AND CLUVERIUS ACCOMPANIED ME. END SUMMARY.

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4. I TOLD THE KING HE WAS RIGHT TO POINT OUT BOTH THE GLOBAL COMPLEXITIES WE FACE AS FRIENDS AND THE NEED NOT TO LOSE SIGHT OF OUR MIDDLE EAST PRIORITIES AS WE TACKLE THE FULL RANGE OF WORLD PROBLEMS. I SAID THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN CLEARLY KEPT THE MIDDLE EAST HIGH ON HIS LIST OF PRIORITIES. HE HAD ASKED ME TO EXPAND MY ROLE BEYOND LEBANON TO DEAL WITH THE FULL RANGE OF REGIONAL ISSUES, PARTICULARLY THE RESOLUTION OF THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT. I THEN BRIEFED THE KING ON WHERE WE STAND IN LEBANON, TELLING HIM THAT I FELT THERE IS NOW A DEFINITE TREND TOWARD IMPASSE. BOTH THE SYRIANS AND ISRAELIS, THE ISRAELIS MORE SO, ARE SHOWING LESS AND LESS WILLINGNESS TO MOVE TO EARLY WITHDRAWAL OF THEIR FORCES. ISRAELI CONDITIONS ARE INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT FOR LEBANON TO

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MEET, PARTICULARLY THE DEMAND FOR MEETINGS IN JERUSALEM. PRESIDENT GEMAYEL DOES NOT FEEL THIS IS NECESSARY OR POLITICALLY WISE. I SAID THAT GEMAYEL HAS BEEN FLEXIBLE WITH ISRAEL BUT THAT HE FULLY INTENDS TO PROTECT NOT ONLY HIS INTERNAL CONSENSUS BUT HIS ARAB TIES AS WELL. HE WAS VERY PLEASED WITH HIS TALKS IN SAUDI ARABIA; HE FELT HE WAS UNDERSTOOD. [

[I CLOSED LEBANON PORTION OF OUR DISCUSSION BY EMPHASIZING THAT WE WOULD BE MAKING EFFORT TO BREAK THIS IMPASSE IN COMING WEEKS AND THAT U.S. GOALS THERE HAD NOT CHANGED AN INCH SINCE JUNE AND THAT, DESPITE EVIDENT PROBLEMS, WE INTENDED TO SUCCEED. [

[5. THEN I GAVE KING A BRIEF REVIEW OF HOW WE SEE PEACE PROCESS EVOLVING. WE DO NOT WANT TO LOSE MOMENTUM OF THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE. MOREOVER, WE CAN NOT WAIT FOR A RESOLUTION OF ALL OF LEBANON'S PROBLEMS BEFORE MOVING AHEAD. THERE MUST BE PARALLEL MOVEMENT. I STRESSED THAT THE BASIC AIM OF THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE IS TO BROADEN ARAB PARTICIPATION IN NEGOTIATIONS. THE KEY TO THIS IS A JORDANIAN-PALESTINIAN UNDERSTANDING ON THE MEANS TO ENTER NEGOTIATION. THERE ARE MANY PEACE

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PROCESS ISSUES TO BE DISCUSSED IN MONTHS AHEAD BUT, RIGHT NOW, THE KEY QUESTION TO BE ANSWERED IS HOW TO ACHIEVE A JORDANIAN-PALESTINIAN AGREEMENT ON THE NEED TO MOVE INTO NEGOTIATIONS. HOPEFULLY, BY THE TIME KING HUSSEIN ARRIVES IN WASHINGTON FOR HIS DECEMBER 21 MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT, THIS WILL BE ANSWERED. JORDANIAN

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FROM HABIB

AND PALESTINIAN EFFORTS IN THIS DIRECTION MUST HAVE SAUDI AND U.S. SUPPORT. I SAID THAT EGYPT IS IMPORTANT AS WELL AND GAVE KING BRIEFING ON MY MEETING WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK, STRESSING LATTER'S SUPPORT FOR JORDANIAN ROLE AND NEED TO BRING PLO TO UNDERSTAND REALITIES OF THE PRESENT SITUATION.

6. I THEN TOLD KING FAHD THAT I WISHED TO BE VERY

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SPECIFIC IN ORDER TO AVOID MISUNDERSTANDING. THE FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS IN RESUMED NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE ARRANGEMENTS FOR PALESTINIAN SELF-GOVERNMENT DURING A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. ALSO, ARAFAT MUST UNDERSTAND THAT THE PLO, AS PLO, CAN NOT PARTICIPATE AT THE TABLE. PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION AND INPUT OF COURSE IS POSSIBLE BUT NOT AS PLO. OTHER, NON-PLO FORMULAS MUST BE FOUND AND WE LOOK TO KING HUSSEIN, THE PALESTINIANS AND SAUDI ARABIA TO FIND THE WAY, AND SOON. CONCERNING THE RELATED ISSUE OF A U.S.-PLO DIALOGUE, I SAID IT IS

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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CLEAR TO ALL WHAT IS REQUIRED. GIVING IT AS MY PERSONAL VIEW, I SAID THAT WHILE IT REMAINS IMPORTANT THAT THE PLO MEET OUR TERMS, THE MORE IMPORTANT GOAL IS TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE OF PALESTINIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL. THERE IS A NEED FOR SPEED; THE DANGERS OF BACKSLIDING OR OF ESCALATION IN LEBANON ARE TOO GREAT TO ALLOW DELAY.

7. [

8. [

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10. 

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11. []

[REDACTED]
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12. []

13. []

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I THANKED KING FAHD FOR HIS VERY THOROUGH REVIEW AND SAID I HAD A FEW CONCLUDING REMARKS TO MAKE. I SAID I WANTED TO BE VERY SPECIFIC ABOUT WHAT ARAFAT MUST UNDER-

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FROM HABIB

STAND. THE PROPOSALS NOW ON THE TABLE PROVIDE A WAY TO RESOLVE THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM. THEY ARE NOT TO BE SUBJECTED TO ANYONE'S PRIOR CONDITIONS AND THEY DO NOT PERMIT THE PLO TO PARTICIPATE DIRECTLY. THE JORDANIAN CONNECTION IS THE WAY TO GET THINGS MOVING. IF THERE IS INSISTENCE ON DIRECT PLO PARTICIPATION, THERE WILL BE NO NEGOTIATIONS. [

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14. I TOLD FAHD THAT I AGREED THAT KING HASSAN PLAYS AN IMPORTANT ROLE AND THAT I WOULD BE SEEING HIM DECEMBER 6. I AGREED WITH FAHD THAT THE U.S.-SAUDI DIALOGUE WAS OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE AND MUST BE MAINTAINED IN PRIVACY AND CANDOR. FAHD SAID HE WOULD SEE ME WHENEVER I CAME TO THE AREA. I THEN TOLD THE KING THAT HIS POINT ABOUT [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]


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INCREASED AID TO ISRAEL WAS SHARED BY THE ADMINISTRATION. DICK FAIRBANKS AND I HAD DISCUSSED IT WITH SECRETARY SHULTZ WHO HAS SAID PUBLICLY THAT WE MUST NOT REWARD INTRANSIGENCE. WE CANNOT PREDICT WHAT CONGRESS WILL DO, BUT THE ADMINISTRATION UNDERSTANDS THE PROBLEM IN THE SAME TERMS FAHD HAD USED. I SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT WE AND SAUDI ARABIA ARE AGREED ON THE NEED TO MOVE ARAFAT TOWARD HUSSEIN AND ON THE NEED TO DO SO IN THE WEEKS JUST AHEAD.

15. FINALLY, I TOLD THE KING THAT KING HUSSEIN IS ABOUT TO EMBARK ON A TASK WHICH WILL BENEFIT ALL THE ARABS. SOME WILL NOT SEE IT THIS WAY, HOWEVER, AND HUSSEIN WILL NEED BOTH POLITICAL AND MATERIAL SUPPORT. I SAID I FELT THE KING WOULD AGREE BUT I WANTED TO REGISTER THIS THOUGHT WITH HIM. [REDACTED]

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AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL KARACHI
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E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: OPRC

SUBJECT: DEPARTMENT PRESS BRIEFING JUNE 21, 1983

**FOR ADDRESSEE POSTS' INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE, FOLLOWING
ARE EXCERPTS FROM TODAY'S PRESS BRIEFING. SPOKESMAN WAS
JOHN HUGHES.**

Q. CAN YOU TELL US WHAT HABIB'S MISSION IS AT THIS POINT
AND WHEN HE IS EXPECTED TO THE REGION AND WHAT HE WILL DO
IF AND WHEN HE RETURNS TO THE REGION?

A. AS YOU KNOW, HE REPORTED TO THE PRESIDENT YESTERDAY.
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HE CONFERRED WITH THE SECRETARY AND OTHER OFFICIALS AT
THE DEPEARTMENT YESTERDAY. THAT PROCESS WILL CONTINUE
TODAY. I REALLY DON'T HAVE ANYTHING FOR YOU ON HIS
TRAVEL PLANS.

Q. CAN YOU TELL ME WHETHER HE IS EXPECTED TO RETURN TO
THE REGION?

A. I THINK THAT KIND OF DISCUSSION AND CONSULTATION THAT
HE IS PRESENTLY ENGAGED IN WITH VARIOUS ADMINISTRATION

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OFFICIALS WOULD HAVE DETERMINED THAT.

Q. IS HE GOING TO STEP DOWN?

A. THE PRESIDENT HAS TOTAL CONFIDENCE. AMBASSADOR HABIB HAS DONE LONG AND ENDEARING WORK. I'M SURE AT SOME STAGE, HE WOULD LIKE TO GO BACK TO CALIFORNIA; BUT ALSO HE HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE REMAINS AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE PRESIDENT.

Q. HAS HE TOLD THE PRESIDENT THIS WEEK THAT HE THINKS NOW IS A GOOD TIME FOR HIM TO BOW OUT AND FOR SOMEONE ELSE TO MOVE IN?

A. I DO NOT KNOW THAT. ALTHOUGH I SAW SOME REPORTS SAYING THAT THAT WAS NOT DISCUSSED AT YESTERDAY'S MEETING; BUT I HAVEN'T ASKED AMBASSADOR HABIB.

Q. COULD YOU TAKE THAT QUESTION?

A. WHY DON'T WE WAIT AND SEE. I'M SURE THAT WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE KINDS OF DISCUSSIONS HE'S HAVING, HIS PLANS WILL BE CLEAR. I DON'T THINK THEY ARE CLEAR NOW.

Q. JUST TO TRY TO SORT IT OUT, WOULD YOU SAY IT WOULD BE FAIR FOR US TO REPORT THAT HABIB IS DISCUSSING WITH
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ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS, INCLUDING THE PRESIDENT, AT THIS TIME NOT ONLY THE NATURE OF HIS MISSION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, BUT ALSO A QUESTION OF WHETHER HE WILL PLAY A ROLE IN THAT MISSION?

A. I THINK IT WOULD BE FAIR TO SAY THAT DISCUSSIONS OF OUR OVERALL TACTICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST ARE CURRENTLY THE SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION, AND AMBASSADOR HABIB IS PLAYING AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN THOSE CONSULTATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS. WHEN THEY ARE CONCLUDED, THEN I'M SURE HE AND WE WOULD HAVE A CLEARER IDEA OF HIS TRAVEL PLANS.

Q. IS IT ASSUMED THAT THIS DECISION WILL BE MADE BEFORE THE SECRETARY LEAVES ON HIS TRIP?

A. I WOULD EXPECT A DECISION TO BE MADE ON AMBASSADOR

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HABIB'S TRAVEL PLANS. HE CAME FROM CALIFORNIA FOR A FEW DAYS CONSULTATION HERE, AND I ASSUME HE WOULD EITHER GO BACK TO CALIFORNIA OR SOMEWHERE ELSE, IF YOU FOLLOW A KIND OF LOGICAL PROCESS OF DEDUCTION. THAT DECISION, I'M SURE, WOULD BE MADE FAIRLY SOON.

Q. LAST WEEK THE SAME LINE OF QUESTIONING WAS BROUGHT UP, NAMELY THE QUESTION ABOUT AMBASSADOR HABIB'S DESIRE TO STEP DOWN. I BELIEVE THE WORD "BASELESS" WAS USED TO

DESCRIBE THAT KIND OF A STORY. WOULD YOU STILL SAY THAT IT IS "BASELESS" TO WRITE ANYTHING ABOUT AMBASSADOR HABIB'S STEPPING DOWN AT THIS POINT?

A. I DON'T WANT TO SPEAK FOR AMBASSADOR HABIB SO FAR AS HIS PERSONAL PLANS ARE CONCERNED. I CERTAINLY WOULD SAY THAT IT IS BASELESS TO SUGGEST THAT THERE IS ANY PRESSURE
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ON AMBASSADOR HABIB TO STAND DOWN. THAT IS NOT THE CASE; HE IS MUCH VALUED. HAVING SAID THAT HE HAS SERVED FOR MANY MONTHS, I'M SURE CALIFORNIA BECKONS. AT THE SAME TIME, HE IS A LOYAL AND DEDICATED DIPLOMAT, AND I THINK HE HAS SAID THAT HE HAS NEVER TURNED A PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES DOWN. THE PRESIDENT, AS I UNDERSTAND IT, HAS SAID THAT HE HOPES HE CONTINUES.

Q. HOW ABOUT THE ELEVATION OF MR. DRAPER'S POSITION TO BECOME --?

A. I KNOW NOTHING ABOUT ANY CHANGE IN AMBASSADOR DRAPER'S POSITION. HE IS INVOLVED IN THESE CONSULTATIONS, AND SO FAR AS HIS TRAVEL PLANS AND HIS ROLE ARE CONCERNED, I THINK THAT IS ALSO THE KIND OF THING THAT IS BEING DISCUSSED IN THE CONTEXT OF THESE CONSULTATIONS.

Q. WHAT ARE THE TRAVEL PLANS THAT YOU ALLUDED TO? IS THERE A POSSIBILITY OF HABIB'S GOING OUT TO --?

A. BOTH AMBASSADOR HABIB AND AMBASSADOR DRAPER HAVE BEEN IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND ARE HERE IN WASHINGTON. I THINK IT IS A LOGICAL QUESTION ABOUT WHEN AND IF THEY WOULD RETURN TO THE AREA.

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Q. BUT IS THERE SOME CONSIDERATION OF HIS, IN A SENSE, ADVANCING A POSSIBLE STOP BY THE SECRETARY TO SYRIA OR HAVE THE SYRIANS IN FACT SAID THAT THEY WOULD NOT RECEIVE HIM?

A. NO. THE SYRIANS TO MY KNOWLEDGE HAVE NOT SAID THAT THEY WOULD RECEIVE SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ; BUT ON THE OTHER HAND, I DON'T KNOW THAT SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ HAS SUGGESTED THAT HE GO THERE. AS WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY SAID, THERE ARE NO PLANS FOR HIM TO VISIT DAMASCUS AT THE
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END OF THIS FAR EASTERN TRIP. HAVING SAID THAT, YOU NEVER RULE ANYTHING OUT.

Q. THE ISSUE IS BEING FRAMED IN THE PRESS TODAY IN TERMS OF HIS LEAVING HIS POST AND IN EFFECT RESIGNING, OR NOT. IS IT POSSIBLE THAT HE MIGHT, IN FACT, TAKE JUST A LEAVE

OF ABSENCE AND BE RETAINED AT THE POST?

A. I REALLY DON'T KNOW HOW MORE CLEARLY I CAN SAY IT. THAT HE IS INVOLVED IN CONSULTATIONS HERE AS TO OUR TACTICS AND STRATEGY IN LEBANON AND IN THE MIDDLE EAST. I THINK HIS OWN PLANS, HOPES, AND EXPECTATIONS WOULD BECOME CLEARER AT THE END OF THAT TIME.

Q. COULD YOU CLARIFY WHAT IS THE AMERICAN POSITION REGARDING THE ISRAELI THOUGHTS OR STATEMENTS REGARDING THE POSSIBLE REDEPLOYMENT OF ISRAELI FORCES IN LEBANON?

A. THE AMERICAN POSITION IS THAT WE ARE IN FAVOR OF THE COMPLETE, TOTAL PULLOUT OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON.

Q. YES, BUT WHAT IS YOUR POSITION REGARDING THE POSSIBILITY OF PARTIAL REDEPLOYMENT?

A. OUR POSITION IS THAT OUR GOAL IS THE TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES; AND WHAT CONTRIBUTES TO THAT IS WHAT WE ARE PURSUING.

Q. WOULD YOU CONFIRM THAT THIS IS THE MAIN ISSUE OF

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DISCUSSION WITH THE LEBANESE OFFICIALS WHO --?

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A. NO, I COULDN'T. IF YOU'RE REFERRING TO MR. HADDAD'S VISIT YESTERDAY, THAT WAS IN FACT, A COURTESY CALL. HE DID SEE THE SECRETARY. IT COULD WELL HAVE COME UP, BUT IT WAS SCHEDULED AS A COURTESY CALL. I THINK HE DID SEE MR. VELIOTES; MAY SEE MR. VELIOTES AGAIN TODAY. I THINK HE MAY SEE MR. MCPHERSON, THE DIRECTOR OF AID, AND HE WILL DISCUSS A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS OF INTEREST TO LEBANON. BUT I'M NOT SUGGESTING THAT THAT DIDN'T COME UP.

Q. DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING ON THE VISITS OF PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AND PRIME MINISTER BEGIN?

A. I THINK THE WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCED PRESIDENT GEMAYEL'S VISIT FOR THE 22 OF JULY. AND, AS YOU KNOW, THERE HAVE BEEN DISCUSSIONS ON THE VISIT BY FOREIGN MINISTER BEGIN BUT I DON'T THINK THERE HAS BEEN A FORMAL RESPONSE IN TERMS OF DATES FROM ISRAEL. I KNOW THERE'S SPECULATION IN THE ISRAELI PRESS ABOUT DATES, BUT I DON'T THINK THE WHITE HOUSE HAVE RECEIVED AN OFFICIAL RESPONSE CONFIRMING DATES. UNTIL THAT HAPPENS, I GUESS THE WHITE HOUSE WILL BE RELUCTANT TO MAKE ANY STATEMENT.

Q. IN LIGHT OF WHAT YOU JUST SAID ABOUT THE AMERICAN POSITION, THAT YOU ARE IN FAVOR OF TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FORCES FROM LEBANON, WHAT WILL HAPPEN IF THE ISRAELIS WILL HAVE TO PULL UNILATERALLY BEFORE MR. BEGIN WILL COME AND YOU WILL HAVE A FAIT ACCOMPLI? DO YOU HAVE ANY ASSURANCES FROM THE ISRAELIS THAT THEY WILL NOT DO THAT?

A. YOU'RE DRAWING ME INTO A HYPOTHETICAL AREA. I'VE TOLD YOU WHAT OUR POLICY IS, AND WE STAND BY THE POLICY AND WHAT CONTRIBUTES TO THE POLICY. YOU'RE ASKING ME WHETHER OTHER POSSIBILITIES ARE THE SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION. I'M SURE THEY MAY BE THE SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION, BUT OUR POLICY REMAINS CONSTANT.

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Q. THERE ARE REPORTS OF AN ISRAELI AND SYRIAN EXCHANGE OF ARTILLERY FIRE IN THE BEKAA TODAY. DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING ON THAT?

A. NO. I'VE SEEN THE REPORTS BUT DON'T HAVE ANYTHING ON IT. OF COURSE, IT UNDERLINES WHAT WE KEEP ON SAYING. NAMELY, THAT IF ALL FOREIGN FORCES WERE REMOVED FROM LEBANON, THERE WOULD NOT BE SUCH EXCHANGES.

Q. THE ANTI-ARAFAT REBELS ARE REPORTING NEW GAINS ON THE GROUND. DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING ON THAT?

A. NO, DON'T HAVE ANYTHING ON THAT FOR YOU.

Q. THERE IS A REPORT TODAY ABOUT THIS BIG LIE COMING OUT OF LEBANON AND ISRAEL BEING RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MASSACRES IN THE CAMPS. HAVE YOU ANYTHING ON THAT?

A. THAT'S AN INTERNAL MATTER FOR LEBANON, AND WE DON'T HAVE ANY RESPONSE ON IT.

Q. HAVE YOU SEEN ANYTHING ON IT, IN ANY CASE? HAS THE EMBASSY IN BEIRUT TAKEN IT UP?

A.. I'VE SEEN THE INITIAL REPORTS ON THE INQUIRY FINDINGS.

Q. THE IMPRESSION IS GETTING AROUND THAT WHAT THE PRESIDENT OR UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER OR WHAT DEFENSE SECRETARY WEINBERGER MAY SAY TO AUDIENCES OUTSIDE OF THE -- ARE SORT OF OBFUSCATED WHEN QUESTIONS ARE ASKED HERE AS TO WHETHER YOU COULD CONFIRM IT FROM THE PODIUM -- NOT UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED

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YOU PARTICULARLY, BUT I MEAN THE DEPARTMENT. THIS CAME UP YESTERDAY WITH REFERENCE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN'S REMARKS TO THE JEWISH EDITORS AND PUBLISHERS IN FLORIDA LAST MONTH.

A. I'M NOT SURE WHAT THE QUESTION IS.

Q. EAGLEBURGER TOLD THE AMERICAN-ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS

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COMMITTEE. WHEN HE WAS ASKED IF THE SYRIANS AND THE PLO GO TO WAR, WILL THE UNITED STATES STAND BY ISRAEL. HE ANSWERED IN ONE WORD: YES. THAT WAS ALL THERE WAS TO IT. BUT WHEN THE QUESTION WAS RAISED HERE, WHAT HE MEANT ACTUALLY WAS THAT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES ARE GOOD, WHICH IS NOT AN ANSWER AT ALL. THIS IS WHAT I CALL OBFUSCATION. DO YOU CONFIRM THAT EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT?

A. I WOULD HAVE TO GO BACK AND LOOK AT THE TRANSCRIPT. I WASN'T HERE LAST WEEK, BUT I'D HAVE TO GO BACK AND LOOK AT THE TRANSCRIPT OF WHAT HE SAID.

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ZFF SECSTATE AND CAIRO ONLY

EXDIS

CAIRO FOR THE SECRETARY'S PARTY AND FOR AMBASSADORS LEWIS,
HABIB AND DRAPER

E.O. 12'6: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MILI, MOPS, US, IS, SYCELLE, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB-DRAPER MISSION: MEETING IN KHALDAH
APRIL 25

1. [REDACTED]
2. SUMMARY: KIMCHE SAID HE WOULD NOT MAKE EXTENDED COMMENTS ON PRESIDENT GEMAYEL'S DECLARATIONS OVER THE LAST FEW DAYS. HOWEVER, HE STATED FLATLY, WHILE ISRAEL WANTED TO REACH AN EARLY AGREEMENT, IT WOULD NOT AGREE TO RENEGOTIATE PREVIOUSLY AGREED POSITIONS. HE ALSO COMPLAINED ABOUT LEBANESE ACTIONS OF APRIL 24 WITH RESPECT TO PUNITIVE MEASURES TAKEN AGAINST LEBANESE MERCHANTS ENGAGED IN TRADE WITH ISRAEL.

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FATTAL REITERATED HIS GOVERNMENT'S DETERMINATION TO

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[REDACTED]

ACHIEVE AN AGREEMENT AND SAID HIS PRESIDENT'S STATEMENTS SHOULD BE READ IN THIS LIGHT. AFTER THIS OPENING, AND RELATIVELY SOFT, EXCHANGES THE PLENARY PROCEEDED TO REVIEW ONCE AGAIN THE COVERING AGREEMENT AND THE ACCOMPANYING AGREED MINUTES. A CERTAIN NUMBER OF POINTS WERE CLEARED UP. RECOGNITION AND ECONOMIC BOYCOTT REMAIN THE PRINCIPAL SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCES. IN ADDITION, THE LEVEL OF SIGNATURE, NAME OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE LIAISON OFFICES TO THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE AND TWO RATHER MAJOR DIFFERENCES WITH RESPECT TO THE RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES STILL (\$)

RESOLVED. IN A (\$) MEETING, THE ISRAELIS PUT ON THE TABLE A DRAFT PAPER CONCERNING INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS AND CRITICAL MEASURES REQUIRED TO INSURE THAT THESE WOULD BE IMPLEMENTED UPON ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. WHILE AGREEING TO THE NEED FOR PRACTICAL STEPS, AMBASSADOR KHARM BASICALLY FUDGED THESE ISSUES, SAYING HE WAS WITHOUT FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS FROM HIS GOVERNMENT.

--

3. THE PLENARY REVIEWED THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS ANNEX. IN AN IMPORTANT BREAKTHROUGH, AN AGREED AD REFERENDUM TEXT ON THE INTEGRATION OF LOCAL UNITS INTO THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE WAS REACHED. THE DEMARCATION OF THE SECURITY REGION (JEBAL BARUK), U.S. PARTICIPATION ON THE MILITARY COMMITTEE, AND UNIFIL, REMAIN THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES IN THE ANNEX PER SE. MOREOVER, NO UNDERSTANDING WAS REACHED ON THE QUESTION OF "HOT PURSUIT" INTO LEBANON'S

[REDACTED]

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TERRITORIAL WATERS, THOUGH DRAPER INDICATED HE MAY HAVE A COMPROMISE FORMULA TO OFFER LATER. (HE TOLD KIMCHE PRIVATELY THAT "HOT PURSUIT" ACROSS THE BORDER WAS ABSOLUTELY OUT.) THE QUESTION OF THE NUMBER OF SUPERVISORY TEAMS, WHICH NEARLY PRECIPITATED AN ISRAELI WALKOUT AT THE LAST MEETING IN KHALDAH, WAS DISCUSSED AT LENGTH WITHOUT ANY CLEAR-CUT RESOLUTION. THE LEBANESE ARGUED STRONGLY FOR A TWO YEAR TIME LIMIT TO THE SUPERVISORY TEAMS AND ADDED THEY WERE PREPARED TO ACCEPT UP TO FIVE TEAMS

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NORMALLY AND UP TO EIGHT UNDER EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES. THE ISRAELIS RIPOSTED THEY WOULD NOT BUDGE IN INSISTING THAT THE AGREED MINUTES REFLECT THAT UP TO EIGHT TEAMS COULD OPERATE IN THE SECURITY REGION, AS HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY AGREED. THEY ALSO OFFERED SOME COMPROMISE FORMULAS ON THE DURATION ISSUE. THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION OF AN ISRAELI DRAFT ON THE "SUPERVISION CENTERS," WHICH REQUIRES FURTHER DISCUSSION THOUGH GENERAL HAMDAN PUT DOWN SEVERAL MARKERS. THE LEBANESE ARE CLEARLY WORRIED ABOUT THE VISIBILITY QUESTION. SEPTTEL WILL PROVIDE DETAILED ACCOUNT OF DISCUSSION ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. END SUMMARY.

4. AT THE BEGINNING OF THE MEETING, KIMCHE SAID HE WOULD NOT REACT AT LENGTH TO PRESIDENT GEMAYEL'S RECENT DECLARATIONS FOR REASONS HE HAD EXPLAINED PRIVATELY TO AMBASSADOR FATTAL. HOWEVER, HE REJECTED ANY ALLEGATIONS THAT IT WAS ISRAEL'S INTENTION OR WISH TO LIMIT LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY, WHICH, WE NOTED, HAD ONLY BEEN PUT IN QUESTION BY THE CAIRO AGREEMENTS AND PLO AND SYRIAN ACTIONS. HE EMPHASIZED ISRAEL WANTED TO WITHDRAW AND TO LEAVE AN INDEPENDENT LEBANON IN ITS WAKE. KIMCHE ALSO

NOTE BY OC/T: (\$) TEXT GARBLED AND/OR OMITTED; CORRECTIONS FOLLOW.

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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STRESSED THAT ISRAEL WANTED TO REACH A SPEEDY
AGREEMENT, BUT ASSERTED VIGOROUSLY ISRAEL WAS NOT
PREPARED TO RENEGOTIATE PREVIOUSLY-AGREED POSITIONS.
TO DO SO, HE SAID, WOULD LEAD TO AN INDEFINITE
PROLONGATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE OBSERVED THAT
ISRAEL WOULD JUDGE LEBANON'S INTENTIONS IN ACCORDANCE
WITH ITS WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT WHAT HAD PREVIOUSLY
BEEN AGREED.

5. KIMCHE THEN REFERRED TO AN INCIDENT WHICH HE
SAID HAD TAKEN PLACE YESTERDAY (APRIL 24) IN
LEBANON AGAINST CERTAIN LEBANESE MERCHANTS ENGAGED
IN TRADE WITH ISRAEL AND HE ASSERTED THAT SOME
ISRAEL AGRICULTURAL GOODS HAD BEEN CONFISCATED
AND LEBANESE MERCHANTS ARRESTED. THE MERCHANTS HAD
ALSO BEEN TOLD THEY WOULD FACE EVEN MORE SEVERE
PENALTIES IF THIS TRADE WAS NOT STOPPED BY MAY 7.
COMING ON THE HEELS OF THE EARLIER LEBANESE ACTION
AGAINST ISRAELI GOODS, KIMCHE REITERATED THAT THESE
ACTIONS MADE A MOCKERY OF ALL THAT HAD BEEN DISCUSSED
IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE ASKED THAT THE

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MERCHANTS BE RELEASED, THE MAY 7 DEADLINE RESCINDED,
AND NON-PERISHABLE GOODS RELEASED.

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6. IN REPLY, FATTAL STATED THAT LEBANON WAS AS DEDICATED AS ISRAEL TO REACHING AN ACCORD. HE COMMENTED THAT IF ONE EXAMINED HIS PRESIDENT'S DECLARATION IN ITS WHOLE--AND NOT IN ITS DETAILS--IT COULD BE SEEN THAT THIS WAS ALSO THE MOOD WHICH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL HAD EXPRESSED. HOWEVER, FATTAL EMPHASIZED, LEBANON DID NOT WANT TO ENTER INTO AN AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD ENDANGER ITS FUTURE OR COMPROMISE ITS INDEPENDENCE. FATTAL OBSERVED THAT THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENTS MUST BE READ WITH "SERENITY" AND THAT DISCUSSION MUST CONTINUE IN ORDER TO REACH COMPROMISE ON THE REMAINING POINTS AT ISSUE. FINALLY, FATTAL STATED HE WAS NOT INFORMED OF YESTERDAY'S ACTION AGAINST THE LEBANESE MERCHANTS AND COULD NOT REPLY AUTHORITATIVELY TO KIMCHE ON THIS POINT.

7. FOLLOWING THIS EXCHANGE, THE PLENARY REVIEWED AGAIN THE COVERING AGREEMENT AND THE ACCOMPANYING AGREED MINUTES IN ORDER TO HIGHLIGHT THOSE POINTS OF AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT BEFORE THE SECRETARY'S ARRIVAL.

PREAMBLE

8. BOTH SIDES AGREED TO THE PREAMBLE IN ITS PRESENT FORM, THOUGH BOTH SIDES RESERVED THEIR POSITION ON THE LEVEL AT WHICH THE SIGNING WOULD TAKE PLACE. IT WAS AGREED THAT THIS ISSUE WOULD BE LEFT IN ABEYANCE.

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ARTICLE 1

9. THE RECOGNITION ISSUE IS STILL NOT RESOLVED IN THIS PARAGRAPH. HOWEVER, A REVISED ORDERING OF THE PARAGRAPHS WITHIN THE ARTICLE WAS AGREED TO. BEGIN TEXT:

1. THE PARTIES AGREE AND UNDERTAKE TO
(IS: RECOGNIZE AND) RESPECT THE SOVEREIGNTY,

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[REDACTED]

-- POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE, AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY
-- OF EACH OTHER. THEY CONSIDER THE EXISTING
-- INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL
-- INVIOABLE.

-- 2. THE PARTIES CONNWB RM HAT THE STATE
-- OF WAR BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL HAS BEEN
-- TERMINATED AND NO LONGER EXISTS.

-- 3. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE PROVISIONS OF PLR-
-- GRAPHS 1 AND 2, ISRAEL UNDERTAKES TO WITHDRAW
-- ALL OF ITS ARMED FORCES FROM LEBANON IN
-- ACCORDANCE WITH THE ANNEX OF THE PRESENT AGREEMENT.

END TEXT.

ARTICLE 7

10. FATTAL PROPOSED, AND ISRAEL ACCEPTED, THE FOLLOW-

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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ING REVISION TO THE LAST SENTENCE OF ARTICLE 7: IT
NOW READS: QUOTE NEW CONTRIBUTORS TO SUCH FORCES
SHALL BE SELECTED FROM AMONG STATES WHICH HAVE
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH BOTH PARTIES TO THE PRESENT
AGREEMENT. END QUOTE. KIMCHE THEN RAISED THE
QUESTION OF THOSE UNIFIL CONTINGENTS PRESENTLY IN
LEBANON WHICH DO NOT HAVE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH
ISRAEL OR LEBANON. FIVN, SENEGAL AND NIGERIA
FALL INTO THIS CATEGORY. IT WAS AGREED THAT THIS
ISSUE WOULD BE LEFT OPEN FOR THE MOMENT AND POSSIBLY
HANDLED LATER BY AN AGREED MINUTE. FATTAL OBSERVED
THAT ONE HAD TO BE CAREFUL TO AVOID A COLLISION WITH
THE U.N. SYSTEM ON THIS MATTER.

ARTICLE 8

11. THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION OF THE NAME WHICH
WOULD BE GIVEN TO THE MILITARY COMMITTEE (PARAGRAPH

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1(C) OF ARTICLE 8). IN ORDER TO SPEED THINGS
ALONG, KIMCHE SUGGESTED THAT THE GROUP BE NAMED THE

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[REDACTED]

"SECURITY COMMITTEE." DRAPER THOUGHT THIS WAS AN ACCEPTABLE COMPROMISE, BUT THE LEBANESE PREFERRED *TO RESERVE THEIR POSITION. SOME OTHER MINOR DRAFTING* CHANGES WERE ALSO AGREED TO IN THIS ARTICLE. WITH RESPECT TO THE AMERICAN PROPOSAL THAT CLAIMS LANGUAGE BE ADDED (ARTICLE 8, PARAGRAPH 2), KIMCHE SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WAS STILL CONSIDERING THIS MATTER.

--
ECONOMIC BOYCOTT LANGUAGE

12. KIMCHE SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO ADD THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH TO ARTICLE 8 IN ORDER TO STRENGTHEN THE

PROVISION WITH RESPECT TO THE ECONOMIC BOYCOTT. (NOTE: THIS PARAGRAPH IS A REVISED FORMULATION OF THE LEBANESE LANGUAGE CONTAINED IN ARTICLE 11 OF THEIR DRAFT.)
BEGIN TEXT:

-- EACH OF THE PARTIES WILL TAKE, UPON ENTRY
-- INTO FORCE OF THE AGREEMENTS PROVIDED FOR
-- IN SUB-PARAGRAPH "A" OF THIS PARAGRAPH, AND
-- NOT LATER THAN ONE YEAR FROM THE ENTRY INTO
-- FORCE OF THE PRESENT AGREEMENT, ALL NECESSARY
-- MEASURES, IN CONFORMITY WITH ITS CONSTITUTIONAL
-- PROCEDURES, FOR THE ABROGATION OF LAWS AND
-- REGULATIONS WHICH ARE NOT COMPATIBLE WITH THE
-- PRESENT ARTICLE OR THE ABOVEMENTIONED AGREEMENTS,
-- OR WHICH IMPEDE THE NON-DISCRIMINATORY PASSAGE
-- OF GOODS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

[REDACTED]

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END TEXT.

FOR THE SAME REASON, KIMCHE ALSO ASKED THAT A FURTHER PARAGRAPH BE INCLUDED UNDER ARTICLE 8 WHICH WOULD STATE THAT EACH PARTY WILL REFRAIN FROM ACTIONS WHICH WOULD HARM THE ECONOMY OF THE OTHER PARTY.

--
13. FATTAL STATED THAT HE COULD NOT ACCEPT THESE PROPOSALS FOR REASONS WHICH HE HAD PREVIOUSLY EXPLAINED. HE INDICATED THAT THIS WAS A MOST DELICATE ISSUE AND HIS GOVERNMENT DID NOT WANT THE

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

BOYCOTT TO BE SUPPRESSED TOO CLEARLY IN THE LANGUAGE OF THE AGREEMENT. HE ALSO NOTED THAT WHEN ONE EMPLOYED PHRASEOLOGY THAT TRADE WOULD BE ON A "NON-DISCRIMINATORY" BASIS, THIS MADE ANY OTHER REFERENCE TO THE BOYCOTT SUPERFLUOUS. DRAPER SUGGESTED A POSSIBLE COMPROMISE IN THE FORM OF AN AGREED MINUTE TO THE AGREEMENT, WHICH WOULD READ: QUOTE: IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS PROVISION SHOULD APPLY MUTATIS MUTANDIS TO AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED BY BOTH PARTIES PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 8, PARAGRAPH 2. UNQUOTE. KIMCHE REPLIED THAT THIS LANGUAGE WOULD STILL BE CONTINGENT ON A FINAL AGREEMENT BEING REACHED; AND RUBENSTEIN UNDERScoreD MY POINT BY SAYING THAT ISRAEL WANTS THE BOYCOTT TO BE ABROGATED WHETHER OR NOT THE FINAL NEGOTIATIONS ON MUTUAL RELATIONS ARE CONCLUDED. IT WAS AGREED THAT THIS ISSUE WOULD BE HELD IN ABEYANCE.

ARTICLE 10

14. FATTAL SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT STILL PREFERRED

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE NUEVO

USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE

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TO MAINTAIN THE INITIAL LANGUAGE ON PARAGRAPH 1,
ARTICLE 10, AS OPPOSED TO THE AMERICAN FORMULA WHICH
STATES THAT QUOTE THE AGREEMENT WOULD REMAIN IN
FORCE UNTIL THE TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN THE PARTIES
IS FORMALLY CONCLUDED. END QUOTE. KIMCHE STATED
THAT ISRAEL ALSO PREFERRED ITS ORIGINAL FORMULATION,
BUT WAS STILL CONSULTING ABOUT THE AMERICAN
PROPOSITION. IT WAS ALSO AGREED AT FATTAL'S SUGGESTION
TO REVISE PARAGRAPH 2 TO READ: QUOTE: THE PRESENT AGREE-
MENT MAY BE MODIFIED OR AMENDED BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT
OF THE TWO PARTIES."

ARTICLE 11

15. ASIDE FROM THE EARLIER DISCUSSION BY THE
ISRAELI SIDE WHICH WOULD MOVE THE FIRST PARAGRAPH
OF ARTICLE 11 (THE ABROGATION OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS)
TO ARTICLE 8, BOTH SIDES AGREED TO REVISE THE SECOND
PARAGRAPH TO READ: "THE PARTIES UNDERTAKE NOT TO
APPLY EXISTING OBLIGATIONS, ENTER INTO ANY OBLIGATION,

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OR ADOPT LAWS OR REGULATIONS IN CONFLICT WITH THE
PRESENT AGREEMENT." THE ISRAELI SIDE WANTED THIS

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LANGUAGE TO BE INCLUDED IN ORDER TO MAKE IT CLEAR
THAT THIS AGREEMENT WOULD TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER
LEBANON'S OBLIGATIONS TO THE ARAB DEFENSE PACT.

ARTICLE 13

16. FATTAL PROPOSED NEW LANGUAGE FOR PARAGRAPH ONE
RELATING TO THE RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES. BEGIN
TEXT:

-- ANY DISPUTE ARISING BETWEEN THE PARTIES
-- CONCERNING THE INTERPRETATION OR APPLICATION
-- OF THE PRESENT AGREEMENT, WHICH IS NOT
-- SETTLED BY NEGOTIATION IN THE JOINT LIAISON
-- COMMITTEE, SHALL BE SUBMITTED TO CONCILIATION,
-- AND IF NOT SO RESOLVED, TO AN AGREED PROCEDURE
-- FOR A DEFINITIVE SETTLEMENT.

END TEXT.

KIMCHE STATED THAT THIS LANGUAGE WAS ACCEPTABLE
PROVIDED THAT IT BEGAN WITH THE WORDING QUOTE:
ANY UNRESOLVED DISPUTE UNQUOTE. FATTAL STRONGLY
RESISTED SUCH AN ADDITION, ARGUING THAT THIS WOULD
ESTABLISH ANOTHER LEVEL OR PHASE IN NEGOTIATING DIS-
PUTES. DESPITE SOME COMPROMISE SUGGESTIONS
OFFERED BY DRAPER, FATTAL REFUSED TO BE BUDGED
AND IT WAS FINALLY AGREED TO SET THIS ISSUE ASIDE FOR
THE MOMENT. FATTAL ALSO DISAGREED WITH THE ISRAELI
SUGGESTION THAT THE PROVISIONS FOR THE RESOLUTION OF
DISPUTES FALLING UNDER THE SECURITY ANNEX (PARAGRAPH 2)
SHOULD ALSO INCLUDE ARTICLES 4 AND 6 OF THE COVERING

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AGREEMENT. THE ISRAELIS ARGUED THAT THESE TWO ARTICLES
WERE OF A SECURITY NATURE AND SHOULD BE DEALT WITH
IN THE FIRST INSTANCE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE
MILITARY COMMITTEE. THIS ISSUE WAS NOT RESOLVED.

AGREED MINUTES

17. BOTH SIDES AGREED TO THE AGREED MINUTES FOR THE
COVERING AGREEMENT.

INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS

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[REDACTED]

LANGUAGE TO BE INCLUDED IN ORDER TO MAKE IT CLEAR
THAT THIS AGREEMENT WOULD TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER
LEBANON'S OBLIGATIONS TO THE ARAB DEFENSE PACT.

ARTICLE 13

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-- CONCERNING THE INTERPRETATION OR APPLICATION
-- OF THE PRESENT AGREEMENT, WHICH IS NOT
-- SETTLED BY NEGOTIATION IN THE JOINT LIAISON
-- COMMITTEE, SHALL BE SUBMITTED TO CONCILIATION,
-- AND IF NOT SO RESOLVED, TO AN AGREED PROCEDURE
-- FOR A DEFINITIVE SETTLEMENT.

END TEXT.

KIMCHE STATED THAT THIS LANGUAGE WAS ACCEPTABLE
PROVIDED THAT IT BEGAN WITH THE WORDING QUOTE:
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MILITARY COMMITTEE. THIS ISSUE WAS NOT RESOLVED.

AGREED MINUTES

17. BOTH SIDES AGREED TO THE AGREED MINUTES FOR THE
COVERING AGREEMENT.

INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS

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18. IN A SIDE MEETING, AMBASSADOR KHARMA DISCUSSED INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS WITH RUBENSTEIN AND KOZAK. HE SAID HE STILL DID NOT HAVE ANY FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS, ESPECIALLY ON THE QUESTION OF "POSITIVE" VERSUS "NEGATIVE" LISTS. THE ISRAELIS PRESSED FOR CONCRETE ARRANGEMENTS TO ENSURE THAT THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE IMPLEMENTED ON THE GROUND; AND THEY PRESENTED A DRAFT TO COVER THESE POINTS. KHARMA, AS HE HAD DONE DURING THE LAST MEETING IN KHALDAH, FUDGED AND SAID HE WAS WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS. HE ALSO HAD DIFFICULTIES WITH THE ISRAELI PROPOSALS WHICH WOULD SPECIFY THOSE AREAS TO BE COVERED DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE FINAL AGREEMENT(S) ON MUTUAL RELATIONS, INCLUDING SUCH AREAS AS CULTURAL RELATIONS. KOZAK TOLD KHARMA THAT IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT FOR LEBANON TO BE AT LEAST IN THE POSITION

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EXDIS

OF BEING ABLE TO STATE CLEARLY WHAT THEY COULD AND
COULD NOT ACCEPT WITH RESPECT TO INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS,
AND ARGUED THE PRESENT LACK OF CLARITY ONLY SERVED
TO INCREASE ISRAELI SUSPICIONS. KHARMA UNDERSTOOD
THIS POINT, BUT OBVIOUSLY IS RUNNING INTO DIFFICULTIES
WITH HIS SUPERIORS.
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FOLLOWING REPEAT JERUSALEM 760 ACTION STATE INFO
BEIRUT TELAVIV DAMASCUS TUNIS CAIRO JIDDA RIYADH
WHITEHOUSE MAR 4.

QUOTE: JERUSALEM 00760

EXDIS

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, HARR, LE, US, IS, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: SHAMIR'S REPORT
ON ISRAELI MINISTERIAL DELIBERATIONS, MARCH 4

1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY: FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR TOLD US
MARCH 4 THAT THE ISRAELI MINISTERIAL DEFENSE
COMMITTEE HAD CONCLUDED AFTER TWO DAYS OF DELI-
BERATIONS THAT THE PROPOSALS WHICH WE HAD BROUGHT

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FROM LEBANON WERE NOT SUFFICIENT TO MEET ISRAEL'S

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REQUIREMENTS CONCERNING SECURITY OR

MUTUAL RELATIONS. THE U.S./LEBANESE PROPOSALS ON SECURITY WERE NOT SUFFICIENT BECAUSE THE LAF LACKED THE CAPABILITY ALONE TO PREVENT A RETURN OF THE PLO. HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF U.S. AND LEBANESE TOTAL OPPOSITION TO A RESIDUAL IDF PRESENCE IN LEBANON, THE FOREIGN AND DEFENSE MINISTRIES HAD BEEN TASKED TO COME UP WITH ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS WHICH WOULD MEET ISRAELI SECURITY NEEDS WITHOUT THE FIVE EARLY-WARNING STATIONS. SHAMIR INDICATED THAT THIS PROPOSAL WOULD CENTER ON RETENTION OF HADDAD AS A COMMANDER OF THE BRIGADE IN SOUTHERN LEBANON AND CLOSE IDF COOPERATION WITH HADDAD, INCLUDING JOINT DAILY PATROLS. SHAMIR ALSO RULED OUT ANY ROLE FOR UNIFIL IN SOUTHERN LEBANON, INCLUDING ASSISTING THE LAF IN PROTECTING THE PALESTINIAN CAMPS.

3. ON MUTUAL RELATIONS, SHAMIR SAID THAT ISRAEL UNDERSTOOD LEBANON'S NEED TO DEFER A FORMAL AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS MUST PROVIDE CLEARLY FOR THE FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS AND GOODS AND IT MUST BE AGREED NOW THAT THE FORMAL AGREEMENT WOULD TERMINATE THE ECONOMIC BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL. SHAMIR ADDED THAT ISRAEL WILL ASK THE U.S. TO GUARANTEE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT. SHAMIR SAID THAT ISRAEL'S NEW PROPOSALS WILL BE PREPARED AND BROUGHT TO THE CABINET WITHIN A FEW DAYS FOR FORMAL APPROVAL, AND THEN WOULD BE SHARED WITH US. IN THE MEANTIME, THE NEGOTIATIONS IN KHALDAH SHOULD CONTINUE.

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4. I TOLD SHAMIR THAT I WAS "MORE THAN DISAPPOINTED" IN THE ISRAELI RESPONSE. WE WOULD, HOWEVER, SHARE SHAMIR'S PRELIMINARY COMMENTS WITH THE LEBANESE. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, IT WAS UP TO LEBANON TO DECIDE WHETHER IT COULD ACCEPT THE ISRAELI POSITIONS. HOWEVER, OUR IMPRESSION WAS THAT THE ISRAELI POSITIONS SHOWED INSUFFICIENT REGARD FOR THE LEBANESE PREDICAMENT AND FOR LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY AND WOULD NOT PRODUCE SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. I SAID U.S.

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POLICY HAD NOT CHANGED. WE CONTINUED TO SUPPORT LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY THROUGHOUT LEBANON, THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES, AND ADEQUATE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR ISRAEL. I SAID THAT I WOULD REPORT TO THE SECRETARY ON THE STATE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND PROBABLY RETURN TO THE MIDDLE EAST SOON. END SUMMARY.

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5. I MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER AND HIS MFA COLLEAGUES (NO MOD/IDF REPRESENTATIVES WERE PRESENT) FOR ABOUT ONE HOUR FRIDAY MORNING, MARCH 4. I WAS JOINED BY AMBASSADORS DRAPER AND LEWIS, GENERAL COOLEY, KRECZKO AND HARE.

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6. SHAMIR OPENED BY REVIEWING THE RESULTS OF THE CABINET MEETINGS ON LEBANON OF WEDNESDAY AND THURSDAY OF THIS WEEK. (APPARENTLY, THE MEETINGS WERE ENLARGED BEYOND THE STEERING GROUP ON LEBANON TO INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE MINISTERIAL DEFENSE COMMITTEE.) SPEAKING IN A QUIET, NON-CONFRONTATIONAL MANNER, HE SAID THE DELIBERATIONS HAD BEEN LONG AND SERIOUS AND HAD ADDRESSED THE AMERICAN AND LEBANESE PROPOSALS WHICH OPPOSED ANY CONTINUING ISRAELI MILITARY PRESENCE IN LEBANON AFTER WITHDRAWAL. SHAMIR STATED THAT THESE LATEST PROPOSALS DID NOT MEET ISRAEL'S SECURITY NEEDS NOR DID THEY

[REDACTED]

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GIVE "FULL SATISFACTION" TO ISRAELI REQUIREMENTS ON MUTUAL RELATIONS (NORMALIZATION). THEREFORE, IT HAD BEEN DECIDED THAT THE MINISTERS OF DEFENSE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS WOULD PREPARE NEW PROPOSALS FOR THE CABINET'S CONSIDERATION WHICH, IF APPROVED, WOULD BECOME THE GUIDELINES FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS AND OUR SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSIONS.

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7. SHAMIR SAID THAT THE MINISTERS HAD RECEIVED AN ASSESSMENT OF THE EXISTING SITUATION IN LEBANON FROM MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE EXPERTS. THE PROGNOSIS HAD BEEN VERY SKEPTICAL ABOUT THE CAPABILITY OF THE VARIOUS LEBANESE SECURITY ELEMENTS TO PREVENT THE RESURGENCE OF PLO TERRORIST ACTIVITIES NEAR ISRAEL'S FRONTIER. AS AN EXAMPLE, THE EXPERTS HAD CITED THE PREVAILING SITUATION IN BEIRUT WHERE

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FOUR LAF BRIGADES, THE MNF, AND INDEED THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT WERE POSITIONED. DESPITE THIS PRELSIE CONTINUING TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST ISRAELI TARGETS, ORIGINATING FROM WITHIN BEIRUT. NONE OF THE TERRORISTS HAD BEEN CAPTURED AND THERE ALSO WAS A CONTINUING PLO INFILTRATION INTO BEIRUT. SHAMIR STRESSED THAT ISRAEL DID NOT BLAME THE LEBANESE FOR BEING UNABLE TO PREVENT THESE INCIDENTS FROM OCCURRING. BUT THEY DID INDICATE A DEFINITE LACK OF CAPABILITY ON THE PART OF THE LEBANESE SECURITY FORCES. SHAMIR SAID THE MINISTERS HAD ALSO REVIEWED THE POSSIBILITY OF COOPERATION BETWEEN THE LEBANESE AND ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE SERVICES. THEY HAD CONCLUDED THAT THE LEBANESE SERVICES WERE "USELESS" FOR THE MOMENT SINCE THEY DID NOT HAVE ANY ASSETS IN SOUTH LEBANON.

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8. SHAMIR SAID THE MINISTERS HAD ANALYZED WAYS IN WHICH THE SITUATION COULD BE ADDRESSED. THEY HAD CONCLUDED THAT HADDAD MUST REMAIN AS THE COMMANDER OF THE SOUTHERN SECURITY ZONE. HADDAD MUST BE ABLE TO SELECT HIS OFFICERS AND THERE HAD TO BE DAILY CONTACT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND HADDAD. HE SAID THAT THE MINISTERS MAY BRING UP PROPOSALS TO HAVE JOINT ISRAELI-LEBANESE PATROLS ON A DAILY BASIS. ALTHOUGH HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE LEBANESE WOULD PROBABLY NOT AGREE TO ALLOWING THE ISRAELIS TO REMAIN IN LEBANON. (SHAMIR DID NOT SPELL THIS CONCEPT OUT.) SHAMIR THOUGHT SOME ISRAELI PERSONNEL WOULD ALSO HAVE TO REMAIN IN THE SECURITY ZONE, FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES AND TO MAN THE MILITARY COMMITTEE. (COMMENT: THESE ARE THE GUIDELINES WHICH THE MINISTERS HAVE GIVEN TO THE MOD/IDF IN ORDER TO DRAW UP NEW SECURITY PROPOSALS WHICH WOULD EXCLUDE FIVE OBSERVATION POSTS.)

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9. ON UNIFIL, THE MINISTERS HAD CONCLUDED THAT THIS FORCE HAD NO POSITIVE ROLE TO PLAY IN THE SECURITY ZONE. IF THEY WERE PLACED AROUND THE PALESTINIAN CAMPS, SHAMIR ASSERTED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE LONG BEFORE A NEW PLO INFRASTRUCTURE WOULD SURFACE, UNDER THE PROTECTION OF UNIFIL.

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10. TURNING TO MUTUAL RELATIONS (NORMALIZATION), SHAMIR SAID HE COULD UNDERSTAND LEBANESE CAUTION ON NOT REACHING FORMAL AGREEMENTS NOW. HOWEVER, SHAMIR SAID THAT THE PRINCIPLES MUST BE AGREED TO AT THE OUTSET BOTH WITH RESPECT TO INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS AND TO THE ULTIMATE FORMAL AGREEMENT. HE STRESSED THAT THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS HAD TO PROVIDE FOR THE "FREE PASSAGE OF PEOPLE, GOODS, AND PRODUCTS". IT ALSO HAD TO BE AGREED THAT THE ECONOMIC BOYCOTT WILL CEASE WHEN A FORMAL AGREEMENT IS REACHED. ON
[REDACTED]

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BOTH SECURITY AND NORMALIZATION ISSUES, SHAMIR SAID HE WOULD HAVE TO LOOK FOR WAYS TO GUARANTEE THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE IMPLEMENTED. THIS COULD BE DONE, HE SUGGESTED, IN VARIOUS WAYS, INCLUDING IN AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES (OR A LETTER FROM THE U.S.).

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11. IN SUMMING UP, SHAMIR SAID THAT THE NEW ISRAELI PROPOSALS WOULD BE BROUGHT TO THE MINISTERIAL DEFENCE COMMITTEE (A FORUM WHICH INCLUDES MOST OF THE MINISTERS) IN A FEW DAYS. HE THOUGHT THAT THE PROCESS OF REVIEW AND DECISION COULD BE COMPLETED QUICKLY.

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12. I REPLIED THAT I WAS "MORE THAN DISAPPOINTED" TO RECEIVE THE ISRAELI VIEWS ON THE LATEST LEBANESE PROPOSALS, BUT SAID THESE WERE MATTERS WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE DISCUSSED WITH THE LEBANESE. IT WAS THEIR COUNTRY AND THEY HAD TO MAKE THEIR DECISIONS. THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT TELL THEM WHAT THEY COULD AND COULD NOT DO. HOWEVER, I WAS CONCERNED THAT THE ISRAELI VIEWS, AS OUTLINED, WOULD NOT PRODUCE A SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL AND REFERRED SPECIFICALLY TO SHAMIR'S POINTS ON JOINT PATROLS AND HADDAD. I SAID I COULD NOT PREDICT THIS WITH CERTAINTY BUT I WAS DEEPLY WORRIED. I ADDED THAT I DID NOT AGREE WITH THE VIEWS OF THE ISRAELI EXPERTS ON LEBANESE CAPABILITIES, ESPECIALLY SINCE THE CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD BE QUITE DIFFERENT AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON. I TOLD SHAMIR THAT I THOUGHT ISRAEL WAS MISSING AN
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OPPORTUNITY TO WRAP UP THE NEGOTIATIONS QUICKLY.
THEY COULD WORK ON THE PROBLEMS FOR MONTHS MORE,
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BUT WOULD ONLY IMPROVE AN AGREEMENT marginally. IF NEGOTIATIONS TRAILED ON, AS I FEARED WOULD BE THE CASE, PRESSURES AND PROBLEMS COULD ARISE WHICH WOULD DERAIL THE PROCESS. THIS WAS MY VERY DEEP CONCERN. MOREOVER, THE ISRAELI POSITION WOULD NOT ALLOW THE FULL RESTORATION OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY (WITH HADDAD IN AN INDEPENDENT POSITION). THE SYRIANS MIGHT REFUSE TO WITHDRAW OR INSIST--IN RETURN FOR HADDAD'S POSITION--THAT SOME SYRIAN SURROGATE SUCH AS KHATIB BE GIVEN A SIMILAR POSITION NEAR SYRIA'S FRONTIERS.

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13. NEVERTHELESS, I TOLD SHAMIR WE WOULD HAVE TO KEEP WORKING ON THE PROBLEM. I SAID I WOULD BE GOING BACK TO THE UNITED STATES THIS AFTERNOON AND WOULD SEE THE SECRETARY TO REPORT ON THE NEGOTIATIONS. I THEN THOUGHT I COULD RETURN AS EARLY AS NEXT WEDNESDAY, DEPENDING ON MY CONSULTATIONS. EVEN IF I WERE NOT BACK, HOWEVER, AMBASSADORS DRAPER AND LEWIS WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO RECEIVE ISRAEL'S REVISED PROPOSALS. IN THE MEANTIME, DRAPER WOULD GO TO BEIRUT TO INFORM THE LEBANESE IN A PRELIMINARY WAY ON THE STATE OF ISRAEL'S DELIBERATIONS. I REITERATED THE U.S. POSITION OF SUPPORT FOR: THE FULL RESTORATION OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY; FULL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES; AND ADEQUATE SECURITY IN ISRAEL'S NORTHERN BORDER AREA.

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14. AMBASSADOR LEWIS SPECIFICALLY ASKED IF THE CABINET HAD REJECTED OUR PROPOSITION THAT ALL ISRAELI FORCES MUST BE WITHDRAWN FROM LEBANON. SHAMIR REPLIED THAT WITHDRAWAL WAS ACCEPTED AS A PRINCIPLE BUT ISRAEL STILL HAD TO FIND OTHER SOLUTIONS TO ITS SECURITY REQUIREMENTS. KINCHE ADDED THAT, IF THE OBSERVATION POSTS WERE TO BE SET ASIDE,
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THE ALTERNATE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS HAD TO BE OF SUFFICIENT WEIGHT TO REPLACE THE OBSERVATION POSTS. I SAID THAT I HAD UNDERSTOOD ISRAEL WOULD BE SUGGESTING VARIOUS SECURITY ALTERNATIVES SUCH AS HADDAD, JOINT PATROLS, AND INTENSIFIED INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION. SHAMIR REPLIED ELLIPTICALLY THAT "EVEN MORE EXTREME PROPOSALS" HAD BEEN SURFACED IN THE MINISTERS' DELIBERATIONS.

15. KIMCHE SAID THERE WERE THREE KEY ELEMENTS IN ISRAEL'S POSITION ON MUTUAL RELATIONS: A) A CLEAN AND DEFINITIVE STATEMENT ON INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS; B) A DISCUSSION NOW ON WHAT THE FORMAL AGREEMENT TO BE NEGOTIATED LATER WOULD LOOK LIKE; AND C) AMERICAN ASSURANCES THAT THESE COMMITMENTS WOULD BE IMPLEMENTED. I REPLIED THAT OUR ASSURANCES WOULD DEPEND ON THE NATURE OF THE AGREEMENTS WHICH WERE REACHED, THOUGH WE WOULD OBVIOUSLY MONITOR THE IMPLEMENTATION AND COMMITMENTS OF THE AGREEMENTS THROUGH OUR PARTICIPATION ON THE SPECIAL LIAISON COMMITTEE.

16. AS THE MEETING WAS DRAWING TO A CLOSE, SHAMIR REFERRED TO RECENT STATEMENTS FROM LEBANON WHICH WERE NOT ENCOURAGING. HE SPECIFICALLY POINTED TO THE UNFRIENDLY TONE OF SOME OF FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM'S REMARKS. I REPLIED THIS WAS NOT SALEM'S INTENT AND NOTED THAT THE LEBANESE HAD DONE CONSIDERABLE BACKGROUNDING TO PREPARE THE LEBANESE PUBLIC ON A MOVE TOWARD NORMALITY BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON. SHAMIR WAS UNCONVINCED. I SUMMED UP BY SAYING THAT, AS ALWAYS, THE U.S. WOULD DO ITS BEST IN A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL WAY TO REACH AGREE-

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MENTS SOON.

17. AS I GOT INTO MY CAR, BAR-ON IN A GOOD TRY AT IMPROVING THE ATMOSPHERE, STRESSED TO ME THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MOD BEING INSTRUCTED TO COME UP WITH PROPOSALS TO OBTAIN THE NEED FOR OBSERVATION POSTS. GROVE
UQNQUOTE DAM

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EXDIS FOR DEP SEC DAM/TODEP 10010

FOLLOWING JERUSALEM 00996 SENT ACTION SECSTATE INFO
BEIRUT TEL AVIV AMMAN CAIRO DAMASCUS JIDDA RIYADH
TUNIS MAR 21

QUOTE: JERUSALEM 00996

EXDIS

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MPOL, MARR, PREL, LE, IS, SY, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: MEETING WITH SHAMIR
AND ARENS, MARCH 20

1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY. WE MET WITH FDNHIN SHAMIR AND DEFMIN
ARENS FOR TWO HOURS MARCH 20, PRIMARILY TO REVIEW
WHERE THINGS STOOD ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. SHAMIR

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SAID THAT HE HAD RECEIVED THE SECRETARY'S ORAL

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MESSAGE AND WANTED TO HEAR OUR FULL RESPONSE TO ISRAEL'S PRELIMINARY COMMENTS ON THE U.S. "NON-PAPER". I SAID THAT THE COMMENTS PRESENTED SOME OPPORTUNITIES FOR PROGRESS BUT CONTINUED TO CONTAIN SOME PROBLEMS, PARTICULARLY AS REGARDS HADDAD AND THE DEGREE OF ISRAELI CONTROL OVER THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE. I THEN WENT THROUGH THE ISRAELI COMMENTS SERIATIM. I DREW ON THE ANALYSIS PREPARED IN WASHINGTON, BUT RECAST THE COMMENTS IN TERMS OF THE LEBANESE POSITION. I MADE CLEAR THAT THE LEBANESE HAD REPEATEDLY AND UNAMBIGUOUSLY REJECTED THE RETENTION OF HADDAD AS COMMANDER AND WOULD VIEW ISRAELI LIAISON OFFICERS AND ENLARGED SUPERVISORY TEAMS AS A RESIDUAL ISRAELI PRESENCE. ARENS AND SHAMIR BOTH SAID THAT HADDAD WAS THE MOST IMPORTANT POINT IN THE ISRAELI COMMENTS. I ALSO MADE CLEAR THAT LEBANON WOULD NOT ACCEPT A SECURITY (ARREST AND INTERROGATION) FUNCTION FOR ISRAEL AGENTS IN LEBANON, ALTHOUGH LEBANON WOULD FULLY SUPPORT COVERT INTELLIGENCE-GATHERING ACTIVITIES. I ALSO SAID THAT THERE WERE SOME POINTS IN THE ISRAELI PAPER, SUCH AS THE EMPHASIS ON QUICK REACTION TO TERRORIST ATTACKS AND MORE ISRAEL/LEBANON LIAISON, WHICH LEBANON COULD ACCEPT. I REGRETTED THAT ISRAEL HAD NOT CHANGED ITS POSITION ON UNIFIL, ARGUING THAT SOME UNIFIL PRESENCE IN SOUTHERN LEBANON WAS PROBABLY NECESSARY TO ALLOW LEBANON TO UTILIZE UNIFIL ELSEWHERE AND TO SECURE PLO WITHDRAWAL.

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3. WHILE SHAMIR INTERMITTENTLY DEFENDED THE ISRAELI COMMENTS, HE LEFT IT TO GENERAL TAMIR TO PROVIDE THE RATIONALE FOR THE CURRENT ISRAELI POSITION.

[REDACTED]

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TAMIR EXPLAINED THAT ISRAEL CONTINUED TO DOUBT THE IMMEDIATE CAPABILITY OF THE LEBANESE ARMY TO PROVIDE SECURITY IN SOUTHERN LEBANON, THE U.S. PRESENTATION IN WASHINGTON NOTWITHSTANDING. TAMIR SAID THAT THE ORIGINAL ISRAELI SECURITY PACKAGE HAD BEEN DESIGNED TO SUPPLEMENT THE LAF IN THREE WAYS: DIRECT (ISRAELI OBSERVATION POSTS); INDIRECT (HADDAD); AND COMMON (SUPERVISORY TEAMS). IF ISRAEL WERE GOING TO GIVE UP THE FIRST, THE OTHER TWO COULD NOT BE WHITTLED DOWN. I SAID THAT I WOULD DISCUSS THE ISRAELI COM-

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MENTS WITH GEMAYEL, TO SEE EXACTLY WHERE THE LEBANESE STOOD.

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4. THERE WAS A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF MUTUAL RELATIONS, WITH GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT THE NEGOTIATORS WERE HEADED IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. I ALSO REPORTED THAT LEBANESE FONMIN SALEM AND KING HUSSEIN HAD BOTH INFORMED US THAT SYRIAN FONMIN KHADDAH HAD TOLD EACH THAT SYRIA WOULD WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH ISRAEL. ARENS CONCLUDED THE MEETING WITH A PLEA THAT THE U.S. TRY TO IMPROVE THE IN-HUMAN CONDITIONS IN WHICH THREE ISRAELI PRISONERS WERE BEING HELD BY SYRIA. I SAID WE WOULD MAKE AN EFFORT ON THEIR BEHALF. END SUMMARY.

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5. I MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR AND DEFENSE MINISTER ARENS AND THEIR AIDES FOR TWO HOURS SUNDAY EVENING, MARCH 20. I WAS ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADORS DRAPER AND LEWIS, GENERAL COOLEY, KRECZKO AND HARE. THE TONE WAS BUSINESSLIKE THROUGHOUT THE MEETING.

6. SHAMIR MADE IT CLEAR AT THE BEGINNING OF THE MEETING THAT HE WANTED TO HEAR OUR FURTHER REACTIONS TO ISRAEL'S PRELIMINARY REACTIONS TO OUR "NON-PAPER". REFERRING TO TODAY'S MINISTERIAL DISCUSSIONS ON LEBANON (OUR MEETING WAS DELAYED FOR ONE HOUR BE-

[REDACTED]

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CAUSE OF THE MINISTERIAL MEETING), SHAMIR SAID HIS ONLY MANDATE WAS TO CONTINUE TO DISCUSS AND NEGOTIATE, THEREBY IMPLYING THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT YET TAKEN ANY NEW NEGOTIATING POSITIONS. THE FOLLOWING IS KEYED TO SECTIONS OF OUR "NON-PAPER".

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REGARDING SECTION (A). TERRITORIAL BRIGADE.

7. I THEN PROCEEDED TO GO POINT BY POINT THROUGH OUR PRELIMINARY RESPONSE TO THE ISRAELI COMMENTS. REGARDING SECTION (A) PERTAINING TO HADDAD AND THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE, I SAID IT WAS ALWAYS UNDERSTOOD THAT HADDAD'S FORCES WOULD BE INTEGRATED INTO THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE. IT WAS ALSO UNDERSTOOD THAT THE BRIGADE WOULD STAY IN THE AREA AND PERSONNEL WOULD BE MAINLY RECRUITED FROM THE REGION. THE

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[REDACTED]

SECRETARY HAD SPOKEN OF HADDAD'S FORCES AS FORMING THE NUCLEUS OF THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE. I NOTED THAT OTHER ELEMENTS, POSSIBLY DRAWN FROM EXISTING LAF UNITS ALREADY IN THE SOUTH, MIGHT BE ADDED TO THE BRIGADE IN ORDER TO MAKE IT A MORE EFFECTIVE FORCE BUT SAID THAT THIS SUBJECT AND THE ISSUE OF WHAT IS PRECISELY MEANT BY INTEGRATING HADDAD'S FORCES NEEDED FURTHER DISCUSSION. WE HAD TOLD THE LEBANESE THAT THE CONCEPT HAD NOT BEEN SUFFICIENTLY EXPLAINED TO THE ISRAELIS. I ALSO SAID THERE WAS NO PROBLEM IN HAVING THE CIVIL GUARD PLACED UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE BRIGADE BUT THEIR PRECISE ROLE AND FUNCTION NEEDED FURTHER DEFINITION.

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8. I SAID FLATLY THAT ISRAEL'S POSITION WITH RESPECT TO MAJOR HADDAD POSED A MAJOR PROBLEM AND DIFFICULTY. WE HAD GONE OVER THIS POINT EXTENSIVELY WITH [REDACTED]

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THE LEBANESE IN THE PAST AND AFTER RECEIVING ISRAEL'S PRELIMINARY COMMENTS HAD AGAIN RAISED THIS ISSUE WITH THE LEBANESE IN WASHINGTON. WE HAD EXPLORED VARIOUS AVENUES TO RESOLVE THIS PROBLEM BUT THE LEBANESE CONTINUED TO INSIST THAT THE VERY IDEA OF KEEPING HADDAD IN THE SOUTHERN SECURITY ZONE WAS A NON-STARTER, THOUGH THEY INTENDED TO DEAL WITH HADDAD HONORABLY. I TOLD SHAMIR I WAS AWARE THAT WHILE THE ISRAELIS MAY HAVE HEARD OF DIFFERING LEBANESE POSITIONS ON HADDAD, I DID NOT BELIEVE THE LEBANESE POSITION WOULD CHANGE, THOUGH I WOULD TAKE THE MATTER UP AGAIN WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL.

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9. SHAMIR REPLIED HE HAD TOLD THE SECRETARY THAT IF THE UNITED STATES INFORMED THE LEBANESE CONVINCINGLY THAT HADDAD HAD TO REMAIN IN THE SOUTH, THEN GEMAYEL WOULD ACCEPT THIS OUTCOME. I ANSWERED THAT THE LEBANESE HAD BECOME MORE THAN A LITTLE ANGRY WITH ME IN WASHINGTON SINCE THEY BELIEVED I WAS TRYING TO PROMOTE HADDAD. THEY WERE ABSOLUTELY ADAMANT IN GIVING HIM ANY ROLE IN THE SOUTHERN ZONE. SHAMIR AND ARENS SAID HADDAD WAS OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE TO ISRAEL.

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10. ON THE ISSUE OF ANY CHANGE IN THE ORGANIZATION [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] UNCLASSIFIED

OF THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE (POINT 4), I SAID THE LEBANESE WERE PREPARED TO GIVE MANY COMMITMENTS BUT THEY WOULD OPPOSE GIVING ISRAEL A VETO OVER THE APPOINTMENT OF SENIOR OFFICERS. THEY WERE WILLING TO HAVE FULL EXCHANGE WITH ISRAEL ON THIS SUBJECT AND HAD EVERY INTENTION OF APPOINTING THE RIGHT KIND OF OFFICERS IN THE SOUTH. IF ISRAEL EXPRESSED STRONG OBJECTIONS TO CERTAIN APPOINTMENTS, I SAID I WAS SURE THEY COULD BE SATISFACTORILY RESOLVED, BUT PRIOR APPROVAL POSED GREAT DIFFICULTIES. SHAMIR REPLIED THAT THIS PROCEDURE WOULD TOTALLY CHANGE THE

[REDACTED]

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CONTEXT.

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11. ON POINT 5 (THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PROCEDURES), I SAID PROCEDURES COULD BE AGREED UPON BUT CERTAIN REQUIREMENTS, SUCH AS THOSE RELATING TO BEING OVER AGE OR THE QUESTION OF CRIMINAL CHARGES, NEEDED FURTHER DISCUSSION. FINALLY, ON THE QUESTION OF ISRAELI ADVISERS, I SAID THAT THE LEBANESE ARGUE THAT SUCH ADVISERS/LIAISON OFFICERS ARE UNNECESSARY AND WOULD FURTHERMORE NOT LEAD TO A TOTAL WITHDRAWAL. THE LEBANESE WERE ABSOLUTELY FIRM ON THIS POINT. ALL IN ALL, I CHARACTERIZED THE LEBANESE ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE AS POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE, THOUGH THEY WERE NOT PREPARED TO MEET ALL OF ISRAEL'S REQUESTS.

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REGARDING SECTION (B)

12. I SAID THERE WAS NO PROBLEM WITH ADDING A REFERENCE TO "INSTANT REACTION TO TERRORISM" IN THIS SECTION, AS LONG AS IT WAS CLEAR THAT OPERATIONS WOULD BE CONDUCTED BY LEBANESE UNITS.

13. ON POINT 2 (U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE MILITARY COMMITTEE), I SAID THE LEBANESE FELT THE NEED TO HAVE AN AMERICAN PRESENCE AT ALL LEVELS. I RECOGNIZED THE ISRAELI CLAIM THAT THE MILITARY COMMITTEE SHOULD HAVE A BILATERAL CHARACTER HAD A CERTAIN VALIDITY AND SUGGESTED THAT ONE WAY TO HANDLE THE PROBLEM WOULD BE BY HAVING AMERICAN PARTICIPATION ONLY AT THE REQUEST OF EITHER PARTY. THIS WOULD

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PRESERVE THE BILATERAL FRAMEWORK OF THE COMMITTEE
AND WOULD ALSO HELP MEET THE LEBANESE REQUIREMENT.

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I STRESSED THAT WE HAD NOT DISCUSSED THIS PROPOSAL
WITH THE LEBANESE.

14. SHAMIR EXPLAINED THE ISRAELI RELUCTANCE TO
HAVING AMERICAN PARTICIPATION WAS NOT BASED ON LACK
OF CONFIDENCE OR DESIRE FOR COOPERATION. HOWEVER,
HE WAS CONCERNED THAT TOO MANY AMERICANS MIGHT GET
INTO THE ACT AND THAT MISUNDERSTANDINGS WERE VIR-
TUALLY CERTAIN TO OCCUR. HE WANTED COOPERATION TO
BE CONDUCTED AT A LEVEL IN WHICH THE AMERICAN
REPRESENTATIVES WOULD HAVE A FULL GRASP OF THE TOTAL
PICTURE AND REFERRED TO THE CURRENT SITUATION IN
BEIRUT AS AN EXAMPLE TO BE AVOIDED. KINCHE ADDED
THAT HE ASSUMED MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES WOULD BE
ATTACHED TO THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE, WHICH
WOULD CONDUCT PERIODIC REVIEWS OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES.
HE ARGUED THIS SHOULD PROVIDE AMPLE SYMMETRY. I
REPLIED THAT QUITE FRANKLY THE LEBANESE CLAIMED THEY
COULD NOT STAND UP TO THE ISRAELIS AND NEEDED A
SHIELD. WE WERE NOT ASKING TO BE ON THE COMMITTEE,
THE LEBANESE WERE. I SAID THAT PERHAPS WE COULD
THINK OF A LIMITED TIME FOR AMERICAN PARTICIPATION
ON REQUEST. IN AN ATTEMPT TO ASSUAGE SHAMIR'S CON-
CERN, I SAID WE WERE ONLY THINKING OF ONE AMERICAN
PARTICIPATING ON THE MILITARY COMMITTEE.

15. I SAID THAT WE BELIEVED THE OFFICE AND OPERA-
TIONS CENTER SHOULD BE CO-LOCATED FOR REASONS OF
EFFICIENCY. WE HAD NOT INFORMED THE LEBANESE OF
ISRAEL'S REQUEST FOR AN OFFICE AND TWO SEPARATE
OPERATIONS CENTERS BUT FEARED THEIR REACTION WOULD
BE NEGATIVE. BASED ON THIS PRESUMPTION, I ASKED
IF IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO INDICATE THAT THE
MILITARY COMMITTEE WOULD REVIEW AND DECIDE SUBSEQUENTLY
IF A SECOND OPERATIONS CENTER WAS NECESSARY. I
STRESSED THAT IN HAVING THE OPERATIONS CENTER MANNED

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[REDACTED]

ON A 24-HOUR BASIS, IDF PERSONNEL COULD NOT BE STATIONED IN LEBANON; THEY WOULD HAVE TO COME IN ON A ROTATING BASIS FOR OFFICIAL PURPOSES.

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16. ON THE QUESTION OF ASSIGNMENT TO THE MILITARY COMMITTEE (POINT 4), I REITERATED LEBANESE OPPOSITION TO GIVING THE ISRAELIS A VETO, THOUGH THEY HAD PROMISED FULL COOPERATION. MOREOVER, LEBANON HAD THE SAME INTEREST AS ISRAEL IN PREVENTING A RESURGENCE OF TENSION. I SAID THERE WERE NO PROBLEMS WITH FACE-TO-FACE CONTACTS BETWEEN COMMANDERS, INCLUDING STAFF (POINT 5).

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17. WE HAD NO PROBLEM TO OMITTING THE REFERENCE TO EACH PARTY STAYING ON ITS OWN SIDE OF THE BORDER (POINT 6), PROVIDED IT WAS CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS WOULD IN FACT BE THE CASE. THE PROBLEM WAS THE INFERENCE GIVEN THAT ISRAEL WOULD RESERVE THE RIGHT TO CROSS THE BORDER. KIMCHE SAID THIS WAS PRECISELY THE PROBLEM IF THE LEBANESE FAILED TO TAKE ACTION AGAINST A TERRORIST THREAT. I REPLIED THAT IF THIS WERE THE CASE, THE MATTER WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN UP IN THE MILITARY COMMITTEE. I ALSO REHEARSED THE PRACTICAL FORMS OF COOPERATION ALONG THE BORDER, AS PREVIOUSLY SPELLED OUT IN OUR "NON-PAPER". ON THE LAST POINT OF THE SECTION (POINT 7), I SIMPLY SUGGESTED THAT WE SEE HOW THE QUESTION OF AMERICAN PARTICIPATION ON THE MILITARY COMMITTEE IS RESOLVED.

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REGARDING SECTION (C)

18. I EXPLAINED THAT OUR INTELLIGENCE EXPERTS COULD

[REDACTED]

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NOT AGREE TO HAVING THE LEBANESE SECURITY SERVICES TRAINED BY MORE THAN ONE SERVICE. IF ISRAEL WERE TO TRAIN THE LEBANESE, THEN WE WOULD NOT, EVEN THOUGH THE LEBANESE HAVE ALREADY REQUESTED OUR ASSISTANCE. MOREOVER, HAVING ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE SEIZING, ARRESTING OR INTERROGATING PERSONS COULD NOT BE SANCTIONED. I ALSO DREW A DISTINCTION BETWEEN COVERT INFORMATION-GATHERING INTELLIGENCE

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ACTIVITIES AND OVERT ACTIONS, SUCH AS TRAINING. THE ISRAELIS, INCLUDING THE MOSSAD REPRESENTATIVE AT THE MEETING, SAID THEY THOUGHT THE SECRETARY HAD AGREED THAT ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE COULD TRAIN IN THE SECURITY ZONE. I ARGUED THAT OUR PROPOSALS ENVISAGED A FULL AND COOPERATIVE INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION AND EXCHANGE, WHICH SHOULD SATISFY ISRAEL. I SUGGESTED THAT THE ISRAELIS REVIEW AGAIN THEIR PROFESSIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND DISCUSS THEM WITH THE LEBANESE. I REPEATED, HOWEVER, OUR VIEW THAT TWO SERVICES COULD NOT TRAIN THE LEBANESE SECURITY SERVICES.

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19. ON POINTS 2 AND 3, I SAID THAT IF SECURITY PERSONNEL WERE TO ACCOMPANY THE SUPERVISORY TEAMS, THEY MUST BE IN UNIFORM, ASSUMING, OF COURSE, THAT THE LEBANESE AGREED. THE ISRAELIS HAD NO PROBLEM WITH THIS POINT. THEY ALSO HAD NO PROBLEM WITH OUR SPECIAL FORCES TRAINING STRIKE UNITS, ONCE IT WAS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE TRAINING WOULD TAKE PLACE OUTSIDE OF THE SECURITY ZONE.

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REGARDING SECTION (E)

20. I SAID THAT THE NUMBERS MENTIONED BY ISRAEL, BOTH WITH RESPECT TO THE SUPERVISORY TEAMS AND PERSONNEL ON THE TEAMS, WERE HIGHER THAN WHAT HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED. MOREOVER, THE ISRAELI DEFINITION OF THE FUNCTION OF THE TEAMS WENT BEYOND

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VERIFICATION, WHICH CREATED A PROBLEM. SHAMIR SAID THAT THE SECRETARY HAD SAID THEY COULD BE A PATROL THOUGH WITHOUT USING THAT WORD. I SAID THE NUMBERS WOULD HAVE TO BE DISCUSSED WITH THE LEBANESE. I THOUGHT THEY WOULD HAVE PROBLEMS. ON POINT 3, THERE WAS NO PROBLEM IN DELETING THE REFERENCE THOUGH IT MUST BE CLEAR THAT THE TEAMS WOULD BE ON A ROTATIONAL BASIS AND NOT STATIONED IN LEBANON. I ALSO SAID WE HAD NO PROBLEM WITH THE REVIEW PROCESS TAKING PLACE IN THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE; IT MAY WELL BE BETTER TO DO IT AT THAT LEVEL. SHAMIR REFERRED BACK TO ISRAEL'S POSITION THAT UNIFIL COULD BE DEPLOYED OUTSIDE THE SECURITY ZONE BUT OTHERWISE MADE NO SUBSTANTIVE COMMENT.

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REGARDING SECTION (D)

21. I REVIEWED THE REASONS WHY TWO UNIFIL BATTALIONS, WHICH COULD BE DESIGNATED, WERE REQUIRED AROUND SIDON AND TYRE IN ORDER TO OBTAIN PLO WITHDRAWAL AND TO OBTAIN SECURITY COUNCIL APPROVAL FOR A NEW UNIFIL DEPLOYMENT AND MANDATE IN LEBANON. I URGED THE ISRAELIS TO RECONSIDER THEIR POSITION AND TAKE SPECIAL NOTE THAT THE LEBANESE WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR SECURITY IN THE PALESTINIAN CAMPS, AND WERE PREPARED TO HAVE THE BEST OF THE UNIFIL BATTALIONS STATIONED IN THE SOUTHERN SECTOR.

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REGARDING SECTION (F)

22. I ONLY SAID THAT IF THE LEBANESE COULD NOT DEPLOY THEIR BORDER GUARDS IN THE SOUTH, THEY WOULD PROBABLY OPT NOT TO HAVE SUCH A FORCE.

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23. SHAMIR THEN ASKED GENERAL TAMIR TO ELABORATE ON ISRAELI SECURITY IDEAS. TAMIR SAID NOTWITHSTANDING THE U.S. MILITARY AND SECURITY ASSESSMENT OF THE CAPABILITY OF THE LAF, ISRAEL STILL BELIEVED THAT THE LAF ITSELF WOULD NOT BE CAPABLE OF PROVIDING SECURITY IN SOUTHERN LEBANON FOR TWO OR THREE YEARS. TO PROVIDE FOR THIS INTERIM PERIOD, ISRAEL HAD ORIGINALLY SUGGESTED THREE "SECURITY SYSTEMS" TO SUPPLEMENT THE LAF:

- (A) "INDIRECT SYSTEM", WHICH MEANT INTEGRATION OF HADDAD'S FORCES; RETENTION OF HADDAD AS COMMANDER; LOCAL CONTACTS BETWEEN LEBANESE AND ISRAELI FORCES ALONG THE BORDER; AND COOPERATION IN THE PURSUIT OF TERRORISTS WHO CROSS THE BORDER;

- (B) "DIRECT SYSTEM", WHICH MEANS THE FIVE OBSERVATION POSTS; FREE ACCESS TO AND BETWEEN THE POSTS; THE FUNCTIONS OF THE POSTS; AND THE ABILITY TO SAFE-HAVEN AGENTS THERE;

- (C) "COMMON SYSTEM", WHICH MEANT THE MILITARY

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COMMITTEE, JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS AND SECURITY
AND INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION.

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24. TAMIR SAID THAT WE HAD LEFT A HALF-DOOR OPEN
ON THE FIRST AND THIRD SYSTEMS, AND COMPLETELY
CLOSED OUT THE SECOND. (I SAID THE THIRD DOOR WAS
THREE-FOURTHS OPEN.) IN TAMIR'S VIEW, IF ISRAEL
WAS GOING TO SACRIFICE THE SECOND SYSTEM, THE OTHER
TWO SHOULD BE COMPLETE.

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25. REGARDING THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE, TAMIR SAID
THAT ISRAEL WILL HAVE ORGANIZED A FULL BRIGADE BEFORE
IT COMPLETED ITS WITHDRAWAL. THEREFORE, THERE WAS
[REDACTED]

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NO NEED FOR THE U.S. IDEA OF SUPPLEMENTING THE
HADDAD FORCES IN ORDER TO COMPLETE THE BRIGADE.
(TAMIR WAS PARTICULARLY NEGATIVE CONCERNING MY SUG-
GESTION THAT THE TWO LAF BATTALIONS IN THE SOUTH,
WHICH WE UNDERSTOOD WERE DRAWN FROM THE SOUTH, COULD
BE ADDED TO THE HADDAD FORCES. TAMIR SAID THAT THE
TWO BATTALIONS CONTAINED ELEMENTS WHICH HAD DEMON-
STRATED THEMSELVES SYMPATHETIC TO THE PLO.)
TAMIR SAID THAT ISRAEL WAS PREPARED TO COOPERATE
WITH THE GOL CONCERNING THE COMPLETION OF THE
BRIGADE. TAMIR ARGUED THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS
HAD ALREADY PRODUCED AGREEMENT THAT THERE WOULD
NOT BE CHANGES IN THE DEPLOYMENT, EQUIPMENT, AND
STRUCTURE OF THE BRIGADES IN SOUTHERN LEBANON
AND THAT THE ONLY OUTSTANDING ISSUE WAS THE QUESTION
OF CHANGES IN SENIOR OFFICERS. (COMMENT: TAMIR
OVERSTATED THE AMOUNT OF AGREEMENT IN THE NEGO-
TIATIONS, WHERE THE ONLY CURRENT AGREEMENT WOULD
ONLY PROHIBIT CHANGES IN THE EQUIPMENT OF THE SOUTHERN
BRIGADES.)

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26. I REITERATED THAT THE GOL WANTED TO REASSURE
ISRAEL THAT SENIOR APPOINTMENTS WOULD TAKE INTO
ACCOUNT ISRAELI VIEWS. LEBANON WAS READY FOR A
FULL DISCUSSION OF CANDIDATES, BUT IT COULD NOT
ACCEPT AN ISRAELI VETO, WHICH IT SAW AS A SERIOUS
DEROGATION OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY.

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27. TAMIR CONTINUED THAT ISRAEL ALSO NEEDED
[REDACTED]

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ISRAELI LIAISON OFFICERS ASSIGNED TO THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE. THIS WAS AN IMPORTANT PART OF THE "INDIRECT SYSTEM". TAMIR SAID THAT ISRAEL WOULD WELCOME LEBANESE LIAISON OFFICERS IN ISRAEL'S NORTHERN-

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MOST BRIGADE. I REPEATED THAT WE THOUGHT LEBANON COULD NOT ACCEPT ISRAELI LIAISON OFFICERS, EVEN ON A BASIS OF RECIPROCITY. HOWEVER, TAMIR'S SUGGESTION OF LEBANESE LIAISON OFFICERS IN ISRAEL WAS INTERESTING. LEBANESE OFFICIALS, DESPITE OUR DISCOURAGEMENT, CONTINUED TO RAISE WITH US THE POSSIBILITY OF INTRODUCING SOME MUTUALITY INTO THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, PERHAPS THROUGH LEAVING OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF OPERATING THE JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS IN ISRAEL. LEBANON WAS NOT INTERESTED IN THESE PROVISIONS SO MUCH FROM THE SUBSTANTIVE ANGLE, BUT IN ORDER TO HELP THEM JUSTIFY PUBLICLY CONCESSIONS WHICH THEY WERE WILLING TO MAKE. I SAID THAT I UNDERSTOOD, AND HAD REPEATEDLY TOLD THE LEBANESE, ABOUT ISRAELI REJECTION OF ANY CONCEPT OF A SECURITY ZONE IN ISRAEL. I SAID THAT ISRAEL MIGHT NEVERTHELESS THINK OF THINGS, LIKE TAMIR'S SUGGESTION, WHICH WOULD HELP THE LEBANESE SELL THE AGREEMENT.

28.

NEXT, TAMIR SUGGESTED THAT DIRECT CONTACTS BETWEEN THE LOCAL FORCES AND ISRAELI FORCES, NOT JUST THROUGH COMMANDER MEETINGS, WAS NECESSARY. AND, TAMIR STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PATROLS.

29. WHEN TAMIR FINISHED HIS PRESENTATION, SHAMIR SAID THAT HE HAD A PRESENT FOR HABIB AND HANDED HIM A COPY OF A DRAFT STUDY BY THE U.S. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE OF THE CAPABILITIES OF THE LEBANESE ARMY, WHICH SHAMIR SAID COMPLETELY SUPPORTED ISRAEL'S VIEW. ARENS ADDED THAT HE HAD READ TO HIS BRIGADE COMMANDERS IN LEBANON THOSE PORTIONS OF THE WASHINGTON TRANSCRIPTS WHICH DEALT WITH THE U.S. DESCRIPTION OF LAF CAPABILITIES. ARENS SAID THAT THE COMMANDERS HAD

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LAUGHED.

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30. SHAMIR THEN SAID THAT THE ATTENTION DEVOTED TO SECURITY IN WASHINGTON SHOULD NOT DETRACT FROM MUTUAL RELATIONS, TO WHICH ISRAEL CONTINUED TO ATTACH IMPORTANCE. KIMCHE ADDED THAT HE INTERPRETED THE LACK OF COMMENT ON HIS PRESENTATION ON MUTUAL RELATIONS IN WASHINGTON AS ASSENT. HE RE-SUMMARIZED HIS PRESENTATION IN FOUR POINTS:

-- THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD AMOUNT TO DE FACTO NORMALIZATION;

-- NEGOTIATIONS ON THE FORMAL AGREEMENT SHOULD START DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD;

-- THERE SHOULD BE ADVANCE AGREEMENT ON THE ELEMENTS OF THE FORMAL AGREEMENT;

-- THERE SHOULD BE U.S. ASSURANCE CONCERNING BOTH THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS AND THE FORMAL AGREEMENT.

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31. I SAID THAT WE HAD ACCURATELY CONVEYED THE ISRAELI POSITION TO THE LEBANESE. THE WASHINGTON MEETINGS HAD NOT CONCENTRATED ON MUTUAL RELATIONS, BECAUSE THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THIS ISSUE WERE HEADED IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. THERE WAS AGREEMENT ON WHAT AMOUNTED TO FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS; FURTHER WORK WAS NEEDED ON MECHANISMS TO REGULATE THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS. WE HAD ALSO DISCUSSED WITH THE LEBANESE WAYS OF IDENTIFYING THE ELEMENTS TO BE INCLUDED IN THE FORMAL AGREEMENT IN ADVANCE, AS THROUGH A DETAILED AGENDA. HOWEVER, ISRAEL MUST

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UNDERSTAND THAT IT COULD NOT NOW DICTATE WHAT WOULD BE IN THE AGREEMENT WHICH WAS TO BE A SUBJECT OF NEGOTIATION LATER. I SAID THAT WE ALSO THOUGHT THAT LEBANON WOULD BE AMENABLE TO STARTING DISCUSSIONS ON THE FORMAL AGREEMENT BEFORE THE SIX-MONTH PERIOD, ALTHOUGH IT MIGHT NOT WANT THEM TO

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START IMMEDIATELY. DRAPER POINTED OUT THAT LEBANON HAD ALREADY AGREED THAT THERE SHOULD BE MEETINGS OF EXPERTS AND EXCHANGES OF INFORMATION DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD AND THAT THIS WAS ONLY A SHORT STEP FROM NEGOTIATIONS. KIMCHE APPEARED TO AGREE WITH THIS GENERAL ROUND-UP OF WHERE THINGS STOOD ON MUTUAL RELATIONS.

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32. I THEN GAVE SHAMIR A BRIEF SUMMARY OF SALEM'S REPORT ON HIS MEETING WITH KHADDAM. SALEM HAD STRESSED TWO THINGS WITH KHADDAM. FIRST, LEBANON WOULD AGREE TO SOME THINGS IN ITS AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL CONCERNING MUTUAL RELATIONS. SECOND, SALEM HAD RECEIVED FROM KHADDAM AN EXPLICIT STATEMENT THAT SYRIA WOULD WITHDRAW SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH ISRAEL. I POINTED OUT THAT HUSSEIN HAD TOLD ME THAT KHADDAM HAD TOLD HIM THAT SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE SIMULTANEOUS WITH ISRAEL'S.

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33. SHAMIR AND ARENS SAID THAT THEY WERE PLEASED TO HEAR OF KHADDAM'S ASSURANCES. HOWEVER, THEY CAUTIONED AGAINST OVER-RELIANCE, SAYING THAT THESE STATEMENTS COULD BE EXPECTED NOW AND THAT THE ONLY REAL TEST WOULD COME WHEN THE ISRAEL/LEBANON AGREEMENT WAS COMPLETED AND ISRAEL SAID IT WAS PREPARED TO WITHDRAW. I AGREED. LEWIS POINTED OUT THAT EVEN IF KHADDAM'S STATEMENTS WERE "TO BE EXPECTED", IT WAS GOOD THAT KHADDAM WAS MAKING THEM, AND THAT HE WAS APPARENTLY MAKING THEM TO A VARIETY OF PROBLEM.

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34. ARENS THEN REFERRED TO THE QUESTION OF ISRAELI PRISONERS HELD BY SYRIA. (I HAD REPORTED THAT SALEM HAD BROUGHT THIS ISSUE UP WITH KHADDAM WITHOUT RESULT.) ARENS SAID THAT THREE ISRAELI PRISONERS WERE BEING HELD IN INHUMAN CONDITIONS, WITHOUT ACCESS TO READING MATERIALS OR TIME OUTSIDE. ONE ISRAELI IS IN SOLITARY CONFINEMENT AND HAS BEEN FOR NINE MONTHS. ARENS SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT ISRAELI PRISONERS PROBABLY WOULD NOT BE RETURNED UNTIL JUST PRIOR TO WITHDRAWAL. HOWEVER, ISRAEL WAS CONCERNED THAT UNDER CURRENT CONDITIONS, THE PRISONERS MIGHT NOT SURVIVE OR KEEP

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[REDACTED]

THEIR SANITY. ARENS SAID THAT THE ICRC HAD SEEN THESE INDIVIDUALS BUT COULD NOT PRODUCE ANY CHANGE IN CONDITIONS.

35. I INDICATED OUR COMPLETE SYMPATHY AND SUPPORT FOR THE ISRAELI POSITION ON PRISONERS AND SAID THAT WE WOULD SEE WHAT WE COULD DO CONCERNING THE CONDITIONS OF THE THREE PRISONERS. GROVE UNQUOTE SHULTZ

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

Date Printed: 10/22/1996

DOC NUMBER: 82CAIRO30129

CHANNEL: n/a

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ACTION SS-25

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EXCISE

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FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5321

INFO AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
☒ RELEASE
☒ EXCISE
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EO Citations

FOIA Exemptions
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TS authority to
☐ CLASSIFY as ☐ S or ☐ C Sec.
☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or ☐ C

SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 30129

DECAPTIONED

RABAT FOR AMBASSADOR HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP (HABIB, PHILIP), EG, US, IS, PEPR

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: MEETINGS IN EGYPT

2. SUMMARY. AMBASSADOR HABIB AND HIS PARTY (FAIRBANKS, CLUVERIUS AND KRECKO), ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR ATHERTON, MET SUNDAY AFTERNOON, NOVEMBER 28, WITH DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER KAMAL HASSAN ALI, MINISTER OF STATE BOUTROS GHALI AND ACCOMPANYING MFA OFFICIALS, AND ON MONDAY, NOVEMBER 29, WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK (KAMAL HASSAN ALI AND PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR OSAMA EL-BAZ WERE ALSO PRESENT). EXCEPT FOR A BRIEF EXCHANGE ON TABA (SEPTTEL), BOTH MEETINGS WERE DEVOTED EXCLUSIVELY

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TO LEBANON AND THE PEACE PROCESS. THE EGYPTIANS CAME ACROSS AS STRONGLY SUPPORTIVE OF WHAT WE ARE SEEKING TO ACCOMPLISH IN BOTH AREAS (DESPITE A DEVIL'S ADVOCATE INTERVENTION BY BOUTROS GHALI, WHO WARNED OF THE LOSS OF U.S. CREDIBILITY BECAUSE OF THE FAILURE OF OUR EFFORTS TO PRODUCE ANY RESULTS SINCE THE PRESIDENT'S SEPTEMBER 1 INITIATIVE). THE EGYPTIANS STRESSED THAT THEY ARE WORKING ON THE PLO TO MEET OUR CONDITIONS FOR A DIALOGUE AND TO AGREE TO PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR

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GETTING AN EXPANDED NEGOTIATING PROCESS STARTED. AT HABIB'S SUGGESTION, MUBARAK AGREED TO SEND A MESSAGE (PERHAPS BY SPECIAL EMISSARY) TO KING HUSSEIN TO DEMONSTRATE EGYPTIAN SUPPORT. HABIB URGED MUBARAK TO DO THIS IMMEDIATELY BEFORE HUSSEIN BEGINS HIS TRAVELS. ON LEBANON, MUBARAK WAS DOUBTFUL THAT PRESIDENT GEMAYEL CAN AGREE TO THE ISRAELI INSISTENCE ON HOLDING NEGOTIATIONS IN JERUSALEM. MUBARAK REFLECTED CONSIDERABLE SKEPTICISM ABOUT SYRIAN INTENTIONS WITH RESPECT BOTH TO WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON AND TO THE PEACE PROCESS. HE AND OSAMA EL-BAZ ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT WE WERE WORKING ONLY FOR PARTIAL SYRIAN AND ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON, WHICH HABIB FIRMLY ASSURED THEM WAS NOT REPEAT NOT THE CASE. HABIB INDICATED THAT, WHILE WE ARE BEHIND SCHEDULE FOR AGREEMENT ON WITHDRAWALS FROM LEBANON AND A SCENARIO TO GET PEACE NEGOTIATIONS RESUMED, HE REMAINED HOPEFUL THAT BY THE TIME MUBARAK VISITS WASHINGTON WE WILL BE IN A POSITION TO DISCUSS SPECIFIC MODALITIES FOR CONVENING NEGOTIATIONS. IN THIS CONNECTION, HABIB INFORMED THE EGYPTIANS CONFIDENTIALLY THAT HE HAD CONVEYED PRESIDENT REAGAN'S INVITATION TO BEGIN TO VISIT WASHINGTON. MUBARAK SHOWED SOME

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INTEREST IN THE TIMING OF A BEGIN VISIT IN RELATION TO HIS OWN. END SUMMARY.

3. IN BOTH THE ALI AND MUBARAK MEETINGS, HABIB STRESSED OUR UNHAPPINESS AT THE SLOW PACE OF PROGRESS ON FINDING A FORMULA FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON. PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD ASKED HIM TO VISIT THE AREA TO TRY TO ACCELERATE THE LEBANESE NEGOTIATIONS AND ALSO TO ENCOURAGE EFFORTS TO GET THE PEACE PROCESS MOVING. WE FELT IT IMPORTANT FOR BOTH EFFORTS TO MOVE FORWARD SIMULTANEOUSLY, WHILE RECOGNIZING THAT PROGRESS IN THE PEACE PROCESS WOULD BE MORE DIFFICULT IN THE ABSENCE OF AN AGREEMENT ON A LEBANON SOLUTION.

4. HABIB REVIEWED IN BOTH THE ALI AND THE MUBARAK MEETINGS OUR POLICY OBJECTIVES AND THE STATUS OF OUR EFFORTS ON LEBANON, INCLUDING THE POSITIONS OF THE LEBANESE, ISRAELIS AND SYRIANS. IN PARTICULAR, HE DESCRIBED THE TWO KEY PROCEDURAL ISSUES (THE LEVEL OF DELEGATION HEADS AND THE LOCATION OF NEGOTIATIONS) WHICH HAD DELAYED MOVING TO SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES, AS WELL AS THE COMPROMISE SOLUTION HE HAD PERSUADED PRESIDENT GEMAYEL TO ACCEPT AND BEGIN TO PUT TO THE ISRAELI CABINET. BY THE TIME OF THE MEETING WITH

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MUBARAK, THE LEBANESE CABINET DECISION HAD BEEN ANNOUNCED, AND MUBARAK EXPRESSED SERIOUS DOUBT THAT GEMAYEL WOULD AGREE TO NEGOTIATIONS IN JERUSALEM. HABIB ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THIS ISSUE COULD LEAD TO FURTHER IMPASSE BUT WANTED TO RESERVE

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JUDGMENT UNTIL HE HAD RECEIVED DRAPER'S REPORT OF HIS SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION WITH GEMAYEL (WHICH HAD NOT BEEN RECEIVED PRIOR TO HABIB'S DEPARTURE FROM CAIRO). HABIB TOLD MUBARAK THAT GEMAYEL HAS NO COMPLEXES AND WANTS GOOD RELATIONS WITH EGYPT. MUBARAK RESPONDED THAT HE WOULD SEND A MESSAGE OF ENCOURAGEMENT TO GEMAYEL AND ADDED THAT "BEGIN SHOULD

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HELP HIM."

5. TURNING TO THE PEACE PROCESS, HABIB STRESSED PRESIDENT REAGAN'S STRONG COMMITMENT TO HIS INITIATIVE. HABIB COMMENDED MUBARAK FOR THE ADVICE HE HAD GIVEN THE PLO (IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE WITH MITTERAND) TO ACCEPT RESOLUTION 242 AND ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST. MUBARAK COMMENTED THAT THIS WAS "THE ONLY WAY" FOR THE PLO TO PROCEED. NOTING THAT THE CURRENT HUSSEIN/ARAFAT TALKS WERE

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[REDACTED]

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OF CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE FOR THE FUTURE OF THE PEACE PROCESS, HABIB SAID THE IMPORTANT THING WAS FOR HUSSEIN TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH THE PLO ON PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR JORDANIAN/PALESTINIAN PARTICIPATION IN NEGOTIATIONS. CAMP DAVID PROVIDED A FORMULA FOR ACHIEVING THIS. MUBARAK SAID THE CAMP DAVID FORMULA WAS A GOOD ONE AND IT WAS UNFORTUNATE THE PLO HAD PREVIOUSLY REJECTED IT. THE PLO SHOULD BE PRACTICAL AND RECOGNIZE THAT IT COULD NOT HAVE A SEAT AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE UNDER THE PLO LABEL. KAMAL HASSAN ALI INTERJECTED THAT HE THOUGHT THE PLO NOW UNDERSTOOD THIS.

6. MUBARAK PRESSED HABIB IN PARTICULAR AS TO WHETHER HE COULD REPORT ANY RESULTS OR CONCLUSIONS FROM HIS TALKS WITH HUSSEIN. HABIB SAID THAT HUSSEIN WAS CLEARLY SEEKING PALESTINIAN CONCURRENCE ON A FORMULA FOR JOINING THE NEGOTIATIONS, WAS CONCERNED ABOUT ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS, AND FELT THAT PROGRESS TOWARD A LEBANESE SOLUTION WAS IMPORTANT FOR THERE TO BE PROGRESS IN THE PEACE PROCESS. IN RESPONSE TO A QUERY AS TO WHETHER HUSSEIN CONSIDERED A SETTLEMENTS FREEZE TO BE A NECESSARY PRECONDITION FOR NEGOTIATIONS, HABIB SAID HE THOUGHT IT WAS PREMATURE TO SAY. HUSSEIN WAS STILL SEEKING A WAY TO JOIN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND HAD NOT YET COME TO THE END OF THAT PROCESS; IT WAS CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT HUSSEIN WAS STRONGLY COMMITTED TO THE EFFORT TO HELP PRESIDENT REAGAN'S INITIATIVE SUCCEED. ON THE QUESTION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE LEBANON NEGOTIATION AND EFFORTS TO GET THE PEACE PROCESS STARTED, MUBARAK CONFIRMED THAT THE LATTER SHOULD NOT AWAIT THE COMPLETION OF WITHDRAWALS FROM LEBANON;

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AGREEMENT ON A FORMULA FOR WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE SUFFICIENT. HABIB WELCOMED THIS REASSURANCE FROM MUBARAK.

7. IN DESCRIBING THE ISRAELI POSITION, HABIB SAID THAT THE GOI CONTINUED TO REJECT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S INITIATIVE BUT RECOGNIZED THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS NOT GOING TO CHANGE HIS POSITION AND THAT WE WERE SERIOUS ABOUT REINVIGORATING THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. BEGIN HAD SAID THAT ISRAEL WAS PREPARED AT ANY TIME TO RESUME THE AUTONOMY TALKS, BUT WE HAD MADE CLEAR OUR OBJECTIVE WAS TO BRING ABOUT ENLARGED PARTICIPATION AND NOT RETURN TO THE OLD AUTONOMY FORMAT. AMBASSADOR FAIRBANKS EMPHASIZED THAT NEVERTHELESS, WHEN NEGOTIATIONS DID GET STARTED, THE EMPHASIS WOULD HAVE TO BE ON THE CAMP DAVID CONCEPT OF A TRANSITION PERIOD RATHER THAN ON FINAL SOLUTIONS. THE EGYPTIANS EXPRESSED FULL AGREEMENT WITH THIS APPROACH.

8. DURING THE MUBARAK MEETING, THE PRESIDENT REVERTED SEVERAL TIMES TO HIS PRE-OCCUPATION WITH SYRIA, PRESSING HABIB FOR THE RESULTS OF HIS TALKS IN DAMASCUS. HABIB NOTED THAT, FOR THE FIRST TIME, HE HAD NOT SEEN PRESIDENT ASSAD, AND HE HAD FOUND FOREIGN MINISTER KHADDAM RELUCTANT TO DISCUSS THE PEACE PROCESS. [

] HABIB [

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THOUGHT HE WAS UNDER PRESSURE
TO GET OUT OF LEBANON IN ORDER TO GET THE ISRAELIS
OUT.

OSAMA EL-BAZ ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS ANY TRUTH
TO REPORTS THAT WE WERE PROPOSING A PARTIAL SYRIAN
AND ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON. HABIB
STATED CATEGORICALLY THAT THIS WAS NOT REPEAT NOT
TRUE; WE SOUGHT A PACKAGE AGREEMENT ON TOTAL WITHDRAWAL
OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES, WHICH COULD THEN BE IMPLEMENTED
IN STAGES. THE KEY TO DEVELOPING SUCH A PACKAGE
WAS FIRST TO GET LEBANESE-ISRAELI TALKS STARTED ON
ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL; THIS WAS WHY IT WAS SO
IMPORTANT TO BREAK THE PRESENT ISRAELI-LEBANESE

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PROCEDURAL IMPASSE. IN RESPONSE TO MUBARAK'S QUESTION
WHETHER HABIB HAD ACHIEVED ANY SPECIFIC RESULTS IN
DAMASCUS, HABIB SAID THERE HAD BEEN NO RESULTS
WITH RESPECT TO THE PEACE PROCESS. WITH
RESPECT TO LEBANON, KHADDAM HAD ONLY SAID THAT
SYRIA WOULD ACCEPT WHATEVER PRESIDENT GEMAYEL
AGREED TO WITH ISRAEL SO LONG AS IT DID NOT IMPINGE
ON LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY OR GIVE ISRAEL A
MILITARY ADVANTAGE. WHILE KHADDAM HAD MAINTAINED
THAT SYRIA WOULD ONLY WITHDRAW AFTER
ISRAEL HAD DONE SO, HABIB SAID HE THOUGHT
SYRIA COULD BE BROUGHT TO ACCEPT A TIMETABLE
FOR SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL, ALTHOUGH THIS WOULD

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REQUIRE SAUDI HELP. THIS ELICITED SOME POSITIVE COMMENTS ABOUT KING FAHD FROM MUBARAK, WHO ASKED HABIB TO GIVE THE KING HIS BEST REGARDS WHEN HE SEES HIM IN MOROCCO.

9. AT THE END OF THE MEETING WITH MUBARAK, HABIB URGED THE EGYPTIANS TO CONTINUE THEIR EFFORTS TO PERSUADE THE PLO THAT THEY COULD NOT EXTRACT A PRICE FOR ENTERING THE NEGOTIATIONS AND SHOULD AGREE TO OUR CONDITIONS FOR A DIALOGUE WHICH WOULD LEAD IMMEDIATELY TO AMBASSADORIAL-LEVEL U.S.-PLO CONTACTS WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF HIGHER-LEVEL CONTACTS LATER ON. MUBARAK SAID EGYPT WAS CONTINUING ITS EFFORTS WITH THE PLO AND THAT KAMAL HASSAN ALI WOULD BE RECEIVING A PLO REPRESENTATIVE THE SAME AFTERNOON TO REPORT ON THE HUSSEIN-ARAFAT TALKS. HABIB SAID IT WOULD ALSO BE IMPORTANT FOR EGYPT TO DEMONSTRATE SUPPORT FOR HUSSEIN AND NOTED THERE WAS SOME URGENCY TO THIS SINCE HUSSEIN WOULD BE LEAVING IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS TO LEAD THE FEZ DELEGATION TO MOSCOW AND PEKING AND WOULD

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PROCEED FROM THERE TO SEVERAL OTHER COUNTRIES, ENDING UP IN WASHINGTON FOR HIS DECEMBER 21 MEETING WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN. MUBARAK INDICATED THAT HE WOULD IMMEDIATELY SEND A MESSAGE AND POSSIBLY A SPECIAL EMISSARY TO HUSSEIN AND WOULD KEEP US INFORMED. FOR OUR PART, HABIB SAID WE WOULD BRIEF THE EGYPTIANS AS SOON AS WE HAD DRAPER'S REPORT OF HIS MEETING WITH GEMAYEL FOLLOWING SUNDAY'S ISRAELI CABINET DECISION. HE WOULD ALSO CONVEY A REPORT THROUGH AMBASSADOR ATHERTON ON HIS MEETING WITH KING FAHD IN MOROCCO.

10. THIS MESSAGE WAS PREPARED FOLLOWING HABIB'S DEPARTURE FROM CAIRO. ATHERTON

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AMMAN/CAIRO FOR AMB HABIB; TEL AVIV/JERUSALEM FOR AMB DRAPER
FROM DRAPER MISSION (ROSS)

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, MOPS, LE, SY, JO
SUBJECT HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: GEMAYEL ON FURTHER VISITS TO ARAB
COUNTRIES

REF: A) DAMASCUS 8464 NOTAL; B) BEIRUT 8613 NOTAL

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2. IN THE COURSE OF A THREE-HOUR DISCUSSION WITH PRESIDENT
GEMAYEL NOVEMBER 26 (REF B) AMB DRAPER REVIEWED INTER ALIA
THE RESULTS OF THE TALKS AMB HABIB AND HE HAD HAD WITH
KHADDAM IN DAMASCUS (REF A). DRAPER HIGHLIGHTED THAT THE SYRIAN
POSITION HAD NOT CHANGED, SYRIAN STILL INSISTED THAT THE SYRIAN
AND ISRAELI PRESENCE IN LEBANON NOT BE EQUATED, THAT
IT WAS READY TO WITHDRAW RAPIDLY ONCE
ISRAEL HAD WITHDRAWN, AND THAT IT STOOD READY TO
ENGAGE IN EARLY DISCUSSIONS WITH LEBANON ON ANY

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MATTER, INCLUDING THE WITHDRAWAL OF ITS FORCES AND IRANIAN ACTIVITIES IN BAALBECK. ALTHOUGH KHADDAM HAD STAYED AWAY FROM ANY DETAILED COMMENTS, HE HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT SYRIA WOULD OPPOSE ANY LEBANESE CONCESSIONS TO ISRAEL THAT WOULD DEROGATE FROM LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY OF THREATEN SYRIAN SECURITY.

3. GEMAYEL, RETURNING TO DRAPER'S REFERENCE TO EARLY TALKS WITH SYRIA, VOLUNTEERED THAT HE KNEW, WITHOUT EVEN HAVING DISCUSSED IT WITH THE SYRIANS, THAT SYRIAN PRESTIGE WAS INVOLVED. AFTER HIS VISITS TO SAUDI ARABIA, MOROCCO, AND THREE WESTERN COUNTRIES, HE HIMSELF WOULD HAVE TO GO THE DAMASCUS FOR A REAL DIALOGUE TO BEGIN. THIS HE WAS PREPARED TO DO, BUT ONLY IF HE HAD "SOME ASSURANCE THAT I COULD ACHIEVE CERTAIN RESULTS."

4. GIVEN THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF GOING TO DAMASCUS AT THIS TIME, GEMAYEL CONFIDED, HE WOULD NOT FOR THE

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MOMENT BE ACCEPTING AN INVITATION EXTENDED BY KING HUSSEIN FOR A VISIT TO 'AMMAN. NO FURTHER ARAB VISITS COULD BE CONTEMPLATED FOR THE TIME BEING.

5. COMMENT: GEMAYEL KNOWS THAT, UNLESS HE WANTS TO POISON LEBANON'S TRADITIONAL "FRIENDLY" RELATIONS WITH SYRIA, HE MUST MAKE DAMASCUS HIS NEXT ARAB STOP. HE CANNOT DO SO AT THE PRESENT TIME, HOWEVER, FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS. BEYOND HIS STATED REASON, THE NEED FOR GUARANTEED RESULTS (WITH WHICH TO JUSTIFY HIS VISIT TO SYRIA AMONG LEBANESE, PARTICULARLY CHRISTIANS), GEMAYEL ALSO KNOWS THAT SUCH A VISIT WOULD FURTHER COMPLICATE HIS RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL AND INCREASE PRESSURES FROM BOTH ISRAEL AND THE PLO FOR HIGH-LEVEL INTERLOCUTORS IN THE EXPECTED NEGOTIATIONS.

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, MOPS, MILI, IS, LE, SY, IT
SUBJECT: HABIB VISIT - LEBANON AND MNF

REF: BEIRUT 6792

1 [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY.

DURING MEETINGS IN ROME OCTOBER 4, AMBASSADOR HABIB
FOUND AGREEMENT WITH FORNMIN COLOMBO AND MFA SECRETARY
GENERAL Malfatti on the need to move as quickly as
practical toward the consolidation of Lebanese government
authority in Beirut and then throughout the country,
the withdrawal of all foreign forces, and the usefulness
of the MNF. Colombo was most interested in the arrests
by plainclothed Lebanese of Palestinians in the camps
under Italian responsibility, how long the MNF should

[REDACTED]

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STAY (HE THINKS IN THE LONG TERM), AND THE SYRIAN
POSITION VIS-A-VIS THE ISRAELIS AS CONCERNS TIMING OF
THEIR WITHDRAWAL. HABIB PRAISED THE ITALIAN PERFORMANCE
AND UNDERTOOK TO CONTINUE CLOSE CONSULTATION AMONG THE
U.S., ITALIAN AND FRENCH GOVERNMENTS. END SUMMARY.

3. HABIB TRIP

HABIB SPOKE IN DETAIL FAMILIAR TO READERS OF HIS ROUND

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OF TALKS ENDING IN DAMASCUS AND WHAT HE HOPED TO ACCOMPLISH. HE DESCRIBED AS USG PRIORITIES (1) THE REASSERTION OF LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY IN BEIRUT, (2) THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE IDF FROM BEIRUT, AND (3) THE GENERAL WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON, LEADING INTO A GENERAL MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT.

4. HE DESCRIBED THE FIRST TASK AS MOVING WELTH THE ELECTION AS PRESIDENT OF AMIN GEMAYEL, WHO WAS WELL RECEIVED IN LEBANON AND BY ARAB COUNTRIES AND WAS MOVING QUICKLY TO APPOINT A PRIME MINISTER AND CABINET. THE SECOND TASK ALSO WAS ACCOMPLISHED, WITH THE TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF THE IDF FROM THE BEIRUT AREA.

5. THE HABIB TRIP MARKED THE BEGINNING OF THE PROCESS AIMED AT THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES. HABIB SAID HE FOUND GOOD UNDERSTANDING IN LEBANON, MUCH SUPPORT IN SAUDI ARABIA, WHERE KING FAHD SAID HE WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL, AND AGREEMENT IN EGYPT AND JORDAN. THE SYRIANS AND ISRAELIS AGREE TO WITHDRAW BUT NOT HOW. WE WERE TRYING TO ACHIEVE A SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL THAT WOULD BE SELF-ENFORCING WITHOUT FORMAL AGREEMENTS, LINKAGE OR NEGOTIATIONS. MOREOVER, WITHDRAWAL MUST BE ACCOMPLISHED QUICKLY OR INCIDENTS AND ESCALATION INEVITABLY WOULD

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SET BACK THE RESOLUTION OF THE LEBANESE PROBLEM, AND THUS INTEREFERE WITH MOVEMENT TOWARD A GENERAL MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT.

6. HABIB FOUND SYRIA PREPARED TO DEPART IMMEDIATELY AFTER IDF WITHDRAWAL, IF REQUESTED BY LEBANON. ISRAEL APPEARED PREPARED FOR WITHDRAWAL SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH SYRIA AND THE REMAINING PLO COMBATANTS, BUT ONLY UNDER CONDITIONS TIED TO SPECIFIC ACTIONS GUARANTEEING ISRAELI SECURITY. HABIB WAS THEREFORE GOING HOME TO REVIE THE SITUATION WITH SENIOR USG OFFICIALS. THE USG WOULD CONSULT ITALY AND FRANCE WITH THE INTENTION OF RESOLVING THE LEBANESE PROBLEM HOPEFULLY BY THE END OF THE YEAR.

7. GEMAYEL ASSASSINATION

COLOMBO AGREED ON THE NEED FOR A QUICK SETTLEMENT IN LEBANON, AND HAD SPECIFIC QUESTIONS. HE ASKED FIRST WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR BASHIR GEMAYEL'S ASSASSINATION,

HABIB REPLIED STRONGLY THAT HE DOES NOT BELIEVE THE GOI WAS INVOLVED, BUT RATHER GEMAYEL'S OPPONENTS -- EITHER THE PLO OR OTHERS WITH THEIR ROOTS IN LEBANON OR ELSEWHERE. TCRITICAL QUESTION NOW IS WHETHER AMIN GEMAYEL CAN ASSERT

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CONTROL OVER ALL THE PHALANGE UNITS, SINCE HE CANNOT
ACHIEVE THE CONSENSUS NEEDED TO GOVERN AS PRESIDENT OF
ALL LEBANON WITHOUT ACHIEVING SUCH CONTROL.

8. PALESTINIAN MASSACRES

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COLOMBO WAS CONCERNED ABOUT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE
KILLINGS, AND HAD HEARD THAT THE GOI STILL WANTS TO
MOVE SOME HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF PALESTINIANS FROM
LEBANON. HABIB SAID THAT SOME ISRAELIS INDEED WOULD
LIKE TO SEE THE PALESTINIANS SCATTERED OUTSIDE LEBANON,
BUT THAT IS IMPOSSIBLE. THE GOI IS CONCERNED ABOUT
GETTING "MILITANT" PALESTINIANS (I.E., COMBATANTS OR
POLITICAL CADRE) OUT OF LEBANON, BUT NOT ALL THOSE
WHO LIVE PEACEFULLY UNDER LEBANESE LAW. HABIB BELIEVED
STRONGLY THAT THE GOI HAD NOT WANTED A MASSACRE IN

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THE CAMPS, BUT BORE SOME RESPONSIBILITY FOR ALLOWING THE PHALANGE MILITIA OR HADDAD FORCES TO ENTER THE CAMPS IN A SEARCH FOR MILITANTS.

9. ARRESTS OF PALESTINIANS

COLOMBO RAISED WITH SOME FERVOR (AS HAD MALFATTI BEFORE HIM) RECENT ARRESTS OF PALESTINIANS BY PLAINCLOTHED MEN IN CAMPS UNDER ITALIAN MNF RESPONSIBILITY. HE COULD UNDERSTAND AMIN GEMAYEL'S DESIRE TO GET FULL CONTROL

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[REDACTED]

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OF THE SITUATION, BUT THE "ELIMINATION" OF MORE PALESTINIANS WOULD PUT THE MNF INTO AN INTOLERABLE POSITION. IN REPLY, HABIB PRAISED ITALIAN AMBASSADOR OTTIERI'S INITIATIVE IN RAISING THIS ISSUE (COLOMBO INTERJECTED THAT OTTIERI HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED), WHICH THE US AND FRENCH AMBASSADORS HAD IMMEDIATELY SUPPORTED (REFTEL). THE GOL IN RETURN HAD MADE SEVERAL COMMITMENTS, AND THE MNF COUNTRIES MUST INSIST ON DUE PROCESS DURING THE RESTORATION OF ESE GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY. HABIB THOUGHT THE POTENTIAL FOR FURTHER DIFFICULTIES WOULD DIMINISH AS THE BEIRUT GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHED ITSELF ON A CONSENSUS BASIS.

10. SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL.

COLOMBO SAID SYRIAN FORMIN KHADDAM HAD SPOKEN TO HIM AT THE UNGA OF SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL WITH ISRAEL, AS REQUESTED BY THE GOL, BUT HE HAD FOUND MUCH DOUBT THAT THE ISRAELIS REALLY INTENDED TO DEPART.

[REDACTED]

HABIB SAID THAT KHADDAM HAD SPOKEN IN THIS SENSE PREVIOUSLY, WHEREAS PRESIDENT ASSAD IN DAMASCUS HAD TOLD HIM THE ISRAELIS WOULD HAVE TO COMPLETE THEIR WITHDRAWAL BEFORE THE SYRIANS BEGAN. THAT MAY HAVE BEEN AN OPENING POSITION, BUT THE QUESTION WAS UP TO NEGOTIATIONS.

11. AS TO ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, THE GOI HAS ALWAYS TOLD THE USG IT IS WILLING TO LEAVE, AND THE USG TAKES THEM AT THEIR WORD. THE ISRAELIS SAY THEIR SECURITY NEVERTHELESS MUST BE GUARANTEED, AND HABIB THOUGHT A BUFFER ZONE IN SOUTH LEBANON WOULD BE NECESSARY.

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12. MNF TIMING

COLOMBO ASKED HOW LONG THE MNF SHOULD REMAIN. (MALFATTI HAD SAID IT MUST REMAIN A LONG TIME -- UNTIL THE GOL HAD CREATED AN ARMY THAT COULD CONTROL THE ENTIRE COUNTRY.) HABIB IN REPLY WAS DELIBERATELY VAGUE. HE CITED PRESIDENT REAGAN'S RECENT STATEMENT ON THE SUBJECT AND SAID NO DECISION WAS NEEDED NOW, ALTHOUGH CLEARLY NO IMPRESSION SHOULD BE GIVEN THAT THE MNF WOULD REMAIN ONLY A SHORT TIME. EVENTUAL WITHDRAWAL SHOULD BE RELATED TO CIRCUMSTANCES.

13. UNIFIL

COLOMBO ASKED ABOUT A POSSIBLE ROLE FOR UNIFIL. SOME PARTICIPANTS WANT TO END THE MANDATE FOR ECONOMIC REASONS OR BECAUSE THEY ARE UNHAPPY WITH UNIFIL'S ROLE. OTHERS -- INCLUDING FRANCE AND ITALY -- WANT TO KEEP UNIFIL ALIVE IN CASE IT COULD BE USEFUL IN LEBANON. HABIB COMMENTED THAT WE WISH TO PRESERVE UNIFIL AS A POSSIBLY USEFUL FORTHER IN A BUFFER ZONE OR IN CONNECTION WITH WITHDRAWAL. WE THEREFORE HOPE THE MANDATE WILL BE EXTENDED. THE ISRAELIS DO NOT LIKE UNIFIL, AND WE MAY HAVE TO ASSERT OUR POSITION.

14. COMMENT

AMBASSADOR HABIB'S VISIT WAS VERY USEFUL. HE HAS A WARM RAPPORT WITH THE ITALIAN LEADERS, CAN ANSWER THEIR QUESTIONS WITH AUTHORITY AND TAKES CARE OF MANY OF THEIR CONCERNS.

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ate Printed: 10/27/1996

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DOC_NUMBER: 82ROME22562

CHANNEL: n/a

INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 /026 W
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1607
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
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15. AMBASSADOR HABIB CLEARED THIS MESSAGE IN DRAFT.
MINOR CHANGES WERE MADE AFTERWARD.

16. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

RABB

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** EXDIS
*** Current Classification ***

Date Printed: 10/07/1996

DOC NUMBER: 82BEIRUT06769

CHANNEL: n/a

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-00: COPY-01 ADS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00
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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

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DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIB/DRAPER MISSION (ROSS)

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PINT, MOPS, XF, IS, SY, LE

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: EXPLORATORY TALKS WITH GAMEYEL
ON PHASE II

2. SUMMARY. AMBASSADOR HABIB OUTLINED HIS PRELIMINARY IDEAS
ON PHASE II OF LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS TO PRESIDENT GEMAYEL
OCTOBER 1. HE PROPOSED TOW-STEP PROCESS: SYRIAN-ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT

(TARGET DATE

OCTOBER 15), WITH SYRIANS WITHDRAWING TO BEKAA AND ISRAELIS

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WITHDRAWING TO WITHIN 40 KMS OF BORDER, AND COMPLETE
WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES (TARGET DATE NOVEMBER 1).
GEMAYEL BLESSED THIS TWO-STEP APPROACH AS "ONLY WAY" TO
PROCEED. IN DISCUSSION OF DISENGAGEMENT, GEMAYEL TOLD
HABIB THAT LEBANESE ARMY COULD NOT BE GIVEN MISSION OF
TAKING OVER ZONE FROM WHICH SYRIANS AND ISRAELIS HAD
WITHDRAWN; THIS WOULD CREATE STRAINS THAT WOULD IMPEDE
EFFORTS TO REBUILD IT. GEMAYEL PROPOSED INSTEAD EITHER
THAT MNF BE GIVEN THIS MISSION (PREFERRED OPTION FROM

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HIS POINT OF VIEW) OR THAT PRESENCE GREATER THAN OBSERVERS AND LESS THAN ARMY BE INTRODUCED. IN DISCUSSION OF WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES, GEMAYEL SAID HE THOUGHT MANY PLO FIGHTERS NOW IN NORTH WOULD LEAVE WITH WYRIANS. THOSE REMAINING COULD BE DISARMED BY LEBANESE ARMY, EVEN IF SOME FIGHTING TOOK PLACE. HABIB SAID IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO AVOID FIGHTING [

] END SUMMARY.

3. ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADORS DILLON AND DRAPER AND BY CHRISTOPHER ROSS, AMBASSADOR HABIB CALLED ON PRESIDENT GEMAYEL OCTOBER 1 AT 11 TO REPORT ON HIS VISITS TO JORDAN, SAUDI ARABIA, AND EGYPT AND ENGAGE IN EXPLORATORY TALKS ON PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS. THE DETAILS OF THESE EXCHANGES ARE REPORTED BELOW. OTHER SUBJECTS DISCUSSED, INTER ALIA GEMAYEL'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SO-CALLED "LEBANESE FORCES", RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL, ISRAEL'S "OFFICE" IN BAABDA, THE FUTURE OF SA'D HADDAD, EMERGING SECURITY PROBLEMS, AND GEMAYEL'S VISIT TO THE U.S., WILL BE THE SUBJECTS OF SEPTELS. THE MEETING LASTED ONE AND ONE-HALF HOURS.

4. HABIB OPENED THE MEETING WITH A BRIEF REPORT ON HIS [REDACTED]

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TRIP TO JORDAN, SAUDI ARABIA, AND EGYPT. THE MODERATE LEADERSHIP IN EACH OF THESE COUNTRIES, HE SAID, WELCOMED THE ELECTION OF GEMAYEL, AND EACH COULD BE USEFUL TO HIM IN DIFFERENT WAYS. JORDAN AND EGYPT, BOTH NOW CONCENTRATING ON THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS, HAD LITTLE THEY COULD BRING TO BEAR IN THE PHASE II LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS, ALTHOUGH THEY WERE SYMPATHETIC TO GEMAYEL'S PROBLEMS.

5. SAUDI ARABIA WAS, HABIB EMPHASIZED, A DIFFERENT CASE. KING FAHD WAS VERY INTERESTED IN AND COMMITTED TO HELPING GEMAYEL, AND HABIB HAD SPOKEN TO HIM SPECIFICALLY ABOUT HELPING WITH THE WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIAN AND PLO FORCES AND PROVIDING POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT. FAHD HAD BEEN VERY POSITIVE AND HAD SAID HE WOULD DO EVERYTHING HE COULD. ON THE ISSUE OF THE REINFILTRATION OF PALESTINAINS INTO LEBANON, FAHD HAD SAID HE WOULD TALK TO ARAFAT, SINCE IT WAS HIS CONVICTION THAT LEBANON SHOULD NEVER AGAIN BE A BASE FOR PLO OPERATIONS.

6. HABIB TOLD GEMAYEL IT MIGHT BE USEFUL FOR HIM TO KNOW THAT FAHD HAD CONFIDED TO HIM THAT MORE COULD HAVE BEEN DONE FOR LEBANON AT THE FEZ CONFERENCE ON THE ISSUE OF PALESTINIAN AND SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL, BUT CERTAIN LEBANESE DEMANDS HAD PREVENTED THIS. FAHD BELIEVED MUCH COULD BE

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DONE FOR LEBANON IN THE FUTURE AND OFFERED TO HELP WITH
THE SYRIANS IF ANY DIFFICULTY AROSE OVER THEIR WITHDRAWAL.
HE ACCEPTED GEMAYEL'S GOOD FAITH ON THE STATUS AND
PROTECTION OF PALESTINAIAN CIVILIANS REMAINING IN LEBANON.
AT HABIB'S URGING, FAHD AGREED TO SEND THE SAUDI

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AMBASSADOR BACK TO BEIRUT "SOON" TO SERVE AS A DIRECT CHANNEL. GEMAYEL TOLD HABIB THAT, INDEED, THE AMBASSADOR WAS EXPECTED SATURDAY, COTOBER 2.

7. TURNING TO THE PHASE II LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS, HABIB STRESSED THE NEED FOR A SCENARIO FOR THE DEPARTURE OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES SIMULTANEOUSLY, BEARING IN MIND THAT SYRIANS DID NOT WANT TO BE EQUATED WITH THE ISRAELIS. HE NOTED HE HAD REARD ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR BOTH OF A ONE-STATE WITHDRAWAL AND OF A STEP-BY-STEP WITHDRAWAL.

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HIS OWN FEELING WAS THAT A MIDDLE PATH WAS A BETTER ANSWER: A TWO-STEP PROCESS LEADING FIRST TO A SUBSTANTIAL DISENGAGEMENT AND THEN TO A FULL WITHDRAWAL. GEMAYEL CONCURRED FULLY WITH THESE IDEAS, CALLING THEM "THE ONLY WAY" TO PROCEED. HABIB SAID IT WAS INTERESTING AND IMPORTANT THAT GEMAYEL FELT THIS TO BE SO. A STEP-BY-STEP WITHDRAWAL WAS FRAUGHT WITH DANGER, SINCE THE SMALLEST INCIDENT COULD DISRUPT THE PROCESS. THERE WAS A CLEAR NEED FOR FULL DISENGAGEMENT.

8. TOUCHING ON SPECIFICS, HABIB SAID A FIRST-STEP DISENGAGEMENT MIGHT BEST CONSIST OF A SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL INTO THE BEKAS FROM THE RIDGE OVERLOOKING BEIRUT AND AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL TO WITHIN 40 KMS OF THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER. AS TARGET DATES, HE PROPOSED OCTOBER 15 FOR THE FIRST-STEP DISENGAGEMENT AND NOVEMBER 1 FOR THE SECOND-STEP WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES. GEMAYEL SAID HE FEARED THE ISRAELIS WOULD NOT WITHDRAW WITHOUT OBTAINING CERTAIN GUARANTEES. IN ANY CASE, HE SAID, NEITHER THE SYRIANS NOR THE ISRAELIS COULD BE COUNTED ON TO RESPECT THEIR PROMISES, SINCE THEIR ARMIES WERE TO SOME EXTENT PRISONERS OF "UNOFFICIAL FORCES" -- THE (SO-CALLED) "LEBANESE FORCES" IN THE CASE OF THE ISRAELIS AND THE PALESTINIANS AND LEFTISTS IN THE CASE OF THE SYRIANS.

9. FOR THIS REASON, GEMAYEL SAID, THE STABILIZATION OF THE ZONE FROM WHICH THE SYRIANS AND ISRAELIS WITHDRAW IN STEP ONE MIGHT REQUIREM GIVING THE MNF A NEW MISSION OR, AT THE VERY LEAST, DEPLOYING NUMEROUS OBSERVERS. HABIB ASKED WHETHER THE LEBANESE ARMY MIGHT BE CAPABLE OF PLAYING THIS ROLE. GEMAYEL RESPONDED THAT, IF THE LEBANESE ARMY WERE PUT INTO THE "NO-MAN'S LAND") STRAINS WOULD

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BE CREATED AND EFFORTS TO REBUILD IT WOULD BE IMPEDED. WHILE HE PREFERRED THE MNF FOR THIS ROLE, IF IT COULD NOT BE SENT IN, THEN SOME KIND OF PRESENCE GREATER THAN OBSERVERS AND LESS THAN AN ARMY WOULD HAVE TO BE INTRODUCED. HE WAS NOT SPECIFIC ABOUT WHAT FORM SUCH A PRESENCE MIGHT TAKE.

10. LOOKING AHEAD TO THE SECOND STEP -- FULL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES, -- HABIB ASKED GEMAYEL ABOUT THE PLO PRESENCE IN THE NORTHERN REGIONS OF LEBANON. GEMAYEL SAID IT WAS HIS VIEW THAT AS THE SYRIANS WITHDREW MANY OF THE PLO FIGHTERS WOULD LEAVE WITH THEM. HE WOULD THEN WORK WITH THE INHABITANTS OF THE REGIONS TO SEND IN THE LEBANESE ARMY TO ENSURE THAT THOSE WHO REMAINED BEHIND WERE DISARMED, EVEN IF THIS MEANT SOME FIGHTING. HABIB REPLIED THIS MIGHT BE DONE WITHOUT FIGHTING.

IT WAS BETTER, HABIB EMPHASIZED, TO DEAL WITH THIS ISSUE BY NEGOTIATION, NOT FIGHTING.

11. HABIB CLOSED THE DISCUSSION OF PHASE II BY INFORMING GEMAYEL THAT HE AND DRAPER WERE GOING ON TO SYRIA LATER IN THE DAY AND THAT DRAPER WOULD RETURN TO LEBANON AND THEN GO ON TO ISRAEL TO CONTINUE THE PROCESS.

12. THIS MESSAGE WAS PREPARED AFTER HABIB AND DRAPER LEFT FOR DAMASCUS. THEY MAY WISH TO COMMENT ON THE MEETING VIA SEPTTEL.
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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** EXDIS
*** Current Classification ***

ate Printed: 10/07/1996

DOC NUMBER: 82JIDDA07234

CHANNEL: n/a

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ACTION SS-25

EXCISE

INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSCE-00 NSAE-00
SSO-00 INRE-00 /026 W

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DECAPTIONED

CAIRO PASS HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, MOPS, SA, LE, US, PLO, SY

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: SEPTEMBER 29 MEETING WITH
KING FAHD

2. SUMMARY. TWO AND A HALF HOUR MEETING WITH KING
COVERED THE FULL RANGE OF TOPICS IN LEBANON. HABIB
OUTLINED USG VIEWS ON WITHDRAWAL OF ALL EXTERNAL FORCES
AND RESTORATION OF GOL AUTHORITY, EMPHASIZING OUR DESIRE
NOT TO HAVE LEBANON HAMPER OUR PEACE OBJECTIVES. FAHD
AGREED WITH OUR OBJECTIVES AND PROMISED SAG SUPPORT
FOR GEMAYEL AND GOL. HE PROMISED TO WORK ON THE SYRIANS
AND THE PLO TO PRESS FOR WITHDRAWAL AND TO TELL THE PLO

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THAT INFILTRATION OF PALESTINIAN FIGHTERS INTO LEBANON
MUST STOP. [

HABIB

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AGREED TO RAISE WITH GEMAYEL THAT HE TALK TO ARAFAT ABOUT THE SAFETY OF PALESTINIAN CIVILIANS BUT CAUTIONED FAHD THAT THERE WOULD BE NO NEW AGREEMENT GRANTING EXTRATERRITORIALITY. FAHD AGREED FULLY WITH THIS CAVEAT AND REAFFIRMED SAG SUPPORT FOR AN INDEPENDENT LEBANON FREE OF OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE AND ENCLAVES. END SUMMARY.

3. AMBASSADOR HABIB MET WITH KING FAHD FOR TWO AND A HALF HOURS SEPTEMBER 29. CHARGE SUDDARTH AND POL COUNS NEWTON ACCOMPANIED. CROWN PRINCE ABDALLAH, FOMIN PRINCE SAUD AND PRINCE BANDAR BIN SULTAN ATTENDED.

BEIRUT SITUATION

4. HABIB OPENED BY GIVING THE KING DETAILED REPORT ON WHERE WE STOOD IN LEBANON AND WHAT OUR POLICY OBJECTIVES WERE. WE HAD THOUGHT THAT, ONCE THE PLO COMBATANTS HAD LEFT BEIRUT, WE COULD MOVE QUICKLY TO STAGE TWO--TO MOVE OUT THE EXTERNAL FORCES AND TO STRENGTHEN THE LEBANESE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT SO THAT IT COULD ASSERT ITS AUTHORITY OVER THE WHOLE COUNTRY. OUR POSITIVE EXPECTATIONS HAD BEEN SET BACK BY BASHIR'S ASSASSINATION, THE ISRAELI ENTRY INTO WEST BEIRUT, AND THE TERRIBLE MASSACRE. THE LATTER TWO EVENTS WERE COMPLETELY CONTRARY

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TO ASSURANCES THE USG HAD GIVEN ON THE BASIS OF ASSURANCES GIVEN IT BY ISRAEL. WE ARE NOW MOVING AHEAD AGAIN, AND THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY HAVE GIVEN US THREE PRIORITIES, ALL INTERRELATED: FIRST, TO GET ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM ALL OF THE BEIRUT AREA; SECOND TO INTRODUCE THE MNF AS A PRESENCE BEHIND WHICH THE GOL COULD ASSERT AUTHORITY OVER WEST BEIRUT; THIRD, TO ARRANGE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL EXTERNAL FORCES FROM LEBANON. DESPITE EVENTS OUR GOAL REMAINS THE SAME; WE SUPPORT THE SOVEREIGNTY AND INTEGRITY OF A FREE AND INDEPENDENT LEBANON WITH RECOGNIZED BORDERS. AS OF TODAY ISRAELI FORCES WILL BE OUT OF ALL BEIRUT INCLUDING THE AIRPORT AND SEAPORT AND THE MNF OF 3600-3700 MEN WILL BE DEPLOYED IN KEY POINTS, INCLUDING AIR AND SEAPORTS. WE HOPE THAT THE LAF AND ISF CAN REASSERT GOL AUTHORITY AND OPEN THE AIRPORT TOMORROW, A VERY IMPORTANT PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT. FAHD INTERJECTSAY THAT THE OPENING WAS VITAL NOT JUST TO THE LEBANESE, BUT TO SHOW THE ARABS AND THE WORLD THAT LAW AND ORDER WAS RETURNING TO LEBANON.

WITHDRAWAL OF EXTERNAL FORCES AND RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF AUTHORITY

5. THE NEXT STEP CONCERNING US, HABIB TOLD FAHD, IS TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL ISRAELI, SYRIAN, AND PLO ORGAN-

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IZED COMBAT FORCES. HABIB SAID THAT THE ANSWER TO WHEN IT SHOULD BE DONE WAS AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE; FOR THE ANSWER HOW IT SHOULD BE DONE, WE WOULD NEED FAHD'S COUNSEL. ALTHOUGH THE ISRAELIS AND SYRIANS SAY THEY WANT TO GET OUT AND THE PLO INDICATES IT DOES NOT WANT TO MAINTAIN AN EXTRATERRITORIAL PRESENCE, THE PROBLEM WILL BE TO ACHIEVE SEPARATE BUT CONCURRENT WITHDRAWALS

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FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8723
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
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EXDIS CAIRO FOR HABIB

WITHOUT SIMULTANEOUS PRECONDITIONS BY THE THREE PARTIES. SOME PREFER A PHASED WITHDRAWAL, BUT HABIB SAID HE FAVORED MORE DRASTIC AND QUICKER PROCESS TO REDUCE THE RISK OF AN INCIDENT THAT COULD SET US BACK. HABIB SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THE NEW LEBANESE GOVERNMENT HAS THE CAPACITY TO RECONCILE THE VARIOUS COMMUNITIES AND HAS DONE A GOOD JOB IN ITS FIRST DAYS. WE INTEND TO WORK

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CLOSELY WITH THE GOL AS WE BELIEVE IT INTENDS TO ASSERT ITS AUTHORITY IN AN EVEN-HANDED WAY AMONG THE COMMUNITIES. MUSLIM LEADERS TO WHOM WE HAVE SPOKEN ARE PLEASED. SEVERAL LONG TALKS WITH GEMAYEL HAVE CONVINCED US OF HIS GOOD INTENTION AND HABIB NOTED HE IS RECEIVING SUPPORT FROM TRADITIONAL SUNNI AND SHIA LEADERS AND FROM MODERATE CHRISTIAN ELEMENTS. HIS PROBLEMS WILL COME FROM RADICALS ON ALL SIDES, BUT WITH U.S. AND ARAB SUPPORT, GEMAYEL WILL BE ABLE TO CARRY OUT HIS INTENTIONS. HE WANTS GOOD RELATIONS WITH ARAB NATIONS AND FEELS HE HAS MADE A GOOD

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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START. HE WILL COME UNDER GREAT PRESSURE FROM ISRAEL; WE BELIEVE WE CAN BE HELPFUL IN THIS REGARD. WE ALSO SEE ENOUGH REASON FOR THE COMMUNITIES TO WORK TOGETHER SO THAT THERE IS HOPE OF RECONCILIATION.

6. OUR AIM, HABIB EMPHASIZED, IS TO CALM THE LEBANESE SITUATION TO THE POINT WHERE IT WIT INTERFERE WITH OUR MIDDLE EAST PEACE EFFORTS, ALLOWING US TO ACCELERATE THE PEACE PROCESS. THE PRESIDENT HAD ASSURED HABIB IN THEIR LAST MEETING THAT HE STILL INTENDS TO PUT ALL HIS EFFORTS BEHIND THE PEACE PROCESS AND DOES NOT WANT THE LEBANESE PROBLEM TO BE A BARRIER. WE LOOK FOR COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE FROM ARAB COUNTRIES AND TO A CERTAIN EXTENT FROM OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES. HABIB SAID THAT HE WOULD BE GOING TO SYRIA TO SEE ASSAD, ALTHOUGH HE DIDN'T YET HAVE A DEFINITE APPOINTMENT, BECAUSE IT WAS TIME TO HAVE ANOTHER GOOD TALK WITH THE SYRIANS ABOUT THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE (FAHD VOLUNTEERED HE WOULD CALL ASSAD TODAY TO NAIL DOWN THE MEETING). WE HAVE TO FIND THE FORMULA FOR ACHIEVING SYRIAN AND ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WITHOUT EQUATING PRESENCES AND CAN USE THE FEZ FORMULA AND WHAT ISRAELIS HAVE BEEN TELLING US. SINCE NO CONTACTS BETWEEN SYRIANS AND ISRAELIS ARE POSSIBLE AND LEBANESE-ISRAELI CONTACTS ARE LIMITED, WE WILL AGAIN BE PLAYING THE ROLE OF INTERMEDIARY AND WILL NEED SAUDI HELP.

7. ON CONCLUSION OF HABIB BRIEFING, FAHD RESPONDED THAT LEBANON WAS THE KEY PROBLEM. THE CHOICE OF AMIN GEMAYEL BY THE LEBANESE PEOPLE WAS A GOOD ONE, ACHIEVED BY CONSENSUS OF MUSLIM AND CHRISTIAN DEPUTIES. HE MUST RECEIVE HELP FROM ALL. HE AGREED THAT PROBLEM ON WITHDRAWAL WAS HOW TO ACHIEVE IT; A TIME LIMIT SHOULD BE SPECIFIED

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AND REQUIREMENTS ESTABLISHED, WITHOUT THE PARTIES HAVING TO TALK TO EACH OTHER. EVEN IF DONE GRADUALLY, EACH SIDE WILL SEE THAT THE OTHER IS FULFILLING HIS OBLIGATIONS. SAG WOULD TALK TO THE SYRIANS; THE USG COULD ALSO AND COULD TALK SEPARATELY TO THE ISRAELIS. FAHD AGREED WITH HABIB THAT THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE A SPECIFIC WITHDRAWAL DATE IN WEEKS, NOT MONTHS, AND SAID THAT SYRIA SHOULD NOT BE REQUIRED TO WITHDRAW FIRST; OTHERWISE SYRIA WOULD BE EXPOSED TO STRONG REBUKE FROM THE ARABS 8. AT THIS POINT HABIB RAISED STRONG USG CONCERN ABOUT CLEAR INDICATIONS THAT THE SYRIANS ARE ALLOWING PLO FIGHTERS TO INFILTRATE BACK INTO THE TRIPOLI AND BEKAA AREAS. HABIB STRESSED THAT THIS WILL COMPLICATE THE SITUATION TREMENDOUSLY AND COULD FRUSTRATE ALL OUR PLANS. HABIB SAID THAT HE HOPED FAHD COULD USE HIS INFLUENCE TO PERSUADE THE PLO TO STOP THIS INFILTRATION AND TO PERSUADE IT NOT TO TRY TO RE-ESTABLISH AN EXTRATERRITORIAL OR MILITARY PRESENCE IN LEBANON, BUT TO SEE ITS FUTURE IN THE PEACE PROCESS. FAHD RESPONDED QUICKLY THAT INFILTRATION FROM SYRIA INTO LEBANON SHOULD NOT TAKE PLACE AND THAT THE VISITS TO LEBANON OF PLO LEADERS WERE WRONG. (SAUD INTERJECTED THAT WHEN KHADDAM HAD VISITED SAUDI ARABIA BEFORE FEZ, THERE WAS AGREEMENT THAT PALESTINIANS WOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO INFILTRATE.) FAHD SAID FLATLY THAT WHATEVER EFFECT THE BEIRUT MASSACRE MIGHT HAVE HAD, THE INFILTRATION WOULD HAVE TO BE STOPPED AND THAT ALL PALESTINIAN FORCES WOULD BE WITHDRAWN FROM LEBANON.

LEBANON AT FEZ SUMMIT

9. OBVIOUSLY DISTURBED BY GOL ACCUSATIONS, FAHD THEN

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Date Printed: 10/07/1995

UNCLASSIFIED

DOC_NUMBER: 82JIDDA07234

CHANNEL: n/a

INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSCE-00 NSAE-00
SSO-00 - INRE-00 /026 W

-----263670 291822Z /53

O 291755Z SEP 82
FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA
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EXDIS CAIRO FOR HABIB

VOLUNTEERED A DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE DISCUSSION ON
LEBANON AT FEZ. HE NOTED THAT LEBANON HAD PRESENTED A
WORKING PAPER AND THAT KING HASSAN HAD READ A LETTER
FROM SARKIS GIVING JOSEPH ABU KHATER FULL POWERS TO ACT
ON HIS BEHALF. FAHD SAID THAT HE HAD WORKED HARD TO
RECONCILE THE LEBANESE WORKING PAPER WITH OTHER ARAB
VIEWS. [

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FAHD CONTINUED, WOULD BE TO ACHIEVE TOTAL WITHDRAWAL
FROM LEBANON IN AN EVEN-HANDED WAY. IT WAS ALSO VITAL
[THE GOAL NOW,

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THAT DEFENSELESS, UNARMED PALESTINIANS WHO ONLY WANT TO LIVE IN PEACE AND LEAD NORMAL LIVES IN LEBANON SHOULD BE TREATED SYMPATHETICALLY AND PROTECTED.

10. HABIB RESPONDED TO FAHD THAT IN OUR ARRANGEMENTS, WITH WHICH ABU KHATER MIGHT NOT HAVE BEEN FAMILIAR, THE OTHER MILITIAS WERE A MATTER TO BE DEALT WITH BY THE LEBANESE BECAUSE THEIR MEMBERS WERE LEBANESE. [

ON THE PALESTINIAN CIVILIANS, HABIB SAID HE WOULD SEEK ALL THE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS AND HOPE THERE WOULD BE NO VIOLATIONS. HE BELIEVED THAT GEMAYEL INTENDS TO KEEP HIS PLEDGES.

CONTACTS WITH POL AND GOL

11. [

PAGE 03 JIDDA 07234 03 OF 04 291815Z

FAHD SAID THAT IT WOULD ALSO BE VERY USEFUL IF GEMAYEL COULD TALK TO ARAFAT TO ASSURE HIM OF THE SAFETY OF PALESTINIAN CIVILIANS. HABIB UNDERTOOK TO SPEAK TO GEMAYEL SPECIFICALLY ON THIS SUBJECT, BUT CAUTIONED THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO BE CAREFUL NOT TO GET INTO ANOTHER FORMAL AGREEMENT (LIKE CAIRO OR BAYT AL-DIN) GIVING PALESTINIANS EXTRATERRITORIAL RIGHTS. FAHD AGREED THAT THIS COULD NCUR AGAIN, BUT HE THOUGHT THAT THE PLO WOULD ONLY BE INTERESTED, AFTER THE MASSACRE, THAT THEIR CIVILIANS BE ALLOWED TO LIVE IN PEACE. HABIB TOLD FAHD THAT HE WOULD BE TALKING TO THE SYRIANS, LEBANESE, AND ISRAELIS ON WITHDRAWAL AND HOPED TO HAVE POSITIVE INFORMATION FOR HIM LATER.

CONCLUSION

12. FAHD MADE THE FINAL POINT THAT SAAD HADDAD COULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO CONTINUE TO OPERATE. HE HAD SOLD HIMSELF TO ISRAEL AND SHOULD WITHDRAW WITH THEM. OTHERWISE HE MIGHT CARRY OUT ANOTHER MASSACRE. HABIB RESPONDED THAT HE HAD MADE CLEAR TO THE ISRAELIS THAT LEBANESE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY MUST BE EXERCISED TO THE BORDER WITHOUT ENCLAVES. THIS DID NOT EXCLUDE A TEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE IN THE SOUTH AS A BUFFER.

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13. IN SUMMATION, HABIB SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT'S SUPPORT DURING THE BOMBING/SHELLING OF BEIRUT HAD BEEN DECISIVE. HE WAS DETERMINED TO SUPPORT LEBANESE

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O 291755Z SEP 82
FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8725
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

SECTION 04 OF 04 JIDDA 07234

EXDIS CAIRO FOR HABIB

INDEPENDENCE AND TO HAVE LEBANON FREE OF FOREIGN FORCES. WE WOULD NEED ARAB HELP; LEBANON MUST HAVE PROPER RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB WORLD AND NOT JUST DEPEND ON THE WEST. FOR TOO MANY YEARS VARIOUS ARAB PRESSURE HAD INTERFERED IN LEBANON AT CROSS PURPOSES. FAHD AGREED AND SAID THAT WHEN LEBANON WAS FREE WITHOUT ENCLAVES AND OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE IT WOULD BE STABLE. HE PROMISED THAT SAUDI AMBASSADOR SHAIR WOULD RETURN TO LEBANON IMMEDIATELY. IN CONCLUSION FAHD SAID HE ALSO AGREED WITH U.S. CONTINUING EMPHASIS ON MIDEAST PEACE EFFORTS; PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD DONE MORE FOR PEACE THAN ANY OTHER U.S. PRESIDENT AND THAT SAUDI ARABIA SUPPORTED

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NUMBER: 82JIDDA07234

CHANNEL: n/a

THE REAGAN INITIATIVE WITH SOME RESERVATIONS. FAHD SAID
THAT HE HAD HOPED TO TALK TO HABIB ABOUT LEBANON AND
THE MIDEAST PEACE ISSUE ON A FUTURE VISIT. SUDDARTH

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EXCISE

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8408
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AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/CR/IR 02 Date: 11/6/97
☒ RELEASE ☒ DECLASSIFY
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SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 06917

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PASS AMBASSADORS HABIB AND DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, LE, US, XF
SUBJECT: BEIRUT SITUATION: SYRIAN RESPONSE TO U.S.
INITIATIVE

REFS: (A) STATE 263977 (B) DAMASCUS 6850 (C) DAMASCUS
- 4039 (D) DAMASCUS 6803

1. SUMMARY: ON SEPTEMBER 22, CHARGE WAS SUMMONED TO MFA TO RECEIVE BRIEF OFFICIAL SARG STATEMENT IN RESPONSE TO OUR MESSAGE OF SEPTEMBER 20 (REF A) ON LEBANON. STATEMENT REFERS TO U.S. "COMMITMENTS" SUPPOSEDLY GIVEN BY AMBASSADOR HABIB IN CONNECTION WITH CEASEFIRE. ALTHOUGH STATEMENT IS NOT PRECISE, AND DOES NOT REFER DIRECTLY TO OUR MESSAGE, IT SEEMS TO IMPLY THAT SARG IS ASKING USG TO ENSURE THAT ISRAEL

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WITHDRAWS FROM LEBANON. WE BELIEVE THIS IS THE PRIMARY SYRIAN GOAL IN WORKING OUT ITS OWN WITHDRAWAL.
END SUMMARY.

2. ON WEDNESDAY MORNING SEPTEMBER 22, CHARGE WAS SUMMONED TO SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY, TO RECEIVE AN OFFICIAL SYRIAN GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO OUR MESSAGE ON LEBANON OF SEPTEMBER 20 (STATE 263977 AND DAMASCUS 6850). AMBASSADOR SABAH QABBANI, DIRECTOR OF AMERICAN AFFAIRS AT THE MINISTRY, READ A BRIEF STATEMENT IN ARABIC


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WHICH HE SAID HAD COME FROM PRESIDENT ASSAD.

3. FOLLOWING IS TRANSLATION OF FULL TEXT OF SYRIAN STATEMENT: [

4. CHARGE ASKED QABBANI TO EXPAND ON THE STATEMENT SINCE IT WAS VERY BRIEF, AND SINCE IT DID NOT DIRECTLY REFER TO THE CONTENT OF OUR SEPTEMBER 20 MESSAGE, WHICH DEALT WITH THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON. QABBANI SAID HE WAS NOT AUTHORIZED TO GO BEYOND THE TEXT AND INTERPRET IT IN ANY WAY. FOLLOWING SOME PROBING, HOWEVER, QABBANI MADE SOME INFORMAL COMMENTS ABOUT THE STATEMENT. HE SAID HE ASSUMED IT REFERRED TO THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT OF JUNE 10, AND THE MEETINGS WHICH TOOK PLACE IN DAMASCUS BETWEEN AMBASSADOR HABIB AND PRESIDENT ASSAD AT THAT TIME. QABBANI SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THE ABOVE STATEMENT TO MEAN THAT AMBASSADOR HABIB HAD BROUGHT A MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN ON THAT OCCASION CONCERNING THE CEASEFIRE, AND THAT MESSAGE WAS



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TAKEN BY ASSAD TO BE AN AMERICAN COMMITMENT TO SYRIA.

5. CHARGE REMINDED QABBANI THAT OUR MESSAGE OF SEPTEMBER 20 STRESSED THE NEED FOR THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT TO INFORM THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT OF SARG'S AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO WITHDRAW SYRIAN FORCES FROM LEBANON, AND ASKED IF THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT ON THIS MATTER. QABBANI RESPONDED IN THE NEGATIVE, EXPLAINING THAT THE SARKIS GOVERNMENT IS NOW IN THE PROCESS OF LEAVING OFFICE AND THE GEMAYEL GOVERNMENT WILL NOT BE SWORN IN UNTIL TOMORROW, SEPTEMBER 23, THEREFORE SARG HAD NOT YET RAISED THE MATTER WITH THE GOL. HE SAID HE DID NOT KNOW WHEN SUCH A CONTACT WOULD TAKE PLACE, BUT IN ANY EVENT IT HAD TO AWAIT THE INAUGURATION OF THE NEW PRESIDENT.

6. COMMENT: AS FAR AS WE CAN TELL FROM EMBASSY RECORDS (WHICH ARE INCOMPLETE BECAUSE WE KEEP LIMITED CLASSIFIED HOLDINGS), THE SYRIAN MESSAGE SEEMS TO BE REFERRING TO THE MEETING BETWEEN AMBASSADOR HABIB AND PRESIDENT ASSAD WHICH BEGAN JUST BEFORE MIDNIGHT ON JUNE 9, 1982 (DAMASCUS 4039), DURING WHICH HABIB MADE A PRESENTATION TO PRESIDENT ASSAD PARTLY BASED ON TALKING POINTS RECEIVED FROM WASHINGTON DURING THE MEETING. ACCORDING TO OUR RECORD OF THAT MEETING, ASSAD ATTEMPTED TO ESTABLISH A FIRM LINK BETWEEN THE CEASEFIRE AND FINAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. NOW, IN RESPONDING TO OUR APPROACH ON THE QUESTION OF WITH-

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DRAWAL FROM LEBANON, IT CAN BE EXPECTED THAT ASSAD WILL INSIST ON OBTAINING ASSURANCES THAT ISRAEL ALSO WILL WITHDRAW COMPLETELY. SARG'S REFERENCE TO THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT SEEMS TO BE IN LINE WITH THAT APPROACH. ASSAD APPEARS ONCE AGAIN TO BE DRAWING OUR ATTENTION TO WHAT HE BELIEVES



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AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

[REDACTED] SECTION 02 OF 02 DAMASCUS 06917

EXDIS

PASS AMBASSADORS HABIB AND DRAPER

WERE AMERICAN COMMITMENTS OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL IN CONNECTION WITH SYRIA'S AGREEMENT TO THE CEASEFIRE OF JUNE 10. AS DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER QADDOUR INDICATED TO CHARGE SEPT. 18 (DAMASCUS 6803) SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL IS NEGOTIABLE BUT FIRST ISRAEL MUST START PULLING BACK. SARG CANNOT WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON AND LEAVE ISRAEL THERE, SO BEFORE COMMITTING ITSELF CLEARLY TO A WITHDRAWAL TIME-TABLE SYRIA WANTS TO KNOW ABOUT ISRAEL'S OBLIGATION TO DEPART.

7. COMMENT CONTINUED: THE BREVITY AND NATURE OF THE SYRIAN RESPONSE TO OUR MESSAGE INDICATES THAT THE SARG REGARDS THIS MATTER AS SOMETHING WHICH REQUIRES MORE DETAILED DISCUSSION BECAUSE IT IS OBVIOUSLY A COMPLEX MATTER WHICH CANNOT BE DEALT WITH SIMPLY IN AN EXCHANGE OF MESSAGES. THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY WELCOME

[REDACTED]

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AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS WITH US THE VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE QUESTION OF FOREIGN FORCES IN LEBANON, PARTICULARLY THE QUESTION OF ISRAELI MILITARY WITHDRAWAL. END COMMENT.

8. AWAIT DEPARTMENT GUIDANCE.

9. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. RUGH

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EXCISE

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LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= PALESTINIANS, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, RESERVATIONS, INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCES, NEGOTIATIONS, EVACUATION PLANS

TAGS= PEPR, PINT, MILI, MOPS, LE, US, XF, IS, PLO, (HABIB, PHILIP C), (BEGIN, MENACHEM)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/GR/IR Date: 11/6/97
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2898
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

SECTION 01 OF 03 JERUSALEM 02459

EXCISE DECAPTIONED

FROM AMB. LEWIS IN JERUSALEM

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, PINT, MILI, MOPS, LE, IS, US, PLO, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: THE PACKAGE PLAN: ROUND TWO

- WITH BEGIN PRODUCES NO SURPRISES

REF: A. TEL AVIV 12120, B. TEL AVIV 12139

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1 [REDACTED]
2. SUMMARY. MY FOLLOW-UP MEETING WITH BEGIN LATE AFTERNOON TODAY (AUGUST 10) PRODUCED NO SURPRISES. BEGIN HAD OBVIOUSLY CARRIED THE DAY EASILY IN OBTAINING CABINET APPROVAL TODAY ON ALL OF THE POINTS ON WHICH HE HAD EARLIER EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS TO ME WITH RESPECT TO HABIB'S PACKAGE PLAN FOR PLO EVACUATION. THE CABINET REFUSED TO ACCEPT THE PRESENCE OF UN OBSERVERS AT ANY POINT IN THE EVACUATION AND REAFFIRMED ISRAEL'S OPPOSITION TO THE INSERTION OF ANY ELEMENT -- FRENCH, ITALIAN, OR AMERICAN -- AT THE BEGINNING OF THE EVACUATION PROCESS. THE ISRAELIS ALSO WANT CRYSTAL [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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CLEAR ASSURANCES THAT THE LISTS OF THOSE ELEMENTS AND THEIR NUMBERS WHO ARE TO BE EVACUATED MATCH SIMILAR LISTS OF RECEIVING STATES. I INFORMED BEGIN THAT PHIL HABIB WAS COMING TO JERUSALEM THIS EVENING. A MEETING HAS BEEN SCHEDULED FOR TOMORROW MORNING, AUGUST 11. I ALSO EXPLAINED THAT PHIL'S INITIAL REACTION TO BEGIN'S RESERVATIONS ON THE PLAN AS EXPRESSED THIS MORNING WAS THAT HE MIGHT BE ABLE TO HANDLE SOME OF THE ISRAELI CONCERNS, BUT NOT OTHERS. I STRESSED THE URGENT NEED TO STOP THE BOMBING OF WEST BEIRUT AND TO RESTORE THE CEASEFIRE. BEGIN REPLIED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO MORE BOMBING NOW THAT TODAY'S ACTIONS HAD ENDED, THOUGH HE WAS IMPRECISE AS TO HOW LONG CALM WOULD PREVAIL. END SUMMARY.

3. BEGIN OPENED OUR HALF HOUR MEETING LATE THIS AFTERNOON, AUGUST 10, BY SAYING HE WISHED TO HAVE YEHUDA AVNER, HIS SPECIAL ASSISTANT, READ OUT THE OFFICIAL VERSION OF THE CABINET COMMUNIQUE ISSUED EARLIER IN THE DAY (REF A), AS WELL AS THE SPECIFIC POINTS WHICH THE CABINET HAD DECIDED UPON WITH RESPECT TO THE PLAN FOR THE DEPARTURE OF THE PLO

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FROM WEST BEIRUT AND LEBANON. AMBASSADOR ARENS WAS ALSO PRESENT AT THE MEETING. I WAS ACCOMPANIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR HARE. BEGIN WAS VISIBLY RELAXED AND IN LESS PAIN THAN DURING OUR PREVIOUS MEETING EARLIER THIS MORNING.

4. AVNER PROCEEDED TO READ THROUGH THE OFFICIAL ENGLISH VERSION OF THE CABINET COMMUNIQUE, WHICH DIFFERS IN LANGUAGE IN SOME RESPECTS FROM REF A AND IS THEREFORE REPEATED BELOW. BEGIN ONLY INTERJECTED AT ONE POINT TO UNDERSCORE THAT THE CABINET HAD

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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ACCEPTED "IN GENERAL PRINCIPLE" THE DOCUMENT WHICH HAD BEEN CONVEYED TO HIM LAST NIGHT. TEXT FOLLOWS:

[

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5. AVNER THEN READ OUT THE CABINET'S POSITION ON THE PLAN AS ADOPTED AT THE CABINET MEETING. BEGIN EMBELLISHED ON CERTAIN POINTS, AS THEY WERE READ FROM A TYPED DOCUMENT WHICH BEGIN LATER GAVE TO ME. NEEDLESS TO SAY, THERE WERE NO SURPRISES FOLLOWING OUR EARLIER MEETING, AS REPORTED IN REF B. BEGIN DIVIDED THE

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CABINET'S POSITION INTO TWO PARTS; THOSE OF SUBSTANCE
AND THOSE OF FORMULATION. THE POINTS OF SUBSTANCE WERE
(STATEMENTS WITHIN PARENTHESIS REFLECT BEGIN'S FURTHER
COMMENT ON EACH POINT):

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2899
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

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6. AFTER RUNNING THROUGH THESE SUBSTANTIVE POINTS, BEGIN MADE TWO POINTS ON THE USE OF TERMINOLOGY IN THE DOCUMENTS AS HE HAD DONE IN OUR EARLIER MEETING. FIRST, THE TERM "E-DAY" AND NOT "D-DAY" SHOULD BE EMPLOYED; SECONDLY, THE PHRASE "MEMBERS OF THE PLO" SHOULD BE USED INSTEAD OF "PALESTINIAN FORCES," REPEATING AGAIN THAT "MEMBERS OF THE PLO" COULD REFER TO CIVILIAN AND MILITARY ELEMENTS.

7. AFTER RECEIVING HIS PAPER, I SAID THAT I HAD REPORTED

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TO WASHINGTON ON OUR EARLIER CONVERSATION THIS MORNING AND WASHINGTON IN TURN HAD SPOKEN TO PHIL. PHIL'S REACTION WAS THAT PERHAPS HE COULD HANDLE SOME OF THE ISRAELI CONCERNS, BUT NOT OTHERS. THEREFORE, AS BEGIN HAD SUGGESTED THIS MORNING, PHIL WAS NOW EN ROUTE TO JERUSALEM THIS EVENING IN ORDER TO DISCUSS THE PLAN DIRECTLY WITH THE PRIME MINISTER TOMORROW MORNING. BEGIN IMMEDIATELY REPLIED HE WOULD BE HAPPY TO SEE PHIL TOMORROW MORNING. THE MEETING HAS BEEN SET FOR 1000 LOCAL.

8. ON LEAVING I SAID PHIL WAS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT LEAVING BEIRUT AT THIS TIME BECAUSE OF CONTINUED ISRAELI BOMBING OF WEST BEIRUT. I NOTED THAT THE FIRING SEEMED TO HAVE SUBSIDED LATE THIS AFTERNOON AND THAT IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT THAT IT STAY STOPPED. BEGIN SAID, "WE WILL STOP IT," AND THEN DIGRESSED INTO A LENGTHY DESCRIPTION OF THE ISRAELI DESTRUCTION OF THE SYRIAN SAM SITES (HE WAS OBVIOUSLY NOT INFORMED ON HOW MANY SAM SITES HAD BEEN STRUCK TODAY), SAYING ISRAEL HAD A "WONDERFUL WEAPON" WHICH COULD CHANGE THE BALANCE OF

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INFO WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

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EXDIS

POWER WITH THE WARSAW PACT.

9. MINIMIZE BEIRUT CONSIDERED. GROVE

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EXCISE

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TEL AV 11477 291139Z

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AMEMBASSY BEIRUT FLASH
INFO WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
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AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
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AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE

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TEL AVIV 11477

EXCISE DECAPTIONED

FOR HABIB FROM LEWIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 7/29/02 (LEWIS, SAMUEL W.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, MILI, LE, IS, PLO, US, XF
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: REESTABLISHMENT OF CEASEFIRE AND
- STATUS OF ELECTRICITY AND WATER SUPPLIES FOR
- WEST BEIRUT

REF: A) BEIRUT 4927, B) LWB/BROWN TELCON RELAYING HABIB
- MESSAGE 7/29, C) BEIRUT 4929

1. [REDACTED]

2. I SPOKE BY PHONE WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN AT 1250
HOURS LOCAL JULY 29 TO CONVEY HABIB'S URGENT MESSAGE. I
TOLD BEGIN THAT NOW THAT THE CEASEFIRE HAD BEEN REESTAB-

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LISHED, PHIL URGED THAT HE FOLLOW THROUGH ON THEIR DISCUS-
SION TO RESTORE ELECTRICITY AND THE FULL FLOW OF WATER TO
WEST BEIRUT. AS RELAYED BY THE LWG, I TOLD BEGIN THAT THE
WATER PROBLEM SEEMED TO CENTER IN THE FACT THAT THE "MAIN
WATER WHEEL" IS MISSING AND MUST BE REPLACED.

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[REDACTED]
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3. BEGIN INITIALLY RESPONDED BY ASKING: "WHAT ABOUT THE PLO AND THE QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE GOING TO LEAVE?" I ASSURED BEGIN THAT PHIL HAD ALSO PRESSED THIS ISSUE STRONGLY WITH SARKIS AND WAZZAN LAST EVENING IMMEDIATELY AFTER HIS RETURN AND WAS WAITING FOR THEM TO OBTAIN THE RESPONSE FROM THE PLO. I TOLD HIM WE WOULD HAVE THE RESPONSE FOR HIM AS SOON AS PHIL HAD SOMETHING MORE TO REPORT. IN THE MEANTIME, HOWEVER, IT IS VITALLY IMPORTANT BOTH TO MAINTAIN THE REESTABLISHED CEASEFIRE AND TO GET THE WATER AND ELECTRICITY FLOWING.

4. BEGIN THEN SAID HE WAS EXTREMELY UPSET TO HAVE LEARNED ONLY AN HOUR AGO [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THAT THE PLO HAD BEEN INFORMED THAT IT WAS ISRAEL WHICH WAS SEEKING THE CEASEFIRE LAST NIGHT. HE SAID THAT IT WAS CERTAINLY NOT CORRECT AND THAT HE DID NOT WANT THE PLO GIVEN ANY IMPRESSION THAT "ISRAEL IS ON ITS KNEES BEGGING FOR A CEASEFIRE." I ASSURED HIM THAT I WAS CERTAIN THIS WAS NOT THE WAY IT HAD BEEN PUT TO THE LEBANESE FOR TRANSMISSION TO THE PLO; HABIB HAD PROPOSED THE CEASEFIRE ON HIS OWN AUTHORITY. ONE COULD NEVER BE SURE HOW MESSAGES WERE SUBSEQUENTLY TRANSMITTED. BEGIN WENT ON TO GRUMBLE AT SOME LENGTH ON THIS SUBJECT AND TO SAY THAT HE HAD ALSO BEEN INFORMED THE PLO HAD ISSUED ORDERS TO ITS ELEMENTS ON THE EASTERN FRONT TO STEP UP THE PRESSURE MILITARILY AGAINST ISRAEL. BEGIN SAID HE WANTED IT UNDERSTOOD THAT IF THE PLO BROKE THE CEASEFIRE IN ONE AREA

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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ISRAEL WOULD RESPOND WHEREVER IT CHOSE TO DO SO. HE SUGGESTED THAT HABIB MAKE THIS POINT AS CLEAR AS POSSIBLE THROUGH HIS INTERLOCUTORS.

5. I KEPT BRINGING HIM BACK TO THE ELECTRICITY AND POWER QUESTION. FINALLY HE SAID HE WOULD GET BUSY ON IT WITH HIS COLLEAGUES, BUT HE SAID THAT THE POWER SITUATION "IS MORE COMPLICATED." HE SAID THAT YESTERDAY THE PLO WAS IN VERY BAD SHAPE AND THAT THE CEASEFIRE WOULD NOW AGAIN GIVE THEM A RESPITE TO RECOVER. I REMINDED HIM OF HIS COMMITMENTS TO YOU. HE SAID THAT ALL HE HAD COMMITTED HIMSELF TO DO WAS TO "CONSULT WITH HIS COLLEAGUES FURTHER" IF THE CEASEFIRE WAS RESTORED, AND THAT HE WOULD PROCEED IMMEDIATELY TO DO. BUT HE GAVE ME NO PROMISES.

6. IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE SOMETHING I COULD RELAY BACK TO BEGIN ON HOW THE CEASEFIRE REQUEST WAS TRANSMITTED,

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MERELY TO ALLAY UNWARRANTED SUSPICIONS. I WILL ALSO MAKE THE POINT THE NEXT TIME WE TALK THAT THE BACKING AND FILLING LAST NIGHT ON THE TIME, AND THE HEAVY SHELLING WHICH WENT ON AFTER NINE O'CLOCK, DAMAGED YOUR CREDIBILITY. I HAVE ALREADY MADE THESE POINTS STRONGLY THIS MORNING TO HANAN BAR-ON AND ASKED HIM TO PASS THEM ON.

7. BEIRUT AND DAMASCUS MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. LEWIS

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ate Printed: 10/03/1996

DOC NUMBER: 82PARIS08837

CHANNEL: n/a

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EXCISE

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PAGE 01 PARIS 08837 112001Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 /025 W
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
☒ RELEASE
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DATE: 11/3/97

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TS authority to

3/11/07

FROM HABIB FOR THE SECRETARY

9302566

E.O. 12065: 3/11/92 (HABIB, P.C.)
TAGS: PEPR, MOPS, XF, LE, IS, SY, SA, JO
SUBJ: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH CHEYSSON - MARCH 11

1.

2. AT HIS REQUEST, I MET THIS EVENING WITH CHEYSSON
FOR ABOUT FORTY MINUTES. I BRIEFED HIM ON MY TRIP TO
THE AREA IN GENERAL TERMS. HE POSED SOME QUESTIONS AND
MADE SOME POINTS WHICH HE MAY BRING UP ALSO IN HIS
MEETING WITH YOU ON FRIDAY, NAMELY:

--E

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ate Printed: 10 Jul 1994 LOC NUMBER: 82PARIS08837

CHANNEL: n/a

-- CHEYSSON NOTED THAT IN HIS RECENT VISITS TO ABU DHABI AND BAGHDAD, HE HAD HEARD VIRTUALLY NO TALK ABOUT THE PALESTINIANS, THE PLO OR ISRAEL; THE FOCUS WAS ON IRAN AND A POTENTIAL IRANIAN THREAT.

-- CHEYSSON WAS CONVINCED FROM HIS TRIP TO ISRAEL THAT THE ISRAELIS FEEL STRONGLY NOW IS NOT THE TIME TO HAVE REAL PROBLEMS OR CRISES WITH THE US. MARESCA

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*** Current Classification ***

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ate Printed: 10/03/1996

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CHANNEL: n/a

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APPROVED BY:S/S-O:MAX ROBINSON

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STATE 168967 TOSEC 090030

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FOLLOWING REPEAT SENT ACTION SECSTATE USUN INFO AMMAN
CAIRO DAMASCUS JERUSALEM JIDDA RIYADH TEL AVIV WHITE
HOUSE DTD JUN 18.

QUOTE: BEIRUT 4259

EXDIS

FROM HABIB: PASS TO SECRETARY IN NEW YORK
E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3 6/18/92 (HABIB, PHILIP)
TAGS: MILI, MOPS, PEPR, PGOV, PINT, LE, IS, US
SUBJ: HABIB MISSION: SITUATION AS OF JUNE 18

1. [REDACTED]
2. HERE IS THE POLITICAL SITUATION AS OF 1100 HOURS LOCAL
FRIDAY, JUNE 18:
--LAST NIGHT WAZZAN AND I WERE IN TOUCH. HE SAID THAT
THE PLO POSITION HAD HARDENED. ARAFAT WAS NOT WILLING -
AT LEAST AT THIS TIME - TO GO FORWARD WITH THE 48-HOUR
STAND STILL DURING WHICH PLO-GOL NEGOTIATIONS WOULD
PROCEED. THIS IS THE CONCEPT WHICH I HAD EARLIER
TRANSMITTED.
--CERTAINLY, THE PROSPECT OF LAF DEPLOYMENT INTO WEST

PAGE 02 STATE 168967 TOSEC 090030

BEIRUT WILL NOT OCCUR WITHOUT AN ARRANGEMENT OF THE SORT
PROPOSED. HOWEVER, IN LEBANON CIRCUMSTANCES CAN CHANGE
ALMOST OVER NIGHT. WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS ISRAEL
FOR SATISFACTORY ASSURANCES SO THAT WE CAN GO FORWARD
IF THE GOL SAYS IT IS FEASIBLE. WE NEED TO KEEP THE
DOOR OPEN IF PLO AND LEBANESE CAN STRIKE A DEAL.
--SARKIS IS STILL HAVING TROUBLE NAILING DOWN A
NATIONAL SALVATION COMMITTEE AND HIS ADVISORS ARE
CONSIDERING OTHER ALTERNATIVES

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--I AM THIS MORNING SENDING THE WORD TO WAZZAN THAT HE SHOULD IN TURN SAY TO ARAFAT THAT - IF ARAFAT REALLY WANTS A 48-HOUR PERIOD IN WHICH TO NEGOTIATE ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE GOL - HE SHOULD LET US KNOW THROUGH WAZZAN AND MAKE A CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT TO THIS EFFECT. THIS MAY BE THE ONLY WAY TO NAIL HIM DOWN. --AS FOR THE MILITARY SITUATION, THE IDF BUILDUP IN THE BEIRUT AREA CONTINUES. EMBASSY OFFICERS REPORT THAT IDF HAS TAKEN OUT - WITH ARTILLERY - A SYRIAN CHECKPOINT AND BUILDING HOUSING PLA REPEAT PLA UNITS AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT.

--[] ESTIMATE IS THAT THE IDF WILL NOT NECESSARILY GO INTO THE PALESTINIAN CAMPS AND CONCENTRATIONS IN WEST BEIRUT WITHIN THE NEXT 24 HOURS, BUT THAT THEY ARE LIKELY DO SO SOON, AND PERHAPS REPEAT PERHAPS WITH BASHIR GEMAYEL'S HELP. HE CLAIMS THATE ARE STILL 10,000 FIGHTERS WHO HAVE FANNED OUT THROUGHOUT WEST

PAGE 03 STATE 168967 TOSEC 090030

BEIRUT FROM THE CAMPS, WHO WILL COME DOWN TO ONLY 4,000 EFFECTIVES IF THE IDF ATTACKS. HE ALSO CLAIMS THEY ARE SOMEHOW STILL RECEIVING ARMS SUPPLIES FROM SYRIANS THROUGH A NETWORK OF BACK ROADS DESPITE IDF INTERDICTION.

3. DEPENDING ON COMMUNICATIONS AND RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS, DETAILS BY SEPTTEL. PASS THIS TO SECRETARY IN TIME FOR BREAKFAST MEETING WITH BEGIN. DILLON UNQUOTE EAGLEBURGER

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B1PAGE 01 JERUSA 00703 01 OF 03 081458Z
ACTION SS-25INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 /025 W
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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE

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Date: 11/3/97

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DECAPIOTED

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS 1,3,4 3/8/02 (HABIB, P.C.)

TAGS: PEPR, MOPS, XF, LE, IS, SY, SA, JO, EG

SUBJ: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR,
MARCH 8

1.

2. SUMMARY: I GAVE FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR A FAIRLY FULL BRIEFING ABOUT MY MEETINGS IN SYRIA, JORDAN, AND SAUDI ARABIA, INCLUDING EVEN SOME OF THE DETAILS OF MY TALKS WITH ASSAD. PRESUMABLY SHAMIR WILL GIVE BEGIN A FULL BRIEFING IN PREPARATION FOR MY MEETING WITH HIM LATER IN THE DAY. SHAMIR ASKED QUESTIONS BUT VOLUNTEERED FEW COMMENTS, INCLUDING ABOUT THE ISRAELI-FRENCH TALKS ON LEBANON DURING MITTERRAND'S VISIT. IN THE END,

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HOWEVER, SHAMIR SUMMED UP MY PRESENTATION AS BASCIALLY OPTIMISTIC THAT THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES WOULD BE PRESERVED, AND THIS POSITION WAS ECHOED IN OFFICIAL ISRAELI PRESS COMMENTARY. LATER IN THE DAY. END SUMMARY.

3. I MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR FOR A LITTLE OVER ONE HOUR MONDAY, MARCH 8. ON THE ISRAELI SIDE, MFA DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL BAR-ON, CHEF DE CABINET BEN AHARON, DIRECTOR FOR NORTH AMERICAN AFFAIRS BEN-TSUR, DIRECTOR

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OF POLITICAL RESEARCH ALIAV, AND LEBANON OFFICER LAVIE ATTENDED. I WAS ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR LEWIS, DAS DRAPER, DCM BROWN AND POL/C HARE.

4. I STARTED WITH A REVIEW OF MY MEETINGS WITH KHADDAM AND ASSAD IN DAMASCUS, NOTING SPECIFICALLY THAT THE PRESS STORIES FROM JERUSALEM ON MY DISCUSSIONS HERE, WHICH HAD BEEN RECEIVED IN DAMASCUS JUST PRIOR TO MY ARRIVAL, HAD NOT FACILITATED MY MISSION. MY MEETING WITH KHADDAM WAS BUSINESSLIKE AND WAS RELATIVELY FREE OF POLEMIC. I HAD CONCENTRATED ON EXPLAINING THE FINE POINTS OF THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT, INCLUDING MY POSITION THAT THE FATAH INFILTRATION ACROSS THE JORDAN BORDER IN LATE JANUARY WAS A VIOLATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE. AS A RESULT, KHADDAM NOW HAD A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF THE DANGERS WHICH SUCH ACTIVITY WOULD POSE TO THE CONTINUATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE. WHILE KHADDAM TOOK THE POSITION THAT SYRIA WAS NOT A PARTY TO THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT, HE DID SAY THAT SYRIA HAD ENDORSED THE ARAB LEAGUE DECISION WELCOMING THE AGREEMENT "FOR THE SAKE OF THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH LEBANON" AND WANTED TO SEE IT PRESERVED. I HAD ASKED KHADDAM TO USE SYRIAN INFLUENCE WITH THE PLO TO ENSURE THAT THIS OBJECTIVE WAS ACHIEVED (NOTING THAT THERE WAS TO BE SYRIAN-FATAH CON-

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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SULTATIONS IN DAMASCUS THE DAY AFTER I LEFT SYRIA).

5. CONTINUING, I SAID I HAD MET WITH PRESIDENT ASSAD ALONE (EXCEPT FOR AN INTERPRETER) FOR MORE THAN TWO HOURS, DURING WHICH I HAD EXPRESSED OUR DESIRE TO MAINTAIN A DIALOGUE. ASSAD AGREED BUT IN A LATER REMARK HAD SAID THAT, "UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES" (REFERRING TO CHARGES OF US INVOLVEMENT IN THE HAMA DISTURBANCES), HE HAD DECIDED TO MEET WITH ME ALONE, TO UNDERLINE HIS POSITION THAT HE WAS RECEIVING ME NOT AS A PRESIDENTIAL EMISSARY BUT IN SOME OTHER PERSONAL CAPACITY. WE ALSO HAD AN EXHAUSTIVE EXCHANGE ABOUT SYRIAN CHARGES THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS INVOLVED IN THE HAMA DISTURBANCES. ASSAD WOULD NOT ACCEPT MY STRONG DENIALS, MAINTAINING THAT HE HAD EVIDENCE OF OUR INVOLVEMENT.

6. WHEN SHAMIR ASKED WHY SYRIA WAS SUSPICIOUS OF THE US AND WHAT THEY BELIEVED US OBJECTIVES WERE, I SAID THAT ASSAD BELIEVES WE WANT A CHANGE OF REGIME SO THAT SYRIA WOULD BE FORCED TO DEAL WITH ISRAEL. ASSAD NEEDS A SCAPEGOAT FOR HIS INTERNAL PROBLEMS. IN ADDITION, HE SAID HE COULD NOT BELIEVE THAT THE UNITED STATES DID NOT KNOW OF AND CONDONE ACTIONS BY "ITS FRIENDS AND ALLIES" SECRET

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(MEANING HE SUSPECTED JORDAN, IRAQ, ISRAEL AND THE PHALANGE OF HELPING THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD TO DESTABILIZE THE HEGIME, ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT MENTION THEM BY NAME).

7. I SAID TO SHAMIR I HAD ALSO EXPLAINED TO ASSAD THE HIGHPOINTS OF THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT, AND HE DID NOT

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FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1486
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE

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EXDIS

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS 1,3,4 3/8/02 (HABIB, P.C.)
TAGS: PEPR, MOPS, XF, LE, IS, SY, SA, JO, EG
SUBJ: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR,
MARCH 8

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ARGUE WITH MY DEFINITIONS. FINALLY, WE HAD DISCUSSED THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN LEBANON, ESPECIALLY THE ARAB FOLLOW-UP COMMITTEE, THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, AND THE PROSPECTS FOR SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM STRATEGIC POINTS (WHICH COULD INVOLVE REMOVAL OF THE MISSILES). ASSAD, AS KHADDAM HAD THE DAY BEFORE, GAVE A PREDICTABLE RESPONSE ON THE NECESSITY OF MAINTAINING THE SYRIAN TROOP PRESENCE IN LEBANON. I EXPLAINED TO SHAMIR QUITE FRANKLY THAT I SAW NO GIVE IN THE SYRIAN POSITION AND CONCLUDED THAT SYRIA WOULD ONLY BUDGE IF FORCED TO DO SO.

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8. I TOLD SHAMIR THAT BOTH ASSAD AND KHADDAM CONTINUED TO POINT TO BASHIR GEMAYEL'S RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL AS THE PRINCIPAL OBSTACLE TO LEBANESE RECONCILIATION AND THE WORK OF THE ARAB FOLLOW-UP COMMITTEE. KHADDAM WOULD NOT ACCEPT MY ARGUMENT THAT BASHIR'S LETTER DISTANCING HIMSELF FROM ISRAEL SHOULD BE ACCEPTED AS A SUFFICIENT BASIS TO MOVE ON TO OTHER MORE PRESSING PROBLEMS. I HAD INFORMED THE SYRIANS THAT IT WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO ALLOW A SYRIAN PUPPET TO BE IMPOSED IN LEBANON AND IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR ALL PARTIES TO DEMONSTRATE THE NECESSARY DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY IN FINDING AN ACCEPTABLE COMPROMISE CANDIDATE. KHADDAM ANSWERED WITH A STRAIGHT FACE THAT SYRIA WOULD NOT INTERFERE IN INTERNAL LEBANESE DEVELOPMENTS, THOUGH I HAD OBSERVED THAT 30,000 TROOPS GAVE SYRIA A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF POLITICAL INFLUENCE.

9. I TOLD SHAMIR THAT KING HUSSEIN WAS DETERMINED TO DO WHAT HE COULD TO HELP MAINTAIN THE CEASE-FIRE, THOUGH IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT HIS MAJOR CONCERN WAS THE SYRIAN THREAT AND INFILTRATIONS ACROSS THE SYRIAN BORDER, DIRECTED EITHER AGAINST TARGETS IN ISRAEL OR JORDAN. DRAPER ADDED THAT GENERAL BIN SHAKER HAD SAID THAT HE WAS MONITORING THE JORDAN BORDER VERY CAREFULLY AGAINST TERRORIST INFILTRATIONS. I ALLUDED TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT WE MIGHT PROVIDE JORDAN WITH HELP FOR GUARDING ITS BORDERS AGAINST INFILTRATION. THE KING WAS INTERESTED IN GETTING THE GULF STATES INVOLVED IN THE LEBANESE SITUATION IN ORDER TO PROVIDE BETTER PROTECTION AGAINST SYRIAN DESIGNS.

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10.

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11. I REVIEWED OTHEE SUBJECTS ALONG LINES PREVIOUSLY REPORTED IN SOME DETAIL (I.E., SAUDI ATTITUDES TOWARD SYRIA AND LIBYA, LEBANON'S SEVERE FINANCIAL PROBLEMS, SYRIA'S ATTITUDES ABOUT THE PLO BUILDUP, SAUDI ATTITUDES TOWARD MUBARAK, SAUDI ATTITUDES TOWARD THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, INTEREST IN SARKIS'S CONTINUING AS PRESIDENT, ETC.). IN SUMMING UP, I SAID THAT I CAME AWAY FROM MY ROUND OF TALKS REASSURED THAT THE PRINCIPAL PARTIES CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD THE DEFINITION OF THE CEASE-FIRE AS I HAD INTERPRETED IT AND THE IMPORTANCE OF ENSURING THAT IT IS MAINTAINED.

12. SHAMIR RAISED ONLY A FEW QUESTIONS ABOUT THE FLOW OF WEAPONS TO THE PLO, THE HAMA DISTURBANCES AND ITS IMPLICATIONS, SAUDI ATTITUDES TOWARD MUBARAK, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF SYRIAN TROOP AND MISSILE WITHDRAWAL FROM

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ACTION SS-25

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INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 /025 W

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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE

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EXDIS

FROM HABIB

LEBANON. WHILE NOT PRESSING THE MATTER, HE WAS CLEARLY INTERESTED IN THE UNFINISHED PART OF MY AGENDA. WE ASKED HIM ABOUT THE FRENCH-ISRAELI DISCUSSION ON LEBANON DURING THE MITTERRAND VISIT. SHAMIR OFFERED LITTLE COMMENT, NOTING ONLY THAT BEGIN HAD EXPLAINED ISRAEL'S VIEWS AND CONCERNS TO MITTERRAND AND THAT A MEETING OF EXPERTS, INCLUDING SHARON, KIMCHE AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE ELYSEE, HAD CONVENED TO EXCHANGE VIEWS. THE FRENCH WERE MORE INTERESTED IN HEARING ISRAEL'S VIEWS THAN IN OFFERING ANY SUGGESTIONS. THE FRENCH ADMITTED TO EXTREMELY POOR RELATIONS WITH SYRIA. SHAMIR HAD ALSO DISCUSSED UNIFIL'S EXPANSION WITH CHEYSSON. CHEYSSON HAD EXPLAINED THAT THE FRENCH WERE COMMITTED TO THE STRENGTHENING OF UNIFIL BUT DID NOT BELIEVE THIS HAD TO BE AT

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THE EXPENSE OF HADDAD'S POSITION. THE ISRAELI CONSENSUS WAS THAT THE FRENCH WERE STILL WADING THROUGH THE LISTS OF PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES, WERE FLATTERED THAT THE CANDIDATES RELIGIOUSLY MAKE THEIR PILGRIMATE TO PARIS, BUT HAVE LITTLE LEVERAGE ON THE OUTCOME. BAR-ON DID NOTE THAT THE FRENCH APPEARED TO BE INTERESTED IN SARKIS EXTENDING HIS TERM, THOUGH THEY APPEARED SOMEWHAT DUBIOUS ABOUT THIS POSSIBILITY. IN NOTING THAT THE FRENCH AND THE ISRAELIS HAD AGREED TO CONTINUE THEIR DISCUSSIONS ON LEBANON, AMBASSADOR LEWIS SPECIFICALLY ASKED WHETHER ISRAEL HAD RAISED THE ISSUE OF TRILATERAL CONVERSATIONS WITH FRANCE, ISRAEL, AND UNITED STATES. (I HAD BEEN

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NOTICEABLY COOL TO BEGIN'S SUGGESTION OF TRILATERAL TALKS DURING MY FIRST VISIT). SHAMIR DID NOT THINK THE ISSUE HAD BEEN RAISED.

13. WE DISCUSSED HOW WE SHOULD HANDLE THE PRESS. I SAID I WOULD SAY NOTHING AND PREFERRED THAT THE ISRAELI SIDE REFRAIN FROM MAJOR SUBSTANTIVE COMMENT UNTIL I HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT. REALIZING THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF THIS APPROACH, WE AGREED THEY SHOULD CONFINE COMMENT TO SAYING THAT I HAD GIVEN A GENERALLY REASSURING REPORT ON THE INTEREST OF ALL PARTIES IN MAINTAINING THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES. I ADDED IF THE ISRAELIS WISHED TO RESTATE THEIR COMMITMENT TO PEACE, AS BEGIN AND SHARON HAD SO PASSIONATELY ADVOCATED IN THE KNESSET DEBATE OF MARCH 2, THIS WOULD ALSO BE A POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION. I SAID I WOULD CERTAINLY TRY TO TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY AFTER MY MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT TO GET THIS MESSAGE ACROSS PUBLICLY.

14. COMMENT: AFTER THIS REPORT WAS DRAFTED, ISRAEL RADIO

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REPORTED THAT I HAD FOUND "A COMMON INTEREST BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES" ON MAINTAINING THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, THOUGH THE REPORT ALSO SAID THAT SHAMIR HAD RAISED HIS CONCERN ABOUT THE FLOW OF WEAPONS TO THE PLO, THE SYRIAN TROOP PRESENCE IN LEBANON, AND THE SYRIAN MISSILES IN THE BEKAA VALLEY. GROVE

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FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5908
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY
USLO RIYADH PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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CA Date: 11/1/87

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EO Citations

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SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 01978

DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIB

E.O.12065: RDS-1,2,3,4-3/4/02 (HABIB, PHILIP C)
TAGS: PEPR, MOPS, XF, LE, SY, SA, IS, JO
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: MEETINGS IN JORDAN WITH KING,
- CROWN PRINCE, PRIME MINISTER, FOREIGN MINISTER,
- ARMED FORCES COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

1. [REDACTED]
2. JOINED BY AMBASSADOR VIETS AND DAS DRAPER, AND OFTEN BY DCM DJEREJIAN AND POLOFF IMBRIE, I HAD USEFUL AND LENGTHY CONSULTATIONS WITH JORDANIAN LEADERS, BEGINNING WITH KING HUSSEIN BUT INCLUDING THE CROWN PRINCE, PRIME MINISTER BADRAN, FOREIGN MINISTER KASIM, ARMED FORCES CHIEF GENERAL BIN SHAKER, ROYAL COURT COUNSELOR LAWZI, AND OTHERS. I MENTIONED TO THE KING THE GOOD WORDS THE

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PRESIDENT HAD SAID ABOUT HIM AND THE IMPORTANCE OF JORDAN. HE WAS OBVIOUSLY PLEASED. FOLLOWING ARE THE MAIN POINTS I MADE TO ALL:

-- I DESCRIBED THE TWO MAIN OBJECTIVES ENTRUSTED TO ME ON THIS TRIP: (A) PRESERVING AND STRENGTHENING THE CEASE-FIRE, AND (B) ANALYZING WHAT COULD BE DONE TO IMPROVE THE INTERNAL LEBANESE SITUATION. I REVIEWED FAIRLY FULLY MY DISCUSSIONS IN INSRAEL, LEBANON AND SYRIA, WITH THE

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EXCEPTION OF PORTIONS OF MY TALK WITH ASSAD.

-- I REVIEWED RECENT DANGEROUS DEVELOPMENTS THREATENING THE CEASE-FIRE, AND OUR EFFORTS TO FORESTALL MAJOR ISRAELI MILITARY ACTION OR FURTHER CHALLENGES AND PROVOCATIONS FROM EITHER THE PALESTINIANS OR THE SYRIANS. GIVEN THE MOOD IN ISRAEL, WHICH I DESCRIBED GRAPHICALLY, I SAID THAT ANY PROVOCATIONS COULD BRING ABOUT A STRONG REACTION AND UNPREDICTIBLE FORMS OF ESCALATION. ALTHOUGH DUE TO OUR EFFORTS THE ISRAELIS HAD HELD OFF GOING NORTH IN RESPONSE TO RECENT INCIDENTS, A SUCCESSFUL PALESTINIAN ACTION AGAINST ISRAEL WOULD SET THINGS OFF. I ASKED THAT JORDAN USE ITS INFLUENCE IN ALL APPROPRIATE QUARTERS TO FORESTALL A DANGEROUS BLOW-UP. I NOTED THAT BEGIN HAD ASSURED ME THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT BE THE FIRST TO BREAK THE CEASE-FIRE.

-- I DESCRIBED THE THREE BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE JULY CEASE-FIRE, AS WELL AS OUR CONCLUSION THAT THE RECENT FATAH OPERATIONS ACROSS THE JORDAN RIVER WAS A CEASE-FIRE VIOLATION BECAUSE THE OPERATION HAD ORIGINATED IN LEBANON.

-- I EXPLORED BRIEFLY HOW UNIFIL'S EXPANSION COULD BE USED TO PROMOTE A MORE STABLE SITUATION.

-- AS FOR THE LEBANESE INTERNAL SITUATION, I UNDERLINED

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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THE IMPORTANCE OF RE-ENGAGING THE SAUDIS AND KUWAITIS IN ARAB FOLLOW-UP COMMITTEE (AFC) ACTIVITIES DESPITE SYRIAN INFLEXIBILITY. I ASKED FOR APPROPRIATE JORDANIAN COOPERATION IN THIS AREA AS WELL, AND THIS PRODUCED AN EXCHANGE OF INTERESTING IDEAS (SEE BELOW).

3. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT POINTS MADE BY KING HUSSEIN PERSONALLY WERE THE FOLLOWING:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

-- THIS LED TO A DISCUSSION (AS WAS THE CASE ALSO EARLIER WITH BADRAN) AS TO WHETHER A PALESTINIAN OPERATION MOUNTED FROM SYRIA, NOT FROM LEBANON, WHICH CROSSED JORDAN INTO THE WEST BANK AND ISRAEL WOULD BE A CEASE-FIRE VIOLATION. I NOTED THAT I HAD SPECIFICALLY CAUTIONED ASSAD NOT TO ALLOW SUCH A PALESTINIAN ADVENTURE. WHILE IT COULD BE SEEN AS NOT A TECHNICAL VIOLATION, THAT WOULD NOT BE THE ISRAELI

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VIEW. IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DANGEROUS AND COULD SPARK A SIGNIFICANT ISRAELI REACTION WHICH, HOWEVER, IN MY OPINION WOULD BE DIRECTED AT THE PLO BUT NOT JORDAN, SINCE ISRAEL GAVE JORDAN CREDIT FOR BLOCKING INFILTRATION ATTEMPTS.

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 /025 W
-----262010 041921Z /42

O 041855Z MAR 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5903
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY
USLO RIYADH PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY

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EXDIS

-- HE SAID THAT JORDAN REMAINED DETERMINED TO CONTROL BORDER INFILTRATIONS BUT COULD NOT TOTALLY SEAL IT OFF. HE WOULD WARMLY WELCOME THE U.S. PROVISION OF ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT TO IMPROVE JORDANIAN EFFORTS TO PREVENT INFILTRATIONS ACROSS THE RIVER. JORDAN WOULD TRY TO BE HELPFUL REGARDING LEBANESE INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS. JORDAN HAD GOOD CONTACTS WITH CHAMOUN AND HIS

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SUPPORTERS, WITH WALID JUMBLATT OF THE NATIONAL MOVEMENT, AND WITH SHI'A AND SUNNI MUSLIM LEADERS, AS WELL AS AMIN GEMAYEL, WHO HAD VISITED AMMAN RECENTLY.

-- IF THE AUTONOMY TALKS REACHED AN IMPASSE, HE HOPED THAT THE U.S. POSITION WOULD NOT REMAIN STATIC AND WOULD REFLECT THE NEED FOR AN ALTERED STRATEGY. HE HOPED THAT THE U.S. WOULD STICK TO ITS ORIGINAL INTERPRETATION OF RESOLUTION 242 AS MEANING THE RETURN OF TERRITORY IN EXCHANGE FOR FULL ACCEPTANCE OF ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST.

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WITHOUT MENTIONING JORDAN'S ARMS NEEDS EXPLICITLY, HE NOTED THAT THE U.S. HAD TO CONTINUE A SENSIBLE ARMS RELATIONSHIP WITH KEY COUNTRIES; HE RECALLED IN THIS CONNECTION THAT LEGITIMATE DEFENSIVE REQUIREMENTS WHICH HAD NOT BEEN SATISFIED BY THE WEST--AS IN NASSER'S CASE YEARS AGO--HAD LED TO GREATER DEPENDENCE UPON THE SOVIETS, WITH ALL THIS IMPLIED FOR THE REGION'S STABILITY.

4. FOREIGN MINISTER KASIM EXPLORED WITH ME A STILL SOMEWHAT AMORPHOUS APPROACH, WHICH HE OUTLINED SUBSEQUENTLY IN MY PRESENCE TO BADRAN AND THE KING, WHO NODDED GENERAL ASSENT. KASIM HAD BEEN INTRIGUED WITH THE RECENT ACTION OF THE KUWAITI PARLIAMENT PROPOSING THAT KUWAITI SUBSIDIES TO SYRIA BE ENDED (KASIM ARGUED THAT THIS STEP WAS TAKEN NOT SIMPLY BECAUSE OF THE HAMA INCIDENT AND THE NEED TO SHOW SYMPATHY TO THE SUNNI MUSLIMS IN SYRIA, BUT ALSO BECAUSE KUWAIT REGARDS SYRIAN SUPPORT FOR IRAN IN THE WAR WITH IRAQ AS AGAINST KUWAIT'S MOST IMPORTANT INTERESTS).

5. BOILED DOWN, KASIM'S IDEA IS TO BUILD ON THIS KUWAITI ACTION SO AS TO MOBILIZE BROADER GULF AND SAUDI PRESSURE AGAINST SYRIA TO ACHIEVE "COMPREHENSIVE" OBJECTIVES, INCLUDING INTER ALIA SYRIAN COOPERATION WITH THE CEASE-FIRE AND SYRIAN ACQUIESCENCE IN BROAD ARAB EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN LEBANON AND HELP BRING ABOUT SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL THERE. KASIM, HOWEVER, DID WANT TO COUPLE THESE OBJECTIVES TO WHAT HE IMPLIED WOULD BE THE AIM OF PERSUADING SYRIA TO JOIN IN A UNITED ARAB STAND AGAINST THE IRANIAN THREAT. THIS IS WHY HE ADVOCATED NOT USING "PREMATURELY" WHATEVER LEVERAGE COULD BE DEVELOPED FROM A COMMON GULF STAND (MEANING NOT USING SUCH LEVERAGE FOR LEBANON OR CEASE-FIRE OBJECTIVES EXCLUSIVELY). THE CLEAR NEXT STEP IN KASIM'S PLAN IS TO ENCOURAGE

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SAUDI ARABIA TO END ITS SUBSIDIES TO SYRIA.

6. HE ALSO THREW OUT AS HIS PERSONAL IDEA PUTTING MORE TEETH IN UNIFIL'S ABILITY TO CONTROL ITS AREA, AND POSSIBLY DEPLOYING THE FORCE INTO OTHER REGIONS OF LEBANON.

7. I DID NOT RESPOND TO HIS THOUGHTS OTHER THAN TO SAY THAT I WOULD THINK THEM OVER CAREFULLY. VIETS

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EXCISE

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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5491

INF RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE

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AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

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SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 1406

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DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS-1, 3 2/27/02 (HABIB, PHILIP)

TAGS:MILI, PEPER, PINS, PINT, LE, IS, SY, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER BOUTROS

2. SUMMARY: BOUTROS IS NOT OPTIMIST ABOUT EITHER THE REGIONAL SITUATION OR LEBANON'S INTERNAL PROBLEMS, BUT WAS MARKEDLY LESS NEGATIVE THAN SARKIS. HE BELIEVES THAT MAINTENANCE OF THE CEASE-FIRE IS VERY IMPORTANT TO THE GOL BECAUSE AN ISRAELI INVASION WOULD (A) DAMAGE THE POSITION OF THE U.S., ON WHOM LEBANON RELIES, IN THE ARAB WORLD AND (B) LEAVE THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY IN A VERY VULNERABLE POSITION FOLLOWING AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. BOUTROS RETURNED TO THIS SECOND POINT SEVERAL TIMES, NOTING THAT WHILE THE MARONITE MILITANTS-THE SO-CALLED LEBANESE FRONT-(LF) ARE ARGUING THAT AN ISRAELI ATTACK MAY BE THE ONLY SOLUTION TO THE SYRIAN PRESENCE IN LEBANON, HE BELIEVES THAT THE LF SHOULD

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NEITHER ENCOURAGE AN ISRAELI ATTACK NOR BECOME INVOLVED SHOULD ONE OCCUR. CONCERNING THE INTERNAL LEBANESE SITUATION, BOUTROS DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT THE SYRIANS ARE LIKELY TO WITHDRAW IN THE NEAR FUTURE EITHER AS THE RESULT OF ARAB PRESSURES OR BECAUSE OF THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN SYRIA. A SYRIAN-LF COMPROMISE IS THEREFORE NECESSARY TO AVOID A BREAKDOWN OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS AS ELECTIONS APPROACH, BUT BOUTROS SEES LITTLE INDICATION OF SYRIAN FLEXIBILITY OR EVEN READINESS TO UNDERTAKE A SERIOUS DIALOGUE WITH

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THE PHALANGE. ON THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM AS A WHOLE, BOUTROS SAID HE DOUBTED SYRIA WANTED TO SEE AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE AND THAT IN ANY EVENT THE SOVIETS WOULD SEEK TO BLOCK ANY SETTLEMENT PROCESS IN WHICH THEY WERE NOT INVOLVED. IN THIS REGARD, HE EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT HAD THE FAHD PLAN INCLUDED A SOVIET ROLE, RUSSIA MIGHT HAVE PRESSED SYRIA TO ACCEPT IT. AT THE CONCLUSION OF OUR MEETING, BOUTROS SAID THAT HE HOPES TO VISIT THE U.S. SOON, PROBABLY DURING THE FIRST HALF OF APRIL.

3. I MET FOR ONE HOUR ON FEBRUARY 27 WITH FOREIGN MINISTER BOUTROS, JOINED BY AMBASSADOR DILLON, DAS DRAPER, AND POLOFF CROCKER. I REVIEWED FOR BOUTROS THE TWO BASIC AIMS OF MY CURRENT MISSION AS I HAD DONE FOR SARKIS AND AL-WAZZAN; AN THEN ASKED HIS VIEWS.

4. BOUTROS BEGAN BY STRESSING THAT HE WAS FULLY AWARE OF THE NECESSITY OF PRESERVING THE CEASE-FIRE IN SOUTH LEBANON. HE SAID THAT LEBANON HAD TWO SPECIAL REASONS FOR WANTING TO AVOID A RENEWAL OF HOSTILITIES:
A. AN ISRAELI ATTACK WOULD SERIOUSLY DAMAGE U.S. RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB WORLD. SINCE LEBANON RELIES HEAVILY ON U.S. SUPPORT AND BACKING, SUCH A DEVELOPMENT

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COULD ONLY DAMAGE LEBANON'S OWN POSITION. IT IS VERY IMPORTANT THAT THE U.S. REMAIN A VALID PARTNER IN THE AREA.

B. IF ISRAEL DOES INVADE, SOONER OR LATER THEY MUST WITHDRAW. [

5. BOUTROS CONTINUED HIS OBSERVATIONS ON THE CEASE-FIRE BY WONDERING WHAT THE MOTIVATIONS AND INTENTIONS UNDERLYING A POSSIBLE ISRAELI OFFENSIVE MIGHT BE [

[ON BALANCE, SAID BOUTROS, HE BELIEVES THAT ISRAEL IS THINKING ONLY OF ISRAEL AND THAT LEBANON WOULD PAY DEARLY FOR AN INVASION.

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ACTION SS-25

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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5492
INF RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 5426
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
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EXDIS

6. BOUTROS PRESSED FOR MY VIEWS ON ISRAELI INTENTIONS AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF AN ATTACK. I REPLIED THAT WHILE THE U.S. WAS EXERTING MAXIMUM EFFORT, THE SITUATION IN SOUTH LEBANON CONTINUED TO BE EXTREMELY TENSE. I TOLD HIM I WOULD BE TAKING UP THESE SAME POINTS WITH ISRAEL, STRESSING ONCE AGAIN THE NEED TO AVOID HOSTILITIES. BOUTROS THEN ASKED WHAT, IN THE EVENT AN ATTACK OCCURED, THE GOVERNMENT AND BASHIR GEMAYEL'S FORCES SHOULD DO. I TOOK THIS OPPORTUNITY TO STRESS

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IN THE STRONGEST TERMS THAT IS IS CRITICAL THAT THE LEBANESE FRON RECOGNIZE THAT AN ATTACK ISNOT A SOLUTION TO LEBAGNON'S PROBLEMS. BOUTROS AGREED THAT BASHIR SHOULD NEITHER ENCOURAGE AN ATTACK NOR BECOME INVOLVED IT ONE OCCURRED. WHEN BOUTROS NOTED THAT THE LEBANESE FRONT'S ARGUMENT WAS THAT OTHER SOLUTIONS WERE IMPOSSIBLE WITH THE SYRIANS HERE, I TOOK THE OCCASION TO SHIFT THE CONVERSATION TO THE SYRIAN PRESENCE IN LEBANON AND PROSPECTS FOR THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS.

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7. I PROBED BUTROS FOR HIS VIEWS FOR THE PROSPECTS OF A SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. HE SAID THAT THE ARAB FOLLOW UP COMMITTEE HAD PROVEN INCAPABLE OF PUTTING PRESSURE ON THE SYRIANS, AND IDI NOT BELIEVE THAT DISTURBANCES IN SYRIA WOULD HAVE ANY IMPACT ON THE SYRIAN PRESENCE IN LEBANIN, ALTHOUGHT THE HAMA EVENTS MAY MAKE THE SYRIANS WNXIOUS TO AVOID SECURITY PROBLEMS IN LEBANON IM THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. I SAID THAT IT THEREFORE SEEMED NECESSARY TO LOOK AT THE LEBANESE SITUATION IN THE CONTEXT OF A CONTINUED SYRIAN PRESENCE AND EXPLORE POSSIBLITITES FOR A COMPROMISE THAT WOULD AVOID SYRIAN DOMINATION OF THE ELECTION PROCESS, SOMETHING THAT COULD CAUSE THE PROCESS ITSELF TO COLLAPSE. [

[IT WAS THEREFORE ESSENTIAL THAT THE TWO REACH AN UNDERSTANDING. THE FIRST STEP TOWARD ANY CO PROMISE MUST BE AN LF-SYRIAN DIALOGUE, BUT BOUTROS DETECTS NO SYRIAN INTEREST IN SERIOUS TALKS. HE OBSERVED THAT HE HAD SENT ARAB DETERRENT FORCES (ADF) COMMANDER SAMI KHATIB TO DAMASCUS SEVERAL DAYS AGO TO RAISE THE MATTER AGAIN WITH KHADDAM, BUT THERE HAD BEEN NO RESPONSE. BOUTROS SAID THAT DURING HIS MEETING IN DAMASCUS LAST MONTH, HAFIZ AL-ASSAD HAD TOLD HIM THAT HE IS NOT AGAINST A DIALOGUE BU BASHIR GEMAYEL MUST KNOW HE CANNOT BE A FRIEND OF BOTH SYRIA AND ISRAEL. I POINTED OUT THAT BASHIR LOOKS TO ISRAEL TO SAME HIM FROM SYRIA, AND BOUTROS NOTED HE HAD SAID AS MUCH TO AL-ASSAD. I TOLD BOUTROS I INTENDED TO RAISE THESE QUESTIONS INDAMASCUS.

8. CONCERNING THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATIN AS A WHOLE, BOUTROS DOUBTED THAT EITHER SYRIA OR THE OTHER ARABS REALLY.

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WANTED AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE. FURTHER, THE SOVIET UNION MAY NOT BE INTERESTED IN AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT BECAUSE THE CURRENT SITUATION CRATES OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE RUSSIONS. IN ANY EVENT, RUSSIA WILL NOT PERMIT SYRIA TO ENTER A PEACE PROCESS THAT DOES NOT INCUDE THE SOVIET UNION ON A LEVEL EQUAL TO THAT OF THE U.S. BOUTROS EXPRESSED THE VIEW IN THIS REGARD THAT HAD THE FAHD PLAN PROVIDED A PREOCESS THAT INCULDED THE SOVIET UNION AS WELL AS SUBSTANCE, THE SYRIANS WOULD HAVE FOUND IT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT TO OPPOSE. BOUTROS SAID THAT WHEN SOVIET EMISSARY SYTENKO WAS HERE LAST FALL, HE HAD ACKNOWLEDGED BOUTROS' POINT THAT THE ONLY DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE BRESHNEV AND FAHD PLANS WAS THAT THE LATTER DID NOT PROVIDE A MECHANISM FOR SOVIET INVOLVEMENT.

9. AT THE CNCLUSION OF OUR CONVERSATION, BOUTROS SAID THW SINCE WALID JUMBALTT HAD BEEN IN THE U.S. , HE FELT HE COULD NOW MAKE A VISIT HIMSELF AS WE HAD DISCUSSED DURING MY PREVIOUS TRIPS.HE IS TENTATIVELY THINKING OF SOMETIME DURING THE FIRST HALF OF APRIL, AFTER THE ARAB LEAGUE MINISTERIAL IN TUNIS.
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Date Printed: 09/27/1996

DOC NUMBER: 81JERUSA03606

CHANNEL: n/a

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EXCISE

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PAGE 01 JERUSA 03606 01 OF 03 071745Z
ACTION SS-25

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AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE

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EXCISE DECAPTIONED

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,4 12/07/2001 (HABIB, PHILIP C.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, IS, LE, XF
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER
SHAMIR, DEC. 7

1

2. SUMMARY: I HAD A ONE-HOUR SESSION WITH FOREIGN
MINISTER SHAMIR DECEMBER 7, DURING WHICH SHAMIR AND HIS
COLLEAGUES RESPONDED QUITE POSITIVELY TO THE RESULTS
OF MY CONVERSATIONS THUS FAR, INCLUDING THOSE WITH
PRINCE FAHD, AND THE DIRECTIONS WHICH WE SHOULD BE TAKING
IN THE COMING PERIOD. AT SEVERAL POINTS IN THE CON-
VERSATION, I MADE IT CLEAR IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF THE
ISRAELIS STOPPED TALKING ABOUT THE SYRIAN MISSILES.
THEY UNDERSTOOD THE POINT, THOUGH I DOUBT WHETHER THEY
BELIEVE THEY CAN AFFORD TO STAY SILENT ON THIS SUBJECT.

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AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE MEETING, THEY SKETCHED OUT AN
ISRAELI PRESS STATEMENT (SEPTTEL) WHICH WOULD HAVE
PUBLICLY AFFIRMED ISRAEL'S COMMITMENT TO THE CESSATION
OF HOSTILITIES AND THE CONTINUATION OF DIPLOMATIC
EFFORTS TO RESOLVE OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS. SUBSEQUENT
TO MY MEETING, THE ISRAELIS DECIDED NOT TO MAKE THE
STATEMENT. THEY MAY HAVE CONCLUDED THAT IT WEDDED
THEM TOO CLOSELY TO THE CONCEPT OF DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS
FOR THE INDEFINITE FUTURE. END SUMMARY.

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3. FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR HAD AN ENLARGED CIRCLE FOR OUR ONE HOUR MEETING ON DECEMBER 7, INCLUDING DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER YEHUDA BEN-MEIR, MFA DIRECTOR GENERAL KIMCHE, DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL BAR-ON, DIRECTOR OF THE POLITICAL RESEARCH CENTER PINCHAS, DIRECTOR OF NORTH AMERICAN AFFAIRS BENTSUR, AND CHEF DE CABINET AHARON. ACCOMPANYING ME WERE CHARGE BROWN, DAS DRAPER, AND POL COUNSELOR HARE.

4. AT THE OUTSET, I EXPRESSED MY DISMAY AT NEWS REPORTS OF MY DECEMBER 4 MEETINGS, ESPECIALLY THAT WITH DEFENSE MINISTER SHARON. I STATED FORCEFULLY THAT TOO MUCH WAS APPEARING IN THE ISRAELI PRESS AND THAT THIS ONLY EMBARRASSED THE SAUDIS AND JORDANIANS AND IMPAIRED MY CREDIBILITY AS A NEGOTIATOR. I CAME BACK TO THIS POINT SEVERAL TIMES DURING THE CONVERSATION. AS USUAL, THE ISRAELIS EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING BUT POINTED TO THE DIFFICULTIES OF CONTROLLING A FREE PRESS. WE NOTED THAT, ON THE BASIS OF EXPERIENCE, WHEN THEY WANTED TO KEEP SOMETHING OUT OF THE PRESS THEY WERE SUCCESSFUL.

5. I THEN GAVE A REPORT ON THE MEETING WITH PRINCE

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FAHD, EXPLAINING HIS IMPORTANCE IN THE SAUDI HIERARCHY. I TOLD SHAMIR THAT FAHD WAS FORTHCOMING AND THAT I HAD COME AWAY WITH THREE PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS:

--FAHD AND THE SAUDIS WERE DEDICATED AND COMMITTED TO THE PRESERVATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE AND UNDERSTOOD THE PROBLEMS WHICH THE VIOLATIONS, THE PLO BUILDUP AND THE MISSILES POSED FOR ITS CONTINUATION.

--FAHD HAD GIVEN ASSURANCES THAT SAUDI ARABIA WOULD CONTINUE TO PLAY A ROLE IN LEBANON AND HAD AGREED THAT THE LEBANESE SITUATION COULD BE THE SOURCE OF MAJOR ESCALATION IN THE REGION, WHICH WOULD BE IN NO ONE'S INTEREST.

--FAHD, WHILE EXPLAINING THAT HIS INFLUENCE WITH THE SYRIANS AT THIS MOMENT WAS NOT THE BEST AND IT WOULD BE BETTER TO WAIT FOR AT LEAST A COUPLE OF WEEKS, WOULD TALK TO THE SYRIANS ABOUT CEASE-FIRE ISSUES. HE WOULD ALSO USE HIS INFLUENCE ON THE PLO. (I STRESSED THE SENSITIVITY OF THIS MATTER).

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6. I EXPLAINED TO -SHAMIR THAT I HAD TOLD FAHD THAT A NUMBER OF LEBANESE, INCLUDING BASHIR GEMAYEL, WANTED THE SAUDIS TO REMAIN IN THE GAME. I ALSO POINTED OUT THAT SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL WAS ORIGINALLY ON THE QUADRI-PARTITE AGENDA. THERE WAS NO QUESTION, I SAID,

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FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
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AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE
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EXDIS

THAT THE SAUDIS--AS WELL AS THE JORDANIANS--WANTED TO SEE THE SYRIANS OUT AND BELIEVE THE LEBANESE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT HAS THE CAPABILITY TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES. I ALSO SAID THAT I HAD PULLED NO PUNCHES IN EXPLAINING THE DANGERS WHICH THE INTRODUCTION OF HEAVY WEAPONS INTO SOUTHERN LEBANON, ESPECIALLY THE 130MMS AND MULTIPLE-LAUNCHED KATYUSHAS, POSED FOR THE CEASE-FIRE AND HAS REPEATED TO FAHD WHAT I HAD ALREADY TOLD ASSAD--THAT THE PLO SHOULD NOT GET INVOLVED IN THE HILL 880 INCIDENT.

7. ON THE INTERNAL LEBANESE SITUATION, I EXPLAINED THE EVOLVING ATTITUDES OF THE MARONITES AND THE SUNNIS TOWARD EACH OTHER, POINTING OUT THAT BOTH GROUPS FEARED BOTH THE SYRIANS AND LEFTISTS. FAHD SAID THE SAUDIS WOULD USE THEIR INFLUENCE WITH THE

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SUNNIS TO PROMOTE COOPERATION WITH THE MARONITES.
IN THAT CONTEXT, WE AGREED, I SAID, THAT OUR ULTIMATE

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OBJECTIVE SHOULD BE AN INDEPENDENT LEBANON WITHOUT A SYRIAN PRESENCE.

8. I THEN TURNED TO THE MISSILES. I SAID FAHD HAD NOT CHANGED HIS POSITION, BELIEVING THAT THE MISSILES SERVED NO USEFUL PURPOSE. HE HAD AGREED WITH MY VIEW THAT THEIR CONTINUED PRESENCE WAS UNDULY PROVOCATIVE. I EXPLAINED I DID NOT WANT TO BE TOO SPECIFIC ON WHAT FAHD HAD EXPRESSED ON THIS SUBJECT,

9. ON BALANCE, I SAID WE HAD A GOOD TALK. THE SAUDIS WERE NOT GOING TO PULL BACK; THEY WERE PREPARED TO DEAL WITH SYRIA AND THE PLO; AND THEY WERE WILLING TO REMAIN ENGAGED IN LEBANON ON A RANGE OF ISSUES,

FAHD WAS ALSO COGNIZANT THAT ISRAELI PATIENCE WAS LIMITED AND STEPS WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN TO ENSURE THAT THE SITUATION DID NOT GET OUT OF HAND. IN VIEW OF THESE POSITIVE INDICATIONS AND THE OVERWHELMING BENEFIT OF THE CEASE-FIRE FOR EVERYONE INVOLVED, I URGED SHAMIR TO CONTINUE TO EXERCISE PATIENCE IN PRESERVING THE CEASE-FIRE.

10. SHAMIR ASKED IF THE SUBJECT OF REPLACING SYRIAN TROOPS WITH OTHER ARAB FORCES HAD BEEN BROUGHT UP.

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I EXPLAINED IT HAD NOT AND I HAD DELIBERATELY NOT MENTIONED THIS POSSIBILITY AT THIS TIME FOR TWO REASONS. FIRST, THE SAUDIS BELIEVE THE LEBANESE CAN DO THE JOB AND, SECONDLY, I KNEW OF THE ISRAELI CONCERN ABOUT INTRODUCING OTHER ARAB FORCES INTO LEBANON. I TOLD SHAMIR, HOWEVER, THAT ONE SHOULD NOT RULE OUT THIS POSSIBILITY ENTIRELY; UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES, IT MIGHT BE USEFUL.

11. KIMCHE SAID HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT OBJECT TO THE

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LEBANESE ARMY ASSUMING A GREATER ROLE AND THAT IF THE ARABS AT THEIR NEXT MEETING WITHDREW THE LEGAL BASIS FOR THE SYRIAN PRESENCE IN LEBANON (BY REFUSING TO EXTEND THE ADF MANDATE) AND STOPPED THE CASH FLOW TO THE SYRIANS, THIS WOULD PROVIDE A FRAMEWORK FOR GETTING THE SYRIANS OUT. WITHOUT AGREEING TO KIMCHE'S PRECISE SCENARIO, I DID SAY THAT ALL OF THE ELEMENTS WERE THERE FOR BUILDING UP AN ARAB CONSENSUS FOR SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL OR REDEPLOYMENT. I SAID I WOULD DISCUSS THIS FURTHER WITH SARKIS AAD BOUTROS. AT THIS POINT, I EXPLAINED LEBANON MUST HAVE ARAB ALLIES TO BALANCE AGAINST SYRIA; WE MUST ALSO WORK TO BOLSTER UP LEBANESE RESOLVE. KIMCHE, REFLECTING ISRAELI DISTRUST OF ARAB INVOLVEMENT IN LEBANON, SAID THAT AT LEAST SOME LEBANESE DID NOT ALWAYS BELIEVE THEY MUST RELY ON THE ARAB WORLD. THEY WANTED A PURELY "LEBANESE" SOLUTION.

12. SHAMIR ASKED WHEN FAHD WOULD START TALKING ABOUT THE MISSILES. I ANSWERED THAT FAHD WOULD BE DISCUSSING THIS WITH THE SYRIANS IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS AND WE

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FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE*WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0841
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
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EXDIS

HAD AGREED THAT HE WOULD GIVE ME A REPORT. I TOLD

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SHAMIR I HAD USED TO ADVANTAGE SHARON'S STATEMENT TO ME THAT ISRAEL WANTS TO MAINTAIN THE CEASE-FIRE AS LONG AS POSSIBLE BUT WILL ALSO WANT TO SEE RESULTS.

I STRESSED AGAIN THE VALUE OF THE CEASE-FIRE AND THAT I KNEW IT WOULD TAKE A MAJOR PROVOCATION TO HAVE IT COLLAPSE. AS AN EXAMPLE, I NOTED WHILE THE DEATHS OF THREE OF HADDAD'S MILITIAMEN IN A MINE ACCIDENT WERE REGRETTABLE AND A SERIOUS MATTER, IT WAS NOT A MAJOR PROVOCATION.

13. AT THE END OF OUR CONVERSATION, SHAMIR RAISED THE QUESTION OF HANDLING THE PRESS. I SAID THAT FOLLOWING MY USUAL PRACTICE, I WOULD SAY NOTHING. HE REPLIED THAT THEY WOULD NEED TO SAY SOMETHING AND WE AGREED TO A BRIEF ISRAELI STATEMENT WHICH WOULD BE ISSUED BY THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. AFTER MY DEPARTURE FROM THE MINISTRY, THE ISRAELIS DECIDED NOT TO ISSUE THE

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STATEMENT AND SIMPLY BACKGROUNDED THE PRESS (SEPTELS). I DO NOT PARTICULARLY APPRECIATE WHAT THEY DID AND INTEND TO PASS THE WORD. I BELIEVE ON RECONSIDERATION THEY CAME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE ORIGINAL PRESS STATEMENT HOOKED THEM TOO SOLIDLY TO THE CEASE-FIRE AND TO DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO DEAL WITH RELATED ISSUES (THE SAMS). I FEAR THAT WE WILL CONTINUE TO BE FACED WITH SELECTIVE LEAKS AND PRESS BACKGROUNDER, NO MATTER HOW UNWISE.

14. AS I WAS PREPARING TO LEAVE, SHAMIR ASKED WHEN I WOULD COME BACK. I SAID I WOULD COME WHENEVER THE PRESIDENT DECIDED BUT, IN ANY EVENT, I WANTED TO GIVE THE SAUDIS A FEW WEEKS TO SEE WHAT THEY COULD DO.
GROVE

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Date Printed: 09/27/1996

DOC NUMBER: 81TELAV18682

CHANNEL: n/a

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ACTION SS-25

EXCISE

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INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 /025 W
-----025763 051234Z /10

O 051205Z DEC 81 ZFF-4

FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1311

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE

USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IM/IPS/CR/IR

Date: 11/3/97

☐ RELEASE

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EO Citations

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FOIA Exemptions

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PA Exemptions

☐ CLASSIFY as ☐ S or ☐ C Sec.

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TS authority to

9302566

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EXCISE
DECAPTIONED

NEA FOR AMBASSADOR LEWIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,4 12/05/01 (BROWN, WILLIAM A.) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, PINS, PINT, IS, LE, SY, XF, EG

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER
SHAMIR

1. [REDACTED]

2. AMBASSADOR HABIB, ACCOMPANIED BY CHARGE BROWN, DAD DRAPER, AND POL/C HARE, MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR FOR AN HOUR AND FORTY-FIVE MINUTES DECEMBER 4. OTHER ISRAELI OFFICIALS IN ATTENDANCE WERE MFA DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL BAR-ON, DIRECTOR FOR NORTH AMERICAN AFFAIRS BENTSUR, AND MFA POLITICAL RESEARCH ANALYST VEDAN. AT THE BEGINNING OF THE MEETING, SHAMIR

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EXPLAINED HOW "VERY, VERY SORRY" THE PRIME MINISTER WAS ON NOT BEING ABLE TO SEE HABIB THIS TIME BUT HOPED IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE WHEN HABIB RETURNED TO JERUSALEM. IT WAS AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER -- CONSIDERING BEGIN'S PRESENT CONDITION -- TO TRY TO ARRANGE A MEETING ON MONDAY, DECEMBER 7.

3. HABIB THEN REPORTED AT LENGTH ON HIS DISCUSSIONS IN BEIRUT, DAMASCUS AND AMMAN, EXPLAINING THAT THE

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TWO-FOLD PURPOSE OF HIS MISSION WAS: TO DISCUSS WAYS THAT THE CEASE-FIRE COULD BE PRESERVED AND STRENGTHENED AND TO TAKE A GOOD LOOK AT THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS IN LEBANON, IN LIGHT OF THE SCHEDULED PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN 1982 AND THE WORK OF THE QUADRIPARTITE GROUP. AFTER CAREFULLY LISTENING TO HABIB'S PRESENTATION, SHAMIR RAISED FIVE POINTS.

4. PLO INFILTRATION THROUGH JORDAN: SHAMIR FIRST ASKED IF HABIB HAD RAISED THE ISSUE OF PLO INFILTRATION THROUGH JORDAN. HABIB RESPONDED EMPHATICALLY THAT HE HAD BOTH WITH THE KING AND CHIEF OF STAFF BIN SHAKER. HUSSEIN HAD ASSURED HIM THAT THE JORDANIANS WERE ON TOP OF THE SITUATION AND WERE WATCHING IT CAREFULLY. HUSSEIN HAD SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED THE DISCOVERY OF PLO ROCKETS NEAR EILAT. HABIB EMPHASIZED THAT THE KING HAD EXPRESSED FULL CONFIDENCE IN HIS FORCES' ABILITY TO CONTROL THE SITUATION; BIN SHAKER HAD SAID THE SAME THING. AT A LATER POINT IN THE CONVERSATION, SHAMIR AGAIN EXPRESSED CONCERN HOW THE PRESENT "CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES" COULD RAPIDLY UNRAVEL IF THE PLO ATTACKED THROUGH JORDAN. VEDAN SAID THAT ISRAEL HAS INFORMATION THAT SOME PLO

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UNITS ARE STILL AT LOOSE IN JORDAN, INFILTRATED FROM SYRIA. HABIB REITERATED HUSSEIN'S ASSURANCES ON THIS ABILITY TO CONTROL THE SITUATION AND SAID HE (HABIB) WOULD LIKE TO HAVE FROM THE ISRAELIS FURTHER DETAILS ABOUT PLO ACTIVITY IN JORDAN.

5. IMPROVED ARAB RELATIONS WITH EGYPT: SHAMIR ASKED IF THERE WERE ANY SIGNS OF IMPROVED ARAB RELATIONS WITH EGYPT. HABIB RESPONDED YES, THOUGH THEY WERE VERY MINOR THUS FAR. HUSSEIN WAS MOVING VERY CAUTIOUSLY; HABIB HAD NO DOUBT THAT THAT KING WOULD LIKE TO ESTABLISH RELATIONS WITH EGYPT AND WOULD BE EXPLORING THIS AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SINAI. HUSSEIN DOES NOT WANT TO COMPLICATE THE ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN RELATIONSHIP. AS FOR SYRIA, THEY STILL HAD THE SAME NASTY ATTITUDE TOWARD EGYPT. NOTHING HAD CHANGED.

6. CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES: DESPITE SOME BANTER ABOUT TERMINOLOGY, SHAMIR (UNLIKE SHARON) TENACIOUSLY REFERRED TO THE TERM "CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES" THROUGHOUT THE CONVERSATION. HIS CONCERNS ABOUT THE PRESENT SITUATION WERE TWO-FOLD. FIRST, SHAMIR SAID THE "TERRORIST" ATTACKS ON HADDAD'S FORCES WERE MAKING THE SITUATION INCREASINGLY PERILOUS. SHAMIR POINTED OUT THAT HADDAD'S AREA WAS COVERED BY THE

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CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AGREEMENT AND WHILE ISRAEL
HAD SOME INFLUENCE OVER HIM, IT WAS BECOMING MORE
DIFFICULT TO CONVINCE HADDAD TO REFRAIN FROM DOING
"SOMETHING VIOLENT" IN RESPONSE TO PLO HARRASSMENTS.
HABIB RESPONDED THAT HE HAD MADE THIS POINT IN HIS

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 /025 W
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O 051205Z DEC 81 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1312
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
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USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY

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EXDIS

NEA FOR AMBASSADOR LEWIS

DISCUSSIONS TO HIS ARAB INTERLOCUTORS; HOWEVER, HE
HAD TO POINT OUT THAT MOST THE INCIDENTS DURING THE
PAST FOUR MONTHS WERE NOT VERY SERIOUS, EXCEPT FOR
THE THREE MEN WHO HAD BEEN KILLED IN THE MINING
INCIDENT. HABIB SAID THE IMPORTANT POINT NOW WAS
TO GET HADDAD OFF HILL 880: HADDAD HAD MADE HIS POINT.
SHAMIR SAID THE SITUATION DID NOT APPEAR VERY SERIOUS;
HABIB REPLIED THAT UNIFIL COMMANDER CALLAGHAN WAS
EXCITED AND CONCERNED. HABIB AGREED THAT IT WAS
IMPERATIVE TO REMOVE POINTS OF CONFRONTATION.
HE WOULD CONTINUE TO STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF NOT
PROVOKING HADDAD, THOUGH ONE HAD TO RECOGNIZE THAT

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HADDAD COULD ALSO BE PUSHY. RESTRAINT WAS NEEDED ON ALL SIDES.

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7. SHAMIR REFERRED TO THE FLOW OF HEAVY WEAPONS INTO SOUTHERN LEBANON, EXPLAINING THIS WAS A CAUSE FOR PROFOUND WORRY. SHAMIR ASKED HOW CAN WE STOP THE FLOW, EMPHASIZING THAT RESULTS AND NOT PROMISES ARE WHAT COUNT. HE STATED THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE ASKING THEMSELVES HOW LONG THEY CAN TOLERATE THIS SITUATION. HABIB SAID HE HAD DISCUSSED THIS BEFORE WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND HAD PROMISED TO DO WHAT HE COULD. HE HAD DONE PRECISELY THAT AND IN VIEW OF THE PRESENT SITUATION ON THE GROUND, WOULD INTENSIFY HIS EFFORT. DRAPER STATED THAT HABIB HAD PUSHED ASSAD VERY HARD ON THIS POINT, EXPLAINING THAT THE DELIVERIES WERE UNNECESSARILY PROVOCATIVE -- ESPECIALLY THE 130MMS AND THE KATYUSHAS. DRAPER ALSO REFERRED TO THE TALKS WHICH CALLAGHAN HAD HAD WITH THE PLO TO TRY TO GET PLO WEAPONS MOVED ABOVE THE LITANI. DRAPER STRESSED THE SENSITIVITY OF THESE CONVERSATIONS, ADDING THAT AS FAR AS WE KNOW, THE PLO HAD NOT FORMALLY REJECTED THIS COURSE, DESPITE ARAFAT'S PUBLIC STATEMENTS TO THE CONTRARY. HABIB NOTED THAT HE WANTED TO TALK TO CALLAGHAN ABOUT HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PLO. HUSSEIN HAD ALSO PROMISED TO BE HELPFUL.

8. SYRIAN MISSILES: SHAMIR NOTED THERE HAD BEEN NO CHANGE IN THE MISSILE SITUATION SINCE THE BEGINNING OF HABIB'S MISSION, AND STATED THIS HAD NOT BEEN FORGOTTEN; THE PRIME MINISTER ASKS ABOUT THE MISSILES ALL THE TIME. HABIB EMPHASIZED FORCEFULLY THAT HE WANTED TO GET THE MISSILES OUT AND HAD MADE THIS POINT CLEARLY TO ASSAD, POINTING OUT THAT HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THEY WERE STILL THERE OR AT LEAST WHY THEY HAVE NOT

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STARTED TO REMOVE THEM. THEY WERE UNNECESSARILY PROVOCATIVE. ASSAD ANSWERED THAT BEGIN KEEPS THREATENING THE SYRIANS PUBLICLY AND HE COULD NOT RESPOND TO PRESSURE. [

] BAR-ON CLAIMED THAT

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THE MISSILES HAD BEEN IN PLACE SINCE APRIL; THE ISRAELIS HAD BEEN ENORMOUSLY PATIENT; AND THE ISRAELI CHIEF OF STAFF HAD EVEN SAID THAT THE MISSILES DID NOT REPRESENT THE MOST MORTAL OF DANGERS TO ISRAEL. HABIB SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THE ISRAELIS COULD STILL BE PATIENT. HE WOULD ASK THE PRIME MINISTER TO GIVE HIM MORE TIME. HABIB STRESSED THAT THE ISRAELIS SHOULD BE UNDER NO ILLUSIONS THAT THE CEASE-FIRE COULD HOLD, IF ACTION WAS TAKEN AGAINST THE MISSILES, ADDING THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO SEE ONE MORE DROP OF BLOOD SPILLED AT METULLA. HABIB SAID HE WOULD TALK FURTHER ABOUT THIS MATTER AFTER HIS TALKS WITH THE SAUDIS.

9. SITUATION IN LEBANON: SHAMIR SAID THAT THE ISRAELIS KNOW SOMETHING ABOUT WHAT IS HAPPENING IN LEBANON AND IN CONTRAST TO HABIB'S IMPRESSION, THEY BELIEVE THE MARONITES ARE PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE FUTURE. THE SYRIAN ARMY WAS STEADILY STRENGTHENING ITS POSITION AND THERE SEEMED NO PROSPECT FOR ITS REMOVAL. HABIB REPLIED THAT SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL MUST BE ON THE AGENDA OF THE QUADRIPARTITE GROUP. WHILE BASHIR GEMAYEL IS WORRIED ABOUT THE SYRIANS, HABIB SAID HE DOES NOT HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT HIS

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PAGE 01 TEL AV 18682 03 OF 03 051243Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 /025 W
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O 051205Z DEC 81 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1313
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
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BASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
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AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
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AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY

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BACK IS AGAINST THE WALL. HE HAS ROOM FOR MANEUVER AND INTENDS TO PLAY HIS HAND IN THE FORTHCOMING ELECTIONS. SHAMIR SAID THE MARONITES HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THE AMERICANS ARE NOT AGAINST THE SYRIAN PRESENCE. HABIB REPLIED HE HAS NO RIGHT TO BELIEVE THAT AFTER HIS CONVERSATION WITH HIM. MOREOVER, OUR RELATIONS WITH HIM ARE BETTER. BASHIR HAD ASKED HABIB TO URGE THE SAUDIS NOT TO ABANDON THEIR GOAL IN ORDER TO PUT ADDED PRESSURE FOR SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. HABIB SAID THE REAL ISSUE WAS HOW FAR THE SAUDIS WERE PREPARED TO GO. BAR-ON SAID THE SAUDIS HAVE FADED OUT OF THE PICTURE. HABIB RETORTED THIS WAS NOT TRUE. THE SAUDIS HAD PLAYED A CRITICAL ROLE IN THE JULY 24 CEASE-FIRE, WHATEVER THE ISRAELIS

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MIGHT BELIEVE, AND HE WOULD NOT HAVE GOTTEN A CEASE-FIRE WITHOUT THEM. THEY ALSO HAD PLAYED A USEFUL ROLE WITHIN LEBANON IN THE CONTEXT OF THE QUADRIPARTITE GROUP. HUSSEIN HAD TOLD HIM THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO PLAY A ROLE, EVEN AFTER FEZ. HABIB SAID HE WOULD TALK TO THE SAUDIS FURTHER AND THEN REPORT BACK.

10. IN CONCLUDING, HABIB EMPHASIZED AS HE HAD IN EARLIER PARTS OF THE CONVERSATION, THAT ON THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE PRESIDENT, HE WAS CHARGED WITH EXPLORING AND DEVELOPING ALL MEANS TO PRESERVE AND STRENGTHEN THE CEASE-FIRE. THE PRESIDENT DID NOT BELIEVE THIS WAS THE TIME TO UPSET THE SITUATION, IN VIEW OF THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS AND THE POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS ON DEVELOPING A MOU ON STRATEGIC COOPERATION AND PROGRESS IN FORMING THE MFO. HABIB STATED HE NEEDED MORE TIME. THE PRESENT SITUATION WAS BETTER THAN ANY ALTERNATIVE, AS LONG AS ISRAEL'S NATIONAL SECURITY WAS NOT THREATENED. WHILE THERE WERE RISKS, THEY WERE ACCEPTABLE UNDER THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, ESPECIALLY SINCE ASSAD KNEW THAT ISRAEL COULD "KICK THE CRAP" OUT OF SYRIA AT ANY TIME. SHAMIR CONCURRED, BUT SAID SYRIA MUST STOP THE FLOW OF HEAVY WEAPONS INTO SOUTHERN LEBANON, REMOVE THE MISSILES AND PREVENT ATTACKS ON HADDAD'S AREA.

11. THIS MESSAGE CLEARED WITH DAS DRAPER. BROWN

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Date Printed: 09/27/1996

DOC NUMBER: 81DAMASC07620

CHANNEL: n/a

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EXCISE

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PAGE 01 DAMASC 07620 031236Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO	OCT-00	ADS-00	INR-10	EUR-12	SS-10	OIC-02	CIAE-00
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FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4270

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

USINT BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY ADDA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
IM/IPS/GR/IR Date: 11/2/97
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☒ EXCISE ☒ DECLASSIFY EO Citations
☐ DENY IN PART
FOIA Exemptions: B1
PA Exemptions: 12/3/06

9302566

DAMASCUS 07620

E.O. 12065: GDS 12/3/87 (ABINGTON, EDWARD G.) OR-P

TAGS: PEPR, SY, US, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: REPORTS THAT SYRIA REJECTED U.S.
MEDIATORY ROLE BECAUSE OF U.S.-ISRAEL MOU

1

2. AMERICAN AND OTHER MEDIA HAVE REPORTED OVER PAST
TWO DAYS THAT SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER KHADDAM, DURING
MEETING DEC. 1 WITH AMBASSADOR HABIB, STATED THAT THE

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U.S. HAD FORFEITED THE RIGHT TO ACT AS A MEDIATOR IN THE
MIDDLE EAST BECAUSE OF THE CONCLUSION OF THE
STRATEGIC COOPERATION AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL. REPORTS
ALSO STATE THAT SYRIA HAS THEREFORE REJECTED ANY U.S.
MEDIATORY EFFORTS WHETHER RELATED TO THE ARAB-ISRAELI
CONFLICT OR LEBANON.

3. FOR THE RECORD, THESE PRESS REPORTS, WHICH WERE
BASED ON A RADIO MONTE CARLO NEWS BULLETIN WHICH WAS
BROADCAST PRIOR TO THE HABIB-KHADDAM MEETING, ARE NOT

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*RPT NOT CORRECT. KHADDAM RAISED SUBJECT OF U.S.-ISRAEL MOU IN PASSING. HABIB REFUSED TO ENGAGE KHADDAM ON THIS MATTER, STATING THAT SUCH ISSUES WERE OUTSIDE THE FRAMEWORK OF HIS MISSION. AT NO TIME DURING HIS MEETING WITH HABIB DID KHADDAM STATE THAT SYRIA REJECTED A U.S. MEDIATORY ROLE. FURTHER, ISSUE OF MOU AND U.S. ROLE DID NOT RPT NOT ARISE DURING THE DEC. 2 ASSAD-HABIB MEETING.

[REDACTED]
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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

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EXCISE

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B1PAGE 01 DAMASC 07592 01 OF 03 021943Z
ACTION SS-25INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----313060 022001Z /42

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FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 42

INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY

USLO RIYADH PRIORITY

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FOIA Exemptions
PA Exemptions

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E DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS 1,3,4 12/2/01 (HABIB, PHILIP C.)

TAGS: MOPS, PEPR, XF, LE, IS, SY, SA, US

SUBJ: HABIB MISSION: MEETINGS WITH SYRIANS, DECEMBER 1
AND 2

1. [REDACTED]

2. *BEGIN SUMMARY: MY LONG TALKS WITH ASSAD AND KHADDAM WERE MARKED BY GREATER-THAN-USUAL AFFABILITY ON ASSAD'S PART IN PARTICULAR AND A PERHAPS SIGNIFICANT WILLINGNESS TO CONTINUE A DIALOGUE ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE SYRIAN MISSILES IN LEBANON AT A FUTURE MOMENT. THE SYRIAN LEADERS APPEARED GENUINELY COMMITTED TO PRESERVING THE CEASE-FIRE IN THE SOUTHERN LEBANON THEATER, PAID AT LEAST LIP SERVICE WILLINGNESS TO ENCOURAGE THE QUADRIPARTITE ARAB FOLLOW-UP COMMITTEE ACTIVITIES IN LEBANON, BUT FIRMLY RESISTED MY PROBES AND SUGGESTIONS ABOUT ALLOWING THE

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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LEBANESE AUTHORITIES TO TAKE OVER GREATER SECURITY DUTIES FROM THE SYRIAN FORCES. I BELIEVE THEY CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD MY WARNINGS THAT TENSIONS COULD EASILY GET OUT OF HAND AND CAUSE A MILITARY CONFLAGRATION, WHICH WOULD BE OF NO VALUE TO SYRIAN INTERESTS, AND THEY RESPONDED--ON THE WHOLE--POSITIVELY TO THE THEME THAT 1982 SHOULD BE A YEAR IN WHICH THE SEARCH FOR BROADER AREA PEACE (NOT SIMPLY IN LEBANON) AND DIPLOMACY SHOULD PREVAIL OVER THE THREATS OF TENSION AND WAR. END SUMMARY.

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3. I MET FOR TWO HOURS WITH DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER KHADDAM ON THE EVENING OF DECEMBER 1, AND FOR MORE THAN TWO HOURS WITH PRESIDENT ASSAD IN THE AFTERNOON OF DECEMBER 2. I WAS ACCOMPANIED IN BOTH CASES BY AMBASSADOR PAGANELLI, DAS DRAPER, AND POLOFF ABINGTON. KHADDAM AND DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER QADDOUR, ALONG WITH AN INTERPRETER AND A NOTETAKER, WERE PRESENT WITH THE PRESIDENT. ASSAD WAS WARMER AND MORE AFFABLE THAN EVER, AND EVEN KHADDAM INDULGED IN RELATIVELY FEW SARCASMS ABOUT U.S. POLICY, BORING IN MOSTLY ON THE U.S.-ISRAELI STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP. IN NO CASE DID EITHER LEADER ARGUE TO ME THAT THE U.S. HAS FORFEITED THE RIGHT TO ACT AS MEDIATOR OR ARBITER IN ANY ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, AS INACCURATELY REPORTED BY MONTE CARLO RADIO AND OTHERS.

4. IN BOTH MEETINGS (AND LATER AT THE DECEMBER 2 DINNER GIVEN IN OUR HONOR BY QADDOUR) I PRESENTED AND THEN DEVELOPED THE FOLLOWING MAJOR POINTS:

-- PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD ASKED ME TO RETURN TO THE REGION BECAUSE OF CONCERN OVER RISING TENSIONS. I WAS SEEKING: (1) TO DETERMINE WHAT COULD BE DONE TO REINFORCE AND BROADEN THE CEASE-FIRE IN SOUTHERN LEBANON, AND (2) TO

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SEE WHAT COULD BE DONE TO ADVANCE PROGRESS TOWARDS LEBANESE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND TOWARDS STRENGTHENING OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT, WITH THE HELP OF THE QUADRIPARTITE ARAB FOLLOW-UP COMMITTEE (RECOGNIZING THAT THE TWO ISSUES ARE LINKED).

-- NEXT YEAR--1982--SHOULD IDEALLY BE DOMINATED BY POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY RATHER THAN MILITARY CONFRONTATION (IN WHICH I WAS ALLUDING NOT ONLY TO SOUTH LEBANON BUT ALSO TO AN IMPROVING INTERNAL SITUATION IN LEBANON AND A PEACEFUL PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION).

-- IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT ALL CONCERNED DO ALL THEY COULD TO REINFORCE THE CEASE-FIRE. SYRIA SHOULD USE ITS INFLUENCE WITH THE PALESTINIAN GROUPS TO FORESTALL CHALLENGES AND CONFRONTATIONS, INCLUDING AGAINST HADDAD AT THIS TENSE MOMENT WHEN HIS CONFLICT WITH UNIFIL OVER HILL 880 HAD NOT BEEN RESOLVED.

-- THE ISRAELIS WERE BECOMING INCREASINGLY CONCERNED OVER THE PALESTINIAN MILITARY BUILDUP IN SOUTHERN LEBANON. THIS COULD ADD TO TENSIONS AND POTENTIAL MISUNDERSTANDINGS. IT WOULD BE BEST IF THERE WERE NO ARMS FLOW INTO LEBANON FROM THE OUTSIDE BUT, IF THIS COULD NOT BE CONTROLLED, IT WAS STILL UNNECESSARILY AND DANGEROUSLY PROVOCATIVE TO

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MOVE MORE HEAVY ARMS, SUCH AS 130MM GUNS, INTO RANGE OF ISRAELI TERRITORY.

-- THERE IS THEREFORE A SERIOUS RISK OF MILITARY ESCALATION, EITHER FROM CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS OR CHALLENGES IN SOUTHERN

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 /025 W
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O 021912Z DEC 81
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4255
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY
USLO RIYADH PRIORITY

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EXDIS

LEBANON OR FROM OTHER DEVELOPMENTS, INCLUDING PROVOCATIONS. IT IS IN THE INTERESTS OF ALL, INCLUDING SYRIA, THAT THIS DANGEROUS SITUATION BE COOLED.

-- IT IS IMPORTANT TO ENCOURAGE SAUDI ARABIA AND OTHER PARTICIPANTS IN THE QUADRIPARTITE ARAB FOLLOW-UP COMMITTEE TO STAY ENGAGED IN TRYING TO IMPROVE THE INTERNAL SCENE IN LEBANON. WE PRESUME SYRIA WOULD AGREE.

-- MOVES TO DEFUSE THE ISSUE OF THE SYRIAN SAMS IN LEBANON SHOULD BE CONSIDERED SERIOUSLY (SEE BELOW).

5. WITH KHADDAM I HAD INDICATED I WAS DELIVERING A MESSAGE OF SYMPATHY FROM THE PRESIDENT TO ASSAD REGARDING THE TRAGIC TERRORIST EXPLOSION IN DAMASCUS; AND I DELIVERED THE ACTUAL MESSAGE TO ASSAD. HE EXPRESSED HIS THANKS. ASSAD (AND KHADDAM BEFORE HIM) MADE THE FOLLOWING BASIC POINTS IN RESPONSE TO MY PRESENTATION:

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-- SYRIA AGREES THAT THE CEASE-FIRE SHOULD BE CONTINUED AND STRENGTHENED. -THE PLO SUPPORTS THE CEASE-FIRE. SYRIA

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HAS SEEN NO CAUSE FOR ALARM BECAUSE OF PALESTINIAN ACTIVITIES (BUT KHADDAM SAID THAT SYRIA WOULD TALK TO THE PLO). IN THE MEETING WITH ASSAD, KHADDAM SAID THERE HAD BEEN NO PLO BUILDUP IN THE SOUTH, TO WHICH I STRONGLY DISAGREED, POINTING TO REINFORCEMENT OF HEAVY WEAPONS IN THE TYRE POCKET, AND BETWEEN THE ZAHRANI AND LITANI RIVERS. ASSAD DID NOT REFUTE MY REBUTTAL.

-- SYRIA SUPPORTS THE POLITICAL RECONCILIATION PROCESS IN LEBANON. IT SUPPORTS QUADRIPARTITE ARAB FOLLOW-UP COMMITTEE ACTIVITY. SUPPORT FOR THIS PEACEFUL PROCESS WILL CONTINUE UNLESS BASHIR GEMAYEL AND THE PHALANGE TRY TO EXPLOIT THE SITUATION. CLEARLY, THE SYRIAN LEADERS REGARD GEMAYEL AS THEIR PRINCIPAL CHALLENGER AND THREAT TO SYRIAN INTERESTS IN LEBANON.

-- SYRIA SUSPECTS THAT A POSSIBLE RISE IN TENSIONS HAS BEEN INDUCED BY ISRAELI INTEREST IN GETTING SOMETHING MORE (UNDEFINED) FROM THE U.S.

-- SYRIA DOES NOT INTEND TO MAKE ANY CHANGES IN TROOP DEPLOYMENTS IN LEBANON. IN THIS RESPECT, KHADDAM WAS ESPECIALLY SARCASTIC IN DISMISSING THE LEBANESE ARMY'S POTENTIAL ROLE IN TAKING OVER GREATER SECURITY DUTIES. HE INSISTED THE ARMY WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO ALL LEBANESE COMMUNITIES OTHER THAN THE MARONITES. (IN MY TALK WITH ASSAD I TOOK ISSUE WITH THIS ASSERTION, AND POINTED OUT THAT ALL COMMUNITIES WERE REPRESENTED IN THE ARMY AND THAT SYRIA SHOULD BE MORE FLEXIBLE IN ALLOWING THE LEBANESE TO TAKE OVER MORE RESPONSIBILITIES IN THEIR OWN COUNTRY). ASSAD WAS ONLY SLIGHTLY SOFTER THAN KHADDAM. HE ARGUED THAT STABILITY--AND THE ABILITY TO COLLECT TAXES FOR THE GOVERNMENT--EXISTED ONLY IN THE AREAS CONTROLLED

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BY THE SYRIANS; IF CHANGES WERE MADE STABILITY WOULD DISAPPEAR.

-- SYRIA GAVE CREDIT TO THE U.S. AND THE HABIB MISSION FOR HAVING DEFUSED SERIOUS TENSIONS WHEN ISRAELI "INSOLENCE" PEAKED WITH ITS AIR ATTACKS ON BEIRUT.

6. I DID NOT RAISE WITH KHADDAM THE ISSUE OF THE SYRIAN MISSILES IN LEBANON BUT I DID SO WITH ASSAD. WE HAD A LIVELY GIVE-AND-TAKE, DURING WHICH WE TALKED LIGHT-

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HEARTEDLY ABOUT ENCOURAGING THE EQUIVALENT OF START TALKS BETWEEN SYRIA AND ISRAEL AT SOME STAGE. I POINTED OUT THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO SERIOUS INTERRUPTION OF THE GENERAL CEASE-FIRE IN THE REGION SINCE JULY AND NOTED THAT THE MISSILES COULD HAVE BEEN SHIFTED SINCE THEY WERE UNNECESSARY, BUT I HAD NOTICED THEY WERE STILL THERE WHEN I DROVE ACROSS THE BEKAA VALLEY THE OTHER DAY. THEY WERE OF NO IMPORTANCE TO SYRIA AT THIS STAGE BUT THEY REMAINED A POTENTIAL SOURCE OF CONFLICT. EVEN IF SYRIA DID NOT WANT TO REMOVE ALL ITS MISSILES FROM LEBANON AT ONCE, TAKING OUT AT LEAST ONE BATTERY COULD BE A START TO SHOW THAT PROVOCATIONS WERE NOT INTENDED.

7. ASSAD TOOK THIS FAIRLY WELL, THE OCCASIONAL JOKE AND SARCASM ASIDE. HE ADMITTED THAT THE ADDITIONAL SYRIAN FORCES IN LEBANON--NOT ONLY IN THE FORM OF THE MISSILES BUT IN OTHER UNITS OF PAST YEARS--CONSTITUTED SIGNIFICANT BURDENS FOR SYRIA. HE WOULD PREFER TO HAVE FEWER SYRIAN FORCES THERE. THE SIZE AND NATURE OF THE SYRIAN FORCES HAS BEEN SET BY SUCH FACTORS AS THE NEED TO PROTECT THE

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EXDIS

GROUND FORCES FROM ISRAELI AIR ATTACK. HE THEN SAID THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT FOR SYRIA TO ENTER INTO DE FACTO NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ISRAEIS ABOUT ITS PRESENCE IN LEBANON--

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EVEN INDIRECTLY--BECAUSE SYRIA CANNOT AGREE TO GIVE ISRAEL ANY RIGHTS IN LEBANON; THAT WOULD BE LIKE GIVING ISRAEL RIGHTS TO INTERFERE IN SYRIAN AFFAIRS. SECOND, SYRIA CANNOT BE SEEN AS GIVING IN WHEN ISRAEL THREATENS TO ATTACK THE SAMS OR SYRIAN FORCES. BEGIN'S REPEATED DEMANDS FOR THE REMOVAL OF THE MISSILES MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE SYRIANS TO AGREE.

8. THERE ENSUED A FURTHER GIVE-AND-TAKE, DURING WHICH I SUGGESTED THAT SYRIA AGREE TO SOME MOVEMENT OF THE SAMS IN RETURN FOR ISRAELI SILENCE ON THE ISSUE FOR A GIVEN PERIOD. I ALSO NOTED THAT THE SAMS IN THE BEKAA HAD NOT BEEN FIRING AND URGED THAT THIS CONTINUE.

9. ASSAD FINALLY OFFERED A LOOPHOLE OF SORTS. [

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[THIS WAS IN THE CONTEXT OF WELCOMING ME BACK TO SYRIA IN THE NEW YEAR AND CERTAINLY FOLLOWING MY RETURN TO WASHINGTON AFTER THIS PRESENT TRIP.

10. COMMENT: ASSAD AND KHADDAM DID NOT GIVE TOO MUCH OTHER THAN THEIR DESIRE TO SEE THE CEASE-FIRE MAINTAINED AND SOME VAGUE PROMISES RE POLITICAL PROGRESS IN LEBANON. CONCERNING THE MISSILES, IN MY TALKS WITH THE ISRAELIS I WILL BE ABLE TO SAY THAT I HAD REGISTERED OUR CONCERNS OVER THE ISSUE, AND TAKE IT FROM THERE. PAGANELLI

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WHITE HOUSE PRIORITY

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FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3,4 6/24/91 (HABIB, PHILIP)
TAGS: MILI, MOPS, PEPR, IS, LE, SA, SY, XF
SUBJ: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER AL-WAZZAN

1. [REDACTED]
2. I CALLED ON PRIME MINISTER AL-WAZZAN ON JUNE 24, ACCOMPANIED BY DAS DRAPER AND DCM BARRETT. WAZZAN HAD HIS OFFICE DIRECTOR PRESENT.
3. I BRIEFED WAZZAN ON MY TALKS IN SYRIA, ISRAEL AND SAUDI ARABIA, LEAVING OUT THE SENSITIVE SUBJECTS

4. WAZZAN CONFIRMED WHAT PRESIDENT SARKIS HAD TOLD ME CONCERNING THE BREAKDOWN OF ARRANGEMENTS FOR A

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 04170 241153Z

SETTLEMENT IN THE ZAHLAH REGION. HE THOUGHT THE MATTER OF CLOSING THE PHALANGE POLITICAL OFFICES WAS A MINOR MATTER FOR HE COULD ORDER ALL POLITICAL OFFICES CLOSED IN HIS CAPACITY AS MINISTER OF INTERIOR. AS TO THE PHALANGE FIGHTERS GIVING UP THEIR HEAVY WEAPONS, HE PERSONALLY THOUGHT THIS WOULD BE AN APPROPRIATE SYMBOLIC GESTURE IN VIEW OF THE LEBANESE DESIRE FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. HE KNEW IT WAS PERHAPS A "MORAL PROBLEM" FOR ARMED MEN TO GIVE UP

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WEAPONS, BUT SAID IT WOULD REMOVE ANY PRETEXT FOR HALTING THE RECONCILIATION PROCESS. HE AGREED WITH ME THAT IT MIGHT MAKE A GREAT DIFFERENCE WHETHER THEY WERE ASKED TO TURN OVER THESE WEAPONS TO THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT FORCES OR THE ADF.

5. WAZZAN WENT ON TO SAY THAT SACRIFICES HAD TO BE MADE TO SOLVE THE LEBANESE PROBLEM AND THAT IT WAS NOW THE TURN OF THE CHRISTIANS TO MAKE THEM. THE MUSLIMS HAD MADE SACRIFICES IN THE PAST BY ACCEPTING SPECIAL PRIVILEGES FOR THE MARONITES, WHILE THE LATTER HAD ALWAYS SOUGHT OUTSIDE SUPPORT FROM FRANCE AND OTHER COUNTRIES. HE, WAZZAN, COULD NOT ASK FORMER PRIME MINISTERS SAEB SALAM OR RACHID KARAME TO MAKE SACRIFICES; THEY HAD NO ARMED FORCES OF THEIR OWN.

6. WE ALSO DISCUSSED THE QUESTION OF GUARANTEES FOR THE PHALANGE ON THE PART OF THE SYRIANS AND THEIR ALLIES. WAZZAN SAID THAT SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER KHADDAM HAD SAID SYRIA WAS READY TO GIVE ANY GUARANTEES REQUESTED BY PRESIDENT SARKIS BUT THAT THE ISLAMIC ASSEMBLY, WHICH HAD NO MILITIA, ALSO WANTED GUARANTEES. I REMINDED HIM THAT THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY WAS FEARFUL OF SYRIAN FORCES AND THOSE ELEMENTS ARMED BY [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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SYRIANS AND THAT ACCOUNTED FOR DESIRE FOR GUARANTEES. WE AGREED THAT THE QUESTION OF ACCEPTABLE AND MUTUALLY AGREED UPON GUARANTEES WAS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF ANY SETTLEMENT AND THAT THE SUBJECT SHOULD BE EARNESTLY PURSUED.

7. AT THE END OF THE CONVERSATION WAZZAN STRESSED THAT THE CURRENT QUADRIPARTITE MEETING IN JIDDA, AND THE PERIOD OF TIME LEADING UP TO THE JULY 4 MEETING AT BAYT AD-DIN, WERE LEBANON'S LAST CHANCE FOR PUTTING AN END TO ITS INTOLERABLE DOMESTIC SITUATION. HE AGAIN REFERRED TO THE NEED FOR SACRIFICES AND TO THE CONTRIBUTION WE, THE US, COULD MAKE BY CONVINCING CERTAIN PARTIES OF THIS. I REPLIED THAT AMBASSADOR DILLON WOULD CONTINUE JOHN DEAN'S POLICY OF MAINTAINING CONTACT WITH ALL POLITICAL FACTIONS AND URGING RESTRAINT AND RECONCILIATION AMONG THEM. HE HAD BEEN SPECIFICALLY SELECTED FOR THE JOB, WAS SENSITIVE TO THIS TYPE OF SITUATION, AND WE HOPED HE WOULD HAVE THE COOPERATION AND SUPPORT OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN HIS ENDEAVORS HERE. WAZZAN PROMISED HIS FULL COOPERATION. DILLON

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INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY

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AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY

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DECAPTIONED

E.O. 12065: RDS-2 7/22/81 (DILLON, ROBERT S.) OR-M

TAGS: MILI, PEPR, PINT, SA, SY, KU, LE, XF

SUBJECT: JULY 25 BAABDA MEETING: CONVERSATION WITH []

1. []
2. [] TOLD ME LAST NIGHT, JULY 21, THAT MEETING OF ARAB FOLLOW-UP COMMITTEE, SCHEDULED FOR JULY 25 AT BAABDA, WOULD GET UNDERWAY EARLY IN THE MORNING. HE EXHIBITED MILD OPTIMISM ABOUT THE MEETING, STATING THAT HE THOUGHT THE PROBLEM OF PHALANGE-ISRAELI RELATIONS HAD BEEN SOLVED AND THE SYRIANS WOULD ACCEPT THE BASHIR STATEMENT. THAT MEANT THE MEETING COULD FOCUS ON THE NEXT STEP IN THE PROCESS-- THE BEGINNINGS OF A POLITICAL CONSENSUS WITHIN LEBANON AND DISCUSSION OF THE EXTENSION OF GOL AUTHORITY TO THE SOUTH. HE COMMENTED THAT HE WAS FEELING EASIER ABOUT BASHIR GEMAYEL'S ATTITUDE TOWARD ISRAEL BECAUSE RECENT ISRAELI ACTIONS HAD DEMONSTRATED []

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 04903 230833Z

TO BASHIR THE UNRELIABILITY AS AN ALLY OF ISRAEL UNDER BEGIN'S LEADERSHIP. [] DESCRIBED BASHIR AS WONDERING IF BEGIN HAD LOST HIS MIND.

3. [] BELIEVED THAT THE EVENTS OF THE LAST FEW DAYS HAD INCREASED THE ABILITY OF THE SARKIS/WAZZAN GOVERNMENT TO ATTRACT THE COOPERATION OF LEBANON'S VARIOUS POLITICAL GROUPINGS. WHILE THE PHALANGE WAS FEELING CHASTENED ABOUT ITS ISRAELI TIES (ALTHOUGH SOME

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Date Printed: 09/20/1961

DOC NUMBER: 81BEIRUT04903

CHANNEL: n/a

PHALANGE MEMBERS WERE OPENLY PLEASED AT SEEING PALESTINIANS AND LEBANESE MUSLIMS UNDERGO BOMBING AND ROCKETING SIMILAR TO THE SHELLING THAT SOME MARONITE AREAS HAD UNDERGONE), THE SYRIANS WERE ALSO IN A WEAKER POSITION BECAUSE OF THEIR INABILITY TO COUNTER ISRAELI ACTIONS. THIS LESSON HAD NOT BEEN LOST ON THOSE GROUPS DEPENDENT ON SYRIAN SUPPORT AND, THEREFORE, THEY TOO WERE IN A MOOD TO COOPERATE WITH THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT.

4. ALL OF THIS IS HIGHLY SPECULATIVE, AS [] HIMSELF WOULD BE THE FIRST TO ADMIT, BUT IT DOES SUGGEST THAT MORALE AT BAABDA IS HIGHER THAN ONE MIGHT HAVE EXPECTED FOLLOWING THE EVENTS OF THE PAST FEW DAYS AND THAT SARKIS WOULD BE HEADING INTO THE JULY 25 MEETING IN A FAIRLY POSITIVE FRAME OF MIND.

5. SARKIS CONFIRMED THIS TO AMBASSADOR HABIB DURING THEIR CONVERSATION ON JULY 22. HE ASSERTED THAT CONTINUING STABILITY IN THE ZAHLAH AREA AND THE STEPS TAKEN ON THE ISSUE OF PHALANGE-ISRAELI RELATIONS ENHANCED THE CHANCES FOR PROGRESS OF THE JULY 25 MEETING. HE ADDED THAT THE BAYT AD-DIN PROCESS PARTICIPANTS WERE ALSO GETTING USED TO WORKING TOGETHER AND DEVELOPING MUTUAL TRUST AND A WILLINGNESS TO GIVE-AND-TAKE, WHICH MADE THEIR MEETINGS MORE LIKELY TO BE PRODUCTIVE.

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EXCISE

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WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

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RIYADH 828

EXCISE DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIB

EO 12065: RDS 1-3-4 5/16/01 (HABIB, PHILIP)
TAGS: MOPS, PEPR, XF, US, IS, SY, LE, SA
SUBJ: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH CROWN PRINCE FAHD

1. [REDACTED]
2. MY MEETING WITH CROWN PRINCE FAHD SATURDAY EVENING, MAY 16, WENT EXTREMELY WELL. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] HE RESPONDED BY ASKING ME TO DEFER MY PLANNED VISIT TO DAMASCUS (AND BEIRUT) FOR ONE MORE DAY AND STAY OVER THROUGH SUNDAY NIGHT. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD TOMORROW, SUNDAY, UNDERTAKE A MAJOR EFFORT WITH THE SYRIANSAADESIGNED TO ASSIST MY MISSION--AND THAT WE SHOULD CONSULT TOGETHER AGAIN ON SUNDAY EVENING.

3. I IMMEDIATELY ACCEPTED HIS IDEA. WHILE HE DID NOT SAY PRECISELY WHAT HE WOULD DO, [REDACTED]

4. FULL REPORT BY SEPTTEL.

5. FOR BEIRUT AND DAMASCUS: ONCE AGAIN, ACTUAL TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS WILL HAVE TO BE TENTATIVE. AMB SEELYE SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT I WILL COME TO DAMSCUS ON MONDAY, RATHER THAN SUNDAY, AND I AM

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STAYING IN RIYADH FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SAUDIS. IF AMB DEAN HAS ALREADY GOT IN TOUCH WITH AL-WAZZAN WITH REGARD TO MY LAST MESSAGE, HE SHOULD EXPLAIN THE NEW SITUATION AND SAY THAT I WILL TRY TO GET IN TOUCH--THROUGH AMB DEAN--LATER TO SEE IF NEW ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE WORKED OUT SATISFACTORILY, BUT I CANNOT GUARANTEE IT. IF IT TURNS OUT IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO INCLUDE BEIRUT IN MY TRAVEL ON EARLY REPEAT EARLY MONDAY MORNING BEFORE GOING TO DAMASCUS, I WOULD WANT A MAXIMUM TURNAROUND TIME OF NOT MORE THAN THREE HOURS IN BEIRUT--WHILE SEEING AL-WAZZAN AND SARKIS AGAIN--BEFORE GOING TO DAMASCUS LATER IN DAY.

6. FOR TEL AVIV: IN ACCORD WITH MY PROMISE, AMB LEWIS SHOULD INFORM BEGIN THAT I HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGED BY FAHD'S RESPONSIVENESS AND WILLINGNESS TO INTERCEDE AGAIN WITH THE SYRIANS. EXPLAIN THAT IT IS THEREFORE NECESSARY FOR ME TO REMAIN ONE MORE DAY IN RIYADH--TO CONSULT FURTHER WITH THE SAUDIS--BEFORE PROCEEDING TO DAMASCUS AND POSSIBLY BEIRUT. AS PROMISED, I WILL STILL TRY TO GET BACK TO ISRAEL ON MONDAY OR, AT THE LATEST, TUESDAY MORNING. GERLACH

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UNCLASSIFIED**EXCISE****P E23**
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ACTION SS-30INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 /031 W
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9376
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AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/CR/IR Date: 11/3/97
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SECTION 01 OF 05 JERUSALEM 01411

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E.O. 12065: RDS 1-3-4 5/12/01 (HABIB, PHILIP)
TAGS: MOPS, IS, LW, SY, XF, PINT
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH ISRAELI MILITARY
DELEGATION, MAY 12

1. [REDACTED]
2. I MET WITH ISRAELI MILITARY DELEGATION AT 1000 LOCAL
ON 12 MAY. THE ISRAELI SIDE, HEADED BY DEPUTY MOD
ZIPORI, INCLUDED LT. GEN. EITAN, IDF COS; MGEN. ADAM,
EITAN'S DEPUTY; MGEN SAGI, DMI; MFA DEPDIRGEN BAR-ON,
AND AMBASSADOR SASSON. ON OUR SIDE THE TEAM CONSISTED
OF MYSELF, AMB. LEWIS, DAS DRAPER, DCM BROWN, POLCOUNS
HILL AND AMEMB DATT HOAG.
3. I OPENED THE MEETING BY REITERATING FOR ZIPORI ET
AL MY MISSION OBJECTIVE OF RESOLVING THE CURRENT
SITUATION BY RETURNING TO THE STATUS QUO ANTE. FROM
THAT POINT OF VIEW IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT I UNDERSTAND
FULLY THE ISRAELI MILITARY ASSESSMENT OF WHAT THEY
ARE FACING COMPARED WITH WHAT THE STATUS QUO ANTE
AROUND ZAHLE HAD BEEN.

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4. GEN. SAGI BEGAN BY GIVING ME HIS VIEW OF THE
STATUS QUO ANTE. FOR THREE YEARS THERE HAS BEEN A
SYRIAN SA-6 BRIGADE ALONG THE SYRIAN-LEBANESE BORDER.
THIS BRIGADE HAS CONTAINED 5 BATTERIES, 4 OF WHICH
ARE USUALLY A FEW HUNDRED METERS INSIDE SYRIA ALONG
THE BORDER AND 1 ORGBH A DISTANCE OF
3 TO 5 KM. DEPENDING ON THE SEASON OF THE YEAR.
FOR THE PAST FEW MONTHS ONLY 1 OF THE 2 SA-6 POSITIONS

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WERE OCCUPIED, THE ONE CLOSER TO THE BORDER. THIS SITE IS ONLY 1 OR 2 KM. FROM THE SYRIAN BORDER. THE GROUND FORCES CONSISTED OF 1 ARMORED BRIGADE AND 1 INFANTRY BRIGADE ACCORDING TO SAGI.

5. DURING THE EARLY APRIL CLASHES IN ZAHLEH THE NORMAL 2 COMMANDO BATTALIONS IN THE AREA WERE INCREASED TO 7 BY DRAWING FORCES FROM HOMS, HAMA AND ALEPPO. FROM THE SOUTHERN BIQA 2 TANK BATTALIONS WERE MOVED UP TO THE ZAHLE AREA. SYRIA HAD HELD POSITION IN SHTAWRAH, HAMASNA, AND AL METN BUT NEVER IN ZAHLE OR ON THE SANNIN HEIGHTS. THE ROUTE THROUGH THE SANNIN TO ZAHLE WAS USED BY THE PHALANGISTS AS A RESUPPLY ROUTE THAT AVOIDED THE SYRIAN DOMINATED MAIN BEIRUT-DAMASCUS HIGHWAY. THIS BACK ROUTE WAS ALSO USED IN PROVIDING PHALANGE ARTILLERY SUPPORT AGAINST THE SYRIAN OFFENSIVE AROUND ZAHLE.

6. WHILE IT WAS NOT PRESENTED IN EXACTLY THE FOLLOWING FASHION, THE SUM TOTAL OF SAGI'S PRESENTATION ON THE SAM STATUS WAS AS FOLLOWS: (A) STATUS QUO ANTE: THERE WAS A SA-6 BRIGADE OF FIVE BATTERIES, UP TO FOUR OF WHICH WERE NORMALLY JUST INSIDE SYRIA, AND ONE TO TWO ON THE SEASON. (B) NEW SITUATION: THREE NEW SA-6 BATTERIES

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WERE PLACED DEEP INSIDE LEBANON IN THE ZAHLE AREA. BEYOND THIS, THERE APPEAR TO BE AS MANY AS TWO MORE SA-6 BATTERIES IN THE BORDER AREA, BUT TECHNICALLY ON THE LEBANESE SIDE (ISRAEL HAS NOT YET FINALLY CONFIRMED THE SECOND OF THESE TWO NEW SA-6 BATTERIES IN THE BORDER AREA). BEYOND THIS, THERE ARE TWO NEW SA-3 BATTERIES ON THE SYRIAN SIDE OF THE BORDER AREA, AND TWO NEW SA-2 BATTERIES ON THE SYRIAN SIDE OF THE BORDER AREA. AS THE ISRAELIS VIEW IT, THERE ARE NOW A TOTAL OF TEN SA-6 BATTERIES IN THE COMBINED ZAHLE AND BORDER AREAS, AND TWO BATTERIES OF SA-2'S AND TWO BATTERIES OF SA-3'S ON THE SYRIAN SIDE, MAKING FOURTEEN BATTERIES IN THE COMBINED BORDER AND ZAHLE AREAS. NOTE: AS WILL BE EVIDENT IN OTHER HABIB MISSION REPORTING, HABIB IS MAKING A DISTINCTION--IN THE POLITICAL APPROACH--BETWEEN THE SAM'S (THREE BATTERIES) IN THE ZAHLE REGION AND THE SAM'S IN THE BORDER AREA, WHETHER ON THE LEBANESE OR SYRIAN SIDE.

7. SAGI SAID THAT THE ZAHLE SA-6 SITES COVER SYRIAN FORCES ON THE SANNIN MOUNTAIN BUT THE SA-2'S AND SA-3'S ARE MOST HARMFUL TO ISRAELI FLIGHTS AS THE COVERAGE FROM THESE MISSILES REACHES TO THE SUBURBS OF BEIRUT. SAGI NOTED THAT SYRIAN-CHRISTIAN FIGHTING CEASED WHEN THE MISSILE CONFRONTATION BEGAN.

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8. ON THE GROUND SYRIA HAS BROUGHT THE 91ST ARMORED BRIGADE FROM THE 1ST ARMORED DIVISION TO THE BORDER AREA BUT NOT INTO LEBANON. ONE MECHANIZED BATTALION HAS BEEN MOVED INTO THE AREA SOUTHEAST OF ZAHLEH TO PROTECT THE THREE SA-6 MISSILE BATTERIES THERE.

9. IN ADDITION TO MOVEMENT IN LEBANON, SAGI OPINED THAT

OC/T NOTE: EXDIS CAPTION ADDED PER S/S-O MR. MANN

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PAGE 01 JERUSA 01411 02 OF 05 130034Z
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SECTION 02 OF 05 JERUSALEM 01411

EXDIS

IN THE LAST FEW DAYS THE SYRIANS HAVE BEGUN PREPARING THEMSELVES FOR GENERAL WAR. TROOPS ON LEAVE HAVE BEEN CALLED BACK TO THEIR UNITS; SOME RESERVES HAVE BEEN CALLED UP; TROOPS IN MILITARY COURSES HAVE BEEN SENT BACK TO THEIR UNITS; DOCTORS ARE BEING RECRUITED; FUEL SUPPLIES, AMMUNITION, MEDICAL SUPPLIES, MISSILES AND OTHER MILITARY EQUIPMENT ARE BEING CHECKED; AND THE SYRIAN AIR FORCE IS ON ALERT HAVING FINISHED ITS PREPARATIONS FOR GENERAL WAR. MIG-23'S HAVE BEEN MOVED FORWARD TO MEZZE AIRFIELD AND SYRIA INTENDS TO MOVE SYRIAN MIG-17'S FROM THE SYRIA-IRAQ BORDER TO MEZZE AND SU-22'S TO DAMASCUS INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT. THESE AIRCRAFT MOVEMENTS MEAN A SHORTENING OF THE RANGE TO TARGETS IN ISRAEL, ACCORDING TO SAGI.

10. ON THE GOLAN YESTERDAY SAGI SAID THAT SYRIAN TROOPS WERE ON ALERT FEVERISHLY DIGGING TRENCHES AND BUILDING POSITIONS. SAGI ANTICIPATES FULL EMERGENCY DEPLOYMENT ON THE GOLAN VERY SOON WHICH, HE NOTED WRYLY "WILL NOT COOL OFF THE SITUATION."

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11. IN THE LIGHT OF THIS SYRIAN BUILD-UP I ASKED SAGI

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FOR HIS ASSESSMENT OF SYRIAN INTENT IF ISRAEL HITS THE SYRIAN MISSILES. SAGI ANSWERED THAT BECAUSE OF THE DYNAMIC NATURE OF THE SITUATION THE QUESTION WAS DIFFICULT TO ANSWER. AT FIRST ISRAEL THOUGHT THE MISSILES WERE FOR DEFENSIVE PURPOSES AROUND ZAHLEH AND AS A SHOW OF FORCE TO DEMONSTRATE THAT SYRIA IS THE ONLY ARAB COUNTRY FIGHTING ISRAEL. SAGI SEES SYRIAN CONFIDENCE GROWING EACH DAY AND THAT SYRIANS ARE NOW PREPARED FOR AN ISRAELI ATTACK ON THE MISSILES. AS TIME PASSES MORE "SHOWS OF GOOD WILL FROM SYRIA'S ARAB BROTHERS" ARE MADE, INCLUDING SAUDI ARABIA, ALGERIA, LIBYA AND EVEN JORDAN. [REDACTED]

12. TO A SERIES OF MY QUESTIONS SAGI RELATED THAT SYRIA HAS NEVER FIRED MISSILES AT ISRAELI RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT. HE NOTED THAT TODAY (12 MAY) AT 0500 LOCAL THE SYRIANS HAD FIRED TWO SA-6 MISSILES FROM THE SYRIAN SIDE OF THE BORDER BUT THERE HAD BEEN NO ISRAELI AIRCRAFT IN THE AREA. SAGI SAID THAT OF THE SA-6 BATTERIES NEAR ZAHLEH ONE OF THE THREE HAS ITS RADAR OPERATING ALL OF THE TIME. HE DOUBTS THAT MORE SAM'S WILL BE DEPLOYED FOR THE TIME BEING AS THERE ARE NOW MORE THAN TWO FULL BRIGADES IN THE AREA. HE EXPECTS MORE RADARS AND MORE ZSU-23'S AND 57MM AAA TO MOVE INTO LEBANON. PERHAPS LATER MORE SA-2'S AND SA-3'S WOULD BE MOVED IN. [REDACTED]

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13. I ASKED ABOUT LOCATION AND CAPABILITY OF SA-9 MISSILES IN LEBANON AND HOW THESE MISSILES AFFECT ISRAELI ATTACKS ON THE PLO. SAGI SAID THAT THE SA-9'S HAD BEEN MOVED IN ON 10 APRIL AND HAD FIRST BEEN LOCATED NEAR DAMUR ON 16 APRIL. THE SA-9'S ARE MOUNTED ON VEHICLES WITH A 15-16000 FT ALTITUDE CAPABILITY WHILE THE HAND HELD SA-7'S ARE GOOD ONLY TO 7000 OR 8000 FEET. THE SA-9'S WERE BROUGHT BY THE LIBYANS TO THE JABRIL GROUP AND ARE MANNED BY LIBYAN CREWS. SAGI RELATED

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INDICATIONS THAT 4 RECENT IL-76 FLIGHTS FROM BENGHAZI TO DAMASCUS HAD BROUGHT MORE SA-9'S DESTINED FOR THE PLO. GEN EITAN ADDED THAT THE SA-9'S AFFECT THESE OPERATIONS SEVERELY AS BOTH THE "TERRORIST" TARGETS AND THE SA-9 MISSILES WERE MOBILE.

14. TO MY QUESTIONS ABOUT ISRAELI AIRCRAFT ACTIVITY IN LEBANON, SAGI SAID THAT THERE WAS NO LOW LEVEL FLIGHT ACTIVITY IN THE BIQA. THE RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS TO THE NORTHERN PART OF LEBANON WERE HIGH ALTITUDE AND WERE CONDUCTED FROM 2 TO 5 TIMES A WEEK DEPENDING ON SYRIAN ACTIVITY. USUALLY THE SAME ROUTES ARE FLOWN ONE OF WHICH IS OVER THE BIQA ACROSS ZAHLEH. BOTH VERTICAL AND SIDE LOOKING PHOTOS ARE TAKEN.

15. AT THE CONCLUSION OF GEN SAGI'S BRIEFING, I THANKED HIM FOR HIS EXCELLENT BRIEFING AND TOLD HIM THAT THE BRIEFING "REALLY HELPED ME PUT MY FINGER ON THE PROBLEMS." GEN EITAN, TRUE TO HIS NATURE, RIPOSTED THAT YOU "NEED A FIST NOT A FINGER" WHEN YOU DEAL WITH THE SYRIANS.

OC/T NOTE: EXDIS CAPTION ADDED PER S/S-O: MR. MANN

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ADP446

PAGE 01 JERUSA 01411 03 OF 05 130040Z
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 /031 W
-----307136 130042Z /60

O 122125Z MAY 81
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9378
INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

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EXDIS

16. EITAN THEN LAUNCHED INTO HIS VIEW OF CURRENT CRISIS SAYING THAT ASSAD IS AFTER SOMETHING MORE THAN MISSILES. HE NOTED THE SYRIAN BUILD-UP AND SAID THE PREPARATIONS COULD BE INTERPRETED AS PART OF AN

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ORDINARY EMERGENCY OR AS PART OF AN EFFORT SIMILAR TO THAT PRIOR TO THE 73 WAR. ACCORDING TO EITAN, MOVEMENTS FORWARD OF MIG-23'S AND SU-22'S COULD BE INTERPRETED AS OFFENSIVE. RELOCATION OF FRRG MISSILES NEAR DAMASCUS COULD BE OFFENSIVE OR DEFENSIVE. PREPARATION AND MOVEMENT OF HEAD-QUARTERS ARTILLERY IS AN OFFENSIVE MOVE. MANNING OF NEW POSITIONS ON THE GOLAN COULD BE OFFENSIVE OR DEFENSIVE. MOVEMENT OF AN ARMORED DIVISION ON THE GOLAN TO NEW POSITIONS AS RECENTLY OBSERVED COULD BE OFFENSIVE OR DEFENSIVE. MANNING OF POSITIONS IN MILITARY HOSPITALS, DISTRIBUTION OF SUPPLIES, HEAVY ARTILLERY AND AMMUNITION COULD BE INTERPRETED OFFENSIVELY OR DEFENSIVELY. THESE SYRIAN MOVES AND SYRIAN PRONOUNCEMENTS EITHER INTENTIONALLY OR UNINTENTIONALLY HAVE INCREASED SYRIAN SELF CONFIDENCE--POSSIBLY WITH SOVIET BACKING.

[REDACTED]

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17. EITAN CONTINUED THAT THERE HAS BEEN VERY ACTIVE LIBYAN BACKING OF THE PLO THROUGH AIRLIFT OF WEAPONRY CHanneled THROUGH SYRIA. SOME OF THE ARMS SHIPPED SUCH AS SA-9'S ARE RARELY FOUND EVEN IN THE EAST BLOCK COUNTRIES. LIBYANS RATHER THAN PLO CONTINUE TO MAN SUCH EQUIPMENT.

18. AT THIS POINT WE GOT INTO A VERY ANIMATED DISCUSSION INVOLVING THE SOVIET POSITION ON LEBANON. EITAN SAID THAT THE SYRIANS HAVE DECLARED THE BIQA PART OF THE DEFENSIVE LINE OF SYRIA AND THAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE RECOGNIZED THIS CLAIM. ONLY AFTER THIS RECOGNITION HAD THE SYRIANS DEPLOYED MISSILES IN THE BIQA. SAM LEWIS AND BILL BROWN STRONGLY REFUTED THIS STATEMENT NOTING THAT THE STATEMENT, ATTRIBUTED BY LE MONDE TO SOLDATOV, WHO HAD NOT BEEN IN THE AREA AT THE TIME, HAD LATER BEEN OFFICIALLY REFUTED AND RIDICULED BY THE SOVIETS. EMBASSY TEL AVIV IS IN THE PROCESS OF DOCUMENTING THIS FOR THE ISRAELIS.

19. I ASKED EITAN WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN ANY ABOVE NORMAL RECENT RESUPPLY OF THE SYRIANS. EITAN ANSWERED THAT THERE HAD BEEN INCREASING DELIVERY OF T-72'S BUT THAT WAS PART OF A STANDING AGREEMENT WITH THE RUSSIANS. HE THEN OFFERED A FARMING ANSWER TO MY QUESTION. HE SAID THAT IF YOU WANT TO RAISE A GOOSE WITH A LARGE LIVER YOU MUST FORCE FEED THE GOOSE. SYRIA IS LIKE A GOOSE THAT YOU CANNOT GET ANY MORE FEED INTO.

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20. EITAN NEXT OUTLINED WHAT HE SEES AS THE 3 MAIN SYRIAN INTENTIONS IN LEBANON. FIRST, THEY ARE TRYING BY ALL MEANS TO DOMINATE LEBANON WHILE CHRISTIANS WHO ARE STILL INDEPENDENT TO AN EXTENT ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO INTERFERE. SECOND, THE SYRIANS ARE TRYING TO DO WHAT THEY SAID IN 1976-- MAKE THE ISRAEL-LEBANON BORDER PART OF THE CONFRONTATION LINE. THIRD, ENABLE THE PLO TO ACT AGAINST ISRAEL OR OTHER TARGETS IN THE AREA.

21. EITAN OBSERVED THAT WHENEVER THERE WERE ATTEMPTS TO FIRE KATYUSHA ROCKETS ACROSS THE JORDANIAN BORDER INTO ISRAEL EITHER IN THE SOUTH NEAR EILAT OR IN THE NORTH ACROSS THE JORDAN RIVER THESE ATTEMPTS WERE ALWAYS SYRIAN SPONSORED. ALSO, WHEN HEAVY FIRING TOOK PLACE IN ZAHLEH OR BEIRUT THERE WAS ALSO FIRING ON ISRAEL'S NORTH FRONTIER. NOW THERE IS NO FIRING ON OUR NORTH FRONTIER BUT THERE IS IN BEIRUT. BEFORE KHADDAM WENT TO LEBANON THERE WAS FIRING ON ZAHLEH. THIS IS PART OF SYRIAN TACTICS, PART OF THEIR WAY OF CONDUCTING DIPLOMACY. TO MY QUESTION EITAN INDICATED THAT THE KATYUSHAS IN BEIRUT HAD COME FROM THE SOUTH, NOT FROM THE SANNIN RIDGE.

22. IN RESPONSE TO MY QUESTION, EITAN ANSWERED THAT SOVIET RELATIONS WITH THE SYRIANS WENT DEEPER THAN JUST SUPPLIES. THE SYRIANS HAD REQUESTED THAT SOVIET SHIPS VISIT SYRIAN PORTS DURING THE CRISIS AND THE SOVIETS HAD AGREED.

23. I ASKED WHETHER THE SAM'S THAT WERE NOW ON THE OC/T NOTE: EXDIS CAPTION ADDED PER S/S-O: MR. MANN

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PAGE 01 JERUSA 01411 04 OF 05 130044Z
ACTION SS-30

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O 122125Z MAY 81
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9379
INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

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EXDIS

BORDER HAD BEEN DIRECTED IN DEFENSE OF DAMASCUS OR FOR OTHER PURPOSES. GENERAL SAGI ANSWERED SAYING THAT THE SA-2'S AND 3'S HAD COME FROM DAMASCUS DEFENSE AND THAT THE SA-6'S THAT HAD LONG BEEN ON THE BORDER WERE 70 KM FROM

DAMASCUS AND WOULD CONTRIBUTE LITTLE TO THE DEFENSE OF DAMASCUS. ACCORDING TO SAGI TO SAY THAT THESE SA-6'S CONTROLLED THE WESTERN APPROACH TO DAMASCUS WAS AKIN TO WHAT THE SYRIANS ARE SAYING ABOUT THE ESSENTIAL NATURE OF THE BIQA FOR DAMASCUS DEFENSE. ISRAEL DOESN'T AGREE WITH THIS SAGI SAID.

24. ZIPORI THEN MADE HIS PRESENTATION BEGINNING WITH WHAT HE SEES AS TWO BASIC PROBLEMS SYRIA IS FACING. THE FIRST OF THESE IS AN INTERNAL PROBLEM WHEREIN AN UNPOPULAR MINORITY ALAWITE REGIME IS IN POWER. THE PROBLEM IS SUCH THAT POLICE HAVE NOT BEEN SUFFICIENT TO MAINTAIN ORDER AND THE ARMED FORCES HAVE HAD TO BE CALLED IN ON MANY OCCASIONS. THE SECOND PROBLEM HAS TO DO WITH RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB WORLD. ASSAD WANTS TO BE NUMBER 1 IN THE ARAB WORLD BUT HAS FAILED. WITH

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TENSIONS RISING THE NECESSITY FOR ARABS TO RALLY TOGETHER MAY SERVE THE PURPOSES OF ASSAD. I TOLD ZIPORI THAT I AGREED THAT THIS COULD BE A SHORT TERM CONSEQUENCE OF THE CURRENT CRISIS.

25. ZIPORI COMMENTED THAT TENSIONS OR HOSTILITIES SERVE THE RUSSIANS. IF THERE IS A SETTLEMENT, THE RUSSIANS CAN CLAIM CREDIT FOR RESTRAINING SYRIA AND IF THERE ARE HOSTILITIES THEN BIG BROTHER CAME TO HELP. I NOTED THAT WE WOULD ADD A THIRD ITEM--THAT THE CRISIS SERVES TO DIVERT WORLD ATTENTION.

26. ZIPORI THEN VERY CANDIDLY STATED "TO BE HONEST SOME OF OUR MOVES MAY HAVE AFFECTED SOME SYRIAN COUNTER MOVES." BUT AFTER 73 ISRAEL MUST BE CAUTIOUS. THE SYRIANS KNOW WE HAVE REINFORCED OUR FORCES. THEIR MOVES MAY BE RELATED TO OURS. "THE PRIME

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MINISTER HAS SAID AND I SAY WE NEED FREE SKIES IN LEBANON AND WE WILL NOT LET THEM GO. WE ARE AT WAR WITH THE TERRORISTS AND CANNOT TAKE CHANCES. WE MUST KNOW WHAT IS GOING ON. IF WE WANT TO KEEP THE NORTHERN AREA OF ISRAEL SECURE, WE MUST KNOW WHAT IS GOING ON", ZIPORI STATED. HE CONTINUED SAYING THAT ISRAEL WAS NOT GOING TO ATTACK SYRIA AND WAS NOT A THREAT TO SYRIA. HE OBSERVED THAT SYRIA HAD A STANDING REGULAR ARMY WITH THE BEST SOVIET WEAPONS WHILE ISRAEL HAS A RESERVE ARMY.

27. ZIPORI COMMENTED THAT EVERY DAY THE STATUS QUO CHANGES. I REPLIED THAT AS FAR AS I WAS CONCERNED THE STATUS QUO WAS SOME TIME AGO AND THAT I HAD TOLD THE SYRIANS THAT THE STATUS QUO ANTE WAS 1 APRIL 81 OR 1 DEC 80 DEPENDING ON THE ISSUE.

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ZIPORI SAID "THEY MUST KNOW WE ARE WORKING ON VERY SHORT TERMS." TO THIS I RESPONDED THAT IN MY CONVERSATIONS WITH ASSAD THAT I HAD NOT CLEARLY STATED AND WOULD NOT STATE ANY DAY OR HOUR BUT HAD CLEARLY INDICATED A SHORT TERM TIME FRAME TO HIM. ZIPORI ADDED THAT ISRAEL CAN DEAL THE BLOW ANY DAY ANY TIME BUT THAT HE WISHED THE WHOLE SITUATION WERE DEFUSED AND "THE SOONER THE BETTER."

28. AT THIS POINT A NOTE WAS PASSED IN TO EITAN AND HE STATED THAT HE HAD FURTHER CONFIRMATION OF MOBILIZATION OF RESERVES IN SYRIA BUT HE DIDN'T KNOW HOW WIDESPREAD IT WAS.

29. EITAN NOTED THAT ISRAEL HAD TAKEN PREPARATORY STEPS IN THE NORTH AND WANTED SYRIA TO KNOW. SYRIA INITIALLY DID NOT TAKE ANY STEPS ON THE GOLAN. AT PRESENT EITAN SEES SYRIAN MOVES AS PLANNED WITH DATES AND TIMES IN MIND. EITAN BELIEVES SOVIET BACKING HAS TAKEN ON A NEW DIMENSION SINCE SOVIET NAVAL UNIT HAS MOVED SOUTH OF CYPRUS. THE MOSKVA IS ACCOMPANYING VESSELS WHICH IS SOMETHING NEW, PERHAPS SOMETHING ISRAEL WILL HAVE TO GET USED TO. IN RESPONSE I ASKED WHAT IT WAS THAT SYRIA HAD DATES AND TIMES FOR. TO THIS EITAN ANSWERED THAT IN LEBANON IT COULD BE A STRIKE AGAINST THE CHRISTIANS AS THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE MISSILES COULD BE INTERPRETED AS A SYRIAN EFFORT TO DETER ISRAEL FROM HELPING THE CHRISTIANS. THERE IS NO NEED OF A SPECIFIC SYRIAN DEPLOYMENT AGAINST THE CHRISTIANS AS THE SYRIANS HAVE BROUGHT FORWARD THEIR MIG-23'S AND SU-22'S AND THE 91ST BRIGADE IS ALREADY IN THE BORDER AREA.

30. SAGI THEN GAVE HIS ASSESSMENT OF THE POLITICAL

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OC/T NOTE: EXDIS CAPTION ADDED PER S/S-O: MR. MANN

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PAGE 01 JERUSA 01411 05 OF 05 130048Z
ACTION SS-30INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 /031 W
-----307273 130057Z /60O 122125Z MAY 81
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9380
INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

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EXDIS

SITUATION WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS A DETERIORATING CRISIS THAT WAS SNOWBALLING. SAGI SAID HE WOULD NOT ACCUSE ASSAD OF INGENIOUSLY PLANNING ALL THAT HAS HAPPENED BUT ASSAD KNOWS THE POTENTIAL GAINS AND RISKS OF WHAT HE IS DOING. IN ZAHLE AND SANNIN WHEN HE STARTED, ASSAD CONTINUED ON IN THE FACE OF WORLD CRITICISM TO REACH A PAX SYRIANA IN LEBANON. NOW HE IS MOVING TO FULL SCALE PREPARATIONS FOR GENERAL WAR IN LEBANON. REDSLIGHT ASSAD WILL NOT MOVE UNITS FROM ZAHLE. WAR IN LEBANON IS SERVING ASSAD'S OWN INTERESTS. THIS IS NOT A NEW IDEA AND GOES BACK TO 1979. ASSAD SEES THAT

MAYBE THIS IS A SOLUTION TO HIS MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD PROBLEM IN SYRIA AS HE RAISES AN EXTERNAL ENEMY TO GAIN INTERNAL BACKING. AT THE END OF 1979 AND START OF 1980 ASSAD WAS FORCED TO SEND HIS OWN ARMOR AGAINST HIS OWN PEOPLE. HE CAME BACK TO THE EXTERNAL ENEMY IDEA SIX MONTHS AGO AS THOUGHTS OF SYRIAN DECISION-MAKERS TURNED TO WAYS TO REDUCE SYRIAN ISOLATION. ASSAD THOUGHT THAT IF HE WENT BACK TO THE ARABS WITH THE "DIRTY BOOTS" OF DEFENDING ARABS AGAINST ISRAEL--THE ONLY ARAB COUNTRY DOING ITS JOB--THEN THE ARABS WOULD BE FORCED TO SUPPORT SYRIA. ALSO THIS IS THE LAST YEAR

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ASSAD CAN BRING SADAT BACK TO THE ARAB LINE AND DESTROY

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THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS. THE SITUATION CAN BE EXPLAINED, ACCORDING TO SAGI, -IN THAT ASSAD IS NOT AFTER FULL SCALE WAR BUT WILL RISK IT FOR LIMITED WAR IN LEBANON. SAGI BELIEVES THAT NO POLITICAL SOLUTION IS POSSIBLE AS ASSAD WILL NOT CHANGE HIS MIND ABOUT HIS OBJECTIVES.

31. AT THIS POINT I SAID THAT ASSAD MUST HAVE SECOND THOUGHTS ON A LIMITED WAR BECAUSE OF UNCERTAINTIES AS TO HOW LIMITED ISRAELIS WOULD MAKE IT. ALSO THERE WAS POTENTIAL BACKLASH FROM OTHER ARABS OVER POSSIBLE INVOLVEMENT IN A WAR WITH ISRAEL. I TOLD THE ISRAELIS THAT I WAS GLAD THAT ZIPORI DID NOT WANT THE SITUATION TO GO THAT FAR.

32. SAGI NOTED THAT THE SYRIANS HAD ALREADY MADE THE OIL THREAT. HE CONTINUED, SAYING THAT THINKING AS THE SYRIANS THINK THERE ARE MANY SOVIET INTERESTS THAT WOULD BE COMPLEMENTED BY WAR IN LEBANON. I ANSWERED THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION THAT THE SOVIETS RECOGNIZE THAT IF THE SITUATION GETS OUT OF HAND IT WILL AFFECT U.S. RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS GLOBALLY. THE SECRETARY WANTS TO KEEP THE SOVIETS OUT OF THE MIDDLE EAST. THE SOVIETS ARE A DISRUPTIVE ELEMENT AND WE DON'T WANT THEM BACK AS THEY COMPLICATE THE SITUATION IN MANY WAYS.

33. NEARING THE END OF THE MEETING AMBASSADOR LEWIS ASKED SAGI HOW THE IRAQIS FIT INTO THIS SITUATION. SAGI RESPONDED THAT IT WAS A PUZZLE BUT THAT ULTIMATELY A SYRIAN-ISRAELI WAR COULD BRING AN END TO THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR JUST AS THE 73 WAR (SIC) SERVED TO END FIGHTING WITH THE KURDS.

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34. TO MY FINAL QUESTION ON EFFECT OF AN ISRAELI-SYRIAN CONFLICT ON U.S. INTERESTS IN THE AREA PARTICULARLY WITH [

35. COMMENT: THE OVERALL TENOR OF THE MEETING WAS OPEN AND FRIENDLY AND NOT AS STRIDENT AS ANTICIPATED. EITAN'S FLEXIBILITY IN VIEWING A NUMBER OF SYRIAN MOVES AS POSSIBLY OFFENSIVE, POSSIBLY DEFENSIVE, WAS SOMEWHAT SURPRISING. ZIPORI COMMENTED ON DEPARTURE, "OUR PRAYERS ARE WITH YOU FOR YOUR SUCCESS."

36. FOR DEPARTMENT: PLEASE PASS TO DIA. GROVE

OC/T NOTE: EXDIS CAPTION ADDED PER S/S-O: MR. MANN

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UNCLASSIFIED**EXCISE**PAGE 01
ACTION SS-30

BEIRUT 02923 091408Z

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 /031 W
-----227242 091410Z /51/41

O 091333Z MAY 81

FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1815

INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IM/IPS/CR/TR

Date: 11/3/97

RELEASE

DECLASSIFY

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EO Citations

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BEIRUT 2923

DECAPTIONED

9302566

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3,4 5/9/01 (DEAN, JOHN GUNTHER) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, XF, MOPS, LE, SY, IS

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: CONVERSATION WITH NATIONAL
MOVEMENT LEADERS

1. [REDACTED]
2. NATIONAL MOVEMENT (NM) LEADER WALID JUMBLATT AND NM OFFICIAL ALBERT MANSOUR MET WITH AMBASSADOR HABIB ON MAY 9. AMBASSADOR DEAN, DAS DRAPER AND POLOFF PATTERSON WERE PRESENT. AMBASSADOR HABIB SAID THAT THE PURPOSE OF HIS VISIT WAS TO SEEK WAYS TO CALM THE CURRENT SITUATION, AND ADDED THAT HIS EFFORTS WERE IN NO WAY INTENDED TO ADVERSELY AFFECT ANY LONG-TERM RESOLUTIONS TO THE LEBANESE CRISIS. HE ASKED JUMBLATT FOR SPECIFIC WAYS TO DEAL WITH THE SITUATION IN ZAHLAH AND MT. SANNIN.

3. JUMBLATT ANSWERED THAT THE NM WAS NOT WILLING AT THE MOMENT TO ACCEPT LEBANESE ARMY DEPLOYMENT IN ZAHLAH BECAUSE OF THE ADVERSE EFFECT IT WOULD HAVE ON THE UNITY OF THE LAF. HE THOUGHT THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 02923 091408Z

ISF (POLICE) WOULD BE AN ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATIVE, ON CONDITION THAT "FOREIGN" PHALANGE ELEMENTS WERE WITHDRAWN FROM THE CITY.

4. ON THE SUBJECT OF MT. SANNIN, JUMBLATT BEGAN BY SAYING THAT GETTING THE SYRIANS TO WITHDRAW WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT BECAUSE THE SYRIANS NOW BELIEVED THAT HOLDING THE SANNIN RIDGE WAS OF STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE TO THEIR CONTROL OF THE BIQA. [REDACTED]

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5. BOTH JUMBLATT AND MANSOUR ASSERTED THAT THE LAF HAD LOST MUCH CREDIBILITY WHEN IT ALLOWED THE PHALANGE TO TAKE OVER AYN AR-RUMMANAH IN OCTOBER 1980. THEY EXPRESSED FEAR THAT FUTURE LAF DEPLOYMENTS WOULD RISK DISINTEGRATION OF THE ARMY INTO FACTIONS. JUMBLATT WAS ALSO HIGHLY CRITICAL OF THE CURRENT LAF LEADERSHIP AND SAID THAT, FOLLOWING THE INCIDENTS IN AYN AR-RUMMANAH, HE COULD NOT SUPPORT THE LAF. JUMBLATT POINTED OUT, HOWEVER, THAT HE HAD BEEN ONE OF THE FEW MEMBERS OF THE NM TO PUBLICLY BACK THE LAF PRIOR TO [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]

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AYN AR-RUMMANAH AND SAID HE CONTINUED TO ENDORSE THE PRINCIPLE OF A STRONG ARMY.

7. JUMBLATT ASSERTED THAT SOME SORT OF ENTENTE OR AT LEAST RESUMPTION OF A DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE PARTIES WAS NECESSARY. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM AMBASSADOR HABIB, JUMBLATT SAID THAT THE TALKS THAT HAD BEGUN BETWEEN THE PHALANGE AND THE SYRIANS IN APRIL HAD ENDED WHEN THE PHALANGE TOOK A HARD LINE APPROACH AFTER ISRAEL'S SHOOTING DOWN OF SYRIAN HELICOPTERS IN THE BIQA'. ALTHOUGH HE FIRST MAINTAINED THAT ENTENTE HAD TO PRECEDE SECURITY MEASURES, JUMBLATT DID NOT DISAGREE WITH AMBASSADOR HABIB'S STATEMENT THAT BOTH

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Date Printed: 09/26/1990

DOC NUMBER: 81BEIRUT02923

CHANNEL: n/a

DIALOGUE AND SECURITY COULD BE DEALT WITH SIMULTANEOUSLY.
AMBASSADOR HABIB URGED JUMBLATT TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT
FIRST PRIORITY HAD TO BE GIVEN TO DEFUSING THE CURRENT
CONFRONTATION IN THE BIQA'.

8. THIS MESSAGE WAS NOT REVIEWED BY AMBASSADOR HABIB
OR DAS DRAPER.
DEAN

[REDACTED]

NVVZCZ

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** EXDIS
*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

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PAGE 01 STATE 121356
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INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 /015 R

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DRAFTED BY: LWG:HSIZER

APPROVED BY: S/S-O: SMANN

R 110448Z MAY 81

FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY CAIRO

STATE 121356

EXDIS FOR DILLON

FOLLOWING REPEAT BEIRUT 2923 ACTION STATE INFO
DAMASCUS JERUSALEM MOSCOW TEL AVIV 9 AMY 81.

QTE BEIRUT 2923

DECAPTIONED

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3,4 5/9/01 (DEAN, JOHN GUNTHER) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, XF, MOPS, LE, SY, IS
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: CONVERSATION WITH NATIONAL
MOVEMENT LEADERS

1. [REDACTED]

2. NATIONAL MOVEMENT (NM) LEADER WALID JUMBLATT AND NM
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[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 STATE 121356

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3. JUMBLATT ANSWERED THAT THE NM WAS NOT WILLING AT THE
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ISF (POLICE) WOULD BE AN ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATIVE, ON
CONDITION THAT "FOREIGN" PHALANGE ELEMENTS WERE

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/PS/CR/IR Date: 11/7/97
☒ RELEASE ☐ DECLASSIFY
☒ EXCISE ☐ DECLASSIFY EO Citations
☐ DENY ☐ IN PART

FOIA Exemptions B1 TS authority to
PA Exemptions ☐ CLASSIFY as ☐ S or ☐ C Sec.
☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or ☐ C

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WITHDRAWN FROM THE CITY.

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4. ON THE SUBJECT OF MT. SANNIN, JUMBLATT BEGAN BY SAYING THAT GETTING THE SYRIANS TO WITHDRAW WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT BECAUSE THE SYRIANS NOW BELIEVED THAT HOLDING THE SANNIN RIDGE WAS OF STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE TO THEIR CONTROL OF THE BIQA'. [

5. BOTH JUMBLATT AND MANSOUR ASSERTED THAT THE LAF HAD LOST MUCH CREDIBILITY WHEN IT ALLOWED THE PHALANGE TO TAKE OVER AYN AR-RUMMANAH IN OCTOBER 1980. THEY EXPRESSED FEAR THAT FUTURE LAF DEPLOYMENTS WOULD

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RISK DISINTEGRATION OF THE ARMY INTO FACTIONS. JUMBLATT WAS ALSO HIGHLY CRITICAL OF THE CURRENT LAF LEADERSHIP AND SAID THAT, FOLLOWING THE INCIDENTS IN AYN AR-RUMMANAH, HE COULD NOT SUPPORT THE LAF. JUMBLATT POINTED OUT, HOWEVER, THAT HE HAD BEEN ONE OF THE FEW MEMBERS OF THE NM TO PUBLICLY BACK THE LAF PRIOR TO AYN AR-RUMMANAH AND SAID HE CONTINUED TO ENDORSE THE PRINCIPLE OF A STRONG ARMY.

7. JUMBLATT ASSERTED THAT SOME SORT OF ENTENTE OR AT LEAST RESUMPTION OF A DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE PARTIES WAS NECESSARY. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM AMBASSADOR HABIB, JUMBLATT SAID THAT THE TALKS THAT HAD BEGUN BETWEEN THE PHALANGE AND THE SYRIANS IN APRIL HAD ENDED WHEN THE PHALANGE TOOK A HARD LINE APPROACH.

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AFTER ISRAEL'S SHOOTING DOWN OF SYRIAN HELICOPTERS IN THE BIQA'. ALTHOUGH HE FIRST MAINTAINED THAT ENTENTE HAD TO PRECEDE SECURITY MEASURES, JUMBLATT DID NOT DISAGREE WITH AMBASSADOR HABIB'S STATEMENT THAT BOTH DIALOGUE AND SECURITY COULD BE DEALT WITH SIMULTANEOUSLY. AMBASSADOR HABIB URGED JUMBLATT TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT FIRST PRIORITY HAD TO BE GIVEN TO DEFUSING THE CURRENT CONFRONTATION IN THE BIQA'.

8. THIS MESSAGE WAS NOT REVIEWED BY AMBASSADOR HABIB OR DAS DRAPER.



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UNCLASSIFIED EXCISEPAGE 01 BEIRUT 02920 01 OF 02 091311Z
ACTION SS-30INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 /031 W
-----226731 091318Z /50O 091212Z MAY 81
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1811
INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATEDEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/CR/IR Date: 11/3/97
☐ RELEASE ☐ DECLASSIFY
☒ EXCISE ☒ DECLASSIFY EO Citations
☐ DENY IN PARTFOIA Exemptions B1 TS authority to
Exemptions ☐ CLASSIFY as ☐ S or ☐ C Sec.
☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or ☐ C

SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 2920

EXCISE CAPTIONEDE.O. 12065: RDS-1,3,4 5/9/01 (DRAPER, MORRIS)
TAGS: MOPS, PEPR, PINT, LE, SY, IS, XF
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: SOME GOL VIEWS

1. [REDACTED]
2. ON EVENING MAY 7, HABIB MET WITH [REDACTED] AMBASSADOR
DEAN AND DAS DRAPER WERE PRESENT.
3. AFTER A GREAT DEAL OF PROBING FOR THE U.S. POSITION
TOWARDS LEBANON AND SYRIAN MOTIVATION IN THEIR PRESENT
STANCE, [REDACTED] SAID PASSIONATELY THAT ISRAEL WILL HURT
THE CHRISTIAN CAUSE BY BOMBING SYRIANS ON THE SANNIIN
HEIGHTS OR AT THE MISSILE SITES. THE CHRISTIANS WOULD
PAY FOR THIS FOR YEARS. SUCH ISRAELI ACTION WAS
DANGEROUS TO CHRISTIAN SECURITY AND ACCEPTANCE IN
THE REGION.

4. WHEN PRESSED BY HABIB AS TO WHETHER THE CHRISTIANS
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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HAD MADE THIS CLEAR TO THE ISRAELIS, [BOUTROS] SAID
THAT THEY HAD NOT, BASICALLY FOR MORALE REASONS. THE
MARONITES WERE DESPERATE, THEIR MILITIA HAD LOST A
GREAT DEAL. THEY NEEDED THIS ISRAELI ACTION OUT OF A
SENSE OF DESPERATION. HABIB NOTED THAT, IN FACT, THE
MARONITE LEADERS HAD COMPLETELY AVOIDED ANY MENTION
OF THE POSSIBLE DAMAGE TO THE CHRISTIAN CAUSE IN THEIR
TALKS WITH THE ISRAELIS.**UNCLASSIFIED**
Page 1

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5. [] THOUGHT THE SYRIANS WANTED TO "OVERWHELM" LEBANON. REGARDLESS OF THE JUSTIFICATION, AFTER AN ISRAELI MILITARY ATTACK, SYRIA WILL BE ABLE TO RALLY SUPPORT THROUGHOUT THE ARAB WORLD -- FOR MANY YEARS -- AND WILL DIRECT IT AGAINST THE ISRAELIS, AND THEIR ALLIES, THE CHRISTIANS.

6. AT ABOUT THIS POINT, HABIB PRESSED HARD TO GET THE GOL TO FOCUS ON MEANS TO AVERT EITHER OF THE TWO CALAMITIES, MAINLY BY RETURNING TO THE STATUS QUO ANTE AND BY FOCUSING ON HOW THE LAF COULD BE EMPLOYED AS AN "ALTERNATIVE", IN GIVING THE SYRIANS A FACE-SAVING WAY OUT OF THIS PRESENT PROBLEM. WHEN [] SAID THAT THE SYRIANS PROBABLY COULDN'T BE DISSUADED FROM THEIR PRESENT STANCE, INCLUDING THEIR STRONG OPPOSITION TO FURTHER LAF DEPLOYMENTS, AND WOULD BE READY TO GO TO A CONFRONTATION WITH THE ISRAELIS, HABIB MADE CLEAR THAT, IN THAT EVENT, NOTHING MORE COULD BE DONE BY ANYONE. THE ISRAELIS WOULD HIT THEM HARD AND IT WOULD HURT. [] SAID THAT THIS WOULD BE A PYRRHIC VICTORY FOR ISRAEL.

7. [] MENTIONED THAT THE LEBANESE WERE IN DANGER OF BEING STABILIZED, IF NOT BY SYRIA, THEN BY ISRAEL.

[]

[]

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[] PURSUED THIS FURTHER WITH A HINT THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR THE LEBANESE TO LOOK TO THE U.S. EXCLUSIVELY, AND MOVE AWAY FROM THE ISRAELIS. THIS WOULD MAKE IT SAFER FOR THEM IN THE REGION.

8. WHEN [] SAID THAT HALF OF THE COUNTRY (SUGGESTING THE MUSLIMS) WOULD BE OPPOSED TO THESE KINDS OF DEPLOYMENT OF THE LAF, HABIB ASKED WHETHER THE GOL COULD PICK AND CHOOSE SEPARATE UNITS FOR SEPARATE PLACES AND THEN WIN A NATIONAL CONSENSUS, OR BROAD POLITICAL SUPPORT. BOUTROS APPEARED TO AGREE THAT THIS MIGHT BE POSSIBLE, THROUGH APPEALS TO LEBANESE PATRIOTISM, ETC.

9. HABIB EXPLORED WHETHER A NEW KIND OF 1979 BOUTROS PLAN -- OR MODUS VIVENDI -- COULD BE APPLIED TO SOUTH LEBANON, UNDER WHICH THERE WOULD BE AN AGREEMENT NOT TO USE THE RESPECTIVE TERRITORIES OF EACH COUNTRY TO ATTACK ONE ANOTHER. HE ASKED WHETHER THE PALESTINIANS COULD BE PUT IN A MOOD TO ACCEPT THIS. []

[] SAID THAT THE PALESTINIANS WERE IN JUST THE OPPOSITE MOOD. THEY DID NOT CARE ABOUT THE PREEMPTIVE STRIKES; IN FACT, THEY WELCOMED THEM BECAUSE THE STRIKES BOLSTERED MORALE.

10. [] EARLIER IN THE CONVERSATION, COMMENTED

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THAT THE U.S. HAD NOT REALLY FOCUSED ON THE LEBANESE PROBLEM. THIS GAMBIT WAS REFUTED. _____ OPINION WAS THAT THE SOVIETS WANTED SYRIAN TROOPS TO REMAIN IN LEBANON -- IN CONTRAST TO THEIR POSITION IN 1976 -- SO AS TO CONTROL THE PLO, AND BECAUSE THE SOVIETS NOW BELIEVED THE SYRIAN TROOPS HAD A ROLE TO PLAY IN DETERMINING THE FUTURE COURSE OF POLICY OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT.

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 02920 02 OF 02 091301Z
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 /031 W
-----226673 091319Z /50

O 091212Z MAY 81
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1812
INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MOSCOM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

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EXDIS

11. [] SAID THAT THE NATURE OF THE CHRISTIAN RESISTANCE TOWARDS THE SYRIAN OCCUPATION WAS PASSIONATE WITHOUT BEING WHOLLY RATIONAL. ISRAEL HAD FOSTERED THIS ATTITUDE.

12. [] WAS SARCASTICALLY PESSIMISTIC THAT THE SAUDIS WOULD BE HELPFUL TO THE LEBANESE. HE NOTED THAT THE SAUDIS HAD FAILED TO REPLY FOR 45 DAYS REGARDING A PROPOSAL FOR A VISIT BY THE LEBANESE PRIME MINISTER, AND STILL HAD NOT SENT A SAUDI AMBASSADOR TO BEIRUT. HE WAS CONVINCED THAT THE SAUDIS WOULD NOT WORK AGAINST THE SYRIAN POSITION IN LEBANON.

13. SUMMING UP, [] SAID THAT LEBANON WAS A VICTOM OF THE EAST-WEST STRUGGLE. A LEBANESE-SYRIAN AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED ONLY BE LEBANON GIVING IN COMPLETELY. THE ONLY SOLUTION -- IN THESE SYRIAN-LEBANESE NEGOTIATIONS -- WAS TO MAKE USE OF THE LAF; YET, HE SAID, THE MUSLIMS PROBABLY WOULD NOT GIVE IT ANY REAL SUPPORT.

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14. COMMENT: THIS WAS ONLY A PRELIMINARY INFORMAL
MEETING TO ALLOW [REDACTED] TO SOUND OUT HABIB. IT

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HELPED SET THE STAGE, HOWEVER, FOR A MEETING THE
FOLLOWING MORNING WITH SARKIS, DURING WHICH WE GOT TO
GRIPS WITH SPECIFIC MEASURES IN A MORE FOCUSED WAY.
DEAN

[REDACTED]

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*** Current Handling Restrictions ***
*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

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EXCISE

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ACTION SS-30

BEIRUT 02913 01 OF 03 090912Z

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 /031.W
-----224276 090916Z /12

O 090801Z MAY 81 ZFF-4

FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 1 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE

☒ RELEASE ☐ DECLASSIFY
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☐ DENY IN PART

EO Citations

FOIA Exemptions

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PA Exemptions

TS authority to
☐ CLASSIFY as ☐ S or ☐ C Sec.
☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or ☐ C

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E.O. 12065
DECAPTIONED

FROM AMBASSADOR HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS-1-3-4 5/8/01 (DRAPER, MORIS)

TAGS: PEPR, XF, MOPS, LE, SY, IS

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: INITIAL TALKS IN BEIRUT

1. [REDACTED]

2. BY THE END OF FRIDAY EVENING, MAY 8, I HAD COMPLETED EXTENSIVE TALKS WITH THE PRESIDENT AND KEY LEBANESE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AS WELL AS WITH LEADERS OF VIRTUALLY ALL MAJOR FACTIONS. THESE TALKS BEGAN ON THURSDAY EVENING, MAY 7, IMMEDIATELY AFTER MY ARRIVAL IN BEIRUT.

3. AS THIS CABLE IS BEING DRAFTED, HEAVY ARTILLERY, MORTAR AND MACHINE-GUN FIRE ARE PROVIDING NOISY INTERRUPTIONS. IT MAY BE TYPICAL OF THE COMPLEX LEBANESE PROBLEM THAT AS MANY AS FIVE FACTIONS MAY BE INVOLVED IN THIS GUNFIRE: THE LEBANESE ARMY, THE SYRIAN ARMY, THE MURABITUN, THE PALESTINIAN LIBERATION ARMY, ALONG WITH A SHI'A FACTION AND AN IRAQI-SUPPORTED GROUP, WHICH MAY HAVE

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STARTED THE CLASHES TODAY, DDAWING THE THE OTHERS LATER. EVERY LEBANESE SPOKE, SOME WITH RESIGNATION, OF THE TRAUMA OF THE CONSTANT VIOLENCE.

4. AFTER MEETING WITH THE HEAD OF THE NATIONAL MOVEMENT, WALID JUMBLATT, THREE PARLIAMENTARY DEPUTIES FROM ZAHLE AND A DELEGATION OF SHI'A DEPUTIES FROM SOUTH LEBANON ON SATURDAY MORNING, MAY 9, I WILL BE GOING TO DAMASCUS, BEARING MIND THE FOLLOWING TENTATIVE

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CONCLUSIONS AND OBSERVATIONS:

-- (A) I HAVE BEEN PRESSING HARD FOR SPECIFIC PROPOSALS AND IDEAS FOR CALMING THE SITUATION IN THE BEKAA AND PREVENTING A CLASH BETWEEN ISRAELI AND SYRIAN FORCES OVER THE QUESTION OF THE SYRIAN FORCES ON THE SANNIIN MOUNTAIN RANGE AND THE SAM MISSILES. WHILE VIRTUALLY EVERY LEBANESE LEADER--WHETHER AN OFFICIAL OR INDEPENDENT--HAS IN TURN PRESSED FOR IMMEDIATE U.S. ATTENTION TO LEBANON'S LONG-RANGE PROBLEMS, INCLUDING IN THE SOUTH OR VIS-A-VIS THE PALESTINIANS, I HAVE CONSISTENTLY FORCED THEM TO RETURN TO THE IMMEDIATE CRISIS AT HAND TO FOCUS ON THE HARD ISSUES. AS NOTED BELOW, I SEE SOME SLIGHT OPPORTUNITIES AS WELL AS SERIOUS OBSTACLES TO A WORKABLE MODUS VIVENDI.

-- (B) SPECIFICALLY, I HAVE BEEN STRESSING THE PROPOSITION THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL TO RETURN TO A PREVIOUS STATUS QUO WHICH, DESPITE ITS IMPERFECTIONS AND RISKS, DID NOT POSE SERIOUS DANGERS TO THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF ANY PARTY, INCLUDING SYRIA, AND OFFERED OPPORTUNITIES FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE SYRIAN-LEBANESE DIALOGUE. IN THE CONTEXT OF THAT PROPOSAL, PRESIDENT SARKIS, FOREIGN MINISTER BOUTROS, MARONITE LEADERS CAMILLE CHAMOUN, PIERRE, BASHIR AND AMINE GEMAYEL, PLUS PRIME MINISTER WAZZAN (IN PRINCIPLE, WITH SERIOUS RESERVATIONS), WOULD

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SUPPORT THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE LEBANESE ARMY TO BOTH THE SANNIIN RIDGELINE AND INTO THE CITY OF ZAHLE, IN RETURN FOR: (1) THE WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SANNIIN RIDGELINE OF THE SYRIANS, THE PHALANGE, AND THE PPS MILITIAS; AND (2) RELIEF OF THE SYRIAN BLOCKADE OF THE CITY OF ZAHLE.

-- (C) THE USE OF LEBANON'S INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES IN ZAHLE AND ELSEWHERE, IN LIEU OF THE LEBANESE ARMY, IS ALSO FEASIBLE FOR NEGOTIATING PURPOSES, ALTHOUGH SOME QUESTION WHETHER THIS FORCE IS NUMERICALLY ADEQUATE TO DO THE JOB AND ALSO HANDLE ITS OTHER RESPONSIBILITIES ELSEWHERE IN LEBANON.

-- (D) ON THE OTHER HAND, THE SYRIANS ARE SENDING STRONG SIGNALS OF OPPOSITION TO ANY EXPANSION OF LEBANESE ARMY AUTHORITY OR DEPLOYMENTS BEYOND THE STATUS QUO OF APRIL 1, THE ANTIONAL MOVEMENT (NM), EARLIER ON MAY 8, ISSUED A COMMUNIQUE--APPARENTLY AT SYRIA'S INSTIGATION--OPPOSING DEPLOYMENT OF THE ARMY TO THE HOT SPOTS. MULIM LEADERS ALSO VOICED DEEP DISTRUST OF THE ARMY'S RELIABILITY AND OBJECTIVITY, AFTER ITS HAVING BEEN INTIMIDATED BY THE PHALANGE LAST YEAR.

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 02913 02 OF 03 090920Z
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 /031 W
-----224342 090922Z /11

O 090801Z MAY 81 ZFF-4

FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 1801

INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE

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EXDIS

-- (E) MUSLIM LEADERS GENERALLY, INCLUDING THE PRIME MINISTER, WHO IN SOME RESPECTS WOULD LIKE TO BE HELPFUL, DO NOT WANT TO DO ANYTHING THAT WOULD HUMILIATE THE SYRIANS OR CAUSE THEM TO LOSE FACE. THEY ALSO ARE IRRITATED WITH THE MILITANT CHRISTIANS WHO, SOME OF THEM HAVE SUGGESTED, GOT THEMSELVES INTO A MESS OF THEIR OWN MAKING. THEY ALSO ACCUSE THE ISRAELIS OF DELIBERATELY SABOTAGING LEBANESE EFFORTS TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE SYRIANS AND TO WORK TOWARD A NATIONAL ENTENTE AMONG LEBANESE FACTIONS. NEVERTHELESS, FORMER PRIME MINISTER SAEB SALAM GAVE ME AN IMPROTANT CONCESSION WHEN HE AGREED--ON BEHALF OF HIS MODERATE MUSLIM COLLEAGUES-- THAT THEY WOULD NOT OBJECT PUBLICLY TO THE CONCEPT OF PUTTING OFFICIAL LEBANESE ARMY OR INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES INTO THESE KEY AREAS UNTIL THEY HAVE LEARNED OF THE SYRIAN RESPONSE TO MY PROPOSALS. THIS WILL GIVE ME A SLIGHT ADVANTAGE IN DAMASCUS THAT I MIGHT NOT OTHERWISE HAVE, EVEN WHILE RECOGNIZING THAT VIRTUALLY ALL SHADES OF LEBANESE OPINION ARE FAIRLY SURE THAT THE SYRIANS WILL NOT GIVE AN INCH. WE SHALL SEE.

--(F) THERE IS ALSO A GENERAL CONSENSUS THAT ALL THE

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PHALANGE FIGHTING MEN WHO WERE INTRODUCED INTO ZAHLE
FROM THE OUTSIDE, THE SO-CALLED "STRANGERS," WOULD

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HAVE TO BE WITHDRAWN AS PART OF A PACKAGE DEAL. I
HAVE NOT ADDRESSED SPECIFICALLY THE IDEA OF REMOVING
ARMED MEN WHO ARE NATIVE TO THE CITY, SINCE MILITIA
LEADER BASHIR GEMAYEL WOULD NEVER AGREE, BUT ALSO
BECAUSE NO ONE RAISED IT. IN SHORT, THIS LATTER ISSUE
COULD BE FINESSED.

-- (G) BY COMPARISON, THE PROBLEM OF THE SAM BATTERIES
IN THE BEKAA REGION APPEARS EVEN MORE MORE INTRACTABLE, AS
ANTICIPATED. THE MUSLIM LEADERS TRY TO JUSTIFY THE
SYRIAN DEPLOYMENT OF SAMES AS A REASONABLE DEFENSIVE
MILITARY MOVE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. WHEN COMBINED
WITH THEIR DEEP RESENTMENT OVER HIGHLY VISIBLE ISRAELI-
PHALANGE COLLABORATION WE CAN NOT EXPECT ANY HELP FROM
THAT QUARTER.

I AM DEEPLY FEARFUL THAT ISRAEL WILL HURT
THE CHRISTIAN CAUSE BY ATTACKING THE SYRIANS AT THE
MISSILE SITES AND ON THE SANNIIN HEIGHTS. ISRAELI
ACTIONS IN THEIR OPINION WOULD MOBILIZE EVEN MODERATE
ARAB QUARTERS IN SUPPORT OF SYRIA AND THEREBY COMPROMISE
THE SENSE OF SECURITY AND ACCEPTANCE THE LEBANESE
CHRISTIANS DEEPLY WANTED. PREDICTIONS THAT ISRAELI
MILITARY ACTION WOULD MOBILIZE ARAB WORLD OPINION AND
ALSO ISOLATE THE U.S. WERE ALSO VOICED BY THE MUSLIMS,
INCLUDING SHI'A LEADER AL-ASSAD.

-- (H) AT THE SAME TIME, I ALSO WERE
CONVINCED THAT THE SYRIANS WANT TO "OVERWHELM" AND
SUBJUGATE LEBANON PERMANENTLY. BY GETTING THE TWO MEN
ON THURSDAY NIGHT TO FOCUS ON MEANS TO AVERT EITHER OF
THE TWO CALAMITIES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE PRESENT CRISIS, THE
STAGE WAS SET FOR A PRODUCTIVE MEETING WITH PRESIDENT SARKIS
ON FRIDAY MORNING.

-- (I) AT THIS MEETING, SARKIS GAVE MEAN IMPRESSIVE
DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY TO NEGOTIATE A DEAL WITH THE

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SYRIANS AND IN FACT ENCOURAGED ME TO BUILD ON WHATEVER
MOMENTUM DEVELOPED TO SECURE OTHER SYRIAN CONCESSIONS
ELSEWHERE, INCLUDING ALLOWING ADDED DEPLOYMENTS OF THE
LEBANESE ARMY IN BEIRUT. I DO NOT, HOWEVER, PROPOSE TO
JEOPARDIZE MOVEMENT ON THE ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE
IMMEDIATE ISRAELI-SYRIAN CONFRONTATION IN FAVOR OF
PROBLEMS IN OTHER AREAS, DESPITE THE DESIRE OF SOME
LEBANESE ELEMENTS TO BROADEN THE DEMANDS ON THE SYRIANS.
THAT COULD BE TOO MUCH FOR A SINGLE BITE BUT CAN BE KEPT
IN MIND AS A FUTURE POSSIBILITY. (VERBATIM TEXT OF THE

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SPECIFIC SARKIS PROPOSALS, AS DELIVERED FRIDAY EVENING, ARE REPRODUCED IN PARA. 7 BELOW, WITH TRANSLITERATION OF ARABIC NAMES AS GIVEN.)

5. AS CAN BE SEEN FROM THE FOREGOING, MY INTENTION IS TO TRY TO MOVE FORWARD WITH AN ACCEPTABLE DEAL FOR THE SANNIIN HEIGHTS AND ZAHLE, SINCE THE TWO ISSUES ARE INTERTWINED POLITICALLY AND GEOGRAPHICALLY, AND EXPAND ON WHATEVER PROGRESS CAN BE DEVELOPED TO DEAL WITH THE MISSILE PROBLEM. WE ARE CONCENTRATING ON GETTING TO THE STATUS QUO ANTE IN AS BRIEF A TIME AS POSSIBLE. I MUST POINT OUT, HOWEVER, THAT WE ARE GETTING MANY AUTHORITATIVE NEGATIVE SIGNALS FROM THE SYRIANS ABOUT ANY REPEAT ANY LEBANESE ARMY DEPLOYMENT. I WILL HAVE TO SEE HOW THE SYRIANS REACT TO MY URGINGS.

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 02913 03 OF 03 090925Z
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 /031 W
-----224407 090927Z /12

O 090801Z MAY 81 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIAC IMMEDIATE 1802
INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE

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EXDIS

6. I WANT TO STRESS, MOREOVER, THAT THESE ARE ONLY INTERIM VIEWS AND OBSERVATIONS, AND I AM SENDING THEM NOW TO INDICATE THE DIRECTION WE HAVE BEEN GOING AND THE REACTIONS SO FAR IN LEBANON.

7. BEGIN TEXT OF SARKIS PROPOSALS:

- (1) THE PEAKS OF SANNINE
- WITHDRAWAL OF ADF FROM THE PEAKS UP TO 3KILOMETERS AS WELL AS THE ARMED MILITIAMEN (RIGHTISTS AND OTHERS WHO ARE ENGAGED IN THE AREA OF THE HILLS.
- TAKING OVER OF THE PEAKS BY LAF (WITHOUT HEAVY EQUIPMENT).
- (2) ZAHLE
- THE RELIEF OF THE CITY OF ZAHLE UP TO THREE KILOMETERS AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN COMBATANTS.
- CONTROL OF THE ROAD OF MAALAPA - HOUEL AL-OUNARA (NOTE: PROBABLY INDUSTRIAL AREA ROAD OF MA'ALAQA - KHUSH AL-UMARA) BY LEBANESE INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES.
- LEBANESE INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES WILL BE DEPLOYED INSIDE THE CITY.
- (3) AIRPORT ROAD

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- REPLACEMENT OF ADF POSITIONS BY LAF ALONG THE ROAD FROM HADEGH (PROBABLY HADITH) TO COUIFAT (PROBABLY SHWAYFAT) TO THE AIRPORT.
- (4) BEIRUT (DEMARCATIION AREA)
- WITHDRAWAL OF PLA (PALESTINIAN LEIBERATION ARMY) FROM THE DEMARCATION LINE.
- DEPLOYMENT OF LAF ALONG THE DEMARCATION LINE, UNTIL THE SEAPORT.
- WITHDRAWAL OF ALL ARMED ELEMENTS FROM THE DEMARCATION AREA UP TO A DEPTH OF ONE KILOMETER FROM EACH SIDE OF THE DEMARCATION LINE.
- N.B. THE ADF MAY SUPPORT THE LAF PARTICULARLY IN THE WESTER AREA (ADF, IN THAT CASE, WOULD BE COMPOSED BY SYRIAN FORCES ONLY). END TEXT.

8 COMMENT: IT IS WORTH NOTING THAT ALL LEBANESE -- ONE WAY OR ANOTHER -- INDICATED THAT THE MISSILE BATTERY PROBLEM WAS A PROBLEM FOR THE SYRIANS AND ISRAELIS, NOT THE LEBANESE.
DEAN

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PAGE 01 TEL AV 01139 250740Z
ACTION SS-25

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O 250736Z JAN 83

FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1039
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE

DEPART... DATE: 11/10/97
☒ RELEASE ☒ DECLASSIFY
☐ EXCISE ☐ DECLASSIFY EO Citations
☐ DENY IN PART

FOIA Exemptions _____ TS authority to
PA Exemptions _____ ☐ CLASSIFY as ☐ S or ☐ C Sec.
☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or ☐ C

EL AVIV 01139

EX DECAPTIONED

BEIRUT FOR AMBASSADOR DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, US, LE, IS, XF
SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: VENUE FOR WORKING GROUPS

REF: HARE/ROSS TELCON, JANUARY 24

1. [REDACTED]
2. POLCOUNS HARE CONVEYED TO DAVID KIMCHE AT 2130 HOURS LOCAL, JANUARY 24, LEBANESE POSITION THAT THEY WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO MEET AT NETANYA FOR WORKING GROUP MEETINGS AND HAD DECIDED THEY WOULD LIKE TO TAKE UP ISRAELI PROPOSALS ON VENUE FOR THE WORKING GROUPS AT THE THURSDAY MEETING IN KIRYAT SHEMONA (REF TELCON). HARE ADDED THAT IF ISRAEL WOULD AGREE TO NAHARIYA, IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE

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TO HAVE A MEETING ON WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 26, THOUGH THIS WAS NOT CERTAIN.

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3. KIMCHE IMMEDIATELY ASKED WHY LEBANON COULD NOT ACCEPT NETANYA AS A VENUE, WHICH HE NOTED WAS A TOWN TOTALLY DEVOID OF POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE. HARE DID NOT OFFER ANY SPECIFIC INTERPRETATION OF LEBANESE MOTIVATIONS. KIMCHE DESCRIBED THE LEBANESE POSITION VARIOUSLY AS "RIDICULOUS," "INCOMPREHENSIBLE," AND "INSULTING." HE SAID HE WOULD PERSONALLY RECOMMEND TO HIS MINISTERS THAT ISRAEL STAND FAST ON NETANYA, THOUGH HE SAID THAT HIS MINISTERS MIGHT POSSIBLY NOT AGREE WITH HIS VIEW. HE ALSO WARNED THAT IF THE IMPASSE CONTINUED ISRAEL MIGHT GO "PUBLIC" TO DESCRIBE WHY THE TALKS WERE NOT MOVING AHEAD MORE RAPIDLY, WHICH WAS A GOAL, HE ASSUMED, THAT WE SHARED. HE ADDED THAT AMBASSADOR FATTAL WAS PERSONALLY EMBARRASSED BY HIS GOVERNMENT'S POSITION ON THIS ISSUE.

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4. KIMCHE ASKED IF AMBASSADOR DRAPER WAS MAKING ANY INTERVENTION WITH THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES. HARE RESPONDED THAT DRAPER'S REMARKS IN THE PLENARY SESSION TODAY DEMONSTRATED OUR VIEW ON THE NECESSITY OF MOVING AHEAD QUICKLY, SUBJECT OF COURSE TO THE AGREEMENT OF BOTH PARTIES. HARE ASKED KIMCHE IF ISRAEL HAD NOT IN FACT PROPOSED NAHARIYA AS A POSSIBLE VENUE IN THE FIRST INSTANCE. KIMCHE BRUSHED THIS ASIDE, SAYING THAT NAHARIYA HAD BEEN OFFERED AS ONE POSSIBLE LOCATION IN THE PAST, BUT ITS FACILITIES WERE LIMITED DURING THE WINTER SEASON. HE WAS MORE OBVIOUSLY ANNOYED BY LEBANESE RELUCTANCE TO ACCEPT NETANYA AFTER THEIR EARLIER TURNDOWN OF HERZILYLIA PETIAH

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5. COMMENT: IN OUR JUDGEMENT, THE LEBANESE ARE BEING OVERLY DIFFICULT IN AGREEING TO A SITE FOR WORKING GROUP DISCUSSIONS. THE ISRAELIS WILL MOST CERTAINLY, AS KIMCHE INDICATED, TRUMPET LEBANESE RECALCITRANCE AS THE PRIMARY REASON FOR THE SLOWDOWN IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. WE BELIEVE THE LEBANESE SHOULD BE ADVISED FIRMLY THAT THIS IS NOT IN THEIR INTEREST, NOR IN THE INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES. END COMMENT.
LEWIS

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JERUSALEM FOR AMBASSADORS HABIB AND DRAPER FROM ROSS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: SCOM, PREL, PINT, MOPS, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US

SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: LEBANESE TOUGHEN PUBLIC STANCE

1. THE LEBANESE STEERING COMMITTEE FOR THE
NEGOTIATIONS TOLD AMBASSADOR HABIB JANUARY 21 THAT IT
WOULD TAKE ACTION TO REFLECT THE LEBANESE POSITION
MORE FIRMLY IN COMING NEGOTIATING SESSIONS AND IN THE
MEDIA. A GLANCE AT THE JANUARY 23 PRESS SHOWS THAT
OFFICIAL LEBANESE SPOKESMEN AND SYMPATHETIC POLITICAL
FIGURES HAVE INDEED BEEN MOBILIZED FOR THIS PURPOSE.

2. (U) MANY PAPERS REPRODUCE A NEWS ANALYSIS

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PUBLISHED BY THE "CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY" OUTLINING THE
LEBANESE POSITION AS COMMUNICATED TO AMBASSADOR HABIB.
ACCORDING TO "SOURCES CLOSE TO THE REGIME" CITED BY THE

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NEWS AGENCY, THE LEBANESE POSITION MAY BE SUMMARIZED AS FOLLOWS:

-- LEBANON IS MORE THAN EVER DETERMINED TO OBTAIN THE COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM ITS TERRITORY IN ACCORDANCE WITH A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN AND TIMETABLE TO BE AGREED UPON.

-- LEBANON CONTINUES TO REJECT THE NORMALIZATION OF ITS RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL, BUT AGREES TO DISCUSS THE FRAMEWORK OF FUTURE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

-- LEBANON AGREES TO DISCUSS THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS THAT ISRAEL DEMANDS, BUT UNDER INTERNATIONAL AUSPICES AND IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT, ESPECIALLY AS REGARDS THE PRESENCE OF ARMAMENTS IN THE SOUTH.

-- LEBANON REJECTS THE ISRAELI DEMAND ON ESTABLISHING EARLY WARNING STATIONS, AS WELL AS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY POINTS BY ANY FOREIGN ARMED FORCE ANYWHERE IN LEBANON, BECAUSE THESE WOULD ENTAIL A SERIES OF MEASURES AND ARRANGEMENTS, INCLUDING LIAISON AMONG THESE POINTS AND ACROSS THE BORDER.

-- LEBANON REMAINS ATTACHED TO AMERICAN PARTICIPATION IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND TO THE PRESENCE OF INTERNATIONAL AND MULTINATIONAL FORCES IN THE SOUTH.

3. (U) "OFFICIAL SOURCES" QUOTED IN LEADING INDEPENDENT ARABIC DAILY "AN-NAHAR" INDICATE THAT "LEBANON WAS

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CAREFUL TO GIVE HABIB ITS CLEAR AND FRANK POSITION ON ALL THE ISRAELI DEMANDS, AS WELL AS ITS OWN DEMAND, I.E., ACHIEVEMENT OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM ITS TERRITORY, POINTING OUT THAT THERE ARE RED LINES THAT CANNOT BE CROSSED BECAUSE OF THEIR CONNECTION WITH CLEAR LEBANESE CONSTANTS."

4. (U) THE THEME OF "RED LINES" IS ALSO PLAYED UP IN A STATEMENT GIVEN TO THE PRESS BY FORMER PRIME MINISTER SALAM FOLLOWING HIS JANUARY 22 MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR DRAPER: "I EMPHASIZED TO AMB. DRAPER THAT ALL LEBANESE WANT PEACE AND ARE WORKING SERIOUSLY FOR IT. THEY WANT TO REACH IT BY PEACEFUL MEANS, NOT THROUGH THE

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CANNON. I EXPLAINED TO HIM IN DETAIL THE RED LINES THAT LEBANON CANNOT CROSS UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES. ISRAEL MUST REALIZE THIS, AND THE UNITED STATES MUST TAKE IT INTO CONSIDERATION."

5. (U) PRIME MINISTER WAZZAN IS QUOTED IN THE PRESS AS WELL: "WE REGRET THAT WE HAVE NOT SEEN SUFFICIENT PROGRESS IN THE ISRAELI POSITIONS. WE HAVE FACED AND WILL FACE THIS (SITUATION) WITH A FIRMNNESS AS STRONG AS OUR RIGHT TO INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY, AS WELL AS WITH A REFUSAL TO SUBMIT TO ANY DEMAND OR CONDITION THAT CONTRADICTS THIS OR HARMS OUR LEBANESE, REGIONAL ARAB, AND OTHER INTERESTS....(NEGOTIATIONS WITH SYRIA AND THE PALESTINIANS) ARE TAKING PLACE AS WELL ON MORE THAN ONE LEVEL. WE HAVE REACHED A POINT WHERE

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SECTION 02 OF 02 BEIRUT 00798

JERUSALEM FOR AMBASSADORS HABIB AND DRAPER FROM ROSS

WE FEEL CONFIDENT OF POSITIVE RESULTS AT THE
APPROPRIATE TIME."

6. (U) THE SUNNI MUFTI OF THE REPUBLIC, SHAYKH HASAN KHALID, IS QUOTED IN AN INTERVIEW WITH AL-ITTIHAD OF ABU DHABI AS SAYING THAT "LEBANON'S INTEREST IS TO BE FOUND IN THE ABSENCE OF NORMALIZATION BETWEEN IT AND ISRAEL...WE ARE ATTACHED TO THE ARMISTICE ACCORD OF 1949."

7. (U) IN A COMMUNIQUE FOLLOWING A MEETING OF ITS LEADERSHIP, THE SHI'ITE MOVEMENT "AMAL" WARNS AGAINST PARTIAL WITHDRAWALS: "WE CALL ON THE LEBANESE

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NEGOTIATORS AND THE AMERICAN PARTNER TO REJECT PARTIAL WITHDRAWALS OR EVEN ANY STUDY OR HINT OF A PARTIAL SOLUTION."

8. COMMENT: THE "CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY" IS VERY CLOSE TO MODERATE PHALANGE OPINION AND TO THE PALACE, AND AMBASSADOR TUENI IS BACKGROUNDING ITS PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENT ALMOST DAILY. THEREFORE, ITS FORMULATION OF THE LEBANESE POSITION GOING INTO ROUND NINE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS MAY BE PRESUMED TO BE ACCURATE.

9. FYI: SALAM DID IN FACT RAISE THREE "RED LINES" WITH DRAPER, BUT ONLY IN GENERAL TERMS -- FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PEOPLE, LIAISON "AS DEFINED BY THE ISRAELIS", AND EARLY WARNING STATIONS. ACCORDING TO SALAM, SYRIA IS THE KEY PARTY IN DEFINING THESE RED

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LINE IN DETAIL, SINCE IT IS IN A POSITION TO RALLY ARAB
OPINION, INCLUDING SAUDI ARABIA, TO ITS POINT OF VIEW.
WHILE THE LEBANESE MUSLIM COMMUNITY HAS, IN SALAM'S
VIEW, SHOWN GREAT COURAGE (FOR INSTANCE, IN ACCEPTING
THE NECESSITY FOR THE LEBANESE AND ISRAELIS TO SIT
DOWN TOGETHER), IT CANNOT GO VERY FAR BEYOND THE
"RED LINES" LAID DOWN BY THE ARAB WORLD. DILLON

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to by: Wish Hall Jr.
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October 13, 1982

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Date: 11/10/97
EO Citations: 9302566
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THE PRESIDENT

From: George P. Shultz

Subject: Our Strategy For Next Steps in the Lebanon Situation

IS TO:

Forthcoming Washington Consultations with Israeli Foreign Minister Shamir and Lebanese President Gemayel:

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The October 14 meeting with Shamir and the October 19 meeting with Gemayel require us to set forth our preferred strategy for dealing with next steps in the Lebanon situation, in the context of strengthening the authority of the Lebanese government throughout all its territory. With Shamir, we have to make clear that there is little "give" in our positions on certain issues (e.g., on the need for a continued UNIFIL, on the need for the fastest possible withdrawal of all foreign military forces, and on the requirement that Lebanon's present political consensus and its relations with the Arab world not be damaged by unnecessarily ambitious Israeli requirements); however, we will want to make it equally clear that we have no wish for a confrontation with Israel and in fact already share many of Israel's interests. We expect that there will be follow-up exchanges with the Israelis which could produce some adjustments in our own approach, but we hope to be able to present a fairly firm scenario to Gemayel next Tuesday. Gemayel very much wants a specific game plan from us.

147-1516

Our Basic Approach (to be presented to Shamir):

-- The fastest possible withdrawal of all foreign military forces, ideally within six weeks. This would include all Syrian, Israeli, and PLO forces (although we would make it clear to the Israelis that the Lebanese may be prepared to allow some PLO to remain, provided they accept Lebanese government authority and are disarmed, and that the U.S. will not oppose any such reasonable and workable arrangements).

-- Withdrawal in two stages. We will explore with the Israelis under what conditions they might withdraw initially to the 40-44 kilometer security zone, taking into account the present Syrian position that there will be no Syrian disengagement and withdrawal until the Israelis have left Lebanon for good. The purpose of this part of the consultation will be to determine whether we should skip the two-staged withdrawal and go instead for a single stage.

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-- More-or-less simultaneous withdrawal by Syrian and Israeli forces (but with appropriate face-saving arrangements for the Syrians).

-- Non-acceptance of Begin's position that all PLO forces must be withdrawn as a first stage, prior to Israeli and Syrian withdrawal (on the grounds that this is a non-starter and that the mass of PLO fighters will probably leave only when the Syrians withdraw).

-- Negotiations with the PLO on withdrawal (will be conducted by mobilizing Saudi and other Arab pressure, through direct Lebanese-PLO contacts, and through Lebanese negotiations with the Syrians, backed-up by the U.S.).

-- Syrian assurances about reinfiltration. We will promote Lebanese-Syrian and even U.S.-Syrian understandings under which the Syrians would agree to cooperate in deterring and forestalling future PLO reinfiltration into Lebanon.

-- UNIFIL must play a peacekeeping role in the 40-44 kilometer security zone in southern Lebanon. We will make it clear we will not go along with Israeli objections to a UNIFIL role in that zone, since we need the military manpower available from UNIFIL and do not want to create a multinational force to assist the Lebanese in controlling that area. We will, however, explore with Shamir developing a new mandate and new rules of engagement for UNIFIL, along with the idea of putting UNIFIL only in the northern area of the security zone while the Lebanese army takes over control from there to the border to Israel.

-- No compromise on full Lebanese control and sovereignty over southern Lebanon. This means in effect that we will not tolerate the Israeli creation of a "protectorate" in southern Lebanon, using Israeli surrogate forces controlled by Major Haddad. Within these guidelines, however, we will encourage direct Lebanese-Israeli negotiations on security arrangements for southern Lebanon (see below).

-- U.S. support for direct Lebanese-Israeli negotiations not only on security arrangements but also on their future bilateral relations, under the following basic guidelines.

o Although we expect to be kept fully informed of the progress of these negotiations by the Lebanese, and we hope by the Israelis as well, we do not consider it necessary to be a direct participant.

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o We will support the Lebanese in resisting Israeli requests which might threaten the present political consensus in Lebanon or Lebanon's long-term economic and political relations with the Arab world.

o The negotiations should not be strung out in a way which delays military withdrawals; if necessary, issues going beyond south Lebanon security arrangements and a possible formal termination of belligerency should be left to a later stage in the evolving Lebanese-Israeli relationship.

o A peace treaty cannot be made a pre-condition for Israeli withdrawal.

-- Filling the vacuum in the Bekaa and northern Lebanon following Syrian and PLO withdrawals. We will make it clear we are exploring various options for controlling this area while the Lebanese army builds up its strength, but have reached no firm conclusions.

Looking Ahead:

I will want to review with you both the outcome of our consultations with Shamir as well as our plan for Lebanon prior to your Tuesday meeting with President Gemayel. As mentioned above, I would hope that we will have a fairly firm scenario in mind by then so that we could proceed rapidly. We would want to ask Gemayel to do his full share in bringing it about.

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PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATELY TO AMBASSADOR HABIB

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TAGS: SOPN, IS, LE, SY
SUBJECT: MEDIA COMMENTARY: LEBANON CONFLICT

FOLLOWING ARE COMMENTARY HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE MEDIA OF
JUNE 20-21.

1. BEGIN JUNE 20:
-- MARY MCGRORY, WRITING IN THE POST AND THE SUN, SAYS:
"GO HOME, MR. BEGIN, GO HOME." SHE SUGGESTS THAT
AMERICANS ARE NOT IN A MOOD RIGHT NOW TO HEAR HIS
PROTESTATIONS ABOUT ISRAEL'S SECURITY AND ASKS WHETHER
THIS SECURITY HAS TO BE PURCHASED BY THE SLAUGHTER OF
INNOCENTS IN TOTAL DISREGARD FOR "A DECENT RESPECT FOR THE
OPINIONS OF MANKIND." SHE CLOSES: "WE ARE TOLD YOU
INSIST ON COMING BECAUSE IF YOU CANCELLED, PEOPLE WOULD
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THINK YOU HAVE SOMETHING TO BE ASHAMED OF. IN OUR
OPINION, YOU DO."

-- HAROLD SAUNDERS, WRITING IN THE TIMES, CALLS ON THOSE
WHO SEE OPPORTUNITY ARISING FROM THE DEATH AND DESTRUCTION
OF THE 1982 WAR TO PROVE THEIR POINT BY ACTION IN THE
SERVICE OF A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY FOR PEACE ALONG THE
FOLLOWING LINES: (A) ISRAEL MUST BE ENABLED TO WITHDRAW
COMPLETELY BEFORE THE OCCUPATION HARDENS; "THIS IS NOT A
SUBJECT FOR NEGOTIATION. ISRAEL'S REMAINING CREDIBILITY

AS A NATION CLAIMING TO WANT PEACE WITH ITS NEIGHBORS DEPENDS ON IT;" (B) TO ENSURE A SAFE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, A STRENGTHENED U.N. FORCE MUST BE PUT IN PLACE QUICKLY WITH AN EFFECTIVE MANDATE; (C) A NEW COMPACT MUST BE NEGOTIATED IN LEBANON WITH INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT; THIS NEGOTIATION CAN PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR A MODERATE ARAB ROLE IN NEGOTIATION OF AN ARAB-ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE; (D) ISRAEL;S AND PALESTINIANS MUST BE BROUGHT TO COME TO TERMS WITH EACH OTHER; (E) THE U.S. MUST MAKE A MAJOR EFFORT TO RESOLVE THE LARGER PALESTINIAN PROBLEM.

-- DAVID SHIPLER, WRITING IN THE TIMES FROM JERUSALEM, DESCRIBES THE NEW SENSE OF ISRAELI GRANDEUR WHICH IS SHAPING A NEW VISION: THE PLO, DEFEATED MILITARILY, WILL DISINTEGRATE POLITICALLY, LEAVING THE FIELD OPEN TO MODERATE ARABS WILLING TO LIVE IN PEACE WITH ISRAEL; LEBANON, UNDER A CHRISTIAN-LED GOVERNMENT, WILL BE WILLING TO SIGN A PEACE TREATY WITH ISRAEL. PALESTINIAN NATIONALISM IS DEAD.

-- THOMAS FRIEDMAN, WRITING IN THE TIMES FROM BEIRUT, BELIEVES "THE FATE OF LEBANON HANGS AS MUCH IN THE BALANCE TODAY AS IN THOSE ANXIOUS WEEKS BEFORE THE

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REPUBLIC WAS FOUNDED IN 1943." HE EXAMINES ALL THE VARIOUS LEBANESE PRESSURES THAT WILL SHAPE THAT COUNTRY'S FUTURE AND CONCLUDES: "MORE THAN A FEW PEOPLE HAVE SUGGESTED HALF-JOKINGLY THAT TO SPARE THE COUNTRY THE AGONY OF A PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, THE POPULAR AMERICAN MEDIATOR, PHILIP C. HABIB, WHO IS OF LEBANESE MARONITE EXTRACTION, BE INDUCED TO TAKE THE JOB."

-- HENRY TANNER, WRITING IN THE TIMES FROM DAMASCUS, SAYS THE DEFEAT OF THE PALESTINIANS MAY MAKE THE QUEST FOR PEACE EVEN HARDER. FOR ONE THING, THIS WAR IS THE FIRST TRULY PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI WAR, AND THE PLO HAS GAINED A MEASURE OF DE FACTO RECOGNITION. AMONG OTHER THINGS, AMBASSADOR HABIB IS NEGOTIATING WITH IT, PERHAPS INDIRECTLY, AND THE CEASEFIRE IN QUESTION IS A PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI CEASEFIRE. THE CREDIBILITY OF THE U.S. HAS TAKEN A HEAVY BLOW. CAMP DAVID IS ANOTHER APPARENT CASUALTY OF THE FIGHTING. THE SOVIET UNION IS WIDELY ASSUMED TO BE DESTINED FOR A KEY ROLE IN ANY NEW APPROACH TO PEACE THAT EMERGES. THE PLO WILL SEEK ITS NEW PROTECTOR IN EGYPT, AND, AS EGYPT MOVES BACK TO THE CENTER OF ARAB POLITICS, THERE WILL BE INCREASING EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI FRICTION.

-- FLORA LEWIS, WRITING IN THE TIMES FROM PARIS, SAYS THE RETICENCE OF MOST ARAB STATES IN REACTING TO THE ISRAELI

INVASION IS DUE NOT SO MUCH TO DISTASTE FOR THE PLO AND ARAB

DISSENSION, BUT REFLECTS RATHER A FEAR OF IRAN AND THE FUNDAMENTALIST MOVEMENT SWEEPING MOSLEM SOCIETIES. THIS IS THE PRESENT DANGER FOR THE GULF. ISRAEL HAS NOW INFLICTED A PROFOUND NEW HUMILIATION, HIGHLIGHTING THAT ARAB LEADERS REALLY HAVEN'T SUCCEEDED IN FINDING THE BASIS FOR A SENSE OF NATIONAL DIGNITY AND PRIDE. ARMS SALES ARE UNCLASSIFIED

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NOT A CURE. IT IS IMPORTANT FOR ISRAEL TO MINIMIZE-THE HUMILIATION AND AVOID SPAWNING FURTHER -FANATICISM IF REASON IS TO HAVE A CHANCE. SOME REAL PROGRESSTOWARD RESOLVING THE LONG ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT IS CRUCIAL. VICTORY IS THE TIME FOR MAGNANIMITY, FOR SENSIBLE CALCULATION OF THE LONG-TERM THREAT. IT IS FOR ISRAEL TO MAKE THE GRAND AND TRULY HEROIC GESTURE, BY OFFERING-- PAL:STINIANS PEACEFUL CONTROL OF THEIR-OWN DESTINY, WHICH IS WHAT AUTONOMY HAS TO MEAN.

-- JOHN LE CARRE, WRITING IN THE POST, BELIEVES THE SAVAGE IRONY OF THE LEBANESE INVASION IS THAT-VIOLENCE HAS MADE VICTIMS OF BOTH THE PALESTINIANS AND THE ISRAELIS: "THE INVASION WAS A MONSTROSITY, LAUNCHED ON-SPECIOUSLY ASSEMBLED GROUNDS, AGAINST A PEOPLE WHO -ON THE ISRAELIS' OWN ADMISSION CONSTITUTE NO SERIOUS MILITARY THREAT----- TOO MANY ISRAELIS, IN THEIR CLAUSTROPHOBIA, HAVE-PERSUADED THEMSELVES THAT EVERY PALESTINIAN MAN AND WOMAN-AND CHILD IS BY DEFINITION A MILITARY TARGET, AND THAT ISRAEL WILL NOT BE SAFE UNTIL THE PACK OF THEM ARE SWEEPED AWAY.- IT-IS THE MOST SAVAGE IRONY THAT BEGIN AND HIS GENERALS CANNOT SEE HOW CLOSE THEY ARE TO INFLECTING UPON ANOTHER PEOPLE THE DISGRACEFUL CRITERIA ONCE INFLICTED UPON THEMSELVES. IT IS WORSE STILL THAT THEY HAVE SO FAR TAKEN THEAMERICANS WITH THEM."

-- AN EDITORIAL IN THE SUN SEES THE P O DEFEAT AND THE DISARRAY AMONG ARAB STATES AS GIVING EGYPT AN OPPORTUNITY TO REASSERT ITS NATURAL LEADERSHIP-IN THE ARAB WORLD. IT COULD CONTRIBUTE TROOPS TO A PEACEKEEPING FORCE, THUS SPEEDING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. IT COULD HELP DRAW JORDAN INTO THE CAMP DAVID AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS.

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-- WILLIAM CLAIBORNE, WRITING IN THE POST FROM JERUSALEM, SAYS ISRAEL HAS EMERGED AS A FORCE TO BE RECKONED WITH-IN

AN ENTIRELY NEW LIGHT BY BOTH THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION. FOR ONE THING, THE ISRAELI VICTORY RAISES THE SERIOUS QUESTION OF WHETHER ISRAEL IS NOW BEYOND THE REACH OF AMERICAN LEVERAGE FOR THE REST OF THE DECADE. BUT, -AS SOME ISRAELI OFFICIALS SEE IT, "WHO RUNS THE SHOW IN THE MIDDLE EAST NOW? THE ANSWER IS THE UNITED STATES AND - ISRAEL." AND THE SOVIET UNION IS THE BIG LOSER.

-- JOSEPH KRAFT, WRITING IN THE POST, SAYS A FUNDAMENTAL SHIFT IN THE INTERNATIONAL BALANCE OF POWER HAS OCCURRED IN FAVOR OF THE WEST FOLLOWING THE ISRAELI AND BRITISH VICTORIES.

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3. BEGIN JUNE 21:

-- ANTHONY LEWIS WARNS ISRAEL IN THE TIMES AGAINST A "MAXIMALIST" APPROACH TO SUBDUING PALESTINIAN NATIONALISM. DRAWING ON AN ARTICLE IN THE JUNE ISSUE OF "MOMENT" MAGAZINE BY ISRAELI ACADEMIC AND FORMER CHIEF OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE YEHOSHAFAT HARKABI, LEWIS POINTS TO OCCASIONS IN MIDEAST HISTORY WHEN MILITARY EXTREMISM HAS SERVED POLITICAL ENDS BADLY. HE ARGUES THAT THE UNCOMPROMISING POINT OF VIEW EXPRESSED BY SHARON ET AL WITH RESPECT TO WIPING OUT THE PLO IS A MODERN RECRUDESCENCE OF SUCH VAINGLORIOUS AND SELF-DEFEATING EXTREMISM.

-- EVANS AND NOVAK, WRITING FROM CAIRO IN THE POST, SAY US "IMPOTENCE OR UNWILLINGNESS" TO PREVENT ISRAEL'S INVASION OF LEBANON HAS RAISED EGYPTIAN FEARS CONCERNING THREE POSSIBLE OUTCOMES: A) AN ISRAELI AGREEMENT WITH HADDAD OPENING THE WAY FOR ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN SOUTHERN LEBANON, B) SOVIET FORCES IN SYRIA TO COUNTER A US PEACEKEEPING PRESENCE IN LEBANON, AND C) DESTABILIZATION OF HUSSEIN BY REFUGEES FROM THE FIGHTING.

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QUOTING A "TOP OFFICIAL" UNDER MUBARAK, E&N SAY INFO HAS REACHED CAIRO CONCERNING A SYRIAN REQUEST TO MOSCOW FOR "DIRECT SOVIET PARTICIPATION" IN THE COUNTRY'S DEFENSE. THEY ARGUE THAT THE ANTI-CAMP DAVID CAMP IN EGYPT HAS BEEN STRENGTHENED BY THE INVASION AND BY THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S FAILURE TO PRESS FORWARD TOWARDS 'FULL AUTONOMY' FOR THE PALESTINIANS. THEY CLAIM THAT HAIG ESPECIALLY IS SEEN BY SOME EGYPTIANS AS A COLLABORATOR WITH THE ISRAELIS. "THE QUESTION BEING ASKED IS THIS: IS HAIG, DESPITE PROTESTATIONS, MOVING TOWARD A MODIFIED U.S.-ISRAELI CONDOMINIUM TO SAFEGUARD WESTERN INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, WITH ISRAEL IN THE ROLE OF THE AMERICAN VICAR AND THE MODERATE ARAB STATES IN THE ROLE OF ACOLYTES?" HAIG

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECRET Date: 11/10/79
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FOIA Exemptions _____ () CLASSIFY as () S or () C Sec. _____ TS authority to
PA Exemptions _____ () DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C

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DECAPTIONED

FOLLOWING BEIRUT 4189 DTD JUN 15 SENT ACTION STATE INFO DAMASCUS
TEL AVIV JERUSALEM BEING REPEATED TO YOU FOR YOUR INFO:

BEIRUT 4189

DECAPTIONED

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 & 3, 6/15/92 ((DRAPER, MORRIS))
TAGS: XF, MOPS, LE, IS, SY, PLO, PEPR
SUBJ: HABIB MISSION: JUNE 14 TALK WITH SARKIS

2. JOINED BY AMBASSADOR DILLON AND DRAPER, I HAD GOOD TALK WITH SARKIS ON EVENING JUNE 14 AT WHICH INTELLIGENCE CHIEF ABDU WAS ALSO PRESENT. AFTER REVIEWING THESE TALKS AND OTHER DEVELOPMENTS, I

HAVE THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS TO OFFER:

--FIRST OF ALL, SARKIS IS FULLY POSITIVE TOWARDS OUR BASIC GOALS AND APPROACHES AS SET FORTH IN STATE 163009 AND STATE 163040, INCLUDING INTER ALIA A 40 KM BUFFER ZONE, A MORE MUSCULAR, MORE EFFECTIVE FORCE TO CONTROL THIS AREA, AND TO OUR VIEWS AS REGARDS THE PLO, ABSORPTION OF THE PALESTINIANS, STRENGTHENING OF THE CENTRAL AUTHORITY, ETC

--SARKIS WILL GIVE ME HIS FURTHER THOUGHTS ABOUT HADDAD BEFORE I

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LEAVE.

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--IT IS VITALLY IMPORTANT, HOWEVER, THAT THE ISRAELIS BEGIN TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT LEBANESE SENSITIVITIES, AND THE NEED TO REFRAIN FROM HUMILIATING THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND THE LEBANESE ARMY. THE ARMY'S MORALE MUST SOMEHOW BE REINVIGORATED AND THEN SUSTAINED, AFTER THE EVENTS OF THE LAST WEEK. ON MY RETURN TO ISRAEL, I INTEND TO TAKE UP THIS ISSUE WITH THE ISRAELIS STRONGLY, SINCE IMPARTING A SENSE OF DIGNITY AND RECOGNITION TO THE LEGITIMATE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES WILL BE CRUCIAL TO THE SUCCESS OF OUR OVERALL STRATEGY.

--IN THIS CONNECTION, SHARON'S MILITARY MOVE ACROSS THE DAMASCUS/BEIRUT HIGHWAY AND FAR INTO THE CHRISTIAN HEARTLAND CLOSELY LINKED WITH BASHIR GEMAYEL'S FORCES, COULD TURN OUT TO BE SHORT-SIGHTED. BOTH SARKIS AND ABDU THOUGHT THAT BASHIR'S NOW MORE OVERT CONNECTION NOT ONLY WITH ISRAELI FORCES BUT ALSO WITH ISRAELI STRATEGY MAY SET BACK OPPORTUNITIES FOR A GENUINE NATIONAL POLITICAL CONSENSUS. AND I AGREE.

--THIS LAST DEVELOPMENT HAS PROVEN TO BE A SERIOUS OBSTACLE TO THE FINAL DEVELOPMENT BY SARKIS OF A NATIONAL SALVATION COMMITTEE, BRINGING TOGETHER THE KEY NATIONAL ACTORS FROM EACH ETHNIC-

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RELIGIOUS GROUPING; WALID JUMBLATT HAS BEEN RELUCTANT TO JOIN--DESPITE THE AGREEMENT OF THE NATIONAL MOVEMENT WHICH HE NOMINALLY HEADS--BECAUSE OF BASHIR'S ACTIONS AND EVIDENCE OF OVERWHELMING ISRAELI INVOLVEMENT.

--IN CONVERSATION WITH BEGIN IN THE US AND WITH ADDED EMPHASIS BY SMA LEWIS, WE SHOULD IMPRESS UPON THE ISRAELIS THAT THEY CANNOT RUN LEBANON LIKE A MINOR SATRAPY. IF THE GUIDANCE I HAVE RECEIVED ON THE STRENGTHENING OF THE CENTRAL AUTHORITIES IS GOING TO BE ACHIEVED, THEN WE HAVE TO MAKE SURE THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE FULLY ON BOARD AND THAT THEIR ACTIONS ARE NOT CONTRARY TO OUR PURPOSES.

3. BECAUSE OF COMMUNICATION LIMITATIONS, I WILL NOT FULLY REPORT ON LEBANESE CONSULTATIONS UNTIL I REACH DAMASCUS, PROBABLY WEDNESDAY MORNING.
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE DAVIDS/CP/IR Date: 11/10/97
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☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or ☐ CFOLLOWING DAMASCUS 4134 DATED JUNE 11 SENT ACTION SECSTATE
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FOR YOUR INFO:

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QUOTE: [REDACTED] DAMASCUS 4134

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JERUSALEM FOR HABIB

E. O. 12065: RDS-1,3 6/11/02 (PAGANELLI, ROBERT P.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, MILI, MOPS, IS, LE, SY, US
SUBJECT: SYRIAN ACCEPTANCE OF CEASEFIRE IN LEBANON -
- INITIAL PERSPECTIVES FROM DAMASCUS1. [REDACTED]
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2. PRESIDENT ASSAD'S RAPID ACCEPTANCE OF A CEASEFIRE IN
LEBANON, WHICH TOOK PLACE WITHOUT ANY ADDITIONAL REPRESENTATIONS FROM US FOLLOWING HABIB'S LATE NIGHT MEETING WITH HIM JUNE 10, IS A TRIBUTE TO PIL HABIB'S SKILLFUL HANDLING OF THE SYRIANS OVER THE PAST TWO DAYS. ASSAD HAS ACCEPTED THE CEASEFIRE ON THE BASIS OF SYRIA'S "PRINCIPLED STAND" AS HE TERMS IT, BUT IN SO DOING HAS PUT THE USG IN THE POSITION OF HAVING TO DELIVER ON THE US POLICY LINE WHICH HABIB CONSTANTLY EMPHASIZED DURING HIS DISCUSSIONS HERE, NAMELY EVENTUAL FULL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON**UNCLASSIFIED**

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WITH FINAL PULLBACK SUBJECT TO AGREED ARRANGEMENTS ON SECURITY AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING ISRAEL. IT IS NO HAPPENSTANCE THAT SARG'S ACCEPTANCE ANNOUNCEMENT IS PUBLICLY TIED TO HABIB-ASSAD DISCUSSIONS.

3. IT HAS BEEN EVIDENT THROUGHOUT OUR CONVERSATIONS DURING THE PAST TWO DAYS THAT ASSAD WANTED A CEASEFIRE. SYRIA'S MILITARY LOSSES WERE OBVIOUSLY AN IMPORTANT FACTOR. AT THE SAME TIME IT WAS ALSO CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED BY ACTIONS ON THE GROUND THAT HE IS WILLING TO COMMIT SIGNIFICANT FORCES --AS WELL AS SUFFER SIGNIFICANT LOSSES-- IN ORDER TO PRESERVE SYRIA'S POSITION IN LEBANON, AND SYRIA'S ARAB IMAGE, AND TO TRY TO HALT THE ISRAELI ADVANCE. THIS HAS CARRIED WITH IT THE CLEAR AND INCREASING DANGER OF ESCALATION INTO A MAJOR SYRIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT. IN OTHER WORDS, ASSAD HAS A BOTTOM LINE AND HE CAN ONLY BE PUSHED SO FAR. WHEN CORNERED, ASSAD WILL FIGHT.

4. THERE ARE TWO IMMEDIATE CONCERNS THAT ARE APPARENT TO US CONCERNING INITIAL OBSERVANCE AND STABILITY OF THE CEASEFIRE. THE FIRST POINT IS THE ISRAELI STIPULATION IN THEIR CEASEFIRE STATEMENT THAT REINTRODUCTION OF SAM MISSILES INTO THE BIQA' BY SYRIA WOULD LEAD TO AN

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IMMEDIATE ISRAELI REACTION AND DESTRUCTION OF THE MISSILES. BASED ON OUR DISCUSSION LATE LAST NIGHT WITH ASSAD, THERE MAY BE SOME SYRIAN RESTRAINT ON THIS POINT. ASSAD TOLD HABIB THAT SYRIA HAD NOT FULLY REPLACED THOSE MISSILE SITES DESTROYED BY ISRAEL IN THE JUNE 9 AIR RAID ON THE BIQA' ALTHOUGH HE SAID THAT FAILING TO DO SO WAS FOR "LOGISTICAL REASONS." WE THINK THERE MAY BE MORE TO HIS RESTRAINT THAN LOGISTICS, SINCE HE ALSO STATED AT THE SAME TIME THAT SYRIA HAD NOT SENT SIGNIFICANT REINFORCEMENTS INTO LEBANON IN THE PAST 24 HOURS EVEN THOUGH ISRAEL HAD DONE SO.

5. ASSAD SAID THAT REINFORCEMENTS HAD NOT BEEN SENT INTO LEBANON BECAUSE SYRIA'S LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS AND SUPPLY WERE RELATIVELY SHORT AND ADDITIONAL REINFORCEMENTS COULD BE SENT IN A SHORT TIME. WHILE THIS IS ONE ELEMENT IN ASSAD'S THINKING, WE BELIEVE THAT ANOTHER CONSIDERATION IS HIS CONCERN FOR THE DEFENSE OF SYRIA PROPER AND ESPECIALLY THE DAMASCUS/GOLAN HEIGHTS AREA. THIS IS BORNE OUT BY YESTERDAY'S DEPLOYMENT OF SYRIA'S RESERVE 3RD ARMORED DIVISION TO AN AREA TEN MILES WEST OF DAMASCUS. THIS PUTS THE 3RD DIVISION IN THE POSITION TO BE MOVED RAPIDLY AS CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRE EITHER TOWARDS THE GOLAN OR INTO LEBANON.

6. THIS ARGUES THAT SYRIA WILL EXERCISE RESTRAINT IN AUGMENTING ITS FORCES IN LEBANON, AS ASSAD HAD IMPLIED

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TO US LAST NIGHT. WE THINK THE SAME MIGHT BE TRUE CONCERNING REINTRODUCTION OF MISSILES INTO THE BIQA' AND THEREFORE RECOMMEND THAT WE NOT REPEAT NOT BELABOR THE SYRIANS ON THIS PARTICULAR POINT AT THIS TIME. HABIB REINFORCED TO ASSAD SEVERAL TIMES DURING OUR DISCUSSIONS THAT THE MISSILES IN THE BIQA' ARE A FLASHPOINT. ISRAELI AIR STRIKES ON THE SITES HAVE REINFORCED THE POINT. A TONING DOWN OF ISRAELI RHETORIC WOULD ALSO BE HELPFUL -- PUBLIC CHALLENGES ARE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. ASSAD HAS AL-

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READY HEARD THE ISRAELIS AND THE US LOUD AND CLEAR ON THE SUBJECT.

7. OTHER MAJOR CONCERN INSOFAR AS INITIAL SYRIAN OBSERVANCE OF CEASEFIRE GOES IS ISRAELI INTENTIONS VIS-A-VIS THE PLO IN BEIRUT AND ELSEWHERE. WE NOTE THAT DEFMIN SHARON, IN A NEWS CONFERENCE JUST BROADCAST BY RADIO ISRAEL, HAS SAID THERE WILL BE NO CEASEFIRE WITH THE PLO. IF THIS IS FOLLOWED UP BY ISRAELI MILITARY ACTIONS AGAINST THE PALESTINIANS, INCLUDING AIR AND NAVAL BOMBARDMENTS AGAINST BEIRUT AND ELSEWHERE, THE CEASEFIRE COULD BE SERIOUSLY THREATENED IN ITS INFANCY.

8. COMMENT: ASSAD'S RAPID ACCEPTANCE OF CEASEFIRE REMINDS US THAT HE IS PREPARED TO ACT POSITIVELY IN A CRUNCH IN US INTERESTS TERMS WHEN THE INTERESTS ARE CLEARLY MUTUAL. AS IN THE DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT DAYS OF 1973-74, ASSAD IS PREPARED TO RECOGNIZE HE MUST LOOK TO THE - US AS THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE WHEN FACED BY OVERWHELMING ISRAELI POWER. WITHOUT HAVING TOO MANY ILLUSIONS, WE SHOULD BE ALERT TO EXPLOIT THE PRESENT SITUATION AS A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY TO IMPROVE US-SARG RELATIONS, KEEPING THIS CLEARLY IN MIND AS WE PROCEED TO SOLIDIFY THE CEASEFIRE AND EFFECT AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, AND AS WE GO ON TO RETACKLE THE TOTALITY OF THE LEBANESE PROBLEM AND MID EAST PEACE PROCESS.

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FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS 1,3,4 6/13/02 (HABIB, AMB) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, XF, MOPS, LE, IS, US, UNSC, PLO

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH BEGIN JUNE 13

1. [REDACTED]

2. AMBASSADOR HABIB, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR LEWIS, DAS DRAPER, DCM BROWN, AND KOZAK, MET FOR TWO HOURS WITH BEGIN, BURG, SHAMIR, MINISTER UZZAN, KINCHE, BAR-ON, YEHUDA AVNER, AND MILITARY SECRETARY COL. NEVO AT 1730 JUNE 13.

3. BEGIN LOOKED BONE-WEARY AND HE BETRAYED A COLD ANGER -- APPARENTLY OVER A REPORT OF TALKS BETWEEN ARENS AND THE SECRETARY. HIS PRINCIPAL PURPOSE WAS TO OUTLINE TO ME THE ISRAELI CONCEPT OF A MULTINATIONAL FORCE, BUT THE MEETING COVERED OTHER IMPORTANT ISSUES INCLUDING, INTER ALIA, THE ISRAELI DEFINITION OF THE CEASEFIRE, THE AIR STRIKES IN BEIRUT, SYRIAN JEWRY, HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, THE FUTURE ROLE OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT, AND MY TRIP TO BEIRUT.

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4. BEGIN OPENED BY SAYING THE CABINET TODAY HAD AGREED

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ON A GENERAL PROPOSAL OR PREFERRED "ARRANGEMENTS" FOR A MULTINATIONAL FORCE TO CONTROL THE 40-KM BUFFER ZONE SO AS TO ALLOW ISRAEL'S WITHDRAWAL. HE RECALLED THAT HE HAD MENTIONED THREE POSSIBILITIES TO ME AND LEVIE. THE CABINET HAD MADE A DECISION TO SUGGEST ONE OPTION: THE BASIC ELEMENTS WOULD BE (A) A MULTINATIONAL FORCE, (B) THE PARTICIPATION OF A U.S. CONTINGENT, (C) AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE, AND (D) BILATERAL AGREEMENTS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EACH PARTICIPATING COUNTRY OR, ALTERNATIVELY, A SINGLE AGREEMENT WHICH ALL PARTICIPANTS WOULD SIGN. BEGIN STATED THAT A COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS (TWO FOREIGN MINISTRY, TWO DEFENSE AND ONE MOSSAD) WOULD BE DEVELOPING THE SPECIFICS, AND GIVE US DETAILS LATER IN THE WEEK. HE ANTICIPATED THAT ISRAEL WOULD WANT EXPLICIT COMMITMENTS IN THESE AGREEMENTS THAT INDIVIDUAL NATIONAL UNITS IN THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE WOULD NOT ALLOW PENETRATION BY THE PLO, EMPLACEMENT OF WEAPONS, OR THE PRESENCE OF ARMED TERRORISTS IN THE 40-KILOMETER ZONE.

5. BEGIN SAID HE WANTED OUR VIEWS AS TO WHETHER THIS APPROACH WAS FEASIBLE AND, IF SO, WHEN THE U.S. COULD GET IN TOUCH WITH POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTOR GOVERNMENTS. (HE SAID HE EXPECTED POSITIVE RESPONSES FROM GOVERNMENTS, JUST AS WAS THE CASE WHEN THE U.S. WAS ORGANIZING THE MFO.) BEGIN SAID HE HAD USED THE TERM "MULTINATIONAL" RATHER THAN "INTERNATIONAL" SINCE THE LATTER COULD SUGGEST A CONNECTION TO THE UNITED NATIONS WHICH ISRAEL WANTS TO AVOID. HE DESCRIBED THE HOSTILITY ISRAEL FACES AT THE UN.

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6. UNIFIL WAS UNACCEPTABLE, HE SAID, BUT LATE IN THE MEETING SAID THAT UNIFIL COULD BE RENEWED FOR THREE MONTHS NEXT WEEK; THIS SHOULD BE DONE "WITHOUT DEBATE," KIMCHE ADDED. HE REITERATED THAT, ONCE A MULTINATIONAL FORCE WAS IN PLACE AND ASSUMED ITS DUTIES, "WE WILL BE OUT OF LEBANON COMPLETELY." HE NOTED THAT BECAUSE THE PLO HAD THE OLD 160MM GUN WITH A LONG RANGE, SOME OF HIS COLLEAGUES HAD DISCUSSED EXPANDING THE ZONE TO 43-48 KILOMETERS, BUT IN THE END THEY HAD DECIDED TO STICK WITH 40 KILOMETERS.

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7. ANSWERING MY FURTHER QUESTIONS, BEGIN SAID THAT THEY DESIRED A "STRONG FORCE" ON THE ORDER OF 10,000 MEN.

8. I MADE IT CLEAR I COULD NOT GIVE AN OFFICIAL OPINION ABOUT THE PROPOSAL. I WOULD REPORT IT, HOWEVER, AND TRY TO GET AN ANSWER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

9. I NOTED THAT BEGIN WAS LEAVING FOR THE U.S. ON TUESDAY AND I WAS NOT SURE I COULD GET AN ANSWER PRIOR TO THAT TIME. IT WAS INCUMBENT ON ME, HOWEVER, TO POINT OUT CERTAIN THINGS THAT WOULD AFFECT U.S. THINKING. FOR EXAMPLE, CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATION WOULD BE REQUIRED FOR A U.S. CONTRIBUTION. THERE WOULD BE DIFFERENT CONSIDERATIONS THAN THOSE FACED IN OBTAINING APPROVAL TO PARTICIPATE IN THE SINAI FORCE. BEGIN INTERJECTED THAT, IN PRESIDENT CARTER'S LETTER CONCERNING THE SINAI FORCE, THE U.S. UNDERTAKINGS WERE MADE SUBJECT TO U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURES. I POINTED OUT THAT IN THE CASE OF THE SINAI MFO, WE HAD TRIED FIRST TO OBTAIN A UN FORCE. IT WAS ONLY WHEN THIS PROVED IMPOSSIBLE THAT THE MFO CONCEPT WAS CON-

NOTE BY OC/T: MESSAGE UPGRADED EXDIS PER S/S-O, MR. MUSTAIN



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FROM HABIB

SIDERED.

10. I RECALLED THAT BEGIN HAD PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED THREE POSSIBILITIES FOR MAINTAINING SECURITY IN THE 40-KILOMETER ZONE. I ASKED WHETHER IT WOULD BE CORRECT TO SAY THAT WHILE THE OPTION APPROVED BY THE CABINET IS ISRAEL'S PROPOSAL, THE OTHER TWO WERE NOT OUTSIDE ISRAEL'S RANGE OF POSSIBILITIES. BEGIN RESPONDED THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT ACCEPT AN EXPANDED UNIFIL AS A SOLUTION, SINCE THERE HAD BEEN PENETRATION OF UNIFIL AREAS BY THE PLO AND REPEATED QUARRELS WITH UNIFIL. I NOTED THAT AS BEGIN HAD PROPOSED ONE OPTION AFTER CONSULTATION WITH HIS CABINET, I MIGHT COME BACK WITH OTHER PROPOSALS AFTER CONSULTATION. BEGIN RESPONDED THAT ISRAEL WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS ANY SUCH PROPOSALS.

11. AMBASSADOR LEWIS ASKED WHETHER THE ISRAELI CONCEPT OF U.S. PARTICIPATION IN A MULTINATIONAL FORCE WAS A FIRM CONDITION. BEGIN RESPONDED THAT IT WAS "NOT A SINE QUA NON." IT WAS "DESIRABLE" FROM ISRAEL'S STAND-POINT BUT, IF THE U.S. DOES NOT WANT TO SEND FORCES,

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THERE COULD BE A MULTINATIONAL FORCE WITHOUT IT.

12. TURNING TO ANOTHER ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM, I SAID

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THAT THE APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF ISRAELI SECURITY WHICH BEGIN HAD PROPOSED DEPENDS IN PART ON THE ACTIVITIES AND ROLE OF THE LEBANESE CENTRAL AUTHORITY. HE MUST BRING ALONG THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. THIS WAS VITAL. I RECALLED THAT HE AND I HAD DISCUSSED THE DESIRABILITY OF A LEBANESE CENTRAL AUTHORITY WHOSE WRIT WOULD RUN THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. IN THIS CONNECTION, THERE WAS THE PROBLEM OF THE PLO AS AN EXTRA-TERRITORIAL ELEMENT WHICH HAS TO BE DEALT WITH WITHIN A LEBANESE CONTEXT; THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM IS PART AND PARCEL OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT'S INABILITY TO CONTROL ITS OWN TERRITORY. IT WAS BECAUSE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE GOVERNMENT'S ROLE THAT I HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO GO TO LEBANON TOMORROW AND TALK WITH VARIOUS LEADERSHIP ELEMENTS ABOUT THE FUTURE ROLE OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. CHANGES FOR THE FUTURE AS WELL AS THE REINFORCEMENT OF THE CEASEFIRE WERE CONNECTED CLOSELY WITH PROSPECTS FOR ISRAEL'S PROPOSALS.

13. BEGIN SAID THAT IT WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT AT THIS TIME A RESHUFFLE OF THE LEBANESE CABINET MAY BE UNDERWAY. I SAID WE HAD THE SAME UNDERSTANDING AND BELIEVED THAT THIS WAS AN EFFORT TO STRENGTHEN SARKIS. MY VISIT TO LEBANON WOULD ALSO BE DIRECTED TOWARDS STRENGTHENING THE WILL OF THE LEBANESE PARTIES TO MOVE IN THIS DIRECTION.

14. BEGIN SAID VIRTUALLY NOTHING ABOUT SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL EXCEPT TO OBSERVE THAT HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHY ASSAD SAYS SYRIA MUST STAY IN LEBANON. ISRAEL WILL LEAVE

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AND SYRIA SHOULD LEAVE ALSO. I PRESSED FOR MORE SPECIFICS AS TO ISRAEL'S BASIC OBJECTIVES. I ASKED WHETHER BEGIN'S POSITION WAS THAT IF THE U.S. AGREES TO A MULTINATIONAL FORCE, THEN OTHER THINGS WERE POSSIBLE. BEGIN RESPONDED THAT HIS PROPOSAL RELATED TO THE BASICS, NOT TO ALL THE DETAILS. THERE WERE MORE PROBLEMS TO BE DEALT WITH WHICH WOULD TAKE TIME. AGREEMENT WITH THE SYRIANS, DISARMING OF THE PLO AND OTHER ISSUES WILL COME LATER.

15. I NOTED THAT A SECURITY ZONE WAS ONLY A PIECE OF THE FRAMEWORK. WE HAD TO CONSOLIDATE THE CEASEFIRE.

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THIS WAS CRITICAL. BEGIN STATED THAT A CEASEFIRE WAS "NOT A SOLUTION." I SAID I THOUGHT WE HAD A CEASEFIRE, BUT NOW WE DON'T, REFERRING TO ISRAEL'S CONTINUING MILITARY ACTION AND CREEPING FORWARD FROM THE CEASE-FIRE LINES.

16. THIS LED TO A LENGTHY GIVE-AND-TAKE ON THE ISRAELI VS. THE U.S. DEFINITION OF THE CEASEFIRE. OUR EXCHANGES BECAME VERY HEATED. IN ESSENCE, BEGIN ARGUED THAT THE CEASEFIRE WAS A UNILATERAL UNDERTAKING BY ISRAEL. THERE WAS NO SIGNED CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT WITH SYRIA OR ANY OTHER ELEMENT. ISRAEL UNDERTOOK ONLY NOT TO FIRE AND HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT IT WOULD FIRE ONLY IF FIRED UPON. WHEN I QUESTIONED WHY ISRAEL WAS CREEPING FORWARD FROM THE CEASEFIRE LINES, BEGIN SAID THAT ISRAEL HAD NOT ACCEPTED THE CONCEPT OF A "CEASEFIRE IN PLACE." HE NOTED THAT THE PRESIDENT'S APPEAL HAD NOT INCLUDED ANY MENTION OF THE WORDS "IN PLACE."

17. IN A VARIETY OF WAYS, I EXPRESSED SHOCK, ASTONISHMENT AND INCREDULITY OVER THE VIEW THAT THE

NOTE BY OC/T: MESSAGE UPGRADED EXDIS PER S/S-O, MR. MUSTAIN.

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EXDIS

FROM HABIB

CEASEFIRE WAS NOT A CEASEFIRE IN PLACE. THIS CONCEPT WAS IMPLICIT IN EVERY CEASEFIRE. WHILE THIS DID NOT NECESSARILY RULE OUT TACTICAL MOVEMENTS NECESSARY TO PROTECT FORCES IN THE EVENT THEY WERE BEING FIRED UPON, A CEASEFIRE COULD NOT BE CONSTRUED AS PERMITTING ONE PARTY TO ADVANCE ON AND ON AS LONG AS IT DID NOT INITIATE FIRE. IN THIS CONNECTION, I POINTED OUT THAT THE ISRAELI EFFORT TO CUT THE DAMASCUS-BEIRUT ROAD WILL CREATE REAL PROBLEMS. THE SYRIAN FORCES MUST BE ALLOWED TO HAVE A WAY OUT. SYRIA STILL HAS ONE BRIGADE IN BEIRUT. THEY SHOULD IN FACT BE ENCOURAGED TO LEAVE BEIRUT THROUGH AN OPEN ROAD.

18. BEGIN PERSISTENTLY COUNTER-ARGUED THAT THIS WAS NOT A PROBLEM. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT ISRAEL HAD NO PROBLEM WITH THE SYRIANS. THE SYRIANS OBSERVED THE CEASEFIRE. OUR PROBLEM IS ONLY WITH THE PLO. THE PLO IS NOT A PARTY TO A CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT. WHEN THE PLO FIRES UPON THE IDF, WE HAVE EVERY RIGHT, HE SAID, TO MAKE STRATEGIC MOVES TO PROTECT OUR PEOPLE.

19. AT ABOUT THIS POINT, BEGIN EMOTIONALLY SAID THAT

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THERE WAS A TENDENCY TO BLAME ISRAEL FOR EVERYTHING. HE DESCRIBED THE ISRAELI CASUALTIES. AND NOW, HE

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ADDED WITH VISIBLE ANGER. THERE HAS BEEN AN OUTCRY THAT "I HAD MISLED PEOPLE." IT WAS UNFAIR TO HAVE BEEN ACCUSED OF DECEIVING PEOPLE. HE LEFT THE ROOM BRIEFLY AT THIS JUNCTURE.

20. WHILE HE WAS ABSENT, BURG DESCRIBED THE DIFFERENCES IN THE WAY ISRAEL REGARDED THE PLO AND SYRIA. THE FIRST WAS AN ORGANIZATION WHICH PRETENDED NO RESPONSIBILITY
SECRET

FOR ITS SPLINTER GROUPS, WHILE SYRIA--AS A STATE--COULD BE RELIED UPON. I REPEATED MY INABILITY TO UNDERSTAND OR APPRECIATE THE ISRAELI POSITION THAT THERE WAS NOT A CEASEFIRE IN PLACE.

21. WHEN BEGIN RETURNED, I REPEATED THAT I FOUND IT HARD TO BELIEVE THAT ISRAEL WOULD DEAL THIS WAY WITH THE APPEAL OF THE PRESIDENT. CLEARLY, THE PRESIDENT HAD PROPOSED A CEASEFIRE IN PLACE. BEGIN REPEATED THAT THAT WOULD BE TRUE IF IT HAD BEEN NEGOTIATED INTO AN AGREEMENT. AS IT IS, IT IS A UNILATERAL UNDERTAKING. BURG REPEATED THAT THERE WERE DYNAMICS IN THE PRESENT SITUATION. THERE COULD BE NO ISRAELI UNDERTAKING TO FREEZE ITS POSITION. SAM LEWIS INTERVENED THAT IT WAS ONLY FAIR TO SAY THAT OUR DISCUSSIONS IN ISRAEL HAD BEEN ON THE CONCEPT OF A CEASEFIRE IN PLACE. I SAID THAT I MADE CLEAR THIS IS WHAT I MEANT WHEN I TALKED TO ASSAD.

22. SAM SAID THAT HE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT A POTENTIAL PROBLEM IN GOOD FAITH BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS.

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IT WAS FUNDAMENTAL. WHAT WE HAVE SAID AND WHAT ISRAEL HAD SAID EARLIER HAS TO HAVE A CERTAIN CREDIBILITY.

23. IN THE END, THE ISRAELIS MORE OR LESS CLARIFIED THEIR POSITION AS THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD FREEZE THEIR POSITIONS ONLY WHEN THERE WAS NO FIRING. WITH FIRING THEY FELT THEY HAD A RIGHT TO MOVE TO PROTECT THEIR MEN. IN SHORT, WHEN FIRING CAME FROM A HILL, THEY COULD TAKE THAT HILL. ON THIS INCONCLUSIVE JUNCTURE, WE WENT TO OTHER MATTERS.

24. WE RETURNED BRIEFLY TO THE FORTY KILOMETER BUFFER

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ZONE. BEGIN EMOTIONALLY SAID THAT HE WANTED THE ISRAELI MEN TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES AND FAMILIES. IF NECESSARY, HOWEVER, HE WAS PREPARED TO KEEP THE IDF IN LEBANON FOR FIVE YEARS OR MORE IN ORDER TO PROTECT EVEN ONE CHILD IN A NORTHERN ISRAELI TOWN FROM BEING THREATENED BY PLO GUNS. ISRAEL WOULD BE DELIGHTED IF A FORCE COULD BE ESTABLISHED, ALLOWING THE IDF TO GET HOME IN WEEKS.

25. I RAISED OUR INTEREST IN HUMANITARIAN PROGRAMS FOR LEBANON, AND DESCRIBED SOME OF WHAT THE U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS WERE DOING. BEGIN SAID THAT ISRAEL WOULD TAKE "A MOST POSITIVE APPROACH." I SAID THIS WAS VERY IMPORTANT AND THANKED HIM.

26. AS THE MEETING BROKE UP, I SAID TO BEGIN THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO END THE FIGHTING IN THE BEIRUT AREA. I SAID THE AIR STRIKES HAD BECOME HEAVY AND THIS NEEDED TO BE BROUGHT TO AN END. I WENT OUT TO THE HALLWAY AND RECEIVED FURTHER NEWS ABOUT ADDED AIR STRIKES AND RETURNED TO BEGIN'S

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PAGE 01 JERUSA 01903 04 OF 04 132222Z
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SECTION 04 OF 04 JERUSALEM 01903

FROM HABIB

OFFICE TO MAKE A FINAL APPEAL (SEPTTEL).

27. DAMASCUS AND BEIRUT NOT INCLUDED BECAUSE OF
MINIMIZE.
GORDON

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Date Printed: 07/10/1997

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DIA WASHINGTON DC// IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

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AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

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USCINCEUR FOR POLAD

E.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: SOPN, IS, JO

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PAGE 02 JERUSA 01729 071022Z

SUBJECT: JERUSALEM AND WEST BANK MEDIA REPORT JUNE 7,
- 1982 (ALSO INCLUDES 5 AND 6 JUNE)

1. SUMMARY:

--INVASION OF LEBANON

--HAIG MAY VISIT ISRAEL

--HABIB MISSION

END SUMMARY

2. INVASION OF LEBANON:

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-- ALL PAPERS CARRY FEATURE REPORTS AND EDITORIALS ON THE ISRAELI INVASION OF SOUTH LEBANON. STRAIGHT NEWS STORIES ARE DRAWN FROM INTERNATIONAL NEWS AGENCIES (AP, UPI, AFP). EDITORIALS: AL QUDS CALLS THE INVASION A "RETURN TO USELESS METHODS" AND DECRIES THE SILENCE OF "THE FREE WORLD AND THE NON-FREE WORLD" IN THE FACE OF CONTINUED ISRAELI AGGRESSION. AL-FAJR SAYS THAT "THE DREAMS OF ISRAELI HAWKS LIKE SHARON AND EITAN HAVE BEEN REALIZED" AND THAT THE BEGIN GOVERNMENT HAS AGAIN "IGNORED WEAK WARNINGS FROM THE US AND EUROPE."

3. POSSIBLE HAIG VISIT?:

-- THE JUNE 7 AL-FAJR CARRIES A SMALL ITEM COPIED FROM HA'ARETZ SPECULATING THAT SECRETARY HAIG MAY VISIT ISRAEL FOLLOWING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC SUMMIT. SECRETARY HAIG, WOULD, THE REPORT SAYS, INTERVENE TO TRY TO STOP THE ISRAELI ADVANCE INTO LEBANON.

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4. HABIB MISSION:

-- ALL PAPERS REPORT THAT AMBASSADOR HABIB WILL ARRIVE IN ISRAEL ON JUNE 7 TO PURSUE A CEASEFIRE ON AN URGENT BASIS. THERE IS NO COMMENT ON HABIB'S CHANCES OF SUCCESS. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, AMBASSADOR HABIB PARTICIPATED IN AN "EMERGENCY WAR COUNCIL" IN PARIS WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN BEFORE DEPARTING FOR ISRAEL.

5. ALSO REPORTED:

-- DEPOSED MAYOR SHAKA' OF NABLUS HAS BEEN DETAINED ON HOUSE ARREST BY MILGOV ORDER UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

-- EIGHTEEN PEOPLE IN JENIN WERE ARRESTED AFTER AN INCENDIARY DEVICE WAS THROWN AT AN ISRAELI MILITARY VEHICLE.

-- NABLUS MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES COMPLAINED OF HARASSMENT AND REPEATED ARRESTS DUE TO THEIR NON-COOPERATION WITH THE ISRAELI CITY MANAGER OF NABLUS.

--CROSS RIVER TRAVEL BANS CONTINUE ON SILWAD, BATTIR, DHEISHEH CAMP AND "ALL NABLUS AREA VILLAGES WHICH DON'T HAVE VILLAGE LEAGUES."

6. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. GROVE

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E.O. 12065:GDS 6/11/88 (WELCH, DAVID)

TAGS: MILI, LE

SUBJECT: SITREP NO. 19 LEBANON WORKING GROUP: SITUATION
AS OF 1300 ETD JUNE 11, 1982

1.

2. THE CEASEFIRE ANNOUNCED EARLIER TODAY REMAINS SHAKY AS
GUNFIRE AND SHELLING CONTINUE IN BEIRUT'S SUBURBS AND,
REPORTEDLY, IN THE BEKAA VALLEY. THERE ARE CONFLICTING
REPORTS REGARDING THE PALESTINIAN POSITION ON THE
CEASEFIRE; GOVERNMENT SOURCES IN ISRAEL HAVE EMPHASIZED
TO THE MEDIA THAT THE CONDITIONS OF THE CEASEFIRE APPLY
ONLY TO SYRIA AND NOT TO THE PLO. HOURS AFTER THE
ANNOUNCED CEASEFIRE DEADLINE, AMBASSADOR DILLON REPORTED

PAGE 02

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INTENSE SHELLING BETWEEN THE PLO AND IDF IN BEIRUT.
ISRAELI NAVAL ARTILLERY IS REPORTED TO HAVE SHELLED
GUERRILLA POSITIONS LOCATED JUST SOUTH OF BEIRUT, WITH
OTHER ARTILLERY FIRE DIRECTED ALSO AT THE NEARBY HILLS
AND ALAYH, 12 MILES INLAND. ALTHOUGH AIR AND GROUND
ENGAGEMENTS HAVE SUBSIDED SINCE YESTERDAY, VOICE OF
LEBANON HAS REPORTED HEAVY ARTILLERY FIGHTING BETWEEN
ISRAEL AND SYRIAN FORCES IN THE BEKAA VALLEY. ATTACKS BY
THE ISRAELI AIR FORCE UPON SYRIAN POSITIONS NEAR THE
BAYDAR PASS, ON THE BEIRUT-TO-DAMASCUS HIGHWAY WERE ALSO

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REPORTED TO HAVE OCCURRED AFTER THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE CEASEFIRE. GOI DEFENSE MINISTER SHARON STATED THAT ISRAELI CASUALTIES TOTAL OVER 100 MEN KILLED AND OVER 600 WOUNDED. SYRIAN AND PALESTINIAN CASUALTY FIGURES ARE LESS RELIABLE, BUT WILL BE VERY MUCH HIGHER. EMBASSY BEIRUT REPORTS THAT LAF TROOPS HAVE BEGUN A TENTATIVE DEPLOYMENT INTO CERTAIN AREAS OF WEST BEIRUT VACATED BY THE SYRIANS AND PALESTINIANS.

3. DIPLOMATIC DEVELOPMENTS: AMBASSADOR PHILIP HABIB HAS TRAVELLED TO ISRAEL TO MEET WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN AND ISRAELI OFFICIALS, CONTINUING DISCUSSIONS REGARDING THE LEBANON CRISIS. IN A TEL AVIV NEWS CONFERENCE, DEFENSE MINISTER SHARON ANNOUNCED GOI INTENTIONS TO CONTINUE THE CEASEFIRE WITH SYRIAN FORCES IN AN EFFORT TO REACH AN "AGREEMENT GUARANTEEING PEACE AND QUIET ALONG ISRAEL'S NORTHERN BORDER;" SHARON EMPHASIZED, HOWEVER, THAT THERE WOULD BE NO CEASEFIRE WITH THE PLO FORCES. HE EXPLICITLY STATED THAT "ISRAEL WOULD UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES ALLOW THE RESTATIONING OF MISSILES IN LEBANON," AND URGED SYRIAN FORCES TO ABIDE BY THE CONDITIONS OF THE AGREEMENT. THE SYRIAN ANNOUNCEMENT STATED THAT PRESIDENT ASSAD IN TALKS WITH HABIB AGREED TO A "CEASEFIRE ON THE

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BASIS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON."
HAIG

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INFO SECDEF WASHDC, PRIORITY
E.O. 12065: N/A
TAGS: MASS, IS
SUBJECT: SHARON VISIT TO WASHINGTON

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1. PARAGRAPH 2 BELOW CONTAINS EXCERPTS FROM HAARETZ
STORY OF MAY 20 ON GOALS SHARON HAS SET OUT FOR
HIMSELF DURING UPCOMING VISIT TO WASHINGTON.

2. COMMENCE TEXT. THE DEFENSE MINISTER'S CONFIDANTS
SAY THAT SHARON'S CHANCES OF OBTAINING THE GOALS
OF HIS CURRENT VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES ARE THE
GREATEST. THEY QUOTE SHARON AS HAVING SAID THAT
THE SUSPENSION OF THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
NOT ONLY DID NOT DAMAGE ISRAEL, IT EVEN BENEFITTED
ISRAEL, SINCE THE AMERICANS WILL PAY INTEREST FOR
THE DELAY.

ANOTHER GOAL OF THE DEFENSE MINISTER'S U.S. VISIT IS
TO OBTAIN PERMISSION FROM THE AMERICANS TO CONVERT
SEVERAL HUNDRED MILLION DOLLARS INTO SHEKELS IN ORDER
FOR ISRAEL TO BE ABLE TO EXPAND INDEPENDENT
PRODUCTION BY THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIES, AMONG OTHER
THINGS, TO HELP DEVELOP THE LAVI AIRCRAFT.

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SHARON ALSO INTENDS TO TALK WITH THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
AND IDF REPRESENTATIVES IN THE UNITED STATES ABOUT

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ISRAEL'S PROCUREMENT PLANS THERE, AND TO REEXAMINE THE
POSSIBILITY OF UNIFYING THE DEFENSE MINISTRY DELEGATION
AND THE IDF ATTACHES, AND TO SEEK WAYS FOR THESE
BODIES TO REDUCE EXPENSES. IT SHOULD BE NOTED
THAT SHARON'S CONFIDENT, ARYE GANGER, WENT TO THE
UNITED STATES A FEW DAYS AGO. END TEXT. LEWIS

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APPROVED BY: IO/UNA:HJFELDMAN
NEA:MWILLIAMSON

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FOLLOWING TEL AVIV 7562 DTD 20 MAY SENT ACTION STATE
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E.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: MILI, IS

SUBJECT: ISRAELI MEDIA COMMENT ON MOU/LEBANON
"LINKAGE"

REFS: A) TEL AVIV B. TEL AVIV 7285

1. PARAGRAPH TWO BELOW CONTAINS EMBASSY TRANSLATION
OF TEXT OF MAY 20 ARTICLE BY MAARIV'S ILAN KFIR
REPORTING THAT "ISRAEL WILL OPPOSE ANY AMERICAN
DEMAND FOR DEFENSE COORDINATION WHICH MIGHT TIE
ISRAEL'S HANDS . . . AND DEPRIVE IT OF THE ABILITY
TO ACT FREELY AGAINST THE TERRORISTS IN LEBANON."

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POINT OF REFERENCE OF ARTICLE IS CLEARLY TOWARD
ANY ATTEMPT TO LINK "DEFENSE COORDINATION" TO THE
MOU ON STRATEGIC COOPERATION.

2. COMMENCE TEXT:

ISRAEL WILL OPPOSE ANY AMERICAN DEMAND FOR DEFENSE
COORDINATION WHICH MIGHT TIE ISRAEL'S HANDS
BEHIND ITS BACK AND DEPRIVE IT OF THE ABILITY TO
ACT FREELY AGAINST THE TERRORISTS IN LEBANON.
A PRONOUNCEMENT TO THIS EFFECT WAS MADE TO MAARIV

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LAST NIGHT BY A SENIOR POLITICAL SOURCE, ON THE EVE OF DEFENSE MINISTER SHARON'S MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON ON THE SUBJECT OF THE MOU'S IMPLEMENTATION. ISRAEL, IT WAS SAID, WILL EXPRESS ITS READINESS TO DEEPEN COOPERATION AND POLITICAL-DEFENSE COORDINATION WITH THE US, BUT IN SUBJECTS LIKE THE POLICY IN LEBANON, WHICH ARE VITAL TO ITS SECURITY, JERUSALEM IS SEEKING TO HAVE COMPLETE FREEDOM OF ACTION.

DEFENSE MINISTER ON TOOK OFF FOR THE US LAST NIGHT ON A VISIT WHICH WAS DESCRIBED AS PRIVATE. DURING THIS VISIT, HOWEVER, HE IS SCHEDULED TO MEET IN WASHINGTON WITH SECRETARY OF STATE ALEXANDER HAIG AND WITH DEFENSE SECRETARY WEINBERGER FOR DISCUSSIONS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MOU-- "WITHOUT PRIOR CONDITIONS," AS SENIOR ISRAELI SOURCES PUT IT.

MINISTER SHARON WILL WORK TO MATERIALIZE THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION'S PLEDGES TO EXTEND AID TO AFRICAN COUNTRIES AND TO HELP ISRAEL CARRY OUT DEALS WITH COUNTRIES IN AFRICA. THE US SUPPORTS ISRAEL'S ACTIVITY IN AFRICA AND SEEKS

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TO MAKE USE OF ISRAEL'S CONNECTIONS THERE IN ORDER TO FORM AN ANTI-SOVIET BLOC IN THE AFRICAN CONTINENT.

THE DEFENSE MINISTER SEEKS TO OBTAIN IN THE US AN INCREASE OF AMERICAN AID TO ISRAELI DEFENSE INDUSTRIES, INCLUDING THE LAVIE PROJECT. END TEXT. LEWIS UNQUOTE HAIG

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FOLLOWING REPEAT SENT ACTION SECSTATE MAY 15
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DEPT. PLS PASS SECDEF AND WHITE HOUSE - FOR THE ACTING
SECRETARY, SECRETARY WEINBERGER, AND NSC - JUDGE CLARKE,
FROM AMBASSADOR LEWIS

E.O. 12065: RDS 3, 5/15/02 (LEWIS, SAMUEL W.) OR-M
TAGS: MASS, IS, US, LE
SUBJECT: SHARON VISIT AND LEBANON

REF: TEL AVIV 7270

1. [REDACTED]

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2. UPON REREADING MY MESSAGE CONCERNING SHARON'S VISIT

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(REFTEL), I REALIZE MY POINT IN PARA. 5 ABOUT THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF EXTRACTING "EXTRANEOUS CONDITIONS" FROM SHARON CONCERNING LEBANON OR JORDAN ARMS SALES CAN BE MISUNDERSTOOD. ALL SENIOR U.S. OFFICIALS WHOM HE SEES IN WASHINGTON SHOULD TALK TURKEY TO SHARON ABOUT THE DANGEROUS SITUATION IN LEBANON. TO SLIDE OVER IT WOULD BE TO GIVE HIM A DANGEROUS SIGNAL AND REINFORCE HIS CONVICTION THAT WHATEVER ISRAEL ULTIMATELY DECIDES IT MUST DO ABOUT THE PLO IN LEBANON CAN BE DONE WITHOUT LONG-LASTING DAMAGE TO U.S.-ISRAELI RELATIONS.

3. MY POINT RATHER IS THAT SHARON WILL TOTALLY REJECT ANY SPECIFIC "QUID PRO QUO" OR "LINKAGE" CONCERNING LEBANON. HE HAS MADE THE POINT REPEATEDLY IN BEGIN'S PRESENCE AND MINE TO HIGH-RANKING U.S. OFFICIALS THAT HOWEVER DESIRABLE THE MOU MAY BE FOR ISRAEL AND THE U.S., IT CANNOT AND WILL NOT BE A MEANS FOR "TYING ISRAEL'S HANDS" TO PREVENT ISRAEL FROM TAKING WHATEVER STEPS IT DEEMS NECESSARY TO PROTECT ITS SECURITY. THAT WOULD CERTAINLY BE HIS RESPONSE IN WASHINGTON AS WELL.

4. NONETHELESS, WE ARE SKATING ON EXTREMELY THIN ICE AT THIS MOMENT WITH RESPECT TO LEBANON. ALTHOUGH THERE IS NOT A STRONG MAJORITY YET IN THE CABINET, MUCH LESS IN THE COUNTRY AT LARGE, TO SUPPORT SHARON'S DETERMINATION TO DEAL THE PLO IN LEBANON A DEVASTATING BLOW, REGARDLESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMATIC CONSEQUENCES, THERE IS A GROWING SENSE OF INEVITABILITY HERE THAT IT IS ONLY A MATTER OF TIME. ONE MAJOR SUCCESSFUL TERRORIST ACT WHICH PRODUCES SEVERAL DEAD COULD TIP THE BALANCE; RENEWE SHELLING OF ISRAELI TOWNS ALONG THE NORTHERN BORDER SURELY DO SO.

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5. FOR THIS REASON, IT IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT THAT SHARON HEAR CLEARLY FROM TOP U.S. OFFICIALS WHAT KIND OF COMPLICATIONS WOULD INEVITABLY RESULT FOR ISRAEL IF A MAJOR OPERATION WERE LAUNCHED USING AMERICAN SUPPLIED WEAPONS. HE HAS A CONSIDERABLE CAPACITY TO MINIMIZE THESE COMPLICATIONS AND TO ASSERT TO HIS COLLEAGUES THAT THE U.S. REACTION WILL BE MERELY VERBAL AND SHORT-LIVED. IF IN FACT OUR REACTION WOULD BE DIFFERENT, SHARON SHOULD KNOW IT WELL IN ADVANCE, AS SHOULD BEGIN. WE RUN GRAVE RISKS OF MISLEADING THE ISRAELIS AND

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PRODUCING EVEN MORE COMPLICATIONS FOR BOTH OUR COUNTRIES IF THEY BELIEVE A MAJOR MILITARY MOVE INTO LEBANON WOULD HAVE NO DIRECT CONSEQUENCES PAST U.N. CONDEMNATIONS OR OTHER SYMBOLIC OR VERBAL SANCTIONS.

6. TO SUM UP: DON'T TRY TO TIE THE MOU TO THE LEBANESE ISSUE WITH SHARON; IT WON'T WORK. BUT DON'T ALLOW SHARON TO LEAVE WASHINGTON WITH ANY ILLUSION ABOUT THE DEGREE TO WHICH A MAJOR MILITARY MOVE INTO LEBANON WOULD AFFECT THE COURSE OF U.S.-ISRAELI RELATIONS, IF INDEED IT WOULD HAVE THOSE CONSEQUENCES. LEWIS
UNQUOTE STOESSEL

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REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= MEETING, TROOP DEPLOYMENT, POLICY, MILITARY LEADER, OCCUPIED /

TAGS= PREL, MILI, MCAP, LE, IS, (LEVY, MOSHE)

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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MILI, LE, IS
SUBJECT: IDF DEPLOYMENT IN LEBANON

1. [REDACTED] ENTIRE TEXT [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY. IDF CHIEF OF STAFF MOSHE LEVY AND LAF CHIEF OF STAFF TANNOUS, MET LATE IN THE EVENING JUNE 12. THE OBJECTIVE OF THE MEETING ON THE ISRAELI SIDE WAS TO EXPLORE WITH THE LEBANESE WHAT CAPABILITIES THEY NOW HAVE FOR POSSIBLE REDEPLOYMENT INTO AREAS CURRENTLY OCCUPIED BY THE IDF. END SUMMARY.

3. IN THE MIDST OF THE GROWING POLITICAL DEBATE WITHIN ISRAEL OVER THE CONTINUING NUMBER OF CASUALTIES IN LEBANON
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 TEL AV 07906 131026Z

AND THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ISRAELI PULLBACK TO A SECURITY LINE OR PARTIAL OR COMPLETE UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL, (SEPTTEL) SOME SERIOUS PLANNING IS TAKING PLACE WITHIN THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT. DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY HANAN BAR-ON CALLED JUNE 13 TO GIVE US A HEADS UP ON THIS PLANNING. HE DESCRIBED A MEETING LAST NIGHT BETWEEN THE ISRAELI AND LEBANESE CHIEFS OF STAFF AS A PRELIMINARY MEETING TO EXPLORE REDEPLOYMENT POSSIBILITIES. HE SAID THE MEETING HAD NOT RESULTED FROM POLITICAL DECISIONS TO REDEPLOY, BUT WAS AN EFFORT TO DEAL CONCEPTUALLY WITH POSSIBILITIES FOR REDEPLOYMENT ON THE MILITARY LEVEL. BAR-ON SAID THERE HAD BEEN HIGH LEVEL MEETINGS IN THE MFA AND MOD MOST OF JUNE 12. HE SAID MEETINGS TOOK PLACE IN AN ATMOSPHERE OF GREAT URGENCY. BAR-ON INSISTED THAT THE LEVY-TANNOUS DISCUSSIONS TOOK PLACE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT. HE SAID THAT ON THE ISRAELI SIDE THE THOUGHT WAS THAT THE LAF MIGHT BE ABLE TO TAKE OVER IN THE BAABDA AREA AND/OR NEAR ALAYH, ALTHOUGH

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NOT THE ENTIRE SHOUF. IN RESPONSE TO CHARGE'S QUESTION, BAR-ON SAID THAT HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT THE NEXT STEP WOULD BE, BUT ANTICIPATED THERE WOULD BE ANOTHER MEETING BETWEEN THE TWO CHIEFS OF STAFF. CHARGE ASKED BAR-ON IF THE NATURE OF THE DISCUSSIONS INDICATED THAT THE IDF NOW HAS INCREASING CONFIDENCE IN THE CAPABILITIES OF THE LAF. BAR-ON SAID THAT ONE OF LEVY'S OBJECTIVES WAS TO GET TANNOUS' VIEWS ON THIS VERY QUESTION.

4. BAR-ON PROMISED TO PROVIDE US WITH A MORE COMPLETE READOUT OF THE OUTCOME OF THE LEVY-TANNOUS MEETING WHEN HE HAS RECEIVED A FULL REPORT. FLATEN

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** EXDIS

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Date Printed: 04/23/1997

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USELO RIYADH PRIORITY

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TEL AVIV 08054

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MILI, IS, LE, US
SUBJECT: ISRAELI-U.S. CONSULTATIONS ON IDF REDEPLOYMENT
IN LEBANON

REF: A. TEL AVIV 7906, B. TEL AVIV 7959

1. [REDACTED]
2. THE ISRAELI PRESS IS TODAY (JUNE 15) REPORTING THAT ISRAEL IS INITIATING DISCUSSIONS WITH WASHINGTON ON ISRAEL'S MILITARY REDEPLOYMENT IN LEBANON. IT IS ALSO REPORTED THAT MFA DIRECTOR GENERAL KIMCHE'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON THIS WEEK WILL FOCUS ON THIS SUBJECT, AS WELL AS HAVING "WORKING CONSULTATIONS" ON VARIOUS BILATERAL SUBJECTS.
3. MFA ACTING DIRECTOR GENERAL HANAN BAR-ON CALLED [REDACTED]

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EARLY JUNE 15, EMBARRASSED BY THE PRESS REPORTS NOTED ABOVE. HE SAID THAT DAVID KIMCHE HAS "NO INSTRUCTIONS WHATSOEVER" TO CONSULT ON WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SHOUF. THE ONLY INSTRUCTIONS RESEMBLING THE PRESS PLAY ON THE ISSUE IS KIMCHE'S INTENTION TO ASK WITH WHOM TO CONSULT ON THESE ISSUES NOW THAT AMBASSADORS HABIB AND DRAPER ARE NOT COMING AND GOING REGULARLY. CHARGE SUGGESTED THAT DISCUSSIONS WITH THE EMBASSY WOULD BE AN APPROPRIATE PLACE TO BEGIN. BAR-ON AGREED.

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BAR-ON WENT ON TO REITERATE THE FACT THAT HE HAS NO EXPLANATION FOR THE PRESS REPORTS ON REDEPLOYMENT. HE ACKNOWLEDGED CHARGE'S COMMENT THAT THERE WAS AN AN OBVIOUS POLITICAL BENEFIT INTERNALLY TO THESE STORIES, BUT SAID THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY DOES NOT KNOW WHAT THE SOURCE OF THE STORIES IS AND WILL REFUSE TO COMMENT PUBLICLY ON THEM. CHARGE SAID THE EMBASSY INTENDS TO RESPOND TO PRESS INQUIRIES BY NOTING THAT WE DO NOT COMMENT PUBLICLY ON DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES. ON BACKGROUND, HOWEVER, WE ARE NOTING THAT WE HAVE NOT BEEN REQUESTED BY THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT TO ENTER INTO CONSULTATIONS -- AS HAS BEEN PUBLICLY STATED IS ISRAEL'S INTENTION -- ON THESE LEVELS. . FLATEN

[REDACTED]

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** EXDIS
*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

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ENCLOSURE= n/a

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LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= CONGRATULATORY, RATIFICATION, AGREEMENT

TAGS= PGOV, PREL, OPDC, US, LE, IS

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AGS PGOV, PREL, OPDC, LE, US
SUBJECT: MESSAGES OF CONGRATULATIONS FROM THE SECRETARY

1. EMBASSY SHOULD PROMPTLY DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGES OF CONGRATULATIONS FROM THE SECRETARY ON THE OCCASION OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE LEBANON-ISRAEL AGREEMENT. NO SIGNED ORIGINALS WILL FOLLOW:

MESSAGE FOR PRIME MINISTER SHAFIQ WAZZAN.

BEGIN QUOTE:

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

PLEASE ACCEPT MY CONGRATULATIONS ON THE RATIFICATION OF THE LEBANON-ISRAEL AGREEMENT. THE IMPRESSIVE VOTE IN THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES IS A STATEMENT TO THE COURAGE OF THE PEOPLE OF LEBANON AND AN AFFIRMATION OF THE WISDOM OF LEBANON'S LEADERSHIP. LEBANON AND ITS FRIENDS OWE YOU A DEBT OF GRATITUDE FOR YOUR STATESMANSHIP IN ACHIEVING THIS HISTORIC DECISION.

WITH BEST REGARDS,
SINCERELY YOURS,
GEORGE P. SHULTZ END QUOTE

3. MESSAGE FOR PRESIDENT GEMAYEL
BEGIN QUOTE:

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

THE SUCCESSFUL PASSAGE BY THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES OF THE LEBANON-ISRAEL AGREEMENT REPRESENTS AN HISTORIC VICTORY FOR YOUR GOVERNMENT IN ITS QUEST TO ACHIEVE THE DEPARTURE OF ALL EXTERNAL FORCES FROM LEBANON. ALLOW ME TO OFFER

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PERSONAL CONGRATULATIONS U AND THE PEOPLE OF
LEBANON. YOUR WISDOM AND STATESMANSHIP ARE AN
ENCOURAGEMENT FOR ALL OF US.

WITH BEST REGARDS,
SINCERELY YOURS,
GEORGE P. SHULTZ END QUOTE.

4. MESSAGE FOR FOREIGN MINISTER ELIE SALEM.
BEGIN QUOTE:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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DEAR ELIE:

I AM GREATLY PLEASED WITH THE WELCOME NEWS THAT THE
CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES HAS RATIFIED THE LEBANON-ISRAEL
AGREEMENT BY A RESOUNDING MAJORITY, AS YOU CORRECTLY
PREDICTED DURING OUR RECENT MEETING. ALLOW ME TO OFFER
MY CONGRATULATIONS TO YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES. YOUR
DETERMINATION AND EFFORT ARE AN INSPIRATION TO US.

WITH BEST WISHES,
SINCERELY,
GEORGE P. SHULTZ END QUOTE.

5. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. SHULTZ

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LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= TROOP WITHDRAWAL, REACTION, DEATH, CASUALTY, AGGRESSION, ARM

TAGS= PREL, MOPS, PGOV, IS, LE, SY, PLO

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, IS, LE
SUBJECT: MOMENTUM PICKS UP FOR IDF REDEPLOYMENT IN LEBANON

REF: TEL AVIV 7816 (NOTAL)

1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY. THE GROWING DEATH TOLL, ALONG WITH CONTINUED SYRIAN INTRANSIGENCE, IS PLAYING A MAJOR ROLE IN BUILDING MOMENTUM WITHIN ISRAEL FOR A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL IN LEBANON. THE CABINET JUNE 12 REPORTEDLY DECIDED TO HAVE THE MINISTERIAL DEFENSE COMMITTEE MEET SOON TO DISCUSS PROPOSALS FOR A REDEPLOYMENT. SENIOR ISRAELI OFFICIALS HAVE STRESSED, HOWEVER, THAT ISRAEL CANNOT WITHDRAW UNILATERALLY AND WITHOUT FULL CONSULTATIONS. END SUMMARY.

3. MOMENTUM IS STEADILY GROWING WITHIN ISRAEL FOR A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL IN LEBANON. THERE IS WIDESPREAD DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE, AND A NUMBER OF JOURNALISTS AND COMMENTATORS ARE BEGINNING TO STATE THAT A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL IS A FOREGONE CONCLUSION. A WELL-CONNECTED ISRAELI JOURNALIST TOLD A/DCM JUNE 12 THAT ISRAEL WOULD RAPIDLY TAKE STEPS TO CONSULT WITH LEBANON AND THE UNITED

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STATES ABOUT IDF REDEPLOYMENT AS SOON AS THE LEBANESE PARLIAMENT HAD APPROVED THE AGREEMENT, WHICH IS GENERALLY UNDERSTOOD WILL TAKE PLACE ON JUNE 13 OR 14. IN A FURTHER REFLECTION OF THIS LINE, MAARIV CORRESPONDENT YA'ACOV EREZ REPORTED JUNE 13 THAT THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE MOD AND IDF "NO LONGER HAVE ANY DOUBTS" ABOUT THE QUESTION OF IDF WITHDRAWAL FROM THE "PROBLEMATIC AREAS" OF LEBANON. IN THEIR VIEW, THE ONLY REMAINING QUESTIONS ARE: WHERE

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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WILL THE NEW LINE BE AND WHEN WILL WITHDRAWAL TAKE PLACE? IDF COMMAND UNEASE ABOUT THE PRESENT DEPLOYMENT WAS ALSO UNDERSCORED IN JUNE 9 COMMENTS TO POLOFF BY FORMER IDF CHIEF OF STAFF MOTTA GUR (REFTEL).

4. ALONG WITH SYRIAN INTRANSIGENCE, THE GROWING DEATH TOLL IS CLEARLY PLAYING A MAJOR ROLE IN BUILDING UP THE PRESSURE FOR AT LEAST A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL OF IDF FORCES IN LEBANON. PRIME MINISTER BEGIN IS REPORTED TO BE ESPECIALLY TORMENTED BY THE RISING DEATH TOLL. FIVE IDF PERSONNEL WERE KILLED JUNE 9 AND 10, BRINGING THE ISRAELI DEATH TOLL TO 500 SINCE THE WAR BEGAN. OF THOSE, ABOUT 145 HAVE LOST THEIR LIVES SINCE THE PLO EVACUATION FROM BEIRUT ENDED ON AUGUST 31, 1982. WITH THIS DEEPENING AND GLOOMY BACKGROUND, ISRAELI WILLINGNESS TO CONTINUE TO ACCEPT THE STATUS QUO IS DISAPPEARING. WHILE A FULL, UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL IS NOT CONSIDERED A REALISTIC OPTION, IT IS BELIEVED BY MANY THAT A WITHDRAWAL TO MORE DEFENSIBLE AND PROTECTED LINES CAN SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCE ISRAELI CASUALTIES. IF THE ATTACKS CONTINUE, ANOTHER POSSIBILITY WOULD BE A SHARP BUT LIMITED (AND ALSO POSSIBLY COVERT) RETALIATION AGAINST PLO POSITIONS BEHIND SYRIAN LINES. HOWEVER, THIS HAS ITS OWN PRICE AND, AS FORMER PRIME MINISTER RABIN INDICATED JUNE 11, MOST OF THE ATTACKS AGAINST THE IDF ARE CARRIED OUT BY THE LEBANESE AND NOT THE PLO. NEVERTHELESS, ISRAEL CAN BE EXPECTED TO STRIKE BACK IN SOME FORM IF THE ATTACKS

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CONTINUE TO ESCALATE.

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5. JERUSALEM POST REPORTED JUNE 12 THAT A "SENIOR
POLITICAL OFFICIAL" HAD SAID THAT ISRAEL WOULD HAVE
TO RECONSIDER ITS POSITION IN LEBANON IF THERE WAS NO
SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN SYRIAN ATTITUDE ON THE LEBANON-

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ISRAEL AGREEMENT WITHIN THE NEXT THREE WEEKS. WHEN THE CHAREE ASKED MFA DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL BAR-ON ABOUT THIS STORY, BAR-ON FIRMLY DENIED THAT A DEADLINE HAD

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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BEEN ESTABLISHED. HE SAID THAT THERE HAVE BEEN "MASSES OF LOOSE TALK" SURROUNDING THE ISSUE AS THE POLITICAL CLIMATE ON THE ISSUE HEATS UP. HE READILY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS INTENSIVELY EXAMINING THE SITUATION AND OPTIONS. HE SAID THE ISSUE IS URGENT AND CANNOT BE PUT OFF FOR MONTHS'

6. YESTERDAY'S (JUNE 12) CABINET MEETING REVIEWED THE SITUATION IN THE WAKE OF THE MOUNTING TOLL. NO DECISIONS WERE TAKEN BUT IT IS REPORTED AT THE URGING OF FIVE CABINET MINISTERS THE CABINET DECIDED THE MINISTERIAL DEFENSE COMMITTEE WOULD MEET SOON TO SS PROPOSALS FOR A MILITARY REDEPLOYMENT IN LEBANON. THE FIVE MIN-

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ISTERS (HAMMER, NE'EMAN, SHOSTAK, ZIPPORI, AND SHARON), REPORTEDLY URGED ARENS TO PREPARE AND SUBMIT HIS PROPOSALS FOR REDEPLOYMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

7. SENIOR ISRAELI OFFICIALS HAVE STRESSED IN THEIR PUBLIC STATEMENTS THAT ISRAEL CANNOT WITHDRAW UNILATERALLY AND WITHOUT FULL CONSULTATIONS. DEFENSE MINISTER ARENS REPORTEDLY TOLD THE CABINET JUNE 12 THAT ISRAEL COULD NOT DECIDE ON A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL WITHOUT FIRST ENSURING THAT FRIENDLY FORCES WERE PREPARED TO TAKE OVER THE AREAS VACATED BY THE IDF. HE REPEATED THOSE REMARKS ON ISRAELI RADIO LATER THAT DAY, NOTING THAT WHEN ISRAEL REDEPLOYS, IT DID NOT WANT TO LEAVE BEHIND A VACUUM WHICH WILL BE FILLED BY THE PLO OR THE SYRIANS. ARENS ADDED, "IF WE SIMPLY MOVE OUT, WE WILL NOT BE PUTTING AN END TO THE TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST US; WE WILL SIMPLY BE MOVING THEM CLOSER TO THE ISRAELI BORDER." CABINET SECRETARY DAN MERIDOR ALSO STRESSED THIS ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM WHEN HE TOLD THE PRESS AFTER THE CABINET SESSION, "I THINK IT IS THE UNDERSTANDING OF ALL THE CABINET THAT

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THERE WILL NOT BE ANY REDEPLOYMENT OR WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON UNLESS WE ENSURE PEACE FOR THE GALILEE AS WE HAVE HAD IT FOR A YEAR OR AS WE WANT TO HAVE IT IN THE FUTURE."

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AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMCONSUL CALCUTTA
AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
AMEMBASSY DHAKA
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
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AMEMBASSY KAMPALA

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AMCONSUL KARACHI
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMCONSUL MADRAS
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT
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//ZFF FOR TEL AVIV ONLY//

E.O. 12356 NA

TAGS: OPRC

SUBJECT: DEPARTMENT PRESS BRIEFING JUNE 10, 1983

FOR ADDRESSEE POSTS' INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE, FOLLOWING
ARE EXCERPTS FROM TODAY'S PRESS BRIEFING. SPOKESMAN WAS
ALAN ROMBERG.

Q. THE ISRAELIS LOST 3 SOLDIERS THIS MORNING AND 1
KIDNAPPED. DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENT TO WHAT SEEMS TO BE A
NEW CAMPAIGN AGAINST ISRAELI PRESENCE?

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A. I DON'T HAVE ANY NEW COMMENT TO OFFER. OBVIOUSLY,
ANY LOSS OF LIFE IN THIS SITUATION IS TRAGIC AND
UNDERScores THE NEED FOR A RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEMS.

Q. HAVE THE ISRAELIS MADE ANY INDICATIONS ABOUT THEIR
LEVEL OF THEIR PATIENCE VIS-A-VIS THE WAR OF ATTRITION?

A. I THINK THAT SOMETHING YOU WOULD HAVE TO TALK TO THE
ISRAELIS ABOUT?

Q. THEY HAVE TALKED TO US ABOUT IT.

A. WELL, WE DON'T NORMALLY TALK ABOUT WHAT THEY TALK TO
US ABOUT.

Q. ANY COMMENT ABOUT THE DEMONSTRATION FOR PROTESTING
THE ANSAR CAMP? THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS COMING OUT FOR
THE LAST 4 DAYS THAT THERE ARE STRIKES AND PROTESTS AND
VIOLENCE AND BURNING OF TENTS. DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING ON
THAT?

A. NOTHING BEYOND THE FACT AS WE NOTED MANY TIMES
BEFORE. WE REMAIN CONCERNED ABOUT THE PRISONERS HELD BY
BOTH SIDES. WE OBVIOUSLY ARE HOPEFUL THAT THEIR RELEASE

CAN BE SUCESSFULLY NEGOTIATED AT A EARLY DATE. BUT I DON'T HAVE SPECIFIC COMMENT ON THAT. WE MADE THAT CONCERN MADE KNOWN A NUMBER OF TIMES BEFORE THAT MADE CLEAR THAT WE ARE ACTIVE ON THAT ISSUE FROM TIME TO TIME WHEN IT IS APPROPRIATE AND DECENT.

Q. ANY CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO SENDING DEPUTY SECRETARY DAM TO SYRIA?

A. THERE ARE NO PLANS FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY DAM TO GO TO SYRIA.

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Q. COULD YOU BRING US UP A BIT ON THE MIDDLE EAST TALKS WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OVER THE PAST FEW DAYS, WHERE THEY STAND; HAVE THEY BEEN CONCLUDED; ANY RECOMMENDATIONS; ETC.

A. I DON'T THINK I CAN GIVE YOU A DETAILED READ OUT ON THEM. THE TALKS WERE HELD YESTEDAY. I DON'T HAVE ANY PARTICULAR RESULTS TO OFFER YOU.

Q. WHERE DOES THE TROOP WITHDRAWAL AGREEMENT (LEBANON-ISRAEL) STAND AT THE PRESENT TIME? WHAT SORT OF FUTURE DOES IT HAVE? IS IT FINISHED?

A. OBVIOUSLY, IT REMAINS TO BE IMPLEMENTED. BUT IT IS AN IMPORTANT STEP. IT PROVIDES THE FRAMEWORK FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL ISRAELI FORCES FROM LEBANON. THE OBVIOUS NEXT STEP IN THE OVERALL PROCESS IS TO GET AGREEMENT ON WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIAN AND PLO FORCES.

Q. THAT WOULD LOGICALLY LEAD TO OUR TALKING TO SYRIA AT A HIGH LEVEL. THE SYRIANS HAVE SAID QUITE CLEARLY AND REPEATEDLY THAT THEY WILL NOT RECEIVE HABIB. WHAT HAS PHIL HABIB GOT TO DO FOR A LIVING RIGHT NOW IF HE CAN'T GO TO SYRIA? WHAT ARE WE GOING TO DO?

A. I'M NOT SURE THAT LOGICALLY OR NECESSARILY BRINGS UP

'HE CONCLUSION THAT YOU HAVE SUGGESTED. I'M NOT RULING OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF FUTURE TALKS AT VARIOUS HIGH LEVELS. WE OBVIOUSLY HAVE WAYS OF TALKING TO THE SYRIANS WITHOUT HIGH LEVEL VISITORS GOING ONE WAY OR THE OTHER. WHAT PHIL HABIB'S PLANS ARE AS I INDICATED BEFORE, I

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Date Printed: 10/23/1996

DOC_NUMBER: 83STATE162220

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DON'T KNOW ABOUT PLANS RETURNING TO THE MIDDLE EAST AT THIS POINT. THAT IS PART OF WHAT IS BEING CONSIDERED IN TERMS OF CONSULTATIONS THAT HE IS HOLDING HERE OR WHEN IT MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE FOR HIM TO GO BACK.

Q. DO YOU HAVE A TIME FOR MINISTER SALEM TO MEET WITH THE SECRETARY TOMORROW?

A. I HAVE A TENTATIVE TIME OF 10:30.

Q. DO YOU HAVE A SCHEDULE FOR THE NEW ISRAELI AMBASSADOR TO MEET WITH THE SECRETARY THIS WEEKEND?

A. NO, I DON'T. I THINK THAT THEY WILL BE GETTING TOGETHER AFTER THE SECRETARY GETS BACK.

Q. IS THE UNITED STATES IN TOUCH WITH SYRIA AT ANY LEVEL?

A. SURE, WE HAVE DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION. THERE ARE DISCUSSIONS THAT GO ON IN MOST DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS.

Q. THE GENTLEMEN WHO IS AN OFFICIAL IN THE LIBYAN STUDENT AIDE OFFICE IS BEING DETAINED. HIS VISA HAS BEEN CANCELLED ON GROUNDS PREJUDICIAL TO U.S. INTERESTS. IS THIS CORRECT? DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENT AS TO WHY HE IS BEING DETAINED AND IS HE TO BE DEPORTED.

A. MR. GHADBAN'S VISA HAVE BEEN INVALIDATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 212 (A) (27) OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT HE UNDERTOOK ACTIVITIES, UNRELATED TO HIS STUDENT STATUS, WHICH WERE PREJUDICIAL TO THE PUBLIC INTEREST.

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** ONLY
*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED

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AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITYDEPARTMENT OF STATE JM/IPS/CR/IR Date: 11/10/97
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PA Exemptions _____ ☐ CLASSIFY as ☐ S or ☐ C Sec.
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STATE 164468

DECAPTIONED

FOLLOWING REPEAT SENT ACTION SECSTATE INFO DAMASCUS
JERUSALEM JIDDA RIYADH TEL AVIV JUNE 10.

QUOTE: BEIRUT 06603

DECAPTIONED

DEPT. ALSO FOR AMBS. HABIB AND DRAPER; PASS JCS FOR J-5

FROM ROSS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, XF, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US
SUBJECT: LEBANON MISSION: PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL TO THE FORE

1. [REDACTED]

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2. SUMMARY. HADDAD AND TUENI HAVE BEGUN SEPARATELY TO EXPRESS THOUGHTS ON HOW TO DEAL WITH WHAT THEY SEE AS AN INEVITABLE PARTIAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. WHILE THEY OPPOSE A WITHDRAWAL OF THIS NATURE AND EXPECT THE U.S. TO OPPOSE IT AS WELL, THEY DO NOT EXPECT THIS OPPOSITION TO OVERCOME THE PRESSURES ON THE ISRAELIS. THEY HAVE THEREFORE BEGUN TO THINK ABOUT HOW TO EXPLOIT THE INEVITABLE FOR WIDER PURPOSES -- I.E., TO RESTORE THE INITIATIVE ON THE DOMESTIC FRONT TO THE GEMAYEL GOVERNMENT AND TO TRIGGER

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TUENI (ECHOED IN THIS BY COL. JOHNNY ABDU, WHO CONTINUES TO FUNCTION AS MNF COORDINATOR) IS ADAMANT THAT THE INITIAL LEBANESE RESPONSE MUST BE TO INSIST ON FULL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, AND HE EXPECTS U.S. SUPPORT FOR THIS POSITION. HE KNOWS THAT THE ISRAELI RESPONSE WILL BE NEGATIVE AND THAT NEITHER LEBANON NOR THE U.S. WILL CHANGE THIS. THEREFORE, HE EXPECTS A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL TO OCCUR. WITHOUT ADDRESSING THE TACTICS OF THE INITIAL LEBANESE RESPONSE, HADDAD EXPECTS THE SAME. THUS, WHILE BOTH HADDAD AND TUENI WOULD PREFER A TOTAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, THEY KNOW THIS IS NOT IN THE CARDS AND HAVE

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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THEREFORE BEGUN TO THINK ABOUT HOW TO EXPLOIT THE INEVITABLE FOR WIDER PURPOSES -- I.E., TO RESTORE THE INITIATIVE ON THE DOMESTIC FRONT TO THE GEMAYEL GOVERNMENT AND TO TRIGGER THE PROCESS OF OBTAINING SYRIAN/PLO WITHDRAWAL.

6. PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL AND DOMESTIC POLITICS

FOR HADDAD, WHO IS A KEY PLAYER IN ATTEMPTS TO BRING THE VARIOUS LEBANESE FACTIONS TOGETHER, A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL, PROPERLY MANAGED (I.E., TO OVERCOME SHI'ITE OPPOSITION TO SUCH A WITHDRAWAL AND TO ENSURE THAT THE IDF DOES NOT LEAVE A VACUUM BEHIND IT FOR THE SYRIANS AND PLO TO FILL) HAS THE ATTRACTION OF GIVING THE GEMAYEL GOVERNMENT SOMETHING NEW TO WORK WITH -- PACIFICATION OF THE 'ALAYH AND SHUF DISTRICTS. THE PRESENT SITUATION, IN WHICH EFFORTS TO REASSERT THE AUTHORITY OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT HAVE BEEN CONFINED TO THE GREATER BEIRUT AREA FOR OVER EIGHT MONTHS, HAS STAGNATED TO THE POINT OF ROT. THE INITIATIVE HAS PASSED FROM THE HANDS OF THE GOVERNMENT INTO THAT OF THE VARIOUS POLITICAL AND CONFESSIONAL GROUPINGS. ONE WAY TO RESTORE THE INITIATIVE TO THE GOVERNMENT, IN HADDAD'S VIEW, IS TO MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR IT TO EXTEND ITS AUTHORITY INTO THE 'ALAYH AND SHUF DISTRICTS. THIS WOULD CHANGE THE TERMS OF THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL DEBATE.

HADDAD IS ALL THE MORE ATTRACTED TO THE IDEA OF A PARTIAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AS AN ACCEPTABLE FALLBACK TO FULL WITHDRAWAL BECAUSE ISRAELI OFFICIALS, IN THEIR CONTINUING CONTACTS WITH VARIOUS MEMBERS OF THE LEBANESE NEGOTIATING TEAM (PRINCIPALLY AMB. FATTAL, WHOM DAVID KIMCHE SAW "ON A PERSONAL BASIS" JUNE 6), HAVE INTIMATED THAT IT MIGHT

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BE POSSIBLE FOR THE IDF TO WITHDRAW ALL THE WAY TO "LINE B" OF THE SECURITY REGION (ROUGHLY THE ZAHRANI RIVER SOUTH OF SIDON). THIS WOULD GIVE THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT CONTROL NOT ONLY OF THE 'ALAYH AND SHUF DISTRICTS, BUT ALSO OF THE IMPORTANT REGIONAL CAPITAL OF SIDON. REASSERTION OF CONTROL IN THESE AREAS WOULD, IN HADDAD'S VIEW, CREATE A WHOLE NEW SET OF CIRCUMSTANCES PERMITTING THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT TO REOCCUPY CENTER STAGE IN DOMESTIC POLITICS.

7. PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL AND THE SYRIAN/PLO PRESENCE

HADDAD AND (WITH DIFFERENCES OF DETAIL) TUENI ARGUE FOR A SCENARIO ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES:

--- ISRAEL, LEBANON, AND THE U.S. CONSULT ON THE CONTINUIN STALEMATE. ISRAEL INSISTS ON A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL.

-- AFTER A SUITABLY STAGE-MANAGED CONSULTATION, ISRAEL BEGINS A WITHDRAWAL WHOSE PACE AND SCOPE ARE LEFT AS AMBIGUOUS AS POSSIBLE IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS.

-- IN COORDINATION WITH THE IDF, THE LAF MOVES INTO AREAS ABANDONED BY THE ISRAELIS.

-- SHORTLY THEREAFTER, THE MNF ASSUMES UNSPECIFIED NEW POSITIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE LAF. (COL. ABDU IS STILL UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT THE FRENCH CONTINGENT WILL ACCEPT DUTIES IN THE 'ALAYH AND SHUF DISTRICTS. BOTH HE AND TUENI APPEAR TO AGREE THAT IN ANY CASE THE MNF MUST BE PRESENT WITH THE LAF IN POSITIONS ADJACENT TO THE SYRIANS. HADDAD SEEMS PREPARED TO ACCEPT AN MNF ROLE LIMITED TO THE MAJOR HIGHWAYS EAST AND SOUTH OF BEIRUT.)

-- LEBANON PRESENTS THE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL TO SYRIA AND

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TO KEY ARAB STATES AS A CONCESSION OBTAINED FROM ISRAEL B LEBANON AND THE U.S.

-- THE BEGINNING OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL HAVING BROKEN THE LINK BETWEEN ISRAELI AND SYRIAN/PLO WITHDRAWAL, LEBANON AND THE U.S. PREVAIL ON KEY ARAB STATES, ESPECIALLY SAUDI ARABIA, TO MAKE A MAJOR EFFORT TO GET A SYRIAN/PLO WITHDRAWAL STARTED. AS PART OF THIS EFFORT, SAUDI ARABIA OFFERS NEW FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS TO SYRIA.

-- THE VARIOUS WITHDRAWALS ALL END IN ABOUT THE SAME TIME FRAME, AND EVERYONE LIVES HAPPILY EVER AFTER.

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8. COMMENT: -SUCH THINKING, OBVIOUSLY HIGHLY TENTATIVE, MAY NOT YET HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL OR FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM. IT DOES TAKE QUITE A POSITIVE VIEW OF THE VALUE OF A PARTIAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, AND ITS PROPONENTS HAVE BEGUN TO PREPARE PUBLIC OPINION. IN RECENT DAYS, SEVERAL NEWS ANALYSES CITING "GOVERNMENT SOURCES OF MINISTERIAL RANK" (THE USUAL DESCRIPTION OF HADDAD) HAVE APPEARED IN BEIRUT PAPERS ADDRESSING THE LIKELIHOOD OF A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL, USUALLY WITH A REFERENCE TO U.S. RESPONSIBILITY FOR SEEING THAT IT LEADS TO THE FULL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES. PUGH UNQUOTE SHULTZ

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
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DECAPTIONED

DEPT. PLS PASS SECDEF AND WHITE HOUSE - FOR THE ACTING
SECRETARY, SECRETARY WEINBERGER, AND NSC - JUDGE CLARKE,
FROM AMBASSADOR LEWIS

E.O. 12065: RDS 3, 5/15/02 (LEWIS, SAMUEL W.) OR-M

TAGS: MASS, IS, US, LE

SUBJECT: SHARON VISIT AND LEBANON

REF: TEL AVIV 7270

1.

2. UPON REREADING MY MESSAGE CONCERNING SHARON'S VISIT
(REFTEL), I REALIZE MY POINT IN PARA. 5 ABOUT THE
IMPOSSIBILITY OF EXTRACTING "EXTRANEIOUS CONDITIONS" FROM
SHARON CONCERNING LEBANON OR JORDAN ARMS SALES CAN BE
MISUNDERSTOOD. ALL SENIOR U.S. OFFICIALS WHOM HE SEES IN
WASHINGTON SHOULD TALK TURKEY TO SHARON ABOUT THE
DANGEROUS SITUATION IN LEBANON. TO SLIDE OVER IT WOULD
BE TO GIVE HIM A DANGEROUS SIGNAL AND REINFORCE HIS
CONVICTION THAT WHATEVER ISRAEL ULTIMATELY DECIDES IT
MUST DO ABOUT THE PLO IN LEBANON CAN BE DONE WITHOUT
LONG-LASTING DAMAGE TO U.S.-ISRAELI RELATIONS.

3. MY POINT RATHER IS THAT SHARON WILL TOTALLY REJECT

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ANY SPECIFIC "QUID PRO QUO" OR "LINKAGE" CONCERNING

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LEBANON. HE HAS MADE THE POINT REPEATEDLY IN BEGIN'S PRESENCE AND MINE TO HIGH-RANKING U.S. OFFICIALS THAT HOWEVER DESIRABLE THE MOU MAY BE FOR ISRAEL AND THE U.S., IT CANNOT AND WILL NOT BE A MEANS FOR "TYING ISRAEL'S HANDS" TO PREVENT ISRAEL FROM TAKING WHATEVER STEPS IT DEEMS NECESSARY TO PROTECT ITS SECURITY. THAT WOULD CERTAINLY BE HIS RESPONSE IN WASHINGTON AS WELL.

4. NONETHELESS, WE ARE SKATING ON EXTREMELY THIN ICE AT THIS MOMENT WITH RESPECT TO LEBANON. ALTHOUGH THERE IS NOT A STRONG MAJORITY YET IN THE CABINET, MUCH LESS IN THE COUNTRY AT LARGE, TO SUPPORT SHARON'S DETERMINATION TO DEAL THE PLO IN LEBANON A DEVASTATING BLOW, REGARDLESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMATIC CONSEQUENCES, THERE IS A GROWING SENSE OF INEVITABILITY HERE THAT IT IS ONLY A MATTER OF TIME. ONE MAJOR SUCCESSFUL TERRORIST ACT WHICH PRODUCES SEVERAL DEAD COULD TIP THE BALANCE; RENEWE SHELLING OF ISRAELI TOWNS ALONG THE NORTHERN BORDER SURELY DO SO.

5. FOR THIS REASON, IT IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT THAT SHARON HEAR CLEARLY FROM TOP U.S. OFFICIALS WHAT KIND OF COMPLICATIONS WOULD INEVITABLY RESULT FOR ISRAEL IF A MAJOR OPERATION WERE LAUNCHED USING AMERICAN SUPPLIED WEAPONS. HE HAS A CONSIDERABLE CAPACITY TO MINIMIZE THESE COMPLICATIONS AND TO ASSERT TO HIS COLLEAGUES THAT THE U.S. REACTION WILL BE MERELY VERBAL AND SHORT-LIVED. IF IN FACT OUR REACTION WOULD BE DIFFERENT, SHARON SHOULD KNOW IT WELL IN ADVANCE, AS SHOULD BEGIN. WE RUN GRAVE RISKS OF MISLEADING THE ISRAELIS AND PRODUCING EVEN MORE COMPLICATIONS FOR BOTH OUR COUNTRIES IF THEY BELIEVE A MAJOR MILITARY MOVE INTO LEBANON WOULD

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HAVE NO DIRECT CONSEQUENCES PAST U.N. CONDEMNATIONS OR OTHER SYMBOLIC OR VERBAL SANCTIONS.

6. TO SUM UP: DON'T TRY TO TIE THE MOU TO THE LEBANESE ISSUE WITH SHARON; IT WON'T WORK. BUT DON'T ALLOW SHARON TO LEAVE WASHINGTON WITH ANY ILLUSION ABOUT THE DEGREE TO WHICH A MAJOR MILITARY MOVE INTO LEBANON WOULD AFFECT THE COURSE OF U.S.-ISRAELI RELATIONS, IF INDEED IT WOULD HAVE THOSE CONSEQUENCES. LEWIS

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DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS SECDEF AND WHITEHOUSE

FOR THE ACTING SECRETARY, SECRETARY WEINBERGER, NSC
- JUDGE CLARKE

FROM LEWIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-3 5/14/02 (LEWIS, SAMUEL W.) OR-M
TAGS: MASS, IS, US
SUBJECT: SHARON VISIT AND STRATEGIC COOPERATION

REF: A) TEL AVIV 6991, B) STATE 126213, C) TEL AVIV 7093

1. [REDACTED]

2. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY: UNLESS SHARON'S IMPENDING TALKS IN WASHINGTON ARE HANDLED RIGHT, U.S. CREDIBILITY WITH BEGIN AND OTHER SENIOR ISRAELI LEADERS MAY AGAIN BE FRACTURED. BEGIN INTERPRETED HAIG'S LETTER OF MAY 8 TO MEAN THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD NOW DECIDED TO GO AHEAD WITH THE MOU ON STRATEGIC COOPERATION. (AND ANY OTHER INTERPRETATION OF THE LETTER WOULD BE TORTURED INDEED.) TO TRY NOW TO EXTRACT EXTRANEOUS CONDITIONS FROM SHARON FOR RENEWAL WILL SURELY FAIL AND WILL BE SEEN BY BEGIN AS BAD FAITH. NOW THAT WE HAVE GONE THIS FAR, WE SHOULD PROCEED

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TO ESTABLISH THE MOU FRAMEWORK AND USE THE CONSULTATION

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STRUCTURE IT ENVISIONS AS OUR BEST CHANCE OF AFFECTING
ISRAELI STRATEGIC PLANNING AND DECISION MAKING IN THE
FUTURE. END INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY.

3. PRIME MINISTER BEGIN WAS TRULY DELIGHTED WITH SECRETARY
HAIG'S MAY 8 LETTER INDICATING THAT THE U.S. IS PREPARED
TO MOVE FORWARD ON TALKS ABOUT THE RESUMPTION OF THE
STRATEGIC DIALOGUE, INCLUDING DISCUSSIONS ON REINSTATEMENT
OF THE MOU AND DEFENSE TRADE. HE INTERPRETED IT TO MEAN
THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS DECIDED TO GO AHEAD WITH THE SUS-
PENDED MOU AND LIFT THE "PUNISHMENT" ISRAEL SUFFER
DECEMBER. THE SECRETARY'S LETTER, FOLLOWING ON PRESIDENT
REAGAN'S STRONGLY SUPPORTIVE LETTER OF APRIL 20, SENT ON
THE EVE OF THE PAINFUL FINAL WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI, HAS
DONE MUCH TO SHORE UP BEGIN'S CONFIDENCE IN THE REAGAN
ADMINISTRATION'S COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL AND SETS THE STAGE
FOR REPAIRING A RELATIONSHIP WHICH HAS BEEN SORELY BUFFETED
IN RECENT MONTHS. EXPECTATIONS ARE NOW HIGH HERE ON MOVING
FORWARD EXPEDITIOUSLY TO REALIZE THE PROMISE OF GENUINE
STRATEGIC COOPERATION WHICH BLOOMED DURING BEGIN'S MEETINGS
WITH THE PRESIDENT LAST SEPTEMBER.

4. THE FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS IS MINDEF SHARON'S IMPENDING
PRIVATE TRIP TO THE UNITED STATES; HE TOLD US HE WOULD BE
GLAD TO RECEIVE INVITATIONS AND COULD BE IN WASHINGTON ON
MAY 25 OR 26 IF SECRETARIES WEINBERGER, HAIG, OR OTHERS
WISHED TO MEET WITH HIM, TAKING PAINS HOWEVER NOT TO APPEAR
TOO EAGER. THUS FAR, NO DIRECT INVITATIONS HAVE BEEN EX-
TENDED. IT WOULD HELP TO AVOID UNNECESSARY COMPLICATIONS
IF APPROPRIATE INVITATIONS WERE ISSUED IMMEDIATELY.

5. SHARON'S VISIT WILL BE CRUCIAL TO BUILDING UPON THE

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POSITIVE FOUNDATION ESTABLISHED BY SECRETARY HAIG'S LETTER.
PROUD AND STILL BRUISED FROM THE SUSPENSION OF THE MOU IN
DECEMBER, SHARON WILL UNDERSTANDABLY NOW EXPECT TO HAVE
PRODUCTIVE TALKS ON THE FRAMEWORK OF STRATEGIC COOPERATION
IN THE COURSE OF HIS VISIT, AND THE U.S. RESPONSE WILL BE
IMPORTANT TO THE ISRAELIS AS A MEASURE OF OUR CREDIBILITY.
IF WE ARE ABLE TO SHOW PROGRESS TOWARD REINSTATING THE MOU
ON STRATEGIC COOPERATION AND GETTING UNDER WAY AGAIN THE
SUSPENDED DEFENSE TRADE MEASURES, WE WILL HAVE DEMONSTRATED
CONCRETELY OUR ONGOING COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL'S SECURITY, AND

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IN THE PROCESS OUR DEPENDABILITY AS A FRIEND AND PARTNER. ON THE OTHER HAND, SHOULD SHARON RETURN TO ISRAEL ANGRY AND EMPTY-HANDED OR FILLED WITH FURTHER DOUBTS ABOUT OUR INTENTIONS, THEATION WILL BE MUCH WORSE THAN PRIOR TO THE DELIVERY OF THE HAIG LETTER. WERE WE TO TRY TO EXTRACT EXTRANEOUS CONDITIONS FROM SHARON IN EXCHANGE FOR RENEWAL (E.G., RE LEBANON OR JORDAN ARMS SALES), THEY WOULD BE FLATLY REJECTED. BEGIN WILL BE BAFFLED AND SUSPECT OUR GOOD FAITH. U.S. CREDIBILITY WOULD HAVE BEEN DANGEROUSLY DAMAGED, AND THE ATMOSPHERE FOR THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER IN JUNE POISONED. I CANNOT OVEREMPHASIZE THE STAKES THAT ARE INVOLVED, NOW THAT OUR APPARENT DECISION TO REINSTATE THE MOU HAS BEEN TAKEN, CONVEYED TO BEGIN, AND PUBLICLY REVEALED BY THE PRESS IN BOTH WASHINGTON AND JERUSALEM. WE SIMPLY CANNOT AFFORD NOW TO BE SEEN AS BACK-PEDALING.

6. IN ADDITION TO REAFFIRMING OUR WILLINGNESS TO REINSTATE THE MOU AND THE FRAMEWORK IT PROVIDES FOR STRATEGIC DIALOGUE, I BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT TO DISCUSS WITH SHARON

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SPECIFIC FORWARD STEPS, INCLUDING AGREEMENT ON A SCHEDULE OF EVENTS. AMONG THE SPECIFIC ACTIONS WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ARE: (1) ESTABLISHING THE MOU'S COORDINATING COUNCIL, (2) APPOINTING JOINT WORKING GROUPS TO ADDRESS THE ISSUES ENUMERATED IN ARTICLE III OF THE MOU, AND (3) SCHEDULING MEETINGS FOR THE COORDINATING COUNCIL AND JOINT WORKING GROUPS. GENERAL ABRASHA TAMIR SHOULD BE INVITED TO FOLLOW UP ON THESE HIGH-LEVEL AGREEMENTS. I STRONGLY URGE THAT SECRETARY WEINBERGER ALSO INDICATE TO SHARON HIS WILLINGNESS TO CO-CHAIR THE FIRST JOINT SESSION OF THE COORDINATING COUNCIL DURING HIS VISIT TO ISRAEL LATER THIS YEAR. THESE STEPS WILL DEMONSTRATE THAT PROGRESS IS UNDER WAY.

7. DISCUSSION OF DEFENSE TRADE ISSUES SHOULD ALSO BE REVIEWED WHILE SHARON IS IN WASHINGTON. SPECIFIC TOPICS WHICH I BELIEVE SHOULD BE ADDRESSED IN THIS CATEGORY INCLUDE THE USE OF FOREIGN MILITARY SALES CREDITS BY ISRAEL TO PURCHASE ISRAELI-MADE MILITARY EQUIPMENT, AND REACTIVATION OF THE STATE/ODD DEFENSE TRADE TEAM. THIS WOULD PUT SOME MEAT ON THE BONES.

8. THE STEPS OUTLINED ABOVE WILL DEMONSTRATE OUR FIRM COMMITMENT TO FOLLOW THROUGH ON THE ISSUES OF THE MOU AND DEFENSE TRADE, AS STATED IN HAIG'S MAY 8 LETTER. I RECOGNIZE THAT THERE IS MUCH WORK TO BE DONE AND LITTLE TIME TO

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COMPLETE IT BEFORE SHARON ARRIVES IN WASHINGTON. THE CONSEQUENCES OF FAILING TO FOLLOW THROUGH HOWEVER WOULD BE

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SEVERE; INSTEAD OF GRADUALLY STEADYING, OUR RELATIONSHIP WILL GO INTO ANOTHER TAILSPIN. I AM CONVINCED THAT LONGER TERM BENEFITS TO THE U.S.-ISRAELI RELATIONSHIP OF OUR BEING IN A POSITION TO BE AT LEAST PARTIALLY FORTHCOMING DURING THE SHARON VISIT MAKE THIS EFFORT IMPERATIVE. OTHERWISE, BEGIN'S MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT IN MID-JUNE WILL FOCUS ON YET ANOTHER UNNECESSARY MISUNDERSTANDING OVER THIS SEQUENCE OF EVENTS--RATHER THAN THE BROADER AND MORE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES LIKE THE FUTURE OF THE PEACE PROCESS.

LEWIS

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Date Printed: 10/23/1996

DOC_NUMBER: 83TELAV09988

CHANNEL: n/a

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PAGE 01 TEL AV 09988 241404Z
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INFO	OCT-00	COPY-01	ADS-00	INR-10	EUR-12	SS-10	CIAE-00
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FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

DIA WASHINGTON DC// IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE

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UNCLAS TEL AVIV 09988

NEA FOR AMBASSADORS LEWIS AND HABIB; CINCEUR FOR POLAD

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL, IS

SUBJECT: ISRAELI PUBLIC COMMENTS ON AMBASSADOR HABIB'S

-- DEPARTURE

1. MFA HAS ISSUED THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT ON
 THE REPLACEMENT OF AMBASSADOR HABIB BY ROBERT
 MCFARLANE AS PRESIDENT REAGAN'S SPECIAL MIDDLE
 EAST ENVOY. COMMENCE TEXT.
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-- MFA SPOKESMAN AVI PAZNER PAID TRIBUTE TO AMBASSADOR
 PHILIP HABIB, OUTGOING PERSONAL ENVOY OF PRESIDENT
 REAGAN. HE SAID THAT AMBASSADOR HABIB'S INDEFATIGABLE
 WORK THROUGHOUT THE YEARS OF HIS SERVICE IN OUR AREA
 HAVE EVOKED THE ADMIRATION OF MANY. HE ALSO WELCOMED
 THE APPOINTMENT OF ROBERT MCFARLANE, WHO MANY IN
 ISRAEL KNOW WELL, AND SAID THAT ISRAEL WAS LOOKING
 FORWARD TO WORKING CLOSELY WITH MR. MCFARLANE IN OUR

COMMON SEARCH FOR PEACE AND STABILITY. HE EXPRESSED HIS HOPE THAT THE COORDINATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL WHICH IS SO ESSENTIAL WILL BE FURTHER STRENGTHENED AND DEEPENED IN THE DAYS AND MONTHS AHEAD. END TEXT.

2. THE JERUSALEM POST QUOTED PRIME MINISTER BEGIN'S PRESS ADVISOR, URI PORAT, AS SAYING THAT PRIME MINISTER BEGIN REGARDS HABIB AS ONE OF THE MOST BRILLIANT DIPLOMATS HE HAS EVER MET AND THAT, IN MANY WAYS, HE WOULD MISS THE AMERICAN OFFICIAL.

3. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED BEIRUT. FLATEN

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED

Date Printed: 10/23/1996

DOC_NUMBER: 83JERUSA02666

CHANNEL: n/a

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USCINCEUR FOR POLAD

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: SOPN, IS, JO

SUBJECT: WEST BANK AND JERUSALEM MEDIA REPORT, FOR
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WEEKEND OF JULY 23-24, AND MONDAY, JULY 25.

1. HIGHLIGHTS:

-- "PEACE NOW" PROTESTS JEWISH SETTLER PRESENCE IN HEBRON

-- VANDALS DESECRATE GRAVES AS PART OF CONTINUING
CONTROVERSY OVER EXCAVATIONS IN THE CITY OF DAVID DIG

-- AMBASSADOR HABIB REPLACED BY ROBERT MCFARLANE AS
SPECIAL MIDEAST ENVOY

END HIGHLIGHTS.

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2. "PEACE NOW" PROTESTS JEWISH SETTLER PRESENCE IN HEBRON
APPROXIMATELY 1,500 "PEACE NOW" SUPPORTERS HELD A
DEMONSTRATION IN HEBRON ON SATURDAY TO PROTEST RECENT
ISRAELI MEASURES IN THE CITY FOLLOWING THE STABBING DEATH
OF YESHIVA STUDENT AHARON GROSS. (MODERATE "AL QUDS")
"THE JERUSALEM POST" REPORTS THAT "THOUSANDS" GATHERED
FOR THE DEMONSTRATION IN CENTRAL HEBRON TO PROTEST PLANS
TO RESETTLE THE JEWISH QUARTER OF THE CITY, AND TO DEMAND
THAT THE CENTRAL BUS STATION BE RETURNED TO ITS ARAB
OWNERS RATHER THAN TRANSFERRED TO JEWISH SETTLERS. A
MOVEMENT SPOKESMAN SAID THAT "PEACE NOW" IS NOT
"MOLLIFIED" BY THE REOPENING OF THE WHOLESALE VEGETABLE
MARKET, AND IS SEEKING CLARIFICATIONS REGARDING THE
FUTURE OF THE ENTIRE TOWN CENTER. ON FRIDAY, JULY 22,
MILITARY AUTHORITIES CLOSED THE CITY TO ALL
NON-RESIDENTS, AS PART OF THE LARGE-SCALE SECURITY
MEASURES UNDERTAKEN TO PREVENT AN OUTBREAK OF VIOLENCE
DURING THE "PEACE NOW" DEMONSTRATION. RADICAL "ASHAAB"
WRITES THAT SATURDAY'S PROTEST WAS THE FIRST OF ITS KIND
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IN HEBRON--AN AREA WHERE THERE IS "SEVERE TENSION"
BETWEEN ARAB RESIDENTS AND JEWISH SETTLERS.

-- QUOTING THE ISRAELI MAGAZINE "AL HAMISHMAR," "ASHAAB"
REPORTS THAT THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF HEBRON HAS
ORDERED THAT ALL BUSES BE MOVED FROM THE CENTRAL TERMINAL
TO AN AREA WHICH IS NOT UNDER THE CONTROL OF ISRAELI
MILITARY AUTHORITIES. THE DIRECTOR OF THE HEBRON BUS
COMPANY HAS REPORTEDLY PRESENTED A COMPLAINT TO THE
COURT, PROTESTING THE SEIZURE OF THE BUS TERMINAL BY
MILITARY AUTHORITIES. ("ASHAAB")

-- DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER LEVI HAS INDICATED THAT PLANS TO
SETTLE 500 FAMILIES IN HEBRON'S JEWISH QUARTER OVER THE
NEXT THREE YEARS HAVE BEEN COMPLETED AND WILL PROCEED
APACE. ("ASHAAB")

-- A DELEGATION REPRESENTING ARAB INSTITUTIONS ON THE
WEST BANK VISITED HEBRON MAYOR NACHE TO EXPRESS THE
MEMBERS' SOLIDARITY WITH CITY RESIDENTS, AND THEIR
SUPPORT FOR THE DISMISSED MAYOR AND MUNICIPAL COUNCIL.
(ALL PAPERS)

-- THREE YOUNG MEN HAVE BEEN ARRESTED BY ISRAELI

AUTHORITIES ON SUSPICION OF COMPLICITY IN THE MURDER OF AHARON GROSS. (ALL PAPERS) MEANWHILE, "ASHAAB" REPORTS THAT MK MEIR TSIVIN HAS REQUESTED THE GOVERNMENT TO INTERVENE IN THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE BURNING OF THE WHOLESALE MARKET, WHICH HE CHARGES HAS LACKED ANY SERIOUS ATTEMPT TO REVEAL THE IDENTITY OF THOSE WHO TOOK PART IN THE INCIDENT.

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UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 03 JERUSALEM 02666

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3. VANDALS DESECRATE GRAVES AS PART OF CONTINUING
CONTROVERSY OVER EXCAVATIONS IN THE CITY OF DAVID DIG

"EXTREMISTS," PRESUMABLY FROM JERUSALEM'S ULTRA-ORTHODOX COMMUNITY, DESECRATED THE GRAVES OF AN ARCHEOLOGIST AND HIS WIFE IN THE SANHEDRIA CEMETARY, FOLLOWING TWO WEEKS OF CONTROVERSY OVER THE EXCAVATIONS AT AREA "G" OF THE CITY OF DAVID. VANDALS ALSO PAINTED GRAFFITI AT THE SITE OF THE DIG PROTESTING THE ONGOING EXCAVATION. ("THE JERUSALEM PDST") MEANWHILE, A BILL--WHICH PROPOSES TO HALT ALL EXCAVATIONS WHICH RABBINICAL AUTHORITIES BELIEVE TO BE SITES FOR JEWISH GRAVES--IS EXPECTED TO BE TABLED IN THE KNESSET TOMORROW. AN EDITORIAL IN TODAY'S "JERUSALEM POST" IS CRITICAL OF THE MEASURE TO BAN THE EXCAVATIONS IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, ARGUING THAT "IF THE PRESENCE OF BONES IS TO BE A COMPLETE BAR TO EXCAVATION, THEN ARCHEOLOGY IN ISRAEL MUST BE PRONOUNCED DEAD."

-- ON A RELATED MATTER, "THE POST" REPORTS THAT JERUSALEM POLICE ARE "FUMING" OVER THE RELEASE OF 15 "RELIGIOUS ZEALOTS" ARRESTED FOR VIOLENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN MEA SHEARIM TWO WEEKS AGO, AND SAID THAT THEIR FRUSTRATIONS "WOULD BE EXPRESSED" IN ANY FUTURE DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD. (THE DETAINEES WERE REPORTEDLY RELEASED ON CONDITION THAT THEY REMAIN OUT OF JERUSALEM, POST IS 100,000 BAIL EACH, AND REPORT DAILY TO POLICE AUTHORITIES.) THE RANK-AND-FILE POLICE AND MID-LEVEL OFFICERS CONTEND THAT THE 15 WERE RELEASED AS A RESULT OF "POLITICAL PRESSURES."

4. AMBASSADOR HABIB REPLACED BY ROBERT MCFARLANE AS
SPECIAL MIDEAST ENVOY
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ALL PAPERS PROMINENTLY REPORT THE ANNOUNCEMENT BY PRESIDENT REAGAN ON FRIDAY TO REPLACE PHILIP HABIB WITH ROBERT MCFARLANE AS SPECIAL MIDEAST ENVOY. GOI-SPONSORED "AL ANBA" WRITES THAT THE MOVE "COINCIDES WITH THE DESIRE OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENT TO TRANSFER THE DIALOGUE WITH SYRIA TO NEW POLITICAL LEVELS." "THE POST" QUOTES ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS AS CONCEDED THAT SYRIA'S REFUSAL TO MEET WITH HABIB WAS AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN THE DECISION TO REPLACE HIM. COMMENTING ON MCFARLANE'S QUALIFICATIONS FOR THE POSITION, "THE POST" WRITES THAT "ALTHOUGH (HE IS) BY NO MEANS A SPECIALIST ON THE MIDDLE EAST, MCFARLANE HAS A VERY THOROUGH UNDERSTANDING OF THE ISSUES INVOLVED," AND HAS ESTABLISHED GOOD PERSONAL RELATIONS WITH BOTH ISRAELI AND ARAB OFFICIALS, WHICH SHOULD SERVE TO FACILITATE HIS EFFORTS. HOWEVER, IN A SEPARATE "POST" ARTICLE ENTITLED "MCFARLANE--MASTER OF OBFUSCATION," THE NEWLY APPOINTED ENVOY IS CRITICIZED FOR HIS LACK OF CLARITY AND CANDOR IN COMMENTING PUBLICLY ON THE ISSUES. SAYS THE AUTHOR, "HE IS VALUED AT THE WHITE HOUSE FOR HIS ABILITY TO KEEP HIS MOUTH SHUT."

-- SUNDAY'S EDITORIAL IN "THE POST" SPEAKS FAVORABLY OF HABIB, LAMENTING THE FACT THAT HE HAS BECOME THE "SCAPEGOAT FOR THE LACK OF AMERICAN POLICY TOWARDS SYRIA." "THE POST" NOTES, HOWEVER, THAT "CHANGING SENIOR ENVOYS CANNOT TAKE THE PLACE OF A MUCH NEEDED, MORE COHERENT POLICY WHICH OUGHT TO EMANATE FROM WASHINGTON." THE EDITORIAL CONCLUDES THAT WHILE MCFARLANE IS A "HIGHLY QUALIFIED SENIOR OFFICIAL," HE IS NOT KNOWN TO HAVE PARTICULAR EXPERIENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND THAT A PREFERABLE ALTERNATIVE WOULD HAVE BEEN

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Date Printed: 10/23/1996

DOC_NUMBER: 83JERUSA02666

CHANNEL: n/a

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TO APPOINT HENRY KISSINGER TO THE POST.

5. OTHER ITEMS OF INTEREST:

A. IN A MEETING OF THE ISRAELI CABINET YESTERDAY,
 DEFENSE MINISTER ARENS INDICATED THAT HE IS "NOT
 INCLINED" TO ALLOW ANY MORE POLITICAL DEMONSTRATIONS IN
 HEBRON, IN THE WAKE OF SATURDAY'S PROTEST THERE BY THE
 "PEACE NOW" MOVEMENT. ("THE POST") "AL QUDS" REPORTS
 THAT ARENS INFORMED CABINET MEMBERS THAT MILITARY
 AUTHORITIES WILL NOT PERMIT ANY POLITICAL DEMONSTRATIONS
 ON THE WEST BANK SINCE THEY SERVE ONLY TO HEIGHTEN

TENSIONS IN THE AREA. CRITICIZING ARENS' DECISION, LABOUR PARTY LEADER PERES SAID THAT THE MEASURE SHOULD BE FULLY DEBATED IN THE POLITICAL ARENA BEFORE BEING IMPLEMENTED.

B. ISRAELI MINISTER OF INTERIOR BURG SAID THAT A DETERMINATION OF THE BROAD LINES OF ISRAELI POLICY REGARDING IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW AND ORDER ON THE WEST BANK WILL TAKE PLACE THIS WEEK, IN ACCORD WITH THE KARP COMMITTEE RECOMENDATIONS. ("AL QUDS")

C. THE FEDERATION OF CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE ON THE WEST BANK HAVE APPEALED TO JORDANIAN PRIME MINISTER BADRAN TO EASE RESTRICTIONS ON STUDENTS AND WORKERS DESIRING TO TRANSIT BRIDGES BETWEEN THE WEST BANK AND JORDAN. ("AL QUDS") ALSO, "AL QUDS" REPORTS THAT A LARGE NUMBER OF STUDENTS WISHING TO APPLY TO UNIVERSITIES OUTSIDE OF THE WEST BANK HAVE SENT A MEMO TO THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT EXPRESSING HOPE THAT AUTHORITIES WOULD PERMIT STUDENTS TO GO TO AMMAN TO COMPLETE APPLICATION PROCEDURES FOR

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INSTITUTIDNS IN JORDAN AND FOREIGN COUNTRIES.

D. A HALF-PAGE ARTICLE IN "AL FAJR" DEVOTED TO A STUDY BY WASHINGTON LAWYER RICHARD DATHAN (SIC) ON AID TO ISRAEL LEADS WITH HEADLINE: "INCREASED AMERICAN AID TO ISRAEL EMPHASIZES THAT THE U.S. DOES NOT WANT TO FOLLOW A NEUTRAL POLICY TOWARD THE STRUGGLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST."

6. WORTH-NOTING:

A. ALL PAPERS REPORT THE VISIT OF FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR AND DEFENSE MINISTER ARENS TO WASHINGTON UPON THE URGENT REQUEST OF THE PRESIDENT.

B. THE FATAH CENTRAL COUNCIL HAS CALLED FOR AN EMERGENCY MEETING TO DISCUSS THE DIFFERENCES AMONG PLO RANKS, AND PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR ALL PALESTINIAN FACTIONS TO "PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE" IN THE DISCUSSIONS, WHICH ARE NOW IN A CRITICAL STAGE. (ALL PAPERS)

C. "AL ANBA" REPORTS THAT THE PLO HAS INVITED NOTABLES IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES TO VISIT TUNIS IN A SHOW OF SUPPORT FOR PLO LEADER ARAFAT. WHILE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES HAVE, IN THE PAST, FORBIDDEN PALESTINIAN LEADERS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES FROM MEETING WITH PLO REPRESENTATIVES, NONE OF THOSE INVITED HAVE YET REQUESTED PERMISSION TO TRAVEL TO TUNIS.

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DEPT. ALSO FOR AMBS. HABIB AND DRAPER; PASS JCS FOR J-T

FROM ROSS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS

SUBJECT: LEBANESE G-2 CHIEF ON 'ALAYH INCIDENT

1. [REDACTED]

2. IN THE COURSE OF A MEETING JULY 17 AND OVER DINNER FOLLOWING THAT MEETING, LEBANESE G-2 CHIEF COL. SIMON QASSIS UNBURDENED HIMSELF TO ROSS ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ATTACK ON LEBANESE ARMY PERSONNEL TRAVELLING UNDER IDF PROTECTION IN 'ALAYH LAST WEEK.

3. ACCORDING TO QASSIS, THE ISRAELIS HAD BEEN PRESSING THE LEBANESE TO INSPECT THE REGION FOR SOME WEEKS AS PART OF THEIR PREPARATIONS FOR REDEPLOYMENT. AFTER TEMPORIZING FOR SOME TIME, THE LEBANESE FINALLY AGREED, BUT WITH CONDITIONS. "TO RETAIN THEIR SELF-RESPECT," THE LEBANESE WERE TO TRAVEL IN THEIR OWN VEHICLES.

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HOWEVER, THEY WERE TO BE UNDER IDF PROTECTION AND FOR THIS REASON DID NOT CARRY ARMS. MOST IMPORTANTLY, QASSIS HIMSELF HAD INSISTED IN A DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE ISRAELIS THAT THE OPERATION BE KEPT SECRET (THE ISRAELIS HAD PROPOSED THAT IT BE PUBLICIZED TO DEMONSTRATE THE DEPTH OF IDF-LAF COOPERATION).

4. AS QASSIS TELLS IT, COL. 'AWN, THE SENIOR LEBANESE OFFICER IN THE RECONNAISSANCE PATROL, FORESAW TROUBLE AS

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SOON AS THE CONVOY REACHED 'ALAYH COMING FROM THE BEIRUT AREA. ABOUT 500 DRUZE WERE STATIONED AT THE 'ALAYH CIRCLE, AND IT WAS ONLY WITH DIFFICULTY THAT THE CONVOY NEGOTIATED ITS WAY THROUGH WITHOUT MAJOR MISHAP. TO AVOID PROBLEMS ON THE RETURN TO BEIRUT FOLLOWING COMPLETION OF THE MISSION, 'AWN ASKED THE SENIOR ISRAELI OFFICER IN THE PATROL TO CHANGE THE ROUTE SO AS TO BYPASS 'ALAYH CIRCLE. ACCORDING TO QASSIS, THIS OFFICER INSISTED ON MAINTAINING THE ORIGINAL ROUTE AND PASSING THROUGH THE CIRCLE A SECOND TIME. BY THAT TIME, SOME 1,000 TO 1,500 DRUZE HAD ASSEMBLED, AND THE LEBANESE ARMY PERSONNEL WERE ATTACKED. ONE SOLDIER HAS SUBSEQUENTLY DIED OF HIS INJURIES.

5. THE FACT THAT THE DRUZE WERE ALERTED TO THE PASSAGE OF LEBANESE ARMY PERSONNEL HAS LED QASSIS TO THINK DARK THOUGHTS ABOUT "MALICIOUS INTENT" ON THE PART OF THE ISRAELIS. (IN CONTACTS WITH THE LEBANESE, THEY HAVE STEADFASTLY DENIED THIS AND EXPRESSED DEEP REGRET FOR THE DEAD AND INJURED.) ROSS HAS URGED QASSIS TO CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE DRUZE GRAPEVINE WORKED ESPECIALLY WELL ON THIS OCCASION AND THAT THE DRUZE OF 'ALAYH COULD HAVE BEEN ALERTED BY RADIO OR TELEPHONE AS THE CONVOY LEFT THE BEIRUT AREA (IT WOULD HAVE HAD 8-9

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MILES TO COVER UPHILL TO GET TO 'ALAYH CIRCLE). AS FOR THE REFUSAL OF THE SENIOR ISRAELI OFFICER TO CHANGE THE ROUTING, STRICT ORDERS AND BAD JUDGEMENT MIGHT HAVE BEEN TO BLAME. ALTHOUGH QASSIS ACCEPTS THESE HYPOTHESES AS POSSIBLE, HE REMAINS UNCONVINCED, AND HAS TOLD THE ISRAELIS SO. DILLARD

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, XF, LE, IS, SY, US, SA

SUBJECT: ENLARGED MEETING BETWEEN THE SECRETARY AND

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PRIME MINISTER BEGIN, JULY 7.

2. SUMMARY. THE MEETING OF THE ENLARGED GROUP TOOK PLACE MORNING JULY 7, AFTER A MORE THAN HOUR LONG PRIVATE MEETING BETWEEN THE SECRETARY AND THE PRIME MINISTER. AFTER THE SECRETARY'S OPENING PRESENTATION CONCERNING HIS DISCUSSIONS IN SAUDI ARABIA, LEBANON, AND SYRIA, SHAMIR AND ARENS SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES,

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ISRAEL, AND LEBANON NEEDED TO WORK TOGETHER IN FACE OF SYRIA'S INTRANSIGENCE. ARENS ARGUED THAT THE SYRIAN POSITION WOULD NOT BE AFFECTED BY A DIPLOMACY BASED ON CARROTS AND OUTLINED A "SYSTEM OF DISINCENTIVES," WHICH OUGHT TO BE APPLIED. THE ISRAELI MINISTERS STATED THAT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LEBANON-ISRAEL AGREEMENT AND ISRAELI REDEPLOYMENT WERE IMPORTANT COUNTERS TO PLAY IN THIS STRATEGY. ARENS SPECIFICALLY SPOKE OF ISRAELI REDEPLOYMENT IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE IN THE DIRECTION OF THE AWWALI RIVER, THOUGH THIS COULD BE CARRIED OUT IN STAGES. THE SECRETARY UNDERLINED LEBANON'S VERY STRONG RESERVATIONS ABOUT ANY ISRAELI REDEPLOYMENT, BELIEVING THAT THE POLITICAL COSTS WERE FAR TOO HIGH. HE REPEATEDLY COUNSELED THE ISRAELIS TO EXERCISE PATIENCE AND PERSEVERANCE, LEST THE RESULT BE AN UNDERMINING OF THE GEMAYEL GOVERNMENT. THE ISRAELIS COMPLAINED THAT THERE WAS NO AUTHORITATIVE CHANNEL WITH THE LEBANESE TO DISCUSS THESE VERY IMPORTANT ISSUES. SHAMIR SAID A TRIPARTITE FORUM WAS REQUIRED. THE SECRETARY AGREED THAT AN AUTHORITATIVE CHANNEL NEEDED TO BE ESTABLISHED AND SAID WE WERE WORKING ON A SUITABLE ARRANGEMENT. HE CAUTIONED, HOWEVER, THAT ANY ARRANGEMENT SHOULD BE HANDLED WITH THE LOWEST POSSIBLE VISIBILITY, IN VIEW OF LEBANON'S

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CONCERNS ABOUT SYRIA AND THE ARABS. FINALLY, THE ISRAELIS SAID THAT IF THE UNITED STATES WERE OPENLY SUPPORTIVE OF ISRAEL'S POSITION ON REDEPLOYMENT, THEY THOUGHT THE GEMAYEL GOVERNMENT WOULD ALTER ITS NEGATIVE VIEW. THE SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT REDEPLOYMENT HAD TO BE LOOKED AT IN RELATION TO OUR CENTRAL OBJECTIVES IN LEBANON -- THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES AND THE EMERGENCE OF A STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. IN THIS CONTEXT, HE ALSO COMMENTED THAT THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE MNF INTO A HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT WOULD BE A MAJOR DECISION, REQUIRING THE PRESIDENT'S APPROVAL. IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT, HE NOTED, TO SELL ANY SUCH CONCEPT TO THE CONGRESS. END SUMMARY.

3. FOLLOWING HIS PRIVATE MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN JULY 7, THE SECRETARY MET WITH BEGIN, SHAMIR, ARENS, BEN DOR, BEN-MEIR, KIMCHE, GENERALS LEVY, BARAK, EINAN, AND MEMBERS OF THEIR STAFFS FOR ONE AND ONE-HALF HOURS. AMBASSADORS LEWIS, HABIB, DRAPER, AND FAIRBANKS, ASSISTANT SECRETARIES VELIOTES AND HUGHES, AND SEITZ, KEMP, FLATEN, AND ROSS AND HARE (NOTETAKERS) JOINED THE SECRETARY FOR THIS MEETING.

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4. AT BEGIN'S INVITATION, THE SECRETARY OPENED THE MEETING WITH A BRIEF REPORT ON HIS TRIP THROUGH THE MIDDLE EAST TO DATE. THE EMPHASIS, HE SAID, HAD BEEN

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ON EXAMINING THE PROBLEMS OF LEBANON, ON ASSESSING THE ATTITUDES OF THE KEY FIGURES OF THE AREA, AND ON SEEKING WAYS TO ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVES SET FORTH BY THE PRESIDENT, I.E., OBTAINING THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES, RESTORING THE SOVEREIGNTY AND INTEGRITY OF LEBANON AND THE AUTHORITY OF ITS CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, AND ASSURING THE SECURITY OF NORTHERN ISRAEL.

5. IN SAUDI ARABIA, THE SECRETARY REPORTED, HE HAD BEEN ENCOURAGED TO FIND THAT THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUED TO SUPPORT THE OBJECTIVE OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN

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FORCES FROM LEBANON. IT DIFFERENTIATED BETWEEN THE ISRAELI AND SYRIAN PRESENCE, BUT IT CONTINUED TO SUPPORT THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES AND REMAINED ENGAGED IN EFFORTS TO BRING THIS ABOUT.

6. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT HE HAD ALREADY REVIEWED THE RESULTS OF HIS VISIT TO SYRIA WITH BEGIN AND THAT A/S VELIOTES HAD DONE THE SAME WITH OTHER ISRAELI LEADERS. TO SUMMARIZE, HE SAID, DURING THE ONE AND ONE-HALF HOURS WITH KHADDAM AND THE FIVE HOURS WITH ASSAD, THERE HAD BEEN A LENGTHY ARGUMENT ABOUT THE MEANING OF THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT, BUT NO COMMON GROUND HAD BEEN FOUND. THE SYRIANS REJECTED THE AGREEMENT. WE HAD DISCUSSED WITH THEM THE VARIOUS POINTS ON WHICH THEY BASED THEIR REJECTION, BUT WE HAD FOUND NO MEETING OF THE MINDS IN ANY WAY. WE HAD NOT EXPECTED THEM TO ACCEPT THE AGREEMENT; IT DID NOT IN FACT NEED SYRIAN ACCEPTANCE. IT NEEDED ONLY SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. IN ANY EVENT, WE WERE NOW AT A STALEMATE WITH SYRIA. WE WOULD NOT GIVE UP, HOWEVER. WE WOULD CONTINUE TO LOOK AT WAYS TO PROCEED. AT THIS POINT, WE DID NOT KNOW WHAT THESE MIGHT BE. ONE DEVELOPMENT HAD OCCURRED -- ASSAD HAD SAID PUBLICLY THAT HE ENDORSED THE EMERGENCE OF AN INDEPENDENT, SOVEREIGN, FREE LEBANON WITH A STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, AND IT HAD BEEN AGREED THAT THERE WOULD BE CONTINUING SYRIAN-U.S. CONVERSATIONS AND CONSULTATIONS ON HOW TO BRING ABOUT THIS OBJECTIVE. WE HAD DESCRIBED THIS AS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A WORKING GROUP, WHILE THE SYRIANS HAD USED DIFFERENT WORDS. IT DID REPRESENT SOME CONTINUING CONTACT ON LEBANON. WE WERE NOT PINNING A LOT OF HOPES ON IT AND DID NOT FEEL IT SHOULD BE PLAYED UP, BUT THE SYRIANS HAD SUGGESTED IT, THUS SHOWING THAT

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THEY WANTED TO KEEP THE DISCUSSION GOING. ONE THING WE HAD FOUND DURING THIS VISIT, THE SECRETARY SAID, WAS THAT ANY SERIOUS AND MEANINGFUL DISCUSSIONS ON LEBANON HAD TO TAKE PLACE WITH ASSAD HIMSELF.

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7. IN LEBANON, THE SECRETARY WENT ON, PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AND HIS GOVERNMENT WERE TROUBLED BY THE FACT THAT, ALTHOUGH THEY HAD NEGOTIATED AN AGREEMENT (AND ONE WITH WHICH THEY WERE PLEASED), MOST OF THE TERRITORY OF THEIR COUNTRY REMAINED UNDER OCCUPATION BY OTHERS. THEY WERE VERY FRUSTRATED. THEY HAD SHOWN GREAT FORCEFULNESS AND MUCH PERSONAL COURAGE EVEN THOUGH THEY HAD BEEN THREATENED AND WORKED OVER TO A CONSIDERABLE DEGREE. THE U.S. FELT, AS ISRAEL DID, THAT WE MUST CONTINUE TO SUPPORT GEMAYEL AND HIS GOVERNMENT, AND MAKE IT AS STRONG AS POSSIBLE.

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8. TO SUMMARIZE, THE SECRETARY CONCLUDED, WE HAD PROBLEMS. WE COULD POINT TO NO PROSPECT OF SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. THE SYRIANS HAD SAID THEY WOULD WITHDRAW, BUT ONLY AFTER ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. THEY ALSO REJECTED THE AGREEMENT. IN OTHER WORDS, THEIR WITHDRAWAL HAD CONDITIONS THAT WERE NOT LIKELY TO BE FULFILLED. THE SECRETARY OBSERVED THAT HE WOULD HAVE WISHED TO HAVE HAD GREATER PROGRESS TO REPORT. OUR GOALS WERE VERY IMPORTANT, AND WE WOULD NOT GIVE UP OUR EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE THEM.

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9. BEGIN, NOTING THAT HE HAD HAD A CHANCE TO ASK ALL HIS QUESTIONS DURING HIS PRIVATE MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY, INVITED HIS COLLEAGUES TO PUT QUESTIONS OR OBSERVATIONS. SHAMIR TOOK THE FLOOR WITH THE DRY OBSERVATION THAT, WHILE THERE WERE MANY QUESTIONS, THERE WERE NOT SO MANY ANSWERS. IT SEEMED WE FACED A SYRIAN REFUSAL TO WITHDRAW FOR A LONG PERIOD. THIS MADE IT NECESSARY FOR ISRAEL, LEBANON, AND THE U.S. TO

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DECIDE TOGETHER WHAT TO DO AS A RESULT, AND TO WORK TOGETHER TO STRENGTHEN OUR POSITIONS IN LEBANON. WE SHOULD TRY TO IMPLEMENT THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT. BY THIS COOPERATION, WE COULD EXERCISE A CERTAIN INFLUENCE OR PRESSURE ON THE SYRIANS TO BRING THEM TO CHANGE THEIR MINDS. INTRODUCING A THEME THAT SHAPED THE REST OF THE MEETING, SHAMIR POSITED THAT THE FIRST THING THAT WOULD BE HELPFUL IN THIS DIRECTION WOULD BE REDEPLOYMENT, IF IT WAS DONE IN COOPERATION WITH THE U.S. AND LEBANON. THEN THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD START TO SEE THAT IT WOULD HAVE TO FACE UP TO THE REALITY OF JOINT LEBANESE-ISRAEL-U.S. ACTIVITY.

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EXPANDING ON THIS THEME, SHAMIR ARGUED THAT REDEPLOYMENT MUST NOT BE PRESENTED AS A CHANGE IN ISRAELI POSITIONS, BUT, ON THE CONTRARY, AS A STEP IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT. ISRAEL SHOULD EXPRESS, SHAMIR CONTINUED, ITS WILLINGNESS AND READINESS TO PULL OUT ALL OF ITS FORCES AND DEMONSTRATE ITS SERIOUSNESS BY UNDERTAKING A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL AND KEEPING CONTROL OF ONLY THAT PART OF LEBANON THAT WAS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY TO ENSURE THE SECURITY OF NORTHERN ISRAEL. THIS SHOULD BE DONE IN FULL COORDINATION WITH THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT, WHICH SHOULD CONVINCE ITS PEOPLE, CHRISTIANS AND MUSLIMS ALIKE, THAT A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL OPERATION WAS IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF LEBANON. ISRAEL UNDERSTOOD THE NECESSITY FOR A NATIONAL CONSENSUS IN LEBANON, BUT PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL WAS A STEP FORWARD IN THE INTEREST OF ALL LEBANESE; SHAMIR THOUGHT THIS SHOULD NOT BE DIFFICULT TO DEMONSTRATE.

10. ARENS, WHO LATER CAME TO DOMINATE THE MEETING, TOOK THE BATON FROM SHAMIR TO SET FORTH HIS VIEWS ON SYRIAN OBJECTIVES AND METHODS IN LEBANON, AND THE BEST WAY TO

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COUNTER THEM. THEY HAD CONTROLLED ALL OF LEBANON FOR EIGHT YEARS. BECAUSE OF THE ISRAELI OPERATION, THEY HAD LOST CONTROL OF 40 PERCENT OF THE COUNTRY, AS WELL AS OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT, WHICH WAS NO LONGER A PUPPET REGIME AS IT HAD BEEN DURING THE SARKIS PRESIDENCY. ASSAD'S OBJECTIVE, ACCORDING TO ARENS, WAS TO TRY TO RECONSTITUTE THE FORMER SITUATION. WHILE HE MIGHT USE WINDOW DRESSING IN HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS ("THERE SHOULD BE NO ISRAELI GAINS," ETC.), HIS BASIC OBJECTIVE WAS A RETURN TO SYRIA'S FORMER LEVEL OF CONTROL OVER LEBANON. WE HAD TO KEEP THIS IN MIND, HE SAID, AS WE LOOKED AT WAYS TO GET THE SYRIANS TO MOVE. REGARDING SYRIAN METHODS IN LEBANON, WE ALL HAD TO REALIZE THAT NO RPT NO HOLDS WERE BARRED. THE ASSASSINATION OF BASHIR GEMAYEL AND THE BOMBING OF THE U.S. EMBASSY, IN BOTH OF WHICH THERE WAS GOOD REASON TO SUSPECT SYRIAN INVOLVEMENT, WERE GOOD EXAMPLES OF THE FACT THAT THE SYRIANS WOULD USE ANY MEANS TO ACHIEVE THEIR OBJECTIVES. IN SUCH AN ATMOSPHERE, THERE WERE NO EFFECTIVE CARROTS. IT WAS THEREFORE NECESSARY TO CREATE DISINCENTIVES TO MAKE ASSAD SEE THAT THE RISKS WERE TOO HIGH, -- THAT THE GAME WAS NOT WORTH THE CANDLE. ANYTHING THAT LEBANON, ISRAEL, AND THE U.S. DID IN ANY OTHER DIRECTION WOULD ENCOURAGE ASSAD TO STICK TO HIS GUNS.

11. ARENS DESCRIBED A "SYSTEM OF DISINCENTIVES" FOR SYRIA AS HAVING FOUR BASUC ELEMENTS:

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-- THE PRESENCE OF THE IDF 22-23 KMS FROM DAMASCUS. ASSAD WAS SURELY CONCERNED ABOUT THE STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF THIS PRESENCE. HE HAD TO BE MADE TO UNDERSTAND THAT IT WOULD NOT DISAPPEAR UNLESS THE SYRIANS LEFT LEBANON.

-- GREATER LEBANESE-ISRAELI COOPERATION. SINCE ASSAD WANTED MORE CONTROL IN LEBANON, HE HAD TO BE SHOWN THAT WHAT HE WAS DOING WAS LEADING TO CLOSER LEBANESE-ISRAELI RELATIONS. IT WAS IMPORTANT IN THIS CONTEXT TO

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EXCHANGE THE INSTRUMENTS BRINGING THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT INTO FORCE. IT WAS HARD TO UNDERSTAND THE PRESENT LEBANESE POSITION ON THIS, SINCE IT COULD NOT FAIL BUT LEAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT SYRIA COULD STILL TORPEDO THE AGREEMENT. BEYOND THE AGREEMENT, THE COORDINATION OF A REDEPLOYMENT COULD ALSO BE PART AND PARCEL OF THIS ELEMENT OF THE DISINCENTIVES.

-- GREATER POLITICAL ISOLATION OF SYRIA. IT SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR TO ASSAD THAT, BY PURSUING HIS PRESENT COURSE, HE WAS INCREASING HIS POLITICAL ISOLATION AND LOSING INFLUENCE IN LEBANON. PRESIDENT GEMAYEL SHOULD EXPLICITLY DEMAND THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE SYRIAN FORCES. UP TO NOW THIS DEMAND HAD BEEN MADE BY "MIDDLE EASTERN INNUENDO." IT WAS TIME TO MAKE IT EXPLICIT. SPEAKING UP WOULD SHOW SYRIA THAT IT WAS LOSING INFLUENCE, BECOMING ISOLATED, AND LOSING THE SYMPATHY OF THE LEBANESE POPULATION. LEBANON'S DEMAND COULD BE FOLLOWED UP BY DEMANDS FROM OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES, WESTERN EUROPE, AND OTHERS. EGYPT AND JORDAN HAD DONE THIS ALREADY. ALL SUCH MOVES WOULD HELP TO DELEGITIMIZE THE SYRIAN PRESENCE IN LEBANON AND WOULD LEAD ASSAD TO FEEL HIS POLITICAL ISOLATION MORE ACUTELY.

-- GREATER COSTS AND PENALTIES. THE SYRIANS MUST BE MADE TO FEEL COSTS AND PENALTIES FOR THEIR PRESENCE IN LEBANON. MANY LEBANESE FELT THAT THE SYRIANS WERE OCCUPIERS. THEY COULD SHOW THE SYRIANS THAT THERE WERE COSTS TO THEIR CONTINUED PRESENCE. (COMMENT: ARENS DID NOT ELABORATE ON WHAT WAS AN OBVIOUS CALL FOR ACTS OF TERRORISM AGAINST THE SYRIANS.) THIS, SAID ARENS, WAS WHAT COULD BE DONE; WHILE THERE WAS NO GUARANTEE THAT IT WOULD WORK, CONSISTENT, COHERENT PRESSURE MUST BE KEPT UP.

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FROM ALL DIRECTIONS. NO SIMILAR INVENTORY OF CARROTS

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COULD BE ESTABLISHED.

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12. ARENS CONTINUED THAT THIS BROUGHT HIM TO THE SUBJECT OF REDEPLOYMENT. THE ISRAELI ARMY, HE EXPLAINED, PRESENTLY IS STANDING ON A CEASE-FIRE LINE WHICH DOES NOT HAVE REAL MILITARY JUSTIFICATION. WHILE THE PRESENT LINE WAS NOT NECESSARY FOR ISRAELI SECURITY, HE RECOGNIZED THAT ISRAEL'S CURRENT DEPLOYMENT PROVIDED AN IMPORTANT UNDERPINNING FOR THE GEMAYEL GOVERNMENT. IF ISRAEL WERE SIMPLY TO PICK UP AND LEAVE, THE PLO AND OTHER SUBVERSIVE ELEMENTS, POSSIBLY INCLUDING THE SYRIANS, COULD MOVE IN AND CAUSE TROUBLE. ARENS SAID THAT, WHILE ISRAEL SHARED OUR GOAL OF WANTING TO STABILIZE THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT, ISRAEL ALSO HAD TO WEIGH CAREFULLY THE HEAVY BURDENS WHICH IT WAS CARRYING. THESE INCLUDED KEEPING A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF SOLDIERS IN LEBANON, LEADING, IN TURN, TO LONGER RESERVE DUTY; THE FINANCIAL COSTS OF SUCH A PRESENCE; AND THE LIVES LOST BECAUSE OF ATTACKS AGAINST THE ISRAELI FORCES INSPIRED BY THE SYRIANS AND THE PLO. ARENS SAID THIS DAY-TO-DAY BURDEN WAS NOT JUSTIFIED BASED SOLELY ON ISRAELI SECURITY CONCERNS.

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13. ARENS STATED THAT THE BURDEN NEEDED TO BE SHARED WITH THE LEBANESE AND POSSIBLY THE MNF. HE SAID IT WAS INEVITABLE THAT IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE THERE WOULD BE AN ISRAELI REDEPLOYMENT IN THE DIRECTION OF THE AWWALI RIVER, THOUGH THIS COULD BE DONE IN STAGES. ARENS SAW NO REASON WHY THE LEBANESE COULD NOT ACCEPT THIS RESPONSIBILITY SINCE IT WOULD GIVE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXTEND FURTHER ITS JURISDICTION. LEBANON, ARENS ARGUED, WAS EFFECTIVELY PARTITIONED NOW; IN THIS CONTEXT, AN ISRAELI REDEPLOYMENT WOULD BE A CLEAR STEP FORWARD.

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14. ARENS COMPLAINED THAT ISRAEL PRESENTLY FELT FRUSTRATED. ISRAEL HAD BEEN UNABLE, HE SAID, TO ENGAGE IN CLEAR-CUT DISCUSSIONS WITH THE LEBANESE. HE SAID WHAT WAS REQUIRED WAS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A FORMAT, INVOLVING ISRAEL, LEBANON, AND THE UNITED STATES, WHERE ISRAELI REDEPLOYMENT PROPOSALS COULD BE DISCUSSED. ABSENT SUCH A MECHANISM, ISRAEL WOULD HAVE NO CHOICE EXCEPT TO START MOVING UNILATERALLY, WHICH WAS OBVIOUSLY BAD. THIS WAS, ARENS STRESSED, THE MOST URGENT ITEM ON THE AGENDA.

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15. BEN-MEIR ECHOED SHAMIR'S AND ARENS' STATEMENTS. HE SAID WE WERE FACED WITH A CLEAR SITUATION WHERE THE SYRIANS DID NOT INTEND TO LEAVE LEBANON. IT WAS

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NECESSARY, HE ARGUED, TO RESPOND AGGRESSIVELY AND NOT LEAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT ASSAD HAD ALL OF THE CARDS. BEN-MEIR SAID THAT WE ARE ALSO HOLDING CARDS AND SHOULD MOVE IN TWO PARALLEL WAYS:

-- TO INCREASE THE POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE ON SYRIA AND MOBILIZE SERIOUS INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE. BEN-MEIR FELT THAT THIS PRESSURE WOULD EVENTUALLY HAVE A CUMULATIVE EFFECT ON SYRIA; AND
-- TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE PRESENT SITUATION WAS NOT FROZEN AND ASSAD DID NOT HAVE COMPLETE MASTERY OVER IT. BEN-MEIR THOUGHT AN ISRAELI REDEPLOYMENT IN THIS CONTEXT WOULD NOT BE A "NECESSARY EVIL," BUT A GOOD AND POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT. REDEPLOYMENT WOULD SHOW THAT LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY WAS BEING EXTENDED AND LEBANON WAS, IN EFFECT, BEING "DEPARTITIONIZED."

16. BEN-MEIR THOUGHT THAT BY FOLLOWING THESE TWO APPROACHES THE SYRIANS WOULD, IN FACT, HAVE SOMETHING TO FEAR. IT WOULD SHOW THAT THE LEBANON-ISRAEL

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AGREEMENT WAS A REALITY WHICH WAS IN THE PROCESS OF BEING IMPLEMENTED. HE SAID IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT IN THIS RESPECT TO GET THE INSTRUMENTS EXCHANGED. BEN-MEIR ARGUED THAT THERE WAS NO DANGER THAT REDEPLOYMENT, CARRIED OUT IN STAGES, WOULD LEAD TO PARTITION, ESPECIALLY NOW THAT THE LEBANON-ISRAEL AGREEMENT WAS IN HAND. AMONG OTHER THINGS, THE AGREEMENT PROVIDED FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE ISRAELI FORCES FROM LEBANON WITHIN AN 8 - 12 WEEK TIME FRAME IF THE SYRIANS ALSO WITHDREW SIMULTANEOUSLY.

17. IN REPLY, THE SECRETARY SAID HE APPRECIATED SHAMIR'S COMMENT ABOUT THE NEED FOR "PATIENCE AND PERSEVERANCE." HE THOUGHT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO LOOK AT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WITH THESE POINTS IN MIND IN OUR EFFORT TO SUPPORT THAT GOVERNMENT. HE ALSO AGREED WITH THE MINISTERS' ASSESSMENT ON THE NECESSITY OF MAINTAINING OUR POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS. HE SAID THAT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT HAS CARRIED OUT ITS DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS VERY WELL. AND WE HAVE ALSO STAYED ON THIS COURSE. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT THE EXISTENCE OF THE AGREEMENT WAS OF INESTIMABLE HELP IN EUROPE AND IN ARAB CAPITALS, SINCE THE AGREEMENT PROVIDED A CONCRETE WAY FOR ISRAEL TO LEAVE LEBANON. THE SECRETARY CONCLUDED THAT WE WILL CONTINUE OUR STRONG DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES.

18. THE SECRETARY SAID IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE SYRIANS WOULD LIKE TO DELEGITIMIZE THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND THEY HAD PLENTY OF SCOPE IN LEBANON. HE REFERRED TO

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THE FACT THAT 90 PERCENT OF LEBANESE EXPORTS TO THE ARAB WORLD GO VIA SYRIA, WHICH PUTS SYRIA IN A STRONG POSITION. IN THE SECRETARY'S VIEW, ONE COULD NOT SIMPLY IGNORE OR ISOLATE SYRIA. IT WAS A REALITY WHICH HAD TO BE KEPT CONSTANTLY BEFORE US.

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19. ON ISRAELI REDEPLOYMENT, THE SECRETARY STATED THAT THIS ACTION HAD TO BE PLACED IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR CENTRAL PURPOSE IN LEBANON, NAMELY, THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES AND THE EMERGENCE OF A STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. BASED ON HIS DISCUSSIONS IN BEIRUT, THE SECRETARY SAID THAT THE LEBANESE FOUND THE IDEA OF AN ISRAELI REDEPLOYMENT VERY DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT. THE LEBANESE HAD EXPRESSED THEMSELVES VERY STRONGLY ON THIS ISSUE, BELIEVING THAT REDEPLOYMENT WOULD BE INTERPRETED AS A MOVE TOWARDS PARTITION AND WOULD UNDERMINE THE CREDIBILITY OF THE GEMAYEL GOVERNMENT. THEY ALSO THOUGHT THAT SYRIA WOULD SEIZE ON ANY ISRAELI REDEPLOYMENT TO CLAIM THAT CONTRARY TO THE ARGUMENT THAT THE LEBANON-ISRAEL AGREEMENT WAS THE ONLY WAY TO GET THE ISRAELIS OUT OF LEBANON, IT COULD BE DONE IN ANOTHER WAY. THE LEBANESE WERE WORRIED ABOUT THAT POINT ALSO.

20. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF FULL WITHDRAWALS OBVIOUSLY HAD GREAT APPEAL FOR THE LEBANESE. HOWEVER, IN SPEAKING ABOUT REDEPLOYMENT, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THE LEBANESE ARMY TO TAKE CONTROL OVER NEW AREAS IF IT WERE NOT ACCOMPANIED BY AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CONFESSIONAL GROUPS. RIGHT NOW, THE SECRETARY OBSERVED, THERE WAS NO SUCH AGREEMENT.

21. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT THE MNF HAD BEEN JUSTIFIED ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT WAS BEING DEPLOYED INTO A NON-HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT AND WITH THE AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES. THERE WAS CONCERN IN THE U.S. AND IN THE CONGRESS, THE SECRETARY SAID, ABOUT THE MNF. IF THE MNF WERE INTRODUCED INTO AN AREA OF HOSTILITY -- WHICH THE LAF COULD NOT HANDLE AND WHERE ISRAEL DID NOT

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WANT TO MAINTAIN ITS PRESENCE BECAUSE OF ITS COSTS -- IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO TELL THE CONGRESS THAT THE MARINES WERE REQUIRED TO TAKE ON THIS BURDEN.

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WHILE WE SHOULD NOT BE WEAK-WILLED, THESE CONSIDERATIONS HAD TO BE BORNE IN MIND. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT IF REDEPLOYMENT WERE TO OCCUR, IT WOULD REQUIRE A GREAT DEAL OF EFFORT TO OBTAIN LEBANESE AGREEMENT IN ADVANCE.

22. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE IN DEVELOPING LEBANESE MILITARY CAPABILITIES, BUT IN OUR PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS, LEBANESE CAPABILITIES HAD BEEN MEASURED AND PREMISED ON AN AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD LEAD TO FULL WITHDRAWALS. IT WAS ANOTHER THING ENTIRELY TO EXAMINE LEBANESE CAPABILITIES WHILE 40,000 SYRIANS AND A NUMBER OF PLO STILL REMAINED IN LEBANON. THIS POSED, THE SECRETARY SAID, A TREMENDOUS DILEMMA.

23. THE SECRETARY SAID HE HAD HEARD ARENS' ARGUMENTS CLEARLY. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, ISRAEL WOULD HAVE TO DECIDE UPON WHAT ACTIONS TO TAKE BASED ON ITS OWN ASSESSMENT. THE SECRETARY THOUGHT IT WAS IMPORTANT, HOWEVER, TO CONTINUE TO CONSULT, AND ADDED THAT PATIENCE AND PERSEVERANCE WERE NEEDED IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. IF THE PACE WERE FORCED, WE COULD WIND UP WITH A COUNTERPRODUCTIVE RESULT LEADING TO A WEAKENED CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN LEBANON AND AN EVEN MORE CHAOTIC SITUATION.

24. ARENS ASKED FOR THE SECRETARY'S OPINION ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF SETTING UP A FORUM FOR DISCUSSION WITH THE LEBANESE. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT HE PERSONALLY BELIEVED THIS WAS ESSENTIAL, BUT AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE ON A LOW VISIBILITY BASIS. THERE WERE CLEARLY VALID REASONS FOR ESTABLISHING AN AUTHORITATIVE CHANNEL, BUT LEBANON ALSO TOOK RISKS, THE SECRETARY ELABORATED,

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IF IT WERE VISIBLY TO MOVE INTO A CLOSE COLLABORATIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL. THIS COULD BE USED BY THE SYRIANS TO BUTTRESS THEIR ARGUMENT WITH THE ARABS THAT THE GEMAYEL GOVERNMENT WAS NOT LEGITIMATE. THE SECRETARY OBSERVED THAT LEBANON NEEDED HELP BUT NOT A BEAR HUG.

25. THE SECRETARY POINTED OUT HE WAS MAKING THESE OBSERVATIONS AGAINST A BACKGROUND IN WHICH THE LEBANESE HAD OPENLY SAID THAT THEY APPROVED OF THE AGREEMENT AND WANTED TO SEE IT WORK. IT WAS IMPORTANT, HOWEVER, TO RECOGNIZE THAT LEBANON ALSO HAD TO DEAL WITH A WIDER ARAB COMMUNITY AS IT ATTEMPTED TO NAVIGATE AROUND THE SYRIAN PROBLEM. WITH RESPECT TO ARENS' STATEMENT ON "DISINCENTIVES," THE SECRETARY OBSERVED HE HAD NO DOUBT THAT PERSUASION, SWEET TALK, AND DIPLOMACY HAD

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THEIR LIMITATIONS WITHOUT DISINCENTIVES. HE COULD, THEREFORE, GENERALLY AGREE WITH ARENS' VIEW.

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26. THE PRIME MINISTER ASKED WHAT COULD BE DONE TO PERSUADE THE LEBANESE THAT ISRAEL DID NOT WANT PARTITION, AND THE ONLY QUESTION WAS PROVIDING GREATER SECURITY FOR ISRAEL'S FORCES. HE THOUGHT THAT PERHAPS AMBASSADOR HABIB COULD EXPLAIN THIS POINT TO THE LEBANESE. HABIB REPLIED THAT THE LEBANESE BELIEVED ISRAELI REDEPLOYMENT WITHOUT DEALING WITH THE ISSUE OF SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL WOULD LEAD TO A PROLONGED OCCUPATION OF LEBANON. THE LEBANESE THOUGHT THAT THE CORE PROBLEM WAS SYRIA; AMIN GEMAYEL BELIEVED THAT ISRAEL IN FACT WANTED TO LEAVE LEBANON. HOWEVER, GEMAYEL FEARED THAT A PROLONGED PROCESS WOULD LEAD TO CHANGES ON THE GROUND, CREATING THE PARTITION OF HIS COUNTRY. THE LEBANESE HAD ALSO HEARD SOME TALK FROM BOTH ISRAELIS AND SOME LEBANESE

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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ABOUT THE PROSPECT OF PARTITION, WHICH WAS ANOTHER COMPLICATION. THE MINISTERS SHOWED SURPRISE AT THIS.

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27. THE SECRETARY SAID IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO REPORT THE MINISTERS' CATEGORIC STATEMENTS ABOUT ISRAELI INTENTIONS TO THE LEBANESE. TO THE EXTENT THAT THE LEBANESE THOUGHT ISRAELI INTENTIONS WERE OTHERWISE, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO GET "CHAPTER AND VERSE" WHICH COULD THEN SUBSEQUENTLY BE BROUGHT TO ISRAEL'S ATTENTION. IN THIS RESPECT, THE SECRETARY SAW A GREAT NEED FOR ESTABLISHING A CHANNEL FOR AUTHORITATIVE COMMUNICATION. AMBASSADOR HABIB ADDED THAT HE HOPED WE WERE IN THE PROCESS OF SETTING UP A CHANNEL WHICH COULD BE HELPFUL.

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28. ARENS SAID THERE MUST BE SOMETHING MORE THAN MEETS THE EYE IN LEBANON'S INSISTENCE THAT THE ISRAELI FORCES SHOULD STAY ON THEIR PRESENT LINES. HABIB ANSWERED THAT THE LEBANESE POSITION WAS BASED ON THE NEED TO SECURE WITHDRAWALS; THEY SAW CLEAR POLITICAL COSTS, ON THE OTHER HAND, WITH RESPECT TO REDEPLOYMENT. HABIB NOTED THAT THE LEBANESE ARGUMENT WAS EVEN LEADING THEM TO THE POINT OF SAYING THAT THE AGREEMENT SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED ONLY IN THE CONTEXT OF FULL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. THE SECRETARY AND HE HAD TOLD THE LEBANESE HOWEVER THAT THIS RESPONSE WOULD NOT ACHIEVE OUR PURPOSE OF SECURING SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. THE SECRETARY ADDED THAT THE DIFFICULTY LAY IN THE FACT THAT THE AGREEMENT WAS BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION OF FULL WITHDRAWALS. IT WAS A COMPLETELY DIFFERENT CONTEXT WHEN THE SYRIANS AND THE PLO STILL REMAINED IN LEBANON. THIS PLACED THE LEBANESE, THE SECRETARY OBSERVED, IN A DIFFERENT

AND DIFFICULT SITUATION.

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29. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT IN REACHING ANY DECISION ON REDEPLOYMENT, HE HOPED IT WOULD BE APPROACHED WITH

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SENSITIVITY AND CARE. HE COMMENTED THAT IF THE LEBANESE WERE SITTING AT THE TABLE TODAY, THEY WOULD SURELY OPPOSE ANY ISRAELI REDEPLOYMENT PROPOSALS. ARENS ASKED IF THE U.S. HAD BEEN SUPPORTIVE OF THE ISRAELI POSITION IN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE LEBANESE. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT HE HAD TOLD THE LEBANESE THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO SEE REDEPLOYMENT IN RELATION TO OUR CENTRAL OBJECTIVES. THE SECRETARY FELT THAT IF AN ISRAELI REDEPLOYMENT DECISION WERE ANNOUNCED SOON, IT COULD LEAD TO A MAJOR PROBLEM. (AT THIS POINT PRIME MINISTER BEGIN HAD TO LEAVE FOR ANOTHER MEETING.)

30. THE SECRETARY SAID THE PRINCIPAL PURPOSE OF HIS VISIT TO THE REGION WAS TO OBTAIN THE VIEWS OF ALL OF THE KEY ACTORS IN ORDER TO BRIEF THE PRESIDENT ON THE CURRENT SITUATION. THESE VIEWS AND ASSESSMENT WOULD HAVE TO BE FACTORED INTO THE DISCUSSIONS WHICH WOULD BE HELD WITH THE PRIME MINISTER IN WASHINGTON, THOUGH WE WOULD BE TALKING AND CONSULTING ABOUT THESE ISSUES BEFORE THEN. AMBASSADORS HABIB AND DRAPER PLANNED TO STAY IN THE REGION A BIT LONGER FOR THIS PURPOSE. THE SECRETARY OBSERVED THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD MADE A NUMBER OF SUGGESTIONS ON HOW TO GET THE SYRIANS AND PLO TO LEAVE LEBANON, AND THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO CONTINUE TO FOCUS ON THIS CENTRAL OBJECTIVE IMAGINATIVELY. ARENS SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THE GEMAYEL GOVERNMENT WOULD BE RESPONSIVE IF THE U.S. SAID THAT WE SUPPORTED ISRAELI REDEPLOYMENT. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT, WHILE THE LEBANESE CERTAINLY LISTENED TO US, THIS HAD TO BE APPROACHED WITH SOME CAUTION. FOR EXAMPLE, THE LEBANESE MIGHT SAY THAT AS PART OF ANY REDEPLOYMENT SCHEME MORE MARINES SHOULD BE DEPLOYED INTO THE VACATED AREAS. THIS WOULD BE, THE SECRETARY SAID,

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A MAJOR DECISION REQUIRING THE APPROVAL OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS. IF THE MNF WERE INTRODUCED INTO A HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT, IT WOULD BE OPERATING UNDER AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT MANDATE.

31. SHAMIR SAID THERE WAS A NEED TO ESTABLISH A TRI-

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PARTITE FORUM TO DISCUSS THESE PROBLEMS. HE THOUGHT THAT POSSIBLY ISRAEL WOULD BE ABLE TO SUCCEED IN CONVINCING THE LEBANESE ON SOME OF THESE POINTS. THE SECRETARY SAID WE WERE IN THE PROCESS OF DOING SOMETHING ABOUT THIS AND HOPED IT WOULD TAKE PLACE. IN THAT EVENT, HE TOLD THE ISRAELIS THAT THEY SHOULD LISTEN TO THE LEBANESE CAREFULLY IN ORDER TO BETTER UNDERSTAND THE "TENDER" SITUATION THEY ARE IN.

32. AS THE MEETING WAS DRAWING TO A CLOSE, THE SECRETARY SAID HE HOPED THAT WE WOULD BE ABLE TO GO BEYOND THE LEBANESE PROBLEM AT ANOTHER POINT. THERE WERE MANY OTHER SUBJECTS ON THE AGENDA. HE THOUGHT THAT THE DISCUSSIONS WITH UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER HAD BEEN WORTH-WHILE. IT WAS ALSO NECESSARY TO TALK ABOUT THE PEACE PROCESS AND DEFENSE MINISTER ARENS' "LIST" ON WHICH CONSIDERABLE EFFORT HAD ALREADY BEEN MADE. HE HOPED THAT THE AGENDA FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S TALKS IN WASHINGTON COULD BE STRUCTURED IN SUCH A WAY THAT THESE OTHER VERY IMPORTANT ISSUES AFFECTING THE U.S.-ISRAELI RELATIONSHIP WERE DISCUSSED. ARENS ASKED IF THE SECRETARY PROPOSED TO TALK TO THE EGYPTIANS LATER IN THE DAY ABOUT THE RETURN OF THE EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR TO ISRAEL. THE SECRETARY NODDED AND SAID HE HAD A GOOD SENSE OF HOW THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT VIEWED THIS ISSUE.

33. THIS MESSAGE WAS NOT CLEARED BY THE SECRETARY'S PARTY. DEPARTMENT SHOULD HANDLE FURTHER DISTRIBUTION. LEWIS UNQUOTE SHULTZ

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EO 12356 DECL.: OADR

TAGS: PREL, XF, US

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S TRIP TO MIDDLE EAST: LEBANON AND THE PEACE PROCESS

1. [REDACTED]

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2. ACTION ADDRESSEES MAY DRAW ON TALKING POINTS BELOW IN BRIEFING HOST GOVERNMENTS ON SECRETARY'S BRIEF VISIT TO THE MIDDLE EAST. WE WILL BE CONDUCTING PARALLEL BRIEFINGS IN WASHINGTON.

3. LEBANON

-- THE PURPOSE OF THE SECRETARY'S TRIP WAS TO HEAR FIRST HAND THE VIEWS OF THE KEY PARTIES ON THE LEBANON WITHDRAWAL ISSUE. THERE WAS NO EXPECTATION OF A MAJOR BREAKTHROUGH.

-- WE CONSIDER THE VISIT TO HAVE BEEN USEFUL. WE NEEDED TO KNOW FIRST HAND WHERE THE SYRIANS STOOD AND ALSO NEEDED TO REVIEW THE SITUATION WITH THE ISRAELIS GIVEN THEIR DETERMINATION TO MOVE TO PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL AND THEIR CONCERNS ABOUT OUR REACTION TO THIS MOVE. WE ALSO

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NEEDED TO ENCOURAGE THE LEBANESE AND SAUDIS, AS WELL AS TO TOUCH BASE WITH KING HUSSEIN AND PRESIDENT MUBARAK.

-- ALL THE COUNTRIES HE VISITED IN HIS TRIP, INCLUDING SYRIA, VOICED SUPPORT FOR A STRONG INDEPENDENT LEBANON, FREE FROM FOREIGN FORCES. UNFORTUNATELY, THERE WAS LITTLE AGREEMENT ON HOW THIS COULD BE ACHIEVED.

-- THERE WERE SOME POSITIVE SIGNS. THE SAUDIS INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO REMAIN ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN TRYING TO SOLVE THE LEBANESE PROBLEM AND EXPRESSED HOPE THAT CONTINUING DIALOGUE WILL BREAK THE DEADLOCK.

-- SYRIAN PRESIDENT ASSAD, HOWEVER, REMAINS STRONGLY OPPOSED TO THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT AND REFUSES TO WITHDRAW HIS TROOPS IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE AGREEMENT. NEVERTHELESS, HE LEFT THE DOOR OPEN BY AGREEING THAT CONTINUED U.S.-SYRIAN DIALOGUE ON THIS ISSUE IS IMPORTANT ENOUGH TO SET UP A FORMAL MECHANISM FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION. THERE HAS BEEN NO CHANGE IN THE SYRIAN POSITION, HOWEVER, ON RECEIVING AMBASSADOR HABIB.

-- THE LEBANESE ARE WORRIED BY THE CONTINUING STALEMATE, AND THEY REJECT ANY ISRAELI PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL WHICH IS

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NOT PART OF A TOTAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL PLAN. THEY RECOMMENDED RENEWED U.S. EFFORTS WITH THE SYRIANS TO GET THEM TO WITHDRAW.

-- THE ISRAELIS SPENT MUCH OF THEIR TIME ARGUING THE NECESSITY OF A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL OR REDEPLOYMENT OF THEIR FORCES TO SOUTH LEBANON, ALTHOUGH NO DECISION HAS YET BEEN TAKEN BY ISRAEL. DESCRIBING SUCH A DEPLOYMENT AS INEVITABLE IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE, THEY SAID ISRAEL'S BURDEN IN MAINTAINING TROOPS IN THEIR PRESENT POSITIONS MUST BE SHARED BY LEBANON AND POSSIBLY THE MNF.

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-- THE LEBANESE BELIEVE A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE INTERPRETED AS A MOVE TOWARD PARTITION AND WOULD UNDERMINE THE CREDIBILITY OF THE GEMAYEL GOVERNMENT. IT WOULD ALSO BE DIFFICULT FOR THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES TO TAKE OVER AREAS VACATED BY ISRAEL WITHOUT A STILL-LACKING AGREEMENT AMONG CONTENDING CONFESSIONAL GROUPS.

-- WE TOLD BOTH THE LEBANESE AND THE ISRAELIS THAT ANY ISRAELI REDEPLOYMENT MUST BE VIEWED IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR CENTRAL PURPOSE IN LEBANON: THE FULL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES.

-- A NEW ROLE FOR THE MNF ALSO HAS PROBLEMS. WITHOUT A PRIOR POLITICAL AGREEMENT AMONG LEBANESE FACTIONS AND

SYRIAN AND PLO ACCEPTANCE, AN EXPANDED MNF MISSION WOULD BE DANGEROUS.

-- WE ARE NOW CONSIDERING OUR NEXT STEPS WITH A VIEW TOWARDS THE FORTHCOMING VISITS TO WASHINGTON OF LEBANESE PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AND ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER BEGIN.

PEACE PROCESS

-- ALTHOUGH THE FOCUS OF THE SECRETARY'S TRIP WAS ON LEBANON, HE LEFT NO DOUBT THAT WE REMAIN COMMITTED TO THE BROADER PEACE PROCESS AND SPECIFICALLY TO THE PRESIDENT'S SEPTEMBER 1 PEACE INITIATIVE.

-- WE BELIEVE THAT SOME CLARIFICATION WOULD BE HELPFUL ON THIS SCORE. WE HAVE BEEN HEARING FROM SOME OF OUR FRIENDS THAT OUR INITIATIVE IS MORIBUND OR EVEN DEAD, AND

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WE HAVE BEEN FAULTED SUPPOSEDLY FOR NOT FOLLOWING THROUGH AS WE SHOULD HAVE.

-- OUR PROPOSALS WERE NEVER MEANT TO BE A U.S. PLAN OF ACTION. RATHER, THEY WERE A CALL FOR AN ARAB CHALLENGE FOR PEACE AND A CONSTRUCTIVE ISRAELI RESPONSE. WE APPEALED TO THE PLAYERS IN THE REGION TO TAKE POSITIVE STEPS TOWARD DIRECT PEACE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF POSITIONS WE ARE COMMITTED TO SUPPORT.

-- THE ARABS SOUGHT CLARIFICATIONS. WE MET WITH A STREAM OF THEIR LEADERS HERE IN WASHINGTON AND ENGAGED IN NUMEROUS ROUNDS OF DISCUSSIONS IN THE REGION. WE ALSO EXCHANGED VIEWS WITH THE ISRAELIS, AND MADE IT CLEAR TO THEM -- AS WE DID TO THE ARABS -- THAT WE WOULD NOT SHIFT OUR POSITIONS OR BACK AWAY FROM OUR INITIATIVE.

-- THIS REMAINS OUR POLICY. THE ISSUE IS NOT WHETHER OUR INITIATIVE IS LOSING STEAM. IT IS WHETHER THE PLAYERS IN THE REGION ARE PREPARED TO WORK WITH IT OR NOT. WE THINK THERE IS STILL TIME TO MOVE FORWARD ON THIS BASIS AND THAT THERE IS CONSIDERABLE INTEREST AMONG THOSE MOST DIRECTLY CONCERNED TO FIND A PATH TO MEANINGFUL NEGOTIATIONS.

-- MEANWHILE, WE SHOULD NOT LOSE SIGHT OF THE FACT THAT WHAT IS OFTEN CASUALLY DESCRIBED AS THE "PALESTINIAN PROBLEM" IS AT BOTTOM A PROBLEM OF HOW THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE LIVE -- THE QUALITY OF THEIR LIVES. WE DO NOT MEAN ONLY IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, BUT THROUGHOUT THE REGION. WE ALL SHOULD LOOK FOR PRACTICAL WAYS TO ADDRESS THIS DIMENSION OF THE ISSUE, AS WELL AS THE POLITICAL DIMENSION. SHULTZ

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STATE 183912 TOSEC 070280

FOR HABIB AND VELIOTES FROM NEA

E.O. 12356 DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS

1. [REDACTED]

2. MIDDLE EAST POLICY SURVEY IN TOMORROW'S ISSUE WILL
PUBLISH A LENGTHY STORY OF THE PROPOSALS PHIL IS
CURRENTLY WORKING ON. TEXT BY SEPTTEL. MEP- HAS

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PROVIDED ADVANCE COPIES TO OTHER MEDIA, AND WE ARE
ALREADY GETTING INQUIRIES.

3. WE PROPOSE THAT DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN TAKE FOLLOWING
LINE IN TOMORROW'S NOON BRIEFING:

QUOTE: OUR BASIC POLICY OBJECTIVES TOWARD LEBANON, AS
RECENTLY RECONFIRMED, REMAIN THOSE WHICH THE PRESIDENT
LAID DOWN LAST SEPTEMBER:

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-- FULL WITHDRAWAL OF EXTERNAL FORCES;

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-- RESTORATION OF LEBANON AS A FULLY SOVEREIGN NATION IN
CONTROL OF ALL ITS TERRITORY.

-- SECURITY FOR ISRAEL'S NORTHERN BORDER.

AMBASSADOR HABIB'S CURRENT TRIP TO THE MIDDLE EAST AIMS
AT ATTAINING THOSE OBJECTIVES. AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE,
WE DO NOT COMMENT ON EITHER OUR STRATEGY OR OUR
DISCUSSIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED. END QUOTE.

4. IF YOU SHOULD WISH TO MODIFY OR ADD TO THIS GUIDANCE,
WE WILL NEED YOUR SUGGESTIONS BY OPENING OF BUSINESS
JULY 1 WASHINGTON TIME. DAM

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BEIRUT 07266

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, XF, LE, IS, SY

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: TRAVEL TO ISRAEL

REF: TEL AVIV 8768

1. [REDACTED] ENTIRE TEXT

2. WE ARE PLANNING TO DEPART BEIRUT AT 1300 HOURS, JUNE 30, AND ARRIVE IN ISRAEL THE USUAL FORTY-FIVE MINUTES LATER. DAMASCUS: PLEASE ALERT SPAR CREW TO BE IN BEIRUT IN TIME FOR THIS DEPARTURE.

3. FOR AMBASSADOR LEWIS: IN LIGHT OF THE FACT THAT THERE WILL BE A SPECIAL CABINET MEETING TO DISCUSS REDEPLOYMENT PROPOSALS, I WOULD LIKE TO HAVE A READ-OUT OF THE OUTCOME OF THAT MEETING IN ADVANCE OF ANY SESSIONS I MAY HAVE WITH BEGIN, SHAMIR, AND ARENS. I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE GOOD TO SEE BEGIN AMONG OTHER REASONS TO REPORT ON WHAT TRANSPIRED IN MY SESSIONS IN SAUDI ARABIA AND LEBANON. HOW-

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EVER, I LEAVE TO YOUR DISCRETION HOW AND WHEN TO SET UP APPOINTMENTS. IF, FOR EXAMPLE, YOU BELIEVE I COULD GET A GOOD READ-OUT OF THE ISRAELI POSITION WITH AN AFTERNOON MEETING WITH KIMCHE, THEN IT MIGHT BE SATISFACTORY TO MEET WITH BEGIN, SHAMIR, AND ARENS ON FRIDAY MORNING. WHATEVER THE CONDITIONS MAY BE IN ISRAEL, I BELIEVE IT ESSENTIAL THAT I HAVE A GOOD SESSION WITH THE LEADERSHIP BEFORE SHABBAT RINGS DOWN THE CURTAIN.

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4. IN VIEW OF THE REDEPLOYMENT DISCUSSION ABOUT TO BE HELD IN CABINET, YOU SHOULD BE AWARE THAT WE HAVE HAD STRONGLY REAFFIRMED THE LEBANESE POSITION. THEY ARE FIRMLY OPPOSED TO PARTIAL IDF WITHDRAWAL UNLESS IT TAKES PLACE IN THE CONTEXT OF A PROGRAM FOR TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES. THEY ALSO WILL NOT AGREE TO EXCHANGE INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION IN CONNECTION WITH A PARTIAL IDF WITHDRAWAL, UNLESS THE OVERALL CONTEXT IS SATISFACTORY.

See of message

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SECDEL FOR SECRETARY FROM HABIB

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E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, XF, LE, SY, IS
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: NEXT STEPS IN THE AFTERMATH
OF THE WASHINGTON LEAKS ON OUR POLICY

1. *[REDACTED]*
2. THE SITUATION AS OF JULY 1:

- THE LEAKS OUT OF WASHINGTON HAVE PRODUCED AN IMMENSELY DAMAGING SETBACK TO OUR EFFORTS HERE. BEGIN, SHAMIR, AND ARENS MADE IT CLEAR IN OUR MEETING WITH THEM THIS MORNING, JULY 1, THAT THERE WAS NO POINT IN PURSUING OUR ALTERNATIVE IDEAS FOR BRINGING ABOUT TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES.

- THE ISRAELIS IN FACT URGE THAT WE LIMIT THE HEAVY DAMAGE ALREADY CAUSED ALL OF US BY MAKING CLEAR WE CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE CONCEPT OF SIMULTANEOUS ISRAELI, SYRIAN, AND PLO WITHDRAWALS. (PROPOSED U.S. GUIDANCE

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BEING SENT SEPTTEL.)

- THE MOST DAMAGING ASPECT OF THE LEAK WAS THE TWIST PUT ON IT TO THE EFFECT THAT WE WERE URGING A UNILATERAL AND "UNCONDITIONAL" ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL.

- THIS NOT ONLY PLAYS INTO THE HANDS OF THE SYRIANS IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES BUT ALSO WILL MAKE IT ALL THE MORE DIFFICULT IN THE FUTURE TO BRING ABOUT THEIR WITH-

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DRAWAL AND THAT OF THE PLO IN A MANNER SATISFACTORY TO THE INTERESTS OF THE U.S., ISRAEL, AND LEBANON.

- ARENS ALSO WAS CATEGORIC IN SAYING THAT THE IDF WOULD CARRY OUT A LIMITED WITHDRAWAL/REDEPLOYMENT IN THE NEAR FUTURE, IF POSSIBLE IN FULL COORDINATION WITH THE LEBANESE AND THE U.S., BUT UNILATERALLY IF THE LEBANESE REFUSE TO COOPERATE.

3. INTERIM CONCLUSIONS:

- THERE IS OBVIOUSLY NO PRESENT POSSIBILITY OF PURSUING OUR APPROACH SEPARATING WITHDRAWAL ARRANGEMENTS FROM THE STAGED IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT, DESPITE KIMCHE'S INTEREST IN A VARIATION ON THIS SCHEME (JERUSALEM 2390). NEVERTHELESS, WE DO NOT NECESSARILY RULE OUT A REVIVAL OF THIS APPROACH AT A LATER STAGE IF WE CAN RECOVER FROM THE DAMAGE DONE BY THIS LEAK.

- IN THE MEANTIME, ISRAEL IS DETERMINED TO PROCEED WITH A LIMITED, PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL IN THE NEAR FUTURE. DEPENDING ON THE ENSUING CIRCUMSTANCES, INCLUDING THE REACTION IN LEBANON, WE MAY BE ABLE TO TAKE OUR IDEA FROM THE BACK BURNER AND TRY AGAIN.

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- THE ISRAELI CABINET MAY DECIDE ON ITS PREFERRED REDEPLOYMENT SCHEME AS EARLY AS ON SUNDAY, JULY 3.

4. SPECIFIC NEXT STEPS:

- I WILL BE HAVING FURTHER TALKS HERE IN ISRAEL TODAY AND PLAN TO RETURN TO LEBANON ON SATURDAY MORNING JULY 2, TO REVIEW THE NEW SITUATION WITH GEMAYEL. IF YOU AGREE, DICK FAIRBANKS AND I WOULD FLY TO MEET YOU JULY 4 IN LUXOR TO DISCUSS OUR FORWARD STRATEGY. WE MIGHT THEN FLY WITH YOU TO LONDON AND, IF YOU BELIEVE CONSULTATION WITH CHEYSSON WOULD BE DESIRABLE BEFORE HIS JULY 6 TRIP TO ISRAEL AND SYRIA, I COULD THEN PEEL OFF IN LONDON, FLY TO PARIS, AND DISCUSS MATTERS WITH CHEYSSON.

- ASSUMING THAT THERE WILL BE IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS STEMMING FROM ISRAELI PLANS FOR A LIMITED ISRAELI REDEPLOYMENT, MORRIS DRAPER SHOULD STAY IN THE AREA TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH THE PARTIES INVOLVED. IF WE CAN BRING ABOUT POLITICAL CONSULTATION BETWEEN WADIA HADDAD AND KIMCHE FOR EXAMPLE, AS WELL AS TECHNICAL SESSIONS BETWEEN GENERALS TANNOUS AND LEVY, THE LEBANESE MAY WANT US INVOLVED.

- HE WILL NEED, HOWEVER, GUIDANCE AS TO THE ROLE,

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IF ANY, THE U.S. ELEMENT AND THE MNF MIGHT HAVE TO PLAY TO ENSURE SUCCESSFUL ARRANGEMENTS. MORRIS COULD PROBABLY STAY IN THE AREA FOR THESE TALKS FOR TWO WEEKS OR SO UNTIL GEMAYEL'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON. HE COULD ALSO BE USED FOR NECESSARY CONSULTATIONS WITH MNF GOVERNMENTS, CERTAINLY IN BEIRUT AND IF NECESSARY IN EUROPE.

- UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, WE ALL BELIEVE THERE IS NO POINT IN YOUR VISITING THE AREA AT THIS TIME. SAM LEWIS STRONGLY CONCURS.

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EXD: DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, LE, IS, MOPS, EG, SA, ASEC

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: JUNE 27-28 TRAVEL PLANS

REF: CAIRO 18346 (NOTAL)

1. [REDACTED] ENTIRE TEXT

2. HERE ARE OUR PLANS:

- ON MONDAY, JUNE 27, FOLLOWING MEETING WITH BEGIN AND COMPANY, WE WILL DEPART ISRAEL AT 1400 LOCAL (1200 ZULU), AND STOP IN CAIRO FOR REFUELING AND A MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR ATHERTON AT THE AIRPORT. EXACT ETA CAIRO WILL BE SENT SEPTTEL BUT IT SHOULD BE AROUND SIXTY MINUTES FLIGHT TIME.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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- WE WILL THEN PROCEED TO TAIF FROM CAIRO, ASSUMING OUR SPAR AIRCRAFT CAN LAND THERE; OTHERWISE WE WILL FLY TO JIDDA. FLIGHT DETAILS BY SEPTTEL.

- ASSUMING THAT WE WILL HAVE HAD A MEETING WITH KING FAHD SOMETIME DURING THE EVENING OF MONDAY/TUESDAY, WE WILL HEAD BACK TO CAIRO DURING THE DAY, JUNE 28, TO HAVE THE MEETING WITH KAMAL HASSAN ALI (REFTTEL) AND PERHAPS MUBARAK, IF ROY CONSIDERS THIS DESIRABLE.

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- THE QUESTION OF WHETHER WE PROCEED THEREAFTER TO EITHER TEL AVIV OR BEIRUT WILL DEPEND ON WHAT HAPPENS IN OUR TALKS IN SAUDI ARABIA AND ISRAEL, AS WELL AS HOW LONG IT TAKES TO HAVE MEETINGS IN CAIRO. WE WILL LET EVERYONE KNOW AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

3. FOR AMBASSADOR ATHERTON: I REALLY WILL NOT HAVE ENOUGH TO SAY TO KAMAL HASSAN ALI AS EARLY AS MONDAY AND PREFER TO SEE HIM ON TUESDAY, AFTER THE SAUDI MEETINGS. HOWEVER, YOU MAY WANT TO GET IN TOUCH WITH KAMAL HASSAN ALI BEFORE COMING TO THE AIRPORT TO MEET ME ON MONDAY AFTERNOON AND OFFER TO CONVEY ANY SPECIAL MESSAGE HE MAY HAVE (WHICH COULD BE USEFUL IN OUR MEETINGS IN SAUDI ARABIA).

4. FOR AMBASSADOR MURPHY: CONFIRMING OUR TALK IN WASHINGTON, IT WOULD BE GOOD IF WE COULD HAVE THE MEETING WITH FAHD ON MONDAY NIGHT, ALLOWING US TO PROCEED TO EGYPT AND ONWARD TRAVEL ON TUESDAY.
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MOPS, PREL, LE, UK, US
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR HABIB DISCUSSES LEBANON WITH UK
PERMANENT UNDER SECRETARY ACLAND

1. [REDACTED]
2. FCO PERMANENT UNDER SECRETARY SIR ANTONY ACLAND,
ACCOMPANIED BY UK AMBASSADOR WRIGHT, ON JUNE 23 CALLED ON
AMBASSADOR HABIB IN THE DEPARTMENT TO DISCUSS RECENT
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS, ESPECIALLY PROSPECTS FOR A
WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON AND THE FUTURE
ROLE OF THE MNF.

US POLICY

3. HABIB SAID THAT US ATTENTION IS NOW FOCUSED ON THE
PROBLEM OF LEBANON, WHILE THE PEACE PROCESS ITSELF WILL
HAVE TO BE DEALT WITH MORE COMPREHENSIVELY. OUR POLICY

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IS SUMMARIZED IN THE THREE POINTS PREVIOUSLY OUTLINED BY THE PRESIDENT: (1) WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES; (2) REESTABLISHMENT OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY OVER ITS OWN TERRITORY; AND (3) SECURITY FOR ISRAEL'S NORTHERN FRONTIER. UNFORTUNATELY, THE SYRIANS ARE BLOCKING WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES, DESPITE SUBSTANTIAL ARAB

SUPPORT FOR THE LEBANESE POSITION.

4. HAOIB SAID THE US IS RE-ASSESSING THE SITUATION, AND THAT HE IS PLANNING TO DEPART FOR THE MIDDLE EAST ON JUNE 24, TRAVELLING FIRST TO ISRAEL, TO ASSESS THE SITUATION ON THE SPOT AND TO EVALUATE THE RESULTS OF THE MOST RECENT CONTACTS.

SYRIAN ROLE

5. THE LEBANESE SITUATION, HE SAID, IS NOT GOOD. IT IS COMPLICATED BY SYRIAN REJECTION OF THE LEBANESE/ISRAELI AGREEMENT AND SYRIAN MANIPULATION OF THE PLO. THE SOVIETS, TOO, ARE TAKING ADVANTAGE OF SYRIAN INTRANSIGENCE AND SEE AN OPPORTUNITY TO ATTEMPT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE SITUATION IN A WAY THEY HAVEN'T HAD FOR A WHILE. WHILE HABIB WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC, HE SAID IT

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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WAS POSSIBLE THE SYRIANS RECOGNIZE THE DANGERS OF ESCALATION IN A CONTINUING CONFRONTATION ON THE GROUND AND WOULD BE AMENABLE TO A LESS COSTLY OUTCOME. THE SYRIANS ARE ALSO AWARE OF THE SENTIMENT BUILDING IN ISRAEL FOR UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL ISRAELI FORCES FROM LEBANON -- DUE LARGELY TO THEIR CONTINUING TO TAKE CASUALTIES, TO THE POINT WHERE THEY HAVE NOW LOST 500 DEAD IN LEBANON. A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL, OR SIMPLY THE PROPOSED "RE-DEPLOYMENT" OF TROOPS BY ISRAEL, WOULD NOT FUNDAMENTALLY RESOLVE THE PROBLEM.

SYRIAN-LEBANESE DIALOGUE

6. ACLAND ASKED WHETHER THE LEBANESE HAD TRIED TO OPEN DIRECT TALKS WITH THE SYRIANS ON TERMS OF WITHDRAWAL. HABIBU CONFIRMED THAT SUCH EFFORTS HAD BEEN MADE BY THE LEBANESE, BUT THAT THE SYRIANS HAD DECLINED TO PARTICIPATE IN A PROPER DIALOGUE.

BRITISH CONTRIBUTION TO MNF

7. ACLAND ASKED HABIB FOR HIS VIEW ON THE FUTURE ROLE OF THE MNF. HABIB SAID THE MNF PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN BEIRUT. IF A STRUCTURED WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN TROOPS COULD BE AGREED TO BY ALL PARTIES, THE MNF COULD PLAY A

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CRITICAL ROLE IN SUPPORT OF THE LEBANESE ARMY IN A NON-HOSTILE ATMOSPHERE. THE MNF WOULD NOT BE ASKED TO PARTICIPATE IN A COMBAT OR POLICE ROLE -- NEITHER THE US NOR THE LEBANESE FAVOR SUCH A ROLE. THE US HAS ALWAYS BELIEVED THE MNF SHOULD NOT BE PUT INTO A COMBAT SITUATION, BUT RATHER SHOULD FUNCTION AS A PRESENCE IN

SUPPORT OF THE LEBANESE. IN A WITHDRAWAL PERIOD, THE PRESENCE OF THE MNF WOULD BE IMPORTANT IN SUPPORT OF THE LEBANESE FORCES MOVING INTO PLACE. THE LEBANESE ARMY ITSELF, DESPITE IMPROVED TRAINING, SHOULD ONLY BE MOVED

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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INTO A POLITICALLY NEUTRAL, NON-COMBAT SITUATION.

8. ACLAND ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE WAS A QUESTION WHETHER HMG WOULD AGREE TO AN EXTENSION OF ITS 100-MAN FORCE IN THE MNF BEYOND AUGUST 7. HE POINTED TO VARIOUS BRITISH COMMITMENTS AROUND THE WORLD IN BELIZE, THE SINAI, AND IN CYPRUS WHERE A TEMPORARY CONTRIBUTION OF TROOPS HAD SEEMINGLY BECOME "ETERNAL."

9. HABIB URGED IN THE STRONGEST TERMS THAT HMG MAINTAIN ITS PARTICIPATION IN THE MNF. THE COST IS MINIMAL, AND WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE DAMAGING TO US EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A SETTLEMENT AND TO INTERESTS SHARED BY BOTH BRITAIN AND THE US. AT THE END OF THE DAY, "THE US COUNTS ON BRITAIN WHEN THE CHIPS ARE DOWN, AND THE CHIPS ARE DOWN TODAY IN LEBANON FOR BOTH BRITAIN AND THE US." PROGRESS IN LEBANON, SAID HABIB, IS ESSENTIAL TO GET THE PEACE PROCESS IN THE REGION BACK ON TRACK. IN RESPONSE TO ACLAND'S REFERENCE TO THE CONTINUING PALESTINIAN QUESTION, HABIB NOTED THAT RESOLUTION OF THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM REMAINS THE CORE PROBLEM IN ACHIEVING PEACE IN THE REGION.

10. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERE,

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[REDACTED]

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ROME ALSO FOR AMBS. HABIB, DRAPER, AND FAIRBANKS

FROM ROSS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, UNSC, UNIFIL, LE, UR

SUBJECT: LEBANON INITIATIVE: SOVIET POSITION ON LEBANON

1. ~~ENTIRE SENT~~
2. FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM REVIEWED HIS JUNE 23 MEETING

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WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR SOLDATOV FOR ROSS JUNE 24. ITS FORMAL PURPOSE WAS TO DISCUSS THE UNIFIL MANDATE RENEWAL, AND SALEM OPENED BY DESCRIBING THE SOVIETS' PAST ABSENTIONS AS "SUPPORTIVE" AND REQUESTING CONTINUED SOVIET SUPPORT. HE HIGHLIGHTED THE ROLE OF UNIFIL AS A POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION TO THE SECURITY OF THE PALESTINIANS IN LEBANON. SOLDATOV LIMITED HIS RESPONSE TO STATING HE WOULD CONSULT HIS GOVERNMENT.

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HAD FREELY CHOSEN THE AGREEMENT AS THE BEST OF THE
ALTERNATIVES AVAILABLE. POINTEDLY, HE NOTED THAT THE
SOVIET UNION HAD NOT OFFERED ANY ALTERNATIVES.

7. COMMENT: BY HIS TELLING, SALEM TOOK A NO-NONSENSE
APPROACH DURING THIS MEETING AND WAS THUS ENCOURAGED AT

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ROME ALSO FOR AMBS. HABIB, DRAPER, AND FAIRBANKS

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3. SOLDATOV THEN VERY UNCHARACTERISTICALLY CONTINUED INTO A SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION OF THE SOVIET POSITION ON LEBANON, ALBEIT IN VERY GENERAL TERMS. BEGINNING FROM THE PROPOSITION THAT THE SOVIET UNION SUPPORTED LEBANON'S INDEPENDENCE, SOVEREIGNTY, AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT HIS GOVERNMENT BACKED THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL NON-LEBANESE FORCES FROM LEBANON. IT WAS UNDERSTOOD, OF COURSE, THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD TO WITHDRAW UNCONDITIONALLY ON THE BASIS OF THE RELEVANT UNSC RESOLUTIONS. RESPONDING SHARPLY AND GRAPHICALLY, SALEM WAVED A FIVE-PAGE LIST OF UNFULFILLED UNSC RESOLUTIONS AND TOLD SOLDATOV HE HOPED THAT LEBANON WOULD NOT GET ADDED TO THAT LIST.

4. SOLDATOV WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE SOVIET UNION SUPPORTED THE LEBANESE PEOPLE FULLY AND WAS VERY UNHAPPY ABOUT WHAT THE U.S. WAS UP TO. U.S. POLICY WAS NEITHER WISE NOR CIVILIZED. IT WAS TRYING TO MONOPOLIZE THE SITUATION, AND ITS ATTEMPT TO DEPRIVE THE SOVIET UNION OF A SHARE IN THE PEACE PROCESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST WAS UNFAIR. THE SOVIET UNION WAS A SUPERPOWER, AND IT COULD NOT BE LEFT LIKE THIS. UNLIKE THE SOVIET UNION, THE U.S. WAS NOT FOR PEACE AND SOVEREIGNTY. UNLIKE THE SOVIET UNION, IT DID NOT MAKE HONEST COMMITMENTS. UNLIKE THE

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SOVIET UNION, IT DID NOT PROVIDE WEAPONS WITH WHICH TO FIGHT THE ENEMY. THE SOVIET UNION WAS A FRIEND OF THE ARABS, AND ITS SUPPORT FOR SYRIA HAD MADE IT NECESSARY FOR THE ISRAELIS TO THINK TWICE BEFORE ATTACKING. SYRIA WAS NOW VERY STRONG THANKS TO SOVIET SUPPORT.

5. SALEM, AGAIN REACTING SHARPLY, TOLD SOLDATOV THAT IF THE SOVIET UNION HAD A PROBLEM WITH THE U.S. ON THE MIDDLE EAST IT SHOULD NOT FIGHT IT OUT IN LEBANON. HE ADVISED SOLDATOV THAT HIS GOVERNMENT SHOULD ISSUE A STATEMENT SUPPORTING NOT THE LEBANESE PEOPLE, BUT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND ITS RIGHT TO TAKE ANY DECISION IT FELT NECESSARY TO FREE ITS COUNTRY. (COL. 'ABDU AND AMB. TUENI HAVE INTRODUCED A JOKE AROUND THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE THAT PRESIDENT GEMAYEL SHOULD START DEMANDING THAT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT BE RECOGNIZED AS "THE SOLE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE LEBANESE PEOPLE."). SALEM ALSO ASKED THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT INTERVENE WITH THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT TO GET ITS FORCES OUT OF LEBANON.

6. SOLDATOV REJOINED THAT THE SOVIET UNION DID NOT WANT TO INTERFERE BETWEEN LEBANON AND SYRIA. ISRAEL MUST SIMPLY GET OUT WITHOUT CONDITIONS. THE SOVIET UNION SYMPATHIZED WITH LEBANON, WHICH HAD HAD TO ACCEPT AN IMPOSED AGREEMENT. SALEM INSISTED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT

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FROM ROSS

SOLDATOV'S WILLINGNESS TO INITIATE AND THEN CONTINUE
A SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION. THIS HAD NOT OCCURRED AT ANY
OF THEIR PREVIOUS MEETINGS, WHICH HAD BEEN DEVOTED
LARGELY TO QUESTIONS FROM SOLDATOV. SALEM, PROFESSING
TO SOLDATOV THAT LEBANON WANTS TO HAVE FRIENDLY
RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION UNDER THE RIGHT
CONDITIONS. HAS INVITED HIM TO MATCH DRINKS (ARAK VS
[REDACTED]
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VODKA) AT HIS HOME, AND SOLDATOV HAS ACCEPTED IN
PRINCIPLE. PUGH

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DEPT. ALSO FOR AMBS. HABIB AND DRAPER; JCS FOR J-5

FROM ROSS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US

SUBJECT: LEBANON MISSION: ROSS-KIMCHE MEETING JUNE 22

REF: A) BEIRUT 6909 NOTAL; B) BEIRUT 7022

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1. ~~REDACTED~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY. ROSS MET KIMCHE IN THE BEIRUT AREA JUNE 22 FOR A REVIEW OF THE STATE OF PLAY IN PREPARATION FOR THE FIRST TRIPARTITE HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING LATER THE SAME DAY (REF B). KIMCHE WAS PLEASED THAT THE TRIPARTITE CHANNEL WAS NOW OPEN. HE ALSO ENCOURAGED ROSS TO MEET WITH HIM, LUBRANI, AND THEIR STAFFS IN ISRAEL FROM TIME TO TIME. KIMCHE AND ROSS REVIEWED LEBANESE AND

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ISRAELI POSITIONS ON THE TIMING OF THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE AGREEMENT, THE STATUS OF PLANNING FOR THE JOINT LIAISON AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS COMMITTEES, THE ISSUE OF PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL (ROSS CAUTIONED THAT CONTINUING ISRAELI-U.S. DISCUSSION OF THIS POSSIBILITY SHOULD NOT BE READ AS SIGNALLING U.S. AGREEMENT OR ACQUIESCENCE. WE CONTINUED TO WORK FOR FULL WITAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES), AND PRIME MINISTER WAZZAN'S PROPOSAL (ENDORSED BY FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM) FOR A DETAILED ILLUSTRATIVE PLAN FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. KIMCHE TOOK NOTE OF THIS PROPOSAL, AS WELL AS OF ROSS' DESCRIPTION OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF INCREASED TERRORISM AGAINST THE ISRAELIS BY SHI'ITE ELEMENTS IN THE EVENT OF PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL. THIS LATTER POINT, KIMCHE SAID, WOULD HAVE TO BE HIGHLIGHTED FOR HIS GOVERNMENT AS IT CONTINUED TO STUDY ITS VARIOUS OPTIONS. END SUMMARY.

3. ROSS MET WITH ISRAELI MFA D/G KIMCHE FOR 45 MINUTES JUNE 22. SINCE HE HAD ALREADY OBTAINED LEBANESE FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM'S APPROVAL FOR TRIPARTITE HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETINGS, HE USED THE DISCUSSION LARGELY TO PREPARE KIMCHE FOR A SUBSEQUENT SESSION WITH AMB. FATTAL, ALTHOUGH HE ALSO MADE A FEW POINTS IN THE BILATERAL CONTEXT.

[REDACTED]
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4. BILATERAL AND TRIPARTITE MEETINGS

-- KIMCHE WAS DELIGHTED TO LEARN THAT SALEM HAD APPROVED TRIPARTITE HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETINGS AND HAD CONVINCED AMB. FATTAL TO CONTINUE TO SERVE FOR THIS PURPOSE. HIS ONLY RESERVATION WAS THAT HE FEARED FATTAL WAS NO LONGER READ INTO THE ISSUES AND WOULD THEREFORE NOT BE AN EFFECTIVE CHANNEL. ROSS UNDERTOOK TO IMPRESS ON SALEM THE NEED TO PREPARE AND MAINTAIN FATTAL AS AN AUTHORIZED SPOKESMAN, AND HE DID THIS SUBSEQUENTLY.

-- KIMCHE AND ROSS AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR ROSS TO COME TO ISRAEL FROM TIME TO TIME TO MEET WITH KIMCHE AND LUBRANI AND THEIR STAFFS. (REUVEN MERHAV, INTRODUCED TO ROSS AS LUBRANI'S PRINCIPAL DEPUTY, WAS PRESENT WITH KIMCHE AT THIS MEETING.)

-- REFERRING TO KIMCHE'S RECENT DISCUSSION WITH AMB. LEWIS, ROSS TOLD KIMCHE THAT HE WOULD BE HAPPY TO TRY TO OBTAIN U.S. MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN ANY LEBANESE-ISRAELI MEETINGS WHERE THE TWO PARTIES THOUGHT THIS MIGHT BE USEFUL DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD BEFORE THE AGREEMENT CAME INTO FOR

5. ENTRY INTO FORCE OF AGREEMENT

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-- ROSS BRIEFED KIMCHE IN GENERAL TERMS ON THE LEBANESE POSITION CONCERNING THE TIMING OF THE EXCHANGE OF INSTRUMENTS BRINGING THE AGREEMENT INTO FORCE, I.E., THAT THIS WAS LINKED TO EVIDENCE THAT THE AGREEMENT WOULD BE FULLY IMPLEMENTED. THE LEBANESE, ROSS SAID, SHOWED NO

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DEPT. ALSO FOR AMBS. HABIB AND DRAPER; JCS FOR J-5

FROM ROSS

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US
SUBJECT: LEBANON MISSION: ROSS-KIMCHE MEETING JUNE 22

ENTHUSIASM FOR AN EXCHANGE OF INSTRUMENTS NOT LINKED IN
SOME WAY TO AT LEAST A COMMITMENT OF FULL IMPLEMENTATION

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IN THE FUTURE. THEIR REASONING WAS THAT THIS WOULD
CREATE UNNECESSARY PROBLEMS WITH THE SYRIANS, WHAT WITH
THE CREATION OF HIGHLY VISIBLE ORGANS, THE BEGINNING OF
"NORMALIZATION," ETC.

-- KIMCHE RESPONDED THAT ISRAEL FELT ON THE CONTRARY THAT
THE ADVANTAGES VIS A VIS SYRIA OUTWEIGHED THE DISADVANTAGES.
TO GET SYRIA TO NEGOTIATE ITS WITHDRAWAL SERIOUSLY
IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO REMOVE ANY GROUNDS FOR HOPE THAT IT
COULD SCUTTLE THE AGREEMENT. THIS COULD BE DONE ONLY BY
BRINGING IT INTO FORCE.

6. JOINT LIAISON AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS COMMITTEES

-- ROSS TOLD KIMCHE THAT, FROM ALL AVAILABLE EVIDENCE,
THE LEBANESE HAD NOT YET SETTLED ON THE CHAIRMAN OR
MEMBERS OF THEIR DELEGATION TO EITHER COMMITTEE FORESEEN
UNDER THE AGREEMENT. SOME IDEAS WERE FLOATING AROUND,
BUT NONE HAD CRYSTALLIZED. IN THIS CONTEXT, ROSS ASKED,
WHAT WAS KIMCHE'S INTERPRETATION OF THE MINIMUM LEVEL OF
THE "SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS" WHO, ACCORDING TO THE
AGREEMENT, ARE TO BE THE DELEGATION HEADS? KIMCHE SAID
THAT TO HIM THIS MEANT THAT THE CHAIRMAN OF THE DELEGATION
SHOULD BE AT LEAST A MINISTERIAL DIRECTOR OR AN
AMBASSADOR. (COMMENT: ALL OF THE LEBANESE IDEAS THAT
ROSS HAS HEARD SATISFY THIS REQUIREMENT.)

-- IN RESPONSE TO ROSS' QUESTION, KIMCHE SAID THE ISRAELIS
LIKEWISE HAD MADE NO FINAL DECISIONS. THESE DEPENDED
PARTLY ON WHAT THE LEBANESE DID AND PARTLY ON WHAT THE
MFA DECIDED TO DO WITH ITS PRESENT REPRESENTATIVES IN
BEIRUT (YITZHAK LEOR, BRUCE KASHDAN, ETC.).

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-- KIMCHE URGED ROSS TO ENCOURAGE THE LEBANESE TO THINK ABOUT THE PHYSICAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE COMMITTEES AND FOR THE ISRAELI LIAISON OFFICE OPERATING IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE JLC. THE ISRAELIS WERE HAVING DIFFICULTIES WITH THE OWNER OF THEIR PRESENT OFFICE (A SAUDI PRINCESS AS REPRESENTED BY HER LEBANESE LAWYER), AND THEY WERE ANXIOUS TO KNOW WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR THEM TO LOOK FOR QUARTERS ELSEWHERE AND, IF SO, WHERE.

7. PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL

-- THE ISSUE OF A PARTIAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL INEVITABLY CAME UP. ROSS CAUTIONED KIMCHE THAT OUR WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS PROS AND CONS AT THIS STAGE SHOULD IN NO WAY BE INTERPRETED AS AGREEMENT OR EVEN AQUIESCENCE IN THE IDEA. THIS AND MANY OTHER ISSUES WERE CURRENTLY UNDER REVIEW IN WASHINGTON, AND IT WAS TOO EARLY TO MAKE ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT OUR POSITION. RESPONDING, KIMCHE PROFESSED TO HAVE ENCOUNTERED GREAT UNDERSTANDING FOR THE IDEA OF PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL IN WASHINGTON. ROSS REPEATED THAT, ON THE CONTRARY, WHILE HIS VARIOUS INTERLOCUTORS MIGHT HAVE DISCUSSED THE PROS AND CONS OF PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL WITH VARYING DEGREES OF ENTHUSIASM, NO DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN. WE CONTINUED TO WORK FOR FULL WITHDRAWALS

-- DRAWING ON AN EMBASSY ANALYSIS OF THE DOMESTIC IMPLICATIONS OF PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL (SEPTTEL), ROSS SKETCHED OUT FOR KIMCHE SOME OF THE FACTORS THAT BROUGHT LEBANESE DECISION-MAKERS TO OPPOSE PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL (DRUZE FEARS OF A LEBANESE FORCES ONSLAUGHT, SHI'ITE FEAR OF LONG-TERM OCCUPATION AND THE RESULTING DANGER

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EXDIS - MILITARY ADDRESSEE HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

DEPT. ALSO FOR AMBS. HABIB AND DRAPER; JCS FOR J-5

FROM ROSS

E.O. 12356:

DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US

SUBJECT: LEBANON MISSION: ROSS-KIMCHE MEETING JUNE 22

OF ESCALATED TERRORISM AGAINST ISRAELIS IN SOUTHERN
LEBANON, THE WILLINGNESS OF SOME MARONITE CIRCLES TO

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THINK IN EARNEST ABOUT A MINI-STATE, AND THE TEMPTATION
FOR THE PLO TO INFILTRATE INTO EVACUATED AREAS). KIMCHE
WAS MOST STRUCK BY THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ESCALATION OF
TERRORISM IN THE SOUTH IN THE EVENT A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL
OCCURRED. THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE IDF WOULD SUFFER AS
MANY OR MORE CASUALTIES FOLLOWING A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL
WAS A POINT HE SAID HE WOULD HAVE TO HIGHLIGHT FOR HIS
GOVERNMENT AS ITS STUDY OF THE VARIOUS OPTIONS CONTINUED.

-- ROSS ASKED KIMCHE WHETHER HE FORESAW CONTINUED USE
OF THE "LOGISTICAL ROUTE" IN THE EVENT OF PARTIAL
WITHDRAWAL. KIMCHE SAID THAT AT THIS POINT HE COULD
NOT RESPOND CONCRETELY. CONTINUED USE OF THE "LOGISTICAL

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ROUTE" WOULD DEPEND HEAVILY ON THE NATURE OF ANY PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL. IN ANY CASE, THERE WOULD BE AN IRREDUCIBLE NEED FOR ARRANGEMENTS TO RELIEVE THE GUARD AT THE MFA LIAISON OFFICE IN YARZE.

8. THE WIDER ISSUE OF FULL WITHDRAWALS

-- ROSS DESCRIBED PRIME MINISTER WAZZAN'S PROPOSAL FOR A DETAILED ILLUSTRATIVE PLAN FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, WHICH WAZZAN BELIEVED THE LEBANESE COULD USE WITH GOOD EFFECT WITH THE SYRIANS AND WITH LEBANON'S ARAB FRIENDS. (ROSS HAD PREVIOUSLY CHECKED WAZZAN'S PROPOSAL OUT WITH SALEM, WHO HAD ENDORSED IT.) KIMCHE SAID THIS SOUNDED LIKE A REASONABLE IDEA AS LONG AS THE DOCUMENT COULD BE KEPT PRIVATE. HE MADE A NOTE TO HIMSELF TO FOLLOW UP UPON HIS RETURN TO ISRAEL.

9. COMMENT: THIS MEETING PROVED TO BE A USEFUL MEANS OF REESTABLISHING A PERSONAL DIALOGUE AND PREPARING FOR THE TRIPARTITE HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING THAT FOLLOWED.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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ROSS AND KIMCHE (AND LATER FATTAL) ALL RECOGNIZED THAT A PERIOD OF "DECOMPRESSION" HAD SET IN WITH THE TERMINATION OF THE FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS AND THAT IT WAS TIME TO SHIFT GEARS. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE ROSS-KIMCHE MEETING WERE NOTABLE IN THAT IT TOOK PLACE ENTIRELY WHILE KIMCHE WAS BEING DRIVEN FROM HIS ARRIVAL AT "DAMUR INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT" TO HIS FIRST MEETING IN HAZMIYYA. IT WAS SOMEWHAT UNSETTLING TO CONDUCT A DISCUSSION ABOUT SERIOUS MATTERS WHILE PROCEEDING UP THE UTTERLY DESERTED OLD SIDON ROAD, NOW LINED WITH EARTH BARRIERS TO WARD OFF TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST ISRAELI TROOPS. PUGH

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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

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SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 07022

DECLASSIFIEDADDRESSEE HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
DEPT. ALSO FOR AMBS. HABIB AND DRAPER; JCS FOR J-5

FROM ROSS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, UNIFIL, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US

SUBJECT: LEBANON MISSION: HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING
JUNE 22

REF: BEIRUT 6909 (NOTAL)

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1. [REDACTED]

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2. SUMMARY. THE FIRST LEBANESE-ISRAELI-U.S. HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING TOOK PLACE JUNE 22. IT WAS AGREED THAT REGULAR MEETINGS WOULD BE HELD EVERY TWO WEEKS. THE AGENDA FOR THE NEXT MEETING INCLUDES AN EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AND VIEWS ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIAN FORCES, AN EXAMINATION OF PRACTICAL PROBLEMS RELATING TO THE ISRAELI PRESENCE IN LEBANON, DISCUSSION OF THE

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ISSUE OF ISRAELI REDEPLOYMENT, EXAMINATION OF THE TIMING AND MODALITIES OF THE EXCHANGE OF INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION, AND THE STATUS OF THE "UNOFFICIAL FORCES" IN SOUTHERN LEBANON AND THEIR RELATIONS WITH UNIFIL. UNDER THE RUBRIC OF "PRACTICAL PROBLEMS," KIMCHE INDICATED THE ISRAELIS WISHED TO DISCUSS CERTAIN MAJOR ISSUES SUCH AS REGULARIZING THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS, BUT ROSS CAUTIONED THAT THERE WERE LIMITS TO WHAT COULD BE DONE BEFORE THE AGREEMENT WAS IMPLEMENTED. IN GENERAL DISCUSSION OF THE STATE OF PLAY, KIMCHE OUTLINED ISRAELI OPTIONS ON PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL, STRESSING THAT NO DECISION HAD BEEN MADE. ROSS STATED THAT WE PREFER TO CONTINUE TO WORK FOR THE FULL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES, WHILE FATTAL SAID SERIOUS THINKING ON PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL SHOULD BE PUT OFF UNTIL THE VISITS OF GEMAYEL AND BEGIN TO WASHINGTON. KIMCHE PRESSED TO HAVE THE AGREEMENT COME INTO FORCE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, AND FATTAL SAID HE WOULD TRY. ON RELATIONS BETWEEN UNIFIL AND THE "UNOFFICIAL FORCES," KIMCHE SAID THAT ISRAEL APPRECIATED THE IMPORTANCE OF KEEPING UNIFIL'S 6000 MEN AVAILABLE AND RECOGNIZED THE DANGER THAT SOME CONTRIBUTORS MIGHT PULL OUT IF THE ISSUE WAS NOT RESOLVED. HE AGREED IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR THE HEADS OF DELEGATION TO DISCUSS THIS PROBLEM SOON AND CONFIDED THAT IT WOULD BE EXAMINED

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WITHIN THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT JUNE 24. THE ATMOSPHERE OF THIS FIRST MEETING WAS BUSINESSLIKE, AND WE BELIEVE FUTURE MEETINGS WILL SERVE A USEFUL PURPOSE IF THE CIRCUITS ARE NOT OVERLOADED WITH ISSUES BEST LEFT UNTIL AFTER THE AGREEMENT COMES INTO FORCE. END SUMMARY.

3. THE FIRST OF THE TRIPARTITE HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETINGS FORESEEN AT THE END OF THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI-U.S. NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE INTERIM PERIOD BEFORE THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT CAME INTO FORCE TOOK PLACE JUNE 22. FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM CALLED ROSS EARLY JUNE 22 TO STATE THAT, HAVING MULLED OVER THE ISSUE OF SUCH MEETINGS AS THE LATTER HAD SUGGESTED, HE HAD DECIDED TO LEND HIS SUPPORT AND HAD CONVINCED AMB. FATTAL TO CONTINUE TO SERVE FOR THAT PURPOSE. WHEN ROSS INFORMED ISRAELI MFA D/G KIMCHE OF THIS HELPFUL DEVELOPMENT UPON THE LATTER'S ARRIVAL ON A VISIT TO BEIRUT LATER IN THE DAY, KIMCHE REVEALED HE HAD A PRIVATE MEETING SCHEDULED WITH FATTAL THAT EVENING AND PROPOSED THAT THIS BECOME THE FIRST HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING.

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4. MEETING FOR ONE HOUR AT FATTAL'S HOME, ROSS, FATTAL, AND KIMCHE, JOINED BY REUVEN MERHAV (DEPUTY TO LEBANON COORDINATOR URI LUBRANI), ISRAELI MFA BEIRUT REP. YITZHAK LEOR, AND DAN LNU (ONE OF LEOR'S

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ASSISTANTS), SETTLED PROCEDURAL MATTERS, ESTABLISHED
AN AGENDA FOR THE NEXT MEETING, AND ENGAGED IN A
GENERAL REVIEW OF THE STATE OF PLAY.

5. PROCEDURAL MATTERS

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AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
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AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
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EXDIS - MILITARY ADDRESSEE HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
DEPT. ALSO FOR AMBS. HABIB AND DRAPER; JCS FOR J-5

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FROM ROSS

UNCLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, UNIFIL, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US

SUBJECT: LEBANON MISSION: HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING

IT WAS AGREED THAT REGULAR MEETINGS WOULD BE HELD
EVERY TWO WEEKS AND THAT URGENT MEETINGS COULD BE

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[REDACTED]

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CALLED THROUGH ROSS AT ANY TIME. (THE NEXT MEETING IS SCHEDULED FOR JULY 6, BUT THIS MAY HAVE TO BE ADJUSTED IN THE LIGHT OF THE SCHEDULE OF AMB. HABIB AND HIS PARTY.) KIMCHE PROPOSED THAT, IF THE LEBANESE AGREED, MEETINGS ALTERNATE BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL; THE LEBANESE WILL LET US KNOW SHORTLY. ALTHOUGH SALEM HAD TOLD ROSS IN AGREEING TO THE MEETINGS THAT THEY SHOULD NOT BE PUBLICIZED IN ORDER TO AVOID CREATING UNNECESSARY COMPLICATIONS WITH THE SYRIANS AND WITH LEBANON'S ARAB FRIENDS, KIMCHE ASKED THAT THIS DECISION BE RECONSIDERED SINCE--PREDICTABLY--HE SAW ADVANTAGES TO DEMONSTRATING THAT OFFICIAL LEBANESE-ISRAELI CONTACTS HAD NOT BEEN INTERRUPTED, AND THAT OPEN DISCUSSIONS WERE CONTINUING. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE ARAB WORLD AT LARGE HAD SWALLOWED THE OCCURRENCE OF NEGOTIATIONS AND THE SIGNING OF THE AGREEMENT. IT WOULD BE USEFUL, HE THOUGHT, TO SHOW THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO BREAK IN THE PROCESS. FATTAL PROMISED TO CHECK WITH SALEM.

6. AGENDA FOR NEXT MEETING

KIMCHE PROPOSED THE FOLLOWING ITEMS FOR THE NEXT MEETING:

-- A) AN EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AND VIEWS ON THE
WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIAN FORCES.

-- B) EXAMINATION OF "CERTAIN PRACTICAL PROBLEMS," FOR
EXAMPLE, HOW THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE WILL BE SET
UP, WHO WILL SERVE ON IT, WHERE THE ISRAELI LIAISON
OFFICE WILL BE LOCATED, HOW THIS OFFICE WILL BE GUARDED,
HOW LIAISON BETWEEN THIS OFFICE AND LEBANESE GOVERNMENT
DEPARTMENTS IS TO OCCUR, WHEN MEETINGS OF EXPERTS ON

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TELECOMMUNICATIONS, DRUGS, CRIME, ETC. CAN BE SCHEDULED, AND HOW THE EXCHANGE OF MERCHANDISE IS TO BE REGULARIZED AND GIVEN A LEGAL BASIS.

-- C) DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE OF ISRAELI REDEPLOYMENT. KIMCHE STRESSED THAT ISRAEL WANTED TO COORDINATE ALL MEASURES WITH LEBANON, INCLUDING HOW TO "SELL" A REDEPLOYMENT TO THE ARAB WORLD.

-- D) EXAMINATION OF THE TIMING AND MODALITIES OF THE EXCHANGE OF INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION BRINGING THE AGREEMENT INTO FORCE. KIMCHE ASKED THAT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT PRESENT ITS FORMAL POSITION ON THIS ISSUE AT THE NEXT MEETING.

ROSS ADDED A FIFTH ITEM EMANATING FROM A MEETING WITH UN AND UNIFIL PERSONNEL HE HAD JUST PARTICIPATED IN (EMBASSY SEPTTEL):

-- E) THE STATUS OF THE "UNOFFICIAL FORCES" IN SOUTHERN LEBANON AND THEIR RELATIONS WITH UNIFIL DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD BEFORE THEIR INTEGRATION INTO OFFICIAL LEBANESE FORCES.

BEFORE THE DISCUSSION TURNED TO A GENERAL REVIEW OF THE SITUATION, ROSS CAUTIONED FATTAL AND KIMCHE THAT, WHILE THE HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETINGS WOULD BE VERY USEFUL, WE SHOULD NOT EXPECT THEM TO BE ABLE TO SOLVE EVERYTHING. THERE WERE LIMITS ON WHAT COULD BE DONE BEFORE THE AGREEMENT WAS IMPLEMENTED, AND CERTAIN AMBIGUOUS SITUATIONS MIGHT CONTINUE IN SOME AREAS. (IT WAS CLEAR

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AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
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JCS WASHDC PRIORITY

SECTION 03 OF 04 BEIRUT 07022

EXDIS - MILITARY ADDRESSEE HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
DEPT. ALSO FOR AMBS. HABIB AND DRAPER; JCS FOR J-5

FROM ROSS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, M
ARR: UNIFIL, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US
SUBJECT: LEBANON MISSION: HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING

FROM THE CONTEXT THAT ROSS WAS ALLUDING TO KIMCHE'S
SECOND AGENDA ITEM, WHICH IS IN PART AN ATTEMPT TO
OPEN DISCUSSION ON MATTERS TO BE DEALT WITH ONLY

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AFTER THE AGREEMENT COMES INTO FORCE.)

7. GENERAL REVIEW OF THE STATE OF PLAY

-- ISRAELI REDEPLOYMENT. FATTAL OPENED THE GENERAL
DISCUSSION BY ASKING KIMCHE WHETHER HE HAD RAISED
REDEPLOYMENT SERIOUSLY WHILE IN WASHINGTON. KIMCHE
REPLIED THAT HE HAD, BUT ONLY AS AN OPTION. HE
MENTIONED THAT AT LEAST SIX OPTIONS WERE UNDER DIS-
CUSSION WITHIN THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT: TO STAY IN PLACE,
TO WITHDRAW ONLY FROM 'ALAYH ITSELF, TO WITHDRAW
DOWN TO THE DAMUR RIVER VALLEY, TO WITHDRAW TO THE AWWALI

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RIVER VALLEY, AND TO WITHDRAW TO THE ZAHRANI RIVER VALLEY. NO DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN. WITHDRAWAL OF SOME KIND HAD ADVANTAGES FOR ISRAEL IN THAT IT MIGHT REDUCE THE NUMBER OF TROOPS REQUIRED IN LEBANON AND RESULT IN FEWER CASUALTIES. HOWEVER, ISRAEL WOULD NOT IMPLEMENT SUCH A PLAN WITHOUT CONSULTATION AND WOULD WANT TO BE CERTAIN THAT THE LEBANESE ARMY COULD TAKE OVER IN AREAS THE ISRAELIS LEFT. FATTAL THEN ASKED ROSS WHAT THE U.S. POSITION WAS. ROSS INDICATED THAT WE REMAINED OPPOSED TO PARTIAL WITHDRAWALS, PREFERRING TO CONTINUE TO WORK FOR THE FULL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES. OUR OPPOSITION DID NOT PREVENT US FROM EXAMINING THE PROS AND CONS OF PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL ON A HYPOTHETICAL BASIS, AS WE ASSUMED BOTH THE LEBANESE AND ISRAELI GOVERNMENTS WERE DOING, BUT OUR WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS THESE PROS AND CONS SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED AS AGREEMENT OR EVEN ACQUIESCENCE. KIMCHE THEN ASKED WHAT THE LEBANESE POSITION WAS. FATTAL REPLIED THAT IT WOULD BE PREMATURE TO THINK SERIOUSLY ABOUT PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL BEFORE THE VISITS OF PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AND PRIME MINISTER

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BEGIN TO WASHINGTON. MEANWHILE, HE WOULD--ON THE BASIS OF HIS PERSONAL CONVICTION--WORK FOR ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE AGREEMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

-- ENTRY INTO FORCE OF AGREEMENT. KIMCHE PRAISED FATTAL'S INTENTION TO WORK FOR A RAPID ENTRY INTO FORCE, REPEATING THE ISRAELI ARGUMENT THAT THE SYRIANS WOULD NOT COME TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE AS LONG AS THEY WERE LEFT ANY HOPE THAT THEY COULD DESTROY THE AGREEMENT. LEOR NOTED THAT PRIME MINISTER WAZZAN HAD RECENTLY MADE A NEGATIVE STATEMENT ON THIS ISSUE TO THE EFFECT THAT GEMAYEL WOULD DELAY BRINGING THE AGREEMENT INTO FORCE UNTIL THE ISSUE OF WITHDRAWAL WAS CLEARED UP. FATTAL, REFLECTING HIS PERSONAL VIEW, CALLED WAZZAN'S STATEMENT "CHILDISH." HE DID GO ON TO SAY, HOWEVER, THAT PUBLIC OPINION COULD CAUSE REAL DIFFICULTIES IF THE AGREEMENT CAME INTO FORCE AND ONLY LEBANON'S OBLIGATIONS WERE FULFILLED.

-- UNIFIL AND THE UNOFFICIAL FORCES. IN PRESENTING THE AGENDA ITEM ON UNIFIL AND THE "UNOFFICIAL FORCES" IN THE SOUTH, ROSS HAD MADE THE POINT THAT UNIFIL WOULD HAVE AN IMPORTANT ROLE TO PLAY IN LEBANON AS A WHOLE IN THE FUTURE (INCLUDING A ROLE IN THE SOUTH AS FORESEEN IN THE AGREEMENT), THAT CERTAIN OF THE CONTRIBUTORS AS WELL AS THE UNIFIL COMMAND WERE DEEPLY DISTURBED BY THE HARRASSMENT OF UNIFIL BY THE "UNOFFICIAL FORCES," AND THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO CLEAR THIS PROBLEM UP BEFORE THE UPCOMING DEBATE ON RENEWAL OF THE UNIFIL

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MANDATE. KIMCHE AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE A GOOD IDEA,
GIVEN THE IMMINENCE OF THE RENEWAL PROCESS, TO DISCUSS

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1225
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SECTION 04 OF 04 BEIRUT 07022

EXDIS - MILITARY ADDRESSEE HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
DEPT. ALSO FOR AMBS. HABIB AND DRAPER; JCS FOR J-5

FROM ROSS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, UNIFIL, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US
SUBJECT: LEBANON MISSION: HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING

THIS ISSUE EVEN BEFORE THE MEETING SCHEDULED FOR JULY 6.
HE SAID THAT ISRAEL APPRECIATED THE IMPORTANCE OF KEEPING
UNIFIL'S 6,000 MEN AVAILABLE AND RECOGNIZED THE DANGER

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THAT SOME CONTRIBUTORS MIGHT PULL THEIR CONTINGENTS OUT
IF THE ISSUE WERE NOT RESOLVED. HE CONFIDED THAT A
MEETING HAD ALREADY BEEN SCHEDULED WITHIN THE ISRAELI
GOVERNMENT FOR JUNE 24 TO LOOK INTO THIS PROBLEM.

-- LEBANESE INTERNAL SCENE. THE DISCUSSION ENDED
WITH KIMCHE ASKING FATTAL FOR HIS READING OF THE MOOD
IN LEBANON ("DEEP PESSIMISM EXCEPT FOR PRESIDENT
GEMAYEL") AND OF THE STRENGTH OF THE INTERNAL
CONSENSUS ("VERY STRONG, WITH NO WEAKENING").

8. COMMENT: THE ATMOSPHERE OF THE MEETING WAS BUSINESS-
LIKE, AND WE BELIEVE FUTURE MEETINGS CAN SERVE A USEFUL
FUNCTION IF THE CIRCUITS ARE NOT OVERLOADED. FATTAL,
WITH WHOM ROSS HAD A DISCUSSION AFTER THE MEETING
ENDED, IS VERY WORRIED THAT THIS COULD HAPPEN IF, FOR
INSTANCE, THE ISRAELIS TRY TO OPEN THE ISSUE OF THE
MOVEMENT OF GOODS. HE DOES NOT APPEAR TOO ENTHUSIASTIC
ABOUT THE PROSPECT OF GETTING INTO REGULAR MEETINGS
WITH THE ISRAELIS, LARGELY BECAUSE HE FEARS THE DIS-
CUSSIONS WILL BECOME COMPREHENSIVE AND INTERMINABLE.
ROSS ASSURED HIM HE WOULD TRY TO KEEP THE AGENDA
FOCUSED ON ISSUES WHERE AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS OR
PRACTICAL ACTIONS WOULD BE USEFUL AND WOULD TRY TO
DEFLECT ATTEMPTS TO INTRODUCE SUBJECTS THAT SHOULD
BE DEALT WITH ONLY AFTER THE AGREEMENT COMES INTO
FORCE. PUGH

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, XF, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US, SA
SUBJECT: ROSS-WAZZAN MEETING JUNE 18

1. [REDACTED] (TEXT.)
2. SUMMARY. ROSS, ACCOMPANIED BY POLOFF FOSTER, PAID A CALL ON PRIME MINISTER SHAFIQ AL-WAZZAN SATURDAY, JUNE 18. ROSS DELIVERED THE LETTER WHICH SECRETARY SHULTZ HAD SENT CONGRATULATING WAZZAN ON THE PARLIAMENTARY NOTE IN FAVOR OF THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI ACCORD

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CSTATE 166913. HE TOOK ADVANTAGE OF THIS VISIT TO BRIEF WAZZAN ON THE MAJOR CONCLUSION OF THE INFORMAL POLICY REVIEW IN WASHINGTON AND TO DISCUSS THE CURRENT STATUS OF EFFORTS TO GET FOREIGN TROOPS OUT OF LEBANON.
END SUMMARY.

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3. ROSS AND POLOFF FOSTER CALLED ON PRIME MINISTER SHAFIQ AL-WAZZAN ON JUNE 18 TO DELIVER THE SECRETARY'S LETTER CONGRATULATING WAZZAN ON THE LEBANESE PARLIAMENT'S

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APPROVAL OF THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI ACCORD (STATE 166913). THE CHARGE, SCHEDULED TO JOIN IN THE CALL, WAS DIVERTED BY URGENT BUSINESS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM. WAZZAN THANKED ROSS FOR THE LETTER AND SAID HE WOULD REPLY TO THE SECRETARY.

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4. ROSS BRIEFED WAZZAN ON THE MAJOR CONCLUSION OF RECENT INFORMAL, POLICY REVIEW IN WASHINGTON, SAYING THE U.S. HAD DECIDED TO CONTINUE EFFORTS TO PROMOTE THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON BY WORKING CLOSELY WITH KEY ARAB AND EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. THE SAUDIS WERE VERY ACTIVE, AND KING FAHD HAD SAID THAT HE WOULD STAY PERSONALLY INVOLVED TO HELP FIND A SOLUTION.

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5. ROSS SAID HE THOUGHT THAT, WITH THE PASSAGE OF TIME, THE SYRIANS WOULD REALIZE THAT THEIR SPOILER TACTICS COULD NOT BE SUCCESSFUL. HE SAID THAT SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER KHADDAM HAD BEEN INVITED TO WASHINGTON, BUT THAT KHADDAM COULD NOT COME BECAUSE HE APPARENTLY ALREADY HAD MADE PLANS FOR THE DATES PROPOSED. ROSS DID NOT RULE OUT A FUTURE HIGH-LEVEL VISIT TO THE REGION, PERHAPS BY SECRETARY SHULTZ HIMSELF, BUT EMPHASIZED THAT THIS WOULD DEPEND IN PART ON THE

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SIGNALS FROM DAMASCUS, INCLUDING PRESIDENT ASSAD'S RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT GEMAYEL'S LETTER.

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6. WAZZAN SAID THAT PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES ON THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI ACCORD HAD BEEN VERY IMPORTANT BECAUSE THEY HAD BEEN "PUBLIC" AND HAD SUCCEEDED IN "DISSIPATING FEARS" SURROUNDING THE ACCORD. HE SAID THE "ESSENTIAL GOAL" LEBANON WAS SEEKING TO ACHIEVE WITH THE ACCORD WAS THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE IDF. HE SAID THAT UNFORTUNATELY THE ISRAELIS HAD MADE THEIR WITHDRAWAL SUBJECT TO SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. THEN, AS AN AFTERTHOUGHT, HE SAID THAT PERHAPS IT WAS BETTER FOR LEBANON THAT THIS WAS SO.

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7. ROSS NOTED THAT WHILE IN WASHINGTON, KIMCHE HAD, IN VERY TENTATIVE TERMS, RAISED THE ISSUE OF A PARTIAL IDF WITHDRAWAL. WE REMAINED OPPOSED, HOWEVER. ROSS ASKED HOW WAZZAN WOULD VIEW SUCH A WITHDRAWAL IF THE ISRAELIS SOUGHT ONE. WAZZAN DID NOT HAVE MAJOR OBJECTIONS TO THE IDEA, POINTING OUT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT TO OBJECT ANY OFFER OF WITHDRAWAL, PARTICULARLY ONE AFFECTING "THE BLEEDING HEART" OF LEBANON--'ALAYH AND THE SHUF. HE DID INSIST, THOUGH, THAT THERE MUST BE NO LAF/IDF OVERLAP WHEN THE LAF IS DEPLOYED INTO AREAS VACATED

BY THE IDF. THIS HE SAID, WAS A MAJOR SOURCE OF
DISAGREEMENT WITH PSP/DRUZE LEADER WALID JUMBLATT.
HE SAID THIS DISAGREEMENT WAS UNFORTUNATE BECAUSE
"WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE JUMBLATT ON OUR SIDE."

8. WAZZAN BROACHED THE IDEA OF GETTING THE ISRAELIS

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AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY
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EXDIS - DEPT FOR AMBS HABIB AND DRAPER FROM ROSS;
PASS JCS FOR J-5

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, XF, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US, SA
SUBJECT: ROSS-WAZZAN MEETING JUNE 18

TO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO SOME KIND OF WRITTEN WITHDRAWAL PLAN SPELLING OUT THE LENGTH OF TIME FROM "DAY X" IT WOULD TAKE TO IMPLEMENT THE VARIOUS PHASES OF FULL WITHDRAWAL. HE THOUGHT LEBANON'S HAND WITH SYRIA AND THE KEY ARABS COULD BE STRENGTHEN IF IT COULD PRESENT A CONCRETE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL PLAN AND THEN PRESS

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FOR SYRIAN ACCEPTANCE OF A GENERALLY SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL AND FOR DETERMINATION OF EXACT DATE OF "DAY X." ROSS SAID THIS IDEA COULD HAVE SOME MERIT, SINCE THE AGREEMENT ITSELF DESCRIBED ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL ONLY IN THE MOST GENERAL TERMS.

9. WAZZAN SAID IT MIGHT ALSO PROVE POSSIBLE OVER TIME TO GET THE ISRAELIS TO CONTEMPLATE FULL UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL BY USING ARGUMENTS THAT STOOD APART FROM THE LEBANON-ISRAELI ACCORD AND THE ACCOMPANYING SIDE LETTER. ON SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL, HE ALMOST JOKINGLY SAID THAT, IF THE SYRIANS WANTED JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS TOTALLING 50 MEN IN THE BIQA' HE HAD NO OBJECTION.

10. WAZZAN THEN ASKED ABOUT U.S. CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIETS REGARDING LEBANON'S PROBLEMS. ROSS RESPONDED THAT THE U.S. BASICALLY HAD POINTED OUT TO THE SOVIETS THE MILITARY DANGERS INHERENT IN THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS, WITHOUT TRYING TO INVOLVE THEM IN WIDER ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM. THE ADMINISTRATION FELT THE SOVIETS WERE AN INSIDIOUS INFLUENCE IN THE REGION, AND THERE WAS NO REASON TO CUT THEM INTO THE PICTURE UNNECESSARILY.

11. ROSS AND WAZZAN DISCUSSED BRIEFLY THE JUNE 16 KILLINGS IN TRIPOLI. WAZZAN CHARACTERIZED THE KILLINGS AS A 'MASSACRE FOR NOTHING--TERRORISM.' CONTINUING THIS COMMENTARY, HE SAID, 'UNFORTUNATELY THERE ARE CERTAIN LEADERS WHO ARE NOT TAKING THE NECESSARY (PUBLIC) POSITIONS.' (HE WAS PROBABLY REFERRING TO FORMER PRIME MINISTER RASHID KARAMI, TRIPOLI'S LEADING POLITICAL LEADER, WHO HAS DENOUNCED THE LEBANESE-ISRAEL ACCORD.)

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12. WAZZAN REQUESTED THAT THE U.S. TAKE UP WITH THE ISRAELIS THE CASE OF A LEBANESE DOCTOR WHO IS BEING HELD AT ANSAR. ROSS AGREED TO DO SO AND NOTED THAT HE WAS PLEASED THAT U.S. AND LEBANESE EFFORTS HAD HELPED CONVINCED THE IDF TO LIFT ITS BLOCKADE OF THE SOUTH LEBANON TOWN OF DAYR QANUN. WAZZAN SAID THERE WOULD BE MANY MORE ATTACKS ON THE IDF WERE IT NOT FOR THE FACT THAT THE LEBANESE BELIEVED THE ACCORD WOULD LEAD TO IDF WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON.

13. COMMENT. WAZZAN WAS OBVIOUSLY BUOYED BY THE RECENT PARLIAMENTARY VOTE. HE SHOWED NO AGITATION AT THE SLOW PACE OF DEVELOPMENTS ON SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. IN A REFLECTIVE MOOD, HE LOOKED INSTEAD TOWARD PRACTICAL WAYS OF ACCELERATING THE PROCESS OF TURNING THE SYRIANS AROUND. HIS PROPOSAL FOR A WRITTEN IDF WITHDRAWAL PLAN FOR PRESENTATION TO THE ARABS MAY MERIT FURTHER CONSIDERATION. PUGH

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SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 06426

EX **DECAPTIONED**

DEPT. PASS AMBS. HABIB AND DRAPER FROM ROSS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MOPS, MARR, XF, AL-1, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US

SUBJECT: LEBANON MISSION: KLIBI VISIT TO LEBANON

1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY: ARAB LEAGUE S/G KLIBI VISITED LEBANON
JUNE 3-4. ALL IN ALL, THE LEBANESE FOUND THE
ATMOSPHERE OF THE VISIT MUCH MORE FRIENDLY THAN EXPECTED,
GIVEN THE PREVIOUS FRICTION BETWEEN KLIBI AND THE
LEBANESE GOVERNMENT, BUT THEY FOUND HIS READOUT

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ON ARAB -- ESPECIALLY ALGERIAN -- ATTITUDES ON LEBANON
MORE NEGATIVE THAN THEY HAD HOPED. GEMAYEL DID
FORMALLY REQUEST THAT AN ARAB SUMMIT BE CONVENED AND
THAT THE DECISIONS OF THE FEZ SUMMIT BE IMPLEMENTED.
HE TOOK A TOUGH LINE ON THE SYRIANS, HINTING FOR
THE FIRST TIME THAT THE LEBANESE MIGHT BE FORCED TO
RESIST THE SYRIAN OCCUPATION BY ACTIVE MEASURES.
(TUENI, IN AN ELOQUENT EDITORIAL WRITTEN FOR KLIBI'S
BENEFIT IN THE JUNE 4 ISSUE OF "AN-NAHAR", WARNED OF**UNCLASSIFIED** Page - 1

OF RELATIONS. AS A MILITARY MAN, HE COULD UNDERSTAND THE NEED FOR SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. NO ARAB, HOWEVER, COULD ACCEPT NORMAL RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL. THIS SAID, BENDJEDID WAS NOT OPPOSING THE AGREEMENT. LEBANON HAD TAKEN ITS DECISION, AND THE ESSENTIAL THING WAS TO GET THE ISRAELIS OUT.

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SECTION 02 OF 03 BEIRUT 06426

EXDIS

DEPT. PASS AMBS. HABIB AND DRAPER FROM ROSS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

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TAGS: MOPS, MARR, XF, AL-Y, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US
SUBJECT: LEBANON MISSION: KLIBI VISIT TO LEBANON

6. REQUEST FOR ARAB SUMMIT

GEMAYEL TOLD KLIBI IN VEHEMENT TERMS THAT HE WANTED A SUMMIT. TAKING A PAGE OUT OF WAZZAN'S BOOK OF PROVERBS, HE TOLD KLIBI: "WHEN A MAN IS DROWNING, HE DOESN'T CARE ABOUT GETTING WET." ARAB RESERVATIONS ON A SUMMIT MADE IT ALL THE MORE ATTRACTIVE, GEMAYEL

[REDACTED]

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SAID, SINCE HE WANTED TO TELL THE ARABS WHAT HE THOUGHT OF THEM. AFTER ALL, WHAT REALISTIC ALTERNATIVE HAD ANY OF THEM PROPOSED TO GET THE ISRAELIS OUT OF LEBANON? THE DECISIONS OF THE FEZ SUMMIT HAD BEEN CLEAR AND DEFINITIVE ON THE SUBSTANCE OF SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. THE ARAB DETERRENT FORCE OF WHICH SYRIAN FORCES HAD BEEN A PART NO LONGER HAD A MANDATE, AND LEBANON WANTED TO NEGOTIATE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS WITHDRAWAL. KLIBI ASKED GEMAYEL TO CONFIRM HIS REQUEST FOR AN ARAB SUMMIT AND FOR APPLICATION OF THE DECISIONS OF THE FEZ SUMMIT IN A WRITTEN AIDE-MEMOIRE, AND GEMAYEL AGREED TO DO SO. (COMMENT: TUENI INDICATED THIS WOULD BE DONE IN A MATTER OF DAYS. HE SAID THAT THE AIDE-MEMOIRE WOULD ALSO, HOWEVER, ASK KLIBI TO UNDERTAKE A "DISCREET" MEDIATION WITH THE SYRIANS.) KLIBI, CONTINUING THE DISCUSSION, PROPOSED THAT A MINI-SUMMIT BE CONSIDERED "ALONG THE LINES OF THE MINI-SUMMIT THAT CREATED THE ARAB DETERRENT FORCE." HE HAD IN MIND HAVING THE SAUDIS BROKER A MEETING OF LEBANESE, SYRIANS, SAUDIS, AND POSSIBLY KUWAITIS AND PALESTINIANS. THE LEBANESE REPLIED THEY WERE NOT AVERSE TO SUCH A MEETING, BUT COULD NOT WAIT FOREVER. THE SAUDIS DID NOT SEEM TO BE FORTHCOMING (COMMENT: THIS WAS SAID BEFORE SALEM'S RETURN FROM SAUDI ARABIA), AND THEY WERE LIKELY TO BECOME DISTRACTED BY THE NEED TO DEAL WITH THE FRAGMENTATION OF THE PLO. IF A MINI-SUMMIT WERE HELD, THE LEBANESE FELT, IT MIGHT BE BENEFICIAL TO INCLUDE THE ALGERIANS. KLIBI WAS NOT ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT THIS SUGGESTION.

7. HINTS OF ACTIVE MEASURES AGAINST SYRIANS

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GEMAYEL, FOR THE FIRST TIME, SPOKE OUTSIDE HIS OWN CIRCLE OF ADVISERS OF THE POSSIBILITY OF ACTIVE MEASURES AGAINST THE SYRIAN OCCUPATION. REMINDING KLIBI THAT "THE LEBANESE ARE GOOD FIGHTERS," HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT "WE DO NOT FORECLOSE FIGHTING FOR OUR LIBERATION. YOU CERTAINLY WOULD NOT WANT ARABS TO FIGHT ARABS." (COMMENT: TUENI TOLD ROSS GEMAYEL WAS THINKING IN EARNEST ABOUT WAYS TO MAKE LIFE DIFFICULT FOR THE SYRIANS IF THEY DID NOT WITHDRAW PEACEFULLY. REFERRING TO AN EDITORIAL HE HAD WRITTEN FOR THE JUNE 4 ISSUE OF "AN-NAHAR", TUENI SAID IT HAD BEEN INSPIRED BY GEMAYEL'S TOUGH POSITION AND WRITTEN FOR KLIBI'S BENEFIT. IN ITS KEY PASSAGE, IT WARNS: "LEBANON, WHICH WAS PREVENTED FROM GOING TO WAR FOR ITS TERRITORY AND TURNED INTO EVERYONE'S COMMON PROPERTY, WILL NOT PERMIT ANYONE TODAY TO PREVENT IT FROM ACHIEVING INTERNAL PEACE TO RESTORE ITS TERRITORY. IF THIS PEACE IS SQUANDERED AND REPLACED BY ANOTHER WAR, THEN NO ONE WILL BE ABLE TO TELL THE SAME FROM THE MAD IN THE ARAB WORLD, BECAUSE EVERYTHING WILL BE MIXED UP, AND UGLY VIOLENCE WILL ERUPT TO BRING STATES TO COLLAPSE, SOCIETIES TO DISSOLVE, AND RICHES TO PERISH IN REVOLUTION." PUTTING ASIDE THE PURPLE PROSE, THE MESSAGE, AS THE REST OF THE EDITORIAL MAKES CLEAR, IS DIRECTED AGAINST SYRIA: BEWARE OF THE EFFECTS ON YOU OF A CONTINUED OCCUPATION OF LEBANON.)

8. STATUS OF LEBANESE CONSENSUS

KLIBI TOLD SPEAKER AL-AS'AD THAT HE NEVER THOUGHT HE WOULD FIND THE DEGREE OF UNANIMITY HE HAD DISCOVERED

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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

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SECTION 03 OF 03 BEIRUT 06426

EXDIS

DEPT. PASS

AMBS. HABIB AND DRAPER FROM ROSS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MOPS, MARR, XF, AL-1, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US

SUBJECT: LEBANON MISSION: KLIBI VISIT TO LEBANON

AMONG THE LEBANESE. HE SEEMED GENUINELY SURPRISED, AND EVEN (AS LATER REPORTED TO TUENI) CALLED ARAB LEAGUE "AMBASSADOR" TO THE U.S. CLOVIS MAQSUD FROM DAMASCUS OF ALL PLACES TO CONVEY HIS ADMIRATION FOR THE LEBANESE CONSENSUS: "THE LEBANESE ARE REALLY UNITED, AND WE MUST FIND A WAY TO HELP THEM." KLIBI WAS PARTICULARLY IMPRESSED BY HIS TALK WITH WAZZAN,

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WHOM HE DESCRIBED AS HAVING PRESENTED A "VERY CONVINCING LAWYER'S DEFENSE" OF THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT. ON THE BASIS OF THIS TALK, KLIBI RECOMMENDED TO GEMAYEL, WHO AGREED, THAT WAZZAN TAKE A TOUR OF THE ARAB STATES TO EXPLAIN THE AGREEMENT AND BUILD SUPPORT FOR LEBANON. (COMMENT: TUENI TOLD ROSS THAT GEMAYEL HAD BEEN PLANNING TO HAVE SA'IB SALAM UNDERTAKE SUCH A MISSION, BUT THAT WAZZAN WOULD ALMOST SURELY NOW BE GIVEN AT LEAST A PART OF IT.)

9. COMMENT: KLIBI IMPRESSED THE LEBANESE AS A TRUE FRIEND OF LEBANON. HE EXPRESSED NO OBJECTION TO THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT BEYOND NOTING THAT THE

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LEBANESE WOULD WANT TO MAKE SURE THAT THE ISRAELI LIAISON OFFICE WAS CLEARLY "WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE." INSTEAD, HE SHOWED A REAL DESIRE TO BE HELPFUL AND APPEARS TO HAVE LEFT WITH A FULL APPRECIATION OF THE LEBANESE POSITION. IN SPITE OF GEMAYEL'S STRONG ADVOCACY OF HOLDING AN ARAB SUMMIT, IT IS DOUBTFUL -- NOW THAT SALEM HAS RETURNED WITH APPARENTLY POSITIVE RESULTS FROM SAUDI ARABIA -- THAT THE LEBANESE WILL PUSH THEIR REQUEST FOR A SUMMIT SERIOUSLY IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. (IT WILL BE INSTRUCTIVE IN THIS REGARD TO SEE IF THE AIDE-MEMOIRE REQUESTED BY KLIBI ACTUALLY GOES FORWARD.) THE LEBANESE WILL, HOWEVER, CONTINUE TO EXPLOIT THE POSSIBILITY OF ARAB LEAGUE ACTION AS A WAY OF KEEPING THE PRESSURE ON THE SYRIANS AND, TO SOME EXTENT (GIVEN THEIR DECLARED OPPOSITION TO A SUMMIT), THE SAUDIS. PUGH

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Date Printed: 10/22/1996

DOC_NUMBER: 83STATE152357

CHANNEL: n/a

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AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMCONSUL CALCUTTA
AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
AMEMBASSY DHAKA
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
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AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMCONSUL KARACHI

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Date Printed: 10/22/1996

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AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMCONSUL MADRAS
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT
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SUBJ DEPARTMENT PRESS BRIEFING JUNE 1, 1983

FOR ADDRESSEE POSTS' INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE, FOLLOWING
ARE EXCERPTS FROM TODAY'S PRESS BRIEFING. SPOKESMAN WAS
ALAN ROMBERG.

Q. IS AMBASSADOR HABIB IN ISRAEL TODAY?

A. YES. HE IS IN ISRAEL TODAY.

Q. WAS THE U.S. AMBASSADOR TO SYRIA RUSHED BACK FROM
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WASHINGTON TO DAMASCUS WITH A MESSAGE FOR PRESIDENT
ASSAD AND COULD THERE BE A PRECURSOR VISIT FOR SECRETARY
SHULTZ TO THE AREA?

A. AMBASSADOR PAGANELLI WAS HERE. HE HAS GONE BACK TO
POST. WE HAVE MADE CLEAR FROM THE PODIUM AS WELL AS
OTHER WAYS ABOUT THE CONCERNS WE HAVE ABOUT THE SITUATION
IN LEBANON AND THE DANGERS WE SEE THERE BUT I DON'T
INTEND TO GET INTO WHAT HE MIGHT BE DOING SPECIFICALLY
IN HIS DIPLOMATIC WORK. AS FAR AS A VISIT BY THE
SECRETARY THERE ARE NO PLANS FOR A VISIT.

Q. THE PRESIDENT SAID YESTERDAY IN AN INTERVIEW WITH THE
7 OR 8 JOURNALISTS THAT YOU HAVE ACHIEVED PROGRESS IN
CONVINCING ASSAD AND THE SYRIANS TO PULL OUT FROM
LEBANON. PRESIDENT ASSAD'S STATEMENT TODAY THAT THE
WHOLE THING IS IN THE PROCESS OF DYING. WHAT'S THE
RATIONALE BEHIND THIS POSITIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE SYRIAN
PULL OUT?

A. I'M NOT GOING TO GET INTO THE SPECIFICS OF ANY
DIALOGUE THERE HAS BEEN EITHER WITH US OR OTHERS.
DESPITE A CERTAIN SKEPTICISM TOWARD THE WAY IT WAS
REPORTED WE DO FEEL THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN
FORCES, SYRIAN, PLO AND ISRAELI FORCES, AND

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Date Printed: 10/22/1996

DOC_NUMBER: 83STATE152357

CHANNEL: n/a

REESTABLISHMENT OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY THROUGHOUT THE
TERRITORY OF LEBANON IS AN ACHIEVABLE AND IMPORTANT GOAL.

Q. BREZINSKI IS IN THE MIDEAST. IS HE THERE FOR THE
STATE DEPARTMENT OR IS IT A PRIVATE TRIP?

A. I DON'T KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT THAT TRIP. I SAW A
REPORT IN THE PAPER THIS MORNING THAT HE WAS THERE. I AM
NOT AWARE THAT HE IS UNDERTAKING ANY OFFICIAL MISSION.

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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0872

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

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AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY

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SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 06422

DECAPTIONED

DEPARTMENT PASS AMBS. HABIB AND DRAPER FROM ROSS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, XF, LE, IS, SY, PLO, SA, US

SUBJECT: LEBANON MISSION: SALEM VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA

1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY: FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM IS VERY PLEASED OVER HIS JUNE 4 VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA, PARTICULARLY HIS UNEXPECTED TWO-HOUR MEETING WITH KING FAHD. FAHD, ACCORDING TO SALEM, SUPPORTS FULLY THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT AND IS PREPARED TO MAKE A MAJOR EFFORT TO PROMOTE A SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. IN ORDER

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TO STRENGTHEN THE LEBANESE DOMESTIC CONSENSUS BEHIND THE AGREEMENT, FAHD WILL SEND AN EMISSARY, PROBABLY 'ALI SHA'IR, TO BEIRUT IN THE NEXT WEEK TO BUCK UP KEY SUNNIS (IN VIEW OF THIS SAUDI INITIATIVE, THE PARLIAMENTARY VOTE ON THE AGREEMENT HAS BEEN PUT BACK TO JUNE 14). TO REVIVE THE LEBANESE-SYRIAN DIALOGUE, FAHD RECOMMENDED A GEMAYEL-ASSAD "LOVE LETTER" AND EVEN ASSISTED SALEM IN DRAFTING A TEXT WHICH SALEM EXPECTS WILL BE SENT JUNE 6 OR 7. FOLLOWING ASSAD'S

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RESPONSE, WHETHER CONSTRUCTIVE OR "IDEOLOGICAL", FAHD WILL TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN FURTHER MOVES TO BRING THE SYRIANS ALONG. FAHD SAID THE SYRIANS REMAIN INTERESTED IN A DIALOGUE WITH THE U.S., EVEN THOUGH THEY WOULD NOT RECEIVE AMB. HABIB, AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT WE WOULD DESIGNATE A HIGH LEVEL EMISSARY. FAHD TOLD SALEM HE IS OPPOSED TO AN ARAB SUMMIT WITHOUT A PRIOR CHANGE IN THE SYRIAN POSITION. SALEM WAS CLEARLY DELIGHTED BY WHAT HE FEELS IS CLEAR SAUDI SUPPORT. END SUMMARY.

3. WITH HIS CUSTOMARY EBULLIENCE AND AT VERY SHORT NOTICE ON A DAY DEVOTED TO PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE DEBATES ON THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT, MINISTER SALEM BRIEFED ROSS JUNE 6 ON HIS VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA. THE PRINCIPAL SUBSTANTIVE EVENT HAD BEEN A TWO-HOUR MEETING WITH KING FAHD, HELD AT THE LATTER'S INITIATIVE AND IN THE PRESENCE ONLY OF FOREIGN MINISTER SAUD AND LEBANESE AMBASSADOR AL-HASAN. IT HAD BEEN AN "EXCELLENT, NO-NONSENSE" REVIEW OF THE SITUATION CONFRONTING LEBANON, WITH FAHD DEMONSTRATING DETAILED KNOWLEDGE OF THE ISSUES AND PERSONALITIES INVOLVED. HE PROFESSED HIMSELF FURIOUS AT THE SYRIANS FOR STAYING IN LEBANON AND MAKING IT POSSIBLE FOR

[REDACTED]

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THE ISRAELIS TO REMAIN. THE MAJOR POINTS OF DISCUSSION ARE SUMMARIZED BELOW.

4. SAUDI POSITION ON AGREEMENT

FAHD SUPPORTS THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT FULLY, ALTHOUGH IT CONTAINS SOME PROVISIONS THAT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER TO AVOID. HOWEVER, HE RECOGNIZES THAT THESE ARE THE PRICE NECESSARY TO OBTAIN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. FOR THE FUTURE -- AND HE INTENDS TO TELL PRESIDENT ASSAD AND OTHERS THIS, THE ESSENTIAL THING IS TO GET THE ISRAELIS OUT OF LEBANON. THEN, "WE" (I.E., LEBANON AND THE ARAB STATES) WILL WORK TO INTERPRET THE MORE TROUBLESOME PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT IN THE NARROWEST POSSIBLE FASHION, "IN THE SPIRIT OF DOCTORS OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE." IN AN ATTEMPT TO TAKE THE CURSE OFF THE ISSUE OF TRADE, SALEM TOLD FAHD THAT LEBANON INTENDS TO ENTERTAIN "LIMITED" TRADE RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL, BUT WILL TAKE ALL NECESSARY MEASURES TO PROTECT ARAB INTERESTS (I.E., TO PREVENT THE RE-EXPORT OF ISRAELI GOODS TO THE ARAB WORLD).

5. DOMESTIC CONSENSUS ON AGREEMENT

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FAHD URGED SALEM TO SEEK THE WIDEST POSSIBLE SUPPORT FOR THE AGREEMENT IN THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES. ALTHOUGH, "LEBANON BEING A DEMOCRATIC COUNTRY," IT IS NOT NECESSARY FOR EVERY DEPUTY TO VOTE IN FAVOR, A "GOOD MAJORITY" WOULD EASE THE PRESSURE ON LEBANON BY REMOVING A MAJOR FOCAL POINT FOR SYRIAN INTERFERENCE. TO HELP THIS PROCESS, FAHD WILL SEND A SENIOR SAUDI

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 06422 02 OF 03 061512Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSCE-00 NSAE-00
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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0873
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY

SECTION 02 OF 03 BEIRUT 06422

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS AMBS. HABIB AND DRAPER FROM ROSS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, XF, LE, IS, SY, PLO, SA, US

Page - 3
UNCLASSIFIED

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SUBJECT: LEBANON MISSION: SALEM VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA

PERSONALITY TO BEIRUT BEFORE THE BEGINNING OF RAMADAN (JUNE 12) TO TALK "DISCREETLY" TO KEY SUNNIS.

(COMMENT: SALEM TOLD ROSS THAT, GIVEN FAHD'S INTENTION -- WHICH PROBABLY MEANT THE RETURN OF 'ALI SHA'IR TO BEIRUT, HE AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES HAD AGREED THAT TUESDAY, JUNE 14, WOULD BE A PROPITIOUS DAY FOR THE PARLIAMENTARY VOTE. MEANWHILE, THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WOULD BE WORKING

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 06422 02 OF 03 061512Z

TO GET DEPUTIES NOW ABROAD "ON VACATION" (I.E., FROM SYRIAN THREATS) BACK TO LEBANON AND WIDEN ITS MAJORITY.)

6. LEBANESE-SYRIAN DIALOGUE

THE SYRIANS HAD TOLD THE SAUDIS THEY WANTED TO MAINTAIN A DIALOGUE WITH BOTH LEBANON AND THE U.S. FAHD PROPOSED THAT, TO RENEW THE LEBANESE-SYRIAN DIALOGUE, PRESIDENT GEMAYEL WRITE A "LOVE LETTER" TO ASSAD EXPLAINING THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH LEBANON HAD SIGNED THE AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL. UPON RECEIPT OF A REPLY -- WHICH FAHD BELIEVED ASSAD MIGHT DELAY UNTIL HE HAD SEEN THE RESULTS OF THE PARLIAMENTARY VOTE -- SAUDI ARABIA AND LEBANON WOULD CONSULT. IF THE REPLY OFFERED AN OPENING, FAHD WOULD DEVELOP IT FURTHER BEFORE TURNING THE DIALOGUE OVER TO THE LEBANESE. IF THE REPLY WAS "IDEOLOGICAL," THE NEXT MOVE WOULD LIKEWISE BE FAHD'S. (COMMENT: GIVEN THE CENTRAL ROLE THAT FAHD WANTS TO PLAY, AS DEMONSTRATED BY HIS CLOSE COLLABORATION WITH SALEM IN DRAFTING THE TEXT OF A POSSIBLE LETTER FOR GEMAYEL'S CONSIDERATION, SALEM FEELS LEBANON MUST FOLLOW FAHD'S SUGGESTION ON THIS NEXT STEP. SALEM WILL BE SUBMITTING THIS IDEA AND THE PROPOSED LETTER TO GEMAYEL TODAY AND EXPECTS THE LETTER TO BE SENT TODAY OR TOMORROW, JUNE 6-7.)

7. U.S.-SYRIAN DIALOGUE

FAHD CONFIRMED THAT, WHILE EXPRESSING A DESIRE TO MAINTAIN A DIALOGUE WITH THE U.S., THE SYRIANS HAD ALSO TOLD THE SAUDIS THEY WOULD NOT RECEIVE AMBASSADOR

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DOC NUMBER: 33 BEIRUT06422

CHANNEL: n/a

HABIB "BECAUSE HE HAD DECEIVED THEM" (SIC). FAHD EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT A HIGH-LEVEL DEPARTMENTAL EMISSARY WOULD BE DESIGNATED TO RESUME THE U.S. DIALOGUE WITH SYRIA.

8. SAUDI FINANCIAL AID TO SYRIA

WHEN SALEM SPECULATED THAT SYRIAN OBJECTIVES MIGHT INCLUDE A MORE FORTHCOMING POSITION ON THE GOLAN ISSUE FROM THE U.S., SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FROM LEBANON, AND FINANCIAL AID FROM "VARIOUS COUNTRIES," FAHD SAID THE MATERIAL ASPECT OF THE SITUATION WAS NO PROBLEM. WHAT WAS IMPORTANT WAS TO PREPARE THE SYRIANS POLITICALLY AND PSYCHOLOGICALLY TO TALK. THIS HAD TO BE DONE WITHOUT SCARING THEM OFF.

9. ARAB SUMMIT

FAHD CONFIRMED TO SALEM THAT HE IS OPPOSED TO HOLDING AN ARAB SUMMIT UNLESS THERE IS PRIOR MOVEMENT WITH SYRIA. AN ARAB SUMMIT AT THIS STAGE, IN FAHD'S WORDS, WOULD, "IF IT DID NOT ACTUALLY COMPLICATE THINGS, CERTAINLY NOT HELP THEM." THE MAJORITY OF THE ARAB STATES, WHICH DO SUPPORT LEBANON, WOULD REMAIN SILENT.

10. COMMENT: SALEM WAS VISIBLY PLEASED WITH HIS VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA. HE HAD GONE EXPECTING TO SEE SAUD AND HAD BEEN DELIGHTED WHEN FAHD HAD TAKEN THE INITIATIVE TO SEE HIM VIRTUALLY ONE-ON-ONE FOR TWO HOURS. UPON RETURNING TO BEIRUT, SALEM CALLED BOTH PRIME MINISTER AL-WAZZAN AND SA'IB SALAM, WHOSE SPIRITS HAD BEEN FLAGGING IN THE FACE OF SYRIAN OPPOSITION, TO

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AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY

SECTION 03 OF 03 BEIRUT 06422

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS AMBS. HABIB AND DRAPER FROM ROSS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, XF, LE, IS, SY, PLO, SA, US
SUBJECT: LEBANON MISSION: SALEM VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA

TELL THEM OF THE HIGHLY SUPPORTIVE POSITION HE FELT
FAHD HAD TAKEN. SALAM WAS "BUCKED UP
" BY THIS NEWS,
WHILE WAZZAN GOT VERY EXCITED WHEN TOLD THAT FAHD WAS
PLEASED WITH HIS "PATRIOTIC STAND." CERTAINLY, WITH FAHD
PERSONALLY COLLABORATING IN DRAFTING A LETTER TO
ASSAD EXPLAINING (I.E., JUSTIFYING) THE LEBANESE-
ISRAELI AGREEMENT, SAUDI ARABIA HAS SHOWN THE DEPTH
OF ITS COMMITMENT TO LEBANON AND TO ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL.

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 06422 03 OF 03 061515Z

AS GHASSAN TUENI REMARKED IN A DISCUSSION SEVERAL
DAYS AGO, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN INCONCEIVABLE UNTIL VERY
RECENTLY TO ENGAGE THE SAUDIS IN ANY RPT ANY DISCUSSION
OF AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN AN ARAB STATE AND ISRAEL.
PUGH

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Date Printed: 04/23/1997

DOC NUMBER: 83CAIRO14982

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PAGE 01 CAIRO 14982 221603Z
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INFO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3568
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AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY

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Date: 11/7/97

CAIRO 14982 FOIA Exemptions () CLASSIFY as () S or () C Sec.
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FOR AMBASSADOR HABIB FROM ATHERTON

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, IS, EG, US
SUBJECT: PROPOSED MEETING WITH KAMAL HASSAN ALI

9302566

1. [REDACTED]
2. I HAVE AN APPOINTMENT WITH KAMAL HASSAN ALI AT NOON ON THURSDAY, MAY 26 TO FOLLOW UP ON THE QUESTION OF THE RETURN OF THE EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR TO ISRAEL. HE WILL OBVIOUSLY BE INTERESTED IN ANY READOUT YOU CAN SEND ME ABOUT YOUR DISCUSSIONS IN ISRAEL ON THIS SUBJECT. THIS WOULD ALSO BE AN OPPORTUNITY TO GIVE ALI AND UPDATE ON YOUR EFFORTS TO PROMOTE SYRIAN/LEBANESE NEGOTIATIONS ON SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. ATHERTON

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Date Printed: 10/22/1996

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INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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AMEMBASSY ACCRA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY

USELO RIYADH PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY

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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (SIGNATURE ADDED - PUGH)

FROM DRAPER

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 05893 212302Z

3.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, LE, IS, US, XF, SY, UN

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: CONCERNS RE UNIFIL

REF: (A) STATER 141501; (B) 141687

1.

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2. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT, IN OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH UNIFIL CONTRIBUTOR STATES AND THE UN SECRETARIAT, WE MAKE CLEAR THE FOLLOWING POINTS IN A NON-APOLOGETIC MANNER:

-- AS MANY UNIFIL REPRESENTATIVES WOULD AGREE, IT MAKES SENSE THAT THE UNIFIL LEADERSHIP AND THE UNIFIL HEAD-QUARTERS BE CONCENTRATED IN LEBANON RATHER THAN ISRAEL. IT WILL NOT BE FEASIBLE, AS IS PRESENTLY THE CASE, FOR UNIFIL TO HAVE ITS HEADQUARTERS IN RAS NAQURAH, WITH SOME UNIFIL DEPENDENTS AND SUPPORT ACTIVITIES BEING CONCENTRATED IN ISRAEL ITSELF. IN THE NEXT PHASE, UNIFIL WILL HAVE TO BE CONCENTRATED IN LEBANON.

-- UNDER THIS SCENARIO WE ENVISAGE THERE WILL BE A CHANGE OF MANDATE FOR UNIFIL WHICH WILL ALLOW THIS FORCE TO OPERATE THROUGHOUT LEBANON. THAT SHOULD BE THE FOCUS OF OUR CONCERNS AND BRIEFINGS. WITHIN THAT CONTEXT, WE SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT UNIFIL WILL HAVE A ROLE IN THE SOUTHERN SECURITY REGION. THAT ROLE -- YET TO BE DEFINED -- WILL INVOLVE THE STATIONING OF A UNIFIL "UNIT" IN THE SIDON REGION, BUT HEADQUARTERED IN THE SIDON REGION IMMEDIATELY NORTH OF THE AWALI RIVER.

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-- WE PRESUME THAT THIS OPERATIONAL ARRANGEMENT FOR SOUTHERN LEBANON WILL NOT BE IN CONFLICT WITH THE GENERAL TRANSFER OF UNIFIL HEADQUARTERS AND OTHER UNITS NORTHWARD.

-- IF WE CAN INDUCE THE UNIFIL CONTRIBUTORS AND THE UN SECRETARIAT TO SEE THEIR FUTURE RESPONSIBILITIES IN TERMS OF LEBANON RATHER THAN LEBANESE-ISRAELI SITUATION, IT WILL BE HELPFUL. PUGH

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PAGE 01 STATE 142438
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APPROVED BY NEA:RPELLETREAU
NEA:WCLUVERIUS
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TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/CP/IR Date: 11/2/97
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EXCISE BEIRUT JERUSALEM FOR HABIB AND DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: IS, JO, LE, PREL, US
SUBJECT: EXPLAINING THE LEBANON-ISRAEL AGREEMENT

REF: AMMAN 4688

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. WE HAVE PREPARED GUIDANCE ON HANDLING THE QUESTION OF THE US-ISRAEL MOA AND ARE CONSULTING WITH THE HABIB/DRAPER MISSION TO ENSURE ITS ACCURACY. WE WILL PROVIDE IT TO YOU AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

3. IN THE MEANTIME, YOU SHOULD ASSURE FONMIN KASIM THAT THE LEBANON-ISRAEL AGREEMENT HAS IN NO WAY ALTERED EITHER THE US APPROACH TO THE PEACE PROCESS OR THE INTENSITY OF

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OUR DESIRE TO MOVE THAT PROCESS FORWARD. INDEED, WE BELIEVE THAT THE LEBANON-ISRAEL AGREEMENT BRINGS US A STEP CLOSER TO OUR GOAL OF A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION TO MIDDLE EAST PROBLEMS. SHULTZ

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Date: 11/1/97

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FOR AMBASSADORS LEWIS AND ATHERTON FROM HABIB

REF: CAIRO 14982

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, IS, EG, US
SUBJECT: PROPOSED MEETING WITH KAMAL HASSAN ALI

REF: CAIRO 14982 ✓

1. [REDACTED]
2. WHEN I TOLD SHAMIR THAT IT WOULD BE AT LEAST THE MIDDLE OF NEXT MONTH BEFORE AN EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR SHOWED UP IN ISRAEL, HE SHRUGGED AND SEEMED TO INDICATE THAT TWO OR THREE WEEKS MIGHT NOT MAKE THAT MUCH DIFFERENCE. FOR AMBASSADOR LEWIS: PLEASE REVIEW MY RECOLLECTION AND SEND TO AMBASSADOR ATHERTON A REPORT OF THAT MEETING.
3. FOR AMBASSADOR ATHERTON: AS FOR AN UPDATE ON OUR EFFORTS TO PROMOTE NEGOTIATIONS ON SYRIAN WITHDRAWALS,

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 05912 231036Z

WE WILL BE SENDING LATER TODAY A REPORT OF OUR TALKS WITH GEMAYEL AND SALEM ON SUNDAY NIGHT. YOU SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT SAY ANYTHING ABOUT A DELAY IN AN EXCHANGE OF RATIFICATION INSTRUMENTS. DRAPER WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH AMBASSADOR LEWIS ON THIS QUESTION WHEN HE ARRIVES IN ISRAEL LATER TODAY.

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SUBJECT= DUTCH CONCERNS RE UNIFIL

REFERENCE= 83 THE HAGUE 3503

CONTROL_NBR= n/a

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ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

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ERRORS= N/A

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CONCEPTS= SOFA, OCCUPIED AREA, PEACEKEEPING FORCE

TAGS= PREL, MARR, US, LE, UN, UNIFIL

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PAGE 01 STATE 141687
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NEA:RHPELLETREAU

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DECLASSIFIED FOR DRAPER CAIRO FOR HABIB

EO 1 12356 DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, US, UN, LE
SUBJECT: DUTCH CONCERNS RE UNIFIL

REF: THE HAGUE 3503

1. [REDACTED]

2. FOLLOWING RESPONDS TO SPECIFIC QUESTION IN REFTL
RELATED TO EXACT LOCATION OF UNIFIL POST IN SOUTHERN
LEBANON UNDER THE LEBANON-ISRAEL AGREEMENT.

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3. THE AGREEMENT SPECIFIES THAT ONE UNIT OF UNIFIL MAY BE STATIONED IN THE SIDON AREA, WHICH MAY SEND TEAMS TO THE PALESTINIAN CAMP AREAS IN THE VICINITY OF TYRE AND SIDON. IT WAS AGREED IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THAT THE UNIT IN THE SIDON AREA WILL BE STATIONED ON THE NORTHERN EDGE OF THE CITY, WHICH PUTS THE UNIT'S HEADQUARTERS JUST OUTSIDE OF THE SECURITY ZONE, JUST NORTH OF THE AWALI RIVER AT A SPECIFIC PLACE NOT YET DETERMINED. THE TEAMS, HOWEVER, CAN PROCEED INTO THE ZONE AS SPECIFIED IN THE ANNEX TO THE AGREEMENT.

4. WOULD APPRECIATE ANY ADDITIONAL CLARIFICATION HABIB/DRAPER MISSION MAY WISH TO PROVIDE ON THIS ISSUE.

5. IN DISCUSSING THIS WITH THE DUTCH, YOU SHOULD RE-EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE RETENTION OF A ROLE

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 STATE 141687

FOR UNIFIL IN THE SOUTH. THIS PROVISION MAY, INDEED, BE CRUCIAL TO LEBANESE ABILITY TO NEGOTIATE A WITHDRAWAL AGREEMENT WITH THE PLO, BECAUSE OF THEIR CONCERNS FOR THE SAFETY OF PALESTINIAN CIVILIANS.

6. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. SHULTZ

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REFERENCE= 83 STATE 134586

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CONTROL_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= PEACE, NEGOTIATION, TROOP WITHDRAWAL, AGREEMENT

TAGS= PREL, JO, US, LE, IS, XF, SY

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/CR/IR Date: 11/7/97

☒ RELEASE ☒ DECLASSIFY
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FOIA Exemptions _____ TS authority to
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PAGE 01 AMMAN 04688 211132Z
ACTION SS-25

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INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
USELO RIYADH PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY

AMMAN 04688

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E.O. 12356:DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, JO, US, LE, IS, XF

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SUBJECT: EXPLAINING THE LEBANON-ISRAEL AGREEMENT

REF: STATE 134586 ✓

1 [REDACTED]

2. THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE.

3. JORDAN'S MEDIA--PARTICULARLY THE NEWSPAPERS--ARE CARRYING SENSATIONALIST REPORTS ABOUT A SIDE AGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES. THE PRESS IS REPORTING IT AS A SECRET AGREEMENT WHICH GIVES ISRAEL "THE RIGHT TO POSTPONE WITHDRAWING ITS FORCES FROM LEBANON UNTIL SYRIAN AND PALESTINIAN FORCES HAVE BEEN WITHDRAWN." ALSO, ISRAEL WILL HAVE THE RIGHT "TO UNDERTAKE RETALIATORY ACTIONS AGAINST ANY ATTACKS THAT

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 AMMAN 04688 211132Z

MIGHT BE LAUNCHED BY PALESTINIAN FEDAYEEN IN SOUTH LEBANON." FOREIGN MINISTER KASIM HAS ASKED CHARGE ABOUT POSSIBLE "SECRET" AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND ISRAEL AND IS CLEARLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS ANY SUCH AGREEMENTS MAY HAVE FOR THE PEACE PROCESS AS WELL AS ARAB SUPPORT FOR THE LEBANON-ISRAEL AGREEMENT.

4. REFTEL GUIDANCE ON THE LEBANON-ISRAEL AGREEMENT DOES NOT TREAT THE QUESTION OF SIDE AGREEMENTS OR LETTERS. WE HAVE ALREADY USED THE GUIDANCE ON THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION TO SUBMIT THE F-16 NOTIFICATION TO CONGRESS. HOWEVER, WE URGENTLY NEED GUIDANCE ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OR EXTENT OF UNDERSTANDINGS WE MAY HAVE WITH ISRAEL IN ORDER TO CONTROL THE PENCHANT HERE FOR CONSPIRACY THEORIZING. IN THIS CONNECTION, ONE THEME WHICH IS LURKING IN THE BACKGROUND HERE IS THE SUSPICION THAT THE U.S. MAY HAVE ALTERED ITS APPROACH TO THE PEACE PROCESS IN SOME WAY IN ORDER TO GET

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ISRAELI AGREEMENT TO THE LEBANON PACT. DJEREJIAN

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*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

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Date Printed: 10/22/1996

DOC_NUMBER: 83STATE139142

CHANNEL: n/a

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AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMCONSUL CALCUTTA
AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
AMEMBASSY DHAKA
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
USMISSION GENEVA

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AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMCONSUL KARACHI
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMCONSUL MADRAS
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

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TAGS: OPRC

SUBJ: DEPARTMENT PRESS BRIEFING MAY 18, 1983

FOR ADDRESSEE POSTS' INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE, FOLLOWING
ARE EXCERPTS FROM TODAY'S PRESS BRIEFING. SPOKESMAN WAS
JOHN HUGHES.

Q. DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING TO SAY ABOUT SYRIA'S APPARENT
REFUSAL TO ALLOW PHILIP HABIB TO RETURN TO DAMASCUS TO
DEAL WITH SYRIA'S PARTICIPATING IN THE WITHDRAWAL FROM
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LEBANON?

A. IT IS TRUE THAT THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT HAS SAID THAT
IT DOES NOT WANT TO RECEIVE AMBASSADOR HABIB AT THIS
PARTICULAR TIME. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THE DIALOGUE IS
THE WAY TO ADVANCE THE CAUSE OF PEACE. THE SYRIAN
ATTITUDE REGARDING AMBASSADOR HABIB'S VISIT IS CERTAINLY
NOT IN THE SPIRIT WE HOPED TO HAVE. WE REMAIN READY TO
ENGAGE IN THE DIALOGUE.

Q. CAN YOU EXPLAIN HOW YOU WOULD ENGAGE IN SUCH A
DIALOGUE IF -- DO YOU KNOW, FOR EXAMPLE, WHETHER THEY ARE
REFUSING TO ANYONE FROM THE UNITED STATES?

A. I DON'T KNOW THAT. I THINK THEY HAVE SPECIFICALLY
REFUSED TO RECEIVE AMBASSADOR HABIB. THAT'S WHERE WE ARE.

Q. HAD THERE BEEN A REQUEST BY THE EMBASSY TO RECEIVE
HIM, AND THEN TOLD US DIPLOMATICALLY AS WELL AS PUBLICLY?

A. YES, I THINK THAT IS CORRECT, THAT WE HAD HOPED THAT
AMBASSADOR HABIB WOULD GO TO DAMASCUS.

Q. DOES THIS RAISE THE POSSIBILITY, THEN, THAT THE
SECRETARY OF STATE MIGHT PERSONALLY PARTICIPATE?

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A. NO. THERE IS NO CHANGE IN THE SECRETARY'S PLANS AT THE MOMENT. YOU KNOW WHAT HIS TRAVEL PLANS ARE, AND HE HAS NO PLAN TO RETURN TO THE MIDDLE EAST AT THE MOMENT.

Q. MIGHT IT NOT BE POSSIBLE THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS OR THE DIALOGUE --- WHATEVER YOU ARE CALLING IT THESE DAYS --- COULD TAKE PLACE SOME PLACE ELSE? FOR EXAMPLE, COULD THE SYRIANS PERHAPS COME TO LEBANON OR HERE?

A. I'M SURE ANYTHING IS POSSIBLE, BUT I DON'T WANT TO
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LEAD YOU IN THE DIRECTION THAT SOMETHING ELSE IS AFOOT. I MEAN THE FACT IS THAT AMBASSADOR HABIB IS, FOR THE MOMENT, IS NOT GOING TO DAMASCUS. HE IS RETURNING TO THE AREA -- I THINK IS IN THE AREA TODAY -- AND UNDOUBTEDLY WILL BE CONFERRING WITH LEBANESE AND ISRAELI LEADERS ON HOW BEST TO MOVE THE PROCESS FORWARD THAT WE WANT TO SEE --

Q. NO THAT THE SYRIANS SAID WHAT THEY SAID, HOW DO YOU PLAN TO PURSUE THE EFFORTS?

A. I THINK WE WILL AWAIT AMBASSADOR HABIB'S THINKING. AS IS SAY, I'M SURE HE WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH LEBANESE AND ISRAELI OFFICIALS TO CONSIDER WHAT NEXT STEPS WE ALL MIGHT TAKE.

Q. DO YOU CONSIDER THIS A SETBACK IN ANY WAY FOR THE PROSPECTS OF GETTING THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON.

A. I THINK THE ADVANTAGES OF DIALOGUE ARE CLEAR. WE ARE READY TO ENGAGE IN THAT DIALOGUE. THAT IS THE WAY TO ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVE, BUT CLEARLY THE DIALOGUE CANNOT GO FORWARD FOR THE MOMENT IF NOBODY IS TALKING.

Q. WOULD YOU SAY THAT YOU UNDERESTIMATED THE SYRIAN'S OPPOSITION TO THIS WHOLE THING, BECAUSE AS RECENT AS

YESTERDAY AND THE DAY BEFORE YOU WERE TELLING US THAT THAT WAS NOT THE END OF THE -- I MEAN SOME OFFICIALS WERE SAYING THAT THERE ARE STILL PROSPECTS, THAT THEY HAVE NOT TURNED IT DOWN, ET CETERA. DO YOU NOW BELIEVE YOU UNDERESTIMATED THE SYRIANS' REACTION TO THIS?
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A. I DON'T THINK IT IS A QUESTION OF UNDERESTIMATING OR OVERESTIMATING. I THINK THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT HAS MADE PLAIN ITS ATTITUDES THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THE ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF FOREIGN TROOP WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON IS AN OVERPOWERING ONE, AND WE WILL HAVE TO SEE HOW THAT DIALOGUE TAKES PLACE AND CONTINUES. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF ARAB STATES WHO ARE OF THE VIEW AND WHO ARE MAKING THAT VIEW KNOWN, AND WE WILL HAVE TO SEE WHETHER THAT ARGUMENT IS PERSUASIVE.

Q. ON THAT ISSUE ALSO, ARE THERE ANY MORE ARAB STATES THAN THE ONES YOU MENTIONED TO US YESTERDAY THAT HAVE EXPRESSED APPROVAL?

A. I THINK THE ONES I LISTED YESTERDAY ARE THE ONES OF WHICH IM'S AWARE.

Q. DURING THE WHOLE PERIOD OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL AND LEBANON, THIS ADMINISTRATION KEPT SAYING THAT IT IS AGAINST ANY PRESSURE AGAINST ISRAEL BECAUSE OF FEAR OF SORT OF BACKFIRE. DOES THIS APPLY TO SYRIA NOW?

A. I THINK WHAT THE ADMINISTRATION SAID WAS THAT PEACE IS THE OBJECTIVE AND PEACE IS THE LURE, AND THAT WAS MORE EFFECTIVE RATHER THAN PRESSURE. I THINK THAT WAS THE ARGUMENT AND THE POSITION THAT WAS USED.

Q. YOU THINK THIS APPLIES TO SYRIA NOW, TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE DIFFERENCES?

A. THERE ARE OVERWHELMING ARGUMENTS FOR THE RATIONALE UNDERLYING SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL, AND WE HOPE THAT THOSE WILL BE EVIDENT TO THE SYRIANS. CERTAINLY, IT IS EVIDENT TO US; CERTAINLY, IT IS EVIDENT TO THE LEBANESE; CERTAINLY, UNCLASSIFIED

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IT IS EVIDENT TO A NUMBER OF ARAB GOVERNMENTS. AS THE SECRETARY HAS SAID, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE SYRIANS NOT LET THIS MOMENT PASS. THEY HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO REMOVE ISRAELI TROOPS FROM SOUTHERN LEBANON. THEY HAVE TO MAKE A DECISION ABOUT THAT.

Q. IF THE F-16S WERE RELEASED, WOULD THEY GO FORWARD ON THE THE ORIGINAL DELIBERY SCHEDULE, WHICH I BELIEVE IS

1985?

A. I WOULD THINK SO.

Q. TALKING ABOUT THE F-16S FOR A MINUTE, I DON'T UNDERSTAND, WHILE YOU'RE TALKING TO CONGRESS, IS THIS SOMETHING THAT YOU FEEL IS LEGALLY REQUIRED, OR IS THIS SOMETHING THAT IS SIMPLY A MATTER OF BIPARTISAN FOREIGN POLICY, TRYING TO CREATE A CONSENSUS, THAT SORT OF THING? WHAT JUSTIFIES --

A. I THINK THIS SECRETARY OF STATE CERTAINLY HAS SOUGHT, AND THIS PRESIDENT HAS SOUGHT THAT CONSENSUS, AND I WOULD THINK IT IS WITHIN THAT SPIRIT THAT THOSE CONSULTATIONS ARE GOING FORWARD.

Q. WHAT CAN AMBASSADOR HABIB ACHIEVE IN THE AREA IF HE IS UNABLE TO GO TO DAMASCUS?

A. I THINK THAT'S WHAT HE'S GOING TO START TALKING WITH HIS COLLEAGUES ABOUT. A VISIT AT THIS TIME BY AMBASSADOR HABIB APPARENTLY HAD BEEN RULED OUT. I DON'T THINK WE HAVE TO WAIT FOR HIM TO GET BACK TO THE AREA TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION WITH HIS OWN COLLEAGUES IN THE UNITED

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STATES AND ALSO WITH HIS COLLEAGUES IN THE LEBANESE AND ISRAELI GOVERNMENTS AND COME AT THE PROBLEM IN A DIFFERENT WAY.

Q. HOW FAR DO YOU SHARE THE IDEA THAT ALL MOVES BY THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION TOWARDS THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEMS OF THE WEST BANK HAVE BEEN SHELVED FOR THE TIME BEING?

A. I THINK THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE OF SEPTEMBER 1 IS SEEN BY MANY ARAB NATIONS AS THE BEST THAT THEY HAVE SEEN FOR SOME TIME. I THINK IT HAS SUPPORT, AND SUPPORT HAS BEEN EXPRESSED FOR IT BY A NUMBER OF ARAB LEADERS IN RECENT DAYS. I THINK THAT THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON PROVES THAT THERE IS MOVEMENT, OBVIOUSLY. IF THERE WEE TO BE A TOTAL TROOP WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON, I'M SURE THAT WOULD BE ALSO HELPFUL. BUT I THINK THAT THIS AGREEMENT THAT HAS JUST BEEN SIGNED INDICATES THAT THERE IS MOVEMENT AND THERE IS PROGRESS, AND, AS THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAS SAID ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS, THAT NEGOTIATIONS REALLY WORK, THAT THERE IS A PAYOFF. THEY HAVE WORKED IN THE CASE OF EGYPT AND ISRAEL, AND NOW THEY'VE WORKED IN THE CASE OF LEBANON AND ISRAEL, AND THAT IS THE ALTERNATIVE TO THE KING OF BLOODSHED AND TERRORISM THAT HAS BEDEVILED THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE FOR MANY YEARS. THAT'S THE ALTERNATIVE THAT WE'RE WORKING

IT'S JUST AROUND THE CORNER. IT TAKES TIME. BUT THERE'S NO LACK OF CONTINUED COMMITMENT TO IT ON THE PART OF THE

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DOC_NUMBER: 83STATE137660

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Date Printed: 10/22/1996

DOC_NUMBER: 83STATE137660

CHANNEL: n/a

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//ZFF FOR TEL AVIV O N L Y//

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: OPRC

SUBJECT: DEPARTMENT PRESS BRIEFING MAY 17, 1983

FOR ADDRESSEE POSTS' INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE, FOLLOWING
ARE EXCERPTS FROM TODAY'S PRESS BRIEFING. SPOKESMAN WAS
JOHN HUGHES.

Q. ANYTHING ON THE SYRIANS CUTTING THE BEIRUT TO DAMASCUS
HIGHWAY?

A. NO. AS YOU HEARD FROM SECRETARY VELIOTES, WE ARE NOT
ABLE TO CONFIRM THAT.

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Q. DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING ON THE REPORT THAT LINKS IRAN TO
THE BOMBING OF THE U.S. EMBASSY IN BEIRUT?

A. WE TRADITIONALLY HAVE NOT GOTTEN INTO INTELLIGENCE
MATTERS AND THAT DOES DERIVE, IF I UNDERSTAND THE REPORT,
FROM INTELLIGENCE SOURCES, SO WE WOULDN'T HAVE ANYTHING ON
THAT.

Q. PRESIDENT GEMAYEL, IN AN INTERVIEW WITH THE TIMES,
URGED SHULTZ TO GET BACK TO THE AREA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
DOES THE SECRETARY HAVE ANY RESPONSE TO THAT?

A. HE DOESN'T HAVE ANY PLANS TO GO BACK TO THE AREA. AS
YOU KNOW, HE HAS FULL CONFIDENCE IN AMB. HABIB AND AMB.
DRAPER. AMB. DRAPER IS IN THE AREA; I THINK PHIL HABIB
WILL BE BACK IN THE AREA LATER THIS WEEK.

Q. WHAT ABOUT THE CHANCES OF AMB. HABIB GOING TO DAMASCUS?

A. I WOULDN'T RULE IT OUT.

Q. ON THE BASIS OF WHAT VELIOTES WAS TELLING US BEFORE,
I GOT THE IMPRESSION THAT HABIB MIGHT, IN FACT, UNDERTAKE
SOME FORM OF SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY BETWEEN BEIRUT AND DAMASCUS.

WAS THAT THE INTENT?

A. I DON'T THINK IT WAS THE INTENT. WE'VE JUST SEEN THE RATIFICATION OF THE AGREEMENT BY THE ISRAELIS AND THE LEBANESE. THAT HAS GONE FORWARD IN A VERY SATISFACTORY WAY. I'M SURE AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO BE INVOLVED IN WHATEVER DISCUSSIONS ARE APPROPRIATE WITH THE SYRIANS.

I DON'T THINK ANYTHING IS IN HAND AT THE MOMENT, BUT I THINK IT'S A LITTLE PREMATURE TO TALK ABOUT SHUTTLE
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DIPLOMACY OR SPECIFIC VISITS.

Q. THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF ISRAEL IS QUOTED IN AN INTERVIEW ON ISRAELI RADIO THIS MORNING AS SAYING HE IS GOING TO SIGN A MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT THIS AFTERNOON WITH AMB. LEWIS. IS A SIMILAR AGREEMENT BEING SIGNED HERE, AND CAN YOU GIVE US SOME INKLING OF WHAT IS IN THIS?

A. NO, I'M REALLY GOING TO HAVE TO REST ON SEC. VELIOTES' EXPLANATION AND REMARKS EARLIER THIS MORNING.

Q. NOW, SINCE THE TWO GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED HAVE SIGNED THE AGREEMENT, WILL YOU RELEASE IT HERE IN FULL AS WAS, FOR EXAMPLE, CAMP DAVID AND OTHER MIDDLE EAST AGREEMENTS?

A. I'M NOT SURE WHAT WE WILL RELEASE, BUT WE WILL RELEASE SOME ASPECT OF THE AGREEMENT. IT'S OBVIOUSLY INCUMBENT UPON US TO MAKE IT AVAILABLE TO CONGRESS FIRST BEFORE WE MAKE IT PUBLIC.

Q. WHICH COMMITTEES IN CONGRESS WILL THE PACKAGE BE GIVEN TO....FOREIGN RELATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE?

A. I DON'T KNOW, BUT I THINK THAT WOULD BE LOGICAL. THE SECRETARY BRIEFED MEMBERS OF THE SENATE LAST NIGHT, AND HE IS GOING TO BE BRIEFING THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE TOMORROW MORNING, I THINK AT BREAKFAST.

Q. YOU JUST SAID PARTS OF THE AGREEMENT MAY BE CLASSIFIED. THAT IS THE THING: IF IT IS CLASSIFIED, THAT IS GOING TO HOLD THE ARABS FROM COMING FORWARD TO AGREE ON THE CONTENTS OF THE AGREEMENT.

A. I DON'T AGREE WITH YOUR THESIS. I THINK THE ARAB
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COUNTRIES HAVE A GOOD UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT TRANSPIRED.

Q. WHAT ARE THE ARAB REACTIONS, IN GENERAL?

A. FROM IRAQ WE HAVE HAD FAVORABLE REACTION. I THINK WE HAVE HAD FROM JORDAN A FAVORABLE REACTION. WE HAVE HAD FROM EGYPT A VERY STRONG SUPPORTIVE REACTION. YOU SAW WHAT THE SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER SAID AT A PRESS CONFERENCE AT JIDDAH AIRPORT AFTER HIS MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY. THOSE WORDS SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES.

SO THERE ARE FOUR GOVERNMENTS RIGHT THERE THAT LEAP IMMEDIATELY TO MIND WHO HAVE SPOKEN OUT, AND I AM SURE OTHERS ARE DOING AND WILL DO SO.

Q. THE AGREEMENT AS PUBLISHED IS VERY SPECIFIC THAT IT WILL TAKE EFFECT WHEN THE DOCUMENTS OF RATIFICATION ARE EXCHANGED, WHEN THE INSTRUMENTS ARE LEGALLY EXCHANGED. IS IT CORRECT TO ASSUME THAT WHAT HABIB WILL BE DOING NOW IN THE REGION WILL BE NEGOTIATING A NEW SET OF NEGOTIATIONS THAT WILL DEAL WITH WHEN THOSE INSTRUMENTS WILL BE EXCHANGED.

A. NO, I THINK YOU ARE WRONG IN THINKING THERE IS ADDITIONAL NEGOTIATION ON THAT. THERE IS NO PROBLEM. TO MY KNOWLEDGE, THERE IS NOT A NECESSITY FOR FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS ON THAT POINT. IT IS SIMPLY A TECHNICAL POINT.

Q. WHAT ABOUT THE OTHER ESSENTIAL POINTS OF THE AGREEMENT? DURING THAT TIME PERIOD, BETWEEN THIS DAY AND WHENEVER IN THE FUTURE THE SYRIANS AND THE PLO FINALLY LEAVE, IF THEY DO, WILL ANY OF THOSE OTHER ASPECTS OF THIS BILATERAL AGREEMENT COME INTO EFFECT?

A. THAT IS WHAT THE TWO GOVERNMENTS ARE GOING TO HAVE TO NEGOTIATE. A LOT OF THE AGREEMENT IS SOMETHING THAT WILL UNCLASSIFIED

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BE IMPLEMENTED IN THE FUTURE.

Q. THERE ARE REPORTS TODAY OUT OF THE WEST BANK OF CLOSING UNIVERSITIES, SUCH AS THE WOMEN'S TEACHERS COLLEGE IN RAMALLAH, AND PLACING MORE PEOPLE IN THE TOWN OF ESSERT. ARE YOU AWARE OF THESE THINGS, AND DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENT?

A. NO. SHULTZ

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CONCEPTS= AGREEMENT, TROOP WITHDRAWAL, CONTRIBUTION, PEACEKEEPING FO

TAGS= PREL, LE, US, IS, UN, UNIFIL, PLO, (EAGLEBURGER, LAWRENCE), (URQUHART, BRIAN)

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TAGS: PREL, LE, UN, US

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SUBJECT: LEBANON-ISRAEL AGREEMENT: UNIFIL ROLE

REF: (A) STATE 135052[✓], (B) USUN 1234^{NR}, (C) USUN 1242^{NR}

1. [REDACTED]

2. DURING UNDERSECRETARY EAGLEBURGER'S MEETING ON MAY 11 WITH BRIAN URQUHART (REF A), URQUHART SAID HE WOULD PROVIDE AT A LATER MOMENT HIS COMMENTS ON THE UNIFIL ASPECT OF THE LEBANON-ISRAEL AGREEMENT. HE HAS NOW PROVIDED HIS COMMENTS (REF B), WHICH WE ARE REPEATING TO YOU. WE ARE SENDING BY SEPTELS REPORT OF IO ASSISTANT

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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SECRETARY NEWELL'S BRIEFING OF AMBASSADORS OF UNIFIL CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES ON MAY 17, AS WELL AS REPORT ON THOSE PORTIONS OF SECRETARY'S MAY 17 CONVERSATION WITH UN SEC GEN DE CUELLAR THAT DEALT WITH UNIFIL.

3. AS YOU WILL NOTE FROM THESE DISCUSSIONS AND URQUHART'S MESSAGE TO EAGLEBURGER, THE UN SECRETARIAT AND TROOP CONTRIBUTORS HAVE RAISED FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS ABOUT UNIFIL'S FUTURE. ALL ARE ANXIOUS TO HEAR HOW THE

GOL ENVISIONS UNIFIL'S NEW ROLE AND BELIEVE WE SHOULD KICK OFF OUR OWN DISCUSSIONS WITH GOL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

4. USING PEG OF CONVERSATIONS AND BRIEFINGS HELD IN U.S. ON UNIFIL, YOU SHOULD GET IN TOUCH WITH AMB. TUENI OR OTHER GOL OFFICIALS CHARGED WITH TAKING LEAD ON UNIFIL TO CONVEY SUBSTANCE OF URQUHART'S CONCERNS AND FLAVOR OF UNIFIL CONTRIBUTORS' QUESTIONS. IN DOING SO, YOU SHOULD OF COURSE PROTECT CONFIDENTIALITY OF URQUHART'S SPECIFIC EXCHANGE WITH US. PLEASE MAKE CLEAR THAT IN ALL OF OUR CONVERSATIONS WE HAVE EXPRESSED FIRM SUPPORT FOR UNIFIL AND IMPORTANCE TO NEGOTIATION OF PLO WITHDRAWAL FOR INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE AT THE CAMPS.

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5. FOR USUN: PLEASE ADVISE URQUHART THAT WE ARE KICKING
OFF OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE GOL ON UNIFIL, USING
SUBSTANCE OF HIS CONCERNS AS PART OF THE DISCUSSION,
WHILE PROTECTING CONFIDENTIALITY OF HIS SPECIFIC EXCHANGE
WITH US. SHULTZ

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*** Current Classification *** [REDACTED]

Date Printed: 10/22/1996

DOC_NUMBER: 83TELAV06733

CHANNEL: n/a

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☐ DENY IN PART
 TS authority to
 FOIA Exemptions ☐ CLASSIFY as ☐ S or ☐ C Sec.
 PA Exemptions ☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or ☐ C

9302566

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 TEL AVIV 06733

ROME FOR AMBASSADOR HABIB

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL, US, IS, LE, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: OPENING STATEMENTS AT
 - KHALDAH SIGNING CEREMONY, MAY 17

1. FOLLOWING ARE OPENING STATEMENTS MADE RESPECTIVELY
 BY AMBASSADORS KIMCHE, FATTAL AND DRAPER, MAY 17, AT
 THE KHALDAH SIGNING CEREMONY.

2. ISRAELI TEXT: QUOTE:

ISRAEL AND LEBANON ARE TODAY REACHING THE END OF LONG
 AND DIFFICULT NEGOTIATIONS IN WHICH BOTH OUR COUNTRIES,
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WITH THE ACTIVE HELP OF THE U.S., SOUGHT TO CREATE A
 NEW RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN US. FOR MORE THAN 4 MONTHS
 WE HAVE MOVED FORWARD, SLOWLY BUT SURELY, TOWARDS OUR
 GOAL: THE GOAL OF PEACE IN PLACE OF WAR, THE GOAL OF
 FRIENDSHIP IN PLACE OF HOSTILITY, THE GOAL OF SECURITY
 IN PLACE OF INSTABILITY, AND VIOLENCE. THESE ARE OUR
 CHERISHED OBJECTIVES, THESE ARE THE DIRECTIVES WHICH
 HAVE GUIDED US DURING THESE PROTRACTED TALKS IN KHALDE,
 KIRYAT SHMONA AND NETHANYA.

TODAY, AS WE MEET IN THE CAPACITY OF NEGOTIATING TEAMS FOR THE LAST TIME, I FEEL THAT THESE AIMS HAVE BEEN SERVED. I KNOW THAT THE SIGNATURES THAT WE HAVE AFFIXED ON THE AGREEMENT ARE JUST THE BEGINNING OF A NEW CHAPTER IN OUR HISTORIES, THAT MANY OBSTACLES STILL STAND IN OUR PATHS, AND THAT THERE ARE MANY WHO WOULD WISH TO RENDER THE AGREEMENT WE ARE SIGNING MEANINGLESS. I WOULD LIKE TO SAY TO ALL THOSE WHO CASTIGATE THIS AGREEMENT AND WHO SEE PEACE AS A BETRAYAL OF THEIR CAUSE: YOU CANNOT GO AGAINST THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE, AND THE PEOPLE OF LEBANON, WHO HAVE PROVEN THEIR STRENGTH OF DETERMINATION BY MAINTAINING THEIR INDEPENDENT CHARACTER FROM THE TIMES OF THE PHOENICIANS, THEY ARE IN FAVOUR OF THIS AGREEMENT, JUST AS OUR PEOPLE ARE.

THE PEOPLE OF LEBANON KNOW BETTER THAN ANYONE ELSE WHAT HAD BEEN THE SITUATION IN THEIR COUNTRY JUST ONE YEAR AGO: A CAPITAL DIVIDED WITH A DEADLY GREEN LINE DIVIDING THE TWO HALVES; A PEOPLE SUFFERING UNDER THE YOKE OF FOREIGN OCCUPYING FORCES, WITHOUT HOPE OF FREEING THEMSELVES FROM THE OPPRESSION TO WHICH THEY WERE BEING SUBJECTED; A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION ESTABLISHING A STATE

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WITHIN A STATE, BREEDING INSTABILITY, VIOLENCE, DEATH AND DESTRUCTION.

THIS IS NOW ALL CHANGING, AND WE ARE THE FIRST TO WISH THE LEBANON A FULL AND COMPLETE RESTORATION OF ITS SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE, WITH A STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IMPOSING ITS AUTHORITY OVER ALL ITS TERRITORY. THIS RETURN TO SANITY AND TO STABILITY CAN ONLY COME ABOUT IF THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT WE ARE ABOUT TO SIGN ARE SCRUPULOUSLY UPHELD; THE ALTERNATIVE WOULD TRULY BE TRAGIC.

MR. CHAIRMAN, OUR COUNTRY IS COMMITTED TO A POLICY OF PEACE WITH OUR NEIGHBOURS. HOW MANY TIMES HAS OUR PRIME MINISTER CALLED FROM THE ROSTRUM OF THE KNESSET TO OUR NEIGHBOURS TO COME AND TALK PEACE, OUR ONLY CONDITION BEING THAT THERE BE NO PRE-CONDITIONS? WE PROVED OUR COMMITMENT TO PEACE LAST YEAR, WHEN DESPITE MANY SCEPTICAL PROGNOSSES THE CONTRARY, WE WITHDREW FROM SINAI ON APRIL 25 AND FULFILLED OUR PROMISE TO THE LETTER. WE ARE PROVING THE SAME COMMITMENT AGAIN TODAY, AT THIS SIGNING CEREMONY. WE HAVE SAID ALL ALONG THAT WE DO NOT COVET A SINGLE SQUARE CENTIMETER OF LEBANESE TERRITORY, THAT IT IS OUR DESIRE TO PULL OUR TROOPS OUT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. AGAIN, THERE WERE MANY

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CHANNEL: n/a

SCEPTICS, BUT WHILE WE ARE HERE TALKING PEACE, WHAT ARE THE OTHERS DOING? YASSER ARAFAT, DURING HIS VISIT TO THE BEQA'A THIS WEEK, DECLARED THAT THE WAY TO GO FORWARD WAS BY WAR -- WAR BY ALL THE ARAB COUNTRIES IN ORDER TO CHANGE THE POLITICAL MAP OF OUR REGION. AS FOR THE PRESIDENT OF SYRIA, LET HIM SHOW HIS CONCERN FOR THE LEBANESE PEOPLE, FOR LEBANESE INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY BY WITHDRAWING

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	ACDA-12	SSN-02	USIE-00	SP-02	SNP-01	PRS-01	/104 W
					-----330125	171812Z	/50

O 171745Z MAY 83
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3670
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE
USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE

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HIS ARMY FROM LEBANESE TERRITORY AND ALLOWING PEACE TO REIGN ONCE AGAIN ON ITS SOIL.

WE HAVE ALL MADE GREAT EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT THIS AGREEMENT AND BOTH YOU AND WE ARE TAKING RISKS. BUT

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BOTH LEBANON AND ISRAEL HAVE A GREAT DEAL TO GAIN FROM THIS AGREEMENT AND I AM CONFIDENT THAT NEITHER OF US WILL EVER HAVE CAUSE TO REGRET OUR ACT TODAY. I WOULD, THOUGH, LIKE TO SAY A WORD ABOUT THE THIRD COUNTRY REPRESENTED HERE TODAY - THE UNITED STATES, AND TO EXPRESS OUR GRATITUDE TO THE TIRELESS EFFORTS OF AMBASSADOR DRAPER AND HIS ENTIRE DELEGATION, TO AMBASSADOR HABIB AND TO SECRETARY SHULTZ ALL OF WHOM CONTRIBUTED GREATLY TO THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF OUR TALKS.

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MR. CHAIRMAN, WE ARE AS YOU KNOW AN ANCIENT PEOPLE, CONSCIOUS OF OUR PAST HERITAGE WHICH LIVES ON WITH US. WE HAD, AS YOU KNOW, EXCELLENT RELATIONS IN THE PAST WITH HIRAM, KING OF TYRE, AND WITH LEBANON IN GENERAL. I WOULD LIKE TO END MY WORDS WITH A PASSAGE FROM THE BOOK OF KINGS, WHICH I BELIEVE IS PARTICULARLY APT TODAY: "AND THE LORD GAVE SO WISDOM, AS HE PROMISED HIM; AND THERE WAS PEACE BETWEEN HIRAM AND SOLOMON; AND THE TWO OF THEM MADE A TREATY." THANK YOU. END ISRAELI TEXT.

3. LEBANESE TEXT:

QUOTE THE AGREEMENT I HAVE THE HONOUR TO SIGN TODAY IN THE NAME OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF LEBANON AIMS FUNDAMENTALLY AT ENDING EIGHT YEARS OF WAR AND ANARCHY. ITS OBJECTIVE IS TO ENSURE THE WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES WHICH, AT DIFFERENT TIMES AND FOR VARIOUS REASONS, ENTERED OUR TERRITORY. "TO EVERY THING THERE IS A REASON, AND A TIME FOR EVERY PURPOSE UNDER THE HEAVEN" SAYS THE BOOK OF ECCLESIASTES. ISN'T IT TIME WE PUT SOME ORDER IN OUR OWN COUNTRY?

SINCE APRIL 13, 1975 LEBANON HAS BEEN, MORE THAN ONCE, NEARLY ENGULFED BY THE STORM. "EVEN THE RUINS DIED" EXCLAIMS LUCAN WHEN HE SAW WHAT WAS LEFT OF TROY. AND, PARAPHRASING THE POET, WE COULD SAY THAT EVEN THE RUINS DIED IN LEBANON. EVENTS HAVE TAUGHT US THAT OUR COUNTRY, HOWEVER BEAUTIFUL, HOWEVER BELOVED, IS NOT AN ABSOLUTE BUT AN EARTHLY CREATION LIABLE TO BE DESTROYED. NOTHING IS MORE FRAGILE THAN A COUNTRY. VERY OFTEN, ITS SPAN OF LIFE IS NO LONGER THAN THAT OF A HUMAN BEING. STATES, JUST AS CIVILISATIONS, CAN PERISH, AND THEY OFTEN

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PERISH BECAUSE OF MAN.

IN THE WORDS OF SIMONE WEIL, A COUNTRY MUST BE LOVED, WITH A SIMPLE AND DIGNIFIED LOVE MADE OF COMPASSION, CARE AND WATCHFULNESS.

SUCH IS OUR LOVE FOR LEBANON. THE ONLY TRUE AND JUST LOVE. A LOVE WHICH ENCOMPASSES, IN ONE TENDER GLANCE, OUR COASTS, OUR PLAINS, EACH TERRACE CARVED IN THE ROCK BY OUR FOREFATHERS, EACH PARTICLE OF THIS SOIL WHICH OUR FATHERS TILLED BEFORE BEING LAID DOWN IN IT. THIS LAND WE LOVE WITH ALL OUR HEART, WITH ALL OUR SOUL AND ALL OUR STRENGTH, IS THE BETROTHED OF THE SONG OF SONGS. WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF SHARING IT WITH ANYONE.

IF WE ARE SIGNING THIS AGREEMENT WITH IT IS ALSO BECAUSE LEBANON HAS A PRESSING NEED FOR CALM AND ORDER. ITS VERY SURVIVAL IS AT STAKE. INSECURITY, A STATE OF WAR, EVEN A MERE WAR OF NERVES JEOPARDIZE ANY UNDERTAKING. THIS IS WHY LEBANON MUST HAVE A CLEAR NOTION -- IN WHICH SENTIMENTALITY ENTERS AS LITTLE AS POSSIBLE -- OF ITS DUTY OF SOLIDARITY TOWARDS THE REGION AND THE WORLD. IT MUST ADOPT A DISCREET, FLEXIBLE AND TOLERANT POLICY, AND A DIPLOMACY, THE ROLE OF WHICH IS TO BE NEITHER PASSIVE NOR PREDOMINANT, BUT COMPLEMENTARY. LEBANON INTENDS TO MAINTAIN THE COMMUNITY OF INTEREST THAT TIES IT TO ITS NEIGHBOURS. A SMALL COUNTRY OF SOME 10,000 SQ. KMS., WITH A LIMITED POTENTIAL, IT SEEKS NEITHER GLORY NOR GRANDEUR, AND CANNOT PRIDE ITSELF ON TROPHIES WON IN THE BATTLE-FIELDS. HAVING LIVED WITHOUT PRE-TENSION, IT WANTS TO GO ON LIVING FAR FROM PROVOCATION, STORMS AND THE RATTLE OF ARMS. WHILE OTHERS MIGHT THRIVE ON FIERY COMPETITIONS, LEBANON WOULD BE RUINED

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CHANNEL: n/a

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	HA-08	L-03	TRSE-00	PM-08	PA-02	INRE-00	SAL-01
	ACDA-12	SSN-02	USIE-00	SP-02	SNP-01	PRS-01	/104 W

-----330167 171813Z /50

O 171745Z MAY 83

FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3671

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE

USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE

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BY THEM. MODERATION IS A CARDINAL VIRTUE FOR LEBANON,
ONE OF THE BASES OF ITS EXISTENCE.

LEBANON INTENDS TO RESTORE AND REESTABLISH A STRONG
CURRENT OF CIVIC FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE MEMBERS OF ITS
MOSAIC OF 17 COMMUNITIES - CHRISTIANS, MOSLEM AND JEWISH -
A MOSAIC WHICH SUBVERSION ATTEMPTED TO SHATTER BY ALL
MEANS. THEIR CUSTOMS, TEMPERAMENTS AND LAWS MIGHT VARY;
BUT LEBANON, FAR FROM TRYING TO LEVEL THE DIFFERENCES,
HAS SET ITSELF AS THE GUARDIAN OF THEIR DIVERSITY,
INsofar AS ITS COMMON FINALITY IS PEACE WITHIN ORDER
AND JUSTICE.

LEBANON INTENDS TO REMAIN FAITHFUL TO ITS ARAB VOCATION,
IN SPITE OF ITS HAZARDS, WHILE ENDING THE STATE OF WAR
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WITH ISRAEL; THERE IS NO CONTRADICTION THERE. BECAUSE
OF THEIR HUMAN AND RELIGIOUS GEOGRAPHY, THE OTHER ARAB
STATES HAVE A MONOLITHIC CHARACTER WHICH DETERMINES THEIR
CONDUCT AND CHANNELS IT IN DIRECTION WHICH A DIVERSIFIED
AND PLURALIST COUNTRY SUCH AS LEBANON CANNOT FOLLOW.
INTER-ARAB SOLIDARITY IN NO WAY IMPELS LEBANON TO COPY
ITS NEIGHBOURS' BEHAVIOUR.

THE ARRLD TO WHICH LEBANON BELONGS CAN BE COMPARED
TO A TREE. AS THE TREE GROWS, ITS BRANCHES SPREAD
APART AND BECOME DIFFERENT. SOME TURN TOWARDS THE RISING
SUN, OTHERS TURN SOUTH, AND OTHERS HAVE TO FIGHT THE
NORTHERN WIND. THEY DON'T SEEM TO KNOW EACH OTHER SINCE

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EACH ONE IS ORIENTED DIFFERENTLY. YET THEY ALL BELONG TO THE SAME TREE TRUNK, FROM WHICH THEY DRAW THEIR SAP, YOUTH AND BRILLIANCE. SEPARATED FROM IT, THEY DIE. THE NOBILITY OF A TREE RESIDES IN THE PLASTICITY OF ITS FORMS. WE ARE NOT LIKE THOSE LOVERS OF UNIFORMITY WHO GLORY IN THE PERFECTION OF A POLE. THE AGREEMENT WE ARE SIGNING TODAY "IS NOT A PEACE AGREEMENT; IT IS A STEP TOWARDS A JUST AND LASTING PEACE". I BORROWED THAT EXPRESSION FROM THE DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT MADE ON MAY 31, 1974 BETWEEN SYRIA AND ISRAEL. IF WE ACCEPT TO COMMIT OURSELVES TOWARDS YOU, IT IS NOT ONLY TO FREE OUR TERRITORY FROM THE BURDEN OF OCCUPATION. NOR IS IT ONLY BECAUSE WE NEED PEACE AND SECURITY. WE TOO LOVE LIBERTY; WE LOATHE ANY SERVITUDE. THE LEBANESE ARE MOUNTAIN PEOPLE. AND MONTESQUIEU NOTES THAT IN MOUNTAINOUS COUNTRIES, THERE IS LITTLE TO KEEP. "ONLY LIBERTY IS WORTH FIGHTING FOR." AND WE SHALL FIGHT FOR IT.

IT HAS BEEN SAID THIS AGREEMENT IS NOT PERFECT. I WOULD
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SAY IT IS REASONABLE; PERFECTION BELONGS TO GOD ONLY. REASON HAD TO PREVAIL OVER THE PASSIONS WHICH CAUSED US SO MUCH SUFFERING. "THERE IS SOMETHING MORE IMMENSE THAN WAR, IT IS PEACE" EXCLAIMED PAUL CLAUDEL. A SHINING TRUTH TO WHICH EACH LEBANESE HOLDS WITH SUCH STRENGTH THAT THERE IS NO ROOM LEFT FOR DOUBT. WE WANT TO BE ARTISANS OF PEACE.

IN A FEW DAYS, THIS AGREEMENT SHALL ENTER INTO FORCE. THE LEBANESE AND ISRAELIS WILL HAVE TO SHOW A GREAT SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY TO ENSURE ITS IMPLEMENTATION AND TO OVERCOME THE OBSTACLES WHICH ARE ALREADY APPEARING IN THE DISTANCE.

BEFORE UDING, I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS MY SINCERE GRATITUDE TO AMBASSADORS KIMCHE AND DRAPER FOR THE INTELLIGENCE, COURTESY AND ABILITY THEY HAVE ALWAYS SHOWN THROUGHOUT THE FIVE MONTHS OF DIFFICULT NEGOTIATIONS. I ALSO WISH TO PAY A TRIBUTE TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, TO THEIR PRESIDENT AND TO THEIR REPRESENTATIVES - PRESENT OR ABSENT - WHOSE FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION WERE SO EFFECTIVE. IN THE NAME OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF LEBANON, I WISH TO EXPRESS TO THEM OUR HEARTFELT GRATITUDE. AND FINALLY, I WISH TO THANK ALL THOSE WHO COOPERATED WITH US IN THIS DIFFICULT TASK. END LEBANESE TEXT.

4. AMERICAN TEXT: QUOTE

TODAY, MAY 17, IS AN HISTORIC AND MEMORABLE OCCASION.

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DOC_NUMBER: 83TELAV06733

CHANNEL: n/a

THIS DAY MARKS THE SUCCESSFUL CULMINATION OF MONTHS OF
HARD NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF LEBANON
AND ISRAEL. THESE NEGOTIATIONS WERE ENTERED INTO FREELY
BUT BOTH GOVERNMENTS SHARED A REALISTIC PREMISE.

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	HA-08	L-03	TRSE-00	PM-08	PA-02	INRE-00	SAL-01
	ACDA-12	SSN-02	USIE-00	SP-02	SNP-01	PRS-01	/104 W
					-----330231	171814Z	/50

O 171745Z MAY 83
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3672
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE
USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE

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AS CHURCHILL ONCE SAID, "IF WE OPEN A QUARREL BETWEEN THE
PAST AND PRESENT, WE SHALL FIND THAT WE HAVE LOST THE
FUTURE." THE DELEGATIONS HERE PUT OLD QUARRELS INTO
PERSPECTIVE; THEY LOOKED TO THE FUTURE, AND THEY HAVE
NOT LOST IT.

SUCCESS IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN
POSSIBLE IN THE ABSENCE OF THE GOOD WILL AND VISION

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EXHIBITED CONSISTENTLY BY THE LEBANESE AND ISRAELIS. THEIR DELEGATES HAVE BEEN PROFESSIONAL, OBSERVANT, AND FAITHFUL TO THE CHARGES OF THEIR GOVERNMENTS, WHICH CONTRIBUTED STRICT GUIDELINES AND A SENSE OF PURPOSE TO THEIR EMISSARIES.

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EACH OF THE PARTIES REPRESENTED IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS HAS SOUGHT NATIONAL POLICY OBJECTIVES OF OVER-RIDING IMPORTANCE.

THE LEBANESE FOR THEIR PART HAVE TRIED TO MAKE POSSIBLE THROUGH THIS AGREEMENT THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL EXTERNAL FORCES FROM THEIR COUNTRY SO THAT LEBANON'S INDEPENDENCE, SOVEREIGNTY, AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, AND ITS NATIONAL UNITY AND NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, COULD ONCE MORE BE RESTORED AND STRENGTHENED.

THE ISRAELIS FORR PART HAVE SOUGHT PRACTICAL, WORKABLE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH -- WITH LEBANON'S FULL COOPERATION -- WOULD ASSURE THEIR SECURITY FROM THE THREAT OF FUTURE ATTACKS FROM LEBANESE TERRITORY.

IN THE COMPLICATED PROCESS OF MESHING THESE IMPORTANT OBJECTIVES INTO ONE COMMON AND COMPREHENSIVE PACKAGE OF UNDERSTANDINGS, OTHER GOALS WERE ACHIEVED. THE TWO SOVERNMENTS DISCOVERED AND TOOK ADVANTAGE OF THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE MANY PURPOSES AND IDEALS IN COMMON TO INSPIRE THEM, NOT THE LEAST OF WHICH HAS BEEN THE FACT THEY ARE PRACTICING DEMOCRACIES. MOREOVER, THEIR LEADERS HAVE FAITH IN MAN'S CAPACITY TO SHAPE WITH GOD'S HELP A BETTER ENVIRONMENT.

ONE OF THE MOST IMPRESSIVE OUTCOMES OF THESE TALKS HAS BEEN THE SETTING OF THE STAGE FOR AN ENDURING AND FRIENDLY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THESE TWO NEIGHBORING STATES. THIS WILL BE A RELATIONSHIP BASED ON MUTUAL RESPECT AND THE SHARED DETERMINATION THAT THE TURMOIL AND VIOLENCE OF PAST YEARS WILL NEVER AGAIN RETURN TO DOMINATE THE SCENE. BOTH COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN VICTIMIZED. THEIR PEOPLES OVER THE YEARS HAVE MADE ENORMOUS SACRI-

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FICES, AND NOT ONLY IN BLOOD AND PROPERTY. THERE IS NO ONE HERE -- AMONG EITHER THE LEBANESE OR ISRAELI DELEGATIONS -- WHO HAS NOT SOMEHOW BEEN TOUCHED BY PAST TRAGEDIES. THEY DESERVE BETTER.

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EQUALLY SIGNIFICANT, THE REPRESENTATIVES OF BOTH GOVERNMENTS HAVE SHOWN COURAGE AND GRACE. THEY HAVE BEEN WILLING TO TAKE RISKS AND TO DEAL WITH UNFAIR CRITICISM, FROM NEAR AND AFAR. INSPIRED BY THE STATESMANSHIP WHICH LEBANON AND ISRAEL HAVE BOTH GIVEN IN FULL MEASURE, ALL OF US HERE INTEND TO OVERCOME THE SERIOUS OBSTACLES AHEAD.

IT IS FITTING THAT THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IS REPRESENTED HERE TODAY TO WITNESS THE SIGNING OF THIS IMPORTANT AGREEMENT. THE UNITED STATES IS A WARM AND RELIABLE FRIEND TO BOTH COUNTRIES. IT IS NOT ONLY A WITNESS TO THISRD, IT WILL REMAIN A FIRM SUPPORTER OF THE UNDERSTANDINGS WHICH HAVE BEEN REACHED AND A FAITHFUL DEFENDER OF THE LEGITIMATE GOALS OF EACH GOVERNMENT. I PERSONALLY, ALONG WITH ALL MEMBERS OF THE AMERICAN DELEGATION AND, OF COURSE, SECRETARY SHULTZ AND PRESIDENT REAGAN, THUS TAKE IMMENSE SATISFACTION IN TODAY'S EVENTS.

IN THE WORDS OF DAG HAMMARSKJOLD, WE NOW JOIN WITH OUR GOOD FRIENDS, THE PEOPLES OF LEBANON AND ISRAEL, "... IN LOOKING TO THE FAR HORIZON." END AMERICAN TEXT.

LEWIS

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED

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Eilat
APAGE 01 LONDON 10247 161110Z
ACTION NEA-11INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 EUR-12 SS-10 DODE-00 NSCE-00
SSO-01 PM-08 SSN-02 /045 W

-----246632 161115Z /16

O 161106Z MAY 83 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 3441
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
USELO RIYADH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

☒ RELEASE☐ EXCISE☐ DENY

INDEX OF

☒ DECLASSIFY☐ DECLASSIFY

IN PART

EO Citations

IN PART

FOIA Exemptions

PA Exemptions

☐ CLASSIFY as☐ S or☐ C Sec.☐ DOWNGRADE TS to☐ S or☐ C

TS authority to

C Sec.

S or C

9302566

LONDON 10247

ZFF-4 FOR BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, ROME TE. AVIV AND JERUSALEM ONLY
FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OVIP (HABIB, AMB.)
SUBJECT: HABIB TRAVEL PLANS

1. [REDACTED]

2. I WILL ARRIVE TEL AVIV MAY 18 FROM ROME (FLIGHT
INFO FOLLOWS SEPTTEL). PLEASE HAVE SPAR AIRCRAFT
READY TO LEAVE FOR BEIRUT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE
AFTER MY ARRIVAL AT BEN GURION. I WOULD PREFER
MEETING ISRAELI OFFICIALS AFTER GOING ON TO OTHER
STOP, BUT WILL ABIDE BY AMBASSADOR LEWIS' ADVICE.

3. I PROPOSE TO OVERNIGHT IN BEIRUT AND GO ON
TO DAMASCUS THE MORNING OF MAY 19. IN BEIRUT

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I WOULD WISH TO SEE FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM AND
PRESIDENT GEMAYEL IN THAT ORDER OR TOGETHER.
IN DAMASCUS I WOULD HOPE TO SEE PRESIDENT
ASSAD. I WILL BE HAPPY TO MEET WITH KHADDAM
FIRST IF THAT IS NECESSARY, BUT WISH TO EMPHASIZE
NEED TO SEE ASSAD.

4. FOLLOWING DAMASCUS I PROPOSE TO GO TO SAUDI
ARABIA TO MEET WITH KING FAHD. DEPENDING ON HOW

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THE TALKS STAND AT THAT POINT WE CAN DECIDE
NEXT MOVES.

5. FOR DRAPER: PLEASE MEET ME ON ARRIVAL IN
ISRAEL SO THAT WE CAN GO TO BEIRUT TOGETHER.
HAVE WITH YOU EXTRA COPIES OF AGREEMENT PACKAGE
IN ENGLISH AND ARABIC, PLUS RECORD OF LAST
MEETINGS, INCLUDING ISRAELI AND LEBANESE
STATEMENTS AT SIGNING.

6. HABIB DEPARTED LONDON FOR ROME ON MAY 15.
LOUIS

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* *** Current Handling Restrictions ONLY
*** Current Classification ***

Date Printed: 10/22/1996

DOC_NUMBER: 83TELAV06723

CHANNEL: n/a

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	PA-02	INRE-00	SAL-01	SSN-02	SP-02	PRS-01	/076 W

-----321206 171452Z /50

O 171437Z MAY 83

FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO USINFO WASHDC IMMEDIATE

SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3661

WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE

USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3149

AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IM/IPS/CR/IR

Date: 11/7/97

☒ RELEASE☐ DECLASSIFY☐ EXCISE☐ DECLASSIFY

EO Citations

☐ DENY

IN PART

FOIA Exemptions

Exemptions

TS authority to

☐ CLASSIFY as ☐ S or ☐ C Sec.☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or ☐ C

9302566

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 TEL AVIV 06723

USIA

DEPARTMENT FOR PA AND PA/PRESS; NEA/P

NSC FOR WILLIAM CLARK

WHITEHOUSE FOR LARRY SPEAKES

USINFO FOR P/PPN, VOA NEWS/CA, NEA, P/RC, R/P, R/FW

AMEMBASSY ROME PASS AMBASSADOR HABIB

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PASS AMBASSADOR DRAPER

E.O. 12356: N/A

SUBJECT: ISRAEL-LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS

1. FOLLOWING ARE REMARKS MADE BY THE HEAD OF THE
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LEBANESE DELEGATION, AMBASSADOR ANTWAN FATTAL; HEAD
OF THE ISRAELI DELEGATION, AMBASSADOR DAVID KIMCHE;
AND HEAD OF THE AMERICAN DELEGATION, AMBASSADOR MORRIS
DRAPER, AT THE SIGNING OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN LEBANON
AND ISRAEL -- KIRYAT SHEMONA, MAY 17, 1983:
BEGIN FATTAL TEXT AS TRANSLATED FROM FRENCH INTO
ENGLISH, READ BY MEMBER OF HIS DELEGATION:
LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:

SOME TIME AGO IN HALDE, I DECLARED, THAT THE AGREEMENT WE ARE SIGNING TODAY, ALTHOUGH IT IS NOT A PEACE TREATY, IS A STEP TOWARDS A JUST AND LASTING PEACE. I ADDED THAT WE WANTED TO BE ARTISANS OF PEACE. AMONG ALL TASKS (AS HEARD) IN THE WORLD, THIS IS ONE OF THE MOST DIFFICULT. IT REQUIRES MUCH PATIENCE, MUCH WISDOM, FLEXIBILITY, AND ABOVE ALL, HUMILITY. IT IS RELATIVELY EASY FOR DIPLOMATS AND LEGAL ADVISERS TO THINK TOGETHER; TO ESTABLISH EFFECTS WHICH ARE MORE OR LESS CONVENIENT FOR BOTH PARTIES. IT IS A KIND OF INTELLECTUAL EXERCISE AND WE DID THAT FOR FIVE MONTHS. BUT, THOUGH AN ARTISAN OF PEACE, THE SKILL OF BEING AN ARTISAN OF PEACE IS A VERY DIFFICULT ONE. AND THE DIFFICULTY COMES WHEN YOU HAVE TO GIVE LIFE TO THE TEXT - WHEN YOU STEP TO PUT A BREATH OF LIFE IN A TEXT AND AVOID IT BEING SENT TO THE CEMETERY OF PROMISES THAT WERE NEVER HELD. I DO BELIEVE THAT FROM NOW ON, OUR TASK AND YOURS WILL BE MORE DIFFICULT THAN IT WAS IN THE FIRST STAGE. HOWEVER, I DO HOPE SINCERELY THAT THIS TREATY WILL BE APPLIED AND THE ENDS WE BOTH TRIED TO ACHIEVE WILL BE ACHIEVED. I USUALLY HOPE BEYOND HOPE. I AM NOT BORN OPTIMIST, BUT I DO BELIEVE THAT THE WORK DONE WAS A NECESSARY ONE -- NOT FOR SENTIMENTAL REASONS -- BUT BECAUSE OF REASON

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ITSELF. SO, WHEN WE SHALL BE ABLE TO OVERCOME THE OBSTACLES WHICH WE SHALL NECESSARILY FIND ON OUR PART, THEN SENTIMENT WILL BE ADDED TO REASON. YOU MUST HAVE NOTICED THAT JUST TODAY PARLIAMENT APPROVED UNANIMOUSLY OUT OF A MAJORITY OF 80 MEMBERS PRESENT THIS AGREEMENT. IT IS OUR PARLIAMENT WITH ALL ITS COLORINGS, ALL ITS CONFESSIONS, ALL ITS TENDENCIES, WHICH WAS UNANIMOUS AND UNDERSTANDING THAT THIS WORK WE DID WAS A WORK OF REASON. I HOPE THAT IN A FEW DAYS WE CAN EXCHANGE THE INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION. AND THAT THOSE WHO WILL TAKE CHARGE WILL GIVE A BREATH OF LIFE AND THOSE TEAMS WILL START WORK IMMEDIATELY. I WOULD LIKE TO SEIZE THIS OCCASION TO THANK YOU AND ALL YOUR COLLABORATORS FOR ALL THE COURTESY YOU HAVE SHOWN DURING THESE DIFFICULT NEGOTIATIONS. I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO THANK OUR FRIENDS FROM THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AND ESPECIALLY AMBASSADOR DRAPER, WHO REALLY DEVOTED HIMSELF TO THE TASK OF LEADING THESE NEGOTIATIONS TO SUCCESS. AND I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO EXPRESS MY GRATITUDE TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES WHOSE FRIENDSHIP NEVER FAILED US. AND, MR. PRESIDENT, I WOULD LIKE TO ADD ONE MORE WORD, AND THANKS TO THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PRESS, YOURS AND OURS, WHO HAVE COVERED OUR WORK. THEY DID SO VERY EFFECTIVELY, AND THEY DID SO IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT WE VERY

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DOC_NUMBER: 83TELAV06723

CHANNEL: n/a

OFTEN REFUSED TO SPEAK. I WOULD LIKE TO THANK THEM
FOR THAT UNGRATEFUL TASK WHICH WAS HOWEVER A VERY
USEFUL ONE.

END FATTAL TEXT.
BEGIN KIMCHE TEXT:

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ACTION NEA-07.

INFO	OCT-00	COPY-01	ADS-00	INR-10	EUR-12	SS-10	CIAE-00
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O 171437Z MAY 83
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO USINFO WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3662
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3150
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 04 TEL AVIV 06723

THANK YOU AMBASSADOR FATTAL, AMBASSADOR DRAPER,
DISTINGUISHED MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION: WHEN YOU FIRST
CAME TO KIRYAT SHEMONA FOUR MONTHS AGO, YOU WERE

OFFERED BREAD AND SALT IN OUR TRADITIONAL GREETING TO HONORED AND WELCOME GUESTS, AND THE CHILDREN OF THIS TOWN LINED THE STREETS HOLDING PLACARDS WITH THE WORD "SHALOM." TODAY, THE PEOPLE OF KIRYAT SHEMONA AND INDEED OF ALL OF ISRAEL ONCE MORE GREET YOU HERE WITH THE WORD "SHALOM," FOR IT IS PEACE THAT WE DESIRE, ESPECIALLY WITH THE PEOPLE OF LEBANON AGAINST WHOM WE HAVE NEVER FELT ANY ANIMOSITY OR ILL-FEELING.

IT IS FITTING THAT IT IS HERE, HERE IN KIRYAT SHEMONA
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WHICH SUFFERED SO MUCH IN THE PAST THAT WE SHOULD BE SIGNING THIS DOCUMENT WHICH BRINGS TO AN END THE STATE OF WAR BETWEEN US AND LAYS THE FOUNDATION FOR A NEW ERA OF PEACE AND GOOD-NEIGHBORLINESS BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES. BUT I MUST BE TRUE TO THE GOOD CITIZENS OF THIS TOWN AND VOICE THEIR ANXIETIES AS WELL. THEY KNOW, MORE THAN ALL OF US, WHY WE WERE FORCED TO ENTER LEBANON NEARLY A YEAR AGO IN ORDER TO DO AWAY, ONCE AND FOR ALL, WITH THE CONSTANT DANGER TO THE CITIZENS OF GALILEE.

AS WE SIGN THIS DOCUMENT OF PEACE HERE TODAY, WE MUST REMEMBER THE REASONS WHICH LED US TO THE PEACE FOR GALILEE OPERATION AND TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE, AND WE, IN ISRAEL, LET US REMEMBER THE HEAVY SACRIFICE WE HAD TO PAY IN ORDER TO REMOVE THE MILITARY INFRASTRUCTURE OF A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION DEDICATED TO OUR DESTRUCTION. WE SHALL NEVER ALLOW SUCH A THREAT TO BE POISED ONCE AGAIN AGAINST THE CITIZENS OF KIRYAT SHEMONA, OR OF ANYWHERE ELSE IN OUR COUNTRY. AND WE HOPE AND PRAY THAT THE TERMS OF THIS AGREEMENT THAT WE ARE SIGNING TODAY WILL HELP TO PREVENT SUCH A POSSIBILITY IN THE FUTURE.

WE, IN ISRAEL, ARE PROVING OUR GOOD FAITH AND OUR DESIRE TO SEE A STRONG AND INDEPENDENT LEBANON AS OUR NEIGHBOR. BUT WHAT OF THE SYRIANS? WILL THEY FOLLOW SUIT, OR WILL THEY TRY TO REMAIN AS AN OCCUPYING POWER IN LEBANON, CONTINUING, TOGETHER WITH THE PLO, TO OPPRESS AND SUBJUGATE THE PEOPLE? HERE LIES THE TEST, THE REAL TEST, REGARDING THE INTENTION OF SYRIA AND INDEED OF THE ENTIRE ARAB WORLD TOWARDS LEBANON. WE CALL ON ALL THOSE WHO WISH PEACE FOR OUR REGION AND PEACE FOR LEBANON TO USE ALL THEIR INFLUENCE TO ACHIEVE A SPEEDY WITHDRAWAL OF THE TERRORIST AND
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DOC_NUMBER: 83TELAV06723

CHANNEL: n/a

OF THE SYRIAN FORCES. WE, ON OUR PART, GUARANTEE TO LEAVE LEBANON AS SOON AS OUR PRISONERS AND OUR MISSING AND THE REMAINS OF THOSE WHO FELL ARE RETURNED, AS SOON AS THE PLO AND THE SYRIANS QUIT LEBANESE TERRITORY, AND THE SOONER THIS HAPPENS, THE BETTER AS FAR AS WE ARE CONCERNED. THE LONGER THE PLO TERRORISTS AND THE SYRIANS REMAIN, THE LONGER IT WILL TAKE FOR LEBANON TO REHABILITATE ITSELF: THE ONUS FOR THAT WILL BE ENTIRELY ON THE HEADS OF THE PLO AND SYRIA.

I MUST SAY TO OUR LEBANESE COLLEAGUES THAT WE PRAISE AND APPRECIATE THE DETERMINATION AND THE STEADFASTNESS SHOWN BY PRESIDENT GEMAYEL IN THE FACE OF THREATS AND PRESSURES. THE FACT THAT THE LEBANESE PARLIAMENT VOTED UNANIMOUSLY IN FAVOR OF THE AGREEMENT, A FACT THAT YOU AMBASSADOR FATTAL JUST MENTIONED NOW, THIS FACT IS AMPLE EVIDENCE THAT THE PEOPLE OF LEBANON ARE IN FAVOR OF DEVELOPING RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL. IT IS OUR HOPE THAT THEY WILL CONTINUE TO STAND FIRM IN THE FACE OF THE THREATS OF THOSE WHO PREFER WAR TO PEACE, VIOLENCE TO STABILITY, WHO WOULD RATHER SEE A LEBANON TORN AND DIVIDED THAN A COUNTRY STRONG AND UNITED.

TO THE PEOPLE OF KIRYAT SHEMONA, TO ALL OF ISRAEL AND TO THE PEOPLE OF LEBANON: I WANT TO END WITH THE WELL-KNOWN BLESSING OF THE PRIESTS OF OLD, A BLESSING APPEARING IN THE BOOK OF NUMBERS AND WHICH WILL BE READ THIS COMING SABBATH IN ALL OUR SYNAGOGUES: "THE LORD LIFT UP HIS COUNTENANCE UPON YOU, AND GIVE YOU PEACE."

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ACTION NEA-07

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Date Printed: 10/22/1996

DOC_NUMBER: 83TELAV06723

CHANNEL: n/a

INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 INR-10 EUR-12 SS-10 CIAE-00
DODE-00 H-01 IO-15 NS
AE-00 SSO-01 L-03 PM-08
PA-02 INRE-00 SAL-01 SSN-02 SP-02 PRS-01 /076 W
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O 171437Z MAY 83

FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO USINFO WASHDC IMMEDIATE

SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3663

WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE

USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3151

AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE

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BEFORE I GIVE THE MICHROPHONE TO AMBASSADOR DRAPER,
I WANT TO ADD THAT I JOIN WITH AMBASSADOR FATTAL
IN HIS GRATITUDE, NOT ONLY TO THOSE WHOM I MENTIONED
IN HALDE--WHICH IS FIRST AND FOREMOST-- THE GREAT
EFFORTS OF AMBASSADOR DRAPER AND HIS TEAM, TO WHOM
WE ARE VERY, VERY GRATEFUL, BUT ALSO TO OUR LEBANESE
COMPANIONS DURING THESE FOUR MONTHS WHO HAVE WORKED
HARD TOGETHER WITH US AND LABORED VERY HARD TO REACH
THIS AGREEMENT. AND ALSO TO OUR FRIENDS OF THE PRESS.
WE HAVE, AS YOU SAID, NOT BEEN ALWAYS VERY KIND TO THEM.
AMBASSADOR FATTAL AND I TOGETHER WITH YOU, WISH TO
JOIN YOU IN GIVING TO THEM OUR GRATITUDE AND THANKS.
THANK YOU.

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END KIMCHE TEXT.

BEGIN DRAPER TEXT:

AMBASSADOR KIMCHE, AMBASSADOR FATTAL, OUR FRIENDS AND
COLLEAGUES AMONG THE MEMBERS OF THE ISRAELI AND
LEBANESE DELEGATIONS, DISTINGUISHED GUESTS, LADIES
AND GENTLEMEN: EARLIER TODAY, AS I WAS TRAVELLING
THROUGH THE STREETS OF BEIRUT TO ATTEND THE SIGNING
CEREMONY AT HALDE, I WAS IMPRESSED ONCE AGAIN BY
THE VISIBLE EVIDENCE OF THE RESILIENCY AND DETERMINATION
OF THE LEBANESE PEOPLE. THEY ARE CLEARING THE AWESOME
DAMAGE WHICH HAD VISITED THEM THROUGH MANY YEARS OF
TURMOIL WHILE THEY SEEK TO REBUILD THEIR SOCIETY,

THEIR ECONOMY, AND THEIR WELL-BEING. AND -- LATER IN THE DAY -- LITERALLY A FEW MINUTES AGO, AS I PASSED THROUGH THE STREETS OF KIRYAT SHEMONA, I RECOGNIZED THE SPECIAL SYMBOLISM OF WHAT I WAS VIEWING HERE. I COULD SEE ON EVERY SIDE AND IN EVERY PLAYGROUND THE SHELTERS IN WHICH THE CHILDREN HERE HAVE SPENT MANY FRIGHTENING NIGHTS OF REFUGE IN FEAR OF ATTACK FROM MISSILES OF DESTRUCTION. BOTH COUNTRIES, ISRAEL AND LEBANON, HAVE SUFFERED MUCH AND WILL NOT FORGET IT. THEIR REPRESENTATIVES AT THIS TABLE -- REFLECTING THE BROAD NATIONAL FEELINGS IN BOTH ISRAEL AND LEBANON -- HAVE SHOWN THEMSELVES DEDICATED TO THE PROPOSITION THAT HAVING LEARNED WELL THE LESSONS OF THE PAST, THERE MUST BE NO REPETITION.

THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON BEING SIGNED TODAY CONSTITUTES THE FOUNDATION STONE ON WHICH BRIGHTER AND MORE SECURE FUTURE IS TO BE BUILT AND PROTECTED.

FOR ISRAEL, CONSTRUCTIVE AND COOPERATIVE UNDERTAKINGS
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HAVE BEEN DEVISED AND AGREED UPON WHICH ARE DESIGNED TO ASSURE THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL FROM THE DARK FORCES THAT HAVE OPERATED FROM LEBANON IN THE PAST. FOR LEBANON, THIS AGREEMENT ENDORSES AND MAKES POSSIBLE ITS OVERRIDING MAJOR OBJECTIVE OF BRINGING ABOUT THE WITHDRAWAL OF EXTERNAL FORCES SO THAT ITS INTEGRITY, ITS INDEPENDENCE, ITS TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY, AND ITS NATIONAL UNITY CAN BE RESTORED TO WHAT THE FATHERS OF THE COUNTRY HAD INTENDED.

WHILE THERE ARE THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN CRITICAL OF WHAT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE MASS OF THE PEOPLES OF ISRAEL AND LEBANON WILL SUPPORT THE UNDERSTANDINGS THEIR REPRESENTATIVES HAVE HAMMERED OUT. THIS CAN BE SEEN IN THE DEBATES WHICH THEIR RESPECTIVE NATIONAL ASSEMBLIES HAVE PRODUCED. THE TWO PEOPLES HAVE ENDED FOR ALL TIME THE STATE OF WAR WHICH ONCE EXISTED. THEY ARE CROSSING THAT THRESHOLD OF A MORE SATISFACTORY AND SENSIBLE RELATIONSHIP BASED ON RESPECT FOR ONE ANOTHER AND RECOGNITION OF THEIR COMMON AIMS. WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT THIS RELATIONSHIP WILL EXPAND AND EVOLVE, AND IN A POSITIVE WAY. WE ARE ALSO CONFIDENT THAT THE OPPOSITION AND OTHER OBSTACLES AHEAD WILL BE OVERCOME, GIVEN THE COURAGE AND GOOD-WILLED DETERMINATION WE HAVE SEEN IN ABUNDANCE, PARTICULARLY IN RECENT DAYS. SO, IN PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S WORDS, "LET US BEGIN." I WANT TO STRESS AT THIS TIME THAT AMERICANS HAVE THE WARMEST AND FRIENDLIEST FEELINGS FOR THE PEOPLES OF ISRAEL AND LEBANON. THEREFORE, OUR PLEASURE IN BEING

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DOC_NUMBER: 83TELAV06723

CHANNEL: n/a

HERE TODAY -- TO WITNESS THE SIGNING OF THIS
AGREEMENT -- IS PARTICULARLY INTENSE. PARTICIPATING
IN THE NEGOTIATIONS HAS REPRESENTED AN OPPORTUNITY TO

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ACTION NEA-07

INFO	OCT-00	COPY-01	ADS-00	INR-10	EUR-12	SS-10	CIAE-00
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-----321605 171504Z /50							

O 171437Z MAY 83
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO USINFO WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3664
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3152
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE

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DEMONSTRATE OUR STRONG AND UNWAVERING SUPPORT FOR THE
LEGITIMATE NATIONAL GOALS OF EACH GOVERNMENT. THE
ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FUTURE WILL BE
TO ASSURE THAT THIS AGREEMENT IS CARRIED OUT EFFICIENTLY
IN THE SPIRIT OF FULL COOPERATION.

AS ATTESTED BY THE RECENT VISIT TO THE AREA BY SECRETARY

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CHANNEL: n/a

OF STATE SHULTZ AS WELL AS THE CONSISTENT VIEW OF
PRESIDENT REAGAN, THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT TAKE
ITS RESPONSIBILITIES LIGHTLY. WE WILL DEVOTE OUR
FULL ENERGIES AND CREATIVITY TO THE GOALS AND TASKS LAID
OUT IN THIS AGREEMENT.

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AND MAY GOD GRANT US ALL SUCCESS IN THIS GREAT
ENTERPRISE.

I SHOULD LIKE TO ADD ON BEHALF OF MY DELEGATION AND MY
GOVERNMENT MY WARMEST PERSONAL THANKS, OUR COLLECTIVE
THANKS AND APPRECIATION, TO AMBASSADOR KIMCHE, AMBASSADOR
FATTAL, TO THE GOOD FRIENDS WE HAVE DEVELOPED AMONG
THE ISRAELI AND LEBANESE DELEGATIONS. WE ARE VERY
PROUD THAT WE SHARED IN THE TASK THE TWO OF YOU --
THE TWO SIDES -- HAVE THOUGHT TO ACHIEVE, AND WE
WON'T FORGET EASILY THE MANY HIGH SPOTS AS WELL AS
THE SLOW SPOTS IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS. THANK YOU VERY
MUCH.

END DRAPER TEXT.

BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
LEE

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Date Printed: 10/22/1996

DOC NUMBER: 83JERUSA01890

CHANNEL: n/a

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PAGE 01 JERUSA 01890 01 OF 03 161806Z
ACTION NEA-07

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INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-10 CIAE-00 DODE-00
H-01 IO-15 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-01 HA-08 L-03
PM-08 PA-02 INRE-00 SAL-01 ACDA-12 SSN-02 USIE-00
SP-02 SNP-01 PRS-01 /085 W

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O 161755Z MAY 83 ZFF4

FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 5507

INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

☒ RELEASE☐ EXCISE☐ DENY☒ DECLASSIFY☐ DECLASSIFY

IN PART

INVT/PS/CR/IR

Date: 11/1/97

TS authority to

☐ CLASSIFY as ☐ S or ☐ C Sec.
☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or ☐ C

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 JERUSALEM 01890

FROM DRAPER

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL, MARR, MOPS, IS, LE

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: U.S. STATEMENTS ON

- MAY 17

9302566

1. FOLLOWING ARE THE TEXTS OF STATEMENTS WHICH I
INTEND TO MAKE AT KHALDEH AND KIRYAT SHEMONA ON MAY 17
IN CONNECTION WITH THE SIGNING CEREMONIES.

2. BEGIN TEXT FOR KHALDEH, LEBANON, MAY 17, 1983:

AMBASSADOR FATTAL; AMBASSADOR KIMCHE; OUR GOOD FRIENDS AND
COMPANIONS, THE MEMBERS OF THE LEBANESE AND ISRAELI
DELEGATIONS; DISTINGUISHED GUESTS; LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:

TODAY, MAY 17, IS AN HISTORIC AND MEMORABLE OCCASION.
THIS DAY MARKS THE SUCCESSFUL CULMINATION OF MONTHS OF
HARD NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF LEBANON AND
ISRAEL. THESE NEGOTIATIONS WERE ENTERED INTO FREELY BUT
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BOTH GOVERNMENTS SHARED A REALISTIC PREMISE.

AS CHURCHILL ONCE SAID, "IF WE OPEN A QUARREL BETWEEN THE
PAST AND PRESENT, WE SHALL FIND THAT WE HAVE LOST THE
FUTURE." THE DELEGATIONS HERE PUT OLD QUARRELS INTO
PERSPECTIVE; THEY LOOKED TO THE FUTURE, AND THEY HAVE NOT
LOST IT.

SUCCESS IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN

POSSIBLE IN THE ABSENCE OF THE GOOD WILL AND VISION EXHIBITED CONSISTENTLY BY THE LEBANESE AND ISRAELIS. THEIR DELEGATES HAVE BEEN PROFESSIONAL, OBSERVANT, AND FAITHFUL TO THE CHARGES OF THEIR GOVERNMENTS, WHICH CONTRIBUTED STRICT GUIDELINES AND A SENSE OF PURPOSE TO THEIR EMISSARIES.

EACH OF THE PARTIES REPRESENTED IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS HAS SOUGHT NATIONAL POLICY OBJECTIVES OF OVERRIDING IMPORTANCE.

THE LEBANESE FOR THEIR PART HAVE TRIED TO MAKE POSSIBLE THROUGH THIS AGREEMENT THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL EXTERNAL FORCES FROM THEIR COUNTRY SO THAT LEBANON'S INDEPENDENCE SOVEREIGNTY, AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, AND ITS NATIONAL UNITY AND NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, COULD ONCE MORE BE RESTORED AND STRENGTHENED.

THE ISRAELIS FOR THEIR PART HAVE SOUGHT PRACTICAL, WORKABLE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH -- WITH LEBANON'S FULL COOPERATION -- WOULD ASSURE THEIR SECURITY FROM THE THREAT OF FUTURE ATTACKS FROM LEBANESE TERRITORY.

IN THE COMPLICATED PROCESS OF MESHING THESE IMPORTANT UNCLASSIFIED

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OBJECTIVES INTO ONE COMMON AND COMPREHENSIVE PACKAGE OF UNDERSTANDINGS, OTHER GOALS WERE ACHIEVED. THE TWO GOVERNMENTS DISCOVERED AND TOOK ADVANTAGE OF THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE MANY PURPOSES AND IDEALS IN COMMON TO INSPIRE THEM, NOT THE LEAST OF WHICH HAS BEEN THE FACT THEY ARE PRACTICING DEMOCRACIES. MOREOVER, THEIR LEADERS HAVE FAITH IN MAN'S CAPACITY TO SHAPE WITH GOD'S HELP A BETTER ENVIRONMENT.

ONE OF THE MOST IMPRESSIVE OUTCOMES OF THESE TALKS HAS BEEN THE SETTING OF THE STAGE FOR AN ENDURING AND FRIENDLY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THESE TWO NEIGHBORING STATES. THIS WILL BE A REALTIONSHIP BASED ON MUTUAL RESPECT AND THE SHARED DETERMINATION THAT THE TURMOIL AND VIOLENCE OF PAST YEARS WILL NEVER AGAIN RETURN TO DOMINATE THE SCENE. BOTH COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN VICTIMIZED. THEIR PEOPLES OVER THE YEARS HAVE MADE ENORMOUS SACRIFICES, AND NOT ONLY IN BLOOD AND PROPERTY. THERE IS NO ONE HERE -- AMONG EITHER THE LEBANESE OR ISRAELI DELEGATIONS -- WHO HAS NOT SOMEHOW BEEN TOUCHED BY PAST TRAGEDIES. THEY DESERVE BETTER.

EQUALLY SIGNIFICANT, THE REPRESENTATIVES OF BOTH GOVERNMENTS HAVE SHOWN COURAGE AND GRACE. THEY HAVE BEEN WILLING TO TAKE RISKS AND TO DEAL WITH UNFAIR CRITICISM,

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Date Printed: 10/22/1996

DOC_NUMBER: 83JERUSA01890

CHANNEL: n/a

FROM NEAR AND AFAR. INSPIRED BY THE STATESMANSHIP WHICH
LEBANON AND ISRAEL HAVE BOTH GIVEN IN FULL MEASURE, ALL
OF US HERE INTEND TO OVERCOME THE SERIOUS OBSTACLES
AHEAD.

IT IS FITTING THAT THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IS
REPRESENTED HERE TODAY TO WITNESS THE SIGNING OF THIS
IMPORTANT AGREEMENT. THE UNITED STATES IS A WARM AND

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PAGE 01 JERUSA 01890 02 OF 03 161810Z
ACTION NEA-07

INFO	OCT-00	COPY-01	ADS-00	INR-10	SS-10	CIAE-00	DODE-00
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	PM-08	PA-02	INRE-00	SAL-01	ACDA-12	SSN-02	USIE-00
	SP-02	SNP-01	PRS-01	/085 W			

-----263162 161829Z /42

O 161755Z MAY 83 ZFF4
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 5508
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 03 JERUSALEM 01890

FROM DRAPER

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, MARR, MOPS, IS, LE
SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: U.S. STATEMENTS ON
RELIABLE FRIEND TO BOTH COUNTRIES. IT IS NOT ONLY A
WITNESS TO THIS ACCORD, IT WILL REMAIN A FIRM SUPPORTER
OF THE UNDERSTANDINGS WHICH HAVE BEEN REACHED AND A
FAITHFUL DEFENDER OF THE LEGITIMATE GOALS OF EACH
GOVERNMENT. I PERSONALLY, ALONG WITH ALL MEMBERS OF THE
AMERICAN DELEGATION AND, OF COURSE, SECRETARY SHULTZ AND

Date Printed: 10/22/1996

DOC_NUMBER: 83JERUSA01890

CHANNEL: n/a

PRESIDENT REAGAN, THUS TAKE IMMENSE SATISFACTION IN
TODAY'S EVENTS.

IN THE WORDS OF DAG HAMMARSKJOLD, WE NOW JOIN WITH OUR
GOOD FRIENDS, THE PEOPLES OF LEBANON AND ISRAEL, "...
IN LOOKING TO THE FAR HORIZON."

END OF TEXT.

3. BEGIN TEXT FOR KIRYAT SHEMONA, ISSAEL, MAY 17, 1983:
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AMBASSADOR KIMCHE; AMBASSADOR FATTAL; OUR FRIENDS AND
COLLEAGUES, THE MEMBERS OF THE ISRAELI AND LEBANESE
DELEGATIONS; DISTINGUISHED GUESTS; LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:
EARLIER TODAY, AS I WAS TRAVELLING THROUGH THE STREETS OF
BEIRUT TO ATTEND THE SIGNING CEREMONY AT KAHLDEH, I WAS
IMPRESSED ONCE AGAIN BY THE VISIBLE EVIDENCE OF THE
RESILIENCY AND DETERMINATION OF THE LEBANESE PEOPLE. THEY
ARE CLEARING THE AWESOME DAMAGE WHICH HAD VISITED THEM
THROUGH MANY YEARS OF TURMOIL WHILE THEY SEEK TO REBUILD
THEIR SOCIETY, THEIR ECONOMY, AND THEIR WELL-BEING.

AND -- LATER IN THE DAY -- AS I PASSED THROUGH THE
STREETS OF KIRYAT SHEMONA, I RECOGNIZED THE SPECIAL
SYMBOLISM OF WHAT I WAS VIEWING HERE. I COULD SEE ON
EVERY SIDE AND IN EVERY PLAYGROUND THE SHELTERS IN WHICH
THE CHILDREN HERE HAVE SPENT MANY FRIGHTENING NIGHTS OF
REFUGE. IN FEAR OF ATTACK FROM MISSILES OF DESTRUCTION.

BOTH COUNTRIES HAVE SUFFERED MUCH AND WILL NOT FORGET IT.
THEIR REPRESENTATIVES AT THIS TABLE -- REFLECTING THE
BROAD NATIONAL FEELINGS IN BOTH ISRAEL AND LEBANON --
HAVE SHOWN THEMSELVES DEDICATED TO THE PROPOSITION THAT,
HAVING LEARNED WELL THE LESSONS OF THE PAST, THERE MUST
BE NO REPETITION.

THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON BEING SIGNED
TODAY CONSTITUTES THE FOUNDATION STONE ON WHICH A
BRIGHTER AND MORE SECURE FUTURE IS TO BE BUILT AND
PROTECTED.

FOR ISRAEL, CONSTRUCTIVE AND COOPERATIVE UNDERTAKINGS
HAVE BEEN DEVISED AND AGREED UPON WHICH ARE DESIGNED TO
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CHANNEL: n/a

ASSURE THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL FROM THE DARK FORCES THAT HAVE OPERATED FROM LEBANON IN THE PAST. FOR LEBANON, THIS AGREEMENT ENDORSES AND MAKES POSSIBLE ITS OVERRIDING MAJOR OBJECTIVE OF BRINGING ABOUT THE WITHDRAWAL OF EXTERNAL FORCES SO THAT ITS INTEGRITY, ITS INDEPENDENCE, ITS TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY, AND ITS NATIONAL UNITY CAN BE RESTORED TO WHAT THE FATHERS OF THE COUNTRY HAD INTENDED.

WHILE THERE ARE THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN CRITICAL OF WHAT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE MASS OF THE PEOPLES OF ISRAEL AND LEBANON WILL SUPPORT THE UNDERSTANDINGS THEIR REPRESENTATIVES HAVE HAMMERED OUT. THIS CAN BE SEEN IN THE DEBATES WHICH THEIR RESPECTIVE NATIONAL ASSEMBLIES HAVE PRODUCED. THE TWO PEOPLES HAVE ENDED FOR ALL TIME THE STATE OF WAR WHICH ONCE EXISTED. THEY ARE CROSSING THE THRESHOLD OF A MORE SATISFACTORY AND SENSIBLE RELATIONSHIP BASED ON RESPECT FOR ONE ANOTHER AND RECOGNITION OF THEIR COMMON AIMS. WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT THIS RELATIONSHIP WILL EXPAND AND EVOLVE, AND IN A POSITIVE WAY. WE ARE ALSO CONFIDENT THAT THE OPPOSITION AND OTHER OBSTACLES AHEAD WILL BE OVERCOME, GIVEN THE COURAGE AND GOOD-WILLED DETERMINATION WE HAVE SEEN IN ABUNDANCE, PARTICULARLY IN RECENT DAYS. SO, "LET US BEGIN," IN PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S WORDS.

AMERICANS HAVE THE WARMEST AND FRIENDLIEST FEELINGS FOR THE PEOPLES OF ISRAEL AND LEBANON. THEREFORE, OUR PLEASURE IN BEING HERE TODAY -- TO WITNESS THE SIGNING OF THIS AGREEMENT -- IS PARTICULARLY INTENSE. PARTICIPATING IN THE NEGOTIATIONS HAS REPRESENTED AN OPPORTUNITY TO DEMONSTRATE OUR STRONG AND UNWAVERING SUPPORT FOR THE LEGITIMATE NATIONAL GOALS OF EACH GOVERNMENT. THE ROLE

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INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 03 JERUSALEM 01890

FROM DRAPER

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E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL, MARR, MOPS, IS, LE

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: U.S. STATEMENTS ON

OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FUTURE WILL BE TO ASSURE THAT
THIS AGREEMENT IS CARRIED OUT EFFICIENTLY IN THE SPIRIT
OF FULL COOPERATION.

AS ATTESTED BY THE RECENT VISIT TO THE AREA BY SECRETARY
OF STATE SHULTZ AND THE CONSISTENT VIEW OF PRESIDENT
REAGAN, THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT TAKE ITS RESPONSIBILI-
TIES LIGHTLY. WE WILL DEVOTE OUR FULL ENERGIES AND
CREATIVITY TO THE GOALS AND TASKS LAID OUT IN THIS
AGREEMENT.

MAY GOD GRANT US ALL SUCCESS IN THIS GREAT ENTERPRISE.
END OF TEXT.

4. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

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TEL AVIV 06574

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FROM DRAPER; ROME PASS TO AMBASSADOR HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MILI, MOPS, SY, IS, US, LE, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: MAY 15 SESSION
IN NETANYA

1. [REDACTED]

2. ALTHOUGH WE WORKED STEADILY ALL DAY, THE FINAL
PROOFREADING OF SOME TEXTS AND THE FINAL ASSEMBLY
OF THE DOCUMENTS WILL HAVE TO TAKE PLACE IN ANOTHER
MEETING SCHEDULED NOW FOR 5:00 P.M. LOCAL, MONDAY,
MAY 16, AT KHALDAH. SOME MEMBERS OF THE
U.S. DELEGATION WILL PROCEED TO BEIRUT VIA SPAR

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AIRCRAFT FOR THIS PURPOSE ON MONDAY. (DETAILS BY
SEPTEL.)3. ASSUMING THAT THERE ARE NO PROBLEMS IN THE DEBATES
IN THE ISRAELI KNESSET AND LEBANESE PARLIAMENT ON
MONDAY, THE DELEGATIONS WILL CONVENE AT KHALDAH
ON TUESDAY, MAY 17 AT 0900 LOCAL FOR THE SIGNING
CEREMONY IN LEBANON; THE DELEGATIONS WILL THEREAFTER
PROCEED BY HELICOPTER TO KIRYAT SHEMONA FOR THE

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SECOND ROUND OF SIGNING, SCHEDULED FOR APPROXIMATELY 1130 THE SAME DAY.

4. AT THE END OF TODAY'S SESSION, KIMCHE MADE TWO POINTS FOR THE RECORD:

--A. HE SAID THAT ISRAEL HAD HOPED THAT THE ISRAELI SIDE LETTER TO THE U.S. DESCRIBING ISRAEL'S CONDITIONS FOR WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE MADE AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE AGREEMENT. ISRAEL HOWEVER HAD TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT LEBANON'S WISHES THAT THE ISRAELI SIDE LETTER AND THE CORRESPONDING LEBANESE SIDE LETTER NOT BE MADE A PART OF THE AGREEMENT. KIMCHE THEN WENT ON TO SAY THAT ISRAEL WANTED TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE CONTENT OF THE ISRAELI SIDE LETTER DESCRIBING THE CONDITIONS THAT MUST BE MET FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL IS CONSIDERED BY ISRAEL AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF WHAT ISRAEL HAS BEEN DOING IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. ISRAEL DOES NOT WANT TO BE ACUSED OF VIOLATING THE AGREEMENT IF IT DOES NOT CARRY OUT ITS OBLIGATIONS TO WITHDRAW BY REASON OF A FAILURE BY THE SYRIANS AND THE PLO TO MEET THE CONDITIONS SPECIFIED.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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--B. TURNING TO THE AGREED MINUTE ON PROPERTY CLAIMS AND THE "CLARIFICATION" READ INTO THE RECORD BY THE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE, KIMCHE SPECIFIED THE ISRAELI POSITION WAS THAT THE EFFECTIVE DATE GOVERNING THE DEFINITION OF ELIGIBLE LEBANESE CITIZENS SHOULD BE NOVEMBER 29, 1947, RATHER THAN ANY DATE IN MAY, 1948. THE NOVEMBER DATE, HE SAID, REFERS TO THE TIME WHEN HOSTILITIES IN THE AREA BROKE OUT.

5. AS REGARDS THESE TWO POINTS, FATTAL INDICATED THAT HE HAD TAKEN NOTE OF THE ISRAELI POSITIONS. DRAPER SAID TO KIMCHE THAT--AS REGARDS THE FIRST POINT ON PRE-CONDITIONS FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL--HE COULD ONLY REPEAT WHAT WE PLANNED TO SAY IN THE MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT, NAMELY, THAT WE "ACKNOWLEDGED" THAT THAT WAS THE ISRAELI POSITION. LEWIS

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ROME FOR HABIB FROM DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MILI, MOPS, IS, LE, SY, US, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: EXPLAINING THE
LEBANON-ISRAEL AGREEMENT

REF: STATE 134586

1. [REDACTED]

2. THE ARGUMENTS AND COUNTER-ARGUMENTS ABOUT THE AGREEMENT EXPLAINED IN REFTEL ARE ON THE WHOLE SATISFACTORY, SUBJECT ONLY TO A FEW ADDED COMMENTS BELOW. THERE ARE, HOWEVER, SOME ADDED POINTS IN THE AGREEMENT WHICH IT MAY BE USEFUL TO MENTION AS WELL, PARTICULARLY IN DEFENDING THE LEBANESE POSITION:

--A. THE PARTIES ARE PREVENTED FROM USING THE

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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TERRITORY OF THE OTHER FOR MILITARY ATTACKS AGAINST A THIRD STATE. (THE LEBANESE HAVE BEEN USING THIS ARGUMENT AS BEING HELPFUL TO SYRIA IN PARTICULAR.)

--B. THE JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS ARE SUBJECT TO TERMINATION WITH NINETY DAYS NOTICE AFTER A PERIOD OF TWO YEARS OF OPERATION, ALTHOUGH THEY WOULD BE REPLACED BY AN ALTERNATIVE VERIFICATION MECHANISM.

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--C. THE TEAMS WILL BE GOVERNED BY THE RULE OF REASON AND PRAGMATIC CONSIDERATIONS. THEIR VERIFICATION MISSIONS ARE TO BE CARRIED OUT IN A WAY WHICH AVOIDS UNDUE INTERRUPTIONS TO NORMAL CIVILIAN LIFE. ALL MILITARY, POLICE AND OTHER OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES ARE EXCLUSIVELY IN THE HANDS OF THE LEBANESE. THESE TEAMS ARE STRICTLY FOR VERIFICATION PURPOSES.

--D. THERE IS AN ELEMENT OF RECIPROCITY IN THAT TEAMS ARE ALSO TO PERFORM IN ISRAELI TERRITORY.

--E. UNLIKE PREVIOUS ISRAELI AGREEMENTS WITH ARAB STATES, THERE IS A DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISM WHICH IS BINDING ON THE PARTIES.

--F. THE PARTIES HAVE AGREED TO BEGIN TO ADDRESS PROPERTY CLAIMS.

--G. THE ISRAELI-LEBANESE INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY IS DECLARED INVIOABLE.

--H. THERE IS A BROAD COMMITMENT TO REFRAIN FROM

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INTERVENING IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF EITHER PARTY.

3. IT IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT THAT U.S. REPRESENTATIVES HANDLE THE QUESTION OF WHETHER LEBANESE RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL HAS TAKEN PLACE WITH THE GREATEST CARE. THE BASIC GUIDANCE SHOULD BE AS FOLLOWS:

--AS REGARDS RECOGNITION, THE AGREEMENT SPEAKS FOR ITSELF. THE AGREEMENT, HOWEVER, IS FULLY CONSISTENT WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 AND WITH THE FEZ COMMUNIQUE.

4. TURNING TO THE SPECIFIC CONCERNS AND REPLIES LISTED IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF REFTTEL:

--3A. CONCERN: THE AGREEMENT IS A PEACE TREATY IN EVERYTHING BUT NAME. COMMENT: STRICTLY SPEAKING, THE FIRST TICK IS MISLEADING. THIS TICK SHOULD PREFERABLY BE ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES: "PRIOR TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF NEGOTIATIONS, LEBANON MADE CLEAR IT COULD NOT NEGOTIATE A PEACE TREATY. THIS WAS ALSO THE VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES. ISRAEL ACCORDINGLY DID NOT INSIST ON CONCLUDING

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A PEACE TREATY IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS." THE REST
OF THE TICKS ARE GOOD. END COMMENT.

--3B. CONCERN: THE SECURITY ZONE. COMMENT: THE
THIRD TICK COULD BE MISLEADING. IF THE TWO BRIGADES
ARE BROUGHT UP TO FULL 100 PERCENT STRENGTH, THERE

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EXDIS

COULD BE AS MANY AS 8400 MEN STATIONED IN THE
SECURITY ZONE FROM THESE TWO BRIGADES EXCLUSIVELY;
AND THE AGREEMENT DOES NOT FORECLOSE BRINGING IN
ADDITIONAL UNITS OR USING THE SECURITY ZONE FOR
TRAINING PURPOSES, INCLUDING THE TRAINING OF NEW
CONSCRIPTS. END COMMENT.

--3C. CONCERN: JOINT PATROLS AND ISRAELI RESIDUAL
PRESENCE. COMMENT: THE TICKS ARE BASICALLY
SATISFACTORY, BUT WE SHOULD STRESS THE NEED FOR U.S.

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REPRESENTATIVES TO USE THE TERM "TEAMS" IN ALL INSTANCES. WE MIGHT ALSO NOTE THAT THE 1949 ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS PROVIDED FOR THE EMPLOYMENT BY THE MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSIONS OF MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PARTIES ON VERIFICATION TEAMS. (THE LEBANESE FIND THIS POINT USEFUL.) IN THE FOURTH TICK "INVESTIGATING INCIDENTS" COULD BE MISLEADING. PROBABLY BEST TO DELETE.

--3D. CONCERN: DEFACTO EMBASSIES. COMMENT: THE EXPLANA-

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TORY TICKS ARE SATISFACTORY, BUT IT WOULD BE SAFER TO CHANGE THE LAST TICK SO AS TO SAY, "THE LEBANESE HAVE INDICATED THEY HAVE NO PRESENT INTENTION OF HAVING A LIAISON OFFICE IN ISRAEL." WE MIGHT ALSO NOTE THAT PREVIOUS MECHANISMS (E.G. 1949 MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSIONS) PROVIDED FOR ONGOING DIRECT CONTACTS BETWEEN REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PARTIES. END COMMENT.

--3E. CONCERN: NORMALIZATION. COMMENT: DROP THE LAST TICK, AND MAKE THE THIRD TICK THE FOURTH TICK, INSERT AS A NEW THIRD TICK "--THE AGREEMENT PROVIDES THAT IT WILL BE UP TO THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE TO REGULATE ANY AD HOC ARRANGEMENTS IN THE INTERIM PERIOD. THIS CERTAINLY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE NORMAL BILATERAL RELATIONS." END COMMENT.

--3F. CONCERN: LIMITS ON LEBANESE AIRCRAFT AND WEAPONRY. COMMENT: THE FIRST SENTENCE OF THE FIRST TICK IS SATISFACTORY. THE SECOND SENTENCE SHOULD BE RESTRUCTURED AS FOLLOWS: "THERE ARE NO RESTRICTIONS ON LEBANESE AIRCRAFT FLYING OVER THE ZONE AND THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS ISRAELI APPROVAL OF FLIGHTS; HOWEVER, TO AVOID ACCIDENTS AND MISUNDERSTANDINGS, THERE WILL BE AN ADVANCE NOTIFICATION PROCEDURE WHICH WILL BE ESTABLISHED BY THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS COMMITTEE UNDER WHICH APPROPRIATE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES WILL BE NOTIFIED IN ADVANCE OF AIRCRAFT MOVEMENTS IN THIS AREA. END COMMENT.

--3G. CONCERN: HADDAD'S FORCES. COMMENT: EXPLANATORY TICKS SHOULD BE CHANGED SLIGHTLY AS FOLLOWS:
"--THE AGREEMENT PROVIDES FOR THE INTEGRATION OF

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ELIGIBLE MEN FROM AMONG HADDAD'S FORCES. THIS INTEGRATION WILL BE CARRIED OUT ACCORDING TO LEBANESE ARMY REGULATIONS AND LEBANESE LAW. UNITS INTO WHICH THE MEN ARE INTEGRATED WILL BE FULLY UNDER LEBANESE GOVERNMENT COMMAND AND CONTROL."

"--MANY OF THE MEN IN HADDAD'S FORCES ARE FORMER MEMBERS OF THE LAF, AND WOULD BE ELIGIBLE FOR REINTEGRATION IN ANY EVENT."

"--UP UNTIL NOW, HADDAD AND HIS FORCES HAVE NOT RECOGNIZED LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY; IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT WILL BRING THIS UNACCEPTABLE CIRCUMSTANCE TO AN END."

"--THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT IS MAKING ITS OWN ARRANGEMENTS AS REGARDS HADDAD HIMSELF. WE ARE PRESUMING AT THIS STAGE THAT HE WILL BE REINTEGRATED INTO THE LEBANESE ARMY AND WILL COME UNDER THE FULL AUTHORITY OF THE APPROPRIATE LEBANESE COMMANDER IN WHATEVER OPERATIONALLY LIMITED ROLE IS ASSIGNED TO HIM."
END COMMENT.

--
--3H. CONCERN: MULTINATIONAL FORCES. COMMENT: THE EXPLANATORY TICKS ARE SATISFACTORY EXCEPT WE WOULD REVISE THE SECOND TICK TO STATE THAT "THE AGREEMENT DOES NOT AFFECT THE RIGHT OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT TO REQUEST . . ." END COMMENT.

--3I. CONCERN: UNIFIL. COMMENT: THE EXPLANATORY TICKS ARE SATISFACTORY WITH TWO EXCEPTIONS. THE FIRST SENTENCE OF THE SECOND TICK MIGHT BE CLEARER. "THE AGREEMENT DEALS WITH UNIFIL ONLY BY WAY OF


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EXDIS

CREATING AN EXCEPTION TO THE FORCE LIMITATIONS IN
THE SECURITY REGION TO ALLOW UNIFIL ACTIVITIES
THERE." THE FOURTH TICK SHOULD MAKE
CLEAR THAT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT DOES INDEED HAVE
IN MIND A NEW UNIFIL MANDATE TO PERMIT REDEPLOYMENT
OF UNIFIL INTO OTHER AREAS OF LEBANON. END COMMENT.

--3J. CONCERN: THE SPECIAL ISRAELI-LEBANESE
RELATIONSHIP. COMMENT: THE TICKS ARE SATISFACTORY
BUT WE MIGHT EXPAND TO POINT OUT THAT IT DOES NOT
REQUIRE ANY CHANGES IN LEBANON'S ARAB LEAGUE
COMMITMENTS OR ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ARAB WORLD,
OTHER THAN REFLECTING LEBANON'S OWN DECISION TO
RESCIND THE EXTRA TERRITORIAL STATUS OF THE PLO IN ITS
TERRITORY.

--3K. CONCERN: LIMITS ON ARMAMENTS. COMMENT:
A SENTENCE SHOULD BE ADDED TO THE FIRST TICK SAYING
THAT, "IN SHORT, THERE ARE NO SIGNIFICANT LIMITATIONS."
AS FOR LIMITATIONS OUTSIDE THE SECURITY ZONE, WE

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SHOULD--I
F ASKED--ANSWER THE QUESTION. SUGGEST THE
FOLLOWING TICK:

"--THERE ARE NO SIGNIFICANT PROHIBITIONS OR
LIMITATIONS ON WEAPONRY OUTSIDE THE SECURITY REGION,
OTHER THAN FOR HIGH ALTITUDE ANTI-AIRCRAFT
MISSILES AND THIS PROVISION IS SUBJECT TO REVIEW
AFTER THREE YEARS." END COMMENT.

--3L. CONCERN: LEBANESE COMMITMENTS TO THE ARAB
LEAGUE AND ARAB SUMMIT DECISIONS. COMMENT: THE FIRST
TICK IS SATISFACTORY. A SECOND TICK SHOULD BE ADDED
TO THE EFFECT "IN OUR OPINION, THE AGREEMENT REACHED

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WAS CONSISTENT NOT ONLY WITH SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 242, BUT ALSO WITH THE FEZ COMMUNIQUE."
THEN THE FINAL TICK SHOULD BE REPLACED BY THE
FOLLOWING:

"--AS NOTED ABOVE, THE AGREEMENT DOES NOT REQUIRE ANY
CHANGE IN LEBANON'S ARAB LEAGUE COMMITMENTS."
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EX-103 JERUSALEM FOR DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, LE, IS, US, XF

SUBJECT: EXPLAINING THE LEBANON-ISRAEL AGREEMENT

1. [REDACTED]

2. AS WE ENGAGE IN EXPLAINING THE LEBANON-ISRAEL AGREEMENT TO INTERESTED GOVERNMENTS AND GROUPS, WE WILL UTILIZE AMBASSADORS ABROAD AND OFFICIALS HERE WHO ARE NOT DEEPLY FAMILIAR WITH THE NEGOTIATING HISTORY AND NUANCES OF THE AGREEMENT. THE ARGUMENTS BELOW AND OUR COUNTERS WERE DRAWN FROM CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY THE ARABS AND QUERIES WE HAVE HAD FROM OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES, SUCH

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AS UNIFIL CONTRIBUTOR GOVERNMENTS. WE EXPECT TO USE THEM

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[REDACTED]

AS BASIC BACKGROUND MATERIAL TO BE DRAWN FROM IN EXPLAINING THE AGREEMENT TO THE ARABS, EUROPEANS, MEDIA AND OTHERS. WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENTS/SUGGESTIONS ASAP. WE ARE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED THAT NONE OF OUR COUNTERS CUT ACROSS THE ARGUMENTS OR STRATEGY THE LEBANESE WILL BE USING WITH THESE GOVERNMENTS.

3 A. CONCERN: THIS AGREEMENT IS A PEACE TREATY IN EVERYTHING BUT NAME.

REPLY:

-- FROM THE BEGINNING, AND TO THE END, LEBANON SUCCESSFULLY RESISTED ISRAELI INSISTENCE ON A PEACE TREATY.

-- THE AGREEMENT DOES END THE FORMAL STATE OF WAR BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES BUT FALLS WELL SHORT OF A PEACE TREATY WHICH WOULD ESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, ETC.

-- THIS DOES NOT NECESSARILY IMPLY THAT LEBANON WILL NOT FIND IT ADVANTAGEOUS TO SIGN A TREATY AT SOME LATER DATE.

-- AFTER ALL, PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ITS ARAB NEIGHBORS IS THE GOAL WE ALL SEEK.

B. CONCERN: THE SECURITY ZONE IS A COVER TO GIVE ISRAEL FREEDOM OF ACTION IN THE SOUTH.

REPLY:

-- THE AGREEMENT PROVIDES FOR A SECURITY ZONE IN SOUTHERN [REDACTED]

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LEBANON WHICH IS COMPLETELY A LEBANESE RESPONSIBILITY, UNDER THE CONTROL OF LEBANESE ARMED FORCES AND POLICE.

-- LEBANON HAS AN EVEN GREATER INTEREST THAN ISRAEL IN SECURING SOUTHERN LEBANON, BECAUSE OF THE NUMBER OF LEBANESE CASUALTIES THERE AND THE FACT THAT THE AREA HAD BEEN OUTSIDE GOVERNMENTAL CONTROL FOR SO LONG. LEBANON WANTED TO IMPLEMENT THESE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN ANY CASE.

-- THE AGREEMENT PROVIDES FOR LEBANON TO AUGMENT ITS [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

FORCES IN THE SOUTH, DOUBLING THE FORCES FROM LEVELS SPECIFIED IN THE 1949 ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. THE NEW LEVEL IS A FIVE-FOLD INCREASE IN LEBANESE ARMY TROOPS STATIONED IN THE SOUTH SINCE THE LEBANESE CIVIL WAR.

-- THERE IS NO LIMIT ON THE NUMBER OF POLICE AND INTERNAL SECURITY PERSONNEL TO BE STATIONED IN THE SECURITY ZONE.

C. CONCERN: THE PROVISION FOR JOINT PATROLS MEANS THAT ISRAEL HAS A RESIDUAL PRESENCE.

REPLY:

-- LEBANON DID NOT AGREE TO JOINT PATROLS IN THE SECURITY ZONE, OR TO MONITORING STATIONS OR TO ANY FORM OF PERMANENT, RESIDUAL ISRAELI MILITARY PRESENCE IN ITS TERRITORY.

-- THE AGREEMENT PROVIDES ONLY FOR A SMALL NUMBER OF VERIFICATION TEAMS (UP TO EIGHT AT ONE TIME) MADE UP OF AN EQUAL NUMBER OF ISRAELIS AND LEBANESE, EACH TEAM OPERATING UNDER A LEBANESE COMMANDER.

[REDACTED]

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-- NO ISRAELIS WILL REMAIN IN LEBANON ON A PERMANENT BASIS. THE AGREEMENT CALLS FOR COMPLETE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANESE TERRITORY.

-- THESE TEAMS HAVE NO OPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES AND ARE CHARGED ONLY WITH VERIFYING THAT THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT ARE BEING PROPERLY CARRIED OUT AND WITH INVESTIGATING INCIDENTS.

-- MANY ARAB-ISRAELI AGREEMENTS, INCLUDING THE GOLAN DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT OF 1974 AND THE ARMISTICE ACCORDS OF 1949, ESTABLISH SUPERVISORY MECHANISMS TO VERIFY SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND THESE MECHANISMS HAVE NEVER BEEN CONSIDERED TO COMPROMISE THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE NATIONS INVOLVED.

D. CONCERN: THE AGREEMENT PERMITS DE FACTO EMBASSIES IN

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LEBANON AND ISRAEL.

REPLY:

-- THE AGREEMENT PROVIDES ONLY THAT EACH PARTY MAY RPT MAY, IF IT CHOOSES, ESTABLISH A LIAISON OFFICE ON THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER. THESE OFFICES OPERATE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE OF WHICH THE U.S. IS A PARTICIPANT.

-- THE PURPOSE OF THE LIAISON OFFICE IS TO ASSIST IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT, AGAIN WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE.

-- THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE IS THE BASIC SUPERVISORY MECHANISM FOR ENSURING THAT THE AGREEMENT IS

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IMPLEMENTED. THIS COMMITTEE WILL DEAL WITH ALL AREAS, INCLUDING SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IF REFERRED TO IT BY THE SUB-ORGAN. SINCE THE COMMITTEE WILL BE MEETING FREQUENTLY, AND OCCASIONALLY AT SHORT NOTICE, IT IS ONLY REASONABLE THAT THE PARTIES HAVE LIAISON OFFICES TO SUPPLY REPRESENTATIVES TO COMMITTEE MEETINGS AND PROVIDE NECESSARY STAFF WORK.

-- THE LIAISON OFFICES WILL NOT FUNCTION AS EMBASSIES OR PERFORM DIPLOMATIC OR CONSULAR FUNCTIONS.

-- THEY WILL BE OF LIMITED SIZE.

-- THE LEBANESE HAVE INDICATED THEY HAVE NO INTENTION OF HAVING AN OFFICE IN ISRAEL.

E. CONCERN: THE AGREEMENT PROVIDES FOR NORMALIZATION BY VIRTUE OF THE FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PERSONS ACROSS THE BORDER.

REPLY:

-- UNDER THE CURRENT SITUATION THERE IS NO LEBANESE CONTROL OR REGULATION OF THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PERSONS ACROSS THE LEBANON-ISRAEL BORDER.

-- IT IS IN LEBANON'S INTERESTS TO BRING SUCH MOVEMENTS

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[REDACTED]

UNDER CONTROL BOTH IN ORDER TO PROTECT ITS ECONOMY AND FOR SECURITY PURPOSES.

-- THE AGREEMENT PROVIDES THAT SPECIFIC AGREEMENTS ON THE MOVEMENTS OF GOODS AND PERSONS WILL NOT BE NEGOTIATED UNTIL ISRAEL HAS WITHDRAWN.

-- TEMPORARY, AD HOC ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE ESTABLISHED DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD.

[REDACTED]

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F. CONCERN: BY PUTTING LIMITS ON LEBANESE AIRCRAFT OVER AND WEAPONS IN THE SECURITY ZONE, LEBANON HAS LOST ITS SOVEREIGN AUTHORITY.

REPLY:

-- BECAUSE OF THE CARE AND SPECIFICITY WITH WHICH ARRANGEMENTS IN THE SECURITY ZONE WERE DRAWN UP, IT IS IMPORTANT TO AVOID ANY POSSIBILITY OF MISUNDERSTANDING OR ACCIDENT IN THIS AREA. THERE ARE NO RESTRICTIONS ON LEBANESE AIRCRAFT FLYING OVER THE ZONE, BUT TO AVOID ANY MISUNDERSTANDINGS, LEBANON WILL NOTIFY ISRAEL AHEAD OF TIME OF ITS INTENTION TO FLY AIRCRAFT OVER THIS AREA.

G. CONCERN: HADDAD AND HIS FORCES WILL BE RETAINED INTACT IN THE ZONE AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO ISRAEL'S BIDDING.

REPLY:

-- THE AGREEMENT PROVIDES FOR THE FULL INTEGRATION OF HADDAD'S FORCES, ACCORDING TO LAF REGULATIONS, FULLY UNDER LEBANESE COMMAND AND CONTROL.

-- UP UNTIL NOW, HADDAD AND HIS FORCES HAVE NOT RECOGNIZED LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY; THE AGREEMENT BRINGS THIS UNACCEPTABLE CIRCUMSTANCE TO AN END.

-- HADDAD HIMSELF WILL HAVE AN OPERATIONALLY LIMITED ROLE IN THE SOUTH AND WILL COME UNDER THE FULL AUTHORITY OF THE LEBANESE COMMANDER.

[REDACTED]

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THE SIDON AND TYRE AREAS.

-- THE AGREEMENT DOES NOT PRECLUDE REDEPLOYMENT OF UNIFIL UNITS INTO OTHER AREAS OF LEBANON, AND THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT MAY INDEED HAVE THIS IN MIND.

-- THIS CLEARLY REQUIRES A NEW UNIFIL MANDATE, BOTH TO SPECIFY A NEW GEOGRAPHIC AREA FOR UNIFIL AND TO CHANGE ITS OPERATIONAL MANDATE.

-- THE PLO IS EXTREMELY ANXIOUS TO HAVE CREDIBLE ASSURANCES THAT PALESTINIAN CIVILIANS WILL BE SAFE AFTER THE PLO WITHDRAWS FROM THE BEKAA.

-- IN PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE LEBANESE AND THE PLO, IT BECAME APPARENT THAT SOME FORM OF INTERNATIONAL ASSURANCES ON THIS QUESTION WOULD BE USEFUL TO BACK UP LEBANESE ASSURANCES.

-- WE ANTICIPATE THAT ANY LEBANON-PLO AGREEMENT WILL BE MORE EASILY CONCLUDED IF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY--THROUGH UNIFIL--HAS A ROLE IN ENSURING PALESTINIAN SAFETY.

-- THE AGREEMENT SPECIFICALLY PROVIDES THAT THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES AND POLICE WILL HAVE SOLE RESPONSIBILITY FOR POLICE AND SECURITY FUNCTIONS, THUS RELIEVING UNIFIL OF THIS ROLE.

-- UNIFIL, AT LEAST IN THE SOUTH, WOULD "SURVEIL AND OBSERVE" IN THE CAMP AREAS, AS REQUESTED BY THE

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LEBANESE. UNIFIL THUS BECOMES THE PROTECTOR OF THE PALESTINIANS IN A MORAL RATHER THAN A PHYSICAL SENSE, BUT THE PRESENCE OF OUTSIDE EYES AND EARS WILL BE AN IMPORTANT REASSURANCE TO THE PALESTINIANS.

J. CONCERN: THIS AGREEMENT CALLS FOR LEBANON--AN ARAB NATION AND MEMBER OF THE ARAB LEAGUE--TO ENTER INTO A RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL OBTAINED ONLY UNDER THE THREAT OF ISRAELI GAINS.

REPLY:

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-- LEBANON BARGAINED LONG AND HARD PRECISELY TO ENSURE THAT THE AGREEMENT ARRIVED AT WAS ONE WITH WHICH IT COULD BE COMFORTABLE AND ITS DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONSENSUS COULD ACCEPT.

-- THE ISRAELIS INITIALLY INSISTED ON FAR MORE THAN THEY GOT. THE AGREEMENT IS FULLY CONSISTENT WITH LEBANON'S INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY.

K. CONCERN: THE AGREEMENT LIMITS WHAT TYPES OF ARMAMENTS THE LAF MAY HAVE BOTH IN THE SOUTH AND ELSEWHERE IN THE COUNTRY.

REPLY:

-- THE AGREEMENT LISTS THE EQUIPMENT WHICH IS NORMAL AND ORGANIC TO EACH STANDARD LEBANESE ARMED FORCES BRIGADE. BRIGADES STATIONED IN THE SOUTH WILL HAVE ALL SUCH EQUIPMENT AND ARMAMENT.

-- THE LEBANON AGREEMENT ENSURES THAT, FOR THE FIRST TIME IN MANY YEARS, LEBANON HAS SOLE AND FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR SECURITY IN THE SOUTH. THE AGREEMENT ASSURES THAT THERE WILL NO LONGER BE OUTSIDE

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INTERFERENCE--FROM ISRAEL OR OTHERS--ON LEBANESE CONTROL OF ITS OWN TERRITORY.

L. CONCERN: THE AGREEMENT WOULD MAKE LEBANON COMMITMENTS TO THE ARAB LEAGUE AND TO ARAB SUMMIT DECISIONS INVALID.

REPLY:

-- A MAJOR GOAL OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WAS TO ENSURE THAT THE FINAL AGREEMENT WOULD NOT HARM LEBANON'S RELATIONS WITH THE OTHER ARABS OR JEOPARDIZE ITS POSITION IN THE ARAB LEAGUE. THIS GOAL WAS FULLY REALIZED IN THE FINAL AGREEMENT.

-- NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PEOPLE WILL NOT BEGIN UNTIL AFTER ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. EAGLEBURGER

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FROM DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MILI, MOPS, IS, LE, US, SY, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: TEST OF ISRAEL-LEBANON
AGREEMENTFOIA Exemptions _____ TS authority to
PA Exemptions _____ () CLASSIFY as () S or () C Sec.
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1 [REDACTED]

2. FOLLOWING IS ENTIRE TEXT OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN
LEBANON AND ISRAEL AS FINALIZED ON MAY 13. WE HAVE
AGREED WITH THE PARTIES THAT THE TEXT IS TO REMAIN
CLASSIFIED UNTL IT HAS BEEN SIGNED. WE RECOMMEND THAT
DEPARTMENT PASS TO APPROPRIATE ADDRESSEES AND WE WILL
ADVISE WHEN SIGNATURE HAS OCCURRED AND THE TEXT MAY BE
USED PUBLICLY.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

--
-- AGREEMENT BETWEEN
-- THE GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL AND
-- THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF LEBANON
--
-- THE GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL AND THE
-- [REDACTED]
-- [REDACTED]

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GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF LEBANON:

--
-- BEARING IN MIND THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING AND
-- STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL PEACE BASED ON FREEDOM,
-- EQUQUALITY, JUSTICE, AND RESPECT FOR FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN
-- RIGHTS;--
-- REAFFIRMING THEIR FAITH IN THE AIMS AND PRINCIPLES
-- OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND RECOGNIZING

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THEIR RIGHT AND OBLIGATION TO LIVE IN PEACE WITH EACH OTHER AS WELL AS WITH ALL STATES, WITHIN SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES;

- HAVING AGREED TO DECLARE THE TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR BETWEEN THEM;

- DESIRING TO ENSURE LASTING SECURITY FOR BOTH THEIR STATES AND TO AVOID THREATS AND THE USE OF FORCE BETWEEN THEM;

- DESIRING TO ESTABLISH THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS IN THE MANNER PROVIDED FOR IN THIS AGREEMENT;

- HAVING DELEGATED THEIR UNDERSIGNED REPRESENTATIVE PLENIPOTENTIARIES, PROVIDED WITH FULL POWERS, IN ORDER TO SIGN, IN THE PRESENCE OF THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THIS AGREEMENT;

- HAVE AGREED TO THE FOLLOWING PROVISIONS:

ARTICLE 1

1. THE PARTIES AGREE AND UNDERTAKE TO RESPECT THE

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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- SOVEREIGNTY, POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF EACH OTHER. THEY CONSIDER THE EXISTING INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON INVIOABLE.

2. THE PARTIES CONFIRM THAT THE STATE OF WAR BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON HAS BEEN TERMINATED AND NO LONGER EXISTS.

3. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE PROVISIDNS OF PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 2, ISRAEL UNDERTAKES TO WITHDRAW ALL ITS ARMED FORCES FROM LEBANON IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ANNEX OF THE PRESENT AGREEMENT.

ARTICLE 2

THE PARTIES, BEING GUIDED BY THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, UNDERTAKE TO SETTLE THEIR DISPUTES BY PEACEFUL MEANS IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO PROMOTE INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY, AND JUSTICE.

ARTICLE 3

IN ORDER TO PROVIDE MAXIMUM SECURITY FOR ISRAEL AND

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LEBANON, THE PARTIES AGREE TO ESTABLISH AND IMPLEMENT SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, INCLUDING THE CREATION OF A SECURITY REGION, AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE ANNEX OF THE PRESENT AGREEMENT.

ARTICLE 4

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1. THE TERRITORY OF EACH PARTY WILL NOT BE USED AS A
- BASE FOR HOSTILE OR TERRORIST ACTIVITY AGAINST THE
- OTHER PARTY, ITS TERRITORY, OR ITS PEOPLE.
2. EACH PARTY WILL PREVENT THE EXISTENCE OR
- ORGANIZATION OF IRREGULAR FORCES, ARMED BANDS,
- ORGANIZATIONS, BASES, OFFICES OR INFRASTRUCTURE, THE
- AIMS AND PURPOSES OF WHICH INCLUDE INCURSIONS OR ANY
- ACT OF TERRORISM INTO THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER
- PARTY, OR ANY OTHER ACTIVITY AIMED AT THREATENING OR
- ENDANGERING THE SECURITY OF THE OTHER PARTY AND
- SAFETY OF ITS PEOPLE. TO THIS END ALL AGREEMENTS
- AND ARRANGEMENTS ENABLING THE PRESENCE AND
- FUNCTIONING ON THE TERRITORY OF EITHER PARTY OF

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- ELEMENTS HOSTILE TO THE OTHER PARTY ARE NULL AND
- VOID.
-
- 3. WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE INHERENT RIGHT OF
- SELF-DEFENSE IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW,
- EACH PARTY WILL REFRAIN:
-
- A. FROM ORGANIZING, INSTIGATING, ASSISTING, OR
- PARTICIPATING IN THREATS OR ACTS OF BELLIGERENCY,
- SUBVERSION, OR INCITEMENT OR ANY AGGRESSION

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- DIRECTED AGAINST THE OTHER PARTY, ITS POPULATION
- OR PROPERTY, BOTH WITHIN ITS TERRITORY AND
- ORIGINATING THEREFROM, OR IN THE TERRITORY OF THE
- OTHER PARTY.
-
- B. FROM USING THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER PARTY FOR
- CONDUCTING A MILITARY ATTACK AGAINST THE
- TERRITORY OF A THIRD STATE.
-
- C. FROM INTERVENING IN THE INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL
- AFFAIRS OF THE OTHER PARTY.
-
- 4. EACH PARTY UNDERTAKES TO ENSURE THAT PREVENTIVE
- ACTION AND DUE PROCEEDINGS WILL BE TAKEN AGAINST
- PERSONS OR ORGANIZATIONS PERPETRATING ACTS IN
- VIOLATION OF THIS ARTICLE.

ARTICLE 5

CONSISTENT WITH THE TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR AND
WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
THE PARTIES WILL ABSTAIN FROM ANY FORM OF HOSTILE
PROPAGANDA AGAINST EACH OTHER.

ARTICLE 6

EACH PARTY WILL PREVENT ENTRY INTO, DEPLOYMENT IN, OR
PASSAGE THROUGH ITS TERRITORY, ITS AIR SPACE AND,
SUBJECT TO THE RIGHT OF INNOCENT PASSAGE IN ACCORDANCE
WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW, ITS TERRITORIAL SEA, BY MILITARY
FORCES, ARMAMENT, OR MILITARY EQUIPMENT OF ANY STATE
HOSTILE TO THE OTHER PARTY.

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ARTICLE 7

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EXCEPT AS PROVIDED IN THE PRESENT AGREEMENT, NOTHING WILL PRECLUDE THE DEPLOYMENT ON LEBANESE TERRITORY OF INTERNATIONAL FORCES REQUESTED AND ACCEPTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON TO ASSIST IN MAINTAINING ITS AUTHORITY. NEW CONTRIBUTORS TO SUCH FORCES SHALL BE SELECTED FROM AMONG STATES HAVING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH BOTH PARTIES TO THE PRESENT AGREEMENT.

ARTICLE 8

1. A. UPON ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE PRESENT AGREEMENT, A JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE WILL BE ESTABLISHED BY THE PARTIES, IN WHICH THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA WILL BE A PARTICIPANT, AND WILL COMMENCE ITS FUNCTIONS. THIS COMMITTEE WILL BE ENTRUSTED WITH THE SUPERVISION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL AREAS COVERED BY THE PRESENT AGREEMENT. IN MATTERS INVOLVING SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, IT WILL DEAL WITH UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS REFERRED TO IT BY THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED IN SUBPARAGRAPH C. BELOW. DECISIONS OF THIS COMMITTEE WILL BE TAKEN UNANIMOUSLY.
- B. THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE WILL ADDRESS ITSELF ON A CONTINUING BASIS TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF MUTUAL RELATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON, INTER ALIA THE REGULATION OF THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS, PRODUCTS AND PERSONS, COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.
- C. WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE JOINT LIAISON

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EXDIS

- COMMITTEE, THERE WILL BE A SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS
- COMMITTEE WHOSE COMPOSITION AND FUNCTIONS ARE
- DEFINED IN THE ANNEX OF THE PRESENT AGREEMENT.

- D. SUBCOMMITTEES OF THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE MAY
- BE ESTABLISHED AS THE NEED ARISES.

- E. THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE WILL MEET IN ISRAEL
- AND LEBANON, ALTERNATELY.

- F. EACH PARTY, IF IT SO DESIRES AND UNLESS THERE IS
- AN AGREED CHANGE OF STATUS, MAY MAINTAIN A
- LIAISON OFFICE ON THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER
- PARTY IN ORDER TO CARRY OUT THE ABOVE-MENTIONED
- FUNCTIONS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE JOINT
- LIAISON COMMITTEE AND TO ASSIST IN THE
- IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESENT AGREEMENT.

- G. THE MEMBERS OF THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE FROM
- EACH OF THE PARTIES WILL BE HEADED BY A SENIOR
- GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL.

- H. ALL OTHER MATTERS RELATING TO THESE LIAISON
- OFFICES, THEIR PERSONNEL, AND THE PERSONNEL OF

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- EACH PARTY PRESENT IN THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER

- PARTY IN CONNECTION WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
- THE PRESENT AGREEMENT WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF A
- PROTOCOL TO BE CONCLUDED BETWEEN THE PARTIES IN
- THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE. PENDING THE
- CONCLUSION OF THIS PROTOCOL, THE LIAISON OFFICES
- AND THE ABOVE-MENTIONED PERSONNEL WILL BE TREATED
- IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF
- THE CONVENTION ON SPECIAL MISSIONS OF DECEMBER 8,
- 1969, INCLUDING THOSE PROVISIONS CONCERNING
- PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES. THE FOREGOING IS
- WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES
- CONCERNING THAT CONVENTION.




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-
2. DURING THE SIX-MONTH PERIOD AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL OF
- ALL ISRAELI ARMED FORCES FROM LEBANON IN ACCORDANCE
- WITH ARTICLE 1 OF THE PRESENT AGREEMENT AND THE
- SIMULTANEOUS RESTORATION OF LEBANESE GOVERNMENTAL
- AUTHORITY ALONG THE INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY BETWEEN
- ISRAEL AND LEBANON, AND IN THE LIGHT OF THE
- TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR, THE PARTIES SHALL
- INITIATE, WITHIN THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE, BONA
- FIDE NEGOTIATIONS IN ORDER TO CONCLUDE AGREEMENTS ON
- THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS, PRODUCTS AND PERSONS AND
- THEIR IMPLEMENTATION ON A NON-DISCRIMINATORY BASIS.
-

-

ARTICLE 9

-

1. EACH OF THE TWO PARTIES WILL TAKE, WITHIN A TIME
- LIMIT OF ONE YEAR AS OF ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE
- PRESENT AGREEMENT, ALL MEASURES NECESSARY FOR THE
- ABROGATION OF TREATIES, LAWS AND REGULATIONS DEEMED
- IN CONFLICT WITH THE PRESENT AGREEMENT, SUBJECT TO
- 


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- AND IN CONFORMITY WITH ITS CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURES.
-
2. THE PARTIES UNDERTAKE NOT TO APPLY EXISTING
- OBLIGATIONS, ENTER INTO ANY OBLIGATIONS, OR ADOPT
- LAWS OR REGULATIONS IN CONFLICT WITH THE PRESENT
- AGREEMENT.
-

-

ARTICLE 10

-

1. THE PRESENT AGREEMENT SHALL BE RATIFIED BY BOTH
- PARTIES IN CONFORMITY WITH THEIR RESPECTIVE
- CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURES. IT SHALL ENTER INTO
- FORCE ON THE EXCHANGE OF THE INSTRUMENTS OF
- RATIFICATION AND SHALL SUPERSEDE THE PREVIOUS
- AGREEMENTS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON.
-
2. THE ANNEX, THE APPENDIX AND THE MAP ATTACHED
- THERETO, AND THE AGREED MINUTES TO THE PRESENT
- AGREEMENT SHALL BE CONSIDERED INTEGRAL PARTS THEREOF.
-
3. THE PRESENT AGREEMENT MAY BE MODIFIED, AMENDED, OR
- SUPERSEDED BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES.
-

-

ARTICLE 11

-

1. DISPUTES BETWEEN THE PARTIES ARISING OUT OF THE
- INTERPRETATION OR APPLICATION OF THE PRESENT
- AGREEMENT WILL BE SETTLED BY NEGOTIATION IN THE
- JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE. ANY DISPUTE OF THIS

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- CHARACTER NOT SO RESOLVED SHALL BE SUBMITTED TO
- CONCILIATION AND, IF UNRESOLVED, THEREAFTER TO AN
- AGREED PROCEDURE FOR A DEFINITIVE RESOLUTION.

2. NOTWITHSTANDING THE PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPH 1,

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EXDIS

- DISPUTES ARISING OUT OF THE INTERPRETATION OR
- APPLICATION OF THE ANNEX SHALL BE RESOLVED IN THE
- FRAMEWORK OF THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS COMMITTEE
- AND, IF UNRESOLVED, SHALL THEREAFTER, AT THE REQUEST
- OF EITHER PARTY, BE REFERRED TO THE JOINT LIAISON
- COMMITTEE FOR RESOLUTION THROUGH NEGOTIATION.

ARTICLE 12

THE PRESENT AGREEMENT SHALL BE COMMUNICATED TO THE
SECRETARIAT OF THE UNITED NATIONS FOR REGISTRATION IN
CONFORMITY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 102 OF THE
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

DONE AT KHALDEH AND KIRYAT SHMONA THIS SEVENTEENTH DAY
OF MAY, 1983, IN TRIPPLICATE IN FOUR AUTHENTIC TEXTS IN
THE ARABIC, ENGLISH, FRENCH AND HEBREW LANGUAGES. IN
CASE OF ANY DIVERGENCE OF INTERPRETATION, THE ENGLISH
AND FRENCH TEXTS WILL BE EQUALLY AUTHORITATIVE.

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FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
STATE OF ISRAEL

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF LEBANON

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WITNESSED BY:

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ANNEX
SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

1. SECURITY REGION

A. A SECURITY REGION IN WHICH THE GOVERNMENT OF
LEBANON UNDERTAKES TO IMPLEMENT THE SECURITY
ARRANGEMENTS AGREED UPON IN THIS ANNEX IS HEREBY
ESTABLISHED.

B. THE SECURITY REGION IS BOUNDED, AS DELINEATED ON
THE MAP ATTACHED TO THIS ANNEX, IN THE NORTH BY A
LINE CONSTITUTING "LINE A", AND IN THE SOUTH AND
EAST BY THE LEBANESE INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY.

2. SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES WILL ENFORCE SPECIAL

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SECURITY MEASURES AIMED AT DETECTING AND PREVENTING
HOSTILE ACTIVITIES AS WELL AS THE INTRODUCTION INTO
OR MOVEMENT THROUGH THE SECURITY REGION OF
UNAUTHORIZED ARMED MEN OR MILITARY EQUIPMENT. THE

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FOLLOWING SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WILL APPLY EQUALLY
THROUGHOUT THE SECURITY REGION EXCEPT AS NOTED:

- A. THE LEBANESE ARMY, LEBANESE POLICE, LEBANESE
INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES, AND THE LEBANESE
AUXILIARY FORCES (ANSAR), ORGANIZED UNDER THE
FULL AUTHORITY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON, ARE
THE ONLY ORGANIZED ARMED FORCES AND ELEMENTS
PERMITTED IN THE SECURITY REGION EXCEPT AS
DESIGNATED ELSEWHERE IN THIS ANNEX.
THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS COMMITTEE MAY APPROVE
THE STATIONING IN THE SECURITY REGION OF OTHER
OFFICIAL LEBANESE ARMED ELEMENTS SIMILAR TO ANSAR.
- B. LEBANESE POLICE, LEBANESE INTERNAL SECURITY
FORCES, AND ANSAR MAY BE STATIONED IN THE
SECURITY REGION WITHOUT RESTRICTIONS AS TO THEIR
NUMBERS. THESE FORCES AND ELEMENTS WILL BE
EQUIPPED ONLY WITH PERSONAL AND LIGHT AUTOMATIC
WEAPONS AND, FOR THE INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES,
ARMORED SCOUT OR COMMANDO CARS AS LISTED IN THE
APPENDIX.
- C. TWO LEBANESE ARMY BRIGADES MAY BE STATIONED IN
THE SECURITY REGION. ONE WILL BE THE LEBANESE
ARMY TERRITORIAL BRIGADE STATIONED IN THE AREA
EXTENDING FROM THE ISRAELI-LEBANESE BOUNDARY TO
"LINE B" DELINEATED ON THE ATTACHED MAP. THE
OTHER WILL BE A REGULAR LEBANESE ARMY BRIGADE

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EXDIS

- STATIONED IN THE AREA EXTENDING FROM "LINE B" TO
- "LINE A". THESE BRIGADES MAY CARRY THEIR ORGANIC
- WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT LISTED IN THE APPENDIX.
- ADDITIONAL UNITS EQUIPPED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
- APPENDIX MAY BE DEPLOYED IN THE SECURITY REGION
- FOR TRAINING PURPOSES, INCLUDING THE TRAINING OF
- CONSCRIPTS, OR, IN THE CASE OF OPERATIONAL
- EMERGENCY SITUATIONS, FOLLOWING COORDINATION IN
- ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURES TO BE ESTABLISHED BY
- THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS COMMITTEE.

- D. THE EXISTING LOCAL UNITS WILL BE INTEGRATED AS
- SUCH INTO THE LEBANESE ARMY, IN CONFORMITY WITH
- LEBANESE ARMY REGULATIONS. THE EXISTING LOCAL
- CIVIL GUARD SHALL BE INTEGRATED INTO ANSAR AND
- ACCORDED A PROPER STATUS UNDER LEBANESE LAW TO
- ENABLE IT TO CONTINUE GUARDING THE VILLAGES IN
- THE SECURITY REGION. THE PROCESS OF EXTENDING
- LEBANESE AUTHORITY OVER THESE UNITS AND CIVIL
- GUARD, UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE SECURITY
- ARRANGEMENTS COMMITTEE, SHALL START IMMEDIATELY
- AFTER THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE PRESENT
- AGREEMENT AND SHALL TERMINATE PRIOR TO THE
- COMPLETION OF THE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON.

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- E. WITHIN THE SECURITY REGION, LEBANESE ARMY UNITS
- MAY MAINTAIN THEIR ORGANIC ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS
- AS SPECIFIED IN THE APPENDIX. OUTSIDE THE
- SECURITY REGION, LEBANON MAY DEPLOY PERSONAL,
- LOW, AND MEDIUM ALTITUDE AIR DEFENSE MISSILES.
- AFTER A PERIOD OF THREE YEARS FROM THE DATE OF
- ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE PRESENT AGREEMENT, THE
- PROVISION CONCERNING THE AREA OUTSIDE THE
- SECURITY REGION MAY BE REVIEWED BY THE SECURITY
- ARRANGEMENTS COMMITTEE AT THE REQUEST OF EITHER
- PARTY.
- F. MILITARY ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT IN THE SECURITY
- REGION WILL BE AS SPECIFIED IN THE APPENDIX.
- DEPLOYMENT OF GROUND RADARS WITHIN TEN KILOMETERS
- OF THE ISRAELI-LEBANESE BOUNDARY SHOULD BE
- APPROVED BY THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS COMMITTEE.

- GROUND RADARS THROUGHOUT THE SECURITY REGION WILL
- BE DEPLOYED SO THAT THEIR SECTOR OF SEARCH DOES
- NOT CROSS THE ISRAELI-LEBANESE BOUNDARY. THIS
- PROVISION DOES NOT APPLY TO CIVIL AVIATION OR AIR
- TRAFFIC CONTROL RADARS.
- G. THE PROVISION MENTIONED IN PARAGRAPH E. APPLIES
- ALSO TO ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILES ON LEBANESE NAVY
- VESSELS. IN THE SECURITY REGION, LEBANON MAY
- DEPLOY NAVAL ELEMENTS AND ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN
- NAVAL BASES OR OTHER SHORE INSTALLATIONS REQUIRED
- TO ACCOMPLISH THE NAVAL MISSION. THE COASTAL
- INSTALLATIONS IN THE SECURITY REGION WILL BE AS
- S
- PECIFIED IN THE APPENDIX.
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

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- H. IN ORDER TO AVOID ACCIDENTS DUE TO
- MISIDENTIFICATION, THE LEBANESE MILITARY
- AUTHORITIES WILL GIVE ADVANCE NOTICE OF ALL
- FLIGHTS OF ANY KIND OVER THE SECURITY REGION
- ACCORDING TO PROCEDURES TO BE DETERMINED BY THE
- SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS COMMITTEE. APPROVAL OF
- THESE FLIGHTS IS NOT REQUIRED.
- I. (1) THE FORCES, WEAPONS AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT
- WHICH MAY BE STATIONED, STOCKED, INTRODUCED
- INTO, OR TRANSPORTED THROUGH THE SECURITY
- REGION ARE ONLY THOSE MENTIONED IN THIS ANNEX
- AND ITS APPENDIX.
- (2) NO INFRASTRUCTURE, AUXILIARY INSTALLATIONS,
- OR EQUIPMENT CAPABLE OF ASSISTING THE
- ACTIVATION OF WEAPONS THAT ARE NOT PERMITTED
- BY THIS ANNEX OR ITS APPENDIX SHALL BE
- MAINTAINED OR ESTABLISHED IN THE SECURITY
- REGION.
- (3) THESE PROVISIONS ALSO APPLY WHENEVER A CLAUSE
- OF THIS ANNEX RELATES TO AREAS OUTSIDE THE
- SECURITY REGION.
3. SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS COMMITTEE
- A. WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE JOINT LIAISON
- COMMITTEE, A SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS COMMITTEE WILL
- BE ESTABLISHED.
- B. THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS COMMITTEE WILL BE
- COMPOSED OF AN EQUAL NUMBER OF ISRAELI AND

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EXDIS

- LEBANESE REPRESENTATIVES, HEADED BY SENIOR
- OFFICERS. A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES
- OF AMERICA WILL PARTICIPATE IN MEETINGS OF THE
- COMMITTEE AT THE REQUEST OF EITHER PARTY.
- DECISIONS OF THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS COMMITTEE
- WILL BE REACHED BY AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES.
-
- C. THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS COMMITTEE SHALL
- SUPERVISE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SECURITY
- ARRANGEMENTS IN THE PRESENT AGREEMENT AND THIS
- ANNEX AND THE TIMETABLE AND MODALITIES, AS WELL
- AS ALL OTHER ASPECTS RELATING TO WITHDRAWALS
- DESCRIBED IN THE PRESENT AGREEMENT AND THIS
- ANNEX. TO THIS END, AND BY AGREEMENT OF THE
- PARTIES, IT WILL:
-
- (1) SUPERVISE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
- UNDERTAKINGS OF THE PARTIES UNDER THE PRESENT
- AGREEMENT AND THIS ANNEX.
-
- (2) ESTABLISH AND OPERATE JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS
- AS DETAILED BELOW.

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(3) ADDRESS AND SEEK TO RESOLVE ANY PROBLEMS

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ARISING OUT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE PRESENT AGREEMENT AND THIS ANNEX AND DISCUSS ANY VIOLATION REPORTED BY THE JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS OR ANY COMPLAINT CONCERNING A VIOLATION SUBMITTED BY ONE OF THE PARTIES.

D. THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS COMMITTEE SHALL DEAL WITH ANY COMPLAINT SUBMITTED TO IT NOT LATER THAN 24 HOURS AFTER SUBMISSION.

E. MEETINGS OF THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS COMMITTEE SHALL BE HELD AT LEAST ONCE EVERY TWO WEEKS IN ISRAEL AND IN LEBANON, ALTERNATELY. IN THE EVENT THAT EITHER PARTY REQUESTS A SPECIAL MEETING, IT WILL BE CONVENED WITHIN 24 HOURS. THE FIRST MEETING WILL BE HELD WITHIN 48 HOURS AFTER THE DATE OF ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE PRESENT AGREEMENT.

F. JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS

(1) THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS COMMITTEE WILL ESTABLISH JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS (ISRAEL-LEBANON) SUBORDINATE TO IT AND COMPOSED OF AN EQUAL NUMBER OF REPRESENTATIVES FROM EACH PARTY.

(2) THE TEAMS WILL CONDUCT REGULAR VERIFICATION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE AGREEMENT AND THIS ANNEX. THE TEAMS SHALL REPORT IMMEDIATELY ANY CONFIRMED VIOLATIONS TO THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS COMMITTEE AND ASCERTAIN THAT VIOLATIONS HAVE BEEN RECTIFIED.

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(3) THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS COMMITTEE SHALL ASSIGN A JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAM, WHEN REQUESTED, TO CHECK BORDER SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS ON THE ISRAELI SIDE OF THE INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY IN ACCORD WITH ARTICLE 4 OF THE PRESENT AGREEMENT.

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- (4) THE TEAMS WILL ENJOY FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT IN THE AIR, SEA, AND LAND AS NECESSARY FOR THE PERFORMANCE OF THEIR TASKS WITHIN THE SECURITY REGION.
- (5) THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS COMMITTEE WILL DETERMINE ALL ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL ARRANGEMENTS CONCERNING THE FUNCTIONING OF THE TEAMS INCLUDING THEIR WORKING PROCEDURES, THEIR NUMBER, THEIR MANNING, THEIR ARMAMENT, AND THEIR EQUIPMENT.
- (6) UPON SUBMISSION OF A REPORT TO THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS COMMITTEE OR UPON CONFIRMATION OF A COMPLAINT OF EITHER PARTY BY THE TEAMS, THE RESPECTIVE PARTY SHALL IMMEDIATELY, AND IN ANY CASE NOT LATER THAN 24 HOURS FROM THE REPORT OR THE CONFIRMATION, RECTIFY THE VIOLATION. THE PARTY SHALL IMMEDIATELY NOTIFY THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS COMMITTEE OF THE RECTIFICATION. UPON RECEIVING THE NOTIFICATION, THE TEAMS WILL ASCERTAIN THAT THE VIOLATION HAS BEEN RECTIFIED.
- (7) THE JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS SHALL BE SUBJECT

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- TO TERMINATION UPON 90 DAYS NOTICE BY EITHER
- PARTY GIVEN AT ANY TIME AFTER TWO YEARS FROM
- THE DATE OF ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE PRESENT
- AGREEMENT. ALTERNATIVE VERIFICATION
- ARRANGEMENTS SHALL BE ESTABLISHED IN ADVANCE
- OF SUCH TERMINATION THROUGH THE JOINT LIAISON
- COMMITTEE. NOTWITHSTANDING THE FOREGOING,
- THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE MAY DETERMINE AT
- ANY TIME THAT THERE IS NO FURTHER NEED FOR
- SUCH ARRANGEMENTS.
- G. THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS COMMITTEE WILL ENSURE
- THAT PRACTICAL AND RAPID CONTACTS BETWEEN THE TWO
- PARTIES ARE ESTABLISHED ALONG THE BOUNDARY TO
- PREVENT INCIDENTS AND FACILITATE COORDINATION
- BETWEEN THE FORCES ON THE TERRAIN.
4. IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON MAY
- REQUEST APPROPRIATE ACTION IN THE UNITED NATIONS
- SECURITY COUNCIL FOR ONE UNIT OF THE UNITED NATIONS
- INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON (UNIFIL) TO BE STATIONED IN
- THE SIDON AREA. THE PRESENCE OF THIS UNIT WILL LEND
- SUPPORT TO THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON AND THE
- LEBANESE ARMED FORCES IN ASSERTING GOVERNMENTAL
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

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- AUTHORITY AND PROTECTION IN THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE
- CAMP AREAS. FOR A PERIOD OF 12 MONTHS, THE UNIT IN
- THE SIDON AREA MAY SEND TEAMS TO THE PALESTINIAN
- REFUGEE CAMP AREAS IN THE VICINITY OF SIDON AND TYRE
- TO SURVEIL AND OBSERVE, IF REQUESTED BY THE
- GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON, FOLLOWING NOTIFICATION TO THE
- SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS COMMITTEE. POLICE AND
- SECURITY FUNCTIONS SHALL REMAIN THE SOLE
- RESPONSIBILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON, WHICH
- SHALL ENSURE THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THE PRESENT
- AGREEMENT SHALL BE FULLY IMPLEMENTED IN THESE AREAS.
5. THREE MONTHS AFTER COMPLETION OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF
- ALL ISRAELI FORCES FROM LEBANON, THE SECURITY
- ARRANGEMENTS COMMITTEE WILL CONDUCT A FULL-SCALE
- REVIEW OF THE ADEQUACY OF THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS
- DELINEATED IN THIS ANNEX IN ORDER TO IMPROVE THEM.
6. WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES
- A. WITHIN 8 TO 12 WEEKS OF THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF
- THE PRESENT AGREEMENT, ALL ISRAELI FORCES WILL

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- HAVE BEEN WITHDRAWN FROM LEBANON. THIS IS
- CONSISTENT WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF LEBANON THAT ALL
- EXTERNAL FORCES WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON.

- B. THE ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES AND THE LEBANESE ARMED
- FORCES WILL MAINTAIN CONTINUOUS LIAISON DURING
- THE WITHDRAWAL AND WILL EXCHANGE ALL NECESSARY
- INFORMATION THROUGH THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS
- COMMITTEE. THE ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES AND THE
- LEBANESE ARMED FORCES WILL COOPERATE DURING THE
- WITHDRAWAL IN ORDER TO FACILITATE THE REASSERTION

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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- OF THE AUTHORITY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON AS
- THE ISRAELI ARMED FORCES WITHDRAW.

APPENDIX

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE ANNEX, THE
LEBANESE ARMED FORCES MAY CARRY, INTRODUCE, STATION,
STOCK, OR TRANSPORT THROUGH THE SECURITY REGION ALL
WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT ORGANIC TO EACH STANDARD LEBANESE
ARMED FORCES BRIGADE. INDIVIDUAL AND CREW-SERVED
WEAPONS, INCLUDING LIGHT AUTOMATIC WEAPONS NORMALLY
FOUND IN A MECHANIZED INFANTRY UNIT, ARE NOT PROHIBITED
BY THIS APPENDIX.

1. WEAPON SYSTEMS LISTED BELOW PRESENTLY ORGANIC TO
EACH BRIGADE IN THE SECURITY REGION ARE AUTHORIZED IN
THE NUMBERS SHOWN:

TANKS

-- 40 TANKS
-- 4 MEDIUM TRACKED RECOVERY VEHICLES

ARMORED CARS

-- 10 AML-90/
SALADIN/ETC.

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EXDIS

- ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS
- 127 M113AL/VCC-L, PLUS 44 M113 FAMILY VEHICLES
- ARTILLERY/MORTARS
- 18 155MM TOWED HOWITZERS (ALSO 105MM/122MM)
- 12 120MM MORTARS
- 27 81MM MORTARS (MOUNTED ON M-125 TRACKED MORTAR CARRIERS)
- ANTI-TANK WEAPONS
- 112 RPG
- 30 ANTI-TANK WEAPONS (106MM RECOILLESS RIFLE/TOW/MILAN)
- AIR DEFENSE WEAPONS
- 12 40MM OR LESS GUNS (NOT RADAR-GUIDED)
- 2. BRIGADE COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT:

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-- 482 AN/GRC-160
-- 74 AN/VRC-46
-- 16 AN/VRC-47
-- 9 AN/VRC-49
-- 43 GRA-39
-- 539 TA-312
-- 27 SB-22
-- 8 SB-993
-- 4 AN/GRC-106

3. BRIGADE SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT:

-- MORTAR LOCATING RADARS
-- ARTILLERY LOCATING RADARS
-- GROUND SURVEILLANCE RADARS
-- NIGHT OBSERVATION DEVICES
-- UNATTENDED GROUND SENSORS

4. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE ANNEX,
ARMORED VEHICLES FOR THE INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES WILL
BE AS FOLLOWS:

-- 24 ARMORED WHEELED VEHICLES WITH GUNS UP TO 40MM

5. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE ANNEX,
THERE WILL BE NO LIMITATIONS ON THE COASTAL
INSTALLATIONS IN THE SECURITY REGION, EXCEPT ON THE
FOLLOWING FOUR CATEGORIES:

-- COASTAL SEA SURVEILLANCE RADARS: 5
-- COASTAL DEFENSE GUNS: 15 40MM OR LESS
-- COASTAL AIR DEFENSE GUNS: 15 40MM OR LESS
(NOT RADAR-GUIDED)

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-- SHORE-TO-SEA MISSILES: NONE

6. THE LEBANESE ARMY INFANTRY BRIGADE AND TERRITORIAL
BRIGADE IN THE SECURITY REGION ARE EACH ORGANIZED AS
FOLLOWS:

-- 1 BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS AND OFF: 14 ENL: 173
-- HEADQUARTERS COMPANY
-- 3 INFANTRY BATTALIONS OFF: 31 EA ENL: 654 EA
-- 1 ARTILLERY BATTALION OFF: 39 ENL: 672

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-	1 TANK BATTALION	OFF: 37	ENL: 579
-	3 TANK COMPANIES		
-	1 RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY		
-	1 LOGISTICS BATTALION	OFF: 26	ENL: 344
-	1 ENGINEER COMPANY	OFF: 6	ENL: 125
-	1 ANTI-TANK COMPANY	OFF: 4	ENL: 117
-	1 ANTI-AIR ARTILLERY COMPANY	OFF: 4	ENL: 146
-	-----		
-	TOTAL: 4,341	OFF: 223	ENL: 4,118

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AGREED MINUTES

ART. 4.4 LEBANON AFFIRMS THAT LEBANESE LAW INCLUDES
ALL MEASURES NECESSARY TO ENSURE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS PARAGRAPH.

ART. 6 WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE
ANNEX REGARDING THE SECURITY REGION, IT IS
AGREED THAT NON-COMBAT MILITARY AIRCRAFT
OF A FOREIGN STATE ON NON-MILITARY
MISSIONS SHALL NOT BE CONSIDERED MILITARY
EQUIPMENT.

ART. 6 IT IS AGREED THAT, IN THE EVENT OF
DISAGREEMENT AS TO WHETHER A PARTICULAR
STATE IS "HOSTILE" FOR PURPOSES OF ARTICLE
6 OF THE AGREEMENT, THE PROHIBITIONS OF
ARTICLE 6 SHALL BE APPLIED TO ANY STATE
WHICH DOES NOT MAINTAIN DIPLOMATIC
RELATIONS WITH BOTH PARTIES.

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ART. 8.1.B IT IS AGREED THAT, AT THE REQUEST OF
EITHER PARTY, THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE
SHALL BEGIN TO EXAMINE THE QUESTION OF
CLAIMS BY CITIZENS OF EITHER PARTY ON
PROPERTIES IN THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER
PARTY.

ART. 8.1.H IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT EACH PARTY WILL
CERTIFY TO THE OTHER IF ONE OF ITS
PERSONNEL WAS ON OFFICIAL DUTY OR
PERFORMING OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS AT ANY GIVEN
TIME.

ART. 8.2 IT IS AGREED THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE
CONCLUDED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

ART. 9 IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS PROVISION SHALL
APPLY MUTATIS MUTANDIS TO AGREEMENTS
CONCLUDED BY THE PARTIES PURSUANT TO
ARTICLE 8, PARAGRAPH 2.

ART. 11 IT IS AGREED THAT BOTH PARTIES WILL
REQUEST THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO
PRDMOTE THE EXPEDITIOUS RESOLUTION OF
DISPUTES ARISING OUT OF THE INTERPRETATION

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OR APPLICATION OF THE PRESENT AGREEMENT.

ART. 11 IT IS AGREED THAT THE PHRASE "AN AGREED
PROCEDURE FOR A DEFINITIVE RESOLUTION"
MEANS AN AGREED THIRD-PARTY MECHANISM
WHICH WILL PRODUCE A RESOLUTION OF THE
DISPUTE WHICH IS BINDING ON THE PARTIES.

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ANNEX

PARA 1.B IT IS AGREED THAT, IN THAT PORTION OF
JABAL BARUK SHOWN ON THE MAP ATTACHMENT TO
THE ANNEX, ONLY CIVILIAN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INSTALLATIONS, SUCH AS
TELEVISION FACILITIES AND RADARS FOR AIR
TRAFFIC CONTROL PURPOSES, MAY BE
EMPLACED. THE RESTRICTIONS ON WEAPONS AND
MILITARY EQUIPMENT THAT ARE DETAILED IN
THE APPENDIX TO THE ANNEX WILL ALSO APPLY
IN THAT AREA.

ANNEX

PARA 2.D THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON AFFIRMS ITS
DECISION THAT THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE
ESTABLISHED ON APRIL 6, 1983, MENTIONED IN
SUBPARAGRAPH C, WILL ENCOMPASS THE
EXISTING LOCAL UNITS WHICH HAD BEEN FORMED
INTO A NEAR BRIGADE-SIZED UNIT, ALONG WITH
LEBANESE ARMY PERSONNEL FROM AMONG THE
INHABITANTS OF THE SECURITY REGION, IN
CONFORMITY WITH LEBANESE ARMY
REGULATIONS. THIS BRIGADE WILL BE IN
CHARGE OF SECURITY IN THE AREA EXTENDING
FROM THE ISRAELI-LEBANESE BOUNDARY TO
"LINE B" DELINEATED ON THE MAP ATTACHMENT
TO THE ANNEX. ALL THE LEBANESE ARMED
FORCES AND ELEMENTS IN THIS AREA,
INCLUDING THE LEBANESE POLICE, LEBANESE

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- INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES AND ANSAR, WILL
- BE SUBORDINATED TO THE BRIGADE COMMANDER.
- THE ORGANIZATION OF THE EXISTING LOCAL
- UNITS WILL BE ADAPTED, UNDER THE
- SUPERVISION OF THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS
- COMMITTEE, IN CONFORMITY WITH THE TABLE OF
- ORGANIZATION FOR THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE
- AS SHOWN IN THE APPENDIX.

ANNEX

PARA 2.G 1. AN AREA EXTENDING FROM:

- 33 DEGREES 15 MINUTES N
- 35 DEGREES 12.6 MINUTES E; TO

- 33 DEGREES 05.5 MINUTES N
- 35 DEGREES 06.1 MINUTES E; TO

- 33 DEGREES 15 MINUTES N
- 35 DEGREES 08.2 MINUTES E; TO

- 33 DEGREES 05.5 MINUTES N
- 35 DEGREES 01.4 MINUTES E;

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- WHICH IS AT PRESENT CLOSED FOR CIVIL
- NAVIGATION, WILL BE MAINTAINED BY
- LEBANON.

- 2. IN ORDER TO PREVENT INCIDENTS, THERE
- WILL BE CONTINUOUS COMMUNICATIONS
- BETWEEN THE SOUTHERN COMMAND OF THE
- LEBANESE NAVY AND THE ISRAELI NAVY IN
- ORDER TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION CONCERNING
- SUSPECTED VESSELS. THE PROCEDURES FOR
- THE ABOVE-MENTIONED EXCHANGE OF
- INFORMATION WILL BE ESTABLISHED BY THE
- SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS COMMITTEE.

- 3. THE LEBANESE NAVY WILL ACT PROMPTLY IN
- ORDER TO ASCERTAIN THE IDENTITY OF SUCH
- SUSPECTED VESSELS. IN EMERGENCY CASES,
- THERE WILL BE DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS
- BETWEEN VESSELS.

ANNEX

- PARA 3.F 1. THE JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS WILL CARRY
- OUT THEIR FUNCTIONS IN RECOGNITION OF
- THE FACT THAT THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR
- MILITARY, POLICE, AND OTHER CONTROL
- OPERATIONS RESTS WITH THE LEBANESE ARMED
- FORCES, POLICE, AND OTHER AUTHORIZED
- LEBANESE ORGANIZATIONS, AND NOT WITH THE
- TEAMS.

- 2. IF THE JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS UNCOVER
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

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- EVIDENCE OF A VIOLATION OR A POTENTIAL
- VIOLATION, THEY WILL CONTACT THE PROPER
- LEBANESE AUTHORITIES THROUGH THE
- SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS SUPERVISION
- CENTERS CREATED PURSUANT TO THE AGREED
- MINUTE TO PARAGRAPH 3.F.(5) OF THE
- ANNEX, IN ORDER TO ASSURE THAT LEBANESE
- AUTHORITIES TAKE APPROPRIATE
- NEUTRALIZING AND PRE

VENTIVE ACTION IN A

- TIMELY WAY. THEY WILL ASCERTAIN THAT
- THE ACTION TAKEN RECTIFIED THE VIOLATION
- AND WILL REPORT THE RESULTS TO THE
- SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS COMMITTEE.

- 3. THE JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS WILL
- COMMENCE LIMITED ACTIVITIES AS EARLY AS

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~ page - 24

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

- POSSIBLE FOLLOWING THE COMING INTO FORCE
- OF THE AGREEMENT FOR THE PURPOSE OF
- MONITORING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
- ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES WITHDRAWAL
- ARRANGEMENTS. THEIR OTHER SUPERVISORY
- AND VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES AUTHORIZED
- IN THE ANNEX WILL COMMENCE WITH THE
- FINAL WITHDRAWAL OF THE ISRAELI ARMED
- FORCES.

- 4. JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS WILL CONDUCT
- DAILY VERIFICATIONS IF NECESSARY DURING
- DAY AND NIGHT.

- VERIFICATIONS WILL BE CARRIED OUT ON THE
- GROUND, AT SEA, AND IN THE AIR.

- 5. EACH JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAM WILL BE

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ACTION SS-25

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EXDIS

- COMMANDED BY A LEBANESE OFFICER, WHO
- WILL RECOGNIZE THE JOINT NATURE OF THE
- TEAMS WHEN MAKING DECISIONS IN
- UNFORESEEN SITUATIONS, DURING THE
- CONDUCT OF THE VERIFICATION MISSION.

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6. WHILE ON A MISSION, THE JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAM LEADER AT HIS DISCRETION COULD REACT TO ANY UNFORESEEN SITUATION WHICH COULD REQUIRE IMMEDIATE ACTION. THE TEAM LEADER WILL REPORT ANY SUCH SITUATION AND THE ACTION TAKEN TO THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS SUPERVISION CENTER.
7. THE JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS WILL NOT USE FORCE EXCEPT IN SELF-DEFENSE.
8. THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS COMMITTEE WILL DECIDE INTER ALIA ON THE PATTERN OF ACTIVITY OF THE JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS, THEIR WEAPONRY AND EQUIPMENT, THEIR MODE OF TRANSPORT, AND THE AREAS IN WHICH THE TEAMS WILL OPERATE ON THE BASIS OF THE
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

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RULE OF REASON AND PRAGMATIC CONSIDERATIONS. THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS COMMITTEE WILL DETERMINE THE OVERALL PATTERN OF ACTIVITY WITH A VIEW TO AVOIDING UNDUE DISRUPTION TO NORMAL CIVILIAN LIFE AS WELL AS WITH A VIEW TO PREVENTING THE TEAMS FROM BECOMING TARGETS OF ATTACK.

9. UP TO A MAXIMUM OF EIGHT JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS WILL FUNCTION SIMULTANEOUSLY.

ANNEX

- PARA 3.F.5 1. TWO SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS SUPERVISION CENTERS WILL BE SET UP BY THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS COMMITTEE IN THE SECURITY REGION. THE EXACT LOCATIONS OF THE CENTERS WILL BE DETERMINED BY THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS COMMITTEE IN ACCORD WITH THE PRINCIPLE THAT THE CENTERS SHOULD BE LOCATED IN THE VICINITY OF HASBAYA AND MAYFADUN AND SHOULD NOT BE SITUATED IN POPULATED AREAS.
2. UNDER THE OVERALL DIRECTION OF THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS COMMITTEE, THE PURPOSE OF EACH CENTER IS TO:

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A) CONTROL, SUPERVISE, AND DIRECT JOINT
SUPERVISORY TEAMS FUNCTIONING IN THE
SECTOR OF THE SECURITY REGION

PAGE 03

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ASSIGNED TO IT.

B) SERVE AS A CENTER OF COMMUNICATIONS
CONNECTED TO THE JOINT SUPERVISORY
TEAMS AND APPROPRIATE HEADQUARTERS.

C) SERVE AS A MEETING PLACE IN LEBANON
FOR THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS
COMMITTEE.

D) RECEIVE, ANALYZE, AND PROCESS ALL
INFORMATION NECESSARY FOR THE
FUNCTION OF THE JOINT SUPERVISORY
TEAMS, ON BEHALF OF THE SECURITY
ARRANGEMENTS COMMITTEE.

3. OPERATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS:

A) THE CENTERS WILL BE COMMANDED BY
LEBANESE ARMY OFFICERS.

B) THE CENTERS WILL FUNCTION 24 HOURS A
DAY.

C) THE EXACT NUMBER OF PERSONNEL IN EACH
CENTER WILL BE DECIDED BY THE
SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS COMMITTEE.

D) ISRAELI PERSONNEL WILL BE STATIONED
IN ISRAEL WHEN NOT ENGAGED IN
ACTIVITIES IN THE CENTERS.

E) THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON WILL BE
RESPONSIBLE FOR PROVIDING SECURITY

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EXDIS

AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR THE
CENTERS.

F) THE JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS WILL
ORDINARILY COMMENCE THEIR MISSIONS
FROM THE CENTERS AFTER RECEIVING
PROPER BRIEFING AND WILL COMPLETE
THEIR MISSIONS AT THE CENTERS
FOLLOWING DEBRIEFING.

G) EACH CENTER WILL CONTAIN A SITUATION
ROOM, COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT,
FACILITIES FOR SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS
COMMITTEE MEETINGS, AND A BRIEFING
AND DEBRIEFING ROOM.

ANNEX

PARA 3.G IN ORDER TO PREVENT INCIDENTS AND FACILITATE
COORDINATION BETWEEN THE FORCES ON THE
TERRAIN, "PRACTICAL AND RAPID CONTACTS" WILL
INCLUDE DIRECT RADIO AND TELEPHONE
COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE RESPECTIVE
MILITARY COMMANDERS AND THEIR STAFFS IN THE

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IMMEDIATE BORDER REGION, AS WELL AS DIRECT
FACE-TO-FACE CONSULTATIONS.

END TEXT. LEWIS

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O 111904Z MAY 83

FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5455

INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IM/PS/CR/IR

Date: 11/7/97

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

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JERUSALEM 01822

RECAPTIONED

FOR SEITZ FROM DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MILI, MOPS, SY, IS, LE, US, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: ARENS CALL TO THE
SECRETARY

REF: SECTO 4210

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT.~~

2. I DO NOT BELIEVE THERE IS ANYTHING THE SECRETARY
SHOULD SAY TO ARENS AT THIS POINT. WE CAME TO
AN UNDERSTANDING EARLIER TODAY WITH ISRAEL ON THE
PACKAGE. PHIL THEN WENT OFF TO BEIRUT WITH PART OF
OUR TEAM TO GET THE LEBANESE ON BOARD. I AM STAYING HERE
IN CASE THERE ARE FURTHER RENEGOTIATIONS WITH THE
ISRAELIS. IF EVERYTHING GOES WELL WITH THE
LEBANESE, WE WILL EXCHANGE DOCUMENTS AND COMPARE
NOTES ON THURSDAY IN NETANYA, AND HAVE A SIGNING
CEREMONY ON FRIDAY.

PAGE 02 JERUSA 01822 111904Z

3. THERE IS NO NEED FOR THE SECRETARY TO GET
INVOLVED YET, BUT WE WILL NOT HESITATE TO CALL ON
HIM IF IT SHOULD BECOME NECESSARY.

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GROVE

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FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3573 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY

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RECAPTIONED

LONDON PASS HABIB FROM DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MILI, MOPS, IS, LE, SY, US, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: MAY 13 PROCEDURAL
MEETING AT NETANYA1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT.~~

2. IN AN ATMOSPHERE OF HIGH GOOD SPIRITS, THE THREE DELEGATIONS COMPLETED MANY OF THE REMAINING PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE UNDERSTANDINGS PREPARATORY TO A SIGNING CEREMONY; HOWEVER, IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR SOME REPRESENTATIVES OF THE THREE DELEGATIONS, PLUS THE HEADS, TO MEET AGAIN AT

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NETANYA ON SUNDAY, MAY 15, TO COMPLETE WORK ON THE FRENCH, ARABIC AND HEBREW TEXTS. AT THE REQUEST OF THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT, THE THREE DELEGATIONS AGREED TO SAY TO THE PRESS THAT A SPECIFIC DATE FOR THE SIGNING CEREMONY HAS NOT YET BEEN DECIDED UPON. IN FACT, THERE HAS BEEN AGREEMENT TO HAVE THE SIGNING CEREMONY IN KHALDAH AND KIRYAT SHEMONA ON TUESDAY, MAY 17, BUT THE ISRAELIS DO NOT WANT TO CONFIRM THIS FACT PUBLICLY OUT OF CONCERN THAT

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--A. IN PRIVATE CONVERSATION AMONG KIMCHE, FATTAL AND DRAPER, IT WAS AGREED THAT THE THREE OF THEM WOULD MEET AT APPROXIMATELY ONCE-WEEKLY INTERVALS OVER THE PERIOD IMMEDIATELY AHEAD TO FORESTALL MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND TO RESOLVE DIFFERENCES IN INTERPRETATION AS THEY EMERGE. THESE MEETINGS WOULD TAKE PLACE REGARDLESS OF THE FORMATION OF THE TWO STANDING COMMITTEES AFTER THE EXCHANGE OF INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION AND THE COMING INTO FORCE OF THE AGREEMENT.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SPR. 2000.

- 1. THE U.S. STATEMENT DESCRIBING THE ORAL UNDERSTANDINGS OF ISRAEL AND LEBANON RELATING TO AD HOC ARRANGEMENTS DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD PRIOR

Date Printed: 10/22/1996

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DOC NUMBER: 88 TELAV06558

CHANNEL: n/a

TO THE CONCLUSION OF MORE FORMAL ARRANGEMENTS ON
MUTUAL RELATIONS AND NORMALIZATION; AND

- 2. THE U.S. STATEMENT ON "GUIDELINES" UNDERSTOOD
BY THE PARTIES AS REGARDS PROPERTY CLAIMS, JOINT
SUPERVISORY TEAMS, SUPERVISION CENTERS, THE

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AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY
USELO RIYADH PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

SECTION 02 OF 02 TEL AVIV 06558

EXDIS



SECURITY FENCE, THE INTEGRITY OF THE TERRITOR-
IAL BRIGADE AND THE ISRAELI LIAISON OFFICE. THE ISRAELI
AND LEBANESE DELEGATIONS FOR THE RECORD APPROVED
THESE TWO STATEMENTS, WHICH ARE TO BECOME EFFECTIVE
AS OF THE DATE OF THE SIGNATURE OF THE AGREEMENT.

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(TEXTS BY SEPTELS.)


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--D. IN CONNECTION WITH THE AGREED MINUTE ON PROPERTY CLAIMS AND THE "GUIDELINE" CLARIFICATION, THE ISRAELI DELEGATION SPECIFIED THAT ISRAEL WOULD BE PREPARED TO BEGIN DISCUSSIONS ON PROCEDURES FOR DEALING WITH PROPERTY CLAIMS AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE PERMANENT ARRANGEMENTS FOR MUTUAL RELATIONS, AND NOT BEFORE. THE LEBANESE DELEGATION TOOK NOTE OF THIS ISRAELI POSITION, WHICH



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IS NOT MENTIONED ANYWHERE IN THE PACKAGE OF DOCUMENTS AND UNDERSTANDINGS.

--E. GENERAL COOLEY, ON BEHALF OF THE THREE DELEGATIONS, MADE A STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD AS REGARDS THE MAP DESCRIBING THE TWO LINES IN THE SECURITY REGION, AND THE DEPICTION OF THE JABAL BARUK AREA, MAKING CLEAR THAT THE MAP TO BE RETAINED BY THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE GOVERNING IN THE EVENT OF DISPUTES OVER THE LINES. ALL THREE DELEGATIONS CONFIRMED THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF THIS ARRANGEMENT, WITH THE STATEMENT TO BE MADE EFFECTIVE AS OF THE DATE OF SIGNATURE OF THE AGREEMENT PACKAGE.

--F. THE ISRAELIS THIS LAST WEEK HAD QUESTIONED WHETHER LEBANESE ARMY REGULATIONS WOULD PERMIT THE INTEGRATION INTO THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE OF MEMBERS OF THE SO-CALLED "LOCAL FORCES" AS SPELLED OUT IN THE ANNEX AND AGREED MINUTES. THE LEBANESE ARMY REGULATIONS HAVE AGE AND OTHER LIMITATIONS ON NEW VOLUNTEERS. GENERAL HAMDAN, ON BEHALF OF THE LEBANESE DELEGATION, MADE IT CLEAR THAT A NEW LEBANESE LAW WAS TO BE PROMULGATED SOON, PERHAPS AS EARLY AS MAY 17, WHICH WOULD IN EFFECT LIFT REGULATIONS THAT OTHERWISE MIGHT BE LIMITING ON MEN FROM THE SO-CALLED LOCAL UNITS. THE NET EFFECT WAS TO ALLOW MEN FROM THESE GROUPS TO COME IN IF THEY ARE UNDER THE AGE OF 45 AND THEY ARE SATISFACTORILY HEALTHY.

--G. FINALLY, IN RESPONSE TO KIMCHE'S QUESTIONS, FATTAL DESCRIBED IN DETAIL LEBANESE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURES RELATING TO RATIFICATION. TO SUMMARIZE,


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FATTAL SAID THAT PARLIAMENT IN EFFECT AUTHORIZED THE EXECUTIVE TO RATIFY AGREEMENTS SUCH AS THIS ONE; PARLIAMENT ITSELF DOES NOT RATIFY THE AGREEMENT. HE SAID HE EXPECTED THAT THE RATIFICATION PROCESS WOULD TAKE UP TO A MAXIMUM OF TEN DAYS FOLLOWING SIGNATURE OF THE AGREEMENT, AT WHICH POINT THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE AUTHORIZED TO EXCHANGE INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION, PUBLISH THE AGREEMENT IN THE GOVERNMENT GAZETTE, AND ISSUE NECESSARY IMPLEMENTING ORDERS.
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FROM HABIB AND DRAPER

FOIA Exemptions () CLASSIFY as () S or () C Sec.
PA Exemptions () DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () CE.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, LE, IS, US
SUBJECT: ISRAEL-LEBANON AGREEMENT: NEXT STEPS
REF: STATE 128665V

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1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT.~~)

2. AS REPORTED ELSEWHERE WE ARE HOPING TO BRING THE ISRAELI-LEBANESE AGREEMENT TO THE POINT OF SIGNATURE WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. IF WE ARE SUCCESSFUL WE WILL THEN TRY TO HAVE THE LEBANESE RATIFICATION PROCESS COMPLETED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. PRESIDENT GEMAYEL HAS SPOKEN OF THE SEQUENCE AFTER SIGNATURE AS TAKING ONLY A FEW DAYS AND INCLUDING CABINET APPROVAL, A PRELIMINARY INFORMAL SIGN OF APPROVAL BY A MAJORITY OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND THEN FORMAL RATIFICATION. HE IS ALSO MEETING WITH A CROSS-SECTION OF POLITICAL LEADERS, INCLUDING EX-PRESIDENTS AND EX-PRIME

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(#)
IN ORDER TO STRENGTHEN
(#)PARIS THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES CAN WEIGH IN
ALSO.-- () THE LEBANESE MEANWHILE MUST CONTINUE TO WORK ON
MAINTAINING THEIR INTERNAL CONSENSUS. THEY SHOULD ALSO**DECLASSIFIED**

ENGAGE IN A MUCH MORE INTENSIVE DIALOG WITH THE SYRIANS AND SAUDIS AND EXPAND THEIR EFFORTS AMONG THE ARAB NATIONS. THE LEBANESE ARE READY TO SEND THEIR TOP LEADERSHIP TO DAMASCUS, STARTING WITH WAZZAN AND SALEM. PRESIDENT GEMAYEL WILL HIMSELF ACT AT THE PROPER MOMENT, BUT IT IS PREFERABLE TO USE OTHER EFFECTIVE CHANNELS FIRST.

-- (D) ARGUMENTS NEED TO BE CONCENTRATED ON DEFENDING THE PRESENT AGREEMENT, RESISTING PRESSURE FOR ITS RE-NEGOTIATION, AND EMPHASIZING THE UNFAVORABLE PROSPECTS IF WITHDRAWALS DO NOT OCCUR. EVEN WITH THE BEST RESULTS IT WILL PROBABLY BE WEEKS BEFORE THE NECESSARY AGREEMENTS ARE REACHED WITH THE SYRIANS AND THE PLO. THIS WILL INCREASE THE DANGER FROM INCIDENTS AND A BREAKDOWN AT ANY LEVEL.
GROVE

NOTE BY OC/T: (#)OMISSION IN TEXT. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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PAGE 01 JERUSA 01816 02 OF 02 111430Z
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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
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FROM HABIB AND DRAPER.

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, LE, IS, US

SUBJECT: ISRAEL-LEBANON AGREEMENT: NEXT STEPS
VELIOTES FINISHES IN CAIRO HE CAN HELP MAKE THE ROUNDS.
MEANWHILE, WE HOPE THAT AS A RESULT OF THE SECRETARY'S
MEETINGS IN PARIS THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES CAN WEIGH IN
ALSO.

-- (C) THE LEBANESE MEANWHILE MUST CONTINUE TO WORK ON
MAINTAINING THEIR INTERNAL CONSENSUS. THEY SHOULD ALSO
ENGAGE IN A MUCH MORE INTENSIVE DIALOG WITH THE SYRIANS
AND SAUDIS AND EXPAND THEIR EFFORTS AMONG THE ARAB
NATIONS. THE LEBANESE ARE READY TO SEND THEIR TOP
LEADERSHIP TO DAMASCUS, STARTING WITH WAZZAN AND SALEM.
PRESIDENT GEMAYEL WILL HIMSELF ACT AT THE PROPER
MOMENT, BUT IT IS PREFERABLE TO USE OTHER EFFECTIVE
CHANNELS FIRST.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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-- (D) ARGUMENTS NEED TO BE CONCENTRATED ON DEFENDING
THE PRESENT AGREEMENT, RESISTING PRESSURE FOR ITS RE-
NEGOTIATION, AND EMPHASIZING THE UNFAVORABLE PROSPECTS
IF WITHDRAWALS DO NOT OCCUR. EVEN WITH THE BEST RESULTS
IT WILL PROBABLY BE WEEKS BEFORE THE NECESSARY AGREEMENTS
ARE REACHED WITH THE SYRIANS AND THE PLO. THIS WILL
INCREASE THE DANGER FROM INCIDENTS AND A BREAKDOWN AT
ANY LEVEL.
GROVE.

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Date Printed: 10/22/1996

DOC_NUMBER: 83JERUSA01801

CHANNEL: n/a

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FROM HABIB AND DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MARR, MOPS, U.S., IS, LE, XF

SUBJECT: U.S.-ISRAEL MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT - ISRAELI
"CLARIFICATIONS"

REF: SECTO 4132

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT.~~

2. ISRAELI NEGOTIATORS HAVE BEEN SEEKING A NUMBER OF CHANGES IN THE MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT (MOA) WHICH HAD BEEN SUBMITTED TO THEM BY SECRETARY SHULTZ. A NUMBER OF THE REVISIONS SEEM TO BE ACCEPTABLE AND WE RECOMMEND THAT THEY BE APPROVED. A REVISED MEMORANDUM REFLECTING THESE CHANGES IS GIVEN BELOW.

3. THE CHANGES RECOMMENDED FOR APPROVAL ARE IN PARAGRAPHS NUMBERED 5, 6A, AND 7, AND IN THE DELETION OF PARAGRAPH 11. FULL TEXT FOLLOWS:

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MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT

GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND THE STATE OF ISRAEL

IN VIEW OF THE LONGSTANDING RELATIONS OF FRIENDSHIP, COOPERATION AND TRUST BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL, THEIR COMMON INTEREST IN THE SECURITY AND STABILITY OF THE REGION, AND THEIR DEEP COMMITMENT TO PROMOTING RELATIONS

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OF PEACE AND SECURITY BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ITS NEIGHBORS.

- RECOGNIZING THAT THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON SIGNED THIS DATE (HEREINAFTER THE "AGREEMENT") WILL SIGNIFICANTLY ENHANCE THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL AND LEBANON AS WELL AS THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE ENTIRE REGION, AND WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THE CONSOLIDATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF GOOD NEIGHBORLY RELATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON;

- THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE STATE OF ISRAEL, SUBJECT TO THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES AND APPLICABLE LAW, CONFIRM AS FOLLOWS:

- 1. IN LIGHT OF THE PARTICIPATION AND ASSISTANCE OF THE UNITED STATES IN ACHIEVING THE AGREEMENT, AND THE DESIRE OF ISRAEL AND LEBANON THAT THE UNITED STATES CONTINUE ITS SUPPORTIVE EFFORTS, THE UNITED STATES WILL TAKE ALL APPROPRIATE MEASURES TO PROMOTE FULL OBSERVANCE OF THE AGREEMENT.

- 2. THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL SHARE AND WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE OBJECTIVE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON THAT ALL EXTERNAL FORCES MUST WITHDRAW PERMA-

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
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NENTLY FROM THAT COUNTRY. THE UNITED STATES ACKNOWLEDGES (A) THAT ISRAEL HAS ENTERED INTO THE AGREEMENT ON THE PREMISE THAT THIS LEBANESE POLICY WILL BE FULFILLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARRANGEMENTS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL EXTERNAL FORCES FROM LEBANON, AND (B) THE POSITION OF ISRAEL THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT WILL OCCUR ONLY IN THE CONTEXT OF:

- (I) THE RECEIPT OF INFORMATION CONCERNING ISRAELI SOLDIERS MISSING IN ACTION, AND THE RETURN OF ISRAELI PRISONERS OF WAR AND THE REMAINS OF SOLDIERS WHO HAVE FALLEN SINCE JUNE 4, 1982, PRIOR TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL PURSUANT TO THE AGREEMENT;

- (II) THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL PLO ARMED ELEMENTS; AND

- (III) THE WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIAN FORCES SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL.

IN THE EVENT THAT PLO ARMED ELEMENTS OR SYRIAN FORCES FAIL TO WITHDRAW IN ACCORD WITH THE ARRANGEMENTS OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT, THE UNITED STATES WILL CONSULT URGENTLY WITH THE PARTIES AND TAKE SUCH OTHER STEPS AS IT DEEMS APPROPRIATE TO BRING ABOUT THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL EXTERNAL FORCES FROM LEBANON, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT

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THE POSITION OF ISRAEL STATED HEREIN.

- 3. IN THE EVENT OF AN ACTUAL OR THREATENED VIOLATION OF THE AGREEMENT, THE UNITED STATES WILL, AT THE REQUEST OF ONE OR BOTH OF THE PARTIES, CONSULT WITH THE PARTIES WITH RESPECT THERETO IN THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE OR THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 5434
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SECTION 02 OF 03 JERUSALEM 01801

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (STADIS REMOVED PER STATE 131405)

FROM HABIB AND DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MARR, MOPS, U.S., IS, LE, XF
SUBJECT: U.S.-ISRAEL MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT - ISRAELI

PURSUANT TO THE AGREEMENT OR THROUGH OTHER AVAILABLE CHANNELS, AS APPROPRIATE. UPON BEING SATISFIED THAT THERE HAS BEEN A VIOLATION OR THREATENED VIOLATION OF THE AGREEMENT, THE UNITED STATES WILL CONSULT WITH THE PARTIES WITH REGARD TO MEASURES TO BE TAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES OR BY THE PARTIES TO HALT, PREVENT OR RECTIFY THE VIO-

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LATION OR THREATENED VIOLATION, TO ENSURE FULL OBSERVANCE OF THE AGREEMENT, TO ENHANCE FRIENDLY AND PEACEFUL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND TO PROMOTE PEACE IN THE REGION AND THE UNITED STATES WILL TAKE SUCH REMEDIAL MEASURES AS IT DEEMS APPROPRIATE.

- 4. IN PARTICULAR, THE UNITED STATES WILL TAKE ALL STEPS IT CONSIDERS APPROPRIATE TO ENCOURAGE AND FACILITATE THE EFFECTIVE PERFORMANCE BY THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON OF ITS RESPONSIBILITY TO TAKE ALL POSSIBLE

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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MEASURES TO PREVENT ARMED ATTACKS FROM ITS TERRITORY BY LAND, SEA OR AIR AGAINST ISRAEL, AND, IN THE EVENT OF SUCH AN ATTACK, OF ITS RESPONSIBILITY TO RESPOND PROMPTLY AND EFFECTIVELY WITH A VIEW TOWARD RESTORING SECURITY IN THE BORDER AREA IN ACCORD WITH THE PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT. RECOGNIZING THAT THE MAINTENANCE OF SECURITY WITHIN ITS BORDERS IS THE SOLE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON, THE UNITED STATES WILL SUPPORT AS IT DEEMS APPROPRIATE PROPORTIONATE ACTIONS BY ISRAEL IN RESPONSE TO ARMED ATTACKS AGAINST ISRAEL FROM LEBANESE TERRITORY WHICH, IN THE VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES, CONSTITUTE APPROPRIATE, LEGITIMATE EXERCISES OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW.

- 5. THE UNITED STATES WILL USE ITS BEST EFFORTS TO AVOID ACTIONS BY OTHER STATES IN THE REGION WITH WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS RELATIONS WHICH ARE DESIGNED TO PREVENT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT, ADVERSELY TO AFFECT IT OR OTHERWISE TO FRUSTRATE ITS PURPOSES, OR TO PREVENT THE DEVELOPMENT OF MUTUAL RELATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON.

- 6. (A) THE UNITED STATES WILL ENCOURAGE THE NON-DISCRIMINATORY MOVEMENT OF GOODS, PRODUCTS AND PEOPLE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON IN THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO THE AGREEMENT.

- (B) THE UNITED STATES WILL USE ITS BEST EFFORTS TO ENSURE THAT NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE CONCLUSION OF AGREEMENTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 8(2) OF THE AGREEMENT WILL PROCEED IN GOOD FAITH AND BE CONCLUDED EXPEDITIOUSLY.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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- 7. THE UNITED STATES WILL OPPOSE AND, IF NECESSARY, VOTE AGAINST ANY ACTION OR RESOLUTION IN THE UNITED NATIONS WHICH IN ITS JUDGMENT ADVERSELY AFFECTS THE AGREEMENT OR ITS IMPLEMENTATION.

- 8. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT, THE UNITED STATES AGREES TO PARTICIPATE IN THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE, AND IN MEETINGS OF THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS COMMITTEE TO WHICH IT IS INVITED BY EITHER PARTY. IN THAT FRAMEWORK, THE UNITED STATES WILL VERIFY UNDERSTANDINGS REACHED BETWEEN THE PARTIES DURING THE NEGOTIATION OF THE AGREEMENT CONCERNING ITS INTERPRETATION OR APPLICATION.

- 9. IT IS THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE UNITED STATES WITH REGARD TO PARAGRAPH 3(F)(7) OF THE ANNEX TO THE AGREEMENT THAT IF IT DOES NOT PROVE TO BE POSSIBLE TO ESTABLISH ALTERNATIVE VERIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS IN ADVANCE OF THE DATE UPON WHICH THE JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS WOULD TERMINATE PURSUANT TO THE PROCEDURES PROVIDED FOR IN THAT PARAGRAPH, THE PROVISIONS REGARDING THOSE TEAMS WILL REMAIN IN EFFECT PENDING COMPLETION OF SUCH ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS.

- 10. THE UNITED STATES WILL ENDEAVOR IN EVERY APPROPRIATE WAY TO CONSOLIDATE THE PEACEFUL RELATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON, AND WILL LEND ITS SUPPORT TO THEIR DEVELOPMENT, INCLUDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

4. THE ISRAELIS HAVE ALSO PROPOSED TO CHANGE PARAGRAPH 2, SUBPARA (II) TO ADD AFTER THE WORDS "THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL PLO ARMED ELEMENTS" THE FOLLOWING: ", AS WELL AS ALL ELEMENTS PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE 4(2) OF THE AGREEMENT, FOLLOWED BY ;". THE "AND" CONNECTING (II) AND (III) WOULD THEN BE DELETED. DESPITE A STRONG PLEA FROM ISRAELI

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Date Printed: 10/22/1996

DOC NUMBER: 83JERUSA01801

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FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 5435
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

SECTION 03 OF 03 JERUSALEM 01801

EXDIS- STADIS////////////////////

FROM HABIB AND DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MARR, MOPS, U.S., IS, LE, XF

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SUBJECT: U.S.-ISRAEL MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT - ISRAELI

NEGOTIATORS TO INCLUDE THIS LANGUAGE WE DO NOT BELIEVE WE CAN POSSIBLY ACCEPT SUCH A SWEEPING ESCALATION OF ISRAELI PRECONDITIONS FOR WITHDRAWAL. IT COULD BE INTERPRETED TO INCLUDE ARMED ORGANIZATIONS, EITHER LEBANESE OR OTHERS SUCH AS LIBYANS OR IRANIANS, WHICH HAVE NEVER BEEN INCLUDED IN THE CONDITIONS AS STATED PREVIOUSLY.

5. THE ISRAELIS ARE INSISTENT UPON REPLACING THE SECOND SENTENCE, PARA 4, WITH THE FOLLWING:

- "RECOGNIZING THAT THE MAINTENANCE OF SECURITY
 - WITHIN ITS BORDERS IS THE SOLE RESPONSIBILITY OF
 - THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON, THE UNITED STATES, AS
 - IT DEEMS APPROPRIATE, WILL SUPPORT ACTIONS BY
 - ISRAEL IN RESPONSE TO ARMED ATTACKS AGAINST
 - ISRAEL FROM LEBANESE TERRITORY BY LAND, SEA,
 - OR AIR, WHICH ACTIONS, IN THE VIEW OF THE
 - UNITED STATES, CONSTITUTE APPROPRIATE, LEGITIMATE
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

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- EXERCISES OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE IN AC-
- CORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PRIN-
- CIPLES THEREUNDER."

6. WE RECOMMEND THAT THIS PROPOSAL BE REJECTED. THE ISRAELIS HAVE TAKEN THE POSITION THAT DIRECT REFERENCE TO THE WORD "PROPORTIONATE" IS A MATTER OF GREAT POLITICAL SENSITIVITY BECAUSE IT IMPLIES THAT PAST ACTIONS HAVE BEEN DISPROPORTIONATE. THEY ARGUE THAT ITS INCLUSION IS OFFENSIVE AND THAT "EVERYONE" IN THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WHO HAS SEEN IT HAS BEEN INCENSED. THEY REHASH THE ARGUMENT THAT IF PROPORTIONALITY IS PART OF GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW, THEN THERE IS NO NEED TO REFER TO IT SPECIFICALLY. IN LIGHT OF THE HISTORY OF ISRAELI INCURSIONS INTO LEBANON AND ISRAELI USE OF AN EXPANSIVE NOTION OF SELF-DEFENSE TO JUSTIFY SUCH ACTION, WE BELIEVE THAT ANY PROVISIONS OF SELF-DEFENSE WHICH DO NOT EXPLICITLY INCLUDE THE CONCEPT OF PROPORTIONALITY GO BEYOND ANY REASONABLE EXPRESSION OF U.S. WILLINGNESS TO SUPPORT SUCH ACTION. EVEN WITH THE INCLUSION OF THE WORD "PROPORTIONATE", WE HAVE ALREADY GONE VERY FAR IN THE LIGHT OF THE FACT THAT ISRAEL HAS UNDERTAKEN NO EXPLICIT OBLIGATIONS IN THIS MOA TO PARALLEL THOSE WHICH THE UNITED STATES WILL HAVE MADE.

7. ACTION REQUESTED: WE REQUEST RECEIPT OF AN APPROVED TEXT BY CLOSE OF BUSINESS MAY 11.
GROVE

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ACTION SS-25

JERUSA 01800 01 OF 02 110128Z

INFO : OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 SSO-01 /027 W

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FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5431

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

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DEPARTMENT: ☒ RELEASE

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IN PART

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☐ CLASSIFY as ☐ S or ☐ C Sec.

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SECTION 01 OF 02 JERUSALEM 01800

EXP **DECLASSIFIED** //

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM HABIB AND DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MILI, MOPS, IS, US, SY, LE, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: PRESENT STATUS OF
NEGOTIATIONS

1. [REDACTED]

2. THIS IS A STATUS REPORT ON THE EFFORTS WE
HAVE BEEN MAKING SINCE YOUR DEPARTURE FROM BEIRUT:

--OUR PRESENT OBJECTIVE IS TO HAVE THE THREE
DELEGATIONS CONVEENE AT 9:00 A.M. ON THURSDAY, MAY 12,
IN NETANYA TO REVIEW AND APPROVE THE TEXTS OF THE
PACKAGE. ON FRIDAY, MAY 13, WE WOULD HOPE TO HAVE
THE FORMAL SIGNINGS, FIRST IN KHALDAH, AND THEN IN
KIRYAT SHEMONA, IN ACCORD WITH THE ISRAELI DEMAND THAT
THE AGREEMENT BE SIGNED IN BOTH COUNTRIES ON THE SAME
DAY. ISRAEL HAS DROPPED THEIR REQUEST THAT MINISTERS
SIGN.

--AT EITHER THE THURSDAY OR FRIDAY MEETINGS, DRAPER
WILL READ ALOUD IN CLOSED SESSION--ATTENDED POSSIBLY
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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BY ONLY TWO MEMBERS FROM EACH DELEGATION--THE
PLANNED U.S. STATEMENT DESCRIBING THE SO-CALLED
ORAL UNDERSTANDING COVERING THE INTERIM PERIOD
BETWEEN THE END OF THE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND THE
CONCLUSION OF MORE FORMAL ARRANGEMENTS ON
NORMALIZATION.

--WE WILL BE VERY LUCKY IF THIS SCHEDULE CAN
BE MET, CONSIDERING THE SERIOUS OBSTACLES WHICH

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MUST STILL BE-OVERCOME BY THE END OF THE DAY ON WEDNESDAY. IF WE CANNOT MAKE THE SIGNING CEREMONY BY FRIDAY, WE WILL TRY FOR NEXT MONDAY, FOLLOWING THE SABBATHS ON SATURDAY AND SUNDAY, WHEN SIGNINGS WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE.

--THE ISRAELI REQUEST FOR "CLARIFICATIONS" TURNED OUT TO BE BOTH TIME-CONSUMING AND DIFFICULT. SOME SO-CALLED CLARIFICATIONS WERE IN EFFECT REQUESTS TO RENEGOTIATE. THEY BROUGHT OUT PROPOSALS FOR AMENDMENTS TO THE AGREEMENT OR ITS ATTACHMENTS WHICH ALREADY HAD BEEN THOROUGHLY DEBATED WITH YOU. WE STUCK FAST ON THE AGREEMENT AS PRESENTED, A FEW EXCEPTIONS ASIDE, AND THE ISRAELIS FOR THE MOST PART EVENTUALLY ACQUIESCED.

--THE LEBANESE FOR THEIR PART ALSO CAME UP WITH SOME UNEXPECTED PROPOSALS FOR CHANGES, WHICH WE WERE ABLE TO SATISFY EVENTUALLY WITH ONE EXCEPTION.

--IN TRYING TO RESOLVE THESE ISSUES, HOWEVER, WE HAVE BEEN TRYING TO SECURE LEBANESE AGREEMENTS TO "CLARIFYING STATEMENTS" WHICH THE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE MIGHO MAKE ORALLY IN THE FINAL PLENARY SESSION.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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THE ISRAELIS HAVE BEEN PARTICULARLY INSISTENT ON SPELLING OUT FURTHER DETAILS ABOUT THE OPERATIONS AND THE USE OF VEHICLES BY THE JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS IN ORDER TO PROTECT WHAT THEY SEE AS THEIR VITAL INTERESTS. THE LEBANESE HAVE BEEN RIGIDLY RESISTING MOST SUCH CLARIFICATIONS, USING THE ARGUMENTS THAT WAZZAN HAS GONE AS FAR AS HE IS ABLE, THAT LEBANESE POLITICAL FIGURES AND FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS ARE BEING BRIEFED ON THE BASIS OF ALREADY-UNDERSTOOD COMMITMENTS AND NOT NEW ONES, AND THAT ISRAELI LEAKS HAVE ALREADY CAUSED MAJOR POLITICAL PROBLEMS FOR LEBANON IN THE PAST TWO DAYS.

--IN THIS AREA, THEREFORE, WE ARE TRYING OUT WITH THE ISRAELIS TOMORROW THE IDEA OF SOME UNILATERAL U.S. STATEMENTS OR LETTERS GIVING OR OWN INTERPRETATION OF THE RELEVANT NEGOTIATING HISTORY AND PROMISING TO SUPPORT SUCH UNDERSTANDINGS WHEN OPERATING PROCEDURES, ETC. ARE ESTABLISHED BY THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS COMMITTEE.

--AN EQUALLY TENDENTIOUS ISSUE HAS BEEN THE FOUR SENTENCES DEALING WITH MUTUAL RELATIONS WHICH WAZZAN BELIEVED HE HAD GOTTEN YOUR AGREEMENT TO DROP IN THE U.S. STATEMENT. THE ISRAEL CABINET'S AGREEMENT

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IN PRINCIPLE WOULD, HOWEVER, FALL APART IF THESE ELEMENTS ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THE PACKAGE OF ORAL UNDERSTANDINGS. WE ARE HOPEFUL THAT WE MAY BE ABLE TO PUT TOGETHER AN UNDERSTANDING ON THIS ISSUE TOMORROW, ALTHOUGH IT WILL AMOST CERTAINLY REQUIRE ANOTHER U.S.-ISRAELI SIDE UNDERSTANDING PROVIDING

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ACTION SS-25

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FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5432

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

SECTION 02 OF 02 JERUSALEM 01800

EXDIS - STADIS////////////////////////////////////

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM HABIB AND DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MILI, MOPS, IS, US, SY, LE, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: PRESENT STATUS OF

OUR ASSURANCE THAT, BASED ON CONSULTATIONS WITH THE LEBANESE, LEBANESE WILL NOT BE PROSECUTED FOR HAVING RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL.

--IN LIEU OF AN MOA, THE LEBANESE HAVE PROPOSED A LETTER OF ASSURANCES FROM YOU, MUCH SIMPLIFIED AND SHORTER THAN OUR ORIGINAL PROPOSAL. THIS IS GOOD. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE ISRAELIS WANT TWO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN THEIR MOA, INCLUDING THE DROPPING OF THE

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WORD "PROPORTIONATE" CONCERNING EXERCISES IN SELF DEFENSE, AS WELL AS AN UNDERSTANDING THAT TERRORIST GROUPS IN ADDITION TO THE PLO WILL HAVE TO BE REMOVED FROM LEBANON BEFORE ISRAELI WITHDRAWALS COULD BEGIN. SATISFYING THE LAST CONDITION WOULD BE VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE LEBANESE, AND THE OUTCOME COULD MEAN THAT THE ISRAELIS (AND SYRIANS) WOULD STAY IN LEBANON FOR A LONG TIME. WE OPPOSE SUCH AMENDMENTS (SEE SEPTTEL).

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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--GEMAYEL IS DEEPLY CONCERNED OVER THE HARSH SYRIAN ATTITUDE AND IS SOMEWHAT AT A LOSS AS HOW TO PROCEED IF ASSAD REMAINS STUBBORN.

3. TOMORROW, WEDNESDAY, MAY WELL BE A CRITICAL DAY. BOTH PARTIES, FORTUNATELY, KNOW THAT DELAYS COULD SET BACK AND HURT THEIR BASIC INTERESTS. THAT MAY BE ENOUGH TO GET US OVER THE SERIOUS HUMPS. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE CANNOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT A REAL IMPASSE WILL DEVELOP. IN THAT EVENT, WE WILL WANT TO CONSULT WITH YOU ABOUT NEXT STEPS, BOTH WITH THE LEBANESE AND ISRAELIS.

GROVE

[REDACTED]

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ENCLOSURE= n/a

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LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= N/A

CONCEPTS= AGREEMENT, TROOP WITHDRAWAL, PALESTINIANS

TAGS= PREL, LE, IS, US, SY, PLO

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/CB/IR ⁹² Date: 11/7/97
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STADIS////////////////////////////////////
BEIRUT/JERUSALEM FOR HABIB/DRAPER

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, LE, IS, US
SUBJECT: ISRAEL-LEBANON AGREEMENT: NEXT STEPS

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1. [REDACTED]
2. WE WILL WANT TO HAVE SOME SUGGESTIONS READY FOR THE SECRETARY WHEN HE RETURNS WEDNESDAY NIGHT, MAY 11, ON NEXT STEPS TO BE TAKEN TO BRING ABOUT IMPLEMENTATION OF ISRAELI-LEBANESE AGREEMENT, PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO NEGOTIATING SYRIAN AND PLO WITHDRAWALS. WOULD THEREFORE
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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APPRECIATE RECEIVING YOUR THOUGHTS ON THIS MATTER BY OOB WASHINGTON, MAY 11.

3. SLUG REPLY FOR NEA ONLY. DAM

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UNCLASSIFIEDPAGE 01 BEIRUT 05391 071205Z
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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS NIACT IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE

USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE

SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0256

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Date: 11/2/97

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☐ CLASSIFY as ☐ S or ☐ C Sec.☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or ☐ C

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DAMASCUS FOR HABIB; TEL AVIV FOR AMB. LEWIS FROM DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MOPS, PINT, PINS, LE, SY, XF

SUBJECT: GEMAYEL REQUESTS U.S. HELP WITH ISRAELIS ON
CURRENT FIGHTINGREF: (A) BEIRUT 5381, (B) BEIRUT 5379, (C) TEL AVIV 6204,
ETC.

1. [REDACTED]
2. AT NOON, I MET WITH GEMAYEL AND WAZZAN. GEMAYEL WAS VISIBLY FATIGUED AND DEEPLY DOWNCAST BY THE EXPERIENCE OF THE SHELLING IN THE LAST 24 HOURS. HE SAID THAT MORALE IN THE COUNTRY HAD SUNK TO A LOW. HE WAS DEEPLY FEARFUL THAT, DESPITE THE CEASEFIRE THAT HAD BEEN HOLDING SINCE 0600 THIS MORNING, SHELLING AND COUNTERSHELLING MIGHT START UP AGAIN IN THE LATE AFTERNOON AND EVENING. ASIDE
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 05391 071205Z

FROM THE TRAGIC HUMAN LOSSES, GEMAYEL SAID, THIS FIGHTING PUT INTO QUESTION HIS PLAN TO GO TO THE PARLIAMENT AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT THIS NEXT WEEK FOR APPROVAL OF THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT.

3. GEMAYEL AND THE PRIMIN EXPRESSED THANKS FOR THE FACT THAT THE U.S. HAD URGED THE ISRAELIS TO DO WHAT THEY COULD LAST NIGHT. IN ACTUAL FACT, HOWEVER, GEMAYEL SAID, THE ISRAELIS HAD DONE VERY LITTLE. HE ASKED THAT

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DATE: 8-2-2001

WE PASS ON TO THE ISRAELIS HIS STRONG HOPE THAT THE ISRAELIS WILL ARREST AND NEUTRALIZE ANY OF THE TROUBLE-MAKERS OR FIGHTERS FROM WHATEVER QUARTER, AND FROM ANY FACTION, DRUZE OR MARONITE. NOW THAT THE ISRAELI CABINET HAS GIVEN ITS APPROVAL IN PRINCIPLE TO THE AGREEMENT, ISRAEL HAS A SHARED INTEREST WITH HIM IN SEEING TO IT THAT IT PASSES THE LEBANESE PARLIAMENT IN AN ATMOSPHERE OF REASONABLE CALM AND TRANQUILITY. HE ASKED THAT IF AT ALL POSSIBLE THIS BE PASSED TO THE ISRAELIS BEFORE 1500 LOCAL, AS HE THINKS THERE IS A GOOD CHANCE FIGHTING MAY ERUPT AGAIN.

4. WHILE I RECOGNIZE THAT THERE ARE REALISTIC LIMITS TO WHAT THE ISRAELIS COULD DO IN THIS SITUATION, IT IS INESCAPABLE THAT SOME FIRING OF ARTILLERY IS FROM AREAS WHERE THE ISRAELIS HAVE CONTROL. WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO URGE THAT THE ISRAELIS DO WHATEVER THEY CAN. THE MOOD HERE IS NOT CONDUCTIVE TO RATIONAL DISCUSSION ABOUT THE AGREEMENT. HADDAD, FOR EXAMPLE, SAID IT IS DIFFICULT TO CONSIDER TIGHTENED ARRANGEMENTS FOR GUARANTEEING THE SAFETY OF THE GALILEE WHEN THE SHELLS ARE FALLING ON LEBANESE CITIZENS. DILLON

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FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 5415
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

SECTION 01 OF 04 JERUSALEM 01782

DECAPTIONED

BEIRUT FOR HABIB AND DRAPER

PARIS FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY

E.O. 12356: DECL:0ADR

TAGS: PREL, MARR, MOPS, US, LE, IS, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: MEETING WITH ISRAELI
WORKING TEAM, MAY 9DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/PS/CR/IR Date: 11/2/97
☒ RELEASE ☒ DECLASSIFY
☐ EXCISE ☐ DECLASSIFY EO Citations
☐ DENY IN PARTFOIA Exemptions _____ TS authority to
PA Exemptions _____ ☐ CLASSIFY as ☐ S or ☐ C Sec. _____
☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or ☐ C1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT.)~~

2. SUMMARY:

DURING AN INTENSIVE FIVE HOUR MEETING MAY 9, LEBANON'S POSITIONS WITH RESPECT TO ISRAEL'S "CLARIFICATIONS" WERE REVIEWED WITH THE ISRAELI WORKING TEAM. IN ADDITION, CERTAIN LEBANESE SUGGESTED CHANGES WERE DISCUSSED. SOME OF THE SECURITY ISSUES WERE FURTHER REVISED AND REQUIRE CONSULTATION WITH THE LEBANESE THOUGH FAIRLY GOOD PROGRESS WAS MADE. ON THE CIVILIAN SIDE, THE ISRAELIS ARE ABSOLUTELY DUG IN THAT THE SIGNING SHOULD JOINTLY TAKE PLACE IN KHALDAD AND KIRYAT SHEMONA, THOUGH THEY HAVE CONCEDED.

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ON SIGNING AT THE FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL. THEY ALSO INSIST LEBANON AGREE THAT THE ISSUE OF CLAIMS WILL NOT BE ADDRESSED UNTIL THE OTHER NEW AGREEMENTS IN THE FIELD OF MUTUAL RELATIONS ARE CONCLUDED. THE ISRAELIS ARE UNHAPPY ABOUT LEBANON'S POSITION ON OTHER POINTS, BUT HAVE PARTICULAR PROBLEMS WITH RESPECT TO THE "FLOATING" PARAGRAPH IN THE "ORAL UNDERSTANDING" WHICH WAS SUBMITTED TO THE ISRAELI CABINET AND DID NOT HAVE FULL LEBANESE CONCURRENCE. AT THE END OF THE DAY, THE ISRAELIS AGREED TO CONSIDER

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OUR PROPOSALS TO MEET THE SUBSTANCE OF THEIR CONCERNS IN THIS PARAGRAPH. HABIB WILL NOW REVIEW THE AGENDA AGAIN WITH THE LEBANESE AND INTENDS TO RETURN TO ISRAEL TOMORROW. END SUMMARY.

3. AFTER INTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE LEBANESE ON SUNDAY, MAY 8, ON ISRAEL'S "CLARIFICATIONS," AMBASSADORS HABIB, LEWIS AND DRAPER AND LEGAL ADVISER ROBINSON, ACCOMPANIED BY OTHER MEMBERS OF THEIR TEAMS, MET WITH DAVID KIMCHE AND HIS WORKING GROUP FOR FIVE HOURS MONDAY, MAY 9. HABIB FIRST ADDRESSED THE SECURITY "CLARIFICATIONS."

SECURITY ISSUES

4. MAP: HABIB EXPLAINED LEBANON'S COMPROMISE PROPOSAL ON TH-DRAWING OF "LINE B", FOLLOWING THE ZAHRANI RIVER FROM ITS SOURCE AND THEN EXTENDING UPWARDS TO MEET ISRAEL'S PROPOSED LINE. ISRAEL BASICALLY ACCEPTED THIS COMPROMISE, THOUGH THEY WANT "LINE B" TO BE ADJUSTED WHERE THE ZAHRANI RIVER DIPS DOWN TOWARDS THE INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY SO THAT "LINE B" WOULD BE CLOSER TO 20 KILOMETERS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY. HABIB SAID HE

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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WOULD TRY TO ELIMINATE THE "DIP" WITH THE LEBANESE. IT WAS ALSO AGREED AMERICAN MAPS WILL BE USED.

5. UNIFIL (PARA 4, SECURITY ANNEX): HABIB EXPLAINED THAT LEBANON WOULD NOT ACCEPT THE DELETION OF TYRE UNDER THIS PARAGRAPH. THE ISRAELIS ACCEPTED RELUCTANTLY.

6. APPENDIX (WEAPONS): THE ISRAELI SIDE AGREED TO SOME MODIFICATION IN THE APPENDIX, WHICH STILL HAVE TO BE FORMALLY APPROVED BY LEBANON. WE DO NOT ANTICIPATE PROBLEMS.

7. JABAL BARUK (AGREED MINUTE, ANNEX, PARA 1.B) HABIB SAID THE LEBANESE WERE CONCERNED ABOUT THE FLAT PROHIBITION ON ARTILLERY IN THE JABAL BARUK AREA, AND ISRAEL FINALLY ACCEPTED THAT WEAPONS LIMITATIONS DETAILED IN THE APPENDIX WOULD ALSO APPLY IN THAT AREA, OR IN OTHER WORDS, THE LEBANESE CAN DEPLOY 155S OR SMALLER CALIBER ARTILLERY PIECES IN THIS AREA.

8. NAVAL EXCLUSION ZONE (ANNEX, PARA 2.G1): IT WAS EXPLAINED THAT THE LEBANESE EITHER WANTED TO MAINTAIN THE EXISTING NAVAL EXCLUSION ZONE OR TO HAVE A 6 MILE ZONE WHICH WOULD NOT HOWEVER EXTEND AS FAR NORTH ALONG THE LEBANESE COAST. THE ISRAELIS FINALLY ACCEPTED THE

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PRESENT NAVAL -EXCLUSION ZONE.

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9. DAILY VERIFICATION BY THE JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS (AGREED MINUTE, ANNEX, 3 F 4): HABIB AGREED HE WOULD TRY OUT WITH THE LEBANESE LANGUAGE WHICH WOULD DELETE THE PRESENT "IF NECESSARY" CLAUSE IN THIS PARAGRAPH, AND TO ADD AT THE END "UNLESS THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS COMMITTEE DECIDES IT IS NOT NECESSARY."

10. LEBANESE COMMAND OF THE JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS (AGREED MINUTE, ANNEX 3 F 5). HABIB SAID THE LEVANESE

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COULD NOT ACCEPT ADDITIONAL LANGUAGE INCLUDED ON THIS SUBJECT IN THE AGREED MINUTE. HOWEVER, LEBANON WAS PREPARED, AS PART OF THE "ORAL GUIDELINES TO ACCEPT LANGUAGE THAT "THE LEBANESE COMMANDER WILL TAKE INTO

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EXDIS

BEIRUT FOR HABIB AND DRAPER

PARIS FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY

E.O. 12356: DECL:0ADR
TAGS: PREL, MARR, MOPS, US, LE, IS, XF
SUBJECT; HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: MEETING WITH ISRAELI

CONSIDERATION THE REQUESTS OF THE ISRAELI SENIOR OFFICER
WITHIN THE MISSION ASSIGNED BY THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS
COMMITTEE; HOWEVER, THE DECISION OF THE LEBANESE OFFICER
IS BINDING." THE ISRAELIS VIGOROUSLY OPPOSED THE FINAL
"BINDING" COMMENT AND HABIB AGREED TO TRY OUT A FORMULA
WHICH WOULD STRIKE OUT THE FINAL CLAUSE AND BEGIN THE
STATEMENT WITH, "IN EXERCISING HIS COMMAND, THE LEBANESE
COMMANDER..." IT WAS ALSO EXPLAINED THAT LEBANON AGREED
THAT WHN THE JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS OPERATED ON THE
ISRAELI SIDE OF THE BORDER (ANNEX, 3, F, 3)) THEY WOULD
BE COMMANDED BY AN ISRAELI OFFICER.

11. SUPERVISIION OF THE JOINT SUPERVISORY TEMAS (AGREED
MINUTE, ANNEX, PARA 3.F.8): HABIB STATED FLATLY THAT THIS

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Date Printed: 10/22/1996

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WAS THE MOST IMPORTANT PART OF THE CONCEPT GUIDING THE JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS FOR THE LEBANESE. IT SIMPLY COULD NOT BE CHANGED. THE ISRAELIS SAID THAT IF THIS WERE THE CASE, LEBANON WOULD HAVE TO AGREE TO ADDITIONAL "ORAL GUIDELINES" GOVERNING THE OPERATIONS OF THE TEAMS.

12. OPERATION OF THE JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS (AGREED MINUTE, ANNEX, PARA 3 F 9): TAMIR SAID ISRAEL NEEDED THREE "SAFETY VALVES" IF PARA 8 WAS TO BE RETAINED IN ITS PRESENT FORM, AS REQUESTED BY LEBANON. THESE POINTS, WHICH COULD BE INCLUDED IN THE "ORAL GUIDELINES", WERE:

-- ON GROUND MISSIONS, EACH TEAMS WILL HAVE TWO VEHICLES FROM EACH PARTY (APC'S OR WHEELED VEHICLES). THE VEHICLES WILL BE PAINTED IN AN AGREED COLOR;

-- LANGUAGE ON SEARCH OF SUSPICIOUS VEHICLES AND PERSONS, ON WHICH THE FOLLOWING COMPROMISE WAS REACHED: "WHILE CARRYING OUT VERIFICATION MISSIONS, THE LEBANESE MEMBERS OF THE TEAM COULD -- IN THE ABSENCE OF LAF OR POLICE UNITS AND THERE APPEARS TO BE A POTENTIAL VIOLATION -- STOP SUSPICIOUS VEHICLES AND SEARCH THEM, DETAIN PERSONS IF THEIR BEHAVIOR WAS SUSPICIOUS OR TAKE CONTROL OF A SUSPICIOUS BUILDING WHILE AWAITING REGULAR LAF OR POLICE UNITS TO CARRY OUT THE ACTUAL INSPECTION. ALL MEMBERS OF THE TEAM - ISRAELI AND LEBANESE - CAN OBSERVE HOW OPERATIONS ARE CARRIED OUT BY REGULAR LAF OR POLICE UNITS;" AND

-- AN ORAL GUIDELINE STATING CLEARLY THAT THE JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS CAN OPERATE THROUGHOUT THE SECURITY REGION.


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HABIB SAID HE WOULD TRY OUT THESE "ORAL GUIDELINES" WITH THE LEBANESE, SINCE THEY FORMED PART OF THE NEGOTIATING HISTORY AND RECORD.

13. LOCATION OF SUPERVISION CENTERS (AGREED MINUTE, ANNEX, (PARA 3 F 5(1): AFTER A GREAT DEAL OF DISCUSSION, THE ISRAELI SIDE COUNTERPROPOSED THAT THE SECOND CENTER SHOULD BE LOCATED IN THE VICINITY OF "RUMMAN," JUST NORTH OF NABATIEH. (THE LEBANESE HAD SUGGESTED "MAIFADOUN," SOUTHWEST OF NABATIEH.)

14. TEAM PRESENCE IN SUPERVISION CENTERS (AGREED MINUTE, PARA 3 F 5 3(D): HABIBV EXPLAINED THAT THE LEBANESE COULD NOT ACCEPT ANY LANGUAGE WHICH INFERRED THAT THE TEAMS WOULD CONSTITUTE A "RESIDUAL ISRAELI PRESENCE" IN LEBANON. THE ISRAELIS REPEATEDLY ATTEMPTED TO EITHER EXCLUDE THIS

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PARAGRAPH, OR TO HAVE WORDING WHICH WOULD ALLOW THE TEAMS TO "REST" AT THE CENTERS. THE ISSUE WAS NEVER FORMALLY RESOLVED.

15. STAFFING OF SUPERVISION CENTERS (AGREED MINUTE, ANNEX 3.F.5(H)): THE ISRAELIS FINALLY BOUGHT OFF ON AN ORAL GUIDELINE WHICH WOULD STATE: "IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE ISRAELI STAFF IN THE CENTERS WILL INCLUDE THOSE NEEDED FOR COMMUNICATIONS, OPERATIONS AND ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION."

16. SECURITY FENCE: THE ISRAELI SIDE AGREED TO AN ORAL FORMULATION WHICH READS: ANY CHANGE IN THE FENCE WILL BE NOTIFIED IN THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS COMMITTEE SUFFICIENTLY IN ADVANCE TO ALLOW THE FENCE TO BE APPROPRIATELY REPLACED."

17. SPECIAL CROSSING POINTS: IT WAS AGREED THAT THE ORAL GUIDELINE WILL STATE THAT "THE COMMANDERS ON THE GROUND WILL ARRANGE SUCH CROSSING POINTS."

P.

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EXDIS

BEIRUT FOR HABIB AND DRAPER

PARIS FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY

E.O. 12356: DECL:0ADR

TAGS: PREL, MARR, MOPS, US, LE, IS, XF

SUBJECT; HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: MEETING WITH ISRAELI

18. TERRITORIAL BRIGADE: THE ISRAELI SIDE AGREED TO THE
LEBANESE PROPOSED ORAL UNDERSTANDING THAT THE "INTEGRITY
OF THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE WILL MAINTAINED."

CIVILIAN ISSUES

19. RECOGNITION: HABIB SAID THE LEBANESE ACCEPTED THE
FORMULATION THAT THE AGREEMENT SPEAKS FOR ITSELF ON THIS
ISSUE, AT LEAST IN OFFICIAL COMMENT, THOUGH THEY WERE
CONCERNED BY NEWSPAPER REPORTS THAT ISRAEL CONSIDERED

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THE AGREEMENT WAS TANTAMOUNT TO RECOGNITION.

20. LEVEL OF SIGNATURE: LEBANON WOULD NOT ACCEPT SIGNING AT TH-EN-TER LEVEL. FATTAL WAS ALSO DUG IN

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ON THE ISRAELI PROPOSAL TO HAVE THE SIGNING TAKE PLACE IN LEBANON AND ISRAEL AND HAD ASKED IF THERE WAS A PRECEDENT FOR THIS PROCEDURE. KIMCHE REPORTED THAT THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NO CHANCE THAT ISRAEL WOULD RELENT IN ITS INSISTENCE THAT THE SIGNING TAKE PLACE JOINTLY IN KHALDAH AND KIRYAT SHEMONA; NOR WOULD ISRAEL EVER ACCEPT SEPARATE PARALLEL SIGNING IN THE TWO COUNTRIES. KIMCHE SAID THAT ISRAEL HAD CONCEDED ON SIGNING AT THE FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL, BUT WOULD NOT ON THIS POINT.

21. ARTICLE 9 (ABROGATION): LEBANON WOULD NOT ACCEPT A "CHAPEAU" TO THIS ARTICLE, THOUGH THEY WERE WILLING TO MODIFY THE LAST CLAUSE TO READ "SUBJECT TO AND IN CONFORMITY WITH ITS CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURES." KOZAK ALSO CLARIFIED THAT, ACCORDING TO THE LEBANESE INTERPRETATION, WHEN THE NEW AGREEMENTS WERE CONCLUDED UNDER ARTICLE 8(2), THEY WOULD BE RATIFIED IN THEIR PARLIAMENT AND THE BOYCOTT LAW WOULD BE AUTOMATICALLY ABROGATED.

22. ARTICLE 10 (REPLACEMENT): IT WAS EXPLAINED THAT LEBANON WOULD NOT RELINQUISH IN HAVING THE WORD "SUPERCEDE" IN THIS ARTICLE SINCE THEY WANTED TO LEAVE OPEN THE POSSIBILITY THAT IT WOULD BE REPLACED BY A PEACE TREATY. THE ISRAELI SIDE BRISTLED.

23. ARTICLE 11 (DISPUTE RESOLUTION): LEBANON WOULD ALSO NOT AGR, B EXPLAINED, TO THE REFERENCE TO ARTICLE 4 IN THIS ARTICLE. THE ISRAELI SIDE DID NOT SPECIFICALLY RESPOND.

24. CLAIMS (AGREED MINUTE): HABIB SAID GOL WAS PREPARED TO MKE IT CLEAR THAT CLAIMS WOULD APPLY ONLY TO LEBANESE CITIZENS PRIOR TO 1948 AND THEIR HEIRS, BUT COULD

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NOT ACCEPT RESTRICTING DISCUSSION ON CLAIMS UNTIL THE CONCLUSION OF OTHER AGREEMENTS UNDER ARTICLE 8 (2). KIMCHE SAID THAT UNLESS THE TWO CONDITIONS WERE MET, THERE WOULD BE "NO DEAL." THIS WAS HOW IT HAD BEEN PRESENTED TO THE CABINET AND IF THE LEBANESE PERSISTED, THE MATTER WOULD HAVE TO GO BACK TO THE CABINET. HABIB REPLIED

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TERSELY THAT HE THOUGHT WE WERE TALKING ABOUT "CLARIFICATIONS" ON A DOCUMENT WHICH HAD ALREADY BEEN AGREED TO BY THE CABINET. ---

25. ORAL UNDERSTANDING: KIMCHE INSISTED THAT THERE SHOULD BE A SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO TRANSPORT WITH RESPECT TO INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS. HABIB SAID HE WOULD INFORM THE LEBANESE THAT ISRAEL WAS INSISTING ON THIS POINT.

26. MOST OF THE ENSUING DISCUSSION CENTERED ON THE "FLOATING PARAGRAPH." HABIB REVIEWED ITS BACKGROUND AT LENGTH, AND OUR SUBSEQUENT EFFORTS TO ENSURE THAT ISRAEL'S ESSENTIAL CONCERNS WERE MET. KOZAK EXPLAINED LEBANON WANTED THE SENTENCE DELETED ("NO MEASURES WILL BE TAKEN AGAINST LEBANESE FOR VISITING OR TRADING WITH ISRAEL, OR AGAINST LEBANESE BECAUSE OF HAVING MAINTAINED RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL") BECAUSE IT WAS UNCONSTITUTIONAL; HOWEVER, THE LEBANESE CAN HAVE AN AMERICAN SIDE LETTER TO ISRAEL CONTAINING THE SAME LANGUAGE, BASED ON ASSURANCES PROVIDED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL. IT WAS POINTED OUT THAT THIS FORM OF ASSURANCE WOULD BE EVEN STRONGER THAN THAT CONTAINED IN THE ORAL STATEMENT. KIMCHE INITIALLY STATED THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NO GIVE ON CHANGING THIS PARAGRAPH, POINTING OUT HE HAD PLACED TREMENDOUS STRESS ON IT DURING THE CABINET MEETING. HOWEVER, HE FINALLY AGREED TO PASS ON THE AMERICAN SUGGESTION TO HIS SUPERIORS. HE ALSO TOOK EXCEPTION TO LEBANESE MODIFICATIONS IN THE SECOND SENTENCE OF THE PARAGRAPH, SAYING THAT IT DILUTED ITS IMPORT.

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EXDIS

BEIRUT FOR HABIB AND DRAPER

PARIS FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY

E.O. 12356: DECL:0ADR

TAGS: PREL, MARR, MOPS, US, LE, IS, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: MEETING WITH ISRAELI

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AMMAN FOR THE SECRETARY AND HABIB FROM DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MOPS, LE, IS, XF

SUBJECT: INTERRUPTED MEETING ON THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI
AGREEMENT

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

2. JOINED BY AMBASSADOR DILLON AND MEMBERS OF OUR TEAM, I MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SALIM AND WADI' HADDAD IMMEDIATELY UPON ARRIVAL AT THE PALACE FROM THE AIRPORT. THE MOOD WAS GRIM. THEY WERE PREOCCUPIED WITH THE FIGHTING THEN GOING ON IN THE SHUF, AND RECOUNTED STORIES OF THE DEAD LYING IN THE STREETS IN ONE VILLAGE. WAZZAN AND GEMAYEL WERE MEETING ELSEWHERE ABOUT THE SHUF SITUATION.

3. I HAD BARELY BEGUN MY PRESENTATION WHEN THE TELEPHONE INTERRUPTED, AND CONTINUED INTERRUPTING VIRUTALLY MINUTE BY MINUTE. I WAS ONLY ABLE TO

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SKIM THROUGH BRIEFLY WHAT HAD TRANSPIRED, AND I STRESSED THAT THE AGREEMENT DOES NOT HAVE TO GO BACK TO THE CABINET. AS INSTRUCTED BY THE SECRETARY, I MENTIONED THE THRUST OF THE PRESIDENT'S TELEPHONE TALK WITH THE SECRETARY OF YESTERDAY'S DATE.

4. AT ONE POINT, HADDAD SAID THAT HE WOULD RATHER THAT DILLON AND I WOULD DO WHAT WE COULD TO GET THE ISRAELIS TO TAKE SOME CONTROL OVER THE

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SITUATION "OTHERWISE, THERE WOULD BE ONE LEFT TO SIGN THE AGREEMENT." AT ABOUT THIS MOMENT ALSO, HADDAD SAID HE HAD RECEIVED INTERCEPTS SUGGESTING THAT THE PSP WOULD START TO SHELL THE AIRPORT, THE PALACE AND THE DEFENSE MINISTRY AREAS. HE HINTED THAT THEY WERE GOING TO TAKE SOME SECURITY PRECAUTIONS FOR GEMAYEL.

5. ON THAT NOTE, WE PROMISED TO DO WHAT WE COULD WITH THE ISRAELIS RIGHT AWAY AND ARRANGED TO MEET TOMORROW MORNING AT 0900 TO RESUME OUR DISCUSSION OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT. I SUBSEQUENTLY TELEPHONED SAM LEWIS WHILE DILLON SENT OUT SOME FLASH CABLES. SAM WAS IN TOUCH WITH ARENS RIGHT AWAY, WHO SAID HE WAS VERY MUCH AWARE OF THE SITUATION AND THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE DOING WHAT THEY COULD.

6. COMMENT: I FELT I HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO BREAK OFF THE MEETING WHEN I DID. THE MOOD WAS SO BITTER AND SO PERMEATED WITH SUSPICIONS OF ISRAELI "INACTION" IN THE SHUF THAT I WAS AFRAID THAT THE WELL WAS BEING POISONED FOR A RATIONAL DISCUSSION OF WHAT THE ISRAELIS MEANT BY "CLARIFICATIONS", ETC. DILLON



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DOC_NUMBER: 83STATE127029

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AMEMBASSY BONN
AMCONSUL CALCUTTA
AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
AMEMBASSY DHAKA
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA

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AMCONSUL KARACHI
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMCONSUL MADRAS
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT
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//ZFF FOR TEL AVIV O N L Y//

E.O. 12356:N/A

TAGS: OPRC

SUBJECT: DEPARTMENT PRESS BRIEFING MAY 6, 1983

FOR ADDRESSEE POSTS' INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE, FOLLOWING
ARE EXCERPTS FROM TODAY'S PRESS BRIEFING. SPOKESMAN WAS
ALAN ROMBERG.

Q. HAVE YOU ANY COMMENT ON THE NEWS COMING FROM JERUSALEM
ABOUT THE AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE
ISRAELIS FROM LEBANON?

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A. I DON'T HAVE ANYTHING INDEPENDENT OF WHAT THE SECRETARY
SAID.....HAS THERE BEEN REPORTING OF WHAT HE SAID SO THAT
YOU ARE ALL AWARE OF THAT?

WHY DON'T I JUST READ AN ACCOUNT OF WHAT HE SAID AS HE WAS
LEAVING THE HOTEL ON HIS WAY TO THE AIRPORT. HE SAID:
"WE'RE REALLY PLEASED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE
CABINET OF ISRAEL HAVE DECIDED TO ACCEPT THIS AGREEMENT.
WE RECOGNIZE THERE IS A TREMENDOUS AMOUNT OF WORK TO BE
DONE, BUT THIS IS A MILESTONE, AND WE ARE DETERMINED TO
KEEP ON AND DO THE ADDITIONAL THINGS THAT ARE NECESSARY TO
SEE THAT IT WORKS. AT THIS MOMENT I JUST WANT TO SAY HOW
GRATEFUL I AM FOR THE HARD WORK AND EFFORTS, CONSTRUCTIVE
ATMOSPHERE, EARNEST INTENTIONS THROUGHOUT THAT THE NEGOTIA-
TORS BOTH HERE AND IN LEBANON HAVE DISPLAYED THROUGHOUT
THIS PERIOD.

"I WOULD POINT OUT THAT THIS AGREEMENT WAS VERY CLOSE TO
COMPLETED WHEN I ARRIVED DUE TO THE GOOD WORK OF THE
NEGOTIATING TEAMS WHO HAD BEEN HERE, WITH THE HELP OF PHIL
HABIB AND MORRIE DRAPER, AND I HAD THE PLEASURE OF HELPING
TO PUT A LITTLE OF THE ICING ON THE CAKE, BUT AT ANY RATE
WE HOPE IT IS GOING TO BE A REAL GOOD CAKE. NOW WE ARE
GOING TO JORDAN TO TALK WITH KING HUSSEIN."

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THOSE WERE THE SECRETARY'S REMARKS AS HE WAS LEAVING THE HOTEL. HE WAS ON HIS WAY TO JORDAN WHERE HE WILL OVERNIGHT BEFORE GOING ON TO SYRIA, SAUDI ARABIA, AND ON SUNDAY ON TO PARIS.

Q. ANYTHING NEW ON SOVIET ADVISERS IN LEBANON?

A. NO, NOTHING NEW ON THAT. DAM

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4. THE FOLLOWING IS THE STATUS OF ISSUES FOLLOWING THE MEETING:

--PREAMBLE: THE LEVEL OF SIGNATURE OF THE AGREEMENT REMAINS UNRESOLVED.

-- ARTICLE 1: THE LEBANESE AGREE TO NUMBERING THE EXISTING CLAUSES AS PARAGRAPHS 1, 2, AND 3 AND DELETING THE WORD "ACCORDINGLY" AND CONFIRM THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF FATTAL'S INSERTION OF "TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 2" AT THE BEGINNING OF PARAGRAPH 3. THEY MAINTAIN THEIR REJECTION OF THE ISRAELI ADDITION OF THE WORDS "RECOGNIZE AND" IN PARAGRAPH 1, BUT CONFIRM THAT THEY WOULD BE WILLING AT THE APPROPRIATE POINT TO STRENGTHEN THE SECOND CLAUSE OF THE PREAMBLE BY REPLACING "RECOGNIZING THEIR RIGHT" WITH "RECOGNIZING EACH STATE'S RIGHT AND OBLIGATION" AS A MEANS OF RESOLVING THE RECOGNITION MATTER.

-- ARTICLE 7: THE LEBANESE ACCEPT THE EDITORIAL CHANGE SUBSTITUTING "THE PRESENT AGREEMENT" FOR "THIS AGREEMENT." THEY CONFIRM THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF FATTAL'S NEW LANGUAGE FOR THE LAST SENTENCE: "NEW CONTRIBUTORS TO SUCH FORCES SHALL BE SELECTED FROM AMONG STATES WHICH HAVE DIPLOMATIC

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RELATIONS WITH BOTH PARTIES TO THE PRESENT AGREEMENT."

-- ARTICLE 8.1.A: THE LEBANESE ACCEPT THE EDITORIAL CHANGE SUBSTITUTING "THE PRESENT AGREEMENT" FOR "THIS AGREEMENT." REGARDING THE NAME OF THE "MILITARY COMMITTEE," THEY REJECT THE LATEST ISRAELI PROPOSAL OF "SECURITY COMMITTEE" --WHICH WE STRONGLY URGED THEY ACCEPT TO PUT THIS ISSUE TO REST--AS OVER BROAD, ESPECIALLY IN ARABIC ("AL-LAJNA AL-AMNIYYA"), CITING THE OPPOSITION OF PRIME MINISTER WAZZAN AS THE MAJOR OBSTACLE. THEY HAVE WITHDRAWN THEIR OWN PROPOSAL--SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS SUPERVISORY--AND SUPPORT THE U.S. PROPOSAL OF "SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS COMMITTEE." THEY ALSO CAME UP WITH A NEW ALTERNATIVE: "MILPTARY ARRANGEMENTS COMMITTEE." WE SUSPECT FROM THE BYPLAY AMONG THE LEBANESE THAT, IF PUSH CAME TO SHOVE, THEY WOULD ACCEPT "MILITARY COMMITTEE" PURE AND SIMPLE.

--ARTICLE 8.1.F: THE LEBANESE ACCEPT OUR PROPOSAL ON THE LIAISON OFFICES WHICH THE ISRAELIS HAVE PREVIOUSLY ACCEPTED.

--ARTICLE 8.2: THE LEBANESE CONFIRM THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF THE SUBSTITUTION OF "NEGOTIATIONS IN ORDER TO CONCLUDE AGREEMENTS" FOR "NEGOTIATIONS WITH A VEIW TO REACHING EARLY AGREEMENTS."

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--ARTICLE 9: THE LEBANESE MAINTAIN THEIR POSITION ON A SEPARATE CLAIMS ARTICLE, BUT IF ISRAEL WOULD ACCEPT THE U.S. PROPOSAL TO REPLACE IT WITH A PHRASE IN ARTICLE 8.2 THEY WOULD DO LIKEWISE. HOWEVER, THEY WOULD EXPAND IT AS FOLLOWS: "AND ON CLAIMS BY CITIZENS OF EITHER PARTY ON PROPERTIES IN THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER PARTY."

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EXDIS - MILITARY ADDEES HANDEL AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
FOR HABIB AND DRAPER FROM ROSS

--ARTICLE 10.1: THE LEBANESE STRONGLY MAINTAIN THEIR POSITION THAT THE REFERENCE TO AN EVENTUAL TREATY OF PEACE NOT BE QUALIFIED IN ANY WAY. WITHOUT BACKING AWAY FROM THE TEXT THUS FAR AGREED, THEY INTEND TO INDICATE TO

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THE ISRAELIS THAT THEIR PREFERENCE WOULD BE DROP THIS PARAGRAPH ENTIRELY AND ALLOW EACH PARTY THE FREEDOM TO CHARACTERIZE THE PRESENT AGREEMENT AS IT WISHED.

--ARTICLE 10.2: THE LEBANESE CONFIRM THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF FATTAL'S REVISION: "THE PRESENT AGREEMENT MAY BE MODIFIED OR AMENDED BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES."

--ARTICLE 11.1: THE LEBANESE REJECT THE ISRAELI PROPOSAL TO MOVE THIS PARAGRAPH TO ARTICLE 8 AND TO RE-WORD IT

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TO REQUIRE FORMAL ABORGATION OF THE BOYCOTT IN ONE YEAR. LEBANON HAS, HOWEVER, AGREED TO MAKE IT A SEPARATE ARTICLE 9, SO AS TO HAVE IT FOLLOW IMMEDIATELY ON ARTICLE 8. (COMMENT: WE ARE RETYPING THE DRAFT AGREEMENT TO REFLECT THIS CHANGE, BUT THE NUMBERING OF ARTICLES IN THIS MESSAGE WILL CONTINUE TO REFLECT THE U.S. COMPILATION OF APRIL 25.)

--ARTICLE 11.2: THE LEBANESE CONFIRM THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF THE ADDITION OF "APPLY EXISTING OBLIGATION," MAKING THE TEXT READ "THE PARTIES UNDERTAKE NOT TO APPLY EXISTING OBLIGATIONS, ENTER INTO ANY OBLIGATION, OR ADOPT LAWS OR REGULATIONS IN CONFLICT WITH THE PRESENT AGREEMENT."

--ARTICLE 13.2: THE LEBANESE MAINTAIN THEIR POSITION THAT THE EXCLUSION FROM THE ARBITRAL PROCEDURE FORESEEN IN ARTICLE 13.1 BE LIMITED TO ISSUES RELATING TO THE ANNEX AND NOT EXTENDED TO ARTICLES 4 AND 6, AS PROPOSED BY THE ISRAELIS.

--AGREED MINUTE TO ARTICLE 6: THE LEBANESE CONFIRM THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF THE INTRODUCTORY PHRASE "WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE ANNEX REGARDING THE SECURITY REGION,".

--ANNEX 1.B: THE LEBANESE MAINTAIN THEIR POSITION ON THE EXCLUSION OF THE PEAK OF JABAL BARUK FROM THE SECURITY REGION.

--ANNEX 2.D: THE LEBANESE ACCEPT THE SHORT FORM OF THE TEXT AS FOLLOWS: "THE EXISTING LOCAL UNITS WILL BE INTEGRATED AS SUCH INTO THE LEBANESE ARMY IN CONFORMITY

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WITH LEBANESE ARMY REGULATIONS. THE PROCESS OF
EXTENDING LEBANESE AUTHORITY OVER THESE UNITS AND THE
CIVIL GUARD UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE -----
COMMITTEE SHALL START IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE ENTRY INTO
FORCE OF THE AGREEMENT AND SHALL TERMINATE PRIOR TO THE
COMPLETION OF THE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON."
(COMMENT: THE LEBANESE WISH TO SUBSTITUTE "THESE UNITS"
ABOVE FOR "THE EXISTING LOCAL BRIGADE." THIS IS
CONSISTENT WITH OTHER AGREED CHANGES.)

--ANNEX 3.B: THE LEBANESE MAINTAIN THEIR POSITION ON
U.S. PARTICIPATION ON THE MILITARY COMMITTEE, ALTHOUGH
THEY WOULD ACCEPT THE U.S. PROPOSAL THAT IT PARTICIPATE
ONLY WHEN REQUESTED BY ONE OF THE PARTIES.

--ANNEX 3.C.3: THE LEBANESE CONFIRM THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF
DELETION OF THE BRACKETED LANGUAGE.

--ANNEX 3.F: THE LEBANESE INSIST THAT A DEADLINE FOR
PHASING OUT THE JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS IS ESSENTIAL TO
ANY FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF SUCH ISSUES AS THEIR
NUMBER, ETC. WE FLOATED A BRIDGING IDEA TO BE ADDED TO
ANNEX 3.F.5 AS FOLLOWS: "...THEIR EQUIPMENT, AND THEIR
DURATION, WITH THE OBJECT OF MODIFYING OR REPLACING
THEM WITH OTHER MEANS OF VERIFICATION WITHIN TWO YEARS
IF, ON THE BASIS OF ITS REVIEW OF THE SECURITY SITUATION
IN THE SECURITY REGION, THE -----COMMITTEE SO DECIDES."
THE LEBANESE REACTED COOLY TO THIS PROPOSAL, ESPECIALLY
THE NOTION THAT IT WOULD TAKE A DECISION OF THE
MILITARY COMMITTEE TO END THE TEAMS' OPERATIONS. -- ANNEX
PARAGRAPH 3.F.2: THE LEBANESE ACCEPTED THE DELETION OF
THE SECOND SENTENCE, AS HAD BEEN AGREED AD REFERENDUM
APRIL 25. BY COMMON U.S.-LEBANESE AGREEMENT, THE PHRASE
DOWLING

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EXDIS - MILITARY ADDEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

FOR HABIB A
ND DRAPER FROM ROSS

"AND ASCERTAIN THAT VIOLATIONS HAVE BEEN RECTIFIED" WAS
ADDED AT THE END OF THE PARAGRAPH TO ENSURE CONSISTENCY
IN THE VARIOUS STATEMENTS OF THE MISSION OF THE JOINT
SUPERVISORY TEAMS.

-- ANNEX PARAGRAPH 3.F.3: WE FLOATED THE U.S. BRIDGING
PROPOSAL WHICH DRAPER HAD PROVIDED TO THE ISRAELIS. THE
LEBANESE CONFIRMED THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF RECIPROCITY
WAS THE KEY; THEY AVE LESS CONCERNED AS TO THE ACTUAL
ARRANGEMENTS. THEY COULD ACCEPT THE U.S. PROPOSAL, ON
CONDITION THAT "ON THE ISRAELI OF THE INTERNATUONAL
BOUNDARY" BE AMENDED TO READ "INSIDE THE ISRAELI SIDE
OF THE INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY."

-- ANNEX PARAGRAPH 4: LEBANESE MAINTAIN THEIR POSITION
ON UNIFIL. THEY HAVE BECOME ACUTELY AWARE THAT EXCLU-

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SION OF UNIFILFROM THE SOUTH WOULD PRECLUDE A UNIFIL
ROLE THROUGHOUT LEBANON. HOWEVER THEY CONFIRM THEIR
WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT THE U.S. IDEA OF ONE BATTALION
IN SIDON IF ISRAEL WILL DO LIKEWISE.

-- ANNEX PARAGRAPH 6: THE LEBANESE MAINTAIN THEIR POSI-
TION ON WITHDRAWAL ARRANGEMENTS. (HERE THERE SEEMS TO BE
A DISCONNECT BETWEEN THE ISRAELI MILITARY -- WHO HAVE
ARGUED THAT THIS BE COVERED IN THE COVER AGREEMENT --
AND THE CHIEF NEGOTIATORS, WHO HAVE AGREED IT BE DONE
IN THE ANNEX AND SIDE LETTERS.)

-- LEBANESE PROPPSED MINUTES ON PARAGRAPH 2.B OF ANNEX:
THE LEBANESE MAPNTAIN THEIR POSITION ON MAJOR HADDAD.
HOWEVER, THEY AGREED TO THE U.S. PROPOSAL ON INTEGRATION

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OF THESE FORCES (WHICH IT HAD BEEN AGREED TO MOVE FROM THE ANNEX TO THE AGREED MINUTES), WITH ONE CHANGE ("ENCOMPASS" VICE "INCLUDE") AND ONE SHIFT -- "IN ACCORDANCE WITH LEBANESE ARMY REGULATIONS" NOW COMES AT THE END OF THE FIRST SENTENCE. THE REFERENCE TO LEBANESE LAW IS DELETED. -- LEBANESE-PROPOSED MINUTE ON PARAGRAPH 2.G: THE LEBANESE MAINTAIN THEIR POSITION THAT ANY UNDERSTANDING ON THE OPERATION OF ISRAELI NAVAL VESSELS IN LEBANESE WATERS BE UNWRITTEN. -- LEBANESE-PROPOSED MINUTES ON PARAGRAPH 3.F.5: AT OUR URGING, THE LEBANESE ARE PREPARING DETAILED PAPERS ON OPERATIONS CENTERS AND JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS. THEY CONTINUE TO SEEK A NUMBER OF TEAMS SMALLER THAN EIGHT. WE SUBMITTED A BRIDGING IDEA AS FOLLOWS: "THERE MAY BE UP TO EIGHT TEAMS OPERATING DAILY ON LAND, SEA, AND AIR, IT BEING UNDERSTOOD THAT THE ----- COMMITTEE WILL EACH DAY ASSIGN THE MINIMUM NUMBER NECESSARY TO PERFORM THE AGREED MISSION." THE LEBANESE SHOWED INTEREST IN THIS IDEA, BUT DID NOT COMMIT THEMSELVES.

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-- ORAL UNDERSTANDING CONCERNING INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS: DESPITE OUR ARGUMENTS THAT LEBANON MUST DEFINE ITS POSITION CLEARLY, THE LEBANESE REFUSE TO ENGAGE IN ANY DISCUSSION OF THE VARIOUS DRAFTS ON THIS SUBJECT, MAINTAINING THAT THE MOST RECENT PAPER TABLED BY AMBASSADOR KHARMA WAS LEBANON'S LAST WORD ON THE SUBJECT. THE LEBANESE WOULD NOT BUDGE FROM THEIR REQUIREMENT FOR A SENTENCE ON NON-IMPORTATION FROM ISRAEL OF PRODUCTS AND GOODS THAT LEBANON PRODUCED FOR EXPORTS. SIMILARLY, THEY WOULD NOT CONSIDER ANY EXPLICIT OR IMPLICIT REFERENCE TO ABROGATION OF THE ARAB BOYCOTT. THEIR EMPHASIS THROUGHOUT WAS ON A "AD HOC, INFORMAL" NATURE OF THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS, AND THEY CRITICIZED BITTERLY ISRAEL'S CONTINUING ESCALATION OF ITS DEMANDS AND ITS INSISTENCE ON PRECISE LANGUAGE IN DETAILED TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS AND ARRANGEMENTS. THEY ARGUED THAT THEY HAD RELUCTANTLY ACCEPTED A U.S. PROPOSAL THAT THEY LET IN A FEW ISRAELI GOODS AND NOW WERE FACED WITH TREATING ALL ISRAELI PRODUCTS ON A NON-DISCRIMINATORY BASIS. IF LEBANON WERE ASKED TO ACCEPT ANYTHING FURTHER, TUENI SAID, IT WOULD LIKELY AS NOT REFUSE TO SIGN ANY AGREEMENT.

5. COMMENT: OVERALL, WE URGED THE LEBANESE TO STOP REACTING EMOTIONALLY TO ISRAELI STATEMENTS IN NON-PAPERS REGARDING THE DETAILS OF THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS -- PARTICULARLY RE THE JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS. THEY SHOULD FOCUS ON WHAT THEY WERE BEING ASKED TO AGREE TO IN WRITING. EVERYTHING ELSE WOULD BE LEFT TO THE MILITARY COMMITTEE, WHERE THEY WILL HAVE A VETO. FOR EXAMPLE,

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KIMCHE HAD STATED CLEARLY THAT THE NUMBER OF MEMBERS OF A TEAM WOULD BE DECIDED BY THE COMMITTEE, AS WOULD THE TYPE OF VEHICLE. ACCORDINGLY, LEBANON SHOULD STOP

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FOR HABIB AND DRAPER FROM ROSS

FRETTERING THAT ISRAEL WOULD SOMEHOW END UP WITH AN EXCESSIVE PRESENCE. IT WAS A STRUGGLE, BUT WE THINK WE MADE A DENT IN THEIR ASSUMPTION THAT ISRAEL WILL BE ABLE TO IMPOSE ITS MAXIMUM DESIRES UNILATERALLY.
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CAIRO FOR AMBASSADOR HABIB AND DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, US, IS, XF
SUBJ: DRAPER MISSION: MEETING OF APRIL 25, 1983,
KHALDAH - SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS/WITHDRAWAL

1. [REDACTED]

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2. SUMMARY. THE SECURITY ANNEX WAS REVIEWED IN
PLENARY SESSION ON APRIL 25, 1983 IN KHALDAH.
AD REFERENDUM AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON A U.S.
COMPROMISE ON THE INTEGRATION OF HADDAD'S FORCES
INTO THE LEBANESE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE, AND THE
ISRAELIS AGREED TO ADAPT THE ORGANIZATIONAL
STRUCTURE OF HADDAD'S FORCES TO MATCH THE ORGANIZATION
OF THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE FORMED ON 6 APRIL BY LEBANON.
THERE WAS AGREEMENT ON THE MISSION OF THE JOINT

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SUPERVISORY TEAMS; HOWEVER, NO AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON THE NUMBER OF TEAMS, THEIR COMPOSITION OR THE LENGTH OF TIME THESE TEAMS WOULD BE NECESSARY. LEBANON LINKED ACCEPTANCE OF JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A TIME LIMIT OF 2 YEARS, AFTER WHICH THE TEAMS WOULD NO LONGER BE NEEDED UNLESS THE MILITARY COMMITTEE DETERMINED OTHERWISE. THE LEBANESE POSITION IS THAT THERE SHOULD NORMALLY BE UP TO FIVE JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS, AND UP TO EIGHT TEAMS IN EXCEPTIONAL CASES. THE ISRAELI SIDE ADMITTED THAT THE QUESTION OF A TIME LIMIT REMAINED TO BE DECIDED, BUT FIRMLY STATED THAT IF LEBANON WITHDREW ITS PREVIOUS ACCEPTANCE OF "UP TO EIGHT TEAMS," ISRAEL WOULD REVERT TO ITS PREVIOUS POSITION OF UP TO TEN TEAMS. KIMCHE STRESSED THAT THE TEAMS WERE THE CENTRAL POINT IN THE PACKAGE OF SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. DRAPER EXPLAINED THAT THE LEBANESE POSITION DID NOT REFLECT A CHANGE IN POSITION SINCE THE NUMBER OF TEAMS WOULD BE DECIDED BY THE MILITARY COMMITTEE ON A DAILY BASIS. DRAPER SUGGESTED THAT A TARGET DATE MIGHT BE SET FOR THE PHASING OUT OF THE TEAMS OR REPLACING THE TEAMS WITH ANOTHER MECHANISM FOR VERIFICATION IF THE SECURITY SITUATION PERMITTED. HAMDAN PROVIDED A CONCEPT FOR THE SUPERVISION CENTERS, STRESSING THAT LEBANON BELIEVED ONE CENTER WAS ENOUGH BUT WOULD AGREE TO TWO, AND

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HE EMPHASIZED THAT LEBANON WOULD NOT ACCEPT ANY OVERNIGHT OR RESIDUAL PRESENCE AT THE CENTERS OR ELSEWHERE IN LEBANON. NO AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON CHANGING THE NAME OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE OR ON DEFINING THE NORTHERN BOUNDARY OF THE SECURITY REGION. HOWEVER, KIMCHE STRESSED THAT ISRAEL WAS STILL CONSULTING ON THE U.S. COMPROMISE PROPOSAL FOR THE NORTHERN BOUNDARY, (4&20 SQUARE KILOMETER NON-FORTIFIED AREA). DRAPER INFORMED KIMCHE INFORMALLY THAT THE U.S. WOULD NOT ACCEPT ANY CONCEPT OF HOT PURSUIT BY IDF GROUND FORCES INTO LEBANESE TERRITORY. END SUMMARY

3. DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS OF APRIL 25, 1983 IN KHALDAH, A PAGE-BY-PAGE REVIEW OF THE SECURITY ANNEX WAS CONDUCTED IN PLENARY SESSION. ON THE QUESTION OF DETERMINING THE NAME FOR THE MILITARY COMMITTEE, FATTAL AGREED WITH THE U.S. BRIDGING PROPOSAL OF "SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS COMMITTEE" AND WITHDREW LEBANON'S PREVIOUS PROPOSAL. KIMCHE INDICATED THAT HE WOULD ACCEPT THE TERM "SECURITY COMMITTEE" IN

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CAIRO FOR AMBASSADOR HABIB AND DRAPER

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y ADD SECTION INFO

AN EFFORT TO REACH AGREEMENT; HOWEVER, NEITHER TERM WAS AGREED UPON.

4. GEN. HAMDAN ASKED IF ISRAEL HAD CONSIDERED THE PREVIOUS U.S. PROPOSAL, WHICH LEBANON SUPPORTED,

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REGARDING DEFINITION OF THE NORTHERN LIMIT OF THE SECURITY REGION. KIMCHE SAID THAT THIS MATTER WAS STILL UNDER "CONSULTATION."

5. A LONG DISCUSSION FOLLOWED ON THE INTEGRATION OF HADDAD'S FORCES INTO THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE. DRAPER SUBMITTED A BRIDGING PROPOSAL TO BOTH SIDES, AND COOLEY SUGGESTED THAT THE PROPOSAL COULD BE WRITTEN EITHER AS A MINUTE OR AS PART OF THE BASIC ANNEX SINCE THE END RESULT WAS GENERALLY AGREED BUT THE WORDING, ESPECIALLY IN THE ANNEX, SEEMED TO BE THE PROBLEM. EINAN ALSO OFFERED A DRAFT PROPOSAL. AFTER CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION DRAPER BROKE THE DEADLOCK AND IT WAS AGREED AD REFERENDUM THAT THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE "WILL ENCOMPASS THE EXISTING LOCAL UNITS WHICH HAD BEEN FORMED INTO A NEAR BRIGADE-SIZE UNIT ALONG WITH LEBANESE ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL FROM AMONG THE INHABITANTS OF THE SECURITY REGION" IN ACCORDANCE WITH LEBANESE LAW AND REGULATIONS. THESE DETAILS WERE PUT INTO AN AGREED MINUT WITH ONLY A BROAD PRINCIPLE STATED IN THE ANNEX. EINAN AND HAMDAN AGREED THAT LEBANESE LAW AND REGULATIONS DID NOT PRECLUDE AN INDIVIDUAL FROM MANDATORY SERVICE FOR POLITICAL REASONS OR BECAUSE OF PAST AFFILIATION WITH ISRAEL. EINAN ACCEPTED A PROPOSAL MADE DURING A MEETING OF THE MILITARY DRAFTING GROUP THAT ISRAEL ACCEPT TO ADAPT THE STRUCTURE OF THE "EXISTING LOCAL FORCES" TO FIT THE TABLE OF ORGANIZATION OF THE LEBANESE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE. GEN. TAMIR STRESSED THAT THE MILITARY COMMITTEE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SUPERVISION OF THIS INTEGRATION AND THIS WAS ADDED TO THE PROPOSED MINUTES.

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6. BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT THE MISSION OF THE JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS IS TO VERIFY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, REPORT VIOLATIONS TO THE MILITARY COMMITTEE, AND ASCERTAIN THAT VIOLATIONS HAVE BEEN RECTIFIED. HOWEVER, NO AGREEMENT WAS REACHED AS TO THE DETAILS OF THE NUMBER OF TEAMS, THEIR COMPOSITION, OR THE LENGTH OF TIME DURING WHICH THE TEAMS WOULD BE NECESSARY. HAMDAN FIRMLY STATED THAT LEBANESE ACCEPTANCE OF JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS WAS CONTINGENT UPON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A TIME LIMIT FOR THE USE OF THESE TEAMS. HE SUGGESTED THAT THEY BE TERMINATED AFTER TWO YEARS, AND SAID THAT THE LEBANESE CONCEPT OF THE TEAMS IS THAT THEY ARE BILATERAL AND THAT THE COMPOSITION OF THE TEAMS AND THE MODE OF TRANSPORT FOR THE TEAMS WOULD DEPEND ON THE MISSION, THE TERRAIN, AND THE CURRENT THREAT AS DETERMINED BY THE MILITARY COMMITTEE. HAMDAN EMPHASIZED THAT LEBANON'S POSITION IS THAT THERE SHOULD NORMALLY BE UP TO FIVE JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS, BUT IN EXCEPTIONAL CASES, "UP TO EIGHT" JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS MIGHT BE NECESSARY IF DETERMINED BY THE MILITARY COMMITTEE.

7. TAMIR SAID THAT BOTH SIDES HAD PREVIOUSLY AGREED TO UP TO EIGHT JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS ON THE LAND, SEA, AND AIR AND THAT EACH TEAM WOULD HAVE TWO ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS PAINTED A COLOR DETERMINED BY THE MILITARY COMMITTEE. KIMCHE ADMITTED THAT THE ISSUE OF THE TIME LIMIT REMAINED AN OPEN QUESTION AND THAT HE ACCEPTED THE FACT THAT THE NUMBER OF TEAMS AND THE TYPE AND NUMBER OF VEHICLES WOULD BE DETERMINED BY THE MILITARY COMMITTEE, SUGGESTING THAT WHEN JEEPS WERE USED, EIGHT PERSONNEL FROM EACH SIDE WOULD BE SUFFICIENT; WHEN HELICOPTERS WERE USED, FOUR PERSONNEL WOULD BE SUFFICIENT; AND WHEN PERSONNEL CARRIERS WERE USED, PERSONNEL REQUIRED WOULD BE LESS THAN 22.

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KIMCHE ASKED HAMDAN SEVERAL TIMES TO CONFIRM THAT LEBANON WAS NOT GOING BACK ON ITS PREVIOUS AGREEMENT OF "UP TO EIGHT" TEAMS. FATTAL SAID THAT LEBANON'S AIM WAS TO AVOID A LARGE NUMBER OF UNIFORMED ISRAELI TROOPS IN LEBANON'S TERRITORY AND THAT LEBANON WOULD AGREE ON "UP TO EIGHT" PROVIDED THE TIME LIMIT WOULD BE ESTABLISHED. KIMCHE SAID THAT THE WORDS, "UP TO EIGHT," WOULD HAVE TO BE WRITTEN IN THE AGREEMENT OR ITS MINUTES. KIMCHE SAID THAT "UP TO EIGHT TEAMS" IS THE CENTRAL POINT IN THE PACKAGE OF SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR ISRAEL AND THAT ANY CHANGE ON LEBANON'S PART WILL BE VIEWED AS SIGNIFICANT AND MAY FORCE ISRAEL TO RETURN TO ITS PREVIOUS POSITION OF UP TO TEN TEAMS.

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KIMCHE ADDED THAT UP TO
EIGHT TEAMS DOES NOT NECESSARILY
MEAN THAT THERE WILL BE EIGHT TEAMS OPERATING EACH DAY.

8. DRAPER EXPLAINED HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT WHAT WAS SAID BY
THE LEBANESE DID NOT REFLECT A CHANGE, SINCE THE NUMBER
OF TEAMS WOULD BE DETERMINED BY THE MILITARY COMMITTEE ON
A DAILY BASIS. DRAPER SUGGESTED THAT POSSIBLY A TARGET
DATE COULD BE ESTABLISHED FOR PHASING OUT THE JOINT
SUPERVISORY TEAMS OR REPLACING THE TEAMS WITH ANOTHER
MECHANISM FOR VERIFICATION.

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EXDIS -- SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MILITARY ADDRESSEES

CAIRO FOR AMBASSADOR KHABIB AND DRAPER

9. ON THE SUBJECT OF SUPERVISION CENTERS, HAMDAN SAID LEBANON SAW NO MILITARY REASON FOR HAVING MORE THAN ONE CENTER, BUT REPEATED ACCEPTANCE OF LEBANON'S PREVIOUS COMPROMISE OF TWO CENTERS. HAMDAN PROVIDED HIS CONCEPT FOR THE CENTERS, STATING THAT THE CENTERS SHOULD COMMAND AND CONTROL THE JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS AND THAT THE LAF WOULD SECURE AND OPERATE THESE CENTERS.

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HAMDAN SAID ISRAELI OFFICERS AT THE CENTERS WOULD ADVISE THE SENIOR LAF OFFICER AND PROVIDE LIAISON FROM THE CENTER TO THE IDF AND TO IDF ELEMENTS IN THE TEAMS, BUT HE EMPHASIZED THAT LEBANON WOULD NOT ACCEPT ANY OVERNIGHT OR RESIDUAL ISRAELI PRESENCE AT THE OPERATIONAL CENTERS OR ELSEWHERE IN LEBANON. HAMDAN RECOMMENDED THAT THE TWO CENTERS BE LOCATED CLOSE TO THE BORDER TO FACILITATE THE FUNCTIONS OF THE TEXAMS AND DZ TO ALLOW FOR THEIR BRIEFING AND DEBRIEFING. HE SAID THAT THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT FOR A LARGE NUMBER OF ISRAELI PERSONNEL, NOR IS THERE A REQUIREMENT FOR MAINTENANCE OR SUPPORT ACTIVITIES.

10. DURING THE DISCUSSION ON NAVAL COORDINATION AND WHETHER OR NOT ISRAELI BOATS COULD ENTER LEBANESE TERRITORIAL WATERS TO CHECK SUSPECTED HOSTILE VESSELS, WHICH WAS NOT RESOLVED, DRAPER TOLD KIMCHE ON AN INFORMAL BASIS THAT THE U.S. WOULD NOT ACCEPT ANY CONCEPT OF HOT PURSUIT BY IDF GROUND FORCES INTO LEBANESE TERRITORY. DRAPER SUGGESTED THAT THE NAVAL ISSUE BE ADDRESSED IN THE CONTEXT OF AIR SURVEILLANCE AND INDICATED THAT A TECHNIQUE WOULD BE PROPOSED TO BRIDGE THAT ISSUE.

11. COMMENT. THE SESSION WAS VERY POSITIVE. IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT THE ISRAELIS CAME TO PLAY BALL AND WERE TRYING HARD TO POSTURE THEMSELVES AS BEING RESPONSIVE AND WILLING TO BE FLEXIBLE. THE AD REFERENDUM AGREEMENT ON INTEGRATION OF HADDAD'S FORCES WAS A MAJOR

Date Printed: 10/22/1996

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DOC. NUMBER: 83BEIRUT05053

CHANNEL: n/a

ACCOMPLISHMENT AND WAS AN ISRAELI CONCESSION FROM
PREVIOUS MEETINGS. ISRAEL'S ONGOING CONSULTATIONS
ABOUT THE NORTHERN LIMIT OF THE SECURITY REGION INDICATES
THIS MAY BE A SUBJECT FOR ISRAELI COMPROMISE IN ANY

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FORTHCOMING PACKAGE DEAL. PUGH.

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E.O. 12356: DECL; OADR
TAGS: PREL, US, JO
SUBJECT: LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO KING HUSSEIN

1. [REDACTED]
2. FOLLOWING LETTER FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO KING HUSSEIN,
RECEIVED FROM THE WHITE HOUSE APRIL 24, SHOULD BE DELIVERED
IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE BEGINNING OF THE SECRETARY'S TRIP
TO THE MIDDLE EAST.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

YOUR MAJESTY:

THANK YOU SO MUCH FOR YOUR LETTER OF APRIL 16. WE, TOO,
WERE SURPRISED AT THE KAREN HOUSE ARTICLES AND CAN SEE
WHY IT CAME AS SUCH A SHOCK TO YOU TO SEE SO MUCH DETAIL
IN PRINT. MISS HOUSE IS A VERY DILIGENT REPORTER WHO

PAGE 02 STATE 112859 TOSEC 040001

OBVIOUSLY SPENT MONTHS PIECING TOGETHER THIS STORY FROM
MANY, MANY DIFFERENT SOURCES -- CLEARLY NOT ALL FROM
JORDAN. FOR EXAMPLE, STORIES ABOUT MY LETTERS TO YOU
HAVE BEEN CIRCULATING FOR MONTHS IN BOTH THE ISRAELI
AND THE ARAB PRESS.

I HAVE THIS WEEK ASKED SECRETARY SHULTZ TO TRAVEL TO THE
MIDDLE EAST TO PERSONALLY PARTICIPATE IN THE EFFORT TO
CONCLUDE AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN

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LEBANON AND ISRAEL WHICH WOULD LEAD TO THE PROMPT WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES. THESE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE BEEN DIFFICULT AND SLOWER THAN I HAD HOPED, BUT AMBASSADOR HABIB AND HIS TEAM HAVE NOW BROUGHT THEM TO THE POINT WHERE WE BELIEVE EARLY AGREEMENT IS POSSIBLE. I APPRECIATE YOUR SUPPORT FOR OUR GOALS IN LEBANON AND YOUR READINESS TO ASSIST PRESIDENT GEMAYEL IN HIS EFFORTS TO RESTORE HIS COUNTRY'S SOVEREIGNTY.

SECRETARY SHULTZ WILL CONCENTRATE HIS EFFORTS ON THE LEBANON ISSUE DURING THIS TRIP BUT HE ALSO HOPES TO BE ABLE TO SEE YOU. I AM SURE YOU WILL UNDERSTAND THAT HE CANNOT NOW PREDICT THE COURSE OF THE LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS AND, THEREFORE, CANNOT PREDICT WHETHER HE WILL BE ABLE TO VISIT JORDAN. HE, OF COURSE, WILL KEEP IN TOUCH WITH YOU THROUGH AMBASSADOR VIETS, WHO WILL MEET WITH THE SECRETARY IN CAIRO EARLY IN THE WEEK.

YOUR MAJESTY, I HAD HOPED THAT THERE NEED NOT BE LINKAGE BETWEEN LEBANON AND THE PEACE PROCESS. NEVERTHELESS, OTHERS HAVE MADE IT SO AND I NOW INTEND TO MOVE THE LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS TO AN EARLY CONCLUSION AND THEN TURN OUR ATTENTION FULLY TO REINVIGORATING THE PEACE PROCESS. MEANWHILE, I HOPE OUR MUTUAL FRIENDS IN THE ARAB WORLD

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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CONTINUE TO SUPPORT YOUR VISION OF WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE, AS I DO.

I LOOK TO YOU AS MY PARTNER IN THE GREAT ENTERPRISE OF PEACE BETWEEN ARABS AND ISRAELIS AND I ASSURE YOU THAT I REMAIN DETERMINED TO OVERCOME ANY AND ALL OBSTACLES TO THE REALIZATION OF THAT GOAL. TOGETHER, WE CAN WIN.

SINCERELY, YOUR FRIEND,
RONALD REAGAN END TEXT. SHULTZ

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, US, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: MEETING OF THE CIVILIAN
SUBCOMMITTEE, KHALDE, APRIL 21

1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY: THE CIVILIAN SUBCOMMITTEE COMPLETED ITS REVIEW OF THE COVERING AGREEMENT AND AGREED MINUTES. HOWEVER, WHILE A NUMBER OF REVISIONS WERE AGREED TO, INCLUDING AGREEMENT ON AN ABBREVIATED TEXT ON PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES, THE QUESTION OF THE ABROGATION OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS INCONSISTENT WITH THE AGREEMENT (ECONOMIC BOYCOTT) WAS DEFERRED. THE ECONOMIC BOYCOTT AND RECOGNITION ISSUES ARE THE TWO PRINCIPAL DIFFERENCES WHICH STILL NEED TO BE RESOLVED IN THE COVERING AGREEMENT. IN SIDE MEETINGS, AGREEMENT WAS NOT REACHED ON THE LEBANESE DRAFT ON INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE

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MOVEMENT OF GOODS. ALSO, THE ISRAELI SIDE PRESSED FOR EXPLANATIONS ON HOW AND WHEN ON-THE-GROUND ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE INTERIM PERIOD WOULD BE HANDLED. AMBASSADOR KHARMA'S VAGUE AND AMBIGUOUS RESPONSES ONLY SERVED TO HEIGHTEN ISRAELI SUSPICIONS THAT THE LEBANESE ARE BACKSLIDING ON THEIR EARLIER COMMITMENTS IN THIS SPHERE. END SUMMARY.

3. AT THE BEGINNING OF THE ME D# PROBLEM

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CONCERNING A LEBANESE NEWSPAPER AGENT FOR THE JERUSALEM POST WHO HAD BEEN INFORMED BY THE LEBANESE SURETE THAT HE COULD NO LONGER BRING COPIES OF THE JERUSALEM POST INTO BEIRUT, AND HAD COPIES OF THE NEWSPAPER ON HAND SEIZED. COMING ON THE HEELS OF THE EARLIER PROBLEM RELATING TO THE CONFISCATION OF ISRAELI GOODS BY THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES, KIMCHE SAID THESE ACTIONS SOURED THE ATMOSPHERE IN ISRAEL AND CREATED AN AIR OF SUSPICION AT THE POLITICAL, AS WELL AS NEGOTIATING, LEVEL.

4. FATTAL REPLIED THAT, WHILE THE INCIDENT CONCERNING THE JERUSALEM POST WAS REGRETTABLE, IT WAS VIRTUALLY INEVITABLE IN A SITUATION WHEN NO GENERAL AGREEMENT ON THE RELATIONS BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL HAD BEEN REACHED. HE SAID HE WOULD LOOK INTO THE MATTER, BUT ALSO DREW A DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS INTO LEBANON AND LITERARY/INFORMATIONAL MATERIALS WHICH HAVE A POLITICAL DIMENSION. KIMCHE SAID HE WOULD APPRECIATE KNOWING WHETHER THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES HAD ACTED UNDER INSTRUCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE JERUSALEM POST, OR WHETHER IT WAS POSSIBLY A MATTER OF AN OVERZEALOUS OFFICIAL OPERATING UNDER PAST GUIDELINES.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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5. KHARMA ALSO EXPLAINED FOR THE RECORD THE HISTORY OF THE EARLIER CONFISCATION OF ISRAELI GOODS. HE SAID THAT LEBANESE CUSTOMS PATROLS HAD, IN FACT, SEIZED A CONVOY OF ISRAELI GOODS IN THE COURSE OF THEIR WORK, AS INDEED THEY HAD ALSO SEIZED OTHER GOODS ENTERING THE BEIRUT AREA ILLEGALLY FROM OTHER PARTS OF LEBANON. UNFORTUNATELY, KHARMA CONTINUED, IT WAS TOO LATE TO TAKE ANY ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THE GOODS WHICH HAD BEEN CONFISCATED, BUT HE HAD BEEN ASSURED THAT APPROPRIATE INSTRUCTIONS HAD BEEN ISSUED TO PREVENT A REPETITION OF SUCH INCIDENTS IN THE FUTURE.

6. AFTER THIS INITIAL EXCHANGE, THE SUBCOMMITTEE CONTINUED THE REVIEW OF THE TEXT OF THE COVERING AGREEMENT AND THE AGREED MINUTES WHICH HAD BEGUN AT PREVIOUS NEGOTIATING SESSIONS. MOST OF THE MORNING'S DISCUSSION CENTERED ON AN ABBREVIATED TEXT ON PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES. IT SOON BECAME CLEAR THAT FATTAL WAS CONCERNED THE TEXT (EVEN THOUGH IT WAS A LEBANESE DRAFT) WOULD ONLY NARROWLY APPLY TO THOSE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES DESCRIBED IN THE CONVENTION FOR SPECIAL MISSIONS, AND WOULD NOT COVER OTHER IMPORTANT "OBLIGATIONS" INCLUDED IN THE CONVENTION. HE SPECIFICALLY REFERRED TO SUCH ISSUES AS THE NOTIFICATION AND NOMINATION PROCESS, THE QUESTION OF DECLARING PERSONA NON GRATA, AND THE

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SIZE OF THE MISSION. FATTAL OBLIQUELY REFERRED TO HIS PRINCIPAL CONCERN WHEN HE MENTIONED AN EARLIER LEBANESE MESSAGE TO CHINA, IN WHICH LEBANON HAD FOREWARNED CHINA THAT THEIR EMBASSY SHOULD NOT BE TOO LARGE.

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NOTE BY OC/T: #PARA 3 AS RECEIVED; CORRECTION WILL FOLLOW.

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7. A DRAFTING GROUP WAS ESTABLISHED TO ADDRESS THESE PROBLEMS; THE TWO PARTIES SUBSEQUENTLY AGREED TO THE FOLLOWING TEXT WHICH MET FATTAL'S CONCERNS:

BEGIN TEXT

ALL OTHER MATTERS RELATING TO THESE LIAISON OFFICES, THEIR PERSONNEL, AND THE PERSONNEL OF EACH PARTY PRESENT

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IN THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER PARTY IN CONNECTION WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESENT AGREEMENT WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF A PROTOCOL TO BE CONCLUDED BETWEEN THE PARTIES IN THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE. PENDING THE CONCLUSION OF THIS PROTOCOL, THE LIAISON OFFICES AND THE ABOVE-MENTIONED PERSONNEL WILL BE TREATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF THE CONVENTION ON SPECIAL MISSIONS OF DECEMBER 8, 1969, INCLUDING THOSE PROVISIONS CONCERNING PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES. THE FOREGOING IS WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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THE POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES CONCERNING THAT CONVENTION.

END TEXT.

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8. THE DISCUSSION MOVED TO ARTICLE 10 AND THE ISRAELI DESIRE THAT THE WORDING SHOULD INCLUDE THE STATEMENT THAT THE PRESENT AGREEMENT SHALL REMAIN IN FORCE UNTIL A ("COMPLETE," "FULL," OR "FORMAL") TREATY OF PEACE IS ACHIEVED. THE PARTIES FINALLY AGREED TO CONSIDER AD REFERENDUM DRAPER'S FORMULATION, WHICH READS: "THE PRESENT AGREEMENT SHALL REMAIN IN FORCE UNTIL THE TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS FORMALLY CONCLUDED." AT ISRAELI INITIATIVE, IT WAS ALSO AGREED THAT PARAGRAPH 2 OF ARTICLE 10, CONCERNING REVISIONS TO THE AGREEMENT, WOULD BE SIMPLIFIED. THE NEW VERSION OF PARAGRAPH 2 READS: "THE PRESENT AGREEMENT MAY BE REVIEWED, AND AMENDED BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES, UPON REQUEST OF EITHER PARTY."

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9. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE CONTENTIOUS FIRST PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 11, WHICH REFERS TO THE ABROGATION OF TREATIES, LAWS, AND REGULATIONS IN CONFLICT WITH THE AGREEMENT, WOULD BE DEFERRED. (THE ISRAELIS OBVIOUSLY WANT TO TIGHTEN UP THE LANGUAGE IN THIS PARAGRAPH AS IT APPLIES TO THE ECONOMIC BOYCOTT.)

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10. ISRAEL AGREED TO ARTICLE 12, CONCERNING RATIFICATION PROCEDURES, AS IT STOOD IN THE LEBANESE DRAFT. THE ISRAELI SIDE ALSO AGREED TO THE LEBANESE DRAFT ON ARTICLE 13 (RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES), THOUGH THEY WANTED ADDITIONAL LANGUAGE TO BE INSERTED WHICH WOULD REFER TO THE PARTIES RESOLVING ISSUES BETWEEN THEM IN THE FIRST INSTANCE. BOTH PARTIES AGREED TO CONSIDER

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A COMPROMISE PROPOSAL, INVOLVING A ONE WORD CHANGE, SUGGESTED BY KOZAK. FINALLY, THE LAST ARTICLE, ARTICLE 14 (UN NOTIFICATION AND LANGUAGE OF TEXTS) WAS ACCEPTED IN ITS PRESENT FORM BY ISRAEL.


11. THE AGREED MINUTES TO THE AGREEMENT WERE ALSO REVIEWED. THERE IS BASIC AGREEMENT IN THIS AREA, THOUGH THE LEBANESE SIDE STILL HAS TO CHECK OUT SEVERAL POINTS.

12. WHILE THE FULL CIVILIAN SUBCOMMITTEE WAS MEETING, KHARMA (LEBANON) AND SEMADAR (ISRAEL) DISCUSSED THE NEW LEBANESE DRAFT FORMULA CONCERNING THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD (JERUSALEM 1357). KHARMA AND SEMADAR REACHED AGREEMENT ON REVISED LANGUAGE RELATING TO TWO POINTS IN THE LEBANESE TEXT. THEY CENTERED ON ISRAELI PREFERENCE THAT THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS BE BASED ON THE DRAWING UP OF NEGATIVE LISTS (I.E., ISRAELI GOODS WHICH COULD NOT BE EXPORTED TO LEBANON) RATHER THAN THE REVERSE, AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE LEBANESE DRAFT. ALSO, KHARMA AGREED WITH SEMADAR THAT THE COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS, WHO WOULD MONITOR TRADE, COULD NOT ADJUST THE VOLUME OF TRADE, GIVEN THE FREE-MARKET ECONOMIES OF THE TWO COUNTRIES. WHEN KHARMA SUBSEQUENTLY SOUGHT APPROVAL ON THESE TWO POINTS FROM HIS SUPERIORS IN BEIRUT, HE RECEIVED A NEGATIVE RESPONSE AND SO INFORMED SEMADAR. HOWEVER, KHARMA PROMISED TO PURSUE THE TWO REVISIONS FURTHER WITH HIS AUTHORITIES. KHARMA AND SEMADAR DID NOT REACH AGREEMENT ON A THIRD ISSUE, NAMELY, THE SENTENCE IN THE LEBANESE DRAFT WHICH READS: "IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT LEBANON WILL NOT IMPORT FROM ISRAEL PRODUCTS AND GOODS THAT LEBANON PRODUCES FOR EXPORT ." THIS SENTENCE IS, OF COURSE, POLITICALLY IMPORTANT TO LEBANON



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EXDIS

BECAUSE OF ITS FEAR OF ARAB BOYCOTT, AND SEMADAR UNDER-
STANDS THIS FULLY.

--
13. FOLLOWING IS THE REVISED TEXT BASED ON THE KHARMA/
SEMADAR UNDERSTANDING.

--
BEGIN TEXT

THERE WILL BE A MOVEMENT OF PRODUCTS AND GOODS BETWEEN
LEBANON AND ISRAEL WHICH WILL TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION
THE PROTECTION OF THEIR RESPECTIVE AGRICULTURE AND
INDUSTRY AS WELL AS THEIR PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION
NEEDS. (IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT LEBANON WILL NOT
IMPORT FROM ISRAEL PRODUCTS AND GOODS THAT LEBANON
PRODUCES FOR EXPORT.) THE MOVEMENT OF PRODUCTS AND
GOODS WHICH ARE NOT SPECIFIED IN THIS ANNEX WILL BE
ON A NON-DISCRIMINATORY BASIS.

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EXPERTS DESIGNATED BY THE TWO GOVERNMENTS WILL MEET
ON A REGULAR BASIS AND NO LESS THAN ONCE A MONTH,
WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE,
TO ENSURE THE PROPER IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ABOVE-
MENTIONED ARRANGEMENT AND TO DEAL WITH PROBLEMS WHICH
ARISE.

END TEXT.

--
14. AT THE END OF THE AFTERNOON SESSION, RUBENSTEIN
QUESTIONED KHARMA ON HOW THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS,
PERTAINING PRINCIPALLY TO THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND
PEOPLE, TRANSPORT, AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS, WOULD, IN

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FACT, BE IMPLEMENTED. KHARMA, WHOSE PROPENSITY FOR AMBIGUITY HAS ALREADY BEEN WELL ESTABLISHED, REACHED NEW HEIGHTS IN DESCRIBING WHAT MAY OR MAY NOT TAKE PLACE ON THE GROUND FOLLOWING AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. KHARMA SAID THAT ANNEXES (OR OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS) CONCERNING THE VARIOUS INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE SUBSEQUENTLY DEVELOPED BY EXPERTS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE. RUBENSTEIN PRESSED FOR MORE PRECISE DEADLINES IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE AGREED TO EVEN BEFORE RATIFICATION OF THE AGREEMENT TOOK PLACE. KHARMA KEPT RESISTING THE EFFORT TO BE PINNED DOWN TO ANY TIMETABLE, SAYING THAT THESE WERE COMPLICATED ISSUES THOUGH HE ADDED THEY WOULD BE PURSUED AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE. AT THE END OF THE DISCUSSION, KHARMA DID, HOWEVER, STATE AT AMERICAN URGING THAT HE WOULD REQUEST HIS GOVERNMENT TO HAVE EARLY MEETINGS IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS FIELD. DESPITE THIS ELABORATION, THE ISRAELIS WERE LEFT WITH THE CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT LEBANON WAS BACKSLIDING ON HOW AND WHEN PRACTICAL

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ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE IMPLEMENTED ON THE GROUND DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD. THERE WAS ALSO NO AGREEMENT ON HOW THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE RECORDED.
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WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY

USELO RIYADH PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY

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EXP **DECAPTIONED**

FROM HABIB AND DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: DADR

TAGS: PREL, IS, SY, LE, PLO, MOPS, XF

SUBJ: HABIB-DRAPER MISSION: NEAR CRISIS AT 21 APRIL
NETANYA SESSION

1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY: THE 21 APR TRIPARTITE NEGOTIATING SESSION AT NETANYA REFLECTED SOME OF THE CROSS CURRENTS NOW EMERGING, INCLUDING GROWING LEBANESE RESISTANCE TO SOME ISRAELI CONCEPTS. THE HEADS OF DELEGATION AGREED PRIDR TO THE SESSION THAT WE SHOULD HAVE FOUR NEGOTIATING SESSIONS NEXT WEEK, MAKING A MAJOR EFFORT TO CONCLUDE AN UNDERSTANDING ON ALL ISSUES EXCEPT THOSE WHICH WILL HAVE TO BE SETTLED AT THE HIGHER POLITICAL LEVEL, E.G., HADDAD,

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UNIFIL, AND THE FEASIBILITY OF SOME JOINT SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. WE CLEARED UP TO 95 PERCENT OF THE LANGUAGE OF THE COVERING AGREEMENT, AS WELL AS THE AGREED MINUTES INTERPRETING THE COVERING AGREEMENT, WITH THE ISRAELI SIDE DEMONSTRATING AN ACCOMMODATING ATTITUDE ON MOST SUBJECTS. IN CONTRAST TO MOST PAST BEHAVIOR, THE LEBANESE SIDE INDULGED IN SOME NITPICKING.

3. A NEAR CRISIS AROSE AS WE WERE ABOUT TO BREAK FOR

LUNCH. GENERAL EINAN, THE CHIEF ISRAELI NEGOTIATOR IN THE MILITARY SUBCOMMITTEE, CAME DOWN FROM THE MEETING ROOM WITH STORM CLOUDS ON HIS FACE AND INSISTED TO KIMCHE THAT THE ISRAELI DELEGATION PACK UP AND LEAVE INSTANTLY. HE CLAIMED THAT THE LEBANESE MILITARY DELEGATION HAD REVOKED SIGNIFICANTLY SOME PREVIOUS UNDERSTANDINGS AND WAS TRYING

TO TURN THE CLOCK BACK. THE ISRAELI REACTION WAS TRIGGERED BY HAMDAM'S RESPONSE TO A POORLY DRAFTED ISRAELI CONCEPT PAPER ON EMPLOYMENT OF THE JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS WHICH WAS PROVIDED TO THE LEBANESE FOR COMMENT AFTER THE CLOSE OF THE LAST MEETING. THE LEBANESE REJECTED THE ISRAELI PAPER AND RETRENCHED TO A POSITION OF 3-5 TEAMS, WHICH THE ISRAELIS REJECTED. KIMCHE PROFESSED TO AGREE WITH EINAN THAT THE ISRAELIS SHOULD LEAVE RIGHT AWAY BUT DRAPER PREVAILED UPON HIM TO STAY FOR AN AFTERNOON SESSION ON SECURITY MATTERS WHICH WOULD BE ATTENDED ONLY BY THE CHIEF CIVILIAN AND MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES. AT THAT AFTERNOON SESSION, A FEW MISUNDERSTANDINGS STARTED TO BE CLEARED UP AND A CONSENSUS WAS REACHED ON RESOLVING ONE MAJOR ISSUE. MEVERTHELESS, THIS SESSION REVEALED IN DETAIL A MAJOR DIFFERENCE IN APPROACH TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE. THE SESSION ALSO MADE CLEARER

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THAN EVER THAT THE LEBANESE HAVE BEEN HAVING SECOND AND EVEN THIRD THOUGHTS ABOUT WHAT THEY HAVE GIVEN UP UN NZGO-TIATIONS ON JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS. AMONG OTHER MATTERS, AND APPEAR DETERMINED TO RESIST CONCEPTS AND METHODS OF OPERATION WHICH THE ISRAELIS UP TILL NOW THOUGHT HAD BEEN ACCEPTED. AT THE SAME TIME, IN THE CIVILIAN SUBCOMMITTEE (REPORTED SEPTEL) THE LEBANESE APPEARED TO BE BACKING AWAY FROM INSTITUTING AT LEAST SOME OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE SIX MONTH INTERIM PERIOD, ALTHOUGH WE CLEARED THIS UP TO A CERTAIN EXTENT BY THE END OF THE SESSION. THIS UNDOUBTEDLY HEIGHTENED ISRAELI CONCERNS. END SUMMARY.

4. SINCE THE SUBJECTS COVERED IN THE MILITARY AND CIVILIAN SUBCOMMITTEES HAVE BEEN REPORTED IN SEPTELS, THE REMAINDER OF THIS REPORT WILL DEAL ONLY WITH THE AFTERNOON SESSION ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS ATTENDED BY DRAPER AND COOLEY FOR THE UNITED STATES, BY KIMCHE AND EINAN FOR ISRAEL, AND BY FATTAL AND HAMDAM ON THE LEBANESE SIDE.

5. INVITED TO SPEAK FIRST, EINAN SAID HE HAD BEEN SHOCKED BY THE APPARENT TURN-AROUND OF THE LEBANESE SIDE ON SOME KEY SECURITY ISSUES. HE SAID HE THOUGHT THAT THE LEBANESE ATTITUDE PUT IN JEOPARDY THE PACKAGE OF SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WAS BEING DEVELOPED. HE SAID HE WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED WITH FOUR ISSUES:

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(1) THE LEBANESE PROPOSAL TO CHANGE THE NAME OF THE
"MILITARY COMMITTEE" TO SOMETHING LIKE THE "SECURITY
ARRANGEMENTS SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE";

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USELO RIYADH PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSX DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY

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EXDIS

FROM HABIB AND DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: DADR
TAGS: PREL, IS, SY, LE, PLO, MOPS, XF
SUBJ: HABIB-DRAPER MISSION: NEAR CRISIS AT 21 APRIL
(2) THE LEBANESE CONCEPT FOR THE INTEGRATION OF HADDAD'S
FORCES INTO THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE;

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[REDACTED]

(3) LEBANESE RESISTANCE TO THE CONCEPT OF "HOT PURSUIT" IN LEBANON'S TERRITORIAL WATERS; AND

(4) THE LEBANESE VIEW THAT WE SHOULD RETURN TO THE CONCEPT OF ONLY THREE TO FIVE SUPERVISORY TEAMS (ORIGINALLY A UNITED STATES IDEA) IN LIEU OF THE AGREED FORMULA OF "UP TO EIGHT TEAMS."

6. DRAPER PROPOSED THAT NEGOTIATORS NOT FALL ON A SWORD

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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OVER THE NAME OF A COMMITTEE BUT LEAVE THIS MINOR ISSUE UNTIL LATER. KIMCHE WENT INTO A LONG EXPOSITION TO THE EFFECT THAT THE LEBANESE HAD TO CHOOSE BETWEEN ASSOCIATION BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES ON ONE HAND OR WITH SYRIA ON THE OTHER AND THAT LEBANON SHOULD RESIST ALLEGED ARAB PRESSURES, INCLUDING ON NAMES OF COMMITTEES.

7. DRAPER COUNTERED THAT LEBANON HAD ALREADY MADE ITS CHOICE OF FRIENDS AND ASSOCIATIONS AND IT WAS EXAGGERATION TO SUGGEST THAT SELECTION OF A NAME FOR A COMMITTEE WOULD HAVE SUCH MONUMENTAL SIGNIFICANCE. FATTAL ALSO HEATEDLY INSISTED THAT LEBANON HAD CHOSEN ITS PATH WITH THE WEST. EINAN REVEALED IN EFFECT THAT HE WAS FEARFUL OF GOING BACK TO HIS SUPERIORS WITH A LEBANESE-PROPOSED CHANGE OF NAME AFTER THE LEBANESE HAD GONE THROUGH 26 SESSIONS WITHOUT POSING OBJECTIONS. HE SAID THAT EVERYONE IN THE ROOM KNEW THAT THE REAL REASON WAS THE ATTITUDE OF THE LEBANESE PRIME MINISTER. WHILE NO ONE DISAGREED WITH THIS LAST ASSERTION, WE MAY HAVE SUCCEEDED IN COMING TENSIONS TEMPORARILY ON THIS MINOR ISSUE.

8. THE QUESTION OF THE CONCEPT OF INTEGRATION OF THE HADDAD FORCES WAS ANOTHER MATTER, HOWEVER. KIMCHE AND EINAN MADE CLEARER THAN EVER THE ISRAELI VIEW THAT THE PRESENT HADDAD FORCES, ADMITTEDLY FORMED BY ISRAEL, SHOULD BE LEGITIMIZED AS THE ONLY REAL BRIGADE IN THE SOUTHERN SECURITY ZONE. ONCE THAT OCCURRED, THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES MIGHT THEN RECRUIT INHABITANTS OF THE SECURITY REGION TO FILL IN THE GAPS IN THIS BRIGADE, WHILE ALSO BRINGING CERTAIN REGULAR LAF OFFICERS TO FLESH OUT THE BRIGADE LEADERSHIP FROM EXISTING LAF UNITS, ASSUMING ONCE AGAIN THAT ALL SUCH OFFICERS HAVE BEEN INHABITANTS OF THE SECURITY REGION. THE LEBANESE CONCEPT OF COURSE HAS BEEN

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THAT THEY HAD FORMED A TERRITORIAL BRIGADE ON PAPER EARLIER THIS MONTH, WITH DESIGNATED OFFICERS FROM VARIOUS LAF UNITS. THEY WOULD PLAN TO INTEGRATE MEMBERS OF THE HADDAD FORCES INTO THIS BRIGADE WHENEVER POSSIBLE ON A UNIT-BY-UNIT BASIS (E.G., PLATOONS, COMPANIES, AND EVEN BATTALIONS). DRAPER INSISTED THAT WHILE ISRAELI INTENTIONS HAD ALWAYS BEEN CLEAR ON THIS ISSUE, THERE NEVER HAD BEEN ANY AGREEMENT FROM THE LEBANESE SIDE TO THE ISRAELI CONCEPT. MOREOVER, CITING THE UNITED STATES NON-PAPER GIVEN TO THE ISRAELIS IN WASHINGTON AS WELL AS THE UNITED STATES COMMENTS TO THE ISRAELI REACTION TO THAT NON-PAPER, DRAPER SAID IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD ALWAYS ACCEPTED THE LEBANESE APPROACH. IN OTHER WORDS, HADDAD'S MEN WOULD BE INTEGRATED INTO A LEGALLY FORMED LEBANESE BRIGADE. DRAPER NOTED THAT SUCH A BRIGADE HAD IN FACT BEEN FORMED ON PAPER BY LEGAL ACTION TAKEN IN THE FIRST 33(9* -048). DRAPER ALSO ADDED THAT IT WAS NOT ONLY POLITICALLY ESSENTIAL FOR THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES TO BE SEEN AS ESTABLISHING THEIR OWN BRIGADE, IT WAS ALSO ESSENTIAL FOR LEGAL REASONS. HAMDAM NOTED THAT THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES COULD THEORETICALLY BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR PAYING ALL THE BACK SALARIES OF MEMBERS OF HADDAD'S FORCES IF IT ACCEPTED THE ISRAELI CONCEPT AND LEGITIMIZED HADDAD'S SO-CALLED BRIGADE.

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DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY

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EXDIS

FROM HABIB AND DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: DADR
TAGS: PREL, IS, SY, LE, PLO, MOPS, XF
SUBJ: HABIB-DRAPER MISSION: NEAR CRISIS AT 21 APRIL

9. AFTER A LONG WRANGLE IN WHICH EVERYONE AT THE TABLE JOINED, A FRAGILE CONSENSUS EMERGED TO THE EFFECT THAT THE OUTCOME OF EITHER THE LEBANESE OR ISRAELI CONCEPT WOULD BE A TERRITORIAL BRIGADE IN THE SOUTHERN PART OF THE SECURITY REGION WHICH WOULD HAVE AS ITS NUCLEUS MANY OR MOST OF THE MEN OF HADDAD'S FORCES. IT WAS AGREED THAT ALL OF US WOULD TAKE A NEW STAB AT DRAFTING AN ISRAELI-LEBANESE UNDERSTANDING OF THIS ISSUE. HOWEVER, KIMCHE IN A SIDE TALK WPTH DRAPER REJECTED THE USE OF THE VERB "TO INTEGRATE" WHEN DESCRIBING WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN TO HADDAD'S FORCES.

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10. A SIMILARLY LONG WRANGLE TOOK PLACE OVER THE QUESTION OF "HOT PURSUIT" INTO LEBANESE TERRITORIAL WATERS. THIS INCLUDED A STERILE EXCHANGE ON DEFINITIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW OF "HOT PURSUIT" IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS. TO COMPRESS A LONG EXCHANGE, A CONSENSUS EMERGED TO THE EFFECT THAT LEBANON WOULD TACITLY ACCEPT ISRAELI "HOT PURSUIT" IN LEBANON'S TERRITORIAL WATERS IN RESPONSE TO TERRORIST ATTACK BY SEA AGAINST ISRAEL, AS LONG AS ISRAEL DID NOT ABUSE SUCH AN UNDERSTANDING. SINCE IT WS CLEAR THAT LEBANON UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES COULD AGREE OR ACQUIESCE IN WRITING, IT WAS DECIDED THAT THIS SENSITIVE ISSUE MIGHT BE HANDLED IN THE SAME WAY AS WE MIGHT HANDLE THE EQUALLY SENSITIVE ISSUE OF ISRAELI AERIAL SURVEILLANCE OF THE

SECURITY REGION.

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11. FINALLY, WE TURNED TO THE JOINT SUPERVISORY PATGMLS, THEIR NUMBER, SCOPE, AND DURATION. HAMDAM AND FAOTAL STRONGLY URGED THAT EVERYTHING POSSIBLE BE DONE TO REDUCE THEIR VISIBILITY. HAMDAM URGED THAT A PROPORTIONATELY GREATER CUMBER OF SUCH TEAMS CARRY ON THEIR ACTIVITIES BY AIR RATHER THAN ON THE GROUND. HZ AND FATTAL ALSO URGED THAT A SCHEDULE BE AGREED UPON UNDER WHICH THE TEAMS WOULD GRADUALLY BE PHASED OUT OVER TWO YEARS. KIMCHE AND EINAM ARGUED EXTENSIVELY THAT THESE TEAMS WERE AT THE HEART OF THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, AND PLAYED DOWN HAMDAM'S ARGUMENT THAT BETTER SECURITY SURVEILLANCE COULD BE ACHIEVED THROUGH CODPERATIVE ARRANGEMENTS IN THE INTELLIGENCE FIELD WHICH LEBANON HAD ALREADY ACCEPTED.

12. TO COMPRESS AN EQUALLY LENGTHY DEBATE, THE OUTCOME WAS THAT ISRAEL REJECTED ANY MOVE AWAY FROM THE POSITION OF "UP TO EIGHT" TEAMS, BUT THE ISRAELIS ALSO AGREED THAT THE INFORMAL PAPER GIVEN TO THE LEBANESE AND UNITED STATES

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SIDES BY THE ISRAELIS IN THE LAST SESSION - DESCRIBING THE ISRAELI CONCEPT OF THE MISSION AND ACTIVITIES OF THESE TEAMS - HAD BEEN UNFELICITOUSLY DRAFTED IN SEVERAL PARAGRAPHS AND COULD BE CHANGED FOLLOWING FURTHER DEBATE.

13. KIMCHE ALSO FINALLY AGREED TO DRAPER'S PROPOSAL THAT WE CONSIDER THE CONCEPT OF TARGETTING DATES FOR PHASING OUT THE SUPERVISORY TEAMS, IF SECURITY CONDITIONS SO PERMIT, AND PROVIDED THE MILITARY COMMITTEE ALSO AGREES. DRAPER POINTED OUT THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD STILL HAVE A VETO ON THE CONTINUATION OF THE TEAMS UNDER THIS APPROACH, BUT THAT TALKING ABOUT TARGET DATES WOULD EASE SEVERAL OF LEBANON'S POLITICAL CONCERNS. GROVE

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TAGS: PRES, MOPS, HARR, XF, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US
SUBJ: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: MILITARY WORKING GROUP MEETING,
NETANYA, APRIL 19, 1983

1. [REDACTED]
2. SUMMARY: INITIAL AND MOST PRODUCTIVE TOPIC DISCUSSED
DURING MILITARY WORKING GROUP'S APRIL 19 SESSION IN NETANYA
WAS DEFINITION OF THE NORTHERN BOUNDARY OF THE SECURITY REGION.
GEN HAMDAN PRESENTED A LEBANESE PROPOSAL WHICH WOULD ESTABLISH
THE NORTHERN BOUNDARY BEGINNING AT THE COST APPROX 40 KILOMETERS
FROM METULLA AND MOVING EAST ROUGHLY ALONG THE ANWALI RIVER TO
THE MOUNTAINS, THEN CONTINUING NORTHWARD, SKIRTING THE SLOPES
OF THE MOUNTAIN RANGE, INCLUDING THE KAFRIYAH
PASS, AND CONTINUING EAST ACROSS THE BIQA' TO THE LEBANESE-
SYRIAN BORDER. HAMDAN'S PROPOSAL WAS ROUGHLY EQUIVALENT TO THE

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ISRAELI POSITION WITH THE EXCEPTION OF A 20 SQUARE KILOMETER

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AREA IN THE VICINITY OF THE PASS. GEN COOLEY SUPPORTED THE LEBANESE POSITION AND SUGGESTED THAT LEBANON AGREE NOT TO FORTIFY THE 20 SQUARE KILOMETER AREA. EINAN WAS RECEPTIVE TO THIS SUGGESTION AND AGREED TO PROPOSE ACCEPTANCE OF HAMDAN'S PROPOSAL TO HIS AUTHORITIES PROVIDED THE MINUTES OR A SIDE LETTER BE WRITTEN TO INDICATE LEBANON'S COMMITMENT TO SECURE THE AREA AROUND THIS NON-FORTIFIED AREA AND TO SPECIFY AT THEEA WOULD BE FREE OF RANGE ARTILLERY AND AIR DEFENSE MISSILES. EINAN AGREED AD REF-ERENDUM TO THE DRAFT ARTICLE OF THE SECURITY ANNEX DEALING WITH INTEGRATION OF HADDAD'S FORCES INTO THE LEBANESE ARMY TERRITORIAL BRIGADE. THE ISRAELI DEL ALSO INDICATED THAT ISRAEL WOULD ACCEPT RAISING THE MAXIMUM ALTITUDE FOR AIR DEFENSE MISSILES OUTSIDE OF THE SECURITY REGION FROM 10,000 FEET TO 15,000 FEET ABOVE GROUND. EINAN QUALIFIED ISRAELI ACCEPTANCE OF THE DRAFT ARTICLE ON NAVAL ACTIVITY IN LEBANON'S TERRITORIAL WATERS FALLING WITHIN THE SECURITY REGION ON MUTUAL ACCEPTANCE OF MINUTES RELATED TO THIS ARTICLE; HOWEVER, NO AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON ISRAEL'S PROPOSED MINUTES, WHICH WOULD RESTRICT LEBANESE NAVAL ACTIVITY OUT OF THE SECURITY REGION. THE US DEL STRONGLY OPPOSED ANY SUCH RESTRICTIONS IN WATERS OUT OF THE SECURITY REGION. COOLEY ADDRESSED THE QUESTION OF US PARTICIPATION IN THE MIL COMMITTEE, PROPOSING THAT DIFFERENCES BE BRIDGED BY A FORMULA THAT WOULD ALLOW FOR EITHER SIDE TO REQUEST THIS PARTICIPATION ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS. EINAN STRONGLY OPPOSED SUCH A FORMULATION UNLESS BOTH SIDES AGREED TO INVITE US PARTICIPATION. END SUMMARY

3. APRIL 19 SESSION OF MILITARY WORKING GROUP IN NETANYA BEGAN BY DISCUSSION OF THE NORTHERN LIMIT OF THE SECURITY REGION. INITIAL POINTS VOICED BY GEN EINAN AND GEN HAMDAN WERE DIVERGENT ON THE QUESTION OF WHETHER JABAL BARUK SHOULD BE INCLUDED

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IN THE SECURITY REGION OR NOT. HAMDAN SAID THAT IT COULD NOT BE INCLUDED, STRESSING THAT BARUK WAS SYMBOLIC FOR THE LEBANESE AND THAT ITS EXCLUSION FROM THE SECURITY REGION WAS PROBABLY EQUALLY SIGNIFICANT FOR THE SYRIANS. EINAN THEN EXPLAINED THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPORTANCE TO ISRAEL OF HAVING A SECURITY REGION OF 40 KILOMETERS (MEASURED FROM METULLA) OR MORE. HAMDAN THEN TABLED A PROPOSED NORTHERN BOUNDARY WHICH WOULD BEGIN AT THAT APPROX 40 KILOMETERS FROM METULLA, MOVE EAST ROUGHLY ALONG THE AWWALI RIVER TO THE MOUNTAINS, THEN CONTINUE NORTHWARD SKIRTING THE SLOPES OF THE MOUNTAIN RANGE INCLUDING THE KAFRIYAH PASS AND CONTINUING EAST ACROSS THE BIQA' TO THE

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LEBANESE-SYRIAN BORDER. HAMDAN CONTRASTED THE LEBANESE AND ISRAELI PROPOSALS AND INDICATED THAT THE ONLY SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE WAS AN AREA OF APPROX 20 SQ KILOMETERS. AFTER EINAN RECOMMENDED THAT WE MOVE TO ANOTHER SUBJECT, GEN COOLEY INTERCEDED FOR THE LEBANESE, SAYING THAT HAMDAN'S PROPOSAL WAS REASONABLE CONSIDERING THAT:

-- THE LAF WOULD SECURE THE AREAS NORTH OF THE LINE WHEREEVER IT MIGHT BE DRAWN.

-- INFILTRATION ROUTES OF CONCERN CROSS THE KAFRIYAH PASS, THUS, IT IS MILITARILY MORE SIGNIFICANT THAN THE PEAK OF JABAL BARUK.

-- INTELLIGENCE EXCHANGE AND VERIFICATION MEASURES WILL COVER THIS AREA.

COOLEY SUGGESTED THAT THE 20 SQ KILOMETER AREA NOT BE FORTIFIED. EINAN WAS RECEPTIVE TO THIS SUGGESTION AND AGREED TO PROPOSE ACCEPTANCE OF HAMDAN'S PROPOSAL TO HIS AUTHORITIES PROVIDED AGREED MINUTES OR A SIDE-LETTER BE WRITTEN INDICATING LEBANON'S COMMITMENT TO CONTROL ACCESS AND SECURE THE AREA AROUND THIS NON-FORTIFIED SECOR AND SPECIFYING THAT THE AREA WOULD BE FREE OF LONG-RANGE ARTILLERY, RADARS, AIR DEF MISSILES AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE EQUIP TO INCLUDE SIGINT AND ELINT EQUIP.

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HAMDAN SAID SUCH AN AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED AND IT WAS AGREED AD REFERENDUM THAT AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL RADARS WOULD BE PERMITTED.

4. EINAN AND HAMDAN AGREED AD REFERENDUM TO DRAFT ART OF THE SECURITY ANNEX DEALING WITH THE INTEGRATION OF HADDAD'S FORCES INTO THE LEBANESE ARMY TERRITORIAL BRIGADE.

5. EINAN SAID THAT ISRAEL WOULD ACCEPT RAISING THE MAXIMUM ALTITUDE FOR AIR DEF MISSILES OUTSIDE OF THE SECURITY REGION FROM 10,000 TO 15,000 FEET ABOVE GROUND AS REQUESTED BY LEBANON.

6. EINAN QUALIFIED ISRAELI ACCEPTANCE OF COL RUHAYYIN'S DRAFT ART ON AUTHORIZED LEBANESE NAVAL ACTIVITY IN THE TERRITORIAL WATERS FALLING WITHIN THE SECURITY REGION ON THE WRITING OF MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE MINUTES SPECIFYING PROCEDURES ON THE

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EXCHANGE OF INFO ON SUSPECTED VESSELS AND FOR CONTINUOUS COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN LEBANESE AND ISRAELI NAVAL ELEMENTS. EINAN ALSO LINKED ACCEPTANCE OF THE PROVISIONS APPLYING WITHIN THE WATERS OF THE SECURITY REGION TO ISRAELI DEMANDS FOR RESTRICTIONS IN LEBANESE TERRITORIAL WATERS OUTSIDE THE SECURITY REGION. COOLEY CLEARLY STATED THE US COULD ACCEPT NO RESTRICTIONS ON LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY OVER ITS TERRITORIAL WATERS OUTSIDE THE SECURITY REGION. (COMMENT. EINAN'S MENTION OF TERRITORIAL WATERS WITHIN THE SECURITY REGION IMPLIES DE FACTO ISRAELI AGREEMENT THAT THE SECURITY REGION EXTENDS INTO LEBANON'S TERRITORIAL WATERS ALONG THE COAST. END COMMENT)

7. IN AN EFFORT TO BRIDGE THE CURRENT ISRAELI AND LEBANESE POSITIONS ON US PARTICIPATION IN THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS COMMITTEE, COOLEY PROPOSED THAT EITHER SIDE COULD REQUEST US

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PARTICIPATION ON THE COMMITTEE ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS. HANDAN SAID LEBANON WOULD CONSIDER THIS IDEA FAVORABLY, BUT EINAN WAS STRONGLY OPPOSED TO US REP UNLESS BOTH SIDES AGREED TO INVITE THE US TO PARTICIPATE. COOLEY STATED THAT THE US WOULD PREFER TO LIMIT ITS PARTICIPATION AND THAT THE US COULD REFUSE REQUESTS TO PARTICIPATE. EINAN ADDED THAT ISRAEL DOES NOT WANT US INVOLVMENT IN EVERY ISSUE, BUT THAT BEFORE ANY UNRESOLVED PROBLEM WAS REFERRED TO THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE, BOTH PARTIES WOULD INVITE US PARTICIPATION IN THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS COMMITTEE.

8. COMMENT. EINAN'S REACTION TO HANDAN'S PROPOSAL FOR DEFINING THE NORTHERN BOUNDARY OF THE SECURITY REGION AND THE IDEA OF A NON-FORTIFIED AREA WAS VERY POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT WHICH INDICATES THAT A SOLUTION ON THAT ISSUE MAY BE WITTEACH.
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FROM DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, US, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: NEW FORMULA ON
MUTUAL RELATIONS

1. [REDACTED]
2. AT THE APRIL 19 NEGOTIATING SESSION IN NETANYA, LEBANESE DELEGATE KHARMA PRESENTED THE FOLLOWING FORMULATION FOR THE MOVEMENT OF PRODUCTS AND GOODS WHICH KIMCHE PROMISED TO CONSIDER PRIOR TO THE NEXT NEGOTIATING SESSION AT KHALDAH ON APRIL 21.
3. BEGIN TEXT:

- THERE WILL BE A MOVEMENT OF PRODUCTS AND GOODS

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL WHICH WILL TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE PROTECTION OF THEIR RESPECTIVE AGRICULTURE AND INDUSTRY AS WELL AS THEIR PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION NEEDS. IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT LEBANON WILL NOT IMPORT FROM ISRAEL PRODUCTS AND GOODS THAT LEBANON PRODUCES FOR EXPORT. THE MOVEMENT OF THE AGREED PRODUCTS AND GOODS WILL BE ON A NON-DISCRIMINATORY BASIS.

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- EXPERTS DESIGNATED BY THE TWO GOVERNMENTS WILL MEET ON A REGULAR BASIS AND NO LESS THAN ONCE A MONTH, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE, TO ADJUST THE FLOW AND CHARACTER OF THE TRADE ACCORDINGLY. END TEXT.
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DECAPTIONED

FROM DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, US, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: NETANYA MEETING APRIL 19

1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY. AFTER THE TRAGIC BOMBING OF THE EMBASSY IN BEIRUT, ALL PARTIES AGREED IN THE APRIL 19 PLENARY IT WAS MORE IMPORTANT THAN EVER TO REACH AN EARLY AGREEMENT. CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS WAS MADE IN THE CIVILIAN COMMITTEE IN CLEANING UP MOST DIFFERENCES IN THE FIRST EIGHT ARTICLES OF THE AGREEMENT, INCLUDING THE AGREED MINUTES INTERPRETING THESE ARTICLES, THOUGH MUTUAL "RECOGNITION" AND GUIDANCE CONCERNING THE ECONOMIC BOYCOTT REMAIN OUTSTANDING, AS DOES THE QUESTION OF WHO WILL SIGN THE AGREEMENT. WE REACHED A CONSENSUS ON PUTTING THE AGREEMENT INTO A FORM OF

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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SUSPENDED ANIMATION IN THE EVENT THAT ISRAEL FEELS IT CANNOT WITHDRAW BECAUSE OF A FAILURE OF THE SYRIANS OR PLO TO COOPERATE IN SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL. A NEW TEXT ON THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD WAS SURFACED BY LEBANON (SEPTTEL). REPORT ON THE MILITARY COMMITTEE DELIBERATIONS WILL BE PROVIDED BY SEPTTEL. THE NEXT TRIPARTITE SESSION WILL BE HELD IN KHALDAH THURSDAY, APRIL 21. END SUMMARY.

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3. THE APRIL 19 PLENARY SESSION WAS LARGELY DEVOTED TO THE EMBASSY BOMB BLAST AND STATEMENTS OF CONDOLENCES. KIMCHE S THAT THE BEST ANSWER TO THE LATEST "OUTRAGE" WOULD BE ACHIEVING AN EARLY AGREEMENT AND ENSURING EFFECTIVE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES SO THAT THE TERRORISTS WILL NEVER BE ABLE TO RETURN TO LEBANON. FATTAL ECHOED THAT THE LESSON TO BE DRAWN WAS AN EVEN GREATER DETERMINATION TO REACH A SPEEDY AGREEMENT. DRAPER THANKED FATTAL AND KIMCHE FOR THEIR MESSAGES OF SYMPATHY AND EXPRESSED GRATIFICATION FOR THE EXTRAORDINARY RESPONSE OF THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES TO THE TRAGEDY, WHICH AFFECTED BOTH AMERICAN AND LEBANESE CITIZENS. HE REFERRED TO THE PRESIDENT'S DETERMINATION TO PRESS AHEAD TO REACH PEACE IN LEBANON AND THE REGION. IT WAS THEN AGREED TO MEET IN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN SUBCOMMITTEES IN ORDER TO REACH AN AGREEMENT ON A MAXIMUM NUMBER OF SUBJECTS, WHILE LEAVING THE PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT ISSUES, SUCH AS HADDAD AND UNIFIL, TO THE SIDE. THE NEXT MEETING WILL BE IN KHALDAH ON THURSDAY, APRIL 21, AFTER WHICH SESSIONS WILL BE HELD APRIL 25-26 IN NETANYA.

4. THE CIVILIAN SUBCOMMITTEE, HEADED BY KIMCHE, FATTAL, AND DRAPER, DECIDED TO REVIEW AGAIN THE TEXT OF THE

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"COVERING AGREEMENT" (SEPTELS ON MILITARY SUBCOMMITTEE AND NEW TEXT ON MOVEMENT OF GOODS). IT IS EXPECTED THAT SUBSEQUENT SESSIONS WILL ADDRESS FURTHER THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS FOR TRADE AND TRANSPORT, AS WELL AS IDENTIFYING THOSE AGENDA ITEMS THAT WOULD GO INTO THE FORMAL AGREEMENT ON MUTUAL RELATIONS SIX MONTHS OR SO AFTER WITHDRAWAL. CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS WAS MADE IN REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE FIRST EIGHT ARTICLES OF THE AGREEMENT AND ON THE AGREED MINUTES INTERPRETING OR CLARIFYING THESE ARTICLES.

5. ISRAEL REITERATED THAT THE AGREEMENT SHOULD BE SIGNED AT THE FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL. FATTAL REPLIED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT BELIEVED THE SIGNING SHOULD BE AT THE FATTAL/KIMCHE LEVEL, THOUGH HE LATER STATED HE WOULD RAISE THE SUBJECT AGAIN WITH UTHORITIES, AS HE HAD PREVIOUSLY.

6. CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION WAS DEVOTED TO ARTICLE I AND HOW ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR SHOULD BE LINKED. FINALLY, BOTH SIDES ACCEPTED DRAPER'S COMPROMISE FORMULA WHICH, IN EFFECT, GAVE CO-EQUAL STATUS TO THESE TWO ITEMS, FOLLOWING A PRE-AMBULAR COMMON APPROACH. AFTER THREE MONTHS OF DEBATE ON THIS ISSUE, THIS WAS A MAJOR BREAKTHROUGH. HOWEVER,

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ISRAEL STILL INSISTS THAT EXPLICIT MUTUAL "RECOGNITION" SHOULD BE REFLECTED IN ARTICLE I, THOUGH FATTAL GAVE AN ELOQUENT REBUTTAL TO THIS POINT. DRAPER TOLD KIMCHE WE HAD OTHER IDEAS TO OVERCOME THIS CONTENTIOUS ISSUE.

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EXDIS

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7. WE ALSO REACHED A CONSENSUS - SPELLED OUT BY DRAPER - OF HOW TO HANDLE THE CONTINGENCY OF A FAILURE BY PLO OR SYRIA TO PROCEED WITH WITHDRAWALS SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE IDF. IN ESSENCE, THE ISRAELI-LEBANESE AGREEMENT WOULD BE PUT INTO A FORM OF SUSPENDED ANIMATION - A SUSPENSION OF OBLIGATIONS - PENDING A RETURN OF CONDITIONS PERMITTING WITHDRAWAL AND THE FULFILLMENT OF OTHER OBLIGATIONS. THERE WAS ALSO

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A LESS EXPLICIT CONSENSUS THAT UNDERSTANDINGS ON THIS POINT COULD BE EFFECTED BY SIDE LETTERS FROM THE PARTIES, SPELLING OUT THEIR RESPECTIVE POSITIONS, ADDRESSED TO THE U.S. OR POSSIBLY TO ONE ANOTHER.

8. AFTER AGREEING TO SOME TEXTUAL CHANGE IN ARTICLES 2-7, MUCH OF THE SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION CENTERED ON ARTICLE 8 AND PARTICULARLY ITS PROVISIONS WITH RESPECT TO LIAISON OFFICES (AND PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES). KIMCHE PRESSED HARD FOR A SEPARATE SITE FOR THE ISRAELI LIAISON OFFICE

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IN BEIRUT AND THE NEED FOR THE LIAISON OFFICE TO HAVE ADEQUATE ROOM FOR MANEUVER, INCLUDING, FOR EXAMPLE, ARRANGING FOR CULTURAL/INFORMATIONAL EXCHANGES AND CONTACTS. THE LEBANESE ARGUED THAT, FOR REASONS OF SECURITY, THE LIAISON OFFICES IN BEIRUT OUGHT TO BE LOCATED IN THE SAME AREA, BUT AGREED TO CHECK THIS FURTHER WITH THEIR AUTHORITIES.

AMBASSADOR KHARMA DREW A DISTIN BETWEEN ALLOWING THE ISRAELI LIAISON OFFICE TO BE IN DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE LEBANESE PRIVATE AREA--WHETHER IN CULTURE OR COMMERCE--AND THOSE ACTIVITIES WITH GOL ENTITIES WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE COORDINATED (OR NOTIFIED) THROUGH THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE. THE ISRAELI SIDE ALSO AGREED TO REVIEW SYMPATHETICALLY THE LEBANESE ABBREVIATED TEXT ON PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES BASED ON THE CONVENTION FOR SPECIAL MISSIONS. COMMENT: WE BELIEVE IT IS WORKABLE.

9. DRAPER ARGUED FOR LANGUAGE IN ARTICLE 8 (MUTUAL RELATIONS) THAT WOULD INCLUDE THE CONCEPT OF SEEKING ARRANGEMENTS TO HANDLE THE PROPERTY CLAIMS OF THE PRIVATE CITIZENS OF EACH COUNTRY. THE ISRAELI SIDE RESISTED, ARGUING THAT SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS SHOULD BE RESERVED FOR THE PEACE TREATY. THEY AGREED, HOWEVER, TO CONSIDER THE MATTER FURTHER, AFTER REPEATED INTERVENTIONS BY DRAPER AND KHARMA THAT THIS COULD MARKEDLY IMPROVE THE PROSPECTS OF BROAD LEBANESE SUPPORT. (COMMENT: THIS ISSUE WAS ALSO THE SUBJECT OF SIDE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN DRAPER AND KIMCHE, AND KOZAK AND RUBINSTEIN, RESPECTIVELY.)


10. FINALLY, DISCUSSION FOCUSED ON THE ECONOMIC BOYCOTT, WHICH FATTAL EQUATED IN IMPORTANCE TO THE "RECOGNITION"

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ISSUE IN TERMS OF ELICITING POSSIBLE VIOLENT ARAB REACTIONS. FATTAL AGREED WITH KIMCHE THAT THE BOYCOTT ISSUE SHOULD BE DIFFERENTIATED BETWEEN ITS SUSPENSION (DE FACTO ABROGATION) DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD AND ITS POSSIBLE ULTIMATE DE JURE ABROGATION WHEN THE FORMAL AGREEMENT ON MUTUAL RELATIONS WAS REACHED; FATTAL SAID THE PRESENT LANGUAGE IN THE LEBANESE ORAL COMMITMENT AS WELL AS IN THE FORMAL COVERING AGREEMENT WAS SUFFICIENT TO TAKE CARE OF THE BOYCOTT ISSUE AND DID NOT NEED TO BE FURTHER HIGHLIGHTED. (THE ISRAELIS CAN BE EXPECTED TO COME BACK ON THIS POINT AT THE NEXT SESSION.) RUBINSTEIN WAS ALSO CONCERNED THAT THE BOYCOTT LAW COULD BE BR TO LEBANESE COURTS DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD, EVEN THOUGH THE EXECUTIVE MIGHT AGREE THAT THE BOYCOTT LAW WOULD NOT BE APPLIED DURING THIS TIME. FATTAL AGREED THIS WAS A THORNY PROBLEM WHICH NEEDED TO BE LOOKED INTO FURTHER. WE LATER TOLD THE LEBANESE THEY "MUST" CLARIFY THEIR POSITION AT THE KHALDAH SESSION. LEWIS



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BEIRUT 04170

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MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
CAIRO/JERUSALEM FOR AMBS. HABIB AND DRAPER

E.O. 12356: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US

SUBJ: HABIB MISSION:

1.

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2. FOREIGN MINISTER ELIE SALEM ASKED AMBASSADOR DILLON
AND ROSS TO COME TO HIS OFFICE APRIL 16, IN HIS WORDS,
"TO GIVE HIM A FEEL FOR WHAT HAS BEEN GOING ON SINCE
AMBASSADOR HABIB LEFT BEIRUT." DRAWING ON THE CABLED
REPORT OF HABIB'S MEETINGS IN ISRAEL, WE OUTLINED ALL
THAT WE FELT SALEM NEEDED TO KNOW PENDING AMB. HABIB'S
RETURN TO BEIRUT, WHICH WE SAID COULD BE AS EARLY AS THE
AFTERNOON OF APRIL 17.

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3. NOTING THAT MANY OF THE PRESS REPORTS OF HABIB'S MEETINGS HAD SUGGESTED PROGRESS TOWARD A COMPROMISE ON THE ISSUE OF MAJOR HADDAD, WE TOLD SALEM THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD IN FACT REMAINED RESERVED AND NON-COMMITTAL DURING THEIR MEETINGS WITH HABIB. HE HAD PUSHED THEM HARD, JUST AS HE HAD PUSHED THE LEBANESE, BUT AT THIS STAGE THE ISRAELIS WERE MULLING THINGS OVER. THEY CONTINUED TO ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO HADDAD AND THE "EFFECTIVE SECURITY" THEY FELT HE HAD ESTABLISHED IN THE SOUTH. HABIB HAD ASKED THAT, IN ANY CABINET DELIBERATIONS ON THIS SUBJECT, THE ENTIRE PACKAGE OF AGREEMENTS AND UNDERSTANDINGS BE CONSIDERED, NOT JUST THE REMAINING POINTS OF DIFFERENCE, SUCH AS THE STATUS OF MAJOR HADDAD. WE SAID WE HAD NO FURTHER DETAILS TO REPORT AND EXPECTED THAT HABIB HIMSELF WOULD BE GIVING THE LEBANESE AN EVALUATION OF THE STATE OF PLAY IMMEDIATELY AFTER HIS RETURN. HABIB HAD SPOKEN TO THE SECRETARY ON APRIL 14, AND THE PRESENT PUSH WOULD BE ALLOWED TO PLAY ITSELF OUT BEFORE FURTHER STEPS WERE CONSIDERED.

4. SALEM RESPONDED WITH A REITERATION OF LEBANESE ANXIETY ABOUT THE PRESENT PHASE. LEBANON HAD NOTHING ELSE TO GIVE, HE SAID, AND HE WAS CONCERNED THAT, EVEN HAVING GONE AS FAR AS IT HAD, LEBANON HAD MET NO ISRAELI UNDER-

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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STANDING OF ITS SITUATION. IF ISRAEL DEMANDED MORE, "IT WOULD BE ALL BONE, NO FLESH." THE NEXT PHASE COULD NOT BE MERELY A CONTINUATION OF THE PRESENT ONE. THE LEBANESE LEADERSHIP WOULD SOON HAVE TO ACCOUNT TO ITS PUBLIC ON THE RESULTS OF ITS POLICY CHOICES, ESPECIALLY ITS EXCLUSIVE RELIANCE ON THE U.S. IF HABIB COULD ASSURE THE LEBANESE THAT THE REMAINING ISSUES COULD BE IRONED OUT OVER THE NEXT TWO OR THREE WEEKS, THAT WAS ONE THING. BUT, IF IMPASSE WAS LIKELY, THEN LEBANON WOULD HAVE TO LOOK HARD AT THE NEXT PHASE. IN SALEM'S VIEW, THE ONLY REALISTIC COURSE OF ACTION WAS TO "DIG IN EVEN DEEPER BEHIND THE U.S. INITIATIVE." TO DO THIS, SALEM WOULD HAVE TO GET TO KNOW THE SECRETARY AND HIS THOUGHTS ON LEBANON AND THE MIDDLE EAST MUCH MORE FULLY THAN HE DID NOW. IN THE EVENT THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS REACHED IMPASSE, HE WOULD HAVE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS TO POSE ABOUT LEBANON'S VERY EXISTENCE. IT MIGHT NOT BE POSSIBLE TO WAIT FOR A PROJECTED MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY MAY 12 (SEPTTEL) TO RAISE THESE QUESTIONS.

5. COMMENT: SALS SATISFIED WITH THE LITTLE THAT WE GAVE HIM AND REASSURED TO LEARN THAT HABIB WAS PROBABLY COMING TO BEIRUT ON APRIL 17. FROM HIS MUSINGS ON NEXT STEPS IF AN IMPASSE IS REACHED, WE JUDGE THAT THE

Date Printed: 10/22/1996

DOC NUMBER: 83BEIRUT04170

CHANNEL: n/a

IDEA OF AN INTERNATIONALLY NEGOTIATED AND
GUARANTEED FORM OF NEUTRALITY FOR LEBANON
IS STILL VERY MUCH UNDER DISCUSSION AMONG
LEBANESE LEADERS. DILLON

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DOC NUMBER: 83CAIRO11374

CHANNEL: n/a

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PAGE 01 CAIRO 11374 171340Z
ACTION NEA-07

INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-10 PM-09 SSN-02
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DEPARTMENT FOR NEA, PA AND PA/PRESS

USINFO FOR PPPN

E.O. 12356: N/A

SUBJECT: SPECIAL ENVOY PHILLIP HABIB ANSWERS NEWSMEN'S
QUESTIONS AFTER BRIEFING PRESIDENT MUBARAK APRIL 16

(BEGIN TRANSCRIPT OF Q AND A)

Q: WHERE ARE YOU GOING?

HABIB: I'M GOING BACK TO ISRAEL THIS AFTERNOON. I WAS
VERY PLEASED TO ACCEPT THE PRESIDENT'S INVITATION TO
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COME DOWN TO GIVE HIM A BRIEFING ON THE STATUS OF THE
NEGOTIATIONS WE HAVE BEEN INVOLVED BETWEEN LEBANON AND
ISRAEL. I'VE DONE SO AND THAT'S ALL I HAVE TO SAY OR DO
HERE AS A MATTER OF FACT.

Q: (INAUDIBLE)

HABIB: WELL, THAT'S WHAT I TOLD THE PRESIDENT ABOUT I
DIDN'T COME HERE TO TELL YOU ABOUT IT. (LAUGHTER)

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DOC_NUMBER: 83CAIRO11374

CHANNEL: n/a

Q: (INAUDIBLE)...DID YOU SUCCEED?

HABIB: WELL, AS YOU KNOW, I DON'T DISCUSS THE NEGOTIATIONS IN ANY SUBSTANTIVE WAY PUBLICLY. THEY ARE CONTINUING AND OUR EFFORTS ARE CONTINUING WITHIN THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES THAT HAVE BEEN LAID DOWN BY OUR PRESIDENT. THAT'S ALL I HAVE TO SAY.

Q: IS SECRETARY SHULTZ COMING HERE?

HABIB: THOSE ARE THINGS THAT I DON'T ADDRESS.

Q: WHAT ABOUT REPORTS THAT AN AGREEMENT WILL BE REACHED IN TWO WEEKS ON A WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN TROOPS FROM LEBANON?

HABIB: I DON'T SET DEADLINES.

(END TRANSCRIPT) PENNEY

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MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
CAIRO/JERUSALEM PASS AMBASSADORS HABIB AND DRAPER FROM
ROSS

E.O. 12356: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH GEMAYEL AND
TEAM, APRIL 14

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1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY. HABIB MET WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL, HIS KEY
FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISORS, AND THE LEBANESE NEGOTIATING
TEAM FOR THREE HOURS APRIL 14 TO ASCERTAIN LEBANESE
POSITIONS ON THE KEY "POLITICAL" ISSUES AND THE NUMEROUS
SECONDARY ISSUES REMAINING UNRESOLVED IN THE FORMAL
NEGOTIATING SESSIONS IN KHALDAH AND KIRYAT SHEMONA/
NETANYA.

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IN A SMALL MEETING WITH GEMAYEL, SALEM, AND WADI' HADDAD, HABIB RAISED THE FUTURE STATUS OF MAJOR HADDAD, THE FUTURE OF UNIFIL, FORMAL RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL, AND THE ASSIGNMENT OF ISRAELI LIAISON OFFICERS TO LEBANESE UNITS IN THE SECURITY REGION. THE LEBANESE STUCK ADAMANTLY TO THEIR PREVIOUS POSITIONS ON ALL BUT UNIFIL, ASSERTING THAT TO GO ANY FURTHER WOULD DESTROY LEBANON'S DOMESTIC CONSENSUS, GREATLY WEAKEN ARMY MORALE, AND CREATE NEW OBSTACLES TO SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. ON UNIFIL, GEMAYEL STATED THAT ITS RETENTION WAS NOT A LEBANESE DEMAND. (SALEM AND GHASSAN TUENI LATER TRIED TO WATER THIS POSITION DOWN.)

IN A LARGER MEETING WITH SALEM, HADDAD, TUENI, AND THEN THE WHOLE LEBANESE NEGOTIATING TEAM, HABIB WENT OVER THE SOME 30 POINTS OF DISAGREEMENT REMAINING IN THE FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS. THE LEBANESE GAVE PRECIOUS LITTLE, WITH HADDAD AND TUENI IN PARTICULAR ACTING AS IF THEY WERE IN A COLLEGE DEBATE RATHER THAN IN SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS. HABIB WILL TAKE THE RESULTS OF HIS TALKS IN LEBANON TO ISRAEL. END SUMMARY.

3. AMB. HABIB, JOINED BY AMB. DILLON AND ROSS AND LATER

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BY GEN. COOLEY AND KOZAC, MET IN VARIOUS GROUPINGS WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL, HIS ADVISORS AND THE LEBANESE NEGOTIATING TEAM FOR THREE HOURS APRIL 14 TO ASCERTAIN LEBANESE POSITIONS ON THE KEY "POLITICAL" ISSUES AND THE NUMEROUS SECONDARY ISSUES REMAINING UNRESOLVED IN THE FORMAL NEGOTIATING SESSIONS IN KHALDAH AND KIRYAT SHEMONA/NETANYA.

4. IN A FIRST, SMALL MEETING WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL, FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM, AND NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR WADI' HADDAD, HABIB REVIEWED THE MAJOR ISSUES: THE FUTURE STATUS OF MAJOR HADDAD, THE FUTURE OF UNIFIL, FORMAL RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL, AND THE ASSIGNMENT OF ISRAELI LIAISON OFFICERS TO LEBANESE UNITS IN THE SECURITY REGION.

5. IN HIS OPENING REMARKS, HABIB MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

--- THE FORMAL SESSIONS HAVE DONE GOOD WORK, BUT THEY ARE TAKING TOO LONG. THEIR WORK HAS, HOWEVER, NARROWED THE DIFFERENCES AND MADE IT POSSIBLE TO FORESEE A CONCLUSION.

-- IT IS NOW POSSIBLE TO CREATE A PACKAGE AGREEMENT TO PRESENT TO BOTH PARTIES FOR APPROVAL. IN ORDER TO PRESENT SUCH A PACKAGE IT IS NECESSARY TO GO OVER THE MAJOR ISSUES

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WITH THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT TO ASCERTAIN ITS "FINAL"
POSITION.

-- IF THE ISRAELIS REJECT THIS PACKAGE, PROTRACTED NEGOTI-
ATIONS IN THE FORMAL FORMAT WILL CONTINUE. ISRAEL OR
LEBANON MAY EVENTUALLY BACK DOWN FROM THEIR PRESENT
POSITIONS, BUT IN THE MEANWHILE SECURITY PROBLEMS WILL

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INTENSIFY IN LEBANON, THE SYRIANS WILL BECOME MORE AND
MORE DISPOSED TO REJECT THE EVENTUAL AGREEMENT, AND A
FEELING OF BITTERNESS WILL EMERGE IN LEBANON VIS A VIS
ISRAEL, NEGATING THE POSSIBILITIES FOR TRUE COOPERATION
THAT HAVE EXISTED UP TO NOW.

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-- OBTAINING ISRAELI AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE EASY, AND
SUCCESS MAY NOT COME ABOUT. THE ISRAELIS MAY PREFER TO
HOLD TO THEIR ARGUMENTS AND LOOK AGAIN AT THE POSSIBILITY
OF PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL, WHICH WOULD BE GOOD FOR NO ONE.

-- BEFORE CONSIDERING FURTHER STEPS WE MUST AWAIT THE
RESULTS OF OUR LATEST APPROACH.

6. HABIB THEN BROACHED THE KEY ISSUES THAT REQUIRED
"POLITICAL" CONSIDERATION. THE FIRST ISSUE HE RAISED WAS
THE FUTURE STATUS OF SA'D HADDAD. HE DESCRIBED THE VARIOUS
OPTIONS THAT GEN. TAMIR HAD "INFORMALLY" PROPOSED OVER THE
LAST WEEKS. THESE FORESAW AT LEAST TEMPORARY COMMAND
RESPONSIBILITIES OVER TROOPS. HOW MUCH FLEXIBILITY DID
THE LEBANESE HAVE, HABIB ASKED. GEMAYEL IMMEDIATELY RE-
PLIED THAT THE LEBANESE PROPOSAL (CHIEF OF INTELLIGENCE
IN THE SECURITY REGION) HAD ALREADY GONE BEYOND THE
LEBANESE "BOTTOM LINE." IT HAD BEEN OFFERED "IN THE LAST
STRETCH" AND AS PART OF A PACKAGE DEAL. THE LEBANESE
GOVERNMENT COULD NOT MOVE BEYOND THIS. SALEM BEGAN TO
ENLARGE ON GEMAYEL'S REMARKS, SAYING THAT THE LEBANESE
PEOPLE COULD NOT ACCEPT HADDAD. GEMAYEL, WHOSE FACE BEGAN
TO REDDEN AND WHOSE VOICE BEGAN TO RISE AT THIS POINT,
INTERRUPTED TO SAY THAT ARMY MORALE WAS THE KEY FACTOR.
HOW COULD MAJOR HADDAD, A "PATENTED" AGENT FOR THE
ISRAELIS, BE GIVEN COMMAND RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE
LEBANESE ARMY WITHOUT DESTROYING MORALE? ALMOST SHOUTING,
GEMAYEL SAID "YOU ASK ME TO ACCEPT THIS? I WOULD PREFER
TO RESIGN." HE POINTED OUT THAT HE HAD JUST GOTTEN RID
OF A NUMBER OF UNSATISFACTORY OFFICERS AND CIVIL
SERVANTS. HOW, HE ASKED, COULD HE ACCEPT SA'D HADDAD
AFTER THE BATTLE HE HAD HAD TO FIGHT ON THESE DISCIPLI-

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NARY ACTIONS? SALEM INTERJECTED THAT HE HAD LOOKED INTO HADDAD'S STATUS AND FOUND THAT HE HAD BEEN DISCIPLINED AND REMOVED FROM THE ARMY BY ORDER OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS. GEMAYEL, RETURNING ANGRILY TO THE ATTACK, SAID HE REFUSED TO TALK ABOUT SA'D HADDAD ANY MORE. HIS STATUS WAS A LEBANESE PROBLEM, AND HE DID NOT WANT TO DISCUSS IT FURTHER WITH ANYONE, EVEN WITH HABIB. SALEM DID CONFIRM AFTER THIS OUTBURST THAT, AS PART OF A PACKAGE DEAL, AND SUBJECT TO THE STATED LEBANESE CONDITIONS ON EXCLUSION OF A COMMAND POST AND LIMITATION ON DURATION, THE LEBANESE OFFER ON HADDAD STILL STOOD.

7. AT THIS POINT, GEMAYEL INTERRUPTED WITH YET ANOTHER EMOTIONAL POSITION. HE REMINDED HABIB THAT, WHEN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS HAD BEGUN, THE STATED OBJECTIVE OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN THE REMOVAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON. THE U.S. POSITION, AS STATED REPEATEDLY, HAD INCLUDED THREE ELEMENTS: WITHDRAWALS, PRESERVATION OF THE LEBANESE DOMESTIC CONSENSUS, AND MAINTENANCE OF LEBANON'S ARAB CREDENTIALS. UP TO THIS VERY MOMENT, GEMAYEL SAID, HE HAD BEEN ASKING FOR EVIDENCE OF U.S. BACKING FOR THESE GOALS WITHOUT GETTING ANY RESPONSE. LEBANON WAS ALREADY BEYOND ITS RED LINES AND HAD ACCEPTED MANY THINGS IN SPITE OF ITSELF AND AGAINST ITS WILL BECAUSE THERE HAD BEEN NO REAL U.S. PRESSURE TO THE CONTRARY. HE SAID HE AND HIS GOVERNMENT WANTED TO WORK AS A TEAM WITH THE U.S. IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS. IF THIS WAS NOT POSSIBLE, "SOMETHING ELSE" SHOULD BE LOOKED AT. INTERRUPTING HABIB'S ATTEMPTS TO RETURN TO THE SUBJECT, HE REJECTED ISRAEL'S ATTEMPT TO CREATE A SECURITY STRATEGY AROUND "ONE VULNERABLE MAN" WHO "MIGHT DIE," AS WELL AS ISRAEL'S

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WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

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EXDIS

MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
CAIRO/JERUSALEM PASS AMBASSADORS HABIB AND DRAPER FROM
ROSS

INSISTENCE ON "PATROLS" EQUIPPED WITH APCs IN LEBANESE
TERRITORY. HABIB RESPONDED THAT HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD
LEBANON'S POSITION ON MAJOR HADDAD AND WOULD RAISE IT
NO FURTHER. THE "SUPERVISORY TEAMS" WERE ANOTHER
MATTER, AND THE MILITARY SUBCOMMITTEE IN THE NEGOTIAT-

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IONS HAD DONE GOOD WORK ON THEM. SALEM INTERJECTED THAT
THE USE OF APCs WAS STILL BEING DRAFTED WITHIN THE
LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. GEMAYEL SAID DARKLY THAT ISRAELI
TACTICS WERE "BLACKMAIL," AND HE WOULD NOT SUBMIT.

8. RETURNING TO THE MAJOR ISSUES, HABIB THEN TURNED TO
UNIFIL. GEMAYEL, IN A SURPRISING CHANGE OF THE LEBA-
NESE POSITION, VOICED THE VIEW THAT LEBANON HAD NO
POSITION ON ITS RETENTION. THIS, HE SAID, WAS A MATTER
FOR THE U.S., THE U.N., AND FOR "YOUR ARAB FRIENDS.
WE ARE NOT CONCERNED BY UNIFIL. WHY DIFFERENTIATE
BETWEEN THE PALESTINIAN CAMPS AND OTHER AREAS OF
LEBANON? IT IS NOT A LEBANESE DEMAND TO HAVE UNIFIL

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AROUND THE CAMPS." SALEM, TRYING TO WATER THIS DOWN, DESCRIBED UNIFIL AS "NOT A MAJOR CONCERN" AND ONE ON WHICH GEMAYEL HAD NOT BEEN BRIEFED. (COMMENT: GEMAYEL IS OBVIOUSLY REFLECTING THE LACK OF CONCERN, TO PUT IT MILDLY, OF MARONITE CIRCLES ON THE FATE OF THE PALESTINIANS. SALEM AND TUENI, AS GREEK ORTHODOX WITH GREATER SENSITIVITY TO THE ARAB WORLD, FEEL DIFFERENTLY. IN THE FOLLOWUP MEETING WITH THE LEBANESE NEGOTIATING TEAM, TO WHICH HE CAME STRAIGHT FROM THE AIRPORT FOLLOWING HIS RETURN FROM CAIRO, TUENI CLAIMED THAT WHAT GEMAYEL HAD MEANT WAS THAT IT WAS UP TO THE U.S. AND "OTHER PARTIES" I.E., THE PALESTINIANS), NOT LEBANON, TO DEMAND UNIFIL, SINCE THIS RESPONDED TO THEIR INTERESTS, NOT LEBANON'S, IN THE FIRST INSTANCE. SALEM FINALLY LEFT IT WITH HABIB THAT HE, HABIB, HAD CARTE BLANCHE ON THIS SUBJECT. IF UNIFIL PROVED IMPOSSIBLE TO SELL TO THE ISRAELIS, THEN -- AS HABIB REMINDED THE LEBANESE -- IT SHOULD BE ABANDONED IN RETURN FOR THE HIGHEST POSSIBLE PRICE.

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9. TURNING TO RECOGNITION, GEMAYEL STATED FLATLY THAT LEBANON COULD NOT RECOGNIZE ISRAEL FORMALLY AT THIS TIME. THE PREAMBLE OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT, AS WELL AS THE FACT OF SIGNATURE, CONSTITUTED DE FACTO RECOGNITION AS FAR AS HE WAS CONCERNED. TO GO FURTHER AT THIS TIME, HE SAID, WOULD DESTROY LEBANON'S ARAB CREDENTIALS. SALEM, LAUGHING DERISIVELY, ASKED HOW LEBANON COULD APPROACH SYRIA TO OBTAIN WITHDRAWAL IF IT HAD RECOGNIZED ISRAEL FORMALLY IN THE AGREEMENT.

10. TURNING BRIEFLY TO THE ISSUE OF ISRAELI LIAISON OFFICERS WITH LEBANESE UNITS IN THE SECURITY ZONE, GEMAYEL SAID THIS WAS OUT OF THE QUESTION. THE MILITARY COMMITTEE WOULD UNDERTAKE THE NECESSARY FUNCTIONS.

11. FOLLOWING THE MEETING WITH GEMAYEL, HABIB AND HIS TEAM MET INITIALLY WITH SALEM. HADDAD, AND TUENI AND THEN WITH THE WHOLE LEBANESE NEGOTIATING TEAM, TO GO OVER THE SOME 30 POINTS OF DISAGREEMENT REMAINING IN THE FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS. SALEM, HADDAD, AND TUENI GAVE PRECIOUS LITTLE, WITH HADDAD AND TUENI IN PARTICULAR ACTING AS IF THEY WERE IN A COLLEGE DEBATE RATHER THAN IN SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS. WE WILL BE DESIGNING A PACKAGE TO PRESENT TO THE ISRAELIS APRIL 15 REFLECTING SOME BUT NOT ALL OF THE LEBANESE POSITIONS. THEY WILL BUY OUR CHANGES AS PART OF A PACKAGE DEAL -- IF WE CAN SELL IT TO THE ISRAELIS. DILLON

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SECTION 01 OF 05 JERUSALEM 01336

DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, US, IS, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: MEETINGS WITH PM BEGIN AND
FONMIN SHAMIR, APRIL 15

1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY. DURING THREE HOURS OF MEETINGS APRIL
15, I MET FPRST WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR AND
MEMBERS OF THE ISRAELI DELEGAT ON AND THEN WITH
PRIME MINIUTER BEGIN, SHAMIR AND WRECS. MOST OF THE
DISCUSSION HFOCUSED ON THE HADDAD ISSUE. I
EXPLAINED I TRIED OUT EVERY POSSIBLE VARIAOION
WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL ON HADDAD WITHOUT AVAIL;

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GEMAYEL HAD VEPLIED PASSIONATELY THAT HE HAD GONE
BEYOND HIS LIMITS IN AGREEING TO MAKE HADDAD THE
DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR INTELLIGENCE. IF HE DID MORE,
LEBANON'S INTERNAL CONSENSUS WOULD BE FRACTURED
AND SYRIA WOULD NOT WIOHDRAW. IN DESCRIBING THE
FULL RANGE OF SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AGREED TO, I
REPEATEDLY ARGUED THAT THE MOMENT WAS RIPE TO
REACH AN AGREEMENT. IF THIS OPPORTUNITY WAS
MISSED, I FEARED THE SITUATION WOULD SOUR. BEGIN,

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SHAMIR AND ARENS REACTED NEGATIVELY AND IN VARIOUS WAYS REAFFIRMED THE ABSOLUTE NECESSITY OF HAVING HADDAD AS THE BRIGADE COMMANDER OR COMMANDER OF THE SECURITY REGION, THOUGH BEGIN ADDED THAT ANY FINAL DECISIONS COULD ONLY BE TAKEN BY THE CABINET.

3. I ALSO REVIEWED THE VARIOUS OTHER KEY NEGOTIATING ISSUES. I PUT ON THE TABLE LEBANON'S PROPOSAL THAT ONLY ONE DESIGNATED UNIFIL BATTALION BE PUT IN THE AREA OF THE PALESTINIAN CAMPS IN SIDON. THE ISRAELIS DID NOT REJECT THIS SUGGESTION. I ALSO SAID THAT LEBANON COULD NOT ACCEPT HAVING A STATEMENT CONSTITUTING "FORMAL RECOGNITION" IN THE AGREEMENT. NOR COULD THEY ACCEPT LIAISON OFFICERS ATTACHED TO THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE, ARGUING THAT THIS CONSTITUTED A RESIDUAL PRESENCE. THE ISRAELIS DID NOT DIGEST EITHER POINT WELL.

4. DURING MY MEETING WITH SHAMIR, WE ALSO HAD THE OCCASION TO RUN OVER OTHER OUTSTANDING POINTS, BOTH ON THE MILITARY AND CIVILIAN SIDE. IT HAS BEEN AGREED THAT WE WILL MEET SUNDAY MORNING WITH ISRAEL'S WORKING GROUP TO GO OVER THESE ISSUES IN MORE DETAIL. END SUMMARY.

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5. DURING THREE HOURS OF MEETINGS APRIL 15, I MET FIRST WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR AND MEMBERS OF THE ISRAELI DELEGATION AND THEN HAD A SECOND MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN, FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR AND DEFENSE MINISTER ARENS. I WAS JOINED BY AMBASSADOR LEWIS, GEN. COOLEY, KOZAK AND HARE FOR THE SHAMIR MEETING AND BY AMBASSADOR LEWIS AND HARE FOR THE BEGIN MEETING.

6. DURING THE BEGIN MEETING, I OPENED BY GIVING A RATHER DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF HOW I SAW THE NEGOTIATIONS AT THIS POINT, AND CONCENTRATED PARTICULARLY ON THE HADDAD ISSUE. I SAID THAT DURING TWO INTENSIVE MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL, I HAD PROBED AND TESTED WHETHER GEMAYEL MIGHT MAKE SOME OTHER ARRANGEMENT THAN THAT ALREADY SUGGESTED BY LEBANON WHICH WOULD PUT HADDAD INTO A COMMAND POSITION. I HAD DONE THIS IN RECOGNITION THAT ISRAEL MIGHT HAVE CONCLUDED THAT SINCE THE LEBANESE HAD SURFACED THE POSSIBILITY THAT HADDAD COULD BE A DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR INTELLIGENCE, IT WOULD ALSO BE PREPARED TO OFFER HIM A FULL COMMAND POSITION. I HAD GONE OVER EVERY POSSIBLE VARIATION WITH GEMAYEL, INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY THAT

HADDAD WOULD BE A TERRITORIAL BRIGADE COMMANDER
UNDZR A REGIONAL COMMANDER AND VARIOUS OTHER
POSSIBILITIES. GEMAYEL HAD REACTED PASSIONATELY
THAT HE COULD NOT GO THAT FAR; IN FACT, HE SAID HE
HAD GONE BEOND HIS LIMITS IN PROPOSING THE DEPUTY
COMMANDER POSITION. GEMAYEL HAD EVEN VIRTUALLY
ACCUSED ME OF TRYING TO PRESSURE HIM INTO MAKING

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AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY
USELO RIYADH PRIORITY
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY

SECTION 02 OF 05 JERUSALEM 01336

EXDIS

FROM HABIB



E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, US, IS, XFM
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: MEETINGS WITH PM BEGIN AND
A DECISION WHICH WOULD FRACTURE LEBANON'S INTERNAL

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CONSENSUS AND PRECLUDE A SYRIAN/PLO WITHDRAWAL. HE HAD QUESTIONED WHY HADDAD HAD BECOME A SINE QUA NON AND HAD POINTED OUT THAT THE HADDAD ISSUE HAD BECOME EVEN MORE DIFFICULT NOW THAT THIS WAS SO WIDELY AND PUBLICLY KNOWN TO BE AN ISRAELI DEMAND.



7. I TOLD BEGIN THAT I DID NOT BELIEVE GEMAYEL COULD GO ANY FURTHER ON HADDAD. IF ISRAEL WANTED TO WAIT, I COULD NOT TOTALLY EXCLUDE THAT LEBANON'S POSITION WOULD CHANGE, BUT EMPHASIZED THAT GEMAYEL

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HAD SAID HE COULD NEVER ACCEP HADDAD AS THE COMMANDER OF THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE OR THE SECURITY REGION. I HAD ALSO DISCUSSED THE HADDAD ISSUE WITH GEN. TANNOUS, WHO KNEW HADDAD WELL AND BORE HIM NO ANIMOSITY. TANNOUS HAD ALSO SAID THAT HADDAD COULD NOT BE DESIGNATED AS "THE COMMANDER". I STRESSED, HOWEVER, THAT THE LEBANESE WERE PREPARED TO NOMINATE HADDAD AS THE DEPUTY COMMANDER WITH SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES FOR INTELLIGENCE. THIS WOULD PUT HIM SQUARELY WITHIN THE COMMAND STRUCTURE.

8. AT THIS POINT, I COMMENTED THAT GEMAYE THOUGHT IT WAS NECESSARY TO LOOK AT THE TOTAL PACKAGE WHICH HAD BEEN DEVELOPED. HE SPOKE OF THE NECESSITY OF LOOKING AT WHAT HAD BEEN AGREED TO, RATHER THAN FOCUSING ON THOSE ISSUES WHICH WENT BEYOND LEBANESE LIMITS. THESE INCLUDED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MILITARY COMMITTEE, TO WHICH LEBANON WILL ASSIGN A GOOD SENIOR OFFICER. IN ADDITION, IT WAS AGREED THAT THERE WOULD BE JOINTLY MANNED OPERATIONS CENTERS, DIRECT CONTACT BETWEEN COMMANDERS AND THEIR STAFFS, COOPERATION BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES, JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS, AND THE DESIGNATION OF THE RIGHT KIND OF OFFICERS FOR THE SECURITY REGION. (ARENS BROKE IN TO SAY THAT HE UNDERSTOOD LEBANON HAD APPOINTED A COMMANDER FOR THE SOUTH, A COL. TANNIS, WHO WAS KNOWN FOR HIS PRO-SYRIAN AND -PLO AFFILIATIONS. ARENS ASSERTED COL. TANNIS HAD ALSO BEEN PART OF THE ADF. I SAID I WOULD HAVE TO CHECK THIS POINT, BUT STRESSED THAT GEMAYEL AND TANNOUS HAD AGREED THAT WHILE ISRAEL WOULD NOT BE GIVEN THE RIGHT TO NOMINATE LEBANESE OFFICERS, OFFICER LISTS WOULD BE SUBMITTED TO ISRAEL. IF

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THERE WERE OBJECTIONS, THEY WOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.)

9. GEMAYEL WAS CONCERNED, I CONTINUED, THAT IF THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE PROTRACTED, AN OPPORTUNITY WOULD BE MISSED IN DEVELOPPNG A LONG-TERM ISRWELI-LEBANESE RELATIONSHIP ON THE BEST POSSIBLE BASIS. I REPEATEDLY STRESSED TO BEGIN THAT THE MOMENT WAS RIPE, AND IF IT WERE MISSED, A DEGREE OF BITTERNEYS MIGHT SET IN. I STRESSED THAT PRESIDENT GEMAYEL WAS A FRIEND AND WAS PREPARED TO GO A LONG WAY WITH ISRAEL. HE HAD AGREED TO THE CONCEPT OF NEGOTIATING A FULL AGREEMENT ON MUTUAL RELATIONS WITHIN SIX MONTHS IN ALL GOOD FAITH. HE ALSO SAID HE WOULD DO IT IN THAT TIME FRAME. HE HAD SAID, HOWEVER, THAT HE COULD NOT ACCEPT THE IDEA OF "FORMAL RECOGNITION AT THIS TIME, WHILE NOTING THAT THE AGREEMENT CONSTITUTED DE FACTO RECOGNITION, IF HE WENT TOO FAR ON NEGOTIATING WHAT WOULD IN FACT CONSTITUTE A PEACE TREATY AT THIS STAGE, GEMAYEL FEARED THE SYRIANS WOULD NOT WITHDRAW.

10. AFTER LISTENING ATTENTIVELY TO MY PRESENTATION, BEGIN SAID THE THREE MINISTERS IN THE ROOM COULD NOT TAKE A DECISION ALONE; THIS WOULD REQUIRE CABINET DELIBERATION. HE SAID THAT HE HAD NOT ONLY CAREFULLY LISTENED TO MY ATTEMPTS TO BRIDGE THE VARIOUS ISSUES, BUT HAD ALSO TRIED TO UNDERSTAND GEMAYEL'S POINT OF VIEW. HOWEVER, HE CONTINUED, THERE WAS AN OVERWHELMING OPINION IN ISRAEL THAT THE BEST POSSIBLE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS HAD TO BE OBTAINED IN ORDER TO AVOID A REPETITION

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SSY JIDDA PRIORITY
USELO RIYADH PRIORITY
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY

SECTION 03 OF 05 JERUSALEM 01336

EXDIS

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, US, IS, XF
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: MEETINGS WITH PM BEGIN AND
OF THE PAST. HE THOUGHT THE LEBANESE PROPOSAL ON
HADDAD MEANT LITTLE, IF ANYTHING AT ALL. WITH
RESPECT TO THE VARIOUS SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, HE
ALLUDED TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE INTERNATIONAL
BOUNDARY COULD BE CLOSED AFTER AN ISRAELI WITH-
DRAWAL AND THEREFORE DID NOT "IN ALL SINCERITY"
SEE THAT MUCH PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE. HE ALSO
REFERRED TO HOW THE PLO HAD ESTABLISHED ITSELF
UNDER UNIFIL AUSPICES IN THE SOUTH. IF HE SAW
GEMAYEL, HE WOULD EXPLAIN THAT THIS WAS AN EXCEP-
TIONAL SITUATION WHICH REQUIRED EXCEPTIONAL MEASURES,

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THOUGH HE NOTED CAREFULLY THAT HE DID NOT SEE WHY
HAVING HADDAD IN A COMMAND POSITION SHOULD BE
LOOKED AT NEGATIVELY BY LEBANON.

11. I REPLIED THAT WITH RESPECT TO UNIFIL THE
LEBANESE HAD AUTHORIZED ME TO CONVEY A PROPOSAL
WHICH WOULD PLACE ONLY ONE UNIFIL BATTALION IN SIDON
AND NO FORCES IN TYRE, THOUGH UNIFIL WOULD ALSO BE
ABLE TO SEND PATROLS TO THE PALESTINIAN CAMPS
AROUND TYRE AT LEBANESE REQUEST. UNDER THIS CON-
CEPT, THE LEBANESE ALSO AGREED THAT ISRAEL COULD
CHOOSE A RELIABLE BATTALION, SUCH AS FROM NORWAY
OR FIJI, AND THE LEBANESE SECURITY FORCES WOULD BE

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RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SECURITY OF THE CAMPS. I EXPLAINED THAT WE BELIEVED IT WAS NECESSARY TO HAVE SOME UNIFIL PRESENCE IN THE SECURITY REGION IN ORDER TO HAVE THE UNIFIL MANDATE EXTENDED. IT WOULD ALSO GIVE AN ASSURANCE TO THE PLO THAT THE PALESTINIAN CAMPS WOULD NOT BE HARMED. (COMMENT: IN NEITHER OF OUR TWO MEETINGS TODAY DID THE ISRAELIS REJECT THIS PROPOSAL.)

12. I EMPHASIZED THAT THE LEBANESE HAD AGREED TO SUBSTANTIAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. THE JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS COULD NOT BE DESCRIBED AS INSIGNIFICANT. FURTHERMORE, THE LEBANESE HAD AGREED TO KEEPING ALL OF HADDAD'S OFFICERS AND TO HIS FORCES BEING INTEGRATED INTO THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE; HADDAD WAS ALSO TO BE PART OF THE COMMAND STRUCTURE OF THIS BRIGADE. WHEN ONE ADDED LEBANON'S DETERMINATION NOT TO ALLOW THE PLO TO COME BACK INTO SOUTH LEBANON, THIS STRUCTURE OF SAFEGUARDS WOULD MINIMIZE THE RISKS.

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13. SHAMIR STATED THAT THE LEBANESE POSITION HAD NOT CHANGED AND THOUGHT ISRAEL WOULD HAVE TO WAIT UNTIL IT HAD IMPROVED. ARENS PROCEEDED TO DESCRIBE HIS VISIT TO SOUTH LEBANON THE PREVIOUS DAY. HE SAID IT WAS "AN EYE-OPENER" AND DEPICTED SOUTH LEBANON AS A SEA OF TRANQUILITY AND PEACE. HADDAD WAS FULLY IN CHARGE AND COMMANDED POPULAR RESPECT. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, IT WAS DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND WHY EITHER ISRAEL OR LEBANON WOULD TAKE STEPS WHICH COULD HARM THE PRESENT SITUATION. HE ADDED THAT HIS EXPERTS ALSO TOLD HIM THAT THEY BELIEVE GEMAYEL COULD ACCEPT HADDAD WITHOUT SUFFERING POLITICALLY.

14. I REPLIED THAT THIS WAS NOT GEMAYEL'S OPINION, NOR QUITE FRANKLY WAS IT MY OWN. IT ALSO DID NOT CORRESPOND TO THE VIEWS OF OUR EXPERTS. LEWIS STATED THAT THE ISSUE WAS NOT WHETHER GEMAYEL COULD SURVIVE IMMEDIATELY IF HADDAD WERE APPOINTED TO A COMMAND POSITION, BUT RATHER THAT A PROCESS OF POLITICAL EROSION WOULD SET IN INTERNALLY AND EQUALLY IMPORTANT. THE SYRIANS WOULD NOT WITHDRAW. I ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THE COMBINATION OF LAF DEPLOYMENT AND THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE WOULD PROVIDE SUFFICIENT FORCE TO HANDLE THE ACTUAL SECURITY THREAT WHICH WOULD BE FACED, NAMELY THE ROOTING OUT OF ANY TERRORIST ELEMENTS IN SOUTHERN LEBANON. TANMOUS WAS ALSO CONVINCED THAT THE LAF

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COULD DO A BETTER JOB THAN ISRAEL IN ADDRESSING
THIS THREAT BECAUSE THE PEOPLE WILL RESPOND TO AND

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INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
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AMEMBASSY CAPRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY
USELO RIYADH PRIORITY
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY

SECTION 04 OF 05 JERUSALEM 01336

EXDIS

FROM HWBIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, US, IS, XF
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: MEETINGS WITH PM BEGIN AND
COOPERATE WITH LEBANON'S NATIONAL ARMY.

15. ARENS SAID THAT HADDAD HAD PROVEN HIS ABILITY
AND HAD ESTABLISHED HIS REPUTATION AND AUTHORITY.
HE WAS ALSO PREPARED TO COOPERATE WITH ISRAEL,

AND ADDED THAT HADDAD WOULD FIND IT IMPOSSIBLE TO ACCEPT A LESSER RESPONSIBILITY. SHAMIR STATED CATEGORICALLY THAT HADDAD WOULD NEVER ACCEPT THE LEBANESE PROPOSAL AND HE WAS NOT SURE EVEN IF ISRAEL COULD CONVINCE HADDAD TO BECOME JUST THE COMMANDER OF THE BRIGADE, AND NOT THE SECURITY

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REGION AS A WHOLE.

16. I REJOINED THAT HADDAD WAS IN CHARGE BECAUSE ISRAEL WAS AT HIS SIDE. IF ISRAEL INSISTED THAT HE STAY IN A COMMAND POSITION, I DID NOT BELIEVE WE WOULD ACHIEVE AN AGREEMENT OR HAVE A SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. LEWIS SAID THAT THE TROUBLE WITH THE CURRENT IMPASSE IS THAT THERE IS NO PERFECT SOLUTION, THOUGH THERE WERE A VARIETY OF POSSIBLE OPTIONS, WHICH WOULD MINIMIZE THE RISKS. WHAT WORRIES US IS THAT THE PROSPECT OF A HEALTHY, LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIP WITH LEBANON WILL BE AT RISK IF AN AGREEMENT IS NOT REACHED SOON. MOREOVER, ISRAEL ALSO RISKED RECEIVING EVEN MORE CASUALTIES IF THE PRESENT SITUATION CONTINUED.

17. BEGIN REPLIED THAT ISRAEL WANTS REASONABLE SECURITY BUT THOUGHT THAT WITHOUT HADDAD AS COMMANDER, THIS WOULD PROVE IMPOSSIBLE. I EMPHASIZED THAT I HOPED IN ANY FUTURE CABINET DISCUSSION FULL DESCRIPTION WILL BE GIVEN TO THE COMPLETE PACKAGE WHICH WAS BEING NEGOTIATED. INCLUDING THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AS WELL AS THE OTHER PROVISIONS IN THE AGREEMENT. WE PARTED ON THIS UNPROMISING NOTE.

18. DURING OUR EARLIER MEETING WITH SHAMIR AND HIS COLLEAGUES, WE WENT THROUGH BRIEFLY ALL OF THE ISSUES ON THE INVENTORY. IN ADDITION TO DISCUSSING THE CRITICAL ISSUES OF HADDAD, UNIFIL, AND RECOGNITION, I HAD ALSO DESCRIBED LEBANESE OPPOSITION TO THE DESIGNATION OF LIAISON OFFICERS TO THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE. ON THE LEBANESE VIEW, LIAISON OFFICERS WOULD CONSTITUTE A RESIDUAL

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ISRAELI PRESENCE; MOREOVER, THEY ARGUED THAT THERE WERE SUFFICIENT LIAISON PROVISIONS ALREADY AGREED TO IN THE FORM OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE, OPERATIONS CENTERS, JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS, AND CONTACT BE-

TWEEN COMMANDERS. SHAMIR RESPONDED THAT THESE OTHER PROVISIONS WERE NOT SUFFICIENT. IT WAS VITAL THAT THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE HAVE ISRAELI OFFICERS ATTACHED TO IT.

19. ON THE MILITARY COMMITTEE, I SUGGESTED THAT IT MAINTAIN ITS BILATERAL CHARACTER BUT THAT THE U.S. COULD PARTICIPATE UPON REQUEST. THIS DID NOT MEAN, I EMPHASIZED, THAT WE WOULD BE ON THE COMMITTEE ALL THE TIME. IN FACT, WE DID NOT WANT TO GET INVOLVED IN OPERATIONAL DETAILS AND WOULD RESIST SUCH INVOLVEMENT.

20. ON THE OPERATIONS CENTERS, I SAID THAT IF THERE WERE MORE THAN TWO OPERATIONS CENTERS, THIS WOULD POSE A PROBLEM OF VISIBILITY. THREE CENTERS WOULD POSE A REAL PROBLEM. FURTHERMORE, IT WAS THE OPINION OF OUR MILITARY EXPERTS THAT TWO OPERATIONS CENTERS SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO CARRY OUT THE TASK. IT WAS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT IT HAD BEEN AGREED ONE OPERATIONS CENTER WOULD BE LOCATED AT HASBAYA. THE REMAINING QUESTION WAS WHERE WOULD THE SECOND CENTER BE LOCATED.

21. WITH RESPECT TO MUTUAL RELATIONS, I SAID THAT MOST OF THE ISSUES HAD BEEN SETTLED. SHAMIR SAID THAT ALL OF THE QUESTIONS RELATING TO INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS WERE STILL NOT CLEARED UP. I REPLIED THAT THE LEBANESE DELEGATION HAD A DRAFT ON TRADE WHICH

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EXDIS

FROM HABIB

E.O. 1356: DECL: OADR
TAGQ: PREL, MOPS, MARR. LE, US, IS, XF
SUBJECT: HABIB MISION: MEETINGS WITH PM BEGIN AND
I HAD SUPPORTED IN THE MEETING WITH SENIOR LEBANESE
OFFICIALS YESTERDAY. THIS ISSUE WOULD HAVE TO BE
ADDRESSED FURTHER AT THE NEXT TRIPARTITE MEETING.
I HAD ALSO TOLD THE LEBANESE TO PROVIDE A DETAILED
OUTLINE OF WHAT SHOULD BE CONTAINED IN THE FINAL
AGREEMENT ON MUTUAL RELATIONS TO BE NEGOTIATED NOT
LATER THAN SIX MONTHS AFTER THE SIGNING OF THE
AGREEMENT.

22. WITH RESPECT TO THE ECONOMIC BOYCOTT, I SAID
THAT THE LEBANESE WERE NOT PREPARED NOW TO FORMALLY

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ABROGATE THE ECONOMIC BOYCOTT. THE LEBANESE MAINTAINED THAT THEIR TRADING RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB WORLD WOULD IMMEDIATELY SUFFER. HOWEVER, THEY WERE PREPARED TO GIVE A FORMULA ON TRADE WHICH WOULD HAVE THE DE FACTO EFFECT OF SETTING ASIDE THE BOYCOTT. I ALSO UNDERSTOOD THAT COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSPORTATION WERE BEING ADDRESSED FOR THE INTERIM PERIOD. AS THESE SERVICES WERE IMPLEMENTED, THE LEBANESE WERE PREPARED TO REMOVE THEIR RESERVATIONS FROM RELEVANT MULTINATIONAL CONVENTIONS. I THOUGHT THIS WAS A PRACTICAL WAY TO PROCEED.

23. SHAMIR RAISED THE ISSUE OF WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF THE SYRIANS AND PLO DID NOT WITHDRAW. KIMCHE NOTED THAT UNDER THOSE CONDITIONS, IF ISRAEL DID NOT WITHDRAW, IT DID NOT WANT TO BE PERCEIVED AS

ABROGATING THE AGREEMENT. IT WAS EQUALLY CLEAR, I SAID, THAT THE LEBANESE DID NOT WANT THE AGREEMENT TO APPLY UNLESS THERE WERE AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. I SAID THAT THIS SHOULD NOT BE A COMPLICATED ISSUE TO RESOLVE.

24. FINALLY, SHAMIR ASKED ABOUT AMERICAN ASSURANCES TO ISRAEL. I SAID I WAS WORKING ON THIS PROBLEM BUT THAT IT NEEDED A COMPLETE WASHINGTON REVIEW. MOREOVER, IT WAS DIFFICULT TO COMPLETE THIS PROCESS UNTIL THE PACKAGE DEAL WAS COMPLETED.

25. COMMENT: WE SHALL HAVE A FURTHER REVIEW WITH THE ISRAELI WORKING GROUP ON THE NUTY-WND2BOWTS ISSUES OF THE AGREEMENT PER SE SUNDAY MORNING AFTER MY RETURN FROM CUIROM I SHALL THEN GO TO

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BZIRUT SUNDAYHAFTRNOMN TO BRIEF THE LEBANESE ON THE RESULTS OF OUR MEETINGS HERE. GROVE

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MILITARY ADDEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
JERUSALEM PASS AMBASSADORS HABIB AND DRAPER FROM ROSS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, XF, LE, IS, US
SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: MILITARY WORKING GROUP
MEETINGS, KHALDAH, APRIL 13-14, 1983

1. [REDACTED]

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2. SUMMARY. THE MILITARY WORKING GROUP REACHED AGREE-
MENT ON A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF ISSUES DURING ITS MEETING
IN KHALDAH ON APRIL 13 AND 14.

--MEETING OF APRIL 13:

GEN. EINAN AND GEN. HAMDAN AGREED THAT LAF UNITS MAY

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MAINTAIN ORGANIC ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS IN THE SECURITY REGION AND MORE IMPORTANTLY, ISRAEL CONCEDED THAT "LEBANON MAY DEPLOY PERSONAL, LOW AND MEDIUM AIR DEFENSE MISSILES" WITH A MAXIMUM EFFECTIVE ALTITUDE OF 10,000 FEET ABOVE SURFACE OUTSIDE OF THE SECURITY ZONE. (ISRAEL IS CONSIDERING A LEBANESE REQUEST TO INCREASE THE ALTITUDE LIMITATION TO 15,000 FEET.) HAMDAN AGREED, AD REFERENDUM, TO PROVIDE THE LOCATIONS OF ANY MISSILES PURCHASED IN THE FUTURE TO THE IDF, AND IT WAS AGREED THAT THIS POINT NOT BE INCLUDED IN THE SECURITY ANNEX OR ITS AGREED MINUTES. THERE WAS AGREEMENT ON THE DRAFT ARTICLE ON MILITARY ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT; THIS ALLOWS FOR DEPLOYMENT OF GROUND SURVEILLANCE RADARS WITHIN TEN KILOMETERS NORTH OF THE ISRAELI-LEBANESE BORDER WHEN APPROVED BY THE MILITARY COMMITTEE, PROVIDED THE SECTORS OF SCAN DO NOT CROSS INTO ISRAEL. THE MOMENTUM CONTINUED INTO THE AFTERNOON, WHEN EINAN AND HAMDAN AGREED TO OMIT MENTION OF EXISTING MINEFIELDS AND FORTIFICATIONS FROM THE SECURITY ANNEX; HOWEVER, DISCUSSION OF THIS SUBJECT RAISED A NEW ISSUE - WHAT TO DO ABOUT THE EXISTING FENCE, CONSTRUCTED BY ISRAEL AROUND 1970, FOLLOWING TERRAIN FEATURES ALONG THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER AREA AND PARTIALLY ON LEBANESE TERRITORY. EINAN AND HAMDAN BOTH DESIRED TO MAINTAIN

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THE EXISTING FENCE, BUT HAMDAN WAS OPPOSED TO ANY WRITTEN MENTION OF THIS ISSUE IN AGREED MINUTES, BECAUSE HE SAID IT WOULD CAUSE A RASH OF CLAIMS BY INDIVIDUAL LEBANESE LAND OWNERS. EINAN'S POSITION WAS THAT THE ISSUE MUST BE ADDRESSED SOMEWHERE IN THE AGREEMENT TO PRECLUDE A POST-AGREEMENT DEMAND THAT THE FENCING BE REMOVED. LEBANON'S PROPOSAL ON VERIFICATION WAS ACCEPTABLE TO THE ISRAELI DELEGATION PROVIDED DETAILS ON THE JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS WHICH HAVE ALREADY BEEN ACCEPTED BY BOTH PARTIES BE INCLUDED IN THE AGREED MINUTES TO THE SECURITY ANNEX. EINAN FLATLY REFUSED TO DISCUSS A LEBANESE PROPOSAL THAT THE MILITARY COMMITTEE ESTABLISH A SPECIAL SUPERVISORY TEAM ON AN AD HOC BASIS TO ASCERTAIN IF ANY IDF MOVEMENTS WITHIN FIVE KILOMETERS OF THE ISRAELI SIDE OF THE BORDER MIGHT IMPERIL THE SECURITY OF LEBANON. EINAN WAS EQUALLY EMPHATIC ABOUT THE PROPOSED USE OF UNIFIL IN THE SECURITY REGION. THE U.S. EFFORT TO BRIDGE THE DEADLOCK ON UNIFIL BY ASKING FOR ISRAELI OR LEBANESE ALTERNATIVES WAS NOT SUCCESSFUL. PRIOR TO ADJOURNMENT, EINAN AND HAMDAN IDENTIFIED THE FOLLOWING AS ISSUES WHICH THE MILITARY SUBCOMMITTEE COULD NOT RESOLVE: THE ROLE OF UNIFIL, HADDAD AS COMMANDER, U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE MILITARY COMMITTEE, EXCHANGE OF LIAISON OFFICERS, AND THE NEW ISSUE OF THE FENCE.

--MEETING OF APRIL 14

OUR PRESENTATION OF A REVISED TEXT OF THE SECURITY
ARRANGEMENTS ANNEX IN AN ATTEMPT TO RECAPTURE THE MOOD
OF THE PREVIOUS DAY MET WITH SOME SUCCESS. EINAN AGREED
TO A MODIFIED LEBANESE PROPOSAL ON DEPLOYMENT OF LAF
FORCES IN THE SECURITY REGION. BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT THE

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EXDIS

MILITARY ADDEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
JERUSALEM PASS AMBASSADORS HABIB AND DRAPER FROM ROSS

MILITARY COMMITTEE WILL ESTABLISH PROCEDURES TO GOVERN
ADDITIONAL LAF DEPLOYMENT INTO THE SECURITY FOR TRAINING
OR EMERGENCY OPERATIONAL PURPOSES. NO AGREEMENT WAS
REACHED ON TECHNIQUES FOR INTEGRATION OF HADDAD'S FORCES
INTO THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE, BUT THE DISCUSSION CLARIFIED
THE RESPECTIVE POSITIONS. ISRAEL WANTS THE LAF TO

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ROUND-OUT THE "EXISTING LOCAL BRIGADE" (HADDAD'S FORCES),
WHILE THE LEBANESE WANT HADDAD'S FORCES TO BE INTEGRATED
INTO A NEWLY CREATED LEBANESE ARMY TERRITORIAL BRIGADE.
COL. RUHAYYIM STATED THAT A GENERAL ORDER WAS PUBLISHED
ON APRIL 6 CREATING THIS BRIGADE AND GIVING IT LEGAL
STATUS SO THAT THE LAF COULD ASSIGN PERSONNEL TO IT.
HAMDAN DECLINED AN OFFER FROM EINAN TO VISIT THE SOUTH
WITH HIM TO VIEW THE EXISTING LOCAL BRIGADE. COL. QA'QUR
SAID THEY WOULD WAIT UNTIL THE AGREEMENT WAS CLOSE AT
HAND. HAMDAN AND EINAN STATED THAT THEY WERE IN AGREEMENT
THAT THE FORCES OF THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE MUST MEET THE
NORMAL LAF CRITERIA FOR MILITARY SERVICE, THAT PERSONS
WILL NOT BE REFUSED BY THE LAF BECAUSE OF PREVIOUS
AFFILIATION WITH ISRAEL, THAT EXISTING UNITS WILL NOT
BE DIVIDED IN THE INTEGRATION PROCESS, AND THAT HADDAD'S
FORCES WILL BE THE NUCLEUS OF THE BRIGADE. END SUMMARY.

3. THE MILITARY WORKING GROUP BEGAN ITS WEDNESDAY,
APRIL 13,
BOTH LAND AND SEA-BASED ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILES IN
LEBANON. ISRAEL CONCEDED AD REFERENDUM THAT OUTSIDE THE
SECURITY REGION LEBANON WOULD BE ABLE TO DEPLOY BOTH
LAND AND SEA-BASED PERSONAL, LOW AND "MEDIUM ALTITUDE"
MISSILES, PROVIDED THAT AN ALTITUDE LIMITATION BE
SPECIFIED IN THE AGREED MINUTES. GEN. EINAN SAID THAT
ISRAEL WOULD ACCEPT 10,000 FEET ABOVE GROUND AS AN
ALTITUDE LIMIT. COL. RUHAYYIM ASKED IF ISRAEL WOULD
CONSIDER 15,000 FEET, SINCE LEBANON IS CONSIDERING THE
FUTURE ACQUISITION OF THE FRENCH CROTALE MISSILE WHICH
HAS AN EFFECTIVE ALTITUDE OF JUST UNDER 15,000 FEET.
EINAN SAID 15,000 MAY BE ACCEPTABLE. IT WAS AGREED
THAT THERE WOULD BE REVIEW OF THE PROVISIONS CONCERNING
MISSILES AFTER THREE YEARS.

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4. RUHAYYIM PROPOSED THAT THE AGREED PROVISIONS REGARDING SURFACE-BASED ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILES BE EXTENDED TO SEA-BASED ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILES OUTSIDE THE SECURITY REGION. EINAN AGREED, BUT SAID IT COULD NOT APPLY TO SURFACE-TO-SEA MISSILES OUTSIDE THE SECURITY REGION. EINAN STATED THAT LEBANON SHOULD NOT BE PERMITTED THE CAPABILITY OF LAUNCHING SURFACE-TO-SEA MISSILES BEYOND LEBANON'S TERRITORIAL WATERS.

5. A LONG DISCUSSION FOLLOWED ABOUT WHETHER THE GENERAL RESTRICTIONS ON WEAPONRY WITHIN THE SECURITY REGION SHOULD BE EXTENDED BEYOND IT. AT ONE POINT IT APPEARED AS THOUGH HAMDAN WAS INADVERTENTLY GOING TO AGREE TO APPLY THE SAME RESTRICTIONS OUTSIDE OF THE SECURITY ZONE. THE U.S. DELEGATION INTERVENED TO VOICE CONCERN THAT THE LEBANESE WOULD BE ACCEPTING RESTRICTIONS THAT MIGHT DISALLOW EQUIPMENT INCLUDED IN THE LAF MODERNIZATION PROGRAM. IT WAS FINALLY AGREED AD REFERENDUM TO ALLOW THE GENERAL RESTRICTIONS ON FORCES, WEAPONS AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO APPLY ONLY WITHIN THE SECURITY REGION AND TO HANDLE WEAPONS RESTRICTIONS OUTSIDE THE SECURITY REGION, SUCH AS ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILES, ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS.

6. THE WORKING GROUP THEN MOVED TO THE SUBJECT OF RADAR AND OTHER MILITARY ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT. AT GEN. COOLEY'S SUGGESTION, BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT: "MILITARY ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT IN THE SECURITY REGION WILL BE SPECIFIED IN AN APPENDIX AND WILL BE DEPLOYED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE, AND THAT RADARS WILL BE DEPLOYED SO THAT THEIR SECTORS OF SEARCH DO NOT

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EXDIS

MILITARY ADDEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
JERUSALEM PASS AMBASSADORS HABIB AND DRAPER FROM ROSS

ROSS THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER."

7. IT WAS AGREED THAT PROCEDURES CONCERNING NOTIFICATION
TO ISRAEL OF LEBANESE FLIGHTS OVER THE SECURITY REGION
WOULD BE ESTABLISHED BY THE MILITARY COMMITTEE.

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8. EINAN AND HAMDAN AGREED TO OMIT THE DRAFT ARTICLE ON
MINEFIELDS AND FORTIFICATIONS FROM THE ANNEX; HOWEVER,
EINAN WANTED TO BE SURE SOMETHING WAS WRITTEN TO INSURE
THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT HAVE TO REMOVE EXISTING FENCING
ALONG THE BORDER AREA. HAMDAN VOICED CONCERN THAT CLAIMS
BY LEBANESE LAND OWNERS AGAINST THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT
MIGHT RESULT FROM ANY WRITTEN MENTION OF THESE FENCES.
HAMDAN WAS SEARCHING FOR SOME TYPE OF ISRAELI OR U.S.
INITIATIVE THAT WOULD ABSOLVE THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT OF
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE LOSS OF ANY PRIVATELY OWNED LAND.
HE DID NOT ASK THAT ISRAEL CONSIDER REMOVING THE FENCE.
IN FACT, HE SAID THERE WERE CERTAIN AREAS WHERE LEBANON
WOULD LIKE TO INSTALL FENCES. COL. ALON SAID THAT THE

FENCE FOLLOWED TERRAIN FEATURES AS OPPOSED TO THE INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED BORDER AND THAT ABOUT "2,000 DUNAMS OF LEBANESE LAND FELL SOUTH OF THE FENCE." EINAN RECOMMENDED THAT THE ISSUE OF THE FENCE BE REFERRED TO THE HEADS OF DELEGATION.

9. REGARDING THE DRAFT ARTICLE ON JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS, LTC ZINGER SAID ISRAEL WOULD ACCEPT IT IF THE AGREED POINTS REGARDING THESE TEAMS BE INCLUDED IN AGREED MINUTES; HAMDAN CONCEDED THAT THE AGREED MINUTES WOULD READ "DAILY" INSTEAD OF "REGULAR" PATROLS.

10. BOTH PARTIES DECIDED NOT TO ADDRESS THE LEBANESE PROPOSAL OF AN AD HOC SUPERVISORY TEAM THAT THE MILITARY COMMITTEE COULD DIRECT UP TO 5 KILOMETERS INSIDE ISRAEL IF THE COMMITTEE DETERMINED THAT LEBANON'S SECURITY MIGHT BE THREATENED.

11. EINAN LISTED AREAS APPROPRIATE FOR FURTHER DELIBERATION BY THE MILITARY SUBCOMMITTEE:

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- INTEGRATION OF HADDAD FORCES.
- SUPERVISION CENTERS.
- INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION.
- HOT PURSUIT ON GROUND AND SEA.
- FIXING THE LINE OF THE SECURITY REGION (EINAN STATED JABAL BARUK SHOULD NOT BE A PROBLEM (FOR THE LEBANESE) BECAUSE NO STATION WILL BE LOCATED THERE).
- NAVAL ACTIVITY IN THE SECURITY REGION.
- SUPERVISORY TEAMS 5 KILOMETERS WITHIN ISRAEL.

12. EINAN LISTED THE MAJOR PROBLEM AREAS, AND HAMDAN AGREED WITH THE FOLLOWING:

- UNIFIL.
- HADDAD AS COMMANDER.
- LIAISON OFFICERS.
- U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE MILITARY COMMITTEE.
- FENCE ALONG THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER.

13. AS REQUESTED BY EINAN AND HAMDAN AT THE APRIL 13 SESSION, MAJ. ANTHONY PREPARED AN UPDATED VERSION OF THE DRAFT SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS ANNEX AND PRESENTED IT AT THE BEGINNING OF THE APRIL 14 SESSION. ALTHOUGH THE WORKING GROUP MEETING ONLY LASTED FOR TWO HOURS, THERE WAS A GOOD EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON INTEGRATION OF THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE AND EINAN AGREED, AD REFERENDUM, TO A LEBANESE PROPOSAL CONCERNING DEPLOYMENT AREAS FOR ONE REGULAR LEBANESE BRIGADE IN THE SECURITY REGION NORTH OF THE

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ZAHRANI RIVER AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE
SOUTH OF THE ZAHRANI. EINAN ALSO ACCEPTED THE DRAFT
LANGUAGE ON INTRODUCTION OF OTHER LAF FORCES INTO THE

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EXDIS

MILITARY ADDEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
JERUSALEM PASS AMBASSADORS HABIB AND DRAPER FROM ROSS

SECURITY REGION FOR PURPOSES OF UNIT TRAINING OR THE TRAINING OF CONSCRIPTS AND FOR EMERGENCY OPERATIONAL PURPOSES IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURES ESTABLISHED BY THE MILITARY COMMITTEE IN THE CASE OF "EMERGENCY OPERATIONAL SITUATIONS."

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14. EINAN ACCEPTED THE PRINCIPLE THAT THE REGULAR LAF BRIGADE AND THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE IN THE SECURITY REGION WOULD BE PART OF THE SOUTHERN REGIONAL COMMAND. COL. RUHAYYIM REPORTED THAT TANNUS HAD SIGNED A GENERAL ORDER ESTABLISHING THE "LEBANESE ARMY TERRITORIAL BRIGADE" AS PART OF THE SOUTHERN REGIONAL COMMAND APRIL 6 AND THAT THE ORDER PROVIDED A LEGAL BASIS FOR THE LAF TO ASSIGN PERSONNEL AND UNITS TO THE BRIGADE. HAMDAN SAID THAT THE NEW BRIGADE NOW HAS ABOUT 1,100 PERSONNEL ASSIGNED, INCLUDING 300 CONSCRIPTS. EINAN STATED THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT ACCEPT UNITS OF THE 3D BDE IN THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE BECAUSE OF THE 3D BDE'S PAST CONNECTIONS WITH THE PALESTINIAN OR PRO-PALESTINIAN ELEMENTS.

15. THE REMAINING DISCUSSION DEALT WITH TECHNIQUES TO BE USED TO INTEGRATE HADDAD'S FORCES INTO THE LAF TERRITORIAL BRIGADE. EINAN STATED THAT THE LAF SHOULD ROUND-OUT "THE EXISTING LOCAL BRIGADE" (HADDAD'S FORCE) WHICH IS ORGANIZED INTO THREE BATTALIONS, ALTHOUGH HE ADMITTED THAT THERE WERE MANY PERSONNEL SHORTAGES. EINAN FELL BACK A BIT AND INSISTED THAT UNITS OF THE EXISTING LOCAL BRIGADE BE INTEGRATED INTO THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE. HAMDAN AGREED THAT THERE WOULD BE "NO DIVIDING OF EXISTING UNITS FOR UNNECESSARY PURPOSES." ZINGER PROPOSED THAT HAMDAN CONSIDER ACCEPTANCE OF THE FOLLOWING THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE WILL CONSIST OF THE EXISTING LOCAL BRIGADE REINFORCED FROM AMONG THE INHABITANTS OF THE SECURITY REGION. HAMDAN SAID THAT HE WOULD CONSIDER IT. HAMDAN AND EINAN AGREED IN PRINCIPLE THAT:
--THERE BE NO UNNECESSARY DIVISION OF EXISTING UNITS.
--THE "EXISTING LOCAL BRIGADE" WILL BE THE NUCLEUS OF THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE.
--FORCES TO BE ASSIGNED MUST MEET THE NORMAL LAF

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CRITERIA FOR MILITARY SERVICE (AGE, HEALTH CONDITIONS, ETC.).

--NO ONE BE REFUSED MILITARY SERVICE FOR POLITICAL REASON

16. EINAN OFFERED TO GO WITH HAMDAN TO REVIEW THE

EXISTING LOCAL BRIGADE FORCES. COL. QA'OUR SAID THEY WOULD WAIT UNTIL AN AGREEMENT WAS VERY CLOSE AT HAND.

17. IN REVIEWING THE REVISED DRAFT, BOTH SIDES CONFIRMED THAT THE OPERATIONS CENTERS WOULD BE CALLED "MILITARY COMMITTEE SUPERVISOR CENTERS."

18. COMMENT: THE PRESENTATION OF A REVISED SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS ANNEX BY THE U.S. DELEGATION ON APRIL 14 PROVED TO BE A SUCCESSFUL TACTIC IN DIRECTING THE EFFORTS OF THE MILITARY WORKING GROUP TOWARD THE UNRESOLVED ISSUES AND IN RE-ESTABLISHING THE MOMENTUM OF THE PREVIOUS SESSION. DILLON

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MILITARY ADDEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, US, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: - APRIL 13 NEGOTIATING
SESSION AT KHALDAH

1. [REDACTED]

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2. SUMMARY: THE PROCESS OF REVIEWING OUTSTANDING ISSUES IN THE HEADS OF DELEGATION WORKING GROUP CONTINUED DURING AN ALL-DAY SESSION A KHALDAH, WITH HABIB AGAIN LEADING THE U.S. DELEGATION IN DRAPER'S ABSENCE. THE SESSION WAS DEVOTED LARGELY TO A CONTINUATION OF ISRAEL'S COMMENTS ON THE LEBANESE DRAFT OF MARCH 29, WITH BOTH PARTIES MAKING FAMILIAR ARGUMENTS. THE MILITARY SUB-COMMITTEE MET WITH THE U.S. IN ATTENDANCE (SEPTTEL), AND LEBANESE AND ISRAELI ECONOMIC EXPERTS HELD BILATERAL

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EXCHANGES. END SUMMARY.

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3. KIMCHE CONTINUED ISRAEL'S COMMENTARY ON THE LEBANESE DRAFTS OF MARCH 29. IN THE MORNING SESSION, HE COMPLETED COMMENTS ON THE COVERING AGREEMENT ITSELF. THE AFTERNOON SESSION WAS DEVOTED TO A DISCUSSION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE LEBANESE DRAFT "ORAL UNDERSTANDING" ON INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS CONCERNING THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PERSONS. ITEMS DISCUSSED WERE AS FOLLOWS:

(A) ISRAEL PROPOSED NEW LANGUAGE CONCERNING THE ABROGATION OF ADHERENCE TO TREATIES IN CONFLICT WITH THE AGREEMENT, STATING THAT ITS OBJECTIVE WAS TO REQUIRE IMMEDIATE ABROGATION BY LEBANON OF ITS ADHERENCE TO THE ARAB DEFENSE PACT. FATTAL SAID IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR LEBANON TO ABROGATE ITS ADHERENCE. EVEN IN ITS PEACE TREATY WITH EGYPT, ISRAEL HAD NOT ACHIEVED THIS. HOWEVER, FATTAL UNWISELY ADDED THAT IN HIS VIEW THE SECURITY PACT WAS NO LONGER IN FORCE, SINCE IT HAD BECOME OBSOLETE. RUBINSTEIN ASKED WHETHER LEBANON WOULD ACCEPT AN AGREED MINUTE REFLECTING THIS INTERPRETATION. FATTAL SAID THIS MIGHT BE POSSIBLE AND UNDERTOOK TO RAISE THIS SUGGESTION WITH HIS AUTHORITIES. (WE EXPECT TO HEAR MORE ON THIS ISSUE, SINCE IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT THE LEBANESE COULD LIVE

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WITH FATTAL'S FORMULA.)

(B) ISRAEL WANTED TO PROVIDE THAT ONLY ISSUES "WHICH ARE NOT RESOLVED BY THE PARTIES" BILATERALLY WOULD GO TO THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE. FATTAL OBJECTED ON THE GROUNDS THAT THIS WOULD SET UP A DE FACTO DIPLOMATIC CHANNEL AND WEAKEN THE COMMITTEE. AFTER MUCH DISCUSSION, KIMCHE SUGGESTED THE MATTER BE LEFT OPEN.

(C) RUBINSTEIN CORRECTLY NOTED THAT THE LEBANESE DRAFT ON DISPUTE SETTLEMENT WAS REDUNDANT IN CALLING FOR "AN AGREED PROCEDURE FOR A DEFINITIVE SETTLEMENT ACCEPTED AS DECISIVE BY THE PARTIES," AND SUGGESTED THAT WE SIMPLY PUT A PERIOD AFTER "SETTLEMENT." HABIB SUPPORTED THIS SUGGESTION, BUT FATTAL ARGUED THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO ELIMINATE THE AGREED MINUTE ON THE MATTER AND THE WORD "DEFINITIVE" IN THE TEXT OF THE AGREEMENT, APPARENTLY NOT REALIZING THAT HE WAS UNDERCUTTING THE OBLIGATION OF THE PARTIES TO SUBMIT DISPUTES TO A BINDING THIRD-PARTY MECHANISM. U.S. EFFORTS RESULTED IN AN AGREEMENT TO LEAVE THE TEXT OF THE AGREEMENT AS RUBINSTEIN HAD ORIGINALLY PROPOSED, BUT FATTAL INSISTED, AND RUBINSTEIN HAPPILY AGREED, ON INCLUDING LANGUAGE WHICH WATERS DOWN THE COMMITMENT TO GO TO BINDING ARBITRATION SOMEWHAT. LEBANON ALSO MAY BE BACK ON THIS POINT WHEN IT REALIZES

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THE EFFECT OF THE AMENDMENTS.

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(D) KIMCHE PROPOSED THAT THE PROVISION EXCLUDING THE SECURITY ANNEX FROM THE SCOPE OF ARBITRATION BE AMENDED TO EXCLUDE ALL "SECURITY PROVISIONS" IN THE AGREEMENT. FATTAL AGREED IMMEDIATELY. HABIB NOTED THAT IT WOULD THEN BE NECESSARY TO AGREE ON WHAT CONSTITUTED "SECURITY

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PROVISIONS," AND KIMCHE AGREED THAT THIS COULD BE DONE IN AN AGREED MINUTE. (WE EXPECT THE LEBANESE TO BE BACK ON THIS POINT WHEN THEIR STEERING COMMITTEE REALIZES THAT THE EXCLUSION FROM ARBITRATION HAS BEEN WIDENED.) IT WAS ALSO NOTED THAT THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROVISIONS IN THE ANNEX WERE SOMEWHAT DUPLICATIVE OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE COVER AGREEMENT, AND IT WAS AGREED TO ATTEMPT TO

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IMPROVE THE DRAFTING WITHOUT CHANGING THE SUBSTANCE.

(E) ISRAEL OBJECTED TO THE FRENCH TEXT BEING AS AUTHORITATIVE AS THE ENGLISH, RECALLING THE EXPERIENCE OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE EQUALLY AUTHORITATIVE TEXTS OF RESOLUTION 242. KIMCHE INDICATED, HOWEVER, THAT IF LEBANON WAS INSISTENT ON HAVING AN AUTHORITATIVE FRENCH TEXT, ISRAEL WOULD NOT GO TO THE MAT.

(F) *KHARMA REPORTED ON THE MEETING OF EXPERTS ON TRADE AND INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD BE DRAWING UP AGREED LISTS OF GOODS WHOSE IMPORTATION INTO LEBANON WOULD BE RESTRICTED. HE PROPOSED TO RESOLVE ISRAEL'S DIFFICULTIES WITH THE LEBANESE TEXT OF THE ORAL UNDERSTANDING ON THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS BY DROPPING THE LANGUAGE ON "NON-IMPORTATION BY LEBANON OF GOODS AND PRODUCTS IT PRODUCES AND EXPORTS" IN FAVOR OF LANGUAGE INDICATING THAT THE PROTECTION OF "TRADE" WOULD BE AMONG THE FACTORS TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN REGULATING THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS. KIMCHE OBJECT THAT THIS WOULD INVITE THE ARABS TO APPLY THE BOYCOTT TO PRESSURE LEBANON INTO CEASING TRADE WITH ISRAEL. AFTER A LONG DISCUSSION ALONG FAMILIAR LINES, BOTH PARTIES AGREED TO CONSIDER A TEXT BASED ON AN ISRAELI SUGGESTION: "THE MOVEMENT OF PRODUCTS AND GOODS BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL WILL BE ASSURED ON A NON-DISCRIMINATORY BASIS TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION OF THE RESPECTIVE PARTIES AND THE NEED TO PROTECT AGRICULTURE AND INDUSTRY. EXPERTS DESIGNATED BY THE TWO GOVERNMENTS WILL MEET ON A REGULAR BASIS, AS FREQUENTLY AS NECESSARY, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE AND NO LESS THAN ONCE A MONTH AND WILL ADJUST THE VOLUMES AND THE CHARACTER OF THE TRADE ACCORDINGLY AND SUPERVISE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS

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ARRANGEMENT AND DEAL WITH PROBLEMS THAT ARISE TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE ECONOMIC NEEDS (OR IMPERATIVES) OF THE PARTIES." KHARMA HAD RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE COMMITMENT TO ASSURE TRADE ON A NON-DISCRIMINATORY BASIS, AND ISRAEL WOULD HAVE PREFERRED TO ELIMINATE THE LANGUAGE ADJUSTING VOLUMES AND CHARACTER. WE MAY HEAR MORE ON THIS ISSUE AS WELL.

4. WE WILL CONTINUE OUR REVIEW OF THE TEXTS APRIL 14. ISRAEL INDICATED THAT IT WILL BE RAISING, INTER ALIA, THE QUESTION OF A UNIFIL PRESENCE IN THE SECURITY REGION.

5. THE LEBANESE ALSO RAISED THE ISSUE OF MAJOR HADDAD IN THE WORKING GROUP ON THE BASIS OF PRESS REPORTS THAT HADDAD HAD CALLED FOR LEBANON TO DECLARE WAR ON SYRIA. FATTAL ASKED HOW ISRAEL COULD EXPECT LEBANON TO GIVE SOMEONE LIKE THIS MILITARY RESPONSIBILITY. HOW WOULD SYRIA REACT? KIMCHE DISPUTED THE ACCURACY OF THE PRESS REPORTS AND RESTATED ISRAEL'S POSITION ON HADDAD. MOST SIGNIFICANTLY, TAMIR FOR THE FIRST TIME HINTED IN A FORMAL SESSION WITH THE LEBANESE THE IDEAS HE HAS BEEN GIVING US ON A PERSONAL BASIS OVER THE PAST FEW DAYS. TAMIR STATED THAT ISRAEL'S POLICY WAS TO BUILD FUTURE RELATIONS ON THE BASIS THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON AND THE LAF WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SECURITY OF SOUTHERN LEBANON. ISRAEL WAS NOT BASING THE FUTURE ON ONE MAN, BUT ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF FUTURE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. HE RECALLED THAT THE LEBANESE HAD SAID THAT ISRAEL COULD CHOOSE THE LEBANESE COMMANDER IN THE SOUTH, AND ISRAEL HAD CHOSEN HADDAD AS PART OF IMPLEMENTING THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS "AT

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EAST IN THE NEAR FUTURE." ISRAEL KNEW LEBANON COULD
GIVE HIM ANY POSITION LATER ON AND THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO
TAKE ORDERS FROM THIS COMMANDER IN ANY EVENT. IT WAS
NOT ISRAEL'S INTENTION TO GIVE HIM CONTROL OF SOUTH
LEBANON. RATHER, HE COULD PROVIDE THE BACKBONE FOR
INTEGRATING HIS BRIGADE INTO THE LAF AND SERVE A SYMBOLIC
PURPOSE. ISRAEL HAD NO INTENTIONS BEYOND THAT. DILLON

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TUNIS FOR UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER; DEPT PASS DRAPER
FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, US, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: APRIL 12 NEGOTIATING ROUND

1. [REDACTED]

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2. SUMMARY. FURTHER EFFORTS WERE MADE IN IDENTIFY-
ING OUTSTANDING ISSUES AND IN RESOLVING SEVERAL
OF THESE DURING A THREE-HOUR NEGOTIATING SESSION
AT NETANYA, APRIL 12. IN AMB. DRAPER'S ABSENCE,
AMB. HABIB LED THE U.S. DELEGATION. INFORMAL MEET-
INGS OF THE HEADS OF DELEGATION GROUP AND THE
MILITARY SUBCOMMITTEE WERE SUPPLEMENTED BY CON-
SULTATIONS AMONG LEBANESE AND ISRAELI POLICE, DRUG,

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AND CUSTOMS OFFICIALS WITHOUT U.S. PARTICIPATION. AS THE APRIL 11 HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING FOCUSED ON ISSUES IDENTIFIED BY THE LEBANESE DELEGATION, THE APRIL 12 MEETING CENTERED ON AN ISRAELI PRESENTATION OF THE ISSUES THEY CONSIDER OUTSTANDING. IN A MOVE OF SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE, THE ISRAELIS WORKED FROM THE LEBANESE DRAFT OF MARCH 29. ISRAEL WILL CONTINUE ITS PRESENTATION ON APRIL 13. IN THE COURSE OF THIS SESSION THE TRADITIONALLY DIFFICULT ISSUES REMAINED EVIDENT. END SUMMARY.

3. FOLLOWING THE FORMAT OF THE APRIL 12 MEETING, THE HEADS OF DELEGATION RESUMED THEIR REVIEW OF OUTSTANDING ISSUES. FATTAL, KHARMA, GEN. HAMDAN, AND BARUD REPRESENTED LEBANON. KIMCHE, RUBINSTEIN, GEN. TAMIR, AND LEOR PARTICIPATED FOR ISRAEL. HABIB, ROSS, KOZAK, AND HARE COMPRISED THE U.S. DELEGATION.

4. KIMCHE LED OFF BY STATING THAT HE HOPED THAT LEBANON HAD NO MORE POINTS OF DISAGREEMENT TO IDENTIFY. (FATTAL RESERVED HIS RIGHT TO RAISE ADDITIONAL ISSUES.) KIMCHE THEN STATED THAT ISRAEL HAD A FEW POINTS OF ITS OWN. HE NOTED THAT ON TWO

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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ISSUES--UNIFIL PRESENCE IN THE SOUTH AND THE ROLE OF MAJOR HADDAD--THE TWO SIDES ARE OPERATING UNDER DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSED INSTRUCTIONS AND COULD NOT MAKE FURTHER PROGRESS PENDING CONSULTATIONS WITH THEIR AUTHORITIES.

5. FATTAL ASKED WHETHER THIS MEANT ISRAEL REJECTED THE LEBANESE PROPOSAL THAT HADDAD SERVE AS DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR G-2. KIMCHE DID NOT RESPOND DIRECTLY, BUT REPEATED BY REITERATING THAT ISRAEL WANTED HADDAD IN A COMMAND POSITION, AND IT SAW TWO SUCH POSTS--THE COMMANDER OF THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE OR THE COMMANDER OF THE SECURITY REGION. FATTAL NOTED THAT HE WOULD NOT BE IN A POSITION TO MAKE CONCESSIONS UNTIL THE HADDAD ISSUE WAS SETTLED AND NOTED THAT WE HAD REACHED THE FINAL STAGE WHERE EVERYTHING WAS LINKED IN A PACKAGE. AFTER AN INTERVENTION BY HABIB, HOWEVER, FATTAL SAID HE HAD NO OBJECTION TO DISCUSSION OF THE OTHER ISSUES.

6. WORKING FROM THE LEBANESE DRAFT OF MARCH 29--THE FIRST TIME ISRAEL HAS SERIOUSLY ADDRESSED A LEBANESE TEXT--KIMCHE PROCEEDED TO IDENTIFY OUTSTANDING ISSUES FROM ISRAEL'S STANDPOINT IN THE ORDER THEY APPEARED IN THE LEBANESE DRAFT. (HE

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INDICATED THAT ISRAEL WOULD WISH TO ALTER THE SEQUENCE OF THE ARTICLES AND OF THE SUBPARAGRAPHS WITHIN ARTICLES AT A LATER STAGE.) FOLLOWING IS A LISTING OF THE ISSUES RAISED:

- A) WHO WILL SIGN THE AGREEMENT? ISRAEL WANTS THE AGREEMENT SIGNED BY FOREIGN MINISTERS, IN

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EXDIS

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MILITARY ADDEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
TUNIS FOR UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER; DEPT PASS DRAPER
FROM HABIB

WHICH CASE LEBANESE REFERENCE TO REPRESENTATIVES
WITH PLENOPOTENTIARY POWERS SHOULD BE DELETED.

- (B) AS INDICATED APRIL 11, ISRAEL INSISTS ON
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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EXPLICIT REFERENCE TO LEBANESE "RECOGNITION" OF
ISRAEL.

- (C) THE PROVISION ON ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL SHOULD
BE CONDITIONED UPON THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN
FORCES. UNDER QUESTIONING FROM HABIB, FATTAL
INDICATED THAT THERE WAS A SERIOUS PROBLEM IN
INCLUDING SUCH A REFERENCE IN THE AGREEMENT ITSELF.
AT HABIB'S SUGGESTION, LEBANON AND ISRAEL TENTA-
TIVELY ACCEPTED THAT REFERENCE TO THE WITHDRAWAL
OF FOREIGN FORCES BE INCLUDED ELSEWHERE IN THE
PACKAGE OF DOCUMENTS.


- (D) KIMCHE NOTED THAT LEBANON HAD DELETED "WELFARE"
FROM THE PROVISION COMMITTING EACH COUNTRY TO
PREVENT ACTIVITY AIMED AT ENDANGERING THE WELFARE
OR SAFETY OF THE POPULATION OF THE OTHER. FATTAL
EXPLAINED THIS CHANGE WAS SIMPLY DESIGNED TO
SEPARATE SECURITY FROM ECONOMIC MEASURES. KIMCHE
SAID HE WOULD NOT MAKE AN ISSUE OF THIS.

- (E) THE LEBANESE HAD DELETED A SUBPARAGRAPH
STATING THAT EACH PARTY WOULD REFRAIN FROM ECONOMIC
AND POLITICAL MEASURES AGAINST THE OTHER. FATTAL
STATED THIS WAS AGAIN DESIGNED TO KEEP SECURITY
AND OTHER ISSUES SEPARATE. IT WAS AGREED THAT THIS
LANGUAGE WOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE MUTUAL RELATIONS
SECTION.

- (F) LEBANON HAD DELETED LANGUAGE IN THE PARA-
GRAPH COMMITTING BOTH PARTIES TO TAKE MEASURES TO
PREVENT VIOLATIONS OF THE AGREEMENT AND COMMITTING
THE PARTIES TO AMEND LEGISLATION TO THAT END.
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[REDACTED]

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FATTAL NOTED THAT THE POINT WAS COVERED ELSEWHERE IN THE AGREEMENT. KIMCHE AND RUBINSTEIN ARGUED THAT LEBANESE LAW EXEMPTED FROM PROSECUTION PERSONS COMMITTING CRIMES AGAINST ISRAELIS. FATTAL ARGUED THAT THE PROBLEM WAS SIMPLY NON-APPLICATION OF THE LAW--NOT A FORMAL EXEMPTION--AND THAT THIS PROBLEM WOULD CEASE TO EXIST WITH THE SIGNING OF THE AGREEMENT AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON. HABIB SUGGESTED AN AGREED MINUTE THAT WOULD SIMPLY AFFIRM THE LEBANESE POSITION THAT LEBANESE LAW CONTAINS THE AUTHORITY NECESSARY FOR ENFORCING THE UNDERTAKING IN THE AGREEMENT. FATTAL SAID HE NOTED THIS BUT PROMISED NOTHING. "IT IS SUPERFLUOUS."

- (G) IN THE SECTION BANNING HOSTILE PROPAGANDA, KIMCHE SUGGESTED ADDING "AND OF INCITEMENT". FATTAL NOTED INCITEMENT WAS COVERED ELSEWHERE IN THE AGREEMENT. KIMCHE SEEMED SURPRISED AND SUGGESTED THAT THE MATTER BE LEFT OPEN FOR LATER DECISION.

- (H) ISRAEL ASKED WHY THE LEBANESE HAD CHANGED "THIS AGREEMENT" TO "THE PRESENT AGREEMENT" THROUGH-OUT. FATTAL EXPLAINED THIS WAS SOLELY FOR REASONS OF INTERNAL CONSISTENCY OF THE TEXT. ISRAEL AGREED.

- I) IN THE PROVISION PROHIBITING ATTACKS ON THE PEOPLE OF THE OTHER PARTY, LEBANON HAD DELETED THE MODIFIER "ANYWHERE". RUBINSTEIN ARGUED THIS WAS NEEDED DUE TO ISRAEL'S HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE WITH THE PLO, PARTICULARLY THE PLO'S INTERPRETATION OF THE 1981 CEASE-FIRE NEGOTIATED BY AMB. HABIB


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FROM HABIB

S APPLYING ONLY TO ATTACKS ACROSS THE LEBANESE
BORDER. FATTAL OBJECTED THAT LEBANON COULD NOT BE
RESPONSIBLE FOR PROSECUTING CRIMES COMMITTED IN
OTHER COUNTRIES. KIMCHE SUGGESTED THE LATTER BE
LEFT IN ABEYANCE.

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- (J) IN THE PROVISION REGARDING THE ESTABLISH-
MENT OF THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE, ISRAEL WANTED
TO ADD THAT IT WOULD "COMMENCE ITS
FUNCTION" UPON
ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE AGREEMENT. FATTAL AGREED.

- (K) KIMCHE ASKED TO DELETE AS A LINKED FUNCTION
OF THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE THE INTERPRETA-
TION OF THE AGREEMENT, NOTING THIS WAS EXPRESSLY
PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE IN THE AGREEMENT. FATTAL
AGREED.

- (L) ISRAEL FELT THE STATEMENT THAT JOINT LIAISON

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COMMITTEE DECISIONS WOULD BE TAKEN UNANIMOUSLY WAS UNNECESSARY BUT WOULD NOT MAKE AN ISSUE OF THIS.

- (M) ISRAEL WANTED TO INCLUDE IN THE FUNCTIONS OF THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE "THE REGULATION OF THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PRODUCTS." FATTAL PROMISED "SYMPATHETIC CONSIDERATION".

- (N) ISRAEL WANTED TO REDRAFT THE LANGUAGE OF THE JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE SECTION IN A MANNER WHICH WOULD HAVE IMPLIED AN INDEPENDENT ROLE FOR THE LIAISON OFFICES. AFTER MUCH DEBATE, HABIB SUGGESTED A FORMULA WHICH WOULD HAVE PROTECTED THE LEBANESE POSITION. KIMCHE SUGGESTED A MODIFICATION WHICH LARGELY RESTORED THE IMPLICATION SOUGHT BY ISRAEL. SURPRISINGLY, FATTAL AGREED, ALTHOUGH WE EXPECT LEBANON WILL RECONSIDER ONCE IT HAS REVIEWED THE TEXT AGAIN.

- (O) ISRAEL SUGGESTED THAT THE OBJECT OF THE

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NEGOTIATIONS. AFTER SIX MONTHS SHOULD BE TO REACH "EARLY" AGREEMENTS ON MUTUAL RELATIONS MATTERS. FATTAL AGREED.

- (P) KIMCHE PROPOSED MOVING THE PROVISION CONCERNING THE AMENDMENT OF TREATIES, LEGISLATION, ETC. TO THE ARTICLE ON MUTUAL RELATIONS. FURTHER, ISRAEL WANTED SUCH AMENDMENTS TO OCCUR UPON ENTRY INTO FORCE BUT IN NO CASE LATER THAN ONE YEAR. THE PRINCIPAL CASE WAS THE ARAB BOYCOTT, AND THIS CHANGE WOULD EMPHASIZE THAT IT WOULD NO LONGER BE APPLIED. FATTAL ARGUED THIS WAS UNNECESSARY AND WOULD RENDER THE GENERAL PROVISION ON AMENDING LEGISLATION MEANINGLESS. RUBINSTEIN ARGUED THAT THE BOYCOTT HAD TO BE FORMALLY RESCINDED IN A ONE-YEAR MAXIMUM, WHETHER OR NOT FORMAL ACCORDS HAD BEEN REACHED ON FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS.

- (Q) KIMCHE SAID ISRAEL WAS HESITANT TO AVOID EXPLICITLY ADDRESSING THE QUESTION OF LEBANON'S RESERVATIONS TO INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS. KHARMA SAID THIS COULD BE COVERED IN AGREED MINUTES AND THAT LEBANON WOULD INFORM THE DEPOSITORY TO ELIMINATE LEBANON'S RESERVATIONS EACH TIME AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON A SPECIFIC SUBJECT (E.G., POSTAL, TELECOMMUNICATIONS). KIMCHE ASKED THAT THE QUESTION BE KEPT OPEN.

- (R) ISRAEL OBJECTED TO LEBANON'S ARTICLE ON

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Date Printed: 10/22/1996

DOC NUMBER: 83BEIRUT04097

CHANNEL: n/a

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ESTABLISHING A CLAIMS COMMISSION, ARGUING THIS WAS
A SUBJECT APPROPRIATE TO A PEACE TREATY. HABIB
SUGGESTED THAT CLAIMS BE LISTED AMONG THE SUBJECTS

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EXDIS
MILITARY ADDEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
TUNIS FOR UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER; DEPT PASS DRAPER
FROM HABIB

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TO BE NEGOTIATED AFTER SIX MONTHS. KIMCHE ASKED TO HOLD THIS IN ABEYANCE AND INDICATED WE "MIGHT" DO AS HABIB HAD PROPOSED.

- (S) KIMCHE AND RUBINSTEIN REITERATED AT LENGTH

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ISRAEL'S DESIRE TO REFER TO A "FORMAL", "FULL", OR "COMPLETE" PEACE TREATY IN THE FUTURE.

- (T) ISRAEL SOUGHT TO LINK THE PROVISIONS ON THE REVIEW OF THE AGREEMENT TO NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE CONCLUSION OF A PEACE TREATY. FATTAL ARGUED THAT THERE MIGHT BE SOUND TECHNICAL REASONS FOR A REVIEW HAVING NOTHING TO DO WITH A PEACE TREATY. KIMCHE SUGGESTED THE LANGUAGE BE SIMPLIFIED TO INDICATE THAT "THE AGREEMENT MAY BE REVIEWED AND AMENDED BY INFORMAL AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES, AT THE REQUEST OF EITHER PARTY." RUBINSTEIN DEMURRED THAT SUCH A REVIEW PROVISION SHOULD BE PART OF A PACKAGE INCLUDING REFERENCE TO A "COMPLETE" PEACE TREATY. FATTAL SAID HE WOULD TRY TO SELL THIS TO HIS AUTHORITIES.

7. THE SESSION ADJOURNED IN LIGHT OF THE LEBANESE DELEGATION'S DESIRE TO RETURN TO BEIRUT WELL BEFORE NIGHTFALL. IT WAS AGREED THAT ISRAEL WOULD CONTINUE TO IDENTIFY ITS REMAINING POINTS OF DIS-AGREEMENT AT THE APRIL 13 MEETING AT KHALDAH. DILLON

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SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 04061

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION
TUNIS FOR UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER; DEPT FOR DRAPER
FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, US, IS, XF
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH GEMAYEL,
APRIL 13

1. [REDACTED]

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2. JOINED BY AMB. DILLON AND ROSS, I MET WITH
PRESIDENT GEMAYEL, FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM, AND
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER WADI' HADDAD FOR ALMOST
TWO HOURS LATE APRIL 13 TO BRIEF THEM ON THE
RESULTS OF MY TALKS IN ISRAEL, SHARE MY IMPRES-
SIONS OF THE STATUS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE
BASIS OF MY PARTICIPATION IN THE MOST RECENT
SESSIONS AT NETANYA AND KHALDAH, AND ELICIT THEIR

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POSITIONS ON SELECTED KEY ISSUES. **UNCLASSIFIED**

3. I BEGAN BY ADDRESSING THE STATUS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE EMERGENCE OF A SMALL NUMBER OF KEY ISSUES THAT REQUIRED POLITICAL DECISIONS OUTSIDE THE FRAMEWORK OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS. AMONG THESE I ENUMERATED THE FUTURE OF MAJOR HADDAD, THE DETAILS OF THE INTEGRATION OF HIS FORCES INTO THE LEBANESE ARMY, THE FUTURE ROLE OF UNIFIL, AND THE ISRAELI DESIRE TO ASSIGN IDF "LIAISON OFFICERS" TO UNITS OF THE LEBANESE SOUTHERN (TERRITORIAL) BRIGADE DOWN TO THE COMPANY LEVEL, CERTAIN DETAILS OF THE FUNCTIONING OF THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI MILITARY "OPERATIONS CENTERS", AND THE ISRAELI DESIRE FOR A STATEMENT OF EXPLICIT MUTUAL RECOGNITION IN THE AGREEMENT. IN ORDER TO GIVE THE LEBANESE A FEELING FOR THE OVERALL PICTURE, I ALSO LISTED RAPIDLY SOME 28 OTHER POINTS OF DISAGREEMENT THAT REMAINED FOLLOWING THE LAST THREE DAYS OF NEGOTIATIONS. I NOTED AS I DID SO THAT THESE HAD TO BE VIEWED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE MANY POINTS OF AGREEMENT ON WHICH SPECIFIC LANGUAGE HAD BEEN DRAFTED.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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4. DRAWING ON MY DISCUSSIONS WITH BEGIN, SHAMIR, AND ARENS IN ISRAEL, I THEN BROACHED THE FUTURE OF MAJOR HADDAD, WHICH I TOLD THE LEBANESE THE ISRAELIS HAD CONVINCED THEMSELVES WAS THE CENTRAL ISSUE. I REVIEWED BRIEFLY THE NOW FAMILIAR ISRAELI ARGUMENTS FOR HIS RETENTION IN A "COMMAND POSITION" FOR AT LEAST A LIMITED PERIOD AND CONFIRMED THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE SAYING THAT A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF MAJOR HADDAD WOULD MAKE AGREEMENT ON THE OTHER REMAINING DIFFERENCES "EASY". IN SHORT, IF THE LEBANESE COULD AGREE TO THE APPOINTMENT OF MAJOR HADDAD AS COMMANDER OF THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE AT LEAST UNTIL A FEW MONTHS AFTER ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, THE AGREEMENT WOULD FALL INTO PLACE IN A SHORT TIME.

5. THE LEBANESE, WHOSE FACES HAD BEGUN TO SHOW SKEPTICISM AND DISAPPOINTMENT SHORTLY AFTER I BEGAN MY INVENTORY OF REMAINING ISSUES AND REACHED OPEN INCREDULITY AS I BEGAN MY REMARKS ON MAJOR HADDAD, REACTED STRONGLY AND CATEGORICALLY. GEMAYEL RESPONDED ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES:

-- THE FRIENDLY ATMOSPHERE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS HAD GIVEN THE ISRAELIS CERTAIN ADVANTAGES. WHILE

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HE, GEMAYEL, HAD NOT BEEN IN FAVOR OF THESE
"ADVANTAGES" (CONCESSIONS), THEY HAD NONETHELESS
BEEN MADE, AND HE COULD SAY NOTHING.

-- THE EXISTING LEBANESE DRAFT TEXT OF THE AGREE-
MENT WAS THE MAXIMUM LEBANON CAN ACCEPT. EVEN AS
IT STOOD, IT WAS VERY DANGEROUS FOR LEBANON AND

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EXDIS -- SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

CORRECTED COPY TEXT (PER BEIRUT 04071)

TUNIS FOR UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER; DEPT FOR DRAPER
FROM HABIB

COULD BE SOLD TO THE LEBANESE PUBLIC AND TO THE
ARAB STATES ONLY WITH GREAT DIFFICULTY. LEBANON
COULD NOT GO "ONE INCH" BEYOND ITS PRESENT DRAFT.

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IT HAD NOTHING NEW TO GIVE. (GEMAYEL DID NOT
OBJECT WHEN I NOTED THAT SOME OF THE PROPOSED
CHANGES WERE RELATIVELY HARMLESS.)

-- IT WAS, IN SHORT, "THIS PAPER OR NOTHING. I AM
NOT READY TO SIGN A DOCUMENT THAT COULD BE SEEN
AS A VIOLATION OF OUR SOVEREIGNTY AND DIGNITY. IT
WOULD BE BETTER TO BRING SOMEONE ELSE TO SIGN THIS
PAPER. WE WANT PEACE WITH ISRAEL, BUT WE HAVE TO
PRESERVE OUR DIGNITY, OUR SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE
MORALE OF OUR ARMY."

-- GEMAYEL HAD BEEN AGAINST THE SOLUTION THE
LEBANESE DELEGATION HAD PROPOSED FOR MAJOR HADDAD
(CHIEF OF INTELLIGENCE FOR THE SECURITY REGION).
IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO SELL "SOMEONE IM-
POSED BY THE ISRAELIS" TO THE LEBANESE PARLIAMENT
AND PEOPLE AND ESPECIALLY TO THE LEBANESE ARMY.
THE LEBANESE PROPOSAL HAD IN ANY CASE NEVER BEEN
ANYTHING MORE THAN A "FACE-SAVING" DEVICE WITHOUT
ANY ATTACHED RESPONSIBILITIES.

-- THE SYRIANS TOO WERE A MAJOR FACTOR. ALREADY,
THEY HAD PLACED THEIR PROTEGE, EX-LEBANESE ARMY
OFFICER AHMAD AL-KHATIB, IN TRIPOLI TO BEGIN
BUILDING "HIS" OWN TERRITORIAL BRIGADE FOR NORTHERN
LEBANON AND THE BIQA'. (WHEN I SAID I HAD NOT
HEARD THIS DISTURBING REPORT, GEMAYEL INVITED ME
TO DISCUSS IT WITH GENERAL TANNOUS. I AM DOING
SO THE MORNING OF APRIL 14.)

6. WADI' HADDAD, WHO OBVIOUSLY HAD AUTHORIZED THE
LEBANESE PROPOSAL ON MAJOR HADDAD, WHILE GEMAYEL

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AND SALEM HAD NOT, ATTEMPTED TO EXPLAIN THAT HE HAD AUTHORIZED IT ONLY RPT ONLY AS PART OF A PACKAGE DEAL IN WHICH THE ISRAELIS MADE CONCESSIONS ON SUCH ISSUES AS THE JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS. SINCE THE ISRAELIS HAD NOT MADE THESE CONCESSIONS, IT WAS UNFAIR OF THEM TO POCKET THE LEBANESE PROPOSAL ON HADDAD AS A CONCESSION. SALEM STATED HIS STRONG VIEW THAT EVEN THE PACKAGE DEAL HADDAD HAD AUTHORIZED WOULD HAVE BEEN VERY DIFFICULT TO DEFEND IN PARLIAMENT.

7. ROSS AND I RETURNED REPEATEDLY TO VARIOUS SCENARIOS ON MAJOR HADDAD THAT MIGHT MAKE A LEBANESE CONCESSION EASIER TO OFFER. GEMAYEL AND HIS TEAM WOULD HAVE NONE OF THESE, ARGUING THAT WE HAD TO CONVINCE THE ISRAELIS THAT THE AGREEMENT PACKAGE WAS A GOOD ONE WITHOUT THIS LAST, FATAL CONCESSION. THE SYRIANS WOULD CLEARLY NOT BUY IT. ONE INDICATOR WAS THE ATTITUDE OF FORMER PRESIDENT FRANJIYAH, WHO IS CLOSE TO THE SYRIANS AND HAD TOLD WADI" IN A RECENT SECRET MEETING THAT THERE WOULD BE CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE ON A NATIONAL SCALE IF THE AGREEMENT COMPROMISED LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY.

8. OUR ATTEMPTS TO GET GEMAYEL AND HIS ADVISERS THINKING ABOUT MAJOR HADDAD ELICITED STRONG EMOTION AND ANGER AMONG THEM. SEVERAL TIMES GEMAYEL REPEATED THAT THE LEBANESE DRAFT AGREEMENT WAS THE MAXIMUM LEBANON COULD ACCEPT, AND EVEN THAT WAS DIFFICULT. THERE WAS REAL DANGER THAT THE LEBANESE DOMESTIC CONSENSUS AND LEBANON'S ARAB CREDENTIALS, BOTH OF WHICH PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD EXPRESSED HIS COMMITMENT TO SUPPORT, WOULD BE DESTROYED. SALEM OBSERVED THAT THE PARLIAMENTARY CONSENSUS NECESSARY TO ENCOURAGE SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL WAS

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EXDIS -- SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MILITARY ADDRESSEES
TUNIS FOR UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER; DEPT FOR DRAPER
FROM HABIB

ALREADY ERODING SIGNIFICANTLY. ONE VERY DIS-
TURBING SIGN WAS THAT, IN RECENT
T FOREIGN AFFAIRS
DEBATES, PRIME MINISTER WAZZAN HAD VERY UNCHAR-
ACTERISTICALLY DISTANCED HIMSELF FROM ANY DIS-
CUSSION OF THE PROPOSED AGREEMENT. FORMER PRIME
MINISTER SALIM AL-HUSS, WITH WHOM SALEM HAD DIS-

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CUSSED THE AGREEMENT, HAD LIKEWISE BEEN CAUSTIC
IN HIS CRITICISM.

9. IN CLOSING, GEMAYEL COMPLAINED THAT, IF THE
U.S.--WITH ALL ITS POWER--COULD NOT GET ISRAEL TO
WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON ON REASONABLE TERMS, THEN
THE END OF THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS WAS AT HAND.
ONLY THE SOVIETS WOULD BENEFIT. THE AMERICAN
ATTITUDE SEEMED TO BE A INVITATION TO THE LEBANESE
GOVERNMENT TO ACCEPT CONCESSIONS FAR BEYOND THE
REALM OF POSSIBILITY. I RESPONDED THAT THE U.S.
WAS NOT GOING TO DISAPPOINT LEBANON AND THAT THE
PRESIDENT'S POSITION WAS CLEAR AND UNCHANGING.
DILLON

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TUNIS FOR UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER; DEPT FOR DRAPER

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, US, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER
BEGIN, APRIL 13

1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY. DURING MY APRIL 13 MEETING WITH BEGIN,
SHAMIR AND ARENS, I FOCUSED PRINCIPALLY ON HADDAD
IN LIGHT OF ISRAEL'S NEGATIVE REACTION TO THE
LEBANESE SUGGESTION THAT HADDAD ASSUME A DEPUTY
[REDACTED]

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COMMANDER POSITION FOR INTELLIGENCE. I PROBED FOR
ISRAELI FLEXIBILITY IN DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN
HADDAD'S POSSIBLE ASSUMPTION OF AN OPERATIONAL ROLE
AND THE TITLE HE MIGHT ENJOY. THERE WAS VERY LITTLE
GIVE ON THE ISRAELI SIDE; THEY WANT HADDAD IN A CLEARLY
IDENTIFIED COMMAND POSITION. I SAID I WOULD DIS-
CUSS THIS ISSUE FURTHER WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL,
BUT DESCRIBED THE OBVIOUS CONSTRAINTS UNDER WHICH
HE WAS OPERATING. I ALSO FLOATED A COMPROMISE

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FORMULA FOR A LIMITED UNIFIL DEPLOYMENT AROUND THE PALESTINIAN CAMPS AT SIDON. BEGIN AND HIS MINISTERS DID NOT REACT ONE WAY OR THE OTHER TO THESE SUGGESTIONS.

3. MUCH OF THE DISCUSSION WAS DEVOTED TO ISRAEL'S CONCERN ABOUT THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT ON F-16S, OUR RECENT STATEMENT ON SETTLEMENTS AND POSITION ON THE LAVIE. ARENS ARGUED THAT THESE ACTS WOULD HARDEN LEBANESE NEGOTIATING POSITION AND LEAD THEM TO BELIEVE THE UNITED STATES WOULD PRESSURE ISRAEL TO SIGN ON THE DOTTED LINE. BEGIN SAID THESE STATEMENTS CONTRIBUTED TO THE IMPRESSION THAT ISRAEL "WAS BEING PENALIZED" WHICH HAD A NEGATIVE EFFECT ON THE NEGOTIATIONS AND MORE GENERALLY. LEWIS AND I REBUTTED THIS LINE OF ARGUMENT. I SAID I WOULD RETURN TO ISRAEL FRIDAY MORNING AFTER HAVING PARTICIPATED IN KHALDAH SESSIONS AND MEETING WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AND OTHER LEBANESE LEADERS. I REPEATEDLY STRESSED THE NEED TO REACH AN EARLY AGREEMENT WHILE GEMAYEL STILL ENJOYED A BROAD INTERNAL CONSENSUS. END SUMMARY.

4. I MET WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN, FOREIGN

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MINISTER SHAMIR, AND DEFENSE MINISTER ARENS FOR ONE HOUR AND A HALF MORNING APRIL 13. I WAS ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR LEWIS AND HARE.

5. BEGIN ASKED ME TO GIVE A CURRENT ASSESSMENT OF WHERE WE STAND IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. I REFERRED TO MY DISCUSSION WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER THE PREVIOUS EVENING AND AGREED WITH SHAMIR'S ASSESSMENT THAT WE WERE NOW COMING TO WHAT I HOPED WOULD BE THE LAST FEW WEEKS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. WE ALSO AGREED THERE WERE THREE OR FOUR KEY ISSUES WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE RESOLVED; IF THIS WERE DONE, THE OTHER ISSUES SHOULD QUICKLY FALL INTO PLACE. IN ADDITION, WE HAD DEVELOPED AN INVENTORY OF THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES, AND WITH THIS IN HAND, I NOW INTENDED TO GO TO BEIRUT TO REVIEW THE ENTIRE LIST WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL TO DETERMINE WHERE WE STOOD.

6. I IDENTIFIED THE PRINCIPAL ISSUES AS HADDAD AND THE ROLE FOR UNIFIL AROUND THE PALESTINIAN CAMPS IN THE SECURITY REGION. I SAID THAT LEBANESE HAD MADE SOME ADJUSTMENTS IN THEIR POSITION. THE LEBANESE HAD CHANGED, FOR EXAMPLE, THEIR ORIGINAL POSITION ON HADDAD, THOUGH I UNDERSTOOD ISRAEL WANTED HADDAD IN A COMMAND POSITION AND HAD REACTED

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NEGATIVELY TO THE LEBANESE SUGGESTIONS CONCERNING HADDAD. THE LEBANESE HAVE NOT ACCEPTED AN OPERATIONAL ROLE FOR HADDAD AND THIS ISSUE, I SAID, NEEDED TO BE FURTHER EXPLORED.

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EXDIS

7. I SUGGESTED THAT A HALF-WAY POSITION MIGHT ALSO BE POSSIBLE ON UNIFIL WHICH WOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ISRAELI CONCERNS ABOUT AN INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE AROUND TYRE. A LIMITED UNIFIL PRESENCE IN THE SIDON AREA COULD BE EXPLORED AND MIGHT

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OFFER ONE WAY FOR UNIFIL NOT TO BECOME A CONTENTIOUS ISSUE. -(COMMENT: THE ISRAELIS DID NOT REACT ONE WAY OR THE OTHER TO THIS POSSIBILITY, WHICH MIGHT SUGGEST A CERTAIN LEEWAY ON THIS ISSUE, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF KIMCHE'S HINTS AT THE APRIL 12 SESSION THAT HE WOULD BE WILLING TO CONSIDER A PROPOSAL INVOLVING A "NOMINAL" UNIFIL PRESENCE.)

8. ON THE POSITIVE SIDE, I NOTED THAT PROGRESS

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HAD BEEN MADE AMONG OTHER THINGS IN DEFINING THE FUNCTIONS OF THE SUPERVISORY TEAMS. I ALSO UNDERSTOOD THAT THE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE SECURITY SERVICES HAD GONE WELL. IN MAKING THESE POINTS, I OBSERVED THAT ISRAEL HAD OFTEN ASKED IF SYRIA WOULD WITHDRAW. WE HAD REPLIED THAT ALL THE INDICATIONS WE HAD RECEIVED THUS FAR WERE POSITIVE. HOWEVER, THE LEBANESE WERE CONCERNED THAT THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS UNDER DISCUSSION COULD CONTAIN ELEMENTS LEADING TO A RESIDUAL ISRAELI PRESENCE WHICH WOULD JEOPARDIZE SYRIA WITHDRAWAL. I ALSO ALLUDED TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT HUSSEIN'S RECENT DECLARATION ON THE PEACE PROCESS MIGHT STIFFEN SYRIAN ATTITUDES, AND THE DEVELOPING SOVIET/SYRIAN RELATIONSHIP COULD ALSO COMPLICATE THE SITUATION.

9. I CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT THESE FACTORS MADE IT ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT TO PRESS AHEAD RAPIDLY TO REACH AN AGREEMENT. AT THE MOMENT, PRESIDENT GEMAYEL ENJOYED A BROAD AND STRONG MUSLIM/CHRISTIAN CONSENSUS. HOWEVER, GEMAYEL WAS RIGHTLY CONCERNED THAT THIS CONSENSUS WOULD ERODE IF AN AGREEMENT WAS NOT ACHIEVED SOON.

10. AFTER THIS REVIEW, ARENS IMMEDIATELY LAUNCHED INTO A DISCUSSION ON SOME POINTS WHICH WERE OBVIOUSLY UPPERMOST ON HIS MIND AND PRESUMABLY HAD BEEN ORCHESTRATED WITH BEGIN AND SHAMIR IN ADVANCE. HE SAID THAT THE SYRIANS WERE CURRENTLY ENGAGED IN AN INTENSE LEVEL OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES, INVOLVING VERY LARGE-SCALE TRAINING EXERCISES. HE RECALLED THAT SIMILAR EXERCISES HAD PRECEDED THE

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YOM KIPPUR WAR, THOUGH HE WAS CAREFUL TO AVOID DRAWING ANY FIRM CONCLUSIONS FROM SYRIA'S PRESENT ACTIVITIES. HE SAID HE WAS PERSONALLY DISTURBED BY THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT ON F-16S, AS WELL AS OUR RECENT STATEMENT ON A SETTLEMENTS FREEZE, IN LIGHT OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS. THEY COMPLICATED THE SITUATION AND INEVITABLY WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF HAVING PRESIDENT GEMAYEL BELIEVE THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD PRESSURE ISRAEL TO SIGN ON THE DOTTED LINE. HE THOUGHT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT GEMAYEL SHOULD HAVE NO ILLUSIONS ON THIS SCORE.

11. LEWIS AND I REBUTTED THIS LINE OF ARGUMENTATION AND SAID THAT THE LEBANESE KNEW VERY WELL THAT IT WAS NOT OUR MANNER TO DEAL WITH ISRAEL THROUGH THREATS AND PRESSURE. IT WAS RATHER A MATTER OF ADDRESSING THE ISSUES ON THE BASIS OF PERSUASION AND NEGOTIATION. THE PRESIDENT HAD MADE A STATEMENT ON THE F-16S IN REPLY TO A QUESTION; HE HAD REITERATED OUR EARLIER POSITION AND HAD NOT MADE ANY DEFINITIVE LEGAL DETERMINATION ON HOW ARMS HAD BEEN USED BY ISRAEL DURING THE WAR. ARENS STRESSED THAT IT WAS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO RECTIFY THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT. I REPLIED THAT THERE WAS NO PRESIDENT IN MY EXPERIENCE WHO WAS MORE DEDICATED TO THE SECURITY AND WELFARE OF ISRAEL. AT THE SAME TIME, THE PRESIDENT BELIEVED VERY STRONGLY ON THE NECESSITY OF RESTORING FULL SOVEREIGNTY TO LEBANON. IN HIS VIEW, THIS PROCESS WOULD ALSO CONTRIBUTE TO A BROADER PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

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12. BEGIN INTERJECTED TO SAY THAT THE GREAT PUBLICITY GIVEN TO THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT ON F-16S AND ALSO THE AMERICAN POSITION ON THE LAVIE PROJECT HAD CREATED THE IMPRESSION THAT "ISRAEL WAS BEING PENALIZED". THIS HAD A NEGATIVE EFFECT ON THE LEBANESE NEGOTIATIONS AND IN THE ARAB WORLD MORE GENERALLY; THIS IMPRESSION, HE ASSERTED, SHOULD BE REMOVED. LEWIS THEN DESCRIBED THE ASSURANCES, WHICH HE HAD ALREADY CONVEYED, FROM THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY THAT THIS ISSUE WOULD FALL AWAY ONCE A LEBANESE AGREEMENT IS REACHED. I ALSO ADDED THAT GEMAYEL'S BASIC CONSTRAINTS WERE RELATED TO HOW THE AGREEMENT WOULD AFFECT HIS INTERNAL CONSENSUS AND SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON, AND WERE NOT BASED ON THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT.

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13. AFTER THIS RATHER PROLONGED DISCUSSION, BEGIN TURNED TO THE NEGOTIATIONS AND HADDAD. HE SAID HADDAD WAS A MAN OF INTEGRITY WHO WANTED TO SAVE THE CHRISTIAN POPULATION IN SOUTH LEBANON. IT WAS NO SECRET THAT ISRAEL HAD COOPERATED WITH HADDAD TO ACHIEVE THIS HONORABLE GOAL. BEGIN STRESSED THAT ISRAEL WANTED AN INDEPENDENT LEBANON, AS ALSO DID HADDAD. BEGIN RECOGNIZED LEBANON HAD MADE "A CERTAIN MOVE" BY SUGGESTING HE BE MADE A DEPUTY COMMANDER IN CHARGE OF SECURITY (PRESUMABLY BEGIN WAS REFERRING TO INTELLIGENCE). HOWEVER, EVERYBODY UNDERSTOOD THAT A DEPUTY COULD BE COUNTER-

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MANDED BY HIS SUPERIORS. THAT IS WHY ISRAEL WANTED HADDAD TO BE COMMANDER OF THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE OR COMMANDER OF THE SOUTHERN SECURITY REGION. BEGIN EMPHASIZED IT WAS AN "ABSOLUTE MUST" THAT HADDAD HAVE A COMMAND POSITION. THIS WAS NOT, BEGIN CONTINUED, AN EXAGGERATED DEMAND. HE QUIETLY ASKED THAT I TALK FURTHER ABOUT THIS ISSUE WITH THE LEBANESE.

14. I SAID I UNDERSTOOD ISRAEL WANTED HADDAD IN A COMMAND POSITION HAVING OPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES. I ASKED IF A DISTINCTION COULD BE MADE BETWEEN HAVING HADDAD IN AN OVERALL COMMAND POSITION AND HAVING OPERATIONAL CONTROL OVER FORCES. I NOTED IN THIS RESPECT THERE WERE OBVIOUS LIMITS ON WHAT LEBANON COULD AGREE TO ON THE HADDAD ISSUE, CITING PARTICULARLY LEBANON'S INTERNAL CONSENSUS, INCLUDING ITS EFFECT ON THE MILITARY, AND LEBANON'S RELATIONSHIP WITH ITS NEIGHBORS. I THOUGHT THAT IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO MAKE A

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DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE TITLE AND THE ROLE. SHAMIR IMMEDIATELY REPLIED THAT THE TWO WENT TOGETHER; OTHERWISE, HADDAD COULD BE EASILY OVERRULED. LEWIS POINTED OUT THAT WITHIN A MILITARY HIERARCHY IT WAS ALWAYS POSSIBLE EVEN FOR A COMMANDER TO BE OVERRULED BY HIS MILITARY SUPERIORS. SHAMIR STRESSED THAT HADDAD HAD TO BE A COMMANDER ON THE SPOT AND IN A POSITION TO DEAL WITH ISSUES ON A DAILY BASIS. "WE HAVE TO BE ABLE TO TALK TO HIM," HE SAID. ARENS CONCURRED WITH SHAMIR'S ASSESSMENT. SHAMIR REMARKED THAT IF THE LEBANESE COULD AGREE ON HADDAD BEING A DEPUTY COMMANDER, IT SHOULD NO LONGER BE A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE ON HIS ASSUMING A COMMAND POSITION. LEWIS SAID THE LEBANESE WERE NATURALLY WORRIED ABOUT THE PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF ANY ROLE WHICH HADDAD MIGHT ASSUME. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO RECOGNIZE THAT HOW SOMETHING WAS DESCRIBED HAD AN EFFECT. AT THE END OF THE CONVERSATION, ARENS DID ALLOW THAT HADDAD'S OFFICIAL POSITION COULD DEPEND ON HOW THE LEBANESE ORGANIZED THEIR MILITARY COMMAND SYSTEM.

15. ARENS COMMENTED THAT THE LEBANESE ARE NOW CONVINCED THAT THE PROBLEM OF CONTROLLING THE PLO WILL BE HANDLED BY THE U.S. THIS IN TURN LED THEM TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THEY DID NOT HAVE TO COOPERATE WITH ISRAEL. I UNDERScoreD OUR ROLE WAS TO HELP TRAIN AND BUILD UP THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES. THE LEBANESE KNEW VERY WELL THAT WE

WOULD NOT ENGAGE IN A COMBAT ROLE IN LEBANON.
MOREOVER, I POINTED OUT THAT THE LEBANESE HAD

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AGREED TO A WIDE RANGE OF COOPERATION WITH ISRAEL
IN THE SOUTHERN REGION, INCLUDING JOINT PATROLS,
INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION, AND INVOLVEMENT IN VARIOUS
LIAISON AND SUPERVISORY MECHANISMS. IT WAS MY VIEW
THAT THESE FORMS OF COOPERATION WERE ULTIMATELY
OF MORE IMPORTANCE FOR ISRAEL THAN ITS RELATIONSHIP
WITH HADDAD. THE LEBANESE WERE INTERESTED IN THIS
COOPERATION BECAUSE THEY SAW THAT IT WAS IN THEIR
OWN INTEREST TO DO SO. SHAMIR REPLIED SKEPTICALLY

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THAT HE WAS NOT CONVINCED.

16. LEWIS STRESSED THAT THE PACKAGE OF SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WERE BEING DEVELOPED SHOULD MAKE THE LEVEL OF RISK TO ISRAEL ACCEPTABLE. HE POINTED OUT THAT IF THE SYRIANS DO NOT LEAVE

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LEBANON, THERE WILL BE A GREAT DANGER OF RADICAL ELEMENTS SPILLING OVER INTO THE SOUTHERN REGION, ABETTED BY UNFRIENDLY OUTSIDE FORCES. IF THIS SHOULD OCCUR, IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DANGEROUS FOR ISRAEL AND SUGGESTED THAT THE PACKAGE OF SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD BE EXAMINED IN THIS LIGHT.

17. AS WE WERE CONCLUDING OUR CONVERSATION, I REPEATED THE IMPORTANCE OF MOVING AHEAD WHILE GEMAYEL STILL ENJOYED A BROAD CONSENSUS WITHIN LEBANON. I DESCRIBED IN SOME DETAIL MY VARIOUS CONTACTS WITH SHI'ITE, SUNNI AND OTHER LEBANESE CONFESSIONAL LEADERS TO UNDERSCORE THIS POINT. FINALLY, I EMPHASIZED THAT PRESIDENT GEMAYEL WAS PROVING TO BE A GOOD LEADER AND IT WAS IN OUR MUTUAL INTERESTS TO HELP HIM RESTORE SOVEREIGNTY THROUGHOUT LEBANESE TERRITORY. ON THIS NOTE, I SAID I WOULD RETURN TO JERUSALEM FRIDAY MORNING AFTER HAVING PARTICIPATED IN THE KHALDAH MEETINGS AND MEETING WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AND OTHER LEBANESE LEADERS. DILLON

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FOR AMBASSADOR ATHERTON FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, US, XF
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: GOE REQUEST FOR LEBANON
UPDATE

REFS: (A) STATE 99428, (B) CAIRO 10865

1. [REDACTED]
2. YOU WILL BE RECEIVING THE LATEST REPORTS ON OUR MEETINGS IN TRIPARTITE NEGOTIATIONS AT NETANYA, APRIL 11 AND 12, AS WELL AS OUR REVIEW OF OUTSTANDING ISSUES WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR AND HIS COLLEAGUES EVENING APRIL 12. THE LATTER REPORT WILL DETAIL IN PARTICULAR THE ARRAY OF ISSUES WHICH NEED TO BE RESOLVED BEFORE AN AGREEMENT IS REACHED. YOU MAY DRAW FREELY FROM THESE REPORTS IN DESCRIBING THE CURRENT STATE OF PLAY TO MUBARAK.

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3. IN BRIEFING PRESIDENT MUBARAK, YOU MAY ALSO DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS IN PROVIDING AN ASSESSMENT OF WHERE WE STAND:

-- SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS HAS BEEN ACHIEVED TOWARD AN AGREEMENT. THERE ARE, HOWEVER, IMPORTANT ISSUES WHICH STILL NEED TO BE RESOLVED.

-- ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL ISSUES CONCERNS THE FUTURE

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STATUS OF MAJOR SA'D HADDAD. THIS SUBJECT NEEDS FURTHER EXAMINATION AND EXPLORATION WITH BOTH PARTIES. THE ISRAELIS WANT HADDAD TO BE IN A COMMAND POST IN THE SOUTH; THE LEBANESE ARE RESISTING THIS COURSE. THIS CONTINUES TO BE THE MOST DIFFICULT ISSUE WE FACE.

-- OTHER SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS BEING ADDRESSED INCLUDE UNIFIL DEPLOYMENT IN SOUTHERN LEBANON TO HELP PROTECT PALESTINIAN CAMPS. THE ISRAELIS ARE OPPOSED TO SUCH A DEPLOYMENT THERE. THERE ARE ALSO DIFFERENCES ON THE VARIOUS SUPERVISORY MECHANISMS TO BE ESTABLISHED IN THE SOUTHERN REGION, SUCH AS THE SUPERVISORY TEAMS AND CENTERS FOR MONITORING OF SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.

-- THE ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENT IS TO RECONCILE LEBANON'S IMPERATIVE TO RESTORE SOVEREIGNTY OVER ALL OF ITS TERRITORY WHILE ALSO ENSURING THAT ISRAEL'S ESSENTIAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ARE MET. OUR IMMEDIATE TASK IS TO BREAK THROUGH THE PRINCIPAL SECURITY ISSUES, PRINCIPALLY ON HADDAD AND UNIFIL; IF THIS CAN BE DONE, THE OTHER PIECES SHOULD FALL INTO PLACE.

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-- THERE ARE STILL SOME ISSUES WHICH MUST BE OVERCOME IN DRAFTING THE OVERALL AGREEMENT ITSELF, THOUGH DRAFTING IS SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLETED. THE ISRAELIS ARE PRESSING FOR LANGUAGE WHICH WOULD LEAD TO ULTIMATE ABROGATION OF ECONOMIC BOYCOTT.

-- ANOTHER IMPORTANT SUBJECT CONCERNS MUTUAL RELATIONS, ESPECIALLY AS IT RELATES TO THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PEOPLE. WHILE A CERTAIN NUMBER OF SUBJECTS STILL NEED TO BE DISCUSSED AND AGREED TO, WE DO NOT SEE ANY INSURMOUNTABLE PROBLEMS IN THIS AREA

-- AS IN MOST NEGOTIATIONS, THE LAST MOMENTS ARE OFTEN THE MOST DIFFICULT; THE PROCESS COULD STILL BE DERAILED GIVEN THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SEVERAL MAJOR ISSUES STILL SEPARATING THE PARTIES. HOWEVER, BOTH SIDES APPEAR TO BE DEDICATED TO REACHING AN EARLY AGREEMENT AND THE NEGOTIATING PACE IS INTENSIFYING. WE ARE DEPLOYING OUR BEST EFFORTS TO ENSURE A RAPID AND SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME. WE CANNOT, HOWEVER, PREDICT IF OR WHEN AN AGREEMENT MIGHT BE REACHED.

-- THE QUESTION OF PLO/SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL HANGS OVER THE NEGOTIATIONS, ESPECIALLY AS BOTH PARTIES NOW SEE

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THE POSSIBILITY OF REACHING AN AGREEMENT. IT WILL BE VITALLY IMPORTANT FOR OUR FRIENDS TO USE ALL OF THEIR INFLUENCE TO ENSURE THAT THE OBJECTIVE OF A COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON IS ACHIEVED, ONCE AN ISRAELI-LEBANESE AGREEMENT IS REACHED.

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3. IF YOU BELIEVE IT WOULD BE ADVISABLE, I COULD COME TO CAIRO THIS WEEKEND TO MEET WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK. I WILL BE AVAILABLE SATURDAY, SUNDAY, AND MONDAY (APRIL 16-18), THOUGH SATURDAY WOULD BE THE MOST CONVENIENT. I AM PLANNING TO STAY IN BEIRUT UNTIL FRIDAY MORNING WHEN I SHALL RETURN TO ISRAEL. PLEASE ADVISE. DILLON

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EXT **DECAPTIONED**

FROM DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MARR, PREL, MOPS, LE, IS, JL XF

SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: FONMIN SALEM URGES U.S.

TO TRY SOMETHING NEW TO BRING THE NEGOTIATIONS TO
A CLOSE

1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY. LEBANESE FONMIN SALEM IS APPREHENSIVE
THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL NOT BE SUCCESSFULLY
COMPLETED OVER WHAT HE REGARDS AS THE NEXT CRITICAL
FEW WEEKS. HE BELIEVES (MISTAKENLY) THAT ONLY
RELATIVELY MINOR ISSUES REMAIN TO BE RESOLVED.
SALEM REITERATED THAT LEBANON HAD REACHED THE LIMITS

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OF ITS SUBSTANTIVE FLEXIBILITY, ALTHOUGH HE DID
SAY THAT LEBANON WOULD ACCEPT A FORMULA TO SAVE
ISRAEL'S FACE WHICH WOULD KEEP HADDAD IN SOUTH

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LEBANON FOR "A TEMPORARY PERIOD" FOLLOWING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL.

3. SALEM'S APPREHENSIONS ARE THREEFOLD. FIRST, HE IS OBVIOUSLY DISTURBED THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT BE ABLE TO UNDERCUT THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND HE FEELS UNSURE ABOUT SYRIAN INTENTIONS. SECOND, HE IS CONVINCED THAT SUPPORT FOR AN AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL IS ERODING IN PARLIAMENT AND WILL ALSO DIMINISH IN OTHER IMPORTANT POLITICAL CONSTITUENCIES, DESPITE HIS EFFORTS TO KEEP ALL ON BOARD. THIRD, HE FEARS THAT A FAILURE TO GAIN A HUSSEIN-ARAFAT UNDERSTANDING WILL SET US ALL BACK. SALEM CALLED FOR THE UNITED STATES TO TAKE A NEW INITIATIVE TO ADD SOME "OOMF" TO BRING THE NEGOTIATIONS TO A CONCLUSION SOON, PERHAPS THROUGH ANOTHER WASHINGTON SESSION WITH ISRAELI AND LEBANESE TEAMS. I PROMISED WE WOULD DO OUR BEST OVER NEXT WEEK'S FOUR-PLUS DAYS OF NEGOTIATIONS, AND WOULD REPORT HIS APPEAL TO WASHINGTON. END SUMMARY.

4. ACCOMPANIED BY KRECZKO, I MET WITH FONMIN SALEM FOR TWO HOURS THE MORNING OF APRIL 6, MAINLY TO CLARIFY THE LEBANESE STAND IN THE EVENT A PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE SURFACES (SEPTEL). SALEM WANTED TO TALK FURTHER.

5. WE REVIEWED YESTERDAY'S NEGOTIATIONS AT KHALDAH AND SOME SUGGESTIONS OF OURS FOR MOVING MATTERS FORWARD. SALEM IS CONVINCED THAT REMAINING SECURITY

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ISSUES CAN EASILY BE RESOLVED, AND BY THE TECHNICIANS. I SAID HE WAS MISTAKEN. WE HAD LEARNED A HARD LESSON A FEW WEEKS AGO WHEN ISRAELI NEGOTIATORS DISCOVERED THAT THEIR THEN-SOFTER APPROACH WAS STRONGLY CRITICIZED BY THE CABINET. I SAID SHARON WAS CONTINUING TO PLAY A MAJOR ROLE.

6. TURNING UNCHARACTERISTICALLY TENSE, SALEM THEN ASKED ME A LONG SERIES OF QUESTIONS CONCERNING SYRIAN ATTITUDES, THE STATUS OF THE HUSSEIN-ARAFAT DISCUSSIONS AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE, AND SOVIET INTENTIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND IN LEBANON SPECIFICALLY. HE WAS DEMONSTRATING BY THESE QUESTIONS HIS CONCERN THAT TIME WAS RUNNING OUT FOR A SOLUTION IN LEBANON. HE

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ASKED WHETHER SOVIET ADVISERS WERE PRESENT WITH SYRIAN FORCES IN LEBANON (I SAID WE HAD HEARD THE SAME STORIES, BUT I HAD NO CONFIRMATION.); WHETHER SA-5S HAD BEEN MOVED INTO LEBANON (I SAID NO); THE NUMBER OF SOVIET ADVISERS IN SYRIA; THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ANDROPOV'S RECENT STATEMENTS; SOVIET POLICY TOWARD LEBANON AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES; WHETHER THE SOVIETS WERE SUPPLYING THE REMAINING PLO FIGHTERS IN NORTHERN LEBANON; AND THE POTENTIAL SOVIET REACTION TO LEBANON'S CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH THE UNITED STATES. DRAWING ON DEPARTMENT'S GUIDANCE, I RESPONDED ALONG FAMILIAR LINES.

7. SALEM WAS MOST CONCERNED ABOUT WHAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT ENCOURAGE THE SYRIANS TO DO IN RESPONSE TO

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AN ISRAELI-LEBANESE AGREEMENT. ALTHOUGH THE SYRIANS HAVE BEEN POSITIVE AND FORTHCOMING IN THEIR DISCUSSIONS WITH GEMAYEL (IN NEW DELHI) AND WITH SALEM (IN LONDON), SALEM REMAINS SUSPICIOUS. SALEM SAID THAT HE HAD MET WITH FORMER PRESIDENT FRANJIAH ON SUNDAY. FRANJIAH REPORTED THAT ASSAD HAD TOLD FRANJIAH FOUR MONTHS AGO THAT SYRIA WOULD CLOSE ITS BORDER WITH LEBANON IF THERE WERE "ANY" AGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON. ON THE OTHER HAND, KHADDAM HAD TOLD HIM, SALEM, THAT THEY COULD WRAP UP A SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL AGREEMENT IN 30 MINUTES.

8. SALEM SAID THAT HE HAD CALLED IN THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR SOLDATOV IN PART TO REASSURE THE SOVIETS IN GENERAL TERMS THAT LEBANON WOULD NOT BECOME A BASE FOR HOSTILE ACTION AGAINST SYRIA.

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HE HAD TOLD SOLDATOV THAT SYRIA WAS LEBANON'S ONLY LAND BRIDGE TO THE ARAB WORLD AND THAT LEBANON INTENDED TO REMAIN PART OF THE ARAB WORLD. THEREFORE, WHILE LEBANON DEFINITELY SOUGHT THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES, IT WOULD CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH SYRIA. SALEM SAID THAT SOLDATOV HAD LIMITED HIS COMMENTS TO A REITERATION THAT SOVIET POLICY ENDORSED A SOVEREIGN AND INTEGRAL LEBANON AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES. IN RESPONSE TO MY INQUIRY, SALEM SAID THAT SOLDATOV'S STATEMENT DEFINITELY INCLUDED PLO FORCES. SALEM HAD MADE CLEAR THAT, WHILE LEBANON BELIEVED THE PALESTINIANS HAD A JUST CAUSE, LEBANON WOULD NEVER PERMIT ANY ARMED PLO IN LEBANON.

9. I ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE SYRIAN AND SOVIET ATTITUDES REMAINED AN OPEN QUESTION FOR US BUT I STRESSED MY VIEW THAT NEITHER LOGICALLY WOULD WANT TO GIVE ISRAEL AN EXCUSE TO REMAIN IN LEBANON. SALEM AGREED THAT THIS WOULD BE A POWERFUL ARGU-

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MENT WITH THE SYRIANS, BUT ASKED WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF LEBANON AND ISRAEL REACHED AN AGREEMENT AND SYRIA NONETHELESS REFUSED WITHDRAWAL--WOULD ISRAEL USE MILITARY ACTION TO FORCE SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL? I SAID THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD PROBABLY WAIT FOR OTHERS AND FOR INTERNATIONAL OPINION IN GENERAL TO FORCE SYRIAN AND AND PLO WITHDRAWAL; THEY WOULD IN THE MEANTIME SIT WHERE THEY WERE IN LEBANON, REGARDLESS OF THE ISRAELI-LEBANESE AGREEMENT.

10. SALEM THEN STRESSED THE URGENT NEED FOR A RAPID CONCLUSION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS DURING WHAT HE

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TERMED THE CRITICAL NEXT WEEKS AHEAD. HE REITERATED THAT THERE WERE VIRTUALLY NO SIGNIFICANT REMAINING SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES. WHEN I MENTIONED HADDAD, HE SAID THAT LEBANON WOULD FIND SOME FACE-SAVING SOLUTION FOR ISRAEL THAT WOULD ALLOW HADDAD TO REMAIN IN THE SOUTH IN A POSITION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR A TEMPORARY PERIOD AFTER WITHDRAWAL, BUT WITH A CUT-OFF DATE. HE RECOUNTED HIS RECENT DEBATES IN PARLIAMENT AND NOTED THAT NOT ONLY WERE THE LEFTIST MEMBERS BECOMING MORE VOCAL BUT THEY WERE BEGINNING TO GATHER SOME SUPPORT. SALEM SAID THAT EVEN FRANJIAH HAD AGREED IN THEIR SUNDAY MEETING THAT WHAT IS POSSIBLE NOW WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE IN MAY. HE IS CONSULTING REGULARLY WITH A WIDE VARIETY OF LEBANESE POLITICIANS TO SHORE UP THEIR BACKING OF THE GOVERNMENT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

11. SALEM THEN CAME TO THE REAL POINT. THE UNITED STATES, HE SAID, SHOULD GIVE THE NEGOTIATIONS SOME "OOMF". THE U.S. SHOULD TAKE A NEW INITIATIVE. HE WONDERED WHETHER ANOTHER WASHINGTON ROUND, WITH A DEFINITIVE OUTCOME, WAS NOT IN ORDER. ELSEWHERE IN OUR TALK, HE MENTIONED THAT WE WOULD IN ANY EVENT WANT TO CONSULT IN WASHINGTON IN CONNECTION WITH HIS PLANS TO ACCEPT AN HONORARY DEGREE FROM MARIETA COLLEGE ON ABOUT MAY 9.

12. I SAID I WOULD REPORT SALEM'S PROPOSALS TO WASHINGTON. I REMINDED SALEM THAT, WHATEVER THE U.S. MIGHT DO TO BRIDGE DIFFERENCES AND CONCLUDE UNDERSTANDINGS, THE ISRAELIS CONTINUED TO EMPHASIZE

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SECTION 03 OF 03 BEIRUT 03753

EXDIS

HE IMPORTANCE OF RUNNING SUCH UNDERSTANDINGS THROUGH THE DIRECT, FACE-TO-FACE ISRAEL-LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS. IN THIS CONTEXT, I RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF ACCELERATING THE PROCESS BY A SALEM-SHAMIR MEETING. SALEM AGAIN DID NOT RULE IT OUT, BUT HE SAID THAT LEBANON WOULD NEED TO BE CONVINCED THAT SUCH A MEETING WOULD BE VIRTUALLY THE LAST STEP NEEDED TO SEAL AN AGREEMENT AND WOULD NOT SIMPLY LEAD TO ESCALATED ISRAELI DEMANDS, SUCH AS FOR A GEMAYEL-BEGIN MEETING.

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13. AS THE MEETING CONCLUDED, I REMINDED SALEM AS I HAD THIS LAST WEEKEND THAT WE HAD TO THINK ABOUT RESUMING NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PLO. WHERE DID HE NOW BELIEVE THE PLO FIGHTERS WOULD GO FROM LEBANON? HE SAID THAT 3-4,000 MIGHT GO TO JORDAN,
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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AND THAT THE REMAINDER WOULD BE ACCEPTED IN IRAQ, ALGERIA, AND SOUTH YEMEN. HE REPEATED THAT KHADDAM HAD TOLD HIM THAT SYRIA WILL NOT ACCEPT A SINGLE FIGHTER. (COMMENT: I WOULD NOT ATTACH WEIGHT TO SALEM'S ANSWER. FROM HIS TONE OF VOICE, IT APPEARED TO BE MORE SPECULATION THAN THE RESULT OF ANY GOL/PLO DISCUSSION. END COMMENT)

14. SALEM ALSO ASKED WHETHER THE TIME WAS RIGHT TO SEEK AN EXPANSION OF THE MNF. I SAID IT WAS PREMATURE IN ANY EVENT. WE HAD TO KNOW FIRST WHETHER UNIFIL WAS GOING TO BE PRESERVED. IF THAT OCCURRED, IT MIGHT NOT BE NECESSARY TO EXPAND THE MNF MUCH BEYOND ITS PRESENT STRENGTH, CONSIDERING THE SPEED WITH WHICH THE LAF WAS GETTING ORGANIZED AND EQUIPPED. SALEM SAID HE WAS SURE FROM HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH CERTAIN EUROPEAN STATES THAT UNIFIL COULD BE EXPANDED TO AS MANY AS 12,000 MEN. I EXPRESSED SURPRISE.

15. COMMENT: I WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH WASHINGTON SHORTLY ABOUT SOME IDEAS TO SPEED UP NEGOTIATIONS TO A CONCLUSION. DILLON

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BEIRUT 03708

SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA, JCS J-5

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREL, FR, IS, LE, US, IT
SUBJECT: POSSIBLE "NEW IDEAS" ON LEBANESE SITUATION

1. [REDACTED]
2. FOLLOWING AN UNEVENTFUL MEETING OF MNF COORDINATING COMMITTEE MEETING AT POLITICAL LEVEL ON APRIL 5, FRENCH AMBASSADOR HENRY INFORMED US THAT FOREIGN MINISTER [REDACTED]

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CHEYSSON WOULD CHAIR A FRENCH NEAR EASTERN CHIEF OF MISSIONS' CONFERENCE IN BEIRUT APRIL 7-8, THE FIRST SUCH MEETING IN BEIRUT IN TEN YEARS. CHEYSSON WOULD ARRIVE EVENING OF APRIL 6 AND DEPART MID-DAY APRIL 8.

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THE MEETINGS WOULD TAKE PLACE IN B'ABDA AND YARZE, AND INCLUDE A SMALL SOCIAL FUNCTION TO WHICH ONLY FRENCH AND LEBANESE OFFICIALDOM WOULD BE INVITED. IN ADDITION, CHEYSSON WOULD GIVE A TWO-HOUR PRESS CONFERENCE THE MORNING OF APRIL 8.

3. HENRY SPECULATED THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF A RAPID, POSITIVE CONCLUSION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL CONSIDERATION MIGHT BE GIVEN TO ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES. HE POSTULATED THE POSSIBILITY OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LEBANON, AS OPPOSED TO THE CURRENTLY DOMINANT IDEA OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE MIDDLE EASTERN PROBLEM. THE CONCEPT OF A LEBANESE CONFERENCE, IN WHICH HE FORESAW THE POSSIBILITY OF SOVIET PARTICIPATION, OR AT LEAST OF PROXY SOVIET INVOLVEMENT THROUGH PARTICIPATION OF EASTERN BLOC COUNTRIES, SEEMED TO BE SOMETHING HENRY HAD DISCUSSED ELSEWHERE. HE COMMENTED, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT FOREIGN MINISTER SALIM WAS OPEN MINDED AND FLEXIBLE, SUGGESTING THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED THIS IDEA WITH SALIM. A LEBANESE OFFICER PARTICIPATING IN THE DISCUSSION ASKED IF CHEYSSON WOULD PROPOSE SUCH A CONFERENCE DURING HIS VISIT TO BEIRUT. HENRY DID NOT DISAVOW THIS POSSIBILITY, SAYING ONLY THAT THE RECENT EC 10 STATEMENT ON THE MIDDLE EAST GAVE CHEYSSON A POINT OF DEPARTURE FOR ADDRESSING THE LEBANESE AND MIDDLE EASTERN SITUATIONS. HENRY NOTED THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO THINK AHEAD, COMMENTING THAT HUSSEIN SEEMED UNLIKELY TO TAKE THE KIND OF DECISION THAT IT HAD BEEN HOPED HE WOULD TAKE.

[REDACTED]

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4. IN A SIMILAR VEIN, FOLLOWING A MEETING APRIL 4 WITH MARONITE CARDINAL KHURAYSH, HENRY TOLD REPORTERS THAT CHEYSSON WOULD COME TO BEIRUT "CARRYING NEW FRENCH IDEAS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE REVITALIZED EUROPEAN INITIATIVE...FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF STABILITY AND PEACE OVER ALL OF (LEBANON'S) TERRITORY." IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION ON WHETHER THE FRENCH HAD AN ALTERNATIVE IN CASE OF FAILURE OF U.S. EFFORTS, HENRY SAID THAT "ALL POSSIBLE AVENUES WERE BEING EXPLORED. THE U.S. HAS LIFTED THE VEIL ON A NUMBER OF OBSTACLES WHICH RAISE QUESTIONS."

5. COMMENT: IT IS POSSIBLE THAT HENRY, PERHAPS REFLECTING FRENCH DISSATISFACTION AT THE EXCLUSIVITY OF THE ROLE PLAYED BY THE UNITED STATES IN LEBANON AND

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REACTING TO THE RECENT GOL EXPRESSIONS OF FRUSTRATIONS AT THE PACE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, HAS FLOATED WITH THE LEBANESE THE IDEA OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LEBANON AS A LIKELY NEXT STEP IN THE EVENT IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO CONCLUDE THE CURRENT TRIPARTITE NEGOTIATIONS ON TERMS ACCEPTABLE TO LEBANON. AS DEPARTMENT IS AWARE, HENRY HAS A REPUTATION FOR SHOOTING FROM THE HIP, AND THE CONFERENCE IDEA MAY REFLECT NOTHING MORE THAN HIS OWN BRAINSTORMING. IF, HOWEVER, CHEYSSON SUGGESTS THIS POSSIBILITY IN HIS APRIL 8 PRESS CONFERENCE, IT COULD COMPLICATE THE NEGOTIATION SCENE.

6. ADDED COMMENT: DRAPER BELIEVES STRONGLY THAT SURFACING THIS CONCEPT OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE-- WITH THE APPEARANCE OF TACIT LEBANESE ACCEPTANCE--WOULD BE A DISASTER. THE ISRAELIS WOULD CALL OFF THE NEGOTIATIONS. DRAPER INTENDS TO SEE FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM IMMEDIATELY TO WARN HIM OF SUCH A COURSE. DILLON

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FROM DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, US, IS, XF

SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: DISCUSSION OF SECURITY

ARRANGEMENTS, MARCH 31 - KIRYAT SHEMONA.

1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY. TODAY'S (MARCH 31) NEGOTIATING SESSION

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IN KIRYAT SHEMONA WAS DEVOTED ALMOST ENTIRELY TO
DISCUSSION, IN COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE, OF SECURITY

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ARRANGEMENTS. THE FOUR HOURS OF TALKS IN THE PRESENCE OF HEADS OF DELEGATIONS PROVIDED AN ATMOSPHERE CONDUCTIVE TO PROGRESS ON THESE APPARENTLY STALEMATED QUESTIONS AND GENUINE PROGRESS WAS MADE. EACH SIDE REVIEWED ITS CURRENT CONCEPT FOR PROVIDING SECURITY WITHIN SOUTH LEBANON. AGREEMENT WAS REACHED FOLLOWING DETAILED DISCUSSION ON THE PRINCIPLE OF DIRECT CONTACT BETWEEN ISRAELI AND LEBANESE COMMANDERS ON EITHER SIDE OF THE BORDER, ON THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL BORDER CROSSINGS TO FACILITATE THESE CONTACTS AND THE MOVEMENT OF SECURITY (INTELLIGENCE) PERSONNEL, AND ON THE GENERAL CONCEPT OF EXPANDED SIZE AND MISSIONS FOR THE JOINT SUPERVISEAMS. DURING DISCUSSION OF THIS LATTER POINT THE ISRAELI DELEGATION AGREED THAT POLICE, MILITARY, AND PARA-MILITARY FUNCTIONS IN THE SECURITY REGION ARE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LEBANESE. THOUGH THE ISRAELIS WANT THEIR PERSONNEL ON THE JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS TO PARTICIPATE IN SPOT-CHECK SEARCHES OF SUSPECT VEHICLES AND BUILDINGS. A DEFINITE HANG-UP WITH RESPECT TO THE SUPERVISORY TEAMS REMAINS THE TYPE, NUMBER, AND PROVIDER OF THE VEHICLES FOR USE BY THE TEAMS. LEBANON PREFERS TO PROVIDE ALL NECESSARY TRANSPORTATION. ISRAEL IS REQUESTING APC'S, AND SUGGESTING COMMON PAINT SCHEME WITH A MILITARY COMMITTEE FLAG. THE SUBJECT WAS LEFT UNRESOLVED FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION AT THE NEXT MEETING. THE LATER PORTION OF THE MEETING REVIEWED THE FIRST FEW PARAGRAPHS OF THE LATEST COMMON DRAFT TEXT. DURING WHICH REMAINING BRACKETS WERE REMOVED FROM INTRODUCTORY CLAUSES AND TEXT PERTAINING TO GENERAL FORCE LIMITATIONS WITHIN THE

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SECURITY REGION. AGREEMENT COULD NOT BE REACHED. HOWEVER, DESPITE REPEATED ATTEMPTS BY THE U.S. DELEGATION TO BRIDGE DIFFERENCES, ON THE TEXT PERTAINING TO THE INTEGRATION OF THE LOCAL FORCE BRIGADE (HADDAD'S FORCES) AND THE CIVIL GUARD. THE ISRAELI AND LEBANESE CONCEPTS FOR THIS INTEGRATION (WHICH IS AGREED IN PRINCIPLE) REMAIN SUFFICIENTLY DIFFERENT. AS PERCEIVED BY THE OTHER SIDE, TO PRECLUDE AGREEMENT. ISRAEL SEEKS COMPLETE INTEGRATION OF THE BRIGADE INTO THE ARMY AS A WHOLE, SEPARATE FROM INTEGRATION OF THE CIVIL GUARD INTO A DIFFERENT STRUCTURE. THE LEBANESE STILL SEEK TO INTEGRATE BRIGADE PERSONNEL INTO THE ARMY OR REPEAT ANOTHER FORCE STRUCTURE ESTABLISHED IN THE AREA BY LEBANON. THEIR REASONING IS THAT NOT

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ALL BRIGADE MEMBERS QUALIFY FOR INTEGRATION INTO THE ARMY, AND THAT SOME WHO DO QUALIFY WILL PREFER TO JOIN A VILLAGE LEVEL MILITIA INSTEAD OR EVEN GET OUT OF THE MILITARY COMPLETELY. 1, THE SESSION PROVED THAT THERE IS STILL SOME FLEXIBILITY IN THE POSITIONS OF BOTH SIDES ON THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, AND THAT BOTH ARE WILLING TO TRY TO WORK OUT SOLUTIONS. THERE REMAINS MUCH WORK TO BE DONE, BUT TODAY'S POSITIVE STEPS ARE A GOOD SIGN. END SUMMARY.

3. AS A RESULT OF A U.S. INITIATIVE, THE PLENARY SESSION TODAY (MARCH 31) DEVOTED ALMOST FOUR HOURS TO A VERY PRODUCTIVE DISCUSSION OF THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR SOUTH LEBANON. ISRAELI DELEGATION CHAIRMAN KIMCHE TURNED THE CHAIR OVER TO THE MILITARY AND THE SESSION CONTINUED IN THE MANNER OF A COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE, CONCENTRATING ON THE PRINCIPAL DIFFERENCES IN UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. THE ENTIRE

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EXDIS -- SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MILITARY ADDRESSEES

DELEGATION FOR EACH SIDE REMAINED THROUGHOUT THE SESSION, EXCEPT FOR A SMALL GROUP (INCLUDING AMBASSADOR FATTAL) WHICH LEFT TO DISCUSS THE DURATION OF THE AGREEMENT (SEPTTEL).

4. GENERALS HAMDAN AND EINAN BEGAN THE SESSION BY REVIEWING THEIR RESPECTIVE CONCEPTS FOR THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN SOUTH LEBANON, REPEATING THEIR STATEMENTS OF MARCH 25. HAMDAN STRESSED THE REQUIREMENTS FOR RETENTION OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY THROUGH TOTAL

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RESPONSIBILITY FOR SECURITY OF THE REGION WITH LEBANESE IN COMMAND. HE NOTED THAT LEBANON AGREED THAT LIAISON AND COORDINATION BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON IS NEEDED, BUT THAT LEBANON CANNOT ACCEPT SUBORDINATION. HADDAD'S FORCES WILL BE INTEGRATED INTO THE LEBANESE ARMY AND THE MILITIA WILL BE INCORPORATED INTO SOME MILITARY STRUCTURE. HE NOTED THAT THE MILITARY COMMITTEE WILL HAVE A LARGE ROLE, ESPECIALLY IN ESTABLISHING PROCEDURES FOR THE JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS, DIRECT CONTACT BETWEEN COMMANDERS AND STAFFS, AND OTHER ITEMS.

5. EINAN THEN DESCRIBED FOCUSABLE CONCEPTS THAT COULD SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF SECURITY IN THIS REGION:

-- PARTIAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FOLLOWED BY LONG TERM STAY IN LEBANON. EINAN NOTED THAT THIS CONCEPT WAS NOT GOOD FOR EITHER SIDE.

-- FIVE ISRAELI STATIONS IN LEBANON UNTIL THE LAF

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IS FULLY CAPABLE OF PROVIDING SECURITY FOR THE REGION BY ITSELF OR UNTIL SOME OTHER AGREEMENT (COMMENT: UNDERSTOOD TO MEAN PEACE TREATY) IS REACHED.

- RAPID ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM ALL OF LEBANON, COUPLED WITH ARRANGEMENTS FOR ISRAEL TO MAINTAIN ITS INFLUENCE IN THE SECURITY REGION THROUGH DIRECT CONTACTS, LIAISON OFFICERS, AND OTHER MOVEMENTS.

- TOTAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON WITHOUT ANY ISRAELI CONTACTS IN THE AREA, RELYING TOTALLY ON LEBANON TO PREVENT REORGANIZATION OF HOSTILE PALESTINIAN ORGANIZATIONS. THIS CONCEPT IS TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO ISRAEL. HE THEN REITERATED WITHOUT ANY VARIATION

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THE DETAILS OF THE THIRD CONCEPT, ABOVE. THAT HE HAD PRESENTED ON MARCH 25.

6. KIMCHE STATED AT THIS POINT THAT ISRAEL AGREES WITH THE STATEMENTS OF GEN. HAMDAN THAT THE SECURITY REGION WILL BE UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE LEBANESE; THAT ALL ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE UNDER THE UMBRELLA OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY; THAT THE FORCES OF HADDAD WILL BE INTEGRATED, THOUGH ISRAEL INCLUDES SA'D HADDAD HIMSELF WHOM ISRAEL CONSIDERS A LEBANESE OFFICER; AND THAT THERE WILL BE A MILITARY COMMITTEE WITH A WIDE SCOPE OF TASKS. KIMCHE STRESSED THAT CONTACT BETWEEN THE FORCES IN THE FIELD MUST BE DIRECT. AS LONG AS EACH REQUEST FOR CONTACT DID NOT HAVE TO GO THROUGH THE MILITARY COMMITTEE, ISRAEL CAN AGREE TO THIS. FATTAL NOTED THAT LEBANON MUST ACHIEVE AN AGREEMENT WHICH WILL PERMIT THEM TO OBTAIN SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. IF SYRIA DEEMS THE ISRAELI-LEBANESE AGREEMENT UNACCEPTABLE, IT WILL NOT WITHDRAW. IF SYRIA DOES NOT WITHDRAW, ISRAEL WILL NOT WITHDRAW. THIS WOULD PUT LEBANON IN TSITION OF HAVING SIGNED AN AGREEMENT THAT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO IMPLEMENT.

7. DISCUSSION NEXT FOCUSED ON THE QUESTION OF DIRECT CONTACT BETWEEN COMMANDERS AND STAFFS OF UNITS ALONG THE BORDER. EINAN SAID THAT IF THE LEBANESE AGREED THAT THE MILITARY COMMITTEE WILL ALLOW DIRECT CONTACT BETWEEN COMMANDERS WHENEVER THEY HAVE PROBLEMS TO RESOLVE, WITHOUT NEED TO OBTAIN PRIOR APPROVAL BY THE MILITARY COMMITTEE, THEN ISRAEL CAN AGREE. HAMDAN NOTED THAT HE ACCEPTED THE PRINCIPLE OF THESE CONTACTS.

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EXDIS -- SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MILITARY ADDRESSEES

HE SAID THE MILITARY COMMITTEE COULD ESTABLISH THE
CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH DIRECT CONTACTS COULD

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OCCUR WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL. AMBASSADOR DRAPER ASKED IF THIS MEANT BOTH SIDES AGREED. HAMDAN THEN REMARKED THAT THE COMMON DRAFT TEXT CONTAINED THE NECESSARY LANGUAGE TO COVER THIS CONTACT. HE FURTHER PROPOSED WORDING TO BE INCLUDED IN AGREED MINUTES THAT SPECIFIES THE TYPE OF CONTACTS (DIRECT, INCLUDING FACE-TO-FACE MEETINGS) TO WHICH LEBANON

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AGREES. GEN. COOLEY REMINDED BOTH SIDES THAT THIS LANGUAGE MEANT ALL COMMANDERS. AFTER CLARIFYING HOW THE LEBANESE PROPOSED HANDLING THIS SUBJECT, EINAN AGREED TO THIS POINT.

8. EINAN NEXT BROUGHT UP THE ISRAELI REQUIREMENTS FOR "GATES" IN THE BORDER BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, IN ADDITION TO THE OFFICIAL CROSSING POINTS, THROUGH WHICH ISRAELI MILITARY AND SECURITY PERSONNEL COULD MOVE TO FACILITATE THE AGREED-UPON CONTACTS. HE ASKED THE U.S. TO RESTATE ITS SUMMARY FROM MARCH 25. AMBASSADOR DRAPER SAID THAT THE U.S. POSITION HAD BEEN THAT BODES NEEDED TO PREPARE FOR CONTINGENCIES IN THE BORDER AREA AND WORK OUT PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS TO INCLUDE ADDITIONAL CROSSING POINTS. GEN. COOLEY ADDED THAT, WITH DIRECT CONTACTS BETWEEN COMMANDERS, IT MADE NO SENSE TO FORCE THEM TO PASS THROUGH OFFICIAL CROSSING POINTS, 30 TO 50 KILOMETERS OUT OF THEIR WAY, TO MEET WITH SOMEONE LOCATED FIVE KMS AWAY. ARRANGEMENTS TO ALLOW FOR THIS CROSSING WOULD MAKE THESE CONTACTS MORE EFFECTIVE. GEN. HAMDAN STATED THAT HE BELIEVED THAT AGREEMENT TO THE DIRECT CONTACTS INCLUDED AGREEMENT TO THE ADDITIONAL CROSSING POINTS AND THAT THESE COULD BE WORKED OUT WITHOUT PROBLEMS FOR MILITARY PERSONNEL. KIMCHE SUGGESTED ADDING A SENTENCE TO THE ANNEX TO THE EFFECT THAT "SPECIAL GATES WILL BE OPENED ALONG THE BORDER IN ORDER TO FACILITATE DIRECT CONTACTS." HAMDAN SAID THIS LANGUAGE WOULD HAVE TO BE IN THE AGREED MINUTES, NOT THE ANNEX. EINAN AGREED TO THIS.

9. EINAN TURNED NEXT TO THE JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS. (HE NOTED THAT WORD PATROL SEEMED UNACCEPTABLE TO THE LEBANESE) IN ORDER TO CLARIFY THE ISRAELI

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CONCEPT. ISRAEL ENVISIONS A MAXIMUM OF TEN TEAMS, WITH TWO APC'S AND ABOUT TEN PERSONNEL FROM EACH COUNTRY (2-4 OFFICERS AND SOME SOLDIERS FOR SECURITY) IN EVERY TEAM. THESE TEAMS WILL BE UNDER LEBANESE CONTROL. THEIR MISSION WILL BE TO SUPERVISE THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, TO INCLUDE STOPPING AND SEARCHING VEHICLES AND SEARCHING BUILDINGS. THEY ARE NOT GOING TO FIGHT, TO ATTACK OR TO DESTROY NEW TERRORIST BASES, BUT WILL BE CAPABLE OF DEFENDING THEMSELVES. HE PROPOSED THAT, SINCE ISRAELI APC'S IN LEBANON ARE A PROBLEM FOR LEBANON, BOTH SIDES PAINT THEIR APC'S THE SAME COLOR AND FLY A MILITARY COMMITTEE FLAG. EACH TEAM WOULD HAVE AN AREA TO CHECK, INVESTIGATE ANY INCIDENTS OR VIOLATIONS, AND EXAMINE WAYS THESE INCIDENTS OR VIOLATIONS COULD BE PREVENTED FROM REOCCURRING.

10MDAN REPLIED THAT THESE TEAMS IN ISRAELI VEHICLES WOULD CAUSE LEBANON PROBLEMS AND WOULD BE SEEN AS A VIOLATION OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY. HE SUGGESTED THE TEAMS TRAVEL IN LEBANESE APC'S OR VEHICLES, WITH LEBANESE ARMY SECURITY AS NECESSARY. LEBANON WANTS ISRAELI OFFICERS TO COME ONLY TO SUPERVISE THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.

11 AMBASSADOR DRAPER SEIZED ON SOME OF THE CONCEPTS PRESENTED TO STRESS THE MAKINGS OF AN UNDERSTANDING ON THIS SUBJECT. THE ISRAELI COMMENT ON A MAXIMUM NUMBER OF TEAMS PROVIDED A CLEAR OPPORTUNITY FOR THE MILITARY COMMITTEE TO ESTABLISH PROCEDURES TO GOVERN THE NUMBER OF TEAMS, HOW MANY PEOPLE FOR EACH TEAM,

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EXDIS -- SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MILITARY ADDRESSEES

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HE ROUTES OR AREAS TO BE COVERED, AND THE SPECIFIC
TYPE OF VEHICLES TO BE USED. ESPECIALLY ENCOURAGING
WAS THE ISRAELI PHRASE "UP TO A MAXIMUM OF," AS APPLIED
TO BOTH THE TEAMS AND THEIR COMPOSITION. HE ALSO NOTED
THAT SECURITY FOR THE TEAMS WOULD BE ENHANCED IF ALL
VEHICLES USED WERE IN THE COLORS OF THE LAF, THUS NOT
ATTRACTING SPECIAL ATTENTION.

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12. IT IS NOT THE ISRAELI WAY TO RELY ON ANYONE ELSE
TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR ISRAELIS, STRESSED BOTH
KIMCHE AND EINAN. EINAN NOTED THIS WAS ESPECIALLY
TRUE IN SOUTH LEBANON AND THAT ISRAEL COULD NOT
ALLOW ITS OFFICERS TO GO WITHOUT ISRAELI SECURITY.

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KIMCHE NOTED THAT THESE ADDITIONAL SOLDIERS WERE ONLY FOR SECURITY OF THE OFFICERS AND SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AN INFRINGEMENT ON LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY.

13. AMBASSADOR DRAPER ENCOURAGED THE DISCUSSION BY NOTING THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT SINGLE POINT MADE SO FAR WAS THAT THE ISRAELI MEMBERS OF THE TEAMS WOULD NOT TAKE ANY POLICE, MILITARY, OR PARA-MILITARY ACTION AGAINST ANYONE IN LEBANON. STATING THAT THAT WAS THE SPIRIT, EINAN SAID IT WAS NOT COMPLETELY CORRECT. THE TEAMS WOULD HAVE MISSIONS TO CONDUCT, SUCH AS STOPPING CARS TO CHECK FOR TERRORISTS. AMBASSADOR DRAPER QUERIED IF, UNDER THIS PROPOSAL, THE JOINT TEAM WOULD STOP A VEHICLE, BUT THE LEBANESE WOULD DO THE SEARCH WHILE THE ISRAELIS WATCHED. KIMCHE INTERJECTED THAT THE LEBANESE WOULD ARREST, BUT BOTH WOULD SEARCH. HIS COMMENT WAS REINFORCED BY EINAN. THE MISSION OF THE TEAMS, HAMDAN SAID, IS AS IT IS IN THE COMMON DRAFT TEXT--CONDUCT REGULAR VERIFICATIONS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. THE TEAMS ARE SUPERVISORY; THE WORK THEY SUPERVISE IS DONE BY LEBANESE ELEMENTS IN THE AREA, NOT BY THE SUPERVISORY TEAMS. AT THIS POINT EINAN TRIED TO INJECT THAT HAMDAN WAS REFERRING TO AN OLD CONCEPT--THAT WHICH INCLUDED THE FIVE STATIONS--AND THAT IF THE LEBANESE WANTED TO GO BACK, THAT WAS FINE WITH THE ISRAELI SIDE. HOW CAN THEY BE SUPERVISORY TEAMS WITHOUT STOPPING VEHICLES AND

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CHECKING, HE ASKED.

14. TRYING TO MOVE AHEAD, KIMCHE COMMENTED THAT BOTH SIDES WANTED THE SAME END, THE QUESTION IS SIMPLY HOW TO ACHIEVE IT. PRACTICALLY, IF THE TEAMS SEE SOMETHING SUSPICIOUS, IT WOULD BE FOLLY FOR THEM NOT TO CHECK IT OUT. THERE WILL NOT ALWAYS BE A LEBANESE PLATOON WITH THE TEAM. NOR A LEBANESE UNIT IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE TO REACT. A VIOLATION OF SOVEREIGNTY WOULD EXIST ONLY IF THE ISRAELIS WERE TO ARREST SUSPECTS, WHICH THEY HAVE AGREED TO LEAVE TO THE LEBANESE. HAMDAN STRESSED HIS BELIEF THAT THE TEAMS SHOULD NOT ACTIVELY CHECK VEHICLES AND BUILDINGS. THEY SHOULD SIMPLY CHECK THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, NOT INTERVENE. KIMCHE AGREED ON THE BASIC MISSION, BUT STATED THAT DID NOT PRECLUDE THE ISRAELI PROPOSAL.

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HAMDAN FINALLY SAID THAT, AS LONG AS THE TWO SIDES AGREED THAT THE ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN BY LEBANESE, THE PRINCIPLE OF EXCEPTIONAL ACTION (INTERVENTION) BY THE TEAMS COULD BE ACCEPTED WHEN SOMETHING ILLEGAL IS OBSERVED. THE DISCUSSION SHOWED A CLEAR NARROWING OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES, AS SUMMARIZED BY AMBASSADOR DRAPER.

-- THE BRIGADES IN THE SECURITY REGION WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SECURITY OF THE AREA AS THEIR PRINCIPAL TASK. LEBANON IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAINTAINING SECURITY.

-- THE SUPERVISORY TEAMS WILL HAVE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND A LISTING OF VARIOUS MISSIONS INCLUDING THOSE ALREADY DISCUSSED. OTHERS CAN ALSO BE WORKED OUT.

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EXDIS -- SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MILITARY ADDRESSEES

14. ALL OF THESE MISSIONS WILL BE WITHIN THE PRECEPT THAT ARRESTS ARE TO BE ACCOMPLISHED BY LEBANON IN ACCORDANCE WITH LEBANESE LAWS, NOT BY UNILATERAL ISRAELI ACTION.

15. THE AFTERNOON BEGAN WITH DETAILED DISCUSSION OF PROVIDING VEHICLES FOR THE JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS. AMBASSADOR DRAPER REITERATED THAT, FOR SECURITY REASONS, IT WOULD BE BEST FOR ALL VEHICLES

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TO BE PAINTED, AT LEAST, AS LEBANESE ARMY VEHICLES. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM KIMCHE, HAMDAN REPLIED THAT THE LEBANESE WOULD GLADLY PROVIDE TRANSPORT TO AND FROM ISRAEL FOR THE SUPERVISORY TEAM MEMBERS. HE ALSO STATED THAT LEBANON WAS WILLING TO PROVIDE ALL NECESSARY VEHICLES, INCLUDING HELICOPTERS, FOR THE TEAMS TO USE. FOLLOWING LENGTHY DISCUSSION, NO AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON THIS QUESTION. DISCUSSION WILL CONTINUE AT THE NEXT MEETING.

16. THE LATEST VERSION OF THE COMMON DRAFT TEXT ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WAS THEN TABLED FOR DETAILED REVIEW, TO ELIMINATE REMAINING BRACKETS AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE. THE REVIEWED, WITH FREQUENT SUGGESTIONS AND TEXT RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE U.S. TEAM, TO CLEAR ALL BRACKETED LANGUAGE FROM THE INITIAL INTRODUCTORY PARAGRAPH OF THE ANNEX AND THE CHAPEAU AND FIRST THREE SUBPARAGRAPHS OF THE SECOND PARAGRAPH, DEALING WITH SPECIFIC SECURITY ARRANGMENTS.

17. THE TWO SIDES WERE UNABLE, HOWEVER, TO AGREE TO LANGUAGE ON THE INTEGRATION OF EXISTING LOCAL FORCES (HADDAD'S BRIGADE) AND THE CIVIL GUARD INTO THE LEBANESE FORCE STRUCTURE. THE LEBANESE SIDE ACCEPTED,

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ALMOST COMPLETELY, THE ISRAELI-PROPOSED LANGUAGE ON THIS SUBJECT, COMBINING IT WITH THEIR OWN PROPOSED TEXT. THE LEBANESE DID NOT ACCEPT THE ISRAELI PROPOSAL THAT ELEMENTS OF THE BRIGADE STATIONED IN THE NORTHERN PORTION OF THE SECURITY REGION COULD MOVE INTO THE SOUTHERN PORTION ONLY FOLLOWING COORDINATION WITHIN THE MILITARY COMMITTEE. COL. RUHAYYIM ARGUED THAT A LEBANESE COMMANDER REQUESTING ADDITIONAL HELP (FORCES) FROM THE LEBANESE ARMY SHOULD NOT BE REQUIRED TO COORDINATE SUCH A MOVEMENT WITH THE MILITARY COMMITTEE.

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TO REMOVE EINAN'S CONCERN THAT LEBANON MIGHT USE THIS CLAUSE TO MOVE A DIFFERENT COMMANDER INTO THE REGION ALONG THE BORDER, HAMDAN ACCEPTED THAT THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE COMMANDER WOULD COMMAND ANY UNITS MOVED IN THIS MANNER. GEN. COOLEY URGED THE TWO SIDES NOT TO PRODUCE AN AGREEMENT WHICH WILL BOG SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS DOWN AND OVERLY RESTRICT THE TACTICAL FLEXIBILITY OF THE LEBANESE COMMANDER. HE NOTED THE ELIMINATION OF BUREAUCRATIC RESTRICTIONS RELATING TO DIRECT CONTACT BETWEEN COMMANDERS AND STATED THAT REQUIRING IT HERE WOULD UNNECESSARILY COMPLICATE SECURITY ACTIVITY. OTHER CHECKS ALREADY ESTABLISHED WILL TAKE CARE OF ANY PROBLEMS IN THIS AREA. THE ISRAELIS DID NOT ACCEPT THIS ARGUMENT AND NOTED THAT THE PHRASE SHOULD BE BRACKETED.

18. LT. COL. ZINGER THEN RAISED ISRAELI CONCERNS WITH THE SPECIFIC LANGUAGE INTEGRATION OF THE LOCAL FORCE BRIGADE AND THE CIVIL GUARD. HE REVIEWED THE ISRAELI CONCEPT OF FULL INTEGRATION OF HADDAD'S BRIGADE IN ITS ENTIRETY INTO THE LEBANESE ARMY, ACCOMPANIED BY INTEGRATION INTO A LEGAL LEBANESE STATUS OF THE CIVIL GUARD. THE PROPOSED LEBANESE TEXT WOULD ALLOW THE DIFFUSION OF THESE FORCES INTO OTHER FORCE ELEMENTS. HAMDAN COMMENTED THAT IF THE ISRAELIS WOULD GIVE HIM THE DETAILS ON THE HADDAD FORCES HE HAD REQUESTED EARLIER HE COULD PROVIDE ISRAEL A FINAL ANSWER ON HOW THEY WILL BE INTEGRATED. (COMMENT: EINAN TOLD COOLEY PRIVATELY AFTER THE MEETING THAT HIS SUPERIORS HAD REFUSED HIS REQUEST TO PROVIDE DETAILS ON THE HADDAD FORCES

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EXDIS -- SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MILITARY ADDRESSEES

AS IT WAS TOO SENSITIVE. END COMMENT.) HE REITERATED
THAT FORMER LEBANESE ARMY MEMBERS WOULD BE ACCEPTED
INTO THE ARMY. MILITIA MEMBERS WHO ARE QUALIFIED
MAY JOIN THE ARMY IN THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE.
THOSE MILITIA MEMBERS WHO ARE NOT QUALIFIED FOR ARMY

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SERVICE WILL BE INTEGRATED INTO THE ANSAR (THE
LEGAL LEBANESE VILLAGE MILITIA). PERSONS WITH
CRIMINAL RECORDS WILL NOT BE INTEGRATED. DESPITE
REPEATED LEBANESE DENIALS OF ANY SUCH INTENTIONS,
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AND U.S. PROBING FOR POSSIBLE ADDITIONAL CLARIFYING
TEXT FOR INCLUSION IN THE AGREED MINUTES, NO PROGRESS
WAS MADE. THIS SUBJECT WILL BE DISCUSSED AGAIN AT
THE NEXT MEETING.

19. COMMENT: THE PROGRESS MADE IN THIS SESSION WAS
THE RESULT OF GROUND WORK LAID BY DRAPER AND THE
U.S. TEAM WITH KIMCHE AND FATTAL WHEREBY THE HEADS
OF DELEGATION COULD HEAR AND COMMENT ON THE MILITARY
POSITIONS STATED BY THEIR REPRESENTATIVES AND, WHERE
POSSIBLE, BREAK THE IMPASSES WHICH HAD DEVELOPED. IT
WAS ESPECIALLY USEFUL FOR KIMCHE TO HEAR THE LEBANESE
STATIR POSITIONS AND CONCERNS UNFILTERED BY THE
ISRAELI MILITARY. THIS PROVED TO BE EFFECTIVE.
KIMCHE APPEARED TO BE MORE SYMPATHETIC TO LEBANESE
CONCERNS THAN HE HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY. THIS ALSO
ENABLED DRAPER, COOLEY AND DAVIES TO TAKE THE LEAD IN
EXPLAINING AND CLARIFYING POINTS DIRECTLY TO THE
HEADS OF DELEGATIONS, WHICH WAS ESPECIALLY EFFECTIVE
ON THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE AND HOW IT
WOULD HANDLE THE ISSUES OF DIRECT CONTACT, CROSSING
POINTS, AND SECURITY AND FUNCTIONING OF THE
SUPERVISORY TEAMS AND ON ELIMINATING MUCH OF THE
BRACKETED LANGUAGE FROM THE COMMON DRAFT TEXT.
ISRAELI MILITARY RHETORIC WAS LESS STRIDENT, PRODUCING
AN ATMOSPHERE AT THIS SESSION WHICH WAS MUCH MORE
CONDUCTIVE TO REACHING UNDERSTANDINGS. WHILE MUCH
STILL NEEDS TO BE DONE, THIS PRODUCTIVE SESSION
LAID THE FOUNDATION FOR HOPEFULLY POSITIVE SESSIONS
NEXT WEEK. END COMMENT.
DILLON

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DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, US, IS, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: MEETINGS WITH SALAM,
AL-WAZZAN AND AL-ASSAD, MARCH 29

1. [REDACTED]

2. IN ADDITION TO MY TALK WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL (SEPTTEL), I HAD A BREAKFAST MEETING WITH SA'IB SALAM, AND, ACCOMPANIED BY POLOFF CROCKER, CALLED ON PRIME MINISTER AL-WAZZAN AND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY PRESIDENT KAMAL AL-ASSAD. THE MESSAGE FROM THE TWO SUNNI LEADERS WAS SIMILAR: THERE CAN BE NO FURTHER LEBANESE CONCESSIONS, PARTICULARLY ON SA'D

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HADDAD. THEY ARE DEEPLY FRUSTRATED OVER THE CONTINUING IMPASSE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND ARE CONSIDERING CALLING FOR A HALT TO THE PROCESS. I ARGUED STRONGLY AGAINST THIS COURSE OF ACTION AND URGED PATIENCE AS WE CONTINUE OUR EFFORTS. WE MAY AVOID DRASTIC ACTION ON THE PART OF THE LEBANESE FOR A WHILE LONGER, BUT IT IS CLEAR THAT FOR SOME, THE BREAKING POINT IS NEAR.

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3. SA'IB SALAM EXPRESSED VISIBLE ANGER OVER THE CURRENT IMPASSE AND WHAT HE CONSIDERS BAD-FAITH BARGAINING ON THE PART OF THE ISRAELIS. HE WAS, HE SAID, CONSIDERING A SPEECH CALLING ON THE GOVERNMENT TO PULL OUT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS NOW. (HE HAS ALREADY MADE ONE STATEMENT--MARCH 28--SAYING THAT LEBABON SHOULD BREAK OFF TALKS IF THE ISRAELIS PERSIST IN CREATING OBSTACLES.) REFERRING TO A DISCUSSION OVER THE WEEKEND IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ON THE NEGOTIATIONS, SALAM SAID THAT A NUMBER OF DEPUTIES HAD BEEN CRITICAL OF THE GOVERNMENT'S CONTINUING EFFORTS. THIS WAS ONE INDICATION, HE MAINTAINED, THAT THE INTERNAL CONSENSUS IN LEBANON IS STARTING TO DETERIORATE AS THE ISRAELIS MOVE FROM ONE PRETEXT TO ANOTHER.

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4. AL-WAZZAN WAS MORE LOW-KEY THAN SALAM, BUT ALSO CLEARLY UPSET. AS HE HAD DONE IN OUR MEETING LAST WEEK, AL WAZZAN REITERATED THAT LEBANON CAN MAKE NO FURTHER CONCESSIONS. LIKE SALAM, HE VIEWS THE ISRAELI INSISTENCE ON SA'D HADDAD AS A PRETEXT: IF THE LEBANESE CONCEDE THIS POINT, THERE WILL BE OTHER DEMANDS. AL-WAZZAN ALSO REFERRED TO RUMBLINGS IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AGAINST THE NEGOTIATIONS

[REDACTED]

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AS DEPUTIES URGED VARIOUS ALTERNATIVES: BREAKING OFF TALKS WITH THE ISRAELIS, GOING TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THE ARAB LEAGUE OR THE SOVIETS, OR EVEN JOINING WITH THE SYRIANS AND THE PLO IN ARMED RESISTANCE AGAINST THE IDF. HE HAD NOT LOST ALL HOPE, AL-WAZZAN SAID, BUT WAS SEEING INCREASINGLY LITTLE TO BASE HOPE ON. HE REPEATEDLY STRESSED THAT LEBANON COULD MAKE NO CONCESSIONS ON HADDAD OR A RESIDUAL ISRAELI MILITARY PRESENCE. AL-WAZZAN CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT A FIRM AND FINAL POSITION FROM THE U.S. WAS ESSENTIAL. IF IT WAS NOT FORTHCOMING, LEBANON WOULD BE FORCED TO SEEK OTHER ALTERNATIVES.

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5. KAMAL AL-ASSAD WAS LESS EMOTIONAL (AND LESS LIKELY TO PRESS FOR BREAKING OFF NEGOTIATIONS OR MOVING TO OTHER ALTERNATIVES), BUT MADE MANY OF THE SAME POINTS AS SALAM AND AL-WAZZAN: ISRAELI INSISTENCE ON HADDAD IS A PRETEXT, THERE IS A MOUNTING SENTIMENT AMONG PARLIAMENTARY DEPUTIES THAT NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE BROKEN OFF, AND THAT IT IS UP TO THE U.S. TO DO SOMETHING. AL-ASSAD URGED THAT THE U.S. MOVE FROM PERSUASION TO PRESSURE IN DEALING WITH ISRAEL IN ORDER TO AVOID A U.S. FAILURE IN LEBANON FOR WHICH WE WOULD PAY THROUGHOUT THE MIDDLE EAST. HE STRESSED, HOWEVER, THAT HE BELIEVES THE

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NEGOTIATIONS MUST CONTINUE SINCE THEY ARE THE ONLY
FORUM FOR AN EFFECTIVE U.S. ROLE WITH THE ISRAELIS.

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6. COMMENT: IN THESE MEETINGS, I EXPRESSED OUR
UNDERSTANDING OF THE LEBANESE POSITION, COUNSELED
PATIENCE AND URGED AGAINST ANY PRECIPITOUS MOVES TO

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EXDIS

FROM HABIB

BREAK OFF THE TALKS. WHILE THERE ARE CLEARLY STILL
COMPLICATIONS AND DIFFICULTIES, I SAID WE MUST ALL
KEEP WORKING. I AVOIDED A DIRECT REPLY TO QUESTIONS
ON WHAT THE U.S. WILL DO IF THIS IMPASSE CONTINUES.

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DOC NUMBER: 83JERUSA01121

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WHILE WE MAY HAVE SOME TIME LEFT BEFORE FRUSTRATIONS
HERE REACH A CRISIS POINT, IT IS CLEAR THAT WE WILL
HAVE TO COME UP WITH SOME ANSWERS SOON. COVEY

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MILITARY ADDEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, US, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: MEETING WITH DEFMIN

ARENS, MARCH 28: MARINE/IDF LIAISON

1. [REDACTED]
2. SUMMARY. DEFENSE MINISTER ARENS REMAINS DIS-
SATISFIED WITH THE LIAISON ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WERE
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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WORKED OUT AT THE MARCH 24 MEETING BETWEEN COL. MEAD
AND GEN. LIFKIN. IN ARENS' VIEW, THEY DO NOT PROVIDE
100 PERCENT ASSURANCES AGAINST AN INCIDENT BETWEEN
THE MARINES AND THE IDF. ARENS MADE THREE SPECIFIC
REQUESTS FOR IMMEDIATE IMPROVEMENT IN THE LIAISON
ARRANGEMENTS: (1) DAILY (AS OPPOSED TO WEEKLY)
NOTIFICATION OF THE MARINE PATROL ROUTES; (2) DIRECT
COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE MARINE AND IDF HEADQUARTERS;
(3) REGULAR, FACE-TO-FACE MEETINGS BETWEEN MEAD AND

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LIFKIN. FOR THE LONGER TERM, ARENS AGAIN SUGGESTED THAT DETAILED MAPS BE EXCHANGED WHICH INDICATE RESPECTIVE AREAS OF OPERATION.

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3. I EXPLAINED TO ARENS THAT COL. MEAD WAS SATISFIED THAT THE NEW LIAISON ARRANGEMENTS WERE COMPLETELY ADEQUATE TO PREVENT INCIDENTS. WITH RESPECT TO ARENS' SUGGESTIONS, I SAID THAT I PRESUMED THERE WOULD BE NO OBJECTION TO DAILY NOTIFICATIONS AND THAT I SUPPORTED DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS BUT BELIEVED THEY ALREADY EXIST. WITH RESPECT TO ARENS' SUGGESTIONS FOR REGULAR MEETINGS BETWEEN MEAD AND LIFKIN AND FOR AN EXCHANGE OF MAPS, I SAID THAT THEY WERE BEYOND WHAT WAS NECESSARY TO PREVENT INCIDENTS AND RAISED UNACCEPTABLE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS. I URGED ARENS NOT TO PRESS EITHER OF THESE SUGGESTIONS AT THIS TIME BUT INSTEAD WAIT TO SEE HOW THE CURRENT ARRANGEMENTS WORKED OUT. END SUMMARY.

--

4. I MET WITH DEFENSE MINISTER ARENS FOR ONE AND ONE-HALF HOURS MARCH 28. ARENS WAS JOINED BY CHIEF OF STAFF EITAN AND GENERALS LEVY, DRORY, EINAN, BEN-TOV AND LIFKIN. DCM FLATEN, DATT AND KRECZKO ACCOMPANIED ME. THE MAIN TOPICS OF DIS-

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CUSSION WERE THE LEBANESE NEGOTIATIONS (SEPTTEL) AND MARINE/IDF LIAISON.

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5. ARENS OPENED OUR DISCUSSION OF THE LIAISON ARRANGEMENTS BY SAYING THAT HE WAS NOT VERY HAPPY WITH THE MARCH 24 MEETING BETWEEN COL. MEAD AND GEN. LIFKIN, ALTHOUGH HE SAID THAT THE NEW LIAISON ARRANGEMENTS WERE marginally BETTER. HE SAID HE WAS DISAPPOINTED THAT THE MEETING HAD OCCURRED IN THE LEBANESE LIAISON OFFICE AS OPPOSED TO IDF OR MARINE HEADQUARTERS. I INTERRUPTED TO SAY THAT THIS HAD BEEN AGREED BY ARENS AND ME IN OUR PREVIOUS MEETING. ARENS ADDED THAT THEY WERE DISAPPOINTED THAT COL. MEAD WAS ACCOMPANIED BY A "WHOLE RETINUE" FROM EMBASSY BEIRUT. I INTERRUPTED AGAIN TO SAY THAT MEAD HAD BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY ONLY ONE EMBASSY OFFICER, DCM PUGH. ARENS THEN SAID THAT THE ONLY THING THAT HAD BEEN ACCOMPLISHED AT THE MEETING WAS THAT MEAD WOULD INFORM LIFKIN ONCE A WEEK REGARDING MARINE MOVEMENTS.

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6. I SAID IT WAS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT THE MEETING WAS MUCH MORE PRODUCTIVE. COL. MEAD HAD REPORTED THAT IT WAS A PROFESSIONAL MEETING AND THAT THE MOOD WAS GOOD. THE COMMUNICATIONS NET HAD BEEN

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IMPROVED AND WE NOW HAD A DESIGNATED OFFICER ON THE NETWORK FROM EUCOM FOR EMERGENCY CONTACTS. (ARENS SAID THE DESIGNATED OFFICER SHOULD HAVE BEEN FROM THE MAU BUT I EXPLAINED THAT THE EUCOM OFFICER HAD BETTER COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE EMBASSY, EUCOM AND OTHER UNITS.) MOST IMPORTANTLY, THE TWO SIDES

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EXDIS

MILITARY ADDEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

HAD AGREED TO TRY TO AVOID CLASHES AND CONFRONTA-

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TIONS AND THERE HAD BEEN NO SUBSEQUENT INCIDENTS. MEAD HAD ALSO CLARIFIED FOR LIFKIN HOW THE MARINES CROSS THE LOGISTICS ROAD. I SAID ALL THIS WAS VERY POSITIVE AND THAT COL. MEAD WAS CONFIDENT THERE WAS A CHANGED ATTITUDE. I REPORTED THAT I HAD ALSO BROUGHT IN ALL OF THE COMMANDERS AND AMBASSADORS OF MNF CONTRIBUTORS TO ASSURE MYSELF THAT OUR LIAISON ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE IDF WERE GENERALLY AS SATISFACTORY AS THEIRS.

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7. I SAID I WAS AWARE THAT WE HAD NOT ACCEPTED SEVERAL ISRAELI PROPOSALS FOR ADDITIONAL LIAISON ARRANGEMENTS. FOR EXAMPLE, WE WOULD NOT AGREE TO AN EXCHANGE OF MAPS WITH LINES DESIGNATING AREAS OF OPERATIONS. THIS WOULD SUGGEST THAT THERE WERE AREAS INTO WHICH THE MARINES COULD NOT ENTER. HOWEVER, WE WOULD CONTINUE TO NOTIFY THE IDF OF OUR PATROL ROUTES SO THAT THEY WOULD KNOW WHERE WE WERE GOING. ALSO, WE HAD CONCLUDED THAT IT WAS UNNECESSARY TO HAVE AN ISRAELI LIAISON OFFICER IN THE MAU HEADQUARTERS. I SAID THAT IT WAS BEST TO LEAVE THE ARRANGEMENTS AS THEY HAD BEEN AGREED AND SEE HOW THEY WORKED. IF NECESSARY, WE COULD TALK AGAIN IN A FEW WEEKS.

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8. ARENS REITERATED THAT HE WAS NOT SATISFIED WITH THE ARRANGEMENTS BECAUSE HE BELIEVED THERE WAS STILL A POSSIBILITY OF AN INCIDENT OCCURRING. HE SAID THERE COULD BE A SITUATION ANY DAY WHERE A PLO TERRORIST WOULD GET BETWEEN THE MARINES AND THE ISRAELIS, THERE WOULD BE CROSS-FIRE AND SOMEONE WOULD BE KILLED. IT WAS AN UNSTABLE SITUATION AND HE WANTED TO BE 100 PERCENT SURE THAT EVERYTHING WAS BEING DONE TO PREVENT INCIDENTS.

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9. ARENS THEN MADE THREE SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS TO IMPROVE LIAISON ARRANGEMENTS: (1) THE MAU SHOULD INFORM THE IDF OF ITS PATROL ROUTES ON A DAILY BASIS; (2) LIFKIN AND MEAD SHOULD MEET TWICE A WEEK; (3) THERE SHOULD BE A DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS LINK BETWEEN MAU HEADQUARTERS AND IDF HEADQUARTERS. ARENS ALSO SAID THAT FOR THE LONG TERM, HE CONTINUED TO BELIEVE THAT THERE SHOULD BE AN EXCHANGE

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OF AGREED MAPS, WITH RESPECTIVE AREAS OF OPERATION DETAILED.

10. I RESPONDED TO EACH OF ARENS' SUGGESTIONS. I SAID I THOUGHT THERE WOULD BE NO PROBLEM IN COMMUNICATING PATROL INFORMATION ON A DAILY BASIS. LIFKIN CONFIRMED THAT MEAD HAD OFFERED TO PROVIDE INFORMATION ON A DAILY BASIS AT THEIR MARCH 24 MEETING. ARENS SAID THAT HE WOULD PREFER DAILY NOTIFICATION.

11. REGARDING REGULAR MEETINGS BETWEEN MEAD AND LIFKIN, I SAID I WAS SURE THE U.S. WOULD NOT AGREE. IN OUR OPINION IT WENT BEYOND WHAT WAS NEEDED TO AVOID INCIDENTS AND CREATED A TROUBLESOME POLITICAL IMAGE. THE U.S. WAS IN LEBANON AT THE REQUEST OF THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON AND IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE PUBLIC PERCEPTION BE THAT THE MARINE RELATIONSHIP IS FIXED TO LEBANON. ARENS SAID THAT HE DID NOT THINK A QUESTION OF IMAGE SHOULD INTERFERE WITH PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS TO SAVE LIVES. HE SAID HE WOULD RAISE THE ISSUE WITH SECRETARIES SHULTZ AND WEINBERGER AND, IF NECESSARY, PRESIDENT REAGAN. I SAID THAT OUR POSITION ON THIS WAS CLEAR AND IF HE RAISED IT NOW HE WAS CERTAIN TO GET A NEGATIVE RESPONSE. IT WAS BETTER TO WAIT FOR A FEW WEEKS AND GIVE THE NEW ARRANGEMENTS A CHANCE TO WORK. IF NECESSARY, WE COULD REVIEW THE SITUATION LATER.

12. WITH RESPECT TO A DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS LINK, I AGREED THAT THIS WAS ADVISABLE. HOWEVER, I SAID IT WAS MY IMPRESSION THAT A DIRECT LINK ALREADY EXISTED. THERE WAS SOME CONFUSION ON THIS AND I UNDERTOOK TO CHECK IT OUT, REITERATING MY BELIEF THAT DIRECT RADIO OR TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS

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WERE ADVISABLE.

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13. ON THE QUESTION OF AN EXCHANGE OF MAPS, I TOLD ARENS FIRMLY THAT THIS WAS OUT OF THE QUESTION BECAUSE IT WOULD SUGGEST THAT THERE WERE PLACES IN THE BEIRUT AREA INTO WHICH THE MARINES COULD NOT GO. WHILE THE U.S. WOULD CONTINUE TO NOTIFY ISRAEL OF ITS MOVEMENTS, IT COULD NOT AGREE TO SUCH LIMITATIONS.

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14. ARENS REPEATED THAT HE WAS STILL NOT SATIS-

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FIED WITH THE LIAISON ARRANGEMENTS ALTHOUGH THEY REPRESENTED A SLIGHT IMPROVEMENT. HE ASKED ME TO CONVEY HIS DISSATISFACTION TO DEFENSE SECRETARY WEINBERGER.

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15. ARENS THEN ASKED WHO THE AMERICAN COLONEL WAS THAT SAID SYRIAN FORCES IN LEBANON WERE BETTER THAN THE ISRAELI FORCES. I REPLIED THAT THIS WAS AN INACCURATE VERSION OF WHAT COL. FINTEL HAD SAID IN HIS BRIEFING ON OUR EFFORTS TO TRAIN AND EQUIP THE LEBANESE ARMY. I SAID THAT FINTEL WAS DOING AN EXCELLENT JOB IN THIS REGARD. I SAID THAT FINTEL'S REFERENCE TO THE SYRIANS DERIVED FROM THE FACT THAT SYRIA ALLOWED THE LEBANESE ARMY TO ROTATE BATTALIONS FROM AREAS UNDER ITS CONTROL FOR TRAINING, WHEREAS THE ISRAELIS HAD SO FAR PREVENTED LEBANESE BATTALIONS FROM ROTATING OUT OF AREAS UNDER ISRAELI CONTROL FOR RETRAINING PURPOSES. DRORY INTERJECTED TO SAY THAT THIS WAS NOT TRUE. ACCORDING TO DRORY, ISRAEL HAD NO OBJECTION IF THE LAF WANTED TO BRING THESE BATTALIONS NORTH FOR TRAINING. DRORY SAID ISRAEL ALSO WOULD NOT OBJECT TO THE REENTRY OF THESE BATTALIONS AFTER THEIR TRAINING. I SAID THAT I WAS GLAD TO HEAR THIS, AND WOULD TRY TO LEARN THE SOURCE OF THE POSSIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING.

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16. GENERAL LIFKIN THEN MADE FOUR OBSERVATIONS ON THE LIAISON ARRANGEMENTS:

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-- LIFKIN SAID THAT DURING THEIR MEETING, COL. MEAD HAD ACKNOWLEDGED THAT WHILE THE NEW LIAISON ARRANGEMENTS WERE GOOD, THEY COULD NOT COMPLETELY

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RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF INCIDENTS AS LONG AS THERE WAS NO CLEAR LINE BETWEEN THE IDF AND THE MARINES. LIFKIN SUPPORTED ARENS' PROPOSAL FOR AN EXCHANGE OF MAPS. I REITERATED THIS WAS NOT NECESSARY OR POSSIBLE;

-- LIFKIN STRESSED THE NEED FOR BETTER COORDINATION BETWEEN THE IDF AND THE ARINES. LIFKIN SAID THAT HE HAD ENCOUNTERED A PROBLEM LAST WEEK ON THE SIDON ROAD AND HAD BEEN UNABLE TO GET IN TOUCH WITH COL. MEAD. HE HAD HAD TO PASS A MESSAGE THROUGH A MARINE CAPTAIN;

-- LIFKIN SAID IDF LIAISON ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE LAF ARE UNSATISFACTORY. HE GAVE AS AN EXAMPLE THAT HE HAD TO FIND OUT FROM COL. MEAD THAT THE LAF WAS CONCERNED THAT THE IDF MOVED TOO FAST IN ITS PATROLS EAST OF THE SIDON ROAD;

-- LIFKIN WAS CONCERNED THAT AMERICAN UNIFORMS WERE BEING OBTAINED BY TERRORISTS. I ASKED LIFKIN HOW THEY WERE OBTAININ THEM AND LIFKIN RESPONDED THAT THERE WERE RUMORS THAT U.S. UNIFORMS AND AMMUNITION WERE BEING EXCHANGED FOR OTHER GOODS. I AGREED WITH LIFKIN THAT THIS WAS A VERY DANGEROUS DEVELOPMENT, IF TRUE, AND PROMISED TO DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH COL. MEAD. DILLON

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DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, US, IS, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: MEETING WITH FONMIN
SALEM, MARCH 25

1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY. I PROVIDED FONMIN SALEM WITH A FRANK
READOUT OF MY TALKS IN ISRAEL. I EXPLAINED THAT I
HAD GONE OVER AT LENGTH WITH ARENS AND SHAMIR WHAT
I CONSIDERED THE TWO MDST SERIOUS REMAINING PROBLEMS
IN THE SECURITY AREA: THE FUTURE OF HADDAD AND
THE ROLE AND SIZE OF JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS.
DESPITE MY EFFORTS, I DID NOT BELIEVE THAT I HAD

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SHAKEN THE ISRAELIS ON EITHER OF THESE, BUT PERHAPS
ISRAEL NEEDED TIME TO REFLECT ON MY PITCH AND ON
THE LEBANESE EXPLANATION EARLIER THAT DAY AT NETANYA
OF HOW FAR IT WOULD GO CONCERNING THE INTEGRATION
OF HADDAD'S FORCES.

3. SALEM SAID HE WAS MORE PESSIMISTIC THAN HE HAD
BEEN IN WEEKS. HE SAID NO ONE COULD CONVINCE HIM
HADDAD WAS THE REAL ISSUE, INACCURATELY ARGUING

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THAT IT HAD NOT BEEN MENTIONED BY ISRAEL DURING THE PREVIOUS TWO MONTHS. EITHER THE ISRAELIS WERE STALLING FOR "OTHER REASONS" OR THEY WERE EXAGGERATING THE HADDAD ISSUE IN ORDER TO GIVE IT UP IN RETURN FOR WHAT THEY REALLY WANTED, PROBABLY JOINT OPERATIONAL PATROLS. SALEM STRESSED THAT LEBANON COULD NOT ACCEPT EITHER HADDAD OR THE ISRAELI IDEA CONCERNING PATROLS.

4. WE DISCUSSED NEXT STEPS. THE LEBANESE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF MOVING QUICKLY. SALEM IS CONVINCED THAT INTERNAL SUPPORT FOR A GOOD AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL WILL ERODE. THE LEBANESE ALSO BELIEVE THAT RESISTANCE TO THE ISRAELI PRESENCE IN THE SOUTH IS BUILDING AND COULD TURN VIOLENT, WITH "DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES FOR LEBANON". SALEM URGED ME TO CONTINUE TO STRESS TO THE ISRAELIS LEBANON'S GOOD FAITH, THE REASONABLENESS OF THE PACKAGE DEVELOPED IN WASHINGTON, THE NEED FOR PROMPT CONCLUSION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND THE FACT THAT LEBANON HAD REACHED ITS LIMITS. I SAID I HAD MADE ALL THESE ARGUMENTS AND WOULD CONTINUE TO DO SO. HE ALSO SAID U.S. CREDIBILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST WAS AT STAKE AND THAT IT WAS TIME FOR THE U.S. TO CONSIDER TAKING STEPS

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TO IMPRESS ISRAEL WITH THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO THE INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY OF LEBANON.

5. FATTAL REPORTED THAT THE ISRAELI NEGOTIATORS HAD IN EFFECT INVITED LEBANON TO PREPARE A COMPREHENSIVE DRAFT OF THE AGREEMENT. KIMCHE HAD ALSO AGREED THAT IMMEDIATELY AFTER EASTER A SMALL TRI-LATERAL GROUP MIGHT GO OVER THE TEXT LINE BY LINE IN INTENSIVE SESSIONS. FATTAL THOUGHT THAT ISRAEL MIGHT BE MORE PERSUADED BY LEBANON'S POSITION IF IT COULD SEE THE ENTIRE PACKAGE. I CONCURRED AND URGED THE LEBANESE TO PREPARE THEIR COMPREHENSIVE DRAFT TEXT. END SUMMARY.

6. I MET WITH FONMIN SALEM FOR TWO HOURS THE EVENING OF MARCH 25. HE WAS JOINED BY PRESIDENTIAL COUNSELORS HADDAD AND TUENI, CHIEF OF STAFF TANNOUS AND THE PRINCIPAL MEMBERS OF HIS NEGOTIATING TEAM. AMBASSADORS DRAPER AND DILLON, GENERAL COOLEY AND KRECZKO ACCOMPANIED ME.

7. SALEM BEGAN THE MEETING WITH A VERY GLOOMY ACCOUNT OF THE DAY'S NEGOTIATING SESSION IN NETANYA. WHILE THERE HAD BEEN PROGRESS IN THE AREA OF MUTUAL RELATIONS, SERIOUS PROBLEMS REMAINED IN THE AREA

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OF SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. SALEM DEPLORED NOT ONLY THE ISRAELI POSITIONS, BUT ALSO THE "OBNOXIOUS, ARROGANT AND SARCASTIC" ATTITUDE OF ISRAELI MILITARY NEGOTIATORS. (THE ISRAELI MILITARY HAD APPARENTLY MADE A JOKE ABOUT LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY, NOT HEARD BY EITHER COOLEY OR DRAPER, WHO ATTENDED PART OF THE SESSION.) HE SAID ISRAELI MILITARY NEGO-

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TIATORS SUBJECTED LEBANON TO A CONSISTENT BARRAGE OF RIDICULE AND ASKED ME TO CONVEY HIS DISAPPOINTMENT AT THIS BEHAVIOR. DRAPER SAID THAT, IN THE PART OF THE SESSION HE ATTENDED, THE LEBANESE SIDE HAD MADE AN EFFECTIVE PRESENTATION AND THAT THE

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ISRAELI COUNTER-ARGUMENTS HAD BEEN WEAK.

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8. SALEM SAID THAT HE COULD NOT BELIEVE HADDAD WAS THE REAL ISSUE AND THAT NO ONE COULD CONVINCE HIM OTHERWISE. NO COUNTRY WOULD BUILD ITS SECURITY ON ONE MAN. HE ALSO COULD NOT BELIEVE THE ISRAELIS WERE SERIOUS ABOUT JOINT OPERATIONAL PATROLS, WHICH WOULD COMPROMISE LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY AND PRECLUDE SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL.

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9. I BRIEFED THE GROUP ON MY MEETINGS IN ISRAEL OVER THE PREVIOUS DAYS. I REPORTED THAT I HAD CONCENTRATED ON THE TWO MAIN PROBLEM AREAS OF HADDAD AND JOINT PATROLS, BUT PRIMARILY HADDAD. WHILE SOME OF MY TEAM DISAGREED, IT WAS MY OWN ASSESSMENT THAT I HAD NOT MOVED THE ISRAELIS. I SAID THAT MAYBE THE ISRAELIS NEEDED TO "STEW" FOR A FEW DAYS, REFLECTING ON THE LEBANESE POSITION. I SAID THAT THE LEBANESE ELABORATION AT NETANYA OF HOW FAR LEBANON WOULD GO IN THE INTEGRATION OF HADDAD'S FORCES COULD BE HELPFUL.

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10. I ASKED WHY LEBANON DID NOT TRY TO GET HADDAD TO TAKE HIMSELF OUT OF THE PICTURE. I NOTED THAT LEBANESE FORCES COMMANDER FADY FRAM HAD SEEN HADDAD EARLIER YESTERDAY AND ASKED THE PURPOSE OF THE TRIP. I GOT NO RESPONSE. HOWEVER, TANNOUS, WHO KNOWS HADDAD VERY WELL, SAID THAT HADDAD COULD NOT TAKE ANY ACTION NOW WHICH WAS INCONSISTENT WITH ISRAELI WISHES. DESPITE MY EXPRESSION OF DISBELIEF, TANNOUS IS CONVINCED THAT ISRAEL WOULD USE EXTREME PRESSURES IF NECESSARY.

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11. TANNOUS AGREED WITH SALEM'S OPINION THAT HADDAD WAS NOT THE REAL ISSUE. HIS OWN VIEW IS THAT THE ISRAELIS WILL CONCEDE ON HADDAD, BUT THEY WILL THEN PRESS THE LEBANESE TO ACCEPT IN RETURN THE ISRAELI CONCEPTION OF JOINT OPERATIONAL PATROLS, LIAISON-ADVISERS, ETC. HE SAID LEBANON WOULD NEVER ACCEPT THIS. HE ALSO SAID THAT LEBANON COULD NOT ACCEPT EVEN ONE ISRAELI LIAISON OFFICER STATIONED WITH LAF BRIGADES IN THE SOUTH (ALTHOUGH THEY REMAIN COMMITTED TO THE IDEAS WHICH WE WORKED OUT

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IN WASHINGTON FOR AN EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AND COORDINATION). TANNOUS SAID ISRAEL KNOWS HADDAD CANNOT COMMAND A BRIGADE. THIS IS WHY THEY INSIST ON LIAISON OFFICERS (ADVISERS).

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12. SALEM AND TUENI ENDORSED THE ANALYSIS PRESENTED BY TANNOUS AND HIS STATEMENTS THAT JOINT PATROLS AND LIAISON OFFICERS ATTACHED TO LEBANESE UNITS WERE UNACCEPTABLE. (SALEM EVEN RESURRECTED HIS IDEA THAT LEBANON NEEDS SOME FIG LEAF OF RECIPROCITY CONCERNING JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS.) THEY ALL AGREED THAT ISRAEL'S REAL INTEREST WAS CONTROL OF THE SOUTHERN PORTION OF THE SECURITY ZONE. THEY REMARKED AT THE BLUNTNESS WITH WHICH ISRAELI MILITARY NEGOTIATORS SPOKE OF THE NEED TO MAINTAIN ISRAELI "INFLUENCE" THERE, MEANING "CONTROL".

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13. TANNOUS SAID THAT THE CLIMATE IN THE SOUTH WAS VERY BAD IN TERMS OF ATTITUDES TOWARD ISRAEL. ISRAEL WAS MAKING A MISTAKE TO THINK IT HAD THE ALLEGIANCE OF THE PEOPLE THERE. THERE WAS ALREADY A SPLIT IN HADDAD'S RANKS AND THE RECENT ISRAELI ARREST OF A LOCAL IMMAM WAS STIRRING THINGS UP. ISRAEL SHOULD NOT BE SO CONVINCED THAT IT COULD ACCEPT A PROLONGED OCCUPATION.

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14. I ASKED SALEM WHAT HE THOUGHT SHOULD BE THE NEXT STEPS. HE SUGGESTED SEVERAL:

-- I SHOULD CONTINUE TO STRESS LEBANON'S GOOD FAITH AND ITS DESIRE TO DO THE MAXIMUM FOR ISRAEL'S SECURITY, CONSISTENT WITH LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY.

-- I SHOULD IMPRESS ON ISRAEL THE LIMITATIONS IM-

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POSED BY THE NEED TO GET THE SYRIANS OUT.

-- I SHOULD EMPHASIZE THAT THE INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY OF LEBANON IS A U.S. PRIORITY AND THE U.S. SHOULD "TAKE STEPS" TO IMPRESS THIS UPON ISRAEL.

-- I SHOULD IMPRESS UPON ISRAEL THE NEED TO CONCLUDE THE NEGOTIATIONS RAPIDLY, BOTH BECAUSE THE POSITION OF MODERATES IN LEBANON WAS ERODING AND BECAUSE THE SITUATION IN THE SOUTH COULD DETERIORATE, WITH "DISASTROUS" CONSEQUENCES FOR LEBANON. (SALEM COMMENTED ON HOW POSITIVE SAAB SALAM HAD BEEN. SALEM SAID THAT LEBANON WOULD LOSE THE SUPPORT OF SUCH MODERATES FOR A GOOD AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL IF

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ISRAEL PRESSED FOR TOO MUCH.)

15. I SAID THAT I HAD MADE ALL THESE POINTS REPEATEDLY AND WOULD CONTINUE TO DO SO. I ALSO COMMENTED THAT THE WASHINGTON MEETINGS HAD SERVED TO IMPRESS ON ISRAEL THAT THE U.S., AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS, SUPPORTED LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY. UNFORTUNATELY, PROBLEMS STILL REMAINED. I THEN BROUGHT THE LEBANESE BACK TO A COMMENT THAT FATTAL HAD MADE EARLIER IN THE MEETING DURING HIS REPORT OF THE DAY'S NEGOTIATING SESSION IN NETANYA. FATTAL HAD NOTED THAT THE ISRAELI NEGOTIATORS HAD IN EFFECT INVITED A LEBANESE COMPREHENSIVE TEXT SO THAT THE

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ENTIRE PACKAGE COULD BE EXAMINED. THEY HAD ALSO AGREED THAT A SMALL NEGOTIATING GROUP BE FORMED (PERHAPS TWO FROM EACH SIDE) AND MEET INTENSIVELY OVER THE TEXT. FATTAL SAID THAT HE WAS AGREEABLE TO THIS PROCEDURE. DRAPER SAID HE HAD SUPPORTED THE CONCEPT AT NETANYA, BUT STRESSED THAT KIMCHE WANTED TO PRESENT THE IDEA TO HIS AUTHORITIES AS COMING FROM THE LEBANESE SIDE. I SAID THAT PERHAPS THE BEST COURSE OF ACTION NOW WAS TO ALLOW THE ISRAELIS TO REFLECT ON THE LEBANESE POSITION OVER THE COMING WEEK, TO PREPARE A COMPREHENSIVE TEXT, AND TO ENGAGE IN INTENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS IMMEDIATELY AFTER EASTER. THE LEBANESE AGREED, BUT NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR WADIA HADDAD SAID THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF THE U.S. COULD CONVINCE ISRAEL DURING THIS WEEK THAT IT WOULD NEED TO LOOK VERY SERIOUSLY AT THE TEXT WHICH LEBANON PUTS FORWARD.

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16. COMMENT: THE LEBANESE HAVE A GOOD START ON A COMPREHENSIVE PACKAGE. WHILE DRAPER AND I WERE IN
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[REDACTED]

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ISRAEL, ROSS, DAVIES AND KRECZKO SPENT FIVE HOURS WITH TUENI AND HIS TEAM AND TWO HOURS WITH FONMIN SALEM GOING OVER IN DETAIL A U.S. COMPILATION OF ALL OF THE TEXTS PUT FORWARD IN THE NEGOTIATIONS OR IN WASHINGTON. END COMMENT. GROVE

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JERUSALEM FOR AMB. HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MARR, MOPS, PREL, LE, IS, US

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT GEMAYEL MARCH 26 RE STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS

1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY: IN AN HOUR AND A HALF MEETING MARCH 26, AMBASSADORS HABIB AND DILLON AND PRESIDENT GEMAYEL REVIEWED THE CURRENT STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS. GEMAYEL MADE CLEAR HIS DEEP DISAPPOINTMENT WITH THE ISRAELI RESPONSE TO THE "NEW IDEAS" PRODUCED IN WASHINGTON. HE REITERATED HIS POSITION ON SEVERAL POINTS: 1) POLITICAL IMPOSSIBILITY OF GOL ACCEPTANCE OF SA'AD HADDAD AS COMMANDER IN SOUTH; 2) NECESSITY OF LAF PERFORMING SECURITY ROLE THERE BECAUSE OF ITS ACCEPTABILITY TO PEOPLE; 3) LEBANESE DESIRE FOR "UNDERSTANDING AND COOPERATION WITH ISRAEL;" 4) GEMAYEL'S BELIEF HE NOW ENJOYED FULL SUPPORT OF LEBANESE IN HIS EFFORTS BUT THE DANGER OF EROSION OF HIS POSITION AS NO RESULTS WERE ACHIEVED; AND 5) HIS OP-

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POSITION TO ISRAELI PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL AS MOVE TOWARD
DE FACTO PARTITION OF LEBANON. END SUMMARY.

3. AMBASSADOR HABIB AND DILLON MET WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL MORNING OF MARCH 26. FOLLOWING A SHORT EXCHANGE ABOUT LEBANON'S RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS, THE CONVERSATION TURNED DIRECTLY TO THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. GEMAYEL OPENED WITH "THE ISRAELI DEMANDS ARE NONSENSE." HABIB DESCRIBED IN SOME DETAIL HIS OWN EFFORTS IN

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JERUSALEM. HE HAD EXPLAINED CLEARLY LEBANON'S POLITICAL REALITIES AS HE SAW THEM. THE ISRAELIS ON THEIR PART HAD INSISTED THAT SA'AD HADDAD WAS THE KEY ELEMENT AND THEY STUCK TO THAT POSITION. THEY HAD ASKED HIM IN TURN TO PUSH THE LEBANESE VERY HARD ON THIS ISSUE BUT HE HAD MADE IT CLEAR HE COULDN'T PUSH BECAUSE HE DIDN'T BELIEVE THE ISRAELI POSITION WAS RIGHT. FURTHERMORE, HE HAD GONE AFTER THE ISRAELIS HARD ON THE SUBJECT OF THE NON-PAPER CONTAINING "NEW IDEAS" AND THE CARE THAT HAD GONE INTO ITS DRAFTING. IN THE END, WHEN HE HAD TOLD THE ISRAELIS THAT A VIRTUAL REJECTION OF THE NON-PAPER MIGHT RETURN THE LEBANESE COMPLETELY TO THEIR PREVIOUS POSITION, THE ISRAELIS HAD SAID THEY DIDN'T CARE, THEY, TOO, WERE RETURNING TO THEIR PREVIOUS POSITION (AT THAT POINT HE HAD PRETENDED NOT TO HEAR). HABIB ALSO EMPHASISED THAT IN DEALING WITH THE ISRAELIS THERE WAS A NEED FOR AN IMAGE OF THE GOL AS READY, PREPARED AND CLEAR IN ITS POSITIONS.

4. GEMAYEL REPLIED THAT ON BALANCE HE WAS STILL AN OPTIMIST. HE BELIEVED THE ISRAELI POSITIONS WERE ARTIFICIAL -- THEY WERE NOT SIMPLY TALKING ABOUT SECURITY, THEY WERE TALKING ABOUT THE ABILITY TO CONTROL ALL AFFAIRS IN SOUTH LEBANON. THEY WERE ASKING FOR COMPLETE LEBANESE CAPITULATION. IN HIS VIEW THE BEST AND ONLY GENUINE

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SECURITY WAS LEBANESE SECURITY. THIS COULD BE ACHIEVED EVEN WITH A WEAK ARMY. THE KEY WAS THAT THE LEBANESE ARMY WOULD HAVE THE LEBANESE PEOPLE WITH IT. "IN A SITUATION IN WHICH WE NEED A HUNDRED MEN, THEY WILL NEED A THOUSAND." GEMAYEL AFFIRMED HIS CONFIDENCE IN HIS OWN POLITICAL JUDGMENT. HE RECALLED, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT IN RECENT WEEKS HE HAD HANDLED BEIRUT AND THE PORT (REFERRING TO RECENT LAF TAKEOVERS FROM THE LEBANESE FORCES) EVEN THOUGH MANY PEOPLE HAD SAID IT COULDN'T BE DONE OR THAT THE TIMING WAS WRONG. HE HAD, HOWEVER, BEEN RIGHT. HE WAS JUST AS CONFIDENT OF HIS ABILITY TO JUDGE THE SITUATION IN THE SOUTH. FURTHERMORE, THE SOLUTION OF THE SECURITY SITUATION HAD TO BE SEEN AS A "NATIONAL ACTIVITY," NOT A "MILITARY ACTIVITY." THE SOLUTION WAS NOT SIMPLY A CASE OF SOLDIERS OR BRIGADES. HABIB SAID HE ACCEPTED THIS LINE OF ARGUMENT.

5. GEMAYEL CONTINUED THAT THE ISRAELIS DID NOT SEEM TO ACCEPT THAT IT WOULD BE EASIER FOR LEBANESE THAN FOREIGNERS TO INSURE SECURITY IN LEBANESE TERRITORY. THEY SEEMED TO BE PRIMARILY INTERESTED IN A BRIDGEHEAD IN LEBANON. HE ADDED, RHETORICALLY, 'THEY HAVE THE WEST BANK -- MAYBE THEY WANT THE SAME THING HERE.' THE GOL ON ITS PART, HE SAID, WANTED "FULL UNDERSTANDING AND COOPERATION" WITH THE ISRAELIS. LEBANON HAD HAD ENOUGH

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TROUBLES WITH ITS NEIGHBORS. IT WAS TIRED OF THE SWORD OF DAMOCLES HANGING OVER ITS HEAD. FURTHERMORE, HE BELIEVED THAT ALL CHRISTIANS AND ALL LEBANESE SHARED THESE FEELINGS WITH HIM.

6. HABIB SAID HE HAD MADE ALL OF THESE ARGUMENTS TO THE ISRAELIS, BUT THE ISRAELIS WERE STUCK ON THE NECESSITY OF SA'D HADDAD. GEMAYEL SAID THAT RATHER THAN ACCEPT SA'AD HADDAD, HE WOULD PREFER "STRAIGHT DEALING" WITH

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SHARON. IT WAS BETTER TO ACCEPT SHARON'S "HEAD" THAN HIS "TAIL." IT WOULD BE MORE HONORABLE TO HAVE EITAN OR DRORY COMMANDING IN THE SOUTH THAN TO HAVE A LEBANESE AGENT OF THE ISRAELIS.

7. HABIB THEN REFERRED TO A RECENT MEETING REPORTED BETWEEN LEBANESE FORCES COMMANDER FAHDI FRAM AND SA'AD HADDAD, ASKING WHAT FRAM HAD SAID TO HADDAD. GEMAYEL REPLIED THAT WHEN FRAM HAD PLANNED TO GO SOUTH, THE ISRAELIS WOULD NOT PERMIT HIM TO GO UNTIL HE AGREED TO SEE SA'AD HADDAD. GEMAYEL EVADED THE QUESTION OF WHAT FRAM SAID TO HADDAD BY REMARKING HE HAD NOT YET TALKED TO

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FRAM. GEMAYEL CONTINUED THAT THERE WERE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SA'AD HADDAD, WHO WAS A LEBANESE AT HEART, AND THE ISRAELIS, BUT THEY CONTROLLED HIM. HIS FAMILY IN MARJ'UYUN WAS VULNERABLE -- HE WAS SUBJECT TO BLACKMAIL. IN THE END, HOWEVER, SA'AD HADDAD COULDN'T STAY IN THE SOUTH.

8. HABIB PERSISTED, WHY DIDN'T SA'AD HADDAD LEAVE THE AREA HIMSELF. GEMAYEL REITERATED HIS REMARKS ABOUT ISRAELI CONTROL. HE ADDED THAT HE FEARED ASKING HADDAD

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DIRECTLY TO LEAVE: "IF I ASK HIM TO RETURN TO THE LAF, THE ISRAELIS WILL SEE IT AS A KIND OF DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST THEM; THEY WILL BE FURIOUS."

9. THIS PORTION OF THE CONVERSATION CONCLUDED WITH GEMAYEL REITERATING THE GOL'S FINAL POSITION. SA'AD HADDAD COULD NOT REMAIN AS BRIGADE COMMANDER IN SOUTHERN LEBANON. HE WOULD BE TREATED HONORABLY BUT THE ISRAELI INSISTANCE ON THE CENTRALITY OF SA'AD HADDAD IN SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WAS SOMETHING THE LEBANESE COULD NOT ACCEPT. FURTHERMORE, THE GOL BELIEVED THIS INSISTANCE MUST BE A COVER FOR SOMETHING ELSE BECAUSE IT COULD NOT BELIEVE THE ISRAELIS ATTACHED SO MUCH IMPORTANCE TO A SINGLE PERSON.

10. HABIB RETURNED TO HIS EARLIER THEME THAT IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT FOR THE LEBANESE TO PRESENT THEIR POSITIONS IN A CLEARCUT WAY. IT WAS NECESSARY THAT ALL TEXTS AND ANNEXES, FOR EXAMPLE, BE COMPLETE. IN DISCUSSIONS THE ISRAELIS ALWAYS CONTENTED THAT THEY HAD GIVEN UP EVERYTHING WITH NOTHING IN RETURN. IN FACT, HOWEVER, AGREEMENT WAS 90 PERCENT COMPLETE. FOR EXAMPLE, THERE WAS AGREEMENT ON THE PRINCIPLES OF:

- A. SECURITY ZONE IN THE SOUTH
- B. LIMITATION OF ARMS IN THAT ZONE
- C. INTELLIGENCE EXCHANGE
- D. INTEGRATION OF THE HADDAD FORCES WITHOUT HADDAD
- E. SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE
- F. VERIFICATION TEAMS

IN SHORT, THE SECURITY PORTION OF THE AGREEMENT WAS ALMOST COMPLETE WITH THE STATUS OF HADDAD AS THE STICKING POINT. "WHEN I SAY THESE THINGS TO THE ISRAELIS," HABIB ADDED,

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"THEY ATTACK ME AND SAY I'M PRO LEBANESE." GEMAYEL RE-
JOINED THAT WAS BECAUSE THE LEBANESE WERE THE ONES
PRESENTING "LOGICAL SOLUTIONS." IT WAS NATURAL THAT ANY
RATIONAL PERSON WOULD AGREE WITH THEM.

11. GEMAYEL INQUIRED IF THERE WERE A DEADLINE. HE
WONDERED IF PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD ATTEMPTED TO IMPOSE ONE
ON SHAMIR. HABIB REPLIED, NO, IT WAS BETTER TO CONTINUE
TO TALK. IT WAS DANGEROUS TO LAY DOWN DEADLINES.
GEMAYEL INQUIRED ABOUT THE CONNECTION BETWEEN LEBANESE
NEGOTIATIONS AND THE PEACE PROCESS, OBSERVING IT WAS
DANGEROUS TO CONNECT THE TWO. HABIB REPLIED THAT THE USG
HAD BEEN CAREFUL NOT TO CONNECT THEM. ON THE OTHER HAND,
MANY PEOPLE TALKED OF LEBANON AS A TEST OF AMERICAN
CREDIBILITY. IN THAT SENSE, A KIND OF CONNECTION WAS
BEING MADE, ALTHOUGH THE USG WAS KEEPING THE TWO THINGS
SEPARATE. GEMAYEL ASKED IF THE ISRAELIS SAW A LINKAGE
BETWEEN THE LEBANESE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE ENTRY OF KING
HUSSEIN INTO THE PEACE PROCESS. HABIB REPLIED HE THOUGHT
THE ISRAELIS WOULD TREAT THE QUESTIONS OF HUSSEIN AND THE
WEST BANK IN A FRAMEWORK LONG SINCE DECIDED. HE DOUBTED
THEY WERE DELAYING THE LE
BANESE NEGOTIATIONS SIMPLY TO
KEEP HUSSEIN OUT OF THE PEACE PROCESS.

12. RETURNING TO SECURITY IN THE SOUTH, GEMAYEL SAID HE
WANTED TO MAKE CLEAR THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO CONCENTRATE
THE BEST LEBANESE SOLDIERS IN THAT AREA. HE MIGHT THEN
WISH TO USE MNF AND UNIFIL IN OTHER PARTS OF THE COUNTRY,
FOR EXAMPLE, THE BIQA'. AFTER ALL, THERE WOULD NOT
INITIALLY BE ENOUGH LEBANESE SOLDIERS FOR ALL AREAS. HE
ALSO WISHED TO CLARIFY HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD SUPERVISORY
TEAMS IN THE SOUTH. TEAMS WERE OKAY, IF THEY WERE VERY
SMALL. IN THE END, HOWEVER, HE DOUBTED THESE THINGS WERE
THE PROBLEMS. IT SEEMED TO HIM THE ISRAELIS WANTED
POLITICAL DOMINANCE. HABIB REPLIED SOME PEOPLE THOUGHT

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HE ISRAELIS WANTED CONTROL WITH NO ONE TO SEE WHAT THEY
WERE DOING. IN WASHINGTON A SENIOR OFFICIAL HAD BLUNTLY

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ASKED THE ISRAELIS IF THAT WAS WHAT THEY HAD IN MIND. FURTHERMORE, GEMAYEL SHOULD BE AWARE OF A POINT THAT HE (HABIB) HAD CONTINUED TO MAKE IN WASHINGTON: EVERY LEBANESE, MUSLIM OR CHRISTIAN, WANTS THE PLO OUT. GEMAYEL AGREED EMPHATICALLY. FURTHERMORE, HE SAID, ONE DANGER IS THAT IF THE ISRAELIS CONTINUE THEIR PRESENT ATTITUDE THEY WILL PROMOTE A KIND OF LEBANESE RAPPROCHEMENT WITH THE PALESTINIANS. THIS WOULD BE VERY DANGEROUS. AS FEELINGS ROSE AMONG SHI'AS IN THE SOUTH, FOR EXAMPLE, THEY WOULD BE LOOKING FOR ALLIES. HE ALSO OBSERVED THAT THE IDF WAS SHOWING NOW IT COULD NOT PREVENT STRIKES AND DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE AREA IT OCCUPIED.

13. IN RESPONSE TO GEMAYEL'S QUESTION, "WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE," HABIB SUGGESTED IT MIGHT BE BEST TO LET THINGS FERMENT FOR AWHILE. GEMAYEL SAID HE WAS NOT IN A HURRY BUT WAS WORRIED ABOUT THE EFFECTS OF DELAY ON LEBANESE NATIONAL CONSENSUS. AT THE MOMENT HE HAD FULL SUPPORT BUT AS TIME PASSED THERE WOULD BE AN EROSION OF THAT SUPPORT. IF HE COULD NOT SHOW RESULTS, PEOPLE WOULD

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DESERT HIM. HE TICKED OFF SEVERAL FEARS, E.G., LOSING SUPPORT OF TRADITIONAL LEADERS SUCH AS SA'B SALAM, WAZZAN, CHAMOUN, FRANJIYAH, KARAMI. DELAY WOULD ALSO STRENGTHEN COMMUNIST LEADERS SUCH AS GEORGE HIRAWI AND MUHSIN IBRAHIM. DELAYS ALSO PROMOTED RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN THE SHI'AS AND THE LEFTISTS. ALL THIS WAS DANGEROUS.

14. HABIB SUMMED UP: AT MIDDAY HE WOULD LEAVE FOR ISRAEL WHERE HE HAD ASKED TO SEE SHAMIR. HE WOULD GO OVER EVERYTHING AGAIN WITH HIM. HE WOULD CLARIFY ONCE AGAIN THE LEBANESE COULD NOT ACCEPT SA'AD HADDAD, EMPHASIZING THIS WAS NOT A PERSONAL VENDETTA AND THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF HADDAD'S NOT BEING TREATED HONORABLY. WHAT ELSE SHOULD HE SAY.

15. GEMAYEL SAID, "TELL THE ISRAELIS WE BELIEVE THE SYRIANS WILL GET OUT, ALTHOUGH WE ALL RECOGNIZE THE DIMENSIONS OF THE SYRIAN PROBLEM." GEMAYEL THEN WANTED TO KNOW WHAT THE U.S. WOULD DO IF HABIB GOT A "NON ANSWER" OR IF THERE WERE MORE DELAY. HABIB SAID THE U.S. WOULD RAISE ITS LEVEL OF PERSUASIVE ARGUMENT TO A HIGHER LEVEL. IT WAS NOT, AS GEMAYEL UNDERSTOOD, INCLINED TO GO TO PHYSICAL PRESSURE. ANOTHER POSSIBILITY WAS PUTTING THE U.S. POSITION PUBLIC, E.G., REGARDING SA'AD HADDAD. HE ASSURED GEMAYEL THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD NOT CHANGED HIS MIND ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES. HABIB WOULD MAKE SURE THE PRESIDENT UNDERSTOOD THE LEBANESE POSITION COMPLETELY. FINALLY, GEMAYEL WANTED TO MAKE SURE THE USG UNDERSTOOD THAT HIS POSITION WAS UNCHANGED

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ON ANY PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL. IF THE ISRAELIS MADE A
UNILATERAL MOVE TO WITHDRAW AND CONSOLIDATE THEIR
POSITIONS IN THE SOUTH, DE FACTO PARTITION WOULD RESULT.
THE SYRIANS WOULD NOT BUDGE. HABIB SAID HE UNDERSTOOD.

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THE U.S. POSITION REMAINED THAT IT WAS ALSO OPPOSED TO
ANY PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL WHICH MIGHT LEAD TO PARTITION.

16. AMB. HABIB DID NOT SEE THIS TELEGRAM BEFORE HIS
DEPARTURE FOR JERUSALEM. DILLON

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DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, US, IS, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: MEETING WITH SHAMIR
AND ARENS, MARCH 23

1. [REDACTED]

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2. SUMMARY. DURING AN HOUR AND A HALF MEETING WITH SHAMIR AND ARENS AT THE KNESSET WEDNESDAY EVENING, MARCH 23, I SAID THAT THE LEBANESE COULD NOT ACCEPT HADDAD AS THE COMMANDER OF THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE IN THE SOUTH. THE LEBANESE WERE ABSOLUTELY ADAMANT ON THIS POINT ACROSS THE BOARD.

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I ALSO SAID THE LEBANESE HAD REAL PROBLEMS WITH THE NEW ISRAELI DEMANDS ON SIZE, NUMBERS, AND TASKS FOR THE "SUPERVISORY TEAMS" ("PATROLS" IN THE ISRAELI LEXICON), AS WELL AS THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE MILITARY COMMITTEE/OPERATIONS CENTERS. THE LEBANESE WERE FRUSTRATED BY THE ESCALATING NATURE OF THE ISRAELI DEMANDS AND HAD THREATENED TO GO BACK TO THEIR ORIGINAL PROPOSALS. I THOUGHT, HOWEVER, THAT A SATISFACTORY COMPROMISE COULD ULTIMATELY BE

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REACHED ON THE VARIOUS SUPERVISORY MECHANISMS, ON CONDITION THAT THE ISRAELIS WITHDREW THEIR POSITION ON HADDAD. I SAW NO WAY THAT THE LEBANESE POSITION WOULD CHANGE ON HADDAD. SHAMIR AND ARENS REACTED VERY NEGATIVELY AND SAID HADDAD'S FUTURE WAS A CRITICAL ELEMENT OF THE ISRAELI CONCEPT ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. SHAMIR (WHO MAY HAVE CONSULTED WITH BEGIN DURING A RECESS FOR A KNESSET VOTE) SAID IF THIS WAS ALL LEBANON HAD TO OFFER, THEN THERE MAY BE NO REASON TO HAVE THE FRIDAY TRIPARTITE MEETING IN NETANYA, AT WHICH WE HAD PLANNED TO HAVE A DETAILED DIALOGUE ON ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES FOR DEALING WITH THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE IN THE SOUTH. ISRAEL, SHAMIR ADDED, MIGHT ALSO HAVE TO GO BACK TO ITS ORIGINAL POSITIONS, INCLUDING THE FIVE OBSERVATION POSTS. I VIGOROUSLY REPLIED THAT IT WAS IMPERATIVE TO MOVE AHEAD, AND TO DISCUSS IN DETAIL WITH THE LEBANESE THEIR PROPOSALS FOR THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE AND ASSOCIATED SECURITY MEASURES. AT THE END, SHAMIR SAID HE WOULD LET US KNOW IF THERE WAS ANY CHANGE ON THE FRIDAY MEETING. END SUMMARY.

3. I MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR AND DEFENSE

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MINISTER ARENS FOR ONE AND A HALF HOURS WEDNESDAY EVENING, MARCH 23, AT THE KNESSET. AT ONE POINT, SHAMIR HAD TO LEAVE THE MEETING FOR 15 MINUTES FOR A KNESSET VOTE. FIVE GENERALS, INCLUDING CHIEF OF STAFF-DESIGNATE LEVY, AND MFA AND SHIN BET REPRESENTATIVES ATTENDED. I WAS ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADORS DRAPER AND LEWIS, DCM FLATEN, GENERAL COOLEY, COLONEL HEILIGER AND HARE. WHILE BASICALLY CORDIAL, THE ATMOSPHERE WAS PUNCTUATED BY THE EXPRESSION OF MORE STRONGLY DEFINED ISRAELI POSITIONS ON THE CENTRAL ISSUES SEPARATING THE TWO PARTIES.

4. AT THE BEGINNING OF THE MEETING, SHAMIR SAID HE WAS WAITING FOR NEWS FROM MY CONSULTATIONS IN BEIRUT AND ASKED IF I WAS BRINGING ANY NEW PROPOSALS OR SUGGESTIONS. I SAID I WAS PREPARED TO GIVE A STRAIGHTFORWARD REPORT ON MY MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL, FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM, GENERAL TANNOUS, AND OTHER KEY ADVISERS. AT THE OUTSET, I EXPLAINED THERE WERE TWO PROBLEMS OF SIGNIFICANCE WHICH WERE APPARENT FROM MY DISCUSSIONS IN BEIRUT. THE FIRST WAS DEFINITE AND CLEARLY DEFINED; THE OTHER WAS IN MY VIEW SUBJECT TO FURTHER DISCUSSION AND COMPROMISE.

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5. THE PRINCIPAL PRBLEM CENTERED ON HADDAD AND HADDAD'S FORCES. I EXPLAINED THAT WHILE THE LEBANESE WERE FULLY PREPARED TO INTEGRATE HADDAD'S FORCES INTO THE SOUTHERN TERRITORIAL BRIGADE, THEY COULD NOT ACCEPT HADDAD AS COMMANDER OF THAT

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FROM HABIB

BRIGADE. ALTHOUGH I HAD LABORIOUSLY EXPLORED WITH THE LEBANESE ALL POSSIBLE VARIATIONS ON HOW HADDAD'S FUTURE MIGHT BE HANDLED, INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY

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OF A LIMITED TERM FOR HADDAD AS SHAMIR HAD PREVIOUSLY SUGGESTED, I HAD RUN INTO A STONE WALL. THE LEBANESE UNANIMOUSLY SAID THERE WOULD BE TWO CONSEQUENCES IF HADDAD WERE KEPT ON IN THE SOUTH IN WHATEVER GUISE: (A) IT WOULD SEVERELY DAMAGE AND DESTABILIZE THE INTERNAL CONSENSUS WITHIN LEBANON, INCLUDING IN THE OFFICER CORPS; AND (B) IT WOULD CREATE REAL PROBLEMS WITH THE SYRIANS. ACCORDING TO THE LEBANESE, SYRIA WOULD ARGUE THAT HADDAD'S RETENTION WOULD NOT CONSTITUTE AN ISRAELI

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WITHDRAWAL--BASED ON ISRAEL'S PAST INTIMATE TIES WITH HIM--OR THEY WOULD DEMAND THAT LT. KHATIB, THE SYRIAN SURROGATE, WOULD BE MADE COMMANDER OF THE BEKAA. THE LEBANESE DID NOT BELIEVE THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO COUNTER THESE ARGUMENTS, ESPECIALLY SINCE IT RAN SO STRONGLY AGAINST THEIR OWN CONCEPT OF A SOVEREIGN AND INTEGRAL LEBANON.

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6. I SAID THAT THE LEBANESE HAD DESCRIBED IN GREAT DETAIL THEIR CONTACTS WITH HADDAD AND THAT THEY BELIEVED AN HONORABLE DEAL COULD BE STRUCK WITH HIM. GEN. TANNOUS IN PARTICULAR KNEW HADDAD WELL AND FAVORABLY AND BELIEVED THAT HADDAD WAS PREPARED TO DO THE RIGHT THING FOR LEBANON. HOWEVER, TANNOUS BELIEVES THAT HADDAD IS NOT PREPARED TO MAKE A DECISIVE MOVE IN VIEW OF THE ISRAELI POSITION. I HAD ALSO SPOKEN TO GEMAYEL ALONE AND FOUND THAT HIS POSITION ON HADDAD WAS EXACTLY THE SAME AS THOSE OF HIS ADVISERS.

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7. THE SECDND PROBLEM CONCERNED THE QUESTION OF THE SUPERVISORY TEAMS AND THEIR MANAGEMENT THROUGH THE MILITARY COMMITTEE AND PROPOSED OPERATIONS CENTER(S). I THOUGHT THERE WAS ROOM FOR DISCUSSION ABOUT THE SIZE OF TEAMS AND THEIR NUMBERS BUT SAID QUITE FRANKLY THAT THE LEBANESE THOUGHT THAT ISRAEL WAS ESCALATING ITS DEMANDS. AS AN EXAMPLE, I EXPLAINED OUR EARLIER EFFORTS WITH THE LEBANESE TO PERSUADE THEM TO ACCEPT THE LOCATION OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE IN THE SECURITY ZONE (WITH CO-LOCATED OPERATIONS CENTER), BUT NOW ISRAEL WAS TALKING ABOUT THREE SEPARATELY LOCATED CENTERS IN THE ZONE. THE SAME ALSO

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APPLIED TO THE NEW ISRAELI DEMANDS ON SUPERVISORY TEAMS, ACCORDING TO THE LEBANESE.

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8. IN AN EFFORT TO CONVEY THE INTENSITY OF THE LEBANESE REACTION TO THESE ESCALATING DEMANDS, I SAID THAT AT ONE POINT THE LEBANESE HAD STATED THAT IF THESE WERE INDEED THE ISRAELI POSITIONS, THEY WOULD GO BACK TO THEIR PRE-WASHINGTON NEGOTIATING STANCE AND STAND ON THEIR FEBRUARY PROPOSALS, (WORKED OUT WITH US IN MARATHON SESSIONS). I HAD CHOSEN TO INTERPRET THE LEBANESE REACTION AS AN EMOTIONAL OUTBURST AND TO FORGE AHEAD ON THE BASIS OF OUR NON-PAPER. NEVERTHELESS, THIS WAS, I COMMENTED, A SIGN OF THE LEVEL OF LEBANESE FRUSTRATION. TO PUT OUR EFFORT ON A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE COURSE, I HAD URGED THE LEBANESE TO DISCUSS FULLY AND IN DETAIL THEIR CONCEPT FOR THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE AT THE FRIDAY MEETING IN NETANYA AND TO ADDRESS HOW IT WOULD BE INTEGRATED AND WHAT LIAISON PROCEDURES WOULD BE ESTABLISHED SO THAT ISRAEL COULD UNDERSTAND THE LEBANESE PROPOSALS REPRESENTED A REALISTIC PLAN. I HAD TOLD THE LEBANESE TO TAKE EXPERTS TO THE FRIDAY MEETING AND SUGGESTED THE ISRAELIS MIGHT ALSO HAVE THEIR NORTHERN COMMANDER PRESENT. I HOPED THIS WOULD OPEN UP THE OPPORTUNITY FOR A GOOD PROFESSIONAL BILATERAL EXCHANGE. (AT THIS POINT, OUR MEETING WAS INTERRUPTED BY A VOTE IN THE KNESSET. WE ASSUME THAT SHAMIR AND ARENS HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO BRIEF THE PRIME MINISTER ON THE TENOR OF THE LEBANESE RESPONSE DURING THIS INTERVAL.)

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9. CONTINUING, I EXPLAINED THAT THE LEBANESE HAD TAKEN A FORTHCOMING AND POSITIVE ATTITUDE TO ISSUES OF COORDINATION AND CONSULTATION. AS AN

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EXDIS

FROM HABIB

EXAMPLE, WHILE THE LEBANESE COULD NOT AGREE TO ISRAEL HOLDING A VETO POWER OVER THE APPOINTMENT OF SENIOR OFFICERS TO THE BRIGADE (OR TO THE MILITARY COMMITTEE), TANNOUS HAD INDICATED THAT HE WOULD "PICK AND CHOOSE" HIS OFFICERS CAREFULLY AND WAS PERFECTLY WILLING TO DISCUSS THESE APPOINTMENTS WITH THE ISRAELIS. IF THERE WERE REAL OBJECTIONS, TANNOUS HAD SAID HE WOULD NOT INSIST ON A PARTICULAR APPOINTMENT. THERE WAS ROOM IN OTHER WORDS FOR DISCUSSION AND COMPROMISE. I ALSO TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO STRESS THE LEADERSHIP QUALITIES OF TANNOUS AND THAT IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO HAVE DIRECT CONTACT BETWEEN THE TWO CHIEFS OF STAFF,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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AS PROVIDED IN OUR "NON-PAPER". WE SHOULD NOT IGNORE THIS IMPOOTANT DIMENSION TO AN ENVOLVING LEBANESE-ISSAELI RELATIINSHIP. IN SUMMING UP MY PRESENTATION, I SAID THAT IF THE ISSUE OF HADDAD AND HIS FORCES WAS OVERCOME, I COULD SEE HOW THE ENTIRE PACKAGE COULD BE RESOLVED IN A MANNER SATISFACTORY TO BOTH PARTIES.

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10. SHAMIR THANKED ME FOR MY EFFORTS BUT SAID HE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT LEBANON WAS NOT INTERESTED IN AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. THEY HAD ONLY GIVEN ISRAEL REASONS WHY THE IDF WOULD HAVE TO STAY IN LEBANON IN VIEW OF THE ABSENCE OF SUFFICIENT ASSURANCES THAT THE PLO WILL NOT BE ABLE TO COME BACK INTO THE AREA. I INTERRUPTED TO SAY THAT THE LEBANESE ALSO THOUGHT ISRAEL WAS NOT INTERESTED IN A WITHDRAWAL, THOUGH I HAD HASTENED TO ASSURE THE LEBANESE LEADERS THAT THIS WAS NOT ISRAEL'S INTENT. CONTINUING, SHAMIR SAID ISRAEL COULD NOT FORGET THE EXPERIENCE OF THE PAST TEN YEARS AND SAID HE THOUGHT THAT LEBANON WAS NOT READY TO "CONTRIBUTE ANYTHING IN THE FIELD OF SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WILL SATISFY US IN THE SMALLEST DEGREE". HE SAID, WITH QUIET SARCASM, THAT LEBANON WAS READY TO GRANT A FAVOR TO ISRAEL BY AGREEING TO CONSULT, POSSIBLY AT THE CHIEF-OF-STAFF LEVEL, FROM TIME TO TIME, BUT THIS "KINDNESS" WAS NOT SUFFICIENT FOR ISRAEL. HE STATED HE SAW NO FURTHER BASIS FOR CONTINUED NEGOTIATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS AND SAID

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THAT ISRAEL MIGHT HAVE TO COME BACK TO ITS ORIGINAL NEGOTIATING POSITIONS. HE THEN PROCEEDED TO DESCRIBE ISRAEL'S EARLIER DEMANDS, INCLUDING THE FIVE OBSERVATION POSTS. IF LEBANON WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT

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THE ORIGINAL ISRAELI PROPOSALS, SHAMIR COMMENTED, THEN ISRAEL WOULD BE READY TO WITHDRAW AT ANY MOMENT.

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11. I VIGOROUSLY RIPOSTED THAT WE COULD NOT ACCEPT SHAMIR'S DESCRIPTION OF THE LEBANESE POSITION. I PROCEEDED TO OUTLINE LEBANESE WILLINGNESS TO ESTABLISH A SUBSTANTIAL SECURITY ZONE, TO ACCEPT WEAPONS AND MANPOWER LIMITATIONS, AND TO ESTABLISH EFFECTIVE SUPERVISORY AND COORDINATION MECHANISMS. BEYOND THIS, I TOLD SHAMIR I WAS CONVINCED THAT THERE WAS A CLEARCUT DECISION AND CONSENSUS AMONG ALL LEBANESE NOT TO ALLOW THE PLO TO COME BACK INTO THEIR COUNTRY IN ANY MANNER OR DEGREE. THE LEBANESE KNEW THAT THE PLO HAD RUINED THEIR COUNTRY AND WERE NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT A SIMILAR REOCCURENCE IN THE FUTURE. THE GOVERNMENT WAS PREPARED, AND HAD THE GROWING CAPABILITY, TO DO WHATEVER WAS NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE THAT OBJECTIVE.

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12. AT THIS POINT CHIEF OF STAFF-DESIGNATE LEVY SAID THAT HE DID NOT QUESTION LEBANESE WILL OR INTENTION, BUT ASKED WHETHER I HONESTLY BELIEVED THAT THEY WERE PREPARED IN TERMS OF MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES TO SECURE THE SOUTHERN ZONE. HE SAID IT TAKES YEARS TO BUILD SUCH A FORCE; IT REALLY COULD NOT BE DONE IN A MATTER OF A FEW WEEKS. I REPLIED THAT WE WERE ALREADY EMBARKED ON AN INTENSIVE TRAINING PROGRAM, INVOLVING EXPERIENCED AMERICAN MILITARY OFFICERS. SEVENTY-FIVE MILITARY ADVISERS WERE ALREADY IN LEBANON. BASED ON THEIR EXPERIENCE AND THEIR REPORTS, IT WAS EVIDENT THAT THESE ADVISERS FELT THE LEBANESE HAD THE CAPABILITY TO DO THE JOB.

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AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY

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EXDIS

FROM HABIB

I POINTED OUT THAT THE LAF WAS NOT GOING TO FIGHT THE SYRIANS OR THE ISRAELIS BUT WOULD RATHER BE AN INSTRUMENT TO PREVENT AND ELIMINATE SUBVERSIVE ELEMENTS WHICH REPRESENTED A THREAT TO BOTH LEBANON AND ISRAEL. ARENS SAID THE QUESTION OF LEBANESE CAPABILITY WAS ESSENTIALLY NOT A MILITARY ISSUE IN THE LEBANESE CONTEXT. HE POINTED TO THE DIFFICULTIES OF BUILDING A NATIONAL ARMY BASED ON DIVERSE CONFESSIONAL GROUPS AND REFERRED TO ISRAEL'S CARE IN EMPLOYING ISRAELI-DRUZE OFFICERS DURING THE LEBANESE OPERATION. I REPLIED THAT THE LEBANESE WERE FULLY AWARE TO THE NEED TO CAREFULLY STRUCTURE THEIR BATTALIONS AND THEN ASKED GEN. COOLEY TO

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GIVE HIS ASSESSMENT OF LEBANESE CAPABILITIES.

13. COOLEY REVIEWED THE COMMITMENT OF GEN. TANNOUS TO BUILDING A NATIONAL ARMY. HE SAID THAT TANNOUS WAS A GOOD SOLDIER AND LEADER AND ALSO HAD EXCELLENT LOGISTICAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL SKILLS. HE POINTED OUT THAT THERE HAD RECENTLY BEEN 2,600 LEBANESE VOLUNTEERS FOR THE ARMY, OF WHOM 600 WERE PRESENTLY IN TRAINING. IT WAS ALSO ENCOURAGING THAT THEY WERE APPROXIMATELY EVENLY SPLIT BETWEEN CHRISTIANS AND MUSLIMS. BASED ON HIS PERSONAL OBSERVATION OF THE LAF AND THE ONGOING TRAINING PROGRAMS, COOLEY THOUGHT THAT THE LEBANESE MILITARY HAD THE CAPABILITY TO ASSERT GOVERNMENT PRESENCE AND CONTROL, ESPECIALLY IN SOUTH LEBANON. IT WAS ALSO IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT THE LAF ENJOYED BROAD POPULAR SUPPORT WHICH IS AN IMPORTANT, INDEED ESSENTIAL, INGREDIENT IN COMBATTING TERRORISM. SHAMIR REPLIED THAT HE WAS SKEPTICAL OF LEBANESE CAPABILITIES AND SUGGESTED THAT IF ONE COULD ONLY

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ACCEPT THE ISRAELI PROPOSALS, THEY COULD BE REVIEWED AFTER THREE MONTHS TO DETERMINE IF THEY WERE NECESSARY.

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14. DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER BEN-MEIR CHIMED IN TO SAY HE WAS ALSO DISAPPOINTED IN OUR RESPONSE. HE CLAIMED THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD ALREADY RETREATED A LONG WAY FROM THEIR ORIGINAL POSITIONS AND WERE NOW BEING ASKED TO GO EVEN FURTHER, "MORE THAN HALF-WAY", HE SAID. HE SAID THAT ISRAEL HAD GONE TO ROCK BOTTOM AND NEEDED TO HAVE A TANGIBLE ASSURANCE THAT ISRAEL COULD DEPEND ON THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE. SHAMIR ALSO SAID ISRAEL NEEDED TO HAVE CONFIDENCE

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IN THE MEN WITH WHOM IT WOULD BE DEALING AND TALKING TO ON A DAILY BASIS AFTER WITHDRAWAL.

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15. I STATED THAT BOTH SIDES WERE GOING BACK TO THEIR INITIAL POSITIONS AND SAID FIRMLY ONE SHOULD NOT IGNORE WHAT HAD ALREADY BEEN AGREED TO. THESE INCLUDED THE INTEGRATION OF HADDAD'S FORCES, A TERRITORIAL ASSIGNMENT FOR THE BRIGADE, AND LOCAL RECRUITMENT INTO THE BRIGADE. I ALSO SAID THAT A GREAT DEAL HAD BEEN ACCOMPLISHED IN THE FIELD OF NORMALIZATION AND THAT WE NOW HAD THE MAKINGS OF A WELL-INTEGRATED AGREEMENT. IT SHOULD BE LOOKED AT AS A TOTAL PACKAGE, IN WHICH THERE WOULD BE A SECURITY ZONE, SUPERVISORY TEAMS, OPERATIONS CENTERS, AND THE OFFICE FOR THE MILITARY COMMITTEE. WHILE IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO GIVE A TOTAL GUARANTEE, I FELT STRONGLY THAT THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WERE SUFFICIENTLY SPELLED OUT TO GIVE ISRAEL CONFIDENCE IN THE FUTURE. SHAMIR AGAIN REPLIED HE COULD NOT SEE ANY PRACTICAL FORMS OF COOPERATION. AS AN EXAMPLE, HE CITED THAT THE LEBANESE WERE NOT READY TO ACCEPT THE CONCEPT OF JOINT PATROLS. I REPLIED THAT LEBANON ACCEPTED THE CONCEPT OF JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS TO CHECK WHAT WAS GOING ON IN THE SECURITY ZONE, THOUGH AS I PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED THE SIZE, NUMBERS, AND TASKS OF THE TEAMS NEEDED FURTHER DISCUSSION. AT THIS POINT SHAMIR SAID HE WOULD HAVE TO CONSULT WITH HIS COLLEAGUES AND DETERMINE WHETHER IT WOULD BE WORTHWHILE TO GO AHEAD WITH THE SCHEDULED MEETING IN NETANYA ON FRIDAY. I SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT TO HAVE THE MEETING AND TO DISCUSS RESPECTIVE CONCERNS AND POSITIONS ON THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE AND OTHER SECURITY ISSUES. OTHERWISE, WE WOULD BE GOING BACK SIX MONTHS AND

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EXDIS

FROM HABIB

THERE WOULD BE LITTLE REASON FOR ME TO REMAIN IN
THE AREA.

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*6. I REPEATED THAT IF WE COULD GET OVER
THE HADDAD ISSUE, I WAS CERTAIN WE WOULD BE ABLE
TO ARRIVE AT A SATISFACTORY COMPROMISE ON THE OTHER
SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE SOUTH. ARENS SAID
THE CRUX OF THE PROBLEM IS THAT NO ONE COULD PRE-
DICT WITH ANY DEGREE OF CERTAINTY WHAT WOULD
HAPPEN AFTER WITHDRAWAL. THERE WERE DIFFERENT
ESTIMATES. INITIALLY, ISRAEL HAD THOUGHT THAT
THE BEST SOLUTION WOULD BE TO HAVE A CONTINUING
ISRAELI PRESENCE IN SOUTH LEBANON TO MAKE CERTAIN

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THAT SOMETHING WOULD BE DONE IF TERRORISTS' THREATS EMERGED. ISRAEL HAD THEN PROPOSED ANOTHER ALTERNATIVE WHICH WAS BASED ON THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE. IN THIS CONTEXT, ARENS STATED IT WAS IMPORTANT TO HAVE A COMMANDER OF THE BRIGADE, NAMELY HADDAD, IN WHOM ISRAEL HAD SUFFICIENT CONFIDENCE. HE SAID THIS WOULD DECREASE THE RISK FOR ISRAEL. I REPLIED THAT EVEN IF ONE ASSUMED A CONTINUING ISRAELI PRESENCE IN LEBANON, THERE WOULD BE AN ELEMENT OF RISK. I AGAIN REPEATED THAT I HAD TRIED VARIOUS ALTERNATIVES WITH THE LEBANESE ON HADDAD BUT HAD GOTTEN NOWHERE.

17. AT THIS POINT SHAMIR, IN AN EFFORT POSSIBLY TO DEFLECT THE OBVIOUS IMPASSE IN OUR DISCUSSION, ASKED WHAT I COULD SAY ABOUT THE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE LEBANESE AND THE SYRIANS. I WENT INTO CONSIDERABLE DETAIL IN DESCRIBING OBEID'S EFFORTS AND THE LEBANESE CONVERSATIONS WITH ASSAD AND KHADDAM IN NEW DELHI AND BETWEEN SALEM AND KHADDAM IN LONDON. BOTH IN NEW DELHI AND LONDON THE SYRIANS HAD ACCEPTED THE CONCEPT OF SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL. THE LEBANESE HAD ALSO EXPLAINED THAT THE SYRIANS HAD TO UNDERSTAND THAT LEBANON WOULD GO AS FAR AS IT WOULD HAVE TO IN THE AGREEMENT ON MUTUAL RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL IN ORDER TO OBTAIN AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. IN OTHER WORDS, THE SYRIANS WOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO DICTATE WHAT SORT OF ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE AGREED TO ON THE ISRAELI-LEBANESE BORDER. WE ALSO BRIEFLY REVIEWED THE POW-MIA QUESTION.

18. IN SUMMING UP, SHAMIR SAID THE PROBLEM WAS

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NOW ONE OF SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. (HE DID NOT REFER TO NORMALIZATION ACTIVITIES AS AN OBSTACLE.) I SAID THAT IF ISRAEL WAS PREPARED TO MAKE THAT ONE MOVE WITH RESPECT TO HADDAD, THEN I BELIEVED ISRAEL WOULD HAVE AN AGREEMENT WITH LEBANON IN ITS HAND. THIS ISSUE HAD BECOME THE CRUX OF THE MATTER. IF ISRAEL COULD TAKE THIS STEP I WAS CERTAIN THAT IT WOULD HAVE ESTABLISHED THE BASIS FOR A LONG-TERM AND SOLID RELATIONSHIP WITH LEBANON. ON THE OTHER HAND IF THERE WERE NO WITHDRAWAL, ONE COULD

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NOT PREDICT WHAT WOULD HAPPEN EXCEPT THAT THE PROSPECT OF ACHIEVING A UNIFIED AND STRONG LEBANON WOULD DRAMATICALLY DIMINISH. THIS WAS NEITHER IN ISRAEL'S INTEREST OR OURS. SHAMIR REITERATED THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO CONSULT AND WOULD LET US KNOW IF THERE WERE ANY CHANGE OF PLAN FOR THE FRIDAY MEETING IN NETANYA. I REITERATED THE IMPORTANCE OF MOVING AHEAD. GROVE

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EX DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PINS, MOPS, LE, IS, US
SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: MEETING WITH PRIME
MINISTER AL-WAZZAN

1. [REDACTED]
2. JOINED BY POLOFF CROCKER, I MET WITH PRIME MINISTER SHAFIQ AL-WAZZAN FOR 30 MINUTES ON MARCH 22. I DID NOT GO INTO SPECIFICS WITH HIM ON THE U.S. "NON-PAPER" OF MARCH 16 OR INITIAL ISRAELI RESPONSES TO IT, SIMPLY NOTING THAT HE WOULD HAVE SEEN REPORTS FROM SA'B SALAM AND FOREIGN MINISTER SALIM.
3. AL-WAZZAN BEGAN BY EMPHASIZING THAT THE LEBANESE

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WORKING PAPER (OF LATE FEBRUARY) REPRESENTED THE GOVERNMENT'S LAST WORD: IT WOULD BE "VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO CHANGE A COMMA." THE WORLD, AND IN PARTICULAR ISRAEL, SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT LEBANON WAS UNANIMOUS IN ITS SUPPORT FOR THE ARMY AND DESIRE TO HAVE ALL FOREIGN FORCES AND "TERRORISTS" OUT. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CONSCRIPTION, FOR THE FIRST TIME IN LEBANON'S HISTORY, WOULD PROVIDE A LARGE, CONFESSIONALLY BALANCED ARMY. AT THE SAME TIME,

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POPULAR SUPPORT FOR THE LAF WOULD ENSURE SUCCESS FOR ITS MISSION: THOSE WHO REMAIN PASSIVE WHEN ISRAELIS ARE ATTACKED IN SOUTH LEBANON WOULD ACTIVELY ASSIST THE LEBANESE ARMY IN GUARANTEEING SECURITY. AL-WAZZAN WAS EMPHATIC ON SA'AD HADDAD -- "A SYMBOL OF TREASON" -- MAINTAINING AS GEMAYEL AND OTHERS HAVE DONE THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO HAVE THE ISRAELIS THEMSELVES IN SOUTH LEBANON RATHER THAN AN ISRAELI PUPPET.

4. IN RESPONSE TO MY QUESTIONS ABOUT MEETINGS WITH ARAFAT IN NEW DELHI AND PALESTINIAN ATTITUDES ON WITHDRAWAL, AL-WAZZAN SAID THAT ARAFAT HAD REPEATED HIS READINESS TO REMOVE HIS FORCES, AND HE BELIEVED THIS WAS IN FACT THE CASE: ONE ILLUSTRATION OF PALESTINIAN WILLINGNESS TO LEAVE WAS THE FACT THAT THE PLO IS ALREADY ASKING FOR LEBANESE HELP IN LOCATING DESTINATIONS FOR FIGHTERS. THE GOVERNMENT WOULD STAY IN TOUCH WITH THE PLO THROUGH QURAYTIM AND UBAYD, AL-WAZZAN SAID, BUT IT IS DIFFICULT TO GO MUCH FURTHER BEFORE AN AGREEMENT IS REACHED WITH THE ISRAELIS.

5. AT THE END OF OUR MEETING, AL-WAZZAN RETURNED TO THE THEME THAT LEBANON COULD OFFER NO FURTHER

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CONCESSIONS TO THE ISRAELIS. IN AN INDIRECT REFERENCE TO SECRET AGREEMENTS, HE MAINTAINED THAT WHAT WAS DECIDED "WITHIN FOUR WALLS" WOULD EVENTUALLY HAVE TO BE PRESENTED TO THE 92 MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WHOSE VIEWS SPAN THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM. DILLON

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EO Citations

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AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM

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EXD DECAPTIONED

E.O. 12356: DECL/OADR
TAGS: PREL, IS, LE, US
SUBJECT: BRIEFING ON VISIT BY ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER
SHAMIR AND LEBANESE FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM

REF: STATE 74735

1. [REDACTED]
2. IN PLACE OF REFTEL, ACTION ADDRESSEES MAY USE
FOLLOWING IN BRIEFING HOST GOVERNMENTS, IF REQUIRED. FYI
ONLY FOR INFO ADDRESSEES.
3. BEGIN TEXT:

-- THE VISITS TO WASHINGTON OF FOREIGN MINISTERS SHAMIR
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AND SALEM HAVE PROVIDED US AN OPPORTUNITY FOR A THOROUGH
REVIEW OF THE REMAINING ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED IN THE
TROOP WITHDRAWAL NEGOTIATIONS AND HEAR THEIR CONCERNS AS
WELL AS EXPRESS OUR OWN VIEWS ON THE NEED FOR RAPID
PROGRESS. THIS LATTER POINT -- THE NEED FOR RAPID
PROGRESS -- WAS STRESSED BY THE PRESDENT TO BOTH SHAMIR
AND SALEM. IN ADDITION, THE PRESIDENT STRESSED HIS
DETERMINATION TO SHAMIR TO PRESS AHEAD WITH THE PEACE
INITIATIVE HE LAUNCHED ON SEPTEMBER 1.

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-- THE MEETINGS WE HELD WITH BOTH DELEGATIONS, WHICH BEGAN ON MARCH 12 AND ENDED MARCH 16, WERE INTENSIVE AND LENGTHY. THE PRESIDENT MET WITH SHAMIR MONDAY AFTERNOON AND SAW SALEM ON WEDNESDAY. HIS MEETING WITH THE ISRAELI AND LEBANESE FOREIGN MINISTERS IS A CLEAR INDICATION OF THE IMPORTANCE HE ATTACHES TO SUCCESSFUL AND RAPID COMPLETION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

-- WE HAD NOT ANTICIPATED A DRAMATIC BREAKTHROUGH AS A RESULT OF THE TALKS AND NO SUCH BREAKTHROUGH HAS OCCURRED. WE DO BELIEVE PROGRESS IS BEING MADE BUT LESS IN THE SENSE OF NARROWING DIFFERENCES THAN IN PERFECTING THE APPRECIATION BY LEADERS OF BOTH THESE GOVERNMENTS OF EACH OTHER'S VIEWS AND OF HOW TO PROCEED.

-- OUR CONCERN WITH RESPECT TO ACHIEVING A STABLE LEBANON AND ENSURING THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL'S NORTHERN BORDER REMAINS UNCHANGED. QUESTIONS AS TO HOW BEST TO ACCOMPLISH OUR OBJECTIVES HAVE BEEN CENTRAL TO OUR DISCUSSIONS.

-- THE ISRAELI DELEGATION CAME HERE AT ISRAEL'S REQUEST FOR A THOROUGH PRESENTATION OF THE ISRAELI POSITION IN

[REDACTED]

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THE NEGOTIATIONS.

-- THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY MADE CLEAR TO THE ISRAELI DELEGATION THAT A RESIDUAL ISRAELI MILITARY PRESENCE WOULD PREVENT THE AGREEMENT FOR WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES (SYRIAN AND PLO) AND THEREFORE, THIS WAS NOT A POSITION THAT WE COULD SUPPORT.

-- AMBASSADOR PHILIP HABIB, AMBASSADOR DRAPER AND HIS TEAM HAVE RETURNED TO THE AREA IN ORDER TO HELP THE PARTIES ARRIVE QUICKLY AT AN AGREEMENT.

-- WE HAVE NOTED THE RECENT PUBLIC STATEMENTS REFLECTING SYRIAN AND PLO INTENTIONS TO WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON IF ISRAEL DOES. WE HOPE THIS IS AN ACCURATE REFLECTION OF THEIR POSITIONS. WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT ACHIEVEMENT OF AN AGREEMENT FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WILL PROVIDE A MAJOR INCENTIVE FOR THE SYRIANS AND THE PLO TO LEAVE LEBANON.

-- OUR DISCUSSION WITH BOTH DELEGATIONS WERE BASED ON OUR POLICY OBJECTIVES, WHICH WERE FIRST OUTLINED LAST FALL BY THE PRESIDENT AND WHICH ARE FAMILIAR TO YOU. THEY ARE THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH AMBASSADORS HABIB AND DRAPER HAVE BEEN CONDUCTING THESE PAST MONTHS.

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1) THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES -- ISRAELI, SYRIAN AND PLO. ALL ARMED ELEMENTS REMAINING IN LEBANON MUST BE SUBJECT TO THE CONTROL OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. THIS INCLUDES THE MILITIA FORCES IN THE SOUTH.

2) ARRANGEMENTS TO ASSURE THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL'S NORTHERN BORDER.

3) THE RESTORATION OF A STABLE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN

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LEBANON.

4) THE EXTENSION OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY THROUGHOUT ITS TERRITORY.

5) ARRANGMENTS TO ASSURE THE SECURITY OF ALL RESIDENTS OF LEBANON, INCLUDING THE PALESTINIANS.

-- WHILE MANY ISSUES HAVE BEEN DEALT WITH AND AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, WE ARE NOW AT THE POINT OF ADDRESSING THE REMAINING CORE ISSUES. WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT MOMENTUM IS NOT LOST AND THAT A TIMETABLE FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON BE WORKED OUT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THE PRESIDENT IS PERSONALLY COMMITTED TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THIS IMPORTANT OBJECTIVE, AS EVIDENCED BY HIS MEETING WITH SHAMIR AND HIS MEETING WITH SALEM.

--- ONCE AN AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN TROOPS, IT WILL BE CLEAR TO WHAT EXTENT AN INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE IS NEEDED TO ASSIST THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES. THE U.S. CONTINUES TO SEE AN IMPORTANT ROLE FOR THE 6,000 UNIFIL TROOPS CURRENTLY IN LEBANON. THERE IS ALSO A NEED FOR A MULTINATIONAL FORCE. ITS OBJECTIVES WOULD BE TO FACILITATE THE WITHDRAWAL PROCESS AND TO ASSIST THE LEBANESE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN RE-ESTABLISHING ITS CONTROL THROUGHOUT LEBANON.

-- IT IS STILL PREMATURE TO DEFINE WHAT THE MNF'S ROLE WILL BE BUT WE DO NOT FORESEE IT ACTING AS A UNIFIL-TYPE FORCE IN SOUTHERN LEBANON.

-- WE WILL CONTINUE TO STRIVE TO SEE FULL PEACE,

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SECURITY AND NORMAL RELATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EACH OF
HER NEIGHBORS, AND TO RESOLVE THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM IN
ALL ITS ASPECTS. THIS IS THE BASIC MESSAGE IN THE

PROPOSALS OUTLINED IN THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE OF
SEPTEMBER 1. AT PRESENT, PROGRESS TOWARD THIS GOAL WITH
LEBANON MUST BE CONDITIONED BY LEBANESE JUDGMENTS OF WHAT
IS POSSIBLE, CONSISTENT WITH THEIR NEED FOR INTERNAL
STABILITY AND ESSENTIAL RELATIONS WITH OTHER ARAB
COUNTRIES. DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS WE HAVE BEEN
SUPPORTING PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS CONSISTENT WITH THE
PEACEFUL RELATIONSHIP WE WANT TO ENCOURAGE. ISRAEL IS NO
LONGER PRESSING ITS CASE FOR IMMEDIATE FULL NORMALIZATION
OF RELATIONS WITH LEBANON.

-- THIS VISIT ALSO AFFORDED US THE OPPORTUNITY TO LISTEN
TO AND EXCHANGE VIEWS ON BROADER ISRAELI SECURITY
CONCERNS, WITH A PARTICULAR FOCUS ON THE RECENT
INTRODUCTION OF SOVIET SA-5 MISSILES INTO SYRIA. WE
BELIEVE THAT THE INTRODUCTION OF THESE ADVANCED WEAPONS
CONSTITUTES A THREAT NOT ONLY TO THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL
BUT TO THE SECURITY OF THE ENTIRE REGION AS WELL.

END TEXT SHULTZ

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, XF, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: MEETINGS IN LEBANON
MARCH 21-22

1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY. WE HAD LENGTHY MEETINGS TODAY, MARCH 22, WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AND HIS CLOSEST ADVISERS. THE LEBANESE HAVE BEEN DISHEARTENED AND EVEN A BIT OUTRAGED BY THE LATEST TURN OF EVENTS. THEY QUESTION ISRAEL'S GOOD FAITH AND STILL FIND ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO UNDERSTAND ISRAEL'S INSISTENCE ON MAKING HADDAD THE CORNERSTONE OF THE SECURITY AGREEMENT. THE LEBANESE SAID THAT THE ISRAELIS HAVE POCKETED THE POSITIVE PROPOSALS IN

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THE U.S. "NON-PAPER" OF MARCH 16 AND THEN HAD MADE NEW DEMANDS. CONSEQUENTLY, GEMAYEL SAID THAT LEBANON'S POSITION WOULD RETURN TO THAT FORMULATED IN BEIRUT DURING THEIR MARATHON SESSION WITH US ON FEBRUARY 23-27 (IN EFFECT RETREATING FROM THEIR AGREEMENT ON THE NON-PAPER).

3. I STRESSED REPEATEDLY THAT THERE ALWAYS WILL BE UPS AND DOWNS IN NEGOTIATIONS. THIS IS PART OF THE

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PICTURE. WHEN PRESSED AS TO U.S. INTENTIONS, I CITED CHAPTER AND VERSE ON EXPRESSIONS OF U.S. SUPPORT FOR LEBANON'S FUTURE UP TO AND INCLUDING PRESIDENT REAGAN. I FROWNED AT IDEAS FOR MOUNTING A LEBANESE PROPAGANDA OFFENSIVE. DRAPER AND I PRESSED GENERAL TANNOUS PARTICULARLY FIRMLY TO USE NEXT FRIDAY'S NEGOTIATING SESSION AT NETANYA TO PRESENT A DETAILED PROPOSAL FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE IN SOUTHERN LEBANON AND THE INTEGRATION OF HADDAD'S FORCES, POINTING OUT THAT A THOUGHTFUL AND DETAILED PRESENTATION COULD HELP BUILD ISRAELI CONFIDENCE IN LEBANON'S ABILITIES AS WELL AS ITS GOODWILL.

4. HABIB AND DRAPER PLAN TO RETURN TO ISRAEL TOMORROW, MARCH 23, TO REVIEW THE LEBANESE POSITION WITH THE ISRAELIS AND TO EXAMINE POSSIBLE NEXT STEPS. ROSS AND KRECZKO WILL STAY BEHIND TO REVIEW WITH FATTAL AND PERHAPS WITH SALEM DRAFT LANGUAGE COVERING NOT ONLY THE UMBRELLA AGREEMENT, BUT ALSO ALL THE SIDE UNDERSTANDINGS AND ORAL ASSURANCES WHICH MAY HAVE TO BE PROVIDED BY ONE SIDE OR ANOTHER. WE WILL THEN HAVE A COMPREHENSIVE AND INTEGRAL PACKAGE FROM WHICH TO WORK IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AHEAD. END SUMMARY.

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5. AMBASSADORS HABIB, DRAPER, AND DILLON, JOINED BY ROSS, AND GEN. COOLEY, MET WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AND HIS TEAM (FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM, HADDAD, TUENI, FATTAL, AND GEN. TANNOUS) FOR NEARLY FOUR HOURS MARCH 22 TO REVIEW THE ISRAELI COMMENTS ON THE U.S. NON-PAPER ON MARCH 16 AND TO ELICIT A LEBANESE REACTION. TO PREPARE GEMAYEL AND HIS GROUP, HABIB HAD BRIEFED FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM ON THE GENERAL LINES OF THE ISRAELI POSITION THE EVENING OF MARCH 21.

6. IT WAS EVIDENT FROM THE OUTSET THAT THE LEBANESE WERE PROFOUNDLY DISTURBED BY THE LATEST TURN OF EVENTS. GEMAYEL, OBVIOUSLY PRIMED BY SALEM'S BRIEFING, PREEMPTED HABIB'S OPENING REMARKS TO INSIST THAT LEBANON'S NEGOTIATING POSITION REMAINED AS FORMULATED DURING THE MARATHON SESSIONS WITH THE HABIB TEAM ON FEBRUARY 23-27 (WHICH WOULD CONSTITUTE A RETREAT FROM LEBANON'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE NON-PAPER). HE QUESTIONED ISRAEL'S DESIRE TO REACH AGREEMENT, DESCRIBING ITS INSISTENCE ON MAKING SA'D HADDAD THE CORNERSTONE OF THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE SOUTH AS CLEAR EVIDENCE OF ITS ILL WILL. LEBANON, HE SAID, HAD ADOPTED ITS POSITION ON THE IDEAS IN THE U.S. NON-PAPER WITH GREAT DIFFICULTY AND AT THE RISK OF ALIENATING SAUDI ARABIA AND THE GULF STATES. IT COULD GO NO FURTHER, AND IT WAS NOW ANXIOUS

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TO KNOW WHAT THE U.S. POSITION WOULD BE IN THE FACE OF ISRAEL'S ATTITUDE. (COMMENT: THE THEMES IN GEMAYEL'S INTRODUCTION WERE REPEATED AGAIN AND AGAIN BY HIS VARIOUS SUBORDINATES DURING THE MEETING.

7. HABIB RESPONDED THAT WE HAD ALREADY PRESENTED LEBANON'S POSITION TO THE ISRAELIS IN THE MANNER

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FROM HABIB/DRAPER

GEMAYEL HAD DESCRIBED. THE WASHINGTON TALKS HAD, HOWEVER, REVEALED MAJOR CONTINUING DIFFERENCES ON THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. THE WIDE GAPS AND LACK OF

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PROGRESS HAD PROMPTED US TO SEARCH FOR STRENGTHENING MEASURES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF CONCEPTS ACCEPTABLE TO THE LEBANESE IN ORDER TO SATISFY THE ISRAELIS AND OBTAIN ANY RESIDUAL ISRAELI MILITARY PRESENCE. THE RESULT, ON THE BASIS OF DISCUSSIONS WITH BOTH THE LEBANESE AND THE ISRAELIS IN WASHINGTON, HAD BEEN OUR NON-PAPER OF MARCH 16. SINCE THEN, THE ISRAELIS HAD SUBMITTED THEIR "PRELIMINARY COMMENTS" TO THE NON-PAPER. SOME OF THESE PRESENTED NO PROBLEMS BUT WE HAD MADE CLEAR OUR

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DISAPPOINTMENT WITH OTHERS.

8. HABIB THEN WENT THROUGH THE ISRAELI COMMENTS AND OUR OWN REACTIONS TO THESE COMMENTS POINT BY POINT. HE FOLLOWED THE POINTS REPORTED FROM THE MARCH 20 MEETING WITH SHAMIR (JERUSALEM 996). HABIB HIGHLIGHTED AS MOST SIGNIFICANT THE ISSUES OF HADDAD, THE COMPOSITION OF THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE, THE QUESTION OF "PATROLS", AND UNIFIL. ALL IN ALL, HE SAID, IT WAS QUITE OBVIOUS THAT THERE WAS A PROBLEM. THE BASIC U.S. POSITION WAS THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS PROPOSED IN THE ISRAELI "COMMENTS" WENT BEYOND WHAT LEBANON COULD ACCEPT AND MADE IT HIGHLY LIKELY THAT SYRIA WOULD NOT WITHDRAW. THE BASIC ISRAELI POSITION RESTED ON THE PRESUMPTION THAT THE LEBANESE ARMY DID NOT HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO ASSURE THE SECURITY OF THE SOUTH, CONTRARY TO OUR VIEW AS PRESENTED IN WASHINGTON.

9. TO STIMULATE A LEBANESE RESPONSE, HABIB SAID HE HAD AGREED TO COME TO LEBANON TO HEAR THE LEBANESE POSITION AGAIN WITH AN OPEN MIND, EVEN THOUGH THE VARIOUS ISSUES HAD BEEN FULLY DISCUSSED ALREADY IN WASHINGTON. PERHAPS THE ISRAELIS WERE LOOKING FOR A COUNTER-PROPOSAL. IT MIGHT BE USEFUL, FOR INSTANCE, TO PRESENT A DETAILED PLAN FOR THE INTEGRATION OF HADDAD'S FORCES.

10. THE LEBANESE RESPONSE TOOK THE FORM OF SUCCESSIVE EXPRESSIONS OF DISAPPOINTMENT AND BARELY MUTED ANGER. TAKING THEIR LEAD FROM GEMAYEL, WHO HAD TO LEAVE THE MEETING FOR AN HOUR, HIS SUBORDINATES RESISTED HABIB'S ATTEMPTS TO ENGAGE ON SPECIFICS, COMPLAINING THAT ONCE MORE ISRAEL HAD POCKETED LEBANON'S CONCESSIONS AND WAS

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SEEKING TO EXTRACT MORE BY ENGAGING IN "RETROGRESSIVE, ESCALATORY" TACTICS. IF WAS UNFAIR, THEY SAID. WADI' HADDAD IN PARTICULAR REPEATED THE POINT MADE BY GEMAYEL THAT, IF THE ISRAELIS REJECTED THE U.S. NON-PAPER, LEBANON WOULD GO BACK TO THE FEBRUARY 23-27 PROPOSALS. LEBANON HAD ACCEPTED THE NON-PAPER ONLY IF ISRAEL ACCEPTED IT, AND IT WOULD NOT NEGOTIATE FURTHER CONCESSIONS BEYOND IT.

11. AFTER SUGGESTING THAT THE ISSUE OF SA'D HADDAD AND HIS BRIGADE MIGHT BE THE MAIN STICKING POINTS AND THAT OTHER ISSUES MIGHT FALL INTO PLACE IF THEY WERE RESOLVED, HABIB ASKED WHETHER ANY OF THE MEASURES THE ISRAELIS WERE PROPOSING ON THE HADDAD ISSUE MIGHT BE POSSIBLE ON A TEMPORARY BASIS, I.E., FOR ONE OR TWO YEARS. SALEM REJECTED THIS IDEA FIRMLY. NO AGREEMENT WAS POSSIBLE ON THIS BASIS, HE SAID, BECAUSE ITS "POLITICAL COLOR" WOULD BE ALL WRONG. LEBANON COULD RESPOND TO HABIB'S PRESENTATION POINT BY POINT, BUT IT WOULD COME BACK IN EACH CASE TO ITS POSITION OF FEBRUARY 23-27. THE ISRAELIS, SALEM COMPLAINED, DID NOT APPEAR TO HAVE ABSORBED THE FACT THAT LEBANON "DID NOT HAVE MUCH MEAT LEFT. IT WAS ALREADY CLOSE TO THE BONE."

12. IN THE FACE OF EVIDENT LEBANESE UNWILLINGNESS TO BE DRAWN INTO A DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THE ISRAELI COMMENTS, HABIB SUMMED UP THE LEBANESE POSITION AS HE UNDERSTOOD IT: LEBANON COULD NOT AGREE TO THE SCHEMA THAT THESE COMMENTS REPRESENTED, AND THEY THEREFORE COULD NOT BE TRANSLATED INTO THE FORMAL AGREEMENT. SALEM AGREED WITH THIS CHARACTERIZATION. HE WENT ON TO SAY, HOWEVER, THAT LEBANON COULD EXAMINE CHANGES IN THE U.S. NON-PAPER PROVIDED THIS WAS ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS. LEBANON WAS TIRED OF "WE GIVE, THEY TAKE" NEGOTIATIONS, AND IT WAS SURPRISED AND IN DESPAIR

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FROM HABIB/DRAPER

OVER THE ESCALATION THE ISRAELIS HAD INTRODUCED, PARTICULARLY ON HADDAD AND HIS BRIGADE AND ON THE "RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS" FOR THE JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS. (COMMENT: SALEM HAD NO SPECIFIC "RECIPROCAL" CHANGES TO SUGGEST.)

13. WHEN HABIB ASKED WHERE THE LEBANESE THOUGHT THE PROCESS SHOULD GO FROM HERE, SALEM RESPONDED WITH AN EMOTIONAL PLEA FOR U.S. HELP: "THE U.S., AS AN OBJECTIVE PARTNER, MUST SEE THAT ONE SIDE IS BEING FAIR, RATIONAL, AND ACCOMMODATING, WHILE THE OTHER SIDE IS BEING ELUSIVE. HOW CAN THE ISRAELIS BELIEVE THAT SA'D HADDAD CAN BE RETAINED? HOW CAN ISRAELI APC'S ROAM LEBANON? THE REACTION IN LEBANON, IN THE ARAB WORLD,

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AND FROM THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE DRAMATIC. LEBANON NEEDS U.S. HELP. WE WOULD RATHER REMAIN UNDER AN UNJUST ISRAELI OCCUPATION THAN LEGITIMIZE A SITUATION ESTABLISHED BY FORCE. YOU HAVE TO GET US OUT OF THIS IMPASSE."

14. GEMAYEL, ECHOED BY GEN. TANNOUS, ARGUED THAT THE LEBANESE ARMY, WITH THE ACTIVE SUPPORT OF THE POPULATION, COULD ASSURE THE SECURITY OF THE SOUTH IN THE INTEREST OF BOTH LEBANON AND ISRAEL. ANY OVERT ISRAELI PARTICIPATION IN THESE EFFORTS, SUCH AS BY JOINT PATROLS, WOULD TURN THE POPULATION AGAINST BOTH THE LEBANESE ARMY AND THE IDF, THUS CREATING AN ATMOSPHERE THAT WOULD BE VERY DANGEROUS FOR BOTH LEBANON AND ISRAEL. THE LEBANESE ARMY MUST BE RESPONSIBLE FOR SECURITY IN THE SOUTH. THE AGREED VERIFICATION AND REVIEW PROCEDURES WOULD ENSURE THAT ANY PROBLEMS WERE CORRECTED.

15. GEMAYEL REVEALED THE EXTENT OF THE DESPERATION THE LEBANESE ARE FEELING BY SHARING SOME OF HIS THOUGHTS ON THE "DANGEROUS" SITUATION IN THE SOUTH AND IN 'ALAYH AND SHUF DISTRICTS AND ON THE POSSIBLE NEED, "AS A LAST CARD," TO DECLARE "NATIONAL RESISTANCE" AGAINST THE ISRAELIS AND SYRIANS. BOTH, HE SAID, WERE EXPLOITING THE EXTREMISTS ON ALL SIDES, AND TIME WAS RUNNING OUT. THE MORE HE DELAYED, THE MORE DIFFICULT THE REUNIFICATION OF LEBANON WOULD BECOME. AN IRREVERSIBLE PHENOMENON WAS BEING CREATED. (GEMAYEL VENTED THESE FEELINGS

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FURTHER IN A ONE-ON-ONE. SEE BELOW.) AFTER GEMAYEL HAD LEFT THE MEETING, SALEM MENTIONED THE ADDITIONAL POSSIBILITY OF A "PROPAGANDA OFFENSIVE" IN THE U.S. AS A WAY OF TURNING ISRAEL TO A

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MORE POSITIVE DIRECTION. HE AND OTHERS CITED EXAMPLES OF LEBANESE FORBEARANCE IN NOT PUBLISHING INCIDENTS DETRIMENTAL TO ISRAEL'S IMAGE. I COUNSELED PATIENCE. LEBANON ALREADY HAD A GOOD PRESS.

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16. TANNOUS DESCRIBED HIS RECENT MEETINGS AND CORESPONDENCE WITH HADDAD, AS WELL AS FREQUENT CONTACTS WITH MEMBERS OF HADDAD'S FORCES. TANNOUS IS CONVINCED THAT HADDAD IS READY TO ACCEPT AN HONORABLE SOLUTION AND TO COOPERATE WITH THE GEMAYEL GOVERNMENT IN ALL WAYS. AN INCONCLUSIVE DISCUSSION TOOK PLACE AS TO WHETHER HADDAD COULD BE INDUCED TO ACCEPT A NEW ARRANGEMENT NOW, PRIOR TO ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, AND IT WAS THE CONSENSUS THAT THE ISRAELIS STILL HAVE TOO MUCH CONTROL AND INFLUENCE OVER HADDAD AND WOULD NOT ALLOW ANYTHING TO HAPPEN THAT WAS NOT OF THEIR LIKING.

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T7. DRAPER POINTED OUT TO TANNOUS THAT WE HAD HELPED ENGINEER A SPECIAL SESSION FOR NEXT FRIDAY TO EXPLORE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE. THIS OFFERED AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE LEBANESE TO COME UP WITH A THOUGHTFUL AND DETAILED PLAN FOR ESTABLISHING THE BRIGADE AND INTEGRATING HADDAD'S FORCES INTO IT. PROPERLY PRESENTED, THE LEBANESE POSITION COULD INFLUENCE THE ISRAELI ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE ABILITIES OF THE LEBANESE TO CARRY OUT THEIR OBLIGATIONS. I PRESSED TANNOUS ALSO TO SEND ADDITIONAL OFFICERS WHO KNOW THE SOUTH AND TO GET INTO THE FINE DETAILS.

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18. AT THE END OF THE GENERAL MEETINGS, HABIB ASKED TO SEE GEMAYEL ALONE FOR A FEW MINUTES. HE

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FROM HABIB/DRAPER.

DISCUSSED THE PROSPECT OF A SECRET MEETING BETWEEN FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM AND FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR. GEMAYEL AGAIN CONCLUDED THAT SUCH A MEETING WOULD BE PREMATURE AT THIS TIME, GIVEN THE PRESENT STATE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND, IN ANY EVENT, HE HAD RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE MEETING BECAUSE IT WOULD NOT BE KEPT SECRET. HE ACKNOWLEDGED HE WAS DISCOURAGED WITH THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS AND AGAIN WONDERED ALOUD WHETHER THE ISRAELIS WERE TRULY SERIOUS, PARTICULARLY IN INSISTING THAT HADDAD STAY IN SOUTHERN LEBANON. HE SAID HE FOUND IT HARD TO BELIEVE THAT ISRAEL COULD PUT SO MUCH POLICY EMPHASIS ON A SINGLE MAN, HADDAD.

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19. GEMAYEL ASKED HABIB WHETHER HE STILL HAD U.S. SUPPORT. GEMAYEL, HIMSELF, HAD HEARD THE PRESIDENT'S OWN WORDS DURING HIS WASHINGTON VISIT ASSURING HIM THAT THE U.S. WOULD NOT WANT TO DO ANYTHING THAT WOULD JEOPARDIZE HIS INTERNAL POLITICAL CONSENSUS OR HIS RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB WORLD. HABIB SAID THAT GEMAYEL MUST HAVE READ REPORTS OF THE MEETINGS THE LEBANESE DELEGATES HAD HAD LAST WEEK WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN AND SECRETARY SHULTZ. THEIR SUPPORT FOR LEBANON'S FUTURE WAS STRONG AND CLEAR.

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20. GEMAYEL THEN SAID THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO GO ON FOREVER IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS. HE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THE NEXT TWO TO THREE WEEKS WOULD BE CRITICALLY IMPORTANT. WHAT WOULD HAPPEN, HE ASKED RHETORICALLY, IF THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE NOT CONCLUDED BY THE END OF THIS PERIOD? HE SAID THAT U.S. CREDIBILITY WAS ALREADY AT STAKE, AND THAT A

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LONG DELAY IN COMPLETING THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD CAUSE SERIOUS DAMAGE TO U.S. INTERESTS IN LEBANON, "THE ROT WOULD BEGIN TO SET IN" AFTER ABOUT THREE WEEKS.

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21. GEMAYEL SAID THAT IN THIS CONNECTION, THE ISRAELIS AS THE OCCUPYING POWER WERE ALREADY INFLUENCING AND CHANGING THE POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND ECONOMIC STRUCTURE IN THE AREAS UNDER THEIR CONTROL. THEY WERE CHANGING THE SITUATION IN SOUTHERN LEBANON AND IN THE SHUF IN SUCH A WAY THAT IT MIGHT BECOME INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT FOR THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES TO ESTABLISH THE UNITY WHICH WAS SO BADLY NEEDED

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AFTER THE ISRAELIS LEFT. GEMAYEL SAID THAT HE HAD RECENTLY HAD A MEAL TOGETHER WITH WALID JUMBLATT, FADY FRAM AND CAMILLE SHAM'UN TO DISCUSS THE FUTURE OF THE SHUF. GEMAYEL SAID THAT HE HAD MADE IT PARTICULARLY CLEAR TO LEBANESE FORCES COMMANDER FRAM THAT HIS MEN WOULD HAVE TO BEHAVE AND NOT STIR UP TROUBLE. ALL THE PARTICIPANTS AT THE WORKING MEAL HAD AGREED THAT THE LAF WAS THE ANSWER TO THE PROBLEMS IN THE SHUF AND SHOULD GO INTO THAT AREA AS SOON AS FEASIBLE. THIS CONCLUSION, GEMAYEL SAID, ONCE AGAIN ILLUSTRATED THE FACT IT WAS THE LAF WHICH THE PEOPLE WANTED AND NOT THE IDF.

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22. HABIB ASKED GEMAYEL AT THE END OF THE MEETING WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN ANY FURTHER SECRET NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ISRAELIS, AND GEMAYEL RESPONDED IN THE NEGATIVE. HE SAID HOWEVER THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD BEEN IN CONSTANT TOUCH WITH TWO FORMER SECRET EMISSARIES TO TRY TO SET UP APPOINTMENTS FOR ISRAELIS TO MEET WITH HIM (GEMAYEL) OR FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM. HE NOTED THAT DAVID KIMCHE HAD EVEN TELEPHONED THE PALACE ONE DAY TO SEEK AN APPOINTMENT WITH A SENIOR STAFFER. GEMAYEL SAID THAT HE SAW NO VALUE IN SUCH CONTACTS AT THIS TIME.

23. THE MEETING ENDED WITH HABIB'S EXPLANATION THAT HE AND DRAPER INTENDED TO RETURN TO ISRAEL ON WEDNESDAY TO DESCRIBE THE LEBANESE POSITION AND TO EXPLORE NEXT STEPS THAT COULD BE UNDERTAKEN. DILLON

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MILITARY ADDEES TREAT AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

FROM AMBASSADOR DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, US, IS, XF

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SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: MEETING OF SECURITY
ARRANGEMENTS/WITHDRAWALS SUBCOMMITTEE, MARCH 21,
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1. [REDACTED]

2. SUMMARY. THE SUBCOMMITTEE SPENT A DESULTORY
HOUR AND A HALF TALKING AROUND THE REMAINING ISSUES
WITH NO PROGRESS. THE SESSION CONSISTED OF A ORAL**UNCLASSIFIED**

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REVIEW BY THE ISRAELI DELEGATION OF THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE DRAFT TEXT ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS DERIVED FROM THE FEBRUARY 26 NON-PAPER, OMITTING THAT PORTION DEALING WITH THE LOCAL FORCES, WHICH WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF THE MARCH 25 MEETING IN NATANYA. NO ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO RESOLVE DIFFERENCES IN THE TWO POSITIONS. THE ISRAELIS RAISED TWO POINTS FOR NEW OR RENEWED CONSIDERATION: IMMUNITY FOR MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE, THE JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS, AND INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL OPERATING IN THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER PARTY; AND THE PROHIBITION OF ANY INFRASTRUCTURE "CAPABLE OF ASSISTING THE ACTIVATION" OF WEAPONS NOT AUTHORIZED BY THE ANNEX OR ITS APPENDIX. END SUMMARY.

3. THE TWO DELEGATIONS AGREED TO SET ASIDE THE SUBJECT OF THE LOCAL FORCES (TERRITORIAL BRIGADE) UNTIL FRIDAY, MARCH 25. GEN. HAMDAN THEN ASKED FOR THE REWRITE OF THE FEBRUARY 26 DRAFT TEXT THAT LT. COL. ZINGER HAD DONE. GEN. EINAN SAID THAT THE REDRAFT WAS AVAILABLE, BUT THAT SEVERAL CHANGES WERE NECESSITATED BY THE RECENT MEETINGS WITH AMB. HABIB AND THE ISRAELIS WOULD PREFER NOT TO TABLE IT. LT. COL. ZINGER READ PORTIONS PERTAINING TO SECURITY

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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ARRANGEMENTS, WITHOUT COMMENT BY THE LEBANESE. THIS REVIEW CORRESPONDED WITH THE RESULTS OF PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS OF THIS TEXT AND INCLUDED IDENTIFIED DIFFERENCES IN POSITION. AT THE END OF THIS REVIEW, GEN. HAMDAN NOTED THAT THE LEBANESE WOULD PREFER TO HAVE THE CLAUSE RELATING TO FORTIFICATIONS SPECIFY BOTH PARTIES, NOT JUST LEBANON. GEN. EINAN RESPONDED THAT ISRAEL HAS INSTALLATIONS IN NORTHERN ISRAEL DIRECTED AGAINST TERRORISTS AND AGAINST SYRIA. IT MIGHT, THEREFORE, BE DIFFICULT TO EXPLAIN CLEARLY THAT THESE ARE NOT DIRECTED AGAINST LEBANON. HE SAID THAT THEY WOULD EXAMINE THE REQUEST.

4. LT. COL. ZINGER THEN RAISED THE QUESTION OF IMMUNITY FOR THOSE MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL OF EACH PARTY PERFORMING DUTY REQUIRED BY THE MILITARY ANNEX OR ITS APPENDIX IN THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER. GEN. HAMDAN NOTED THAT THIS WAS A SUBJECT FOR STUDY BY ANOTHER SUBCOMMITTEE, BUT WOULD LOOK AT THIS PROPOSAL AND RESPOND ON FRIDAY, MARCH 25. THE TWO SIDES AGREED ONLY ON THE PRINCIPLE THAT IMMUNITIES SHOULD BE DISCUSSED IN THE OTHER SUBCOMMITTEE.

5. LT. COL. ZINGER THEN BROUGHT UP THE ISRAELI DESIRE TO INCLUDE LANGUAGE THAT WOULD PRECLUDE THE DEVELOPMENT

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ANYWHERE IN LEBANON, OF ANY INFRASTRUCTURE OR INSTALLATION THAT WOULD FACILITATE THE ACTIVATION OF ANY WEAPON NOT AUTHORIZED BY THIS AGREEMENT. HIS PROPOSED TEXT WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO THE LEBANESE. GEN. HAMDAN FELT THAT, SINCE THE TEXT CLEARLY MEANT SAM'S, IT SHOULD CLEARLY STATE THAT WHEREVER SAM'S ARE PROHIBITED, SO ALSO IS THE DEVELOPMENT OF INFRA-

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MILITARY ADDEES TREAT AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

STRUCTURE OR INSTALLATIONS FOR SAM'S. FOLLOWING SOME
GIVE AND TAKE ON THIS ISSUE, IT WAS DECIDED THAT ALL
THREE PARTIES WOULD ATTEMPT TO FIND WAYS TO EXPRESS
THIS CONCEPT IN THE APPROPRIATE CLAUSES OF THE DRAFT
TEXT.

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6. COMMENT: PERHAPS MOST SIGNIFICANT ABOUT THIS
MEETING IS THE FACT THAT NEITHER SIDE EXPECTED TO
ACCOMPLISH ANYTHING, BUT WANTED TO GIVE THE IMPRES-
SION OF CONTINUED WORK ON THE ISSUES. BOTH DELE-
GATIONS ACCEPTED THAT NO REAL WORK COULD BE DONE ON
SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS UNTIL AFTER AMB. HABIB HAS
DISCUSSED WITH THE LEBANESE LEADERS THE RESULTS OF
HIS MEETINGS WITH THE ISRAELIS ON SECURITY
ARRANGEMENTS. DILLON

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FROM HABIB AND DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MPOL, MARR, PREL, LE, IS, XF
SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: TRAVEL AND NEED FOR
MEETINGS WITH LEBANESE

1. [REDACTED]

2. OUR PRESENT PLANS ARE TO LEAVE ISRAEL BETWEEN
1730 LOCAL AND 1800 MONDAY, MARCH 21, ARRIVING
BEIRUT THE USUAL 50 MINUTES LATER, FOLLOWING THE
REGULAR NEGOTIATING SESSIONS IN NETANYA AND A
MEETING WITH DEFENSE MINISTER ARENS IN THE LATE

PAGE 02 JERUSA 00984 202201Z

AFTERNOON. FOR BEIRUT, AMBASSADOR DILLON: PLEASE
GET THE WORD TO GEMAYEL THAT WE WOULD BE PREPARED
TO HAVE A MEETING MONDAY NIGHT AT 2000 HOURS OR
LATER WITH HIM AND HIS ADVISERS SALEM, HADDAD AND
TUENI. IT WOULD BE EQUALLY CONVENIENT TO US IF
HE PREFERRED, HOWEVER, TO HAVE SUCH A MEETING THE
FIRST THING TUESDAY MDRNING, MARCH 22.

3. FOR ROME AND PARIS: WE ARE NOT SURE WHETHER

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LEBANESE FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM IS IN PARIS OR ROME. WHEREVER HE IS WE WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF THE APPROPRIATE EMBASSY WOULD GET IN TOUCH WITH HIM TO SAY WE PLAN TO FLY TO BEIRUT MONDAY EARLY EVENING AND WOULD BE PREPARED TO HAVE A MEETING THAT EVENING AT 2000 HOURS OR THE FOLLOWING MORNING. HABIB HAD TALKED TO SALEM ABOUT THIS CONTINGENCY, AND SALEM WILL BE EXPECTING SUCH ADVICE. PLEASE REPORT WHATEVER INFORMATION YOU DEVELOP FROM SALEM TO TEL AVIV, BEIRUT AND JERUSALEM, ALL NIACT IMMEDIATE.

4. AGAIN FOR BEIRUT: WE WILL HAVE ON THE SPAR AIRCRAFT GENERAL COOLEY, KRECKO AND TENNANT. PLEASE ASK PEARLIE WHITE TO MAKE RESERVATION FOR TENNANT AT THE CHARLES HOTEL. GROVE

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USOFFICE KOLONIA
USOFFICE MAJURO
AMEMBASSY HONIARA
AMEMBASSY BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN

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PARIS FOR KANEDA, COMNAVFOR KOREA FOR REAR ADMIRAL VOGT

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: OPRC, XE, US

SUBJECT: APRIL 21 EAP PRESS SUMMARY

MOSCOW FOR POL/EXT

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- 1. PHILIPPINES
- 2. PHILIPPINES/CHINA/TAIWAN
- 3. CHINA
- 4. TAIWAN
- 5. JAPAN
- 6. KOREA
- 7. QUAYLE ASIA TRIP
- 8. VIETNAM/LAOS
- 9. LAOS
- 10. PAPUA-NEW GUINEA

COMMENT AND ANALYSIS

- 11. CHINA

1. PHILIPPINES

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-- REUTER'S CLIFT, AP (BALTIMORE SUN), AND THE WASHINGTON TIMES (ALL MANILA) REPORT US EMBASSY MANILA SPOKESMAN JERRY HUCHEL SAID FRIDAY THAT GUNMEN KILLED LT COL JAMES ROWE AS HE WAS DRIVING TO WORK AT THE JOINT US MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP HEADQUARTERS.

AP SAYS ROWE WAS CHIEF OF THE ARMY DIVISION AT JUSMAG. IT ADDS THAT ROWE'S CHAUFFEUR WAS WOUNDED IN THE SHOOTING AND IS IN SERIOUS CONDITION. IT QUOTES COL VICTOR TIANGCO OF THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY'S REGIONAL CAPITAL COMMAND AS SAYING ASSAILANTS OPENED FIRE WITH M-16 RIFLES AS ROWE'S CAR APPROACHED THE JUSMAG COMPOUND IN QUEZON CITY, A SUBURB OF MANILA, AT 7:10 AM FRIDAY (MANILA TIME). IT ADDS TIANGCO SAID 21 BULLETS STRUCK THE CAR AND THAT THE ASSAILANTS THEN SPED AWAY. IT SAYS THERE WAS NO INDICATION AS TO WHO STAGED THE ATTACK OR WHY.

-- THE WASHINGTON TIMES NOTES THAT WHILE THERE WAS NO INDICATION OF WHO STAGED THE ATTACK OR WHY, IT FOLLOWED THREATS BY THE NPA TO HIT US MILITARY TARGETS IN THE PHILIPPINES. ON APR 9, IT STATES, NPA GUERRILLAS BOMBED A US MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS FACILITY NEAR BAGUIO.

-- CLIFT REPORTS THE US EMBASSY FRIDAY ADVISED AMERICANS TO TAKE EXTRA SAFETY PRECAUTIONS FOLLOWING THE KILLING OF COL ROWE. HE SAYS THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ALSO STEPPED UP SECURITY FOR US BASES AND PERSONNEL IN THE COUNTRY. "WE ARE INFORMING ALL AMERICANS TO TAKE HEIGHTENED SECURITY MEASURES AT THIS TIME," HE QUOTES AN EMBASSY SPOKESMAN AS SAYING.

CLIFT ADDS THAT AMB PLATT DESCRIBED THE KILLING AS THE WORK OF "COWARDLY ASSASSINS," AND HE STATED THAT "THIS ACT WILL ONLY STRENGTHEN AMERICAN RESOLVE TO STAND WITH THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES LED BY UNCLASSIFIED

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PRESIDENT AQUINO. WE WILL NOT BE DETERRED BY TERRORISTS."

ACCORDING TO CLIFT, COL ROWE WAS PART OF A US LIAISON TEAM HELPING THE PHILIPPINE ARMY IN ITS FIGHT AGAINST THE NPA. HE REPORTS ROWE WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR COORDINATING MILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN AID AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT. HE SAYS THE KILLING WAS THE 3RD INCIDENT INVOLVING THE US MILITARY IN THE PHILIPPINES THIS MONTH AND APPEARED TO BE PART OF A NEW OFFENSIVE BY THE NPA. HE REPORTS MILITARY SOURCES SAID THE NPA HAD ALSO PLANTED LANDMINES INSIDE CLARK AIR BASE ON APRIL 5, BUT THE INCIDENT WENT UNREPORTED BECAUSE THE MINES DID NO DAMAGE.

-- REUTER'S GELB REPORTS THE WHITE HOUSE FRIDAY DENOUNCED THE MURDER OF ROWE AS A "TERRIBLE AND HEINOUS ACT" THAT HAD THE APPEARANCE OF A PLANNED ASSASSINATION. HE QUOTES WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN FITZWATER AS SAYING THE US WOULD WORK CLOSELY WITH THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT TO TRACK DOWN COL ROWE'S KILLERS, AND HE REITERATED US SUPPORT FOR AQUINO'S GOVERNMENT. "PRESIDENT AQUINO HAS OUR TOTAL SUPPORT IN HER EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN NATIONAL UNITY, REVITALIZE DEMOCRACY, AND COUNTER THE COMMUNIST INSURGENCY," HE QUOTES FITZWATER AS SAYING.

GELB REPORTS FITZWATER SAID THE KILLING OF ROWE "CERTAINLY HAD THE EARMARKS OF AN INTENTIONAL ATTACK,"

BUT HE ADDED THAT THE US DOES NOT KNOW WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE.

GELB SAYS ROWE WAS A HIGHLY DECORATED OFFICER WHO WAS CAPTURED DURING THE VIETNAM WAR BUT ESCAPED AFTER 5 YEARS IN ENEMY HANDS, ACCORDING TO DEFENSE OFFICIALS. HE QUOTES ONE OFFICIAL AS SAYING ROWE WAS RIDING IN AN UNCLASSIFIED

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ARMORED EMBASSY SEDAN, BUT THE BULLET THAT KILLED HIM "ENTERED THROUGH A NON-HARDENED PORTION OF THE VEHICLE."

-- UPI (MANILA 4/14) SAYS MORE THAN 800 COMMUNIST REBELS AND GOP FORCES WERE KILLED IN CLASHES IN THE FIRST 3 MONTHS OF THIS YEAR, ARMED FORCES CHIEF GEN DE VILLA SAID LAST FRIDAY. IT NOTES HE TOLD A NEWS CONFERENCE THAT GOP TROOPS KILLED 587 NPA REBELS DURING THE FIRST 3 MONTHS, A 21 PERCENT INCREASE OVER THE SAME PERIOD LAST YEAR. IT ADDS HE SAID 217 GOP TROOPS LOST THEIR LIVES, MARKING A 7 PERCENT DECLINE. IT REPORTS HE GAVE NO ESTIMATE OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES FROM THE WAR DURING THE PERIOD.

UPI SAYS DE VILLA ADDED THAT 322 REBELS, INCLUDING 11 RANKING LEADERS, WERE CAPTURED, AND 241 SURRENDERED. IT REPORTS HE SAID SOLDIERS RECOVERED 434 FIREARMS BUT LOST 226 GUNS TO THE REBELS DURING THE PERIOD.

UPI QUOTES DE VILLA AS SAYING: "WE ARE GLAD TO INFORM OUR PEOPLE THAT THE FIRST QUARTER RESULTS OF OUR MILITARY OPERATIONS HAVE SHOWN THAT OUR GOVERNMENT IS CONTINUING TO GAIN HEADWAY IN THE COUNTERINSURGENCY CAMPAIGN." IT REPORTS HE ALSO SAID THAT DOCUMENTS SEIZED FROM THE REBELS SHOWED DEMORALIZATION IS WIDESPREAD IN THEIR RANKS BECAUSE OF POWER STRUGGLES AMONG THE INSURGENCY'S LEADERS.

-- WALTER WRIGHT (WASHINGTON POST HONOLULU 4/15) SAYS IMELDA MARCOS, CLAIMING HER HUSBAND IS NEAR DEATH,

FRANTICALLY SPENDS HER DAYS DEFENDING HIS PAST AND HER FUTURE. HE NOTES THAT MARCOS' ILLNESS HAS LEFT IMELDA FACING CRIMINAL CHARGES ALONE WITH THEIR ALLEGED CO-CONSPIRATORS. HE REPORTS SHE SAYS SHE KNOWS TOO LITTLE OF THEIR AFFAIRS TO FIND THE MONEY TO LIVE ON, LET ALONE MAKE AN OUT-OF-COURT DEAL WITH US OR PHILIPPINE AUTHORITIES. HE ADDS SHE SAID IN AN INTERVIEW THAT IT IS UNCLASSIFIED

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THE US, NOT SHE, THAT IS GUILTY.

WRIGHT QUOTES MRS MARCOS: "WHY ARE WE THIEVES AFTER 20 YEARS ONLY AFTER WE HAVE LANDED HERE? IS IT TO JUSTIFY A WRONG ACT," THE US "KIDNAPPING" OF MARCOS? "AMERICA REALLY DID US IN. BEFORE THE KIDNAPPING, WE WERE GOOD-LOOKING. I WAS 'BEAUTIFUL,' I WAS 'GREAT.' AND AFTER THE KIDNAPPING, I WAS -- EVERYTHING WAS ROTTEN. THEY HAVE DONE SUCH A GOOD JOB ON THE MARCOSES, THE AMERICANS HAVE DONE SUCH A GOOD JOB THAT WE MAY NOT BE ABLE TO RISE. NO, SORRY, WE WILL RISE UP," HE REPORTS SHE SAID.

IN HISTORY ACCORDING TO IMELDA MARCOS, WRIGHT SAYS, HER HUSBAND WON THE 1986 ELECTION AND THE MILITARY COUP AGAINST HIM COLLAPSED, BUT THE US FORCED HIM OUT, EVEN TO THE POINT OF SUPPLYING US ROCKETS FOR THE PHILIPPINE AIR FORCE HELICOPTER THAT FIRED ON THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE. NOW, HE REPORTS SHE ADDED, FEDERAL INVESTIGATORS HAVE "TERRORIZED" THEIR FRIENDS AND SUPPORTERS, SUBPOENAING THEM AS WITNESSES AND DIGGING INTO THEIR BANK ACCOUNTS, SHE SAID. HE REPORTS SHE STATED THAT EVEN THEIR LAWYERS ARE SHYING AWAY FOR FEAR OF NOT GETTING PAID, LAWYERS WHO SHE SAID THEY WOULD "KILL ME" FOR GIVING ANOTHER INTERVIEW."

WRIGHT SAYS HAWAIIAN MEDIA AND REPORTERS HAD A FIELD DAY 2 WEEKS AGO WHEN IMELDA CLAIMED POVERTY AND DEMANDED THAT THE US PAY 200,000 DOLLARS FOR HER HUSBAND'S HOSPITAL BILLS. THAT WAS THE SAME WEEK TV VIEWERS WERE TOLD IMELDA MARCOS GETS A WEEKLY TAKE-OUT OF DUCK L'ORANGE FROM HONOLULU'S PRICEY "MICHEL'S" RESTAURANT, HE NOTES.

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WRIGHT REPORTS MRS MARCOS ALSO TEARFULLY DENIED THAT SHE HAD SAID THAT SHE WANTED HER HUSBAND'S BODY CREMATED AND THAT SHE WOULD SPRINKLE HIS ASHES "TO FERTILIZE HIS COUNTRY," SAYING: "WE ARE CATHOLICS. WE DO NOT BELIEVE IN CREMATING."

WRIGHT SAYS IMELDA MARCOS' OUTBURSTS DO NOT APPEAR TO HAVE HELPED IN THE CAMPAIGN TO GET AQUINO AND PRESIDENT

BUSH TO LET HER HUSBAND GO HOME. BUT SHE KEEPS TRYING,

HE ADDS. HE QUOTES HER AS SAYING: "THIS WOULD BE THE BEST TIME FOR HER (AQUINO). WE ARE COMPLETELY WORN OUT. SHE WOULD LOOK GOOD, AND POLITICALLY I THINK THERE WOULD BE RECONCILIATION."

-- REUTER (PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER), THE WASHINGTON POST, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE (ALL NEW YORK), THE LA TIMES, THE BALTIMORE SUN, AND USA TODAY (ALL 4/18) REPORT FEDERAL DISTRICT JUDGE JOHN KEENAN MONDAY RULED THAT FERDINAND MARCOS IS TOO ILL TO STAND TRIAL WITH HIS WIFE IMELDA AND OTHERS ON FRAUD AND RACKETEERING CHARGES.

HOWEVER, REUTER REPORTS KEENAN SAID IF MARCOS' HEALTH IMPROVES HE WILL BE ADDED TO THE TRIAL OF 8 OTHERS. IT SAYS JUDGE KEENAN SEVERED MARCOS FROM THE CASE ON THE ADVICE OF PROSECUTORS, WHO 2 WEEKS AGO SENT T HE JUDGE A LETTER SAYING A GOVERNMENT DOCTOR HAD EXAMINED MARCOS AND FOUND HIM TOO ILL TO PARTICIPATE IN THE TRIAL.

REUTER NOTES THAT NO TRIAL DATE HAS YET BEEN SET FOR IMELDA MARCOS AND HER CO-DEFENDANTS, BUT IT SAYS A HEARING HAS BEEN SET FOR MAY 6 FOR TURNING OVER 350,000 GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS TO THE DEFENSE. IT REPORTS PROSECUTORS SAID THEY WOULD ASK THAT SOME DOCUMENTS BE SEALED BECAUSE OF THEIR SENSITIVE NATURE AND BECAUSE THEY MIGHT AFFECT NATIONAL SECURITY.

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-- REUTER (4/18), THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE (BOTH ZURICH), AP (BALTIMORE SUN AND WASHINGTON TIMES BERN), THE NY TIMES' IBRAHIM (PARIS), THE WASHINGTON POST'S PARRY (GENEVA), AND USA TODAY (ALL 4/19) REPORT SWISS POLICE TUESDAY ARRESTED SAUDI ARABIAN BUSINESSMAN ADNAN KHASHOGGI AT THE REQUEST OF US AUTHORITIES, WHO ARE SEEKING KHASHOGGI'S EXTRADITION TO STAND TRIAL IN NEW YORK ON CHARGES OF FRAUD AND RACKETEERING IN CONNECTION WITH "ILLEGAL PROPERTY DEALINGS" ON BEHALF OF FERDINAND MARCOS."

IBRAHIM SAYS THE US CONTENTS THAT KHASHOGGI FACILITATED THE THEFT BY THE MARCOSES OF AT LEAST 103 MILLION DOLLARS THEY INVESTED IN THE PURCHASE OF REAL ESTATE IN NEW YORK. HE ADDS THAT KHASHOGGI IS ALSO ACCUSED OF TAKING A NUMBER OF VALUABLE PAINTINGS THAT THE MARCOSES ARE SAID

BY THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT TO HAVE STOLEN AND SMUGGLED OUT OF THAT COUNTRY WHEN THEY FLED THE PHILIPPINES IN 1986.

-- THE TRIBUNE SAYS KHASHOGGI WAS ALSO CHARGED IN FEDERAL COURT IN MANHATTAN WITH CONSPIRING WITH THE MARCOSES TO VIOLATE A COURT ORDER BARRING THE TRANSFER OF PROPERTIES

OWNED BY MARCOS; THE INDICTMENT SAID A MARCOS ASSOCIATE BACKDATED A DEED TO SHOW THAT KHASHOGGI HAD ASSUMED OWNERSHIP OF SOME NY OFFICE BUILDINGS OWNED BY MARCOS.

-- AP QUOTES A US EMBASSY SPOKESMAN IN SWITZERLAND AS SAYING THE US PLANS TO SUBMIT A DETAILED EXTRADITION REQUEST TO SWISS AUTHORITIES WITHIN 60 DAYS, AS REQUIRED BY TREATY. UNDER THE US-SWISS EXTRADITION TREATY, IT REPORTS, SWISS AUTHORITIES MUST DECIDE WHETHER
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KHASHOGGI'S ALLEGED OFFENSES ARE CONSIDERED CRIMINAL ACTS UNDER BOTH US AND SWISS LAWS. IT ADDS THAT KHASHOGGI HAS 10 DAYS TO FILE AN APPEAL AND REQUEST HIS RELEASE. IT REPORTS THE FEDERAL TRIBUNAL, SWITZERLAND'S SUPREME COURT, WOULD HAVE THE FINAL SAY IF KHASHOGGI FIGHTS AN EXTRADITION ORDER.

-- AP (4/19) REPORTS THE HEAD OF THE US PACIFIC COMMAND SAID WEDNESDAY THAT HE IS "CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC" THAT THE PHILIPPINES WILL AGREE TO A NEW PACT ON US BASES, BUT HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT POLITICAL SENTIMENT AGAINST THE FACILITIES IS GROWING. IT QUOTES CINCPAC ADM HUNTINGTON HARDISTY AS SAYING HE BELIEVES THE 2 COUNTRIES CAN AGREE ON AN ARRANGEMENT REGARDING THE BASES BEYOND 1991. "EVERYONE HAS AN INTEREST IN THE UNITED STATES REMAINING IN THE PHILIPPINES. WE'RE GOOD FRIENDS. WE'RE GOOD ALLIES. AND I HOPE THAT RELATIONSHIP WILL CONTINUE," IT QUOTES HARDISTY AS TELLING THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE. IT ADDS HE SAID HE WAS "CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC THAT IN 1991 WE CAN REACH A FAVORABLE RENEGOTIATION OF THE MILITARY BASE AGREEMENT."

HOWEVER, AP REPORTS, UNDER QUESTIONING FROM SEN JOHN MCCAIN (R-ARIZ), HARDISTY SAID HE CONCURRED WITH PHILIPPINE VP SALVADOR LAUREL'S STATEMENT THAT POLITICAL OPPOSITION TO THE BASES IS INCREASING. "I DON'T DISAGREE WITH THAT ASSESSMENT, BUT I THINK REASON WILL PREVAIL IN 1991. I THINK WE'VE SEEN A LOT OF RHETORIC AND A LOT OF

POSTURING AGAINST THE AQUINO GOVERNMENT," IT REPORTS HARDISTY SAID. IT NOTES HE ADDED THAT LAUREL "HAS A POLITICAL AGENDA AS WELL."

AP REPORTS THAT LAUREL, WHO WAS IN WASHINGTON THIS WEEK, HAS SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THE PHILIPPINE PUBLIC FAVORS THE US PRESENCE, A STRONG ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT IS GROWING IN THE PHILIPPINE SENATE, 2/3 OF WHICH MUST RATIFY A NEW UNCLASSIFIED

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US-PHILIPPINE TREATY ON THE BASES.

-- REUTER (4/19) QUOTES LAUREL AS SAYING WEDNESDAY IN WASHINGTON THAT THE NUMBER OF COMMUNIST GUERRILLAS IN HIS

COUNTRY HAS DOUBLED UNDER AQUINO'S GOVERNMENT BECAUSE SHE HAS BEEN TOO LENIENT ON THE INSURGENCY. IT SAYS LAUREL, WHO IS EXPECTED TO RUN FOR PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES IN 1992, WAS IN WASHINGTON FOR TALKS WITH MEMBERS OF THE US CONGRESS. IT SAYS THE VP USED A MEETING WITH REPORTERS TO JAB AT HIS RIVAL AQUINO.

"WHEN CORY AND I TOOK OVER AS PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT (IN 1986), THE COMMUNIST INSURGENTS IN THE PHILIPPINES NUMBERED ABOUT 14,500 FULLY-ARMED REGULARS. NOW, BASED ON CAPTURED DOCUMENTS..., IT IS MORE THAN 30,000. SOME PLACE IT AT 33,000 FULLY-ARMED. THAT MEANS THE NUMBER OF COMMUNIST INSURGENTS HAVE MORE THAN DOUBLED," REUTER QUOTES LAUREL AS SAYING. MEANWHILE, IT REPORTS HE ADDED, THE NUMBER OF MOSLEM REBELS HAD INCREASED FROM SOME 10,000 TO OVER 20,000.

REUTER REPORTS LAUREL CHARGED THAT AQUINO HAD BEEN SOFT IN DEALING WITH THE COMMUNIST REBELS. "THE NEW GOVERNMENT RELEASED ALL THE CAPTURED COMMUNIST LEADERS...INSTEAD OF CONTINUING TO GO AFTER THEM, A LOT OF PEACE TALKS WERE HELD, AND THEY WERE ABLE TO MOVE AROUND THE COUNTRY FREELY...THEY GOT THE FEELING THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT WAS SOFT ON THE REDS AND HARD ON THE ARMED FORCES," IT QUOTES HIM AS SAYING.

REUTER ADDS THAT LAUREL SAID HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS HAD DEFENDED CAPTURED REBELS AND OFTEN UNFAIRLY CONDEMNED THE UNCLASSIFIED

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SOLDIERS WHO SEIZED THEM.

ON THE QUESTION OF RETAINING US BASES IN THE PHILIPPINES BEYOND 1991, REUTER REPORTS, LAUREL SAID HIS COUNTRY'S SENATE IS STRONGLY OPPOSED TO KEEPING THE BASES AND AQUINO IS NON-COMMITAL. BUT, HE ADDED, A RECENT PUBLIC OPINION POLL SHOWED THAT A LARGE MAJORITY OF FILIPINOS FAVOR KEEPING THE BASES, WHICH PROVIDE JOBS.

REUTER NOTES THAT SEN LUGAR (R-IND), "ONE OF THE CONGRESS' TOP EXPERTS ON THE PHILIPPINES," WAS QUOTED IN THE WASHINGTON TIMES WEDNESDAY AS SAYING THAT LAUREL'S ESTIMATES ON THE COMMUNIST INSURGENTS WERE OVERBLOWN (SEE THE APRIL 19 EAP PRESS SUMMARY). IT SAYS LUGAR ALSO DOUBTS THAT OPPOSITION TO THE BASES IN THE PHILIPPINES IS AS STRONG AS LAUREL SAYS IT IS.

-- REUTER (MANILA 4/20) SAYS THE PHILIPPINES' LARGEST TRADE UNIONS THURSDAY REJECTED A GOP OFFER OF A MODERATE WAGE INCREASE, AND PRESIDENT AQUINO WARNED THAT A THREATENED NATIONWIDE STRIKE WOULD SET BACK ECONOMIC

RECOVERY. "I APPEAL TO YOU...IF WE AGAIN TAKE UP BATTLE POSITIONS WE WILL GO BACK TO THE SITUATION OF 1986," IT QUOTES AQUINO AS TELLING LABOR LEADERS, REFERRING TO THE ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES DURING HER FIRST YEAR OF OFFICE, WHEN SHE WAS PLAGUED BY ARMY COUP THREATS.

ACCORDING TO REUTER, THE COUNTRY'S 3 BIGGEST LABOR UNIONS HAVE THREATENED A NATIONWIDE STRIKE IF THEIR DEMAND FOR A 47 PERCENT WAGE INCREASE IN THE 3-DOLLAR DAILY MINIMUM WAGE IS NOT MET.

REUTER REPORTS OFFICIALS SAID AFTER A THURSDAY MEETING AT THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE THAT THE 2 SIDES AGREED TO STUDY EACH OTHER'S PROPOSALS AND MEET AGAIN. HOWEVER, IT ADDS,

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UNION LEADERS TOLD REPORTERS THEY WERE STICKING TO THEIR DEMAND FOR A 1.40-DOLLAR DAILY WAGE INCREASE. IT SAYS AQUINO HAS OFFERED 70 CENTS, TELLING UNIONS THAT A SHARP INCREASE IN WAGES WOULD TRIGGER INFLATION AND AGGRAVATE POVERTY. IT ADDS THAT AN EMPLOYERS' GROUP THAT MET WITH AQUINO SAID GRANTING THE WORKERS' DEMANDS WOULD FORCE SMALL BUSINESSES TO CLOSE.

REUTER QUOTES UNION LEADER DEMOCRITO MENDOZA AS SAYING WORKERS HAD NOT FINALIZED STRIKE PLANS BUT THAT THEY WOULD STAGE DEMONSTRATIONS TO PRESS THEIR DEMANDS. IT ALSO REPORTS THAT ONLY 2 OF THE COUNTRY'S 3 MAJOR UNIONS ATTENDED THE THURSDAY MEETING AT THE MALACANANG. IT SAYS THE LEFTIST "MAY 1ST MOVEMENT (KMU)" SNUBBED AQUINO'S INVITATION AND INSTEAD HELD A 1000-STRONG PROTEST MARCH TO THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE.

2. PHILIPPINES/CHINA/TAIWAN

, - AFP (MANILA 4/18) REPORTS PHILIPPINE TRADE AND INDUSTRY SECRETARY TOLD REPORTERS MONDAY THAT THE PHILIPPINES WILL OPEN A TRADE OFFICE IN TAIPEI IN JULY TO ATTRACT INVESTMENT FROM TAIWAN, DRAWING AN IMMEDIATE REACTION FROM BEIJING. "WE WILL SET UP A ONE-STOP ACTION CENTER FOR INVESTMENT IN TAIWAN ON JULY 1. THAT WOULD SAVE PROSPECTIVE FOREIGN INVESTORS MONEY," IT QUOTES CONCEPCION AS SAYING. IT ADDS CONCEPCION SAID THE TRADE OFFICE WOULD "PROCESS TRADE AND INVESTMENT INQUIRIES AND...ENHANCE ECONOMIC RELATIONS."

AFP REPORTS THE PRC EMBASSY IN MANILA IMMEDIATELY ISSUED A STATEMENT URGING THE GOP TO "HANDLE THIS MATTER CAREFULLY AND PROPERLY." IN ESTABLISHING DIPLOMATIC UNCLASSIFIED

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RELATIONS, IT NOTES THE CHINESE STATEMENT SAID, THE 2 COUNTRIES AGREED IN 1976 THAT "THE PHILIPPINES SHOULD NOT (HAVE) ANY OFFICIAL CONTACT...WITH TAIWAN," AND POINTED OUT THAT THE PHILIPPINE BOARD OF INVESTMENT "IS A GOVERNMENT AGENCY."

HOWEVER, AFP ADDS, CONCEPCION STATED, WITHOUT ELABORATING, THAT THE TRADE OFFICE IN TAIWAN "WON'T BE UNDER" THE BOARD.

AFP POINTS OUT THAT TAIWAN BUSINESSMEN ARE AMONG THE TOP FOREIGN INVESTORS IN THE PHILIPPINES, AND TAIWAN INVESTMENT THERE IN 1988 TOTALLED 110 MILLION DOLLARS, ACCORDING TO OFFICIAL STATISTICS.

3. CHINA

-- REUTER'S DINMORE (BEIJING) REPORTS AN ESTIMATED

100,000 STUDENTS AND WORKERS CALLING FOR DEMOCRACY POURED INTO CENTRAL BEIJING EARLY SATURDAY, HOURS BEFORE THE SCHEDULED HU YAOBANG FUNERAL. WESTERN JOURNALISTS WHO ESTIMATED THE CROWD SIZE AS SO SPOTTED 2 CONVOYS OF TRUCKS CARRYING ABOUT 2,000 SECURITY MEN HEADING FOR TIANANMEN SQUARE, HE SAYS. HE NOTES THE PROTESTERS SHOUTED "REAL DEMOCRACY," "FREEDOM OF SPEECH" AND "END TO DICTATORSHIP."

DINMORE SAYS THAT STUDENTS FROM OTHER CITIES AND WORKERS TOOK AN ACTIVE PART FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE STUDENTS MARCHED TO THE SQUARE MONDAY.

4. TAIWAN

,- UPI'S BERLINGER (ANCHORAGE 4/20) REPORTS A COAST GUARD CUTTER MOUNTED A MACHINE GUN IN A SHOW OF FORCE TO PERSUADE A FLEEING FISHING VESSEL FROM TAIWAN TO STOP FOR UNCLASSIFIED

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A BOARDING APPROVED BY BOTH THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND TAIWAN AUTHORITIES, THE COAST GUARD REPORTED THURSDAY. HE SAYS THE PERMISSION FROM TAIWAN TO BOARD CAME LATE WEDNESDAY, AND A COAST GUARD BOARDING PARTY STEPPED ON TO THE "TYI YANG" LATE WEDNESDAY LOOKING FOR EVIDENCE OF UNAUTHORIZED FISHING. THERE WAS NO IMMEDIATE WORD THURSDAY ON THE BOARDING PARTY SEARCH, IT ADDS.

5. JAPAN

-- THE WASHINGTON POST'S HIATT AND THE NY TIMES' WEISMAN (BOTH TOKYO) REPORT THAT TAKESHITA'S TROUBLES ARE CONTINUING.

HIATT SAYS POLITICAL ANALYSTS DISAGREE ON WHETHER TAKESHITA'S TROUBLES WILL MARK A TURNING POINT IN

JAPANESE POLITICS. HE ADDS THAT THEY ARE NOT SURE IF THE LDP CAN "BLUSTER THROUGH THE CRISIS." HE SAYS EVEN LDP MEMBERS ARE "TUCKING TAKESHITA POSTERS INTO THE CLOSET." HE SAYS THE PM'S CHIEF CONSOLATION AMID ALL THE ARRESTS AND RESIGNATIONS HAS BEEN THAT MOST OF HIS COLLEAGUES AND WOULD-BE COMPETITORS HAVE BEEN EQUALLY TAINTED BY THE "RECRUIT" SCANDAL. BUT HE SAYS NOT EVERYONE IS WILLING TO COUNT TAKESHITA OUT. HE QUOTES THE SINGAPOREAN AMBASSADOR TO JAPAN AS SAYING THAT TAKESHITA IS STILL "VERY TOUGH."

-- WEISMAN STATES THAT DESPITE A FLURRY OF INTENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS AND MANEUVERING, TAKESHITA HAS FAILED TO RESOLVE THE SERIOUS DEADLOCK WITHIN THE LDP OVER THE "RECRUIT" SCANDAL. AN ATMOSPHERE OF CRISIS HAS BEEN UNDERScoreD BY THE LATEST OPINION POLLS WHICH SHOW THE

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PM'S APPROVAL RATING AS DROPPING TO A POINT OF NEAR INVISIBILITY, ACCORDING TO WEISMAN. HE ALSO NOTES THAT ON THURSDAY KATSUHIKO SHIRAKAWA, A DIET MEMBER, ALONG WITH 47 OTHER LDP MEMBERS, FORMED THE "LIBERAL REFORM FEDERATION" TO PUSH FOR THE OUSTER OF LEADERS TAINTED BY THE SCANDAL. HE POINTS OUT THAT THIS IS JUST ONE OF DOZENS OF SUCH GROUPS FORMED RECENTLY. BUT, WEISMAN STATES, THIS ONE IS SEEN AS UNUSUAL BECAUSE ITS MEMBERS CAME FROM ALL PARTS OF THE IDEOLOGICAL SPECTRUM.

WEISMAN REPORTS THAT, DESPITE THE APPEARANCE OF THESE GROUPS, TAKESHITA'S RESIGNATION IS STILL WIDELY CONSIDERED UNLIKELY. HE NOTES THAT THERE IS TALK WITHIN THE LDP ABOUT POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES TO TAKESHITA WHO ARE NOW OUTSIDE THE INNER CIRCLE. HE SAYS THESE INCLUDE FORMER PM TAKEO FUKUDA, FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER MASAYOSHI ITO, SHIN KANEMARU AND MASAHARU GOTODA. HE SAYS THE LAST TWO ARE TAKESHITA ALLIES.

-- THE WASHINGTON POST'S AUERBACH AND THE JOURNAL OF COMMERCE'S ROCKWELL REPORT SEN BAUCUS (D-MONT) WARNED THURSDAY THAT THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION WILL BE "CUTTING THE HEART OUT OF" THE NEW TRADE LAW IF IT FAILS TO NAME JAPAN AS A PERSISTENT UNFAIR TRADER.

ROCKWELL SAYS THAT AS PART OF AN EFFORT TO COUNTER JAPANESE LOBBYING OF THE ADMINISTRATION, BAUCUS HAS BEEN ACTIVELY CAMPAIGNING TO TARGET JAPAN'S IMPORT POLICIES. HE NOTES THAT A JAPANESE OFFICIAL SAID HE FULLY EXPECTED USTR HILLS TO NAME JAPAN AS A PRIORITY COUNTRY. HE QUOTES THE OFFICIAL AS STATING: "IT IS DEFINITELY GOING TO OFFEND THE JAPANESE...FROM THE JAPANESE SIDE, WE HAVE DONE MANY THINGS ALREADY TO INCREASE IMPORTS, FROM BEEF

AND CITRUS TO PUBLIC WORKS AGREEMENTS. OUR MARKET IS NOW COMPARABLE TO THE US AND BETTER THAN THE EUROPEAN

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COMMUNITY." HE ADDS THE OFFICIAL CONCEDED THAT THE HUGE TRADE SURPLUS JAPAN HAS WITH THE US IS A PROBLEM, BUT HE SAID TOKYO IS WORKING TO BRING THE BILATERAL TRADE ACCOUNT INTO BALANCE.

-- AUERBACH SAYS SEN BAUCUS' REMARKS TO REPORTERS ILLUSTRATED WIDESPREAD CONCERN ON CAPITOL HILL THAT THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION WILL LET JAPAN OFF THE HOOK AS IT COMPILES ITS LIST OF COUNTRIES TARGETED FOR TRADE SANCTIONS. HE QUOTES THE SENATOR AS SAYING: "SUPER 301 IS THE HEART OF THE NEW LAW. IF JAPAN, THE MOST EGREGIOUS OFFENDER, IS NOT NAMED, THE MOST IMPORTANT PROVISION OF THE TRADE LAW WILL BE CUT OUT. IT WILL BE VERY DAMAGING TO THE AMERICAN PSYCHE AND TO THE AMERICAN POSITION IN THE WORLD. AMERICANS WILL NOT BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY. WE BARK, DON'T BITE; WE ARE WORDS, NOT DEEDS."

ACCORDING AUERBACH, BAUCUS SAID HIS WORDS WERE AIMED AT USTR HILLS AND OTHER ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS, WHO HAVE BEEN LOBBIED BY A CONSTANT PARADE OF REPRESENTATIVES FROM FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS SEEKING TO STAY OFF THE LIST. HE POINTS OUT THAT JAPANESE TRADE MINISTER HIROSHI MITSUZUKA WILL BE IN WASHINGTON SHORTLY.

AUERBACH SAYS THAT JAPAN'S VICE MINISTER OF FINANCE, TOYOO GYOHTEN, WARNED MONDAY THAT TARGETING JAPAN FOR TRADE PENALTIES COULD IMPEDE COORDINATION AMONG THE MAJOR INDUSTRIALIZED NATIONS ON ECONOMIC ISSUES.

AFTER A RECENT HEARING ON CAPITOL HILL, AUERBACH ADDS, USTR HILLS TOLD REPORTERS IT IS "PREMATURE" TO SAY WHICH COUNTRIES WILL BE TARGETED, AND SHE ADDED THAT THE US "WELCOMES" ANY MARKET-OPENING MOVES ON THE PART OF JAPAN, UNCLASSIFIED

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"BUT WE ARE ANALYZING THE FACTS AS THEY EXIST TODAY."

AUERBACH NOTES THAT FOREIGN DIPLOMATS HAVE REPORTED THAT HILLS' OFFICE IS CONDUCTING NEGOTIATIONS WITH POTENTIAL TARGET NATIONS, SEEKING TO GAIN AN END TO SOME PRACTICES BEFORE COUNTRIES ARE BRANDED AS UNFAIR TRADERS, WHICH HE SAYS MANY POTENTIAL TARGETS, ESPECIALLY ASIAN NATIONS, WOULD SEE AS A LOSS OF FACE.

-- THE JOURNAL OF COMMERCE (TOKYO) SAYS THAT JAPAN HAS NO QUICK-FIX SOLUTION TO ITS YAWNING TRADE GAP WITH THE US AND WANTS WASHINGTON TO DO MORE TO REDUCE AMERICA'S DEFICIT, JAPANESE TRADE OFFICIALS SAID THURSDAY. ACCORDING TO THE JOURNAL, THEY ALSO WARNED THAT THE US

COULD KILL OFF THE MULTILATERAL DRIVE FOR FREER WORLD TRADE IF IT PURSUES A POLICY OF SETTING TRADE TARGETS FOR ITS PARTNERS TO MEET.

-- REUTER (TOKYO) NOTES JAPAN FRIDAY QUASHED SPECULATION THAT IT WOULD MATCH WEST GERMANY'S INCREASE IN INTEREST RATES. IT QUOTES JAPANESE FINANCE MINISTER TATSUO MURAYAMA AS TELLING A NEW CONFERENCE: "JAPAN HAS NO PLAN TO CHANGE ITS MONETARY POLICY NOW."

-- THE WASHINGTON TIMES (TOKYO) REPORTS THAT JAPAN MAY DEVELOP ITS OWN 7.5 BILLION DOLLAR ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM TO REPLACE THE "PATRIOT" IT PRODUCES UNDER LICENSE FROM THE US UNDER A 1985 AGREEMENT, THE "NIHON KEIZEI SHIMBUN" SAID. ACCORDING TO THE TIMES, THE REPORT COMES AS TOKYO AND WASHINGTON REMAIN MIRED IN DISAGREEMENT OVER A PROPOSAL TO JOINTLY DEVELOP A NEW FIGHTER JET.

-- SCRIPPS HOWARD'S FRIEDENBERG (WASHINGTON TIMES) SAYS THAT JAPAN HAS SURPASSED THE US IN FOREIGN ECONOMIC

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SUPPORT. THIS YEAR, HE NOTES, THE JAPANESE WILL CONTRIBUTE 10 BILLION DOLLARS IN OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE TO NEEDY NATIONS, SURPASSING THE US FOR THE FIRST TIME.

-- REUTER (UN, NY 4/20) SAYS THAT JAPAN SHARPLY CRITICIZED ISRAELI POLICY IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES THURSDAY, TELLING THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY IT WAS TIME THE POLICY'S "FUTILITY" WAS RECOGNIZED IN FACE OF THE PALESTINIAN UPRISING. IT REPORTS THAT JAPANESE AMBASSADOR MAKOTO TANIGUCHI SAID TOKYO WAS SERIOUSLY CONCERNED "OVER THE MASSIVE USE OF FORCE BY ISRAELI AUTHORITIES AGAINST PALESTINIAN CIVILIANS."

REUTER SAYS THAT THE JAPANESE DELEGATE ALSO SAID THE PLO REPRESENTED THE PALESTINIANS AND THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT ISRAEL AND THE PLO RECOGNIZE EACH OTHER'S POSITION AND THAT THE PLO PARTICIPATE IN A PEACE PROCESS.

-- REUTER (TOKYO) REPORTS A USAF SR-71 RECONNAISSANCE PLANE CRASHED INTO THE SOUTH CHINA SEA FRIDAY AFTER DEVELOPING ENGINE FAILURE, THE "US RESCUE COORDINATION CENTER" ON OKINAWA SAID. IT NOTES A SPOKESMAN SAID THE 2 CREW MEMBERS WERE RESCUED AND FLOWN TO CLARK AIR BASE IN THE PHILIPPINES, WHERE BOTH WERE IN GOOD CONDITION.

---REUTER (OKYO) SAYS THAT JAPANESE ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION SOARED TO A RECORD AVERAGE OF 21 GALLONS PER ADULT LAST YEAR, LARGELY DUE TO THE INCREASING POPULARITY OF BEER, A GOJ REPORT SAID FRIDAY.

6. KOREA
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-- REUTER (SEOUL) REPORTS ROK STATE PROSECUTORS CHARGED AN OPPOSITION PARTY OFFICIAL FRIDAY WITH BRIBING A CANDIDATE OF A RIVAL PARTY TO PULL OUT OF A SPECIAL ELECTION, A SPOKESMAN SAID. IF CONVICTED, SUH SUK-JAE, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE RDP UNTIL HE RESIGNED LAST WEEK, WOULD LOSE HIS PARLIAMENTARY SEAT, IT SAYS. REUTER ADDS THAT SUH HAS ADMITTED PAYING 75,000 DOLLARS TO THE CANDIDATE OF ANOTHER OPPOSITION PARTY TO WITHDRAW FROM THE APRIL 14 ELECTION IN THE EASTERN CITY OF TONGHAE. IT NOTES THAT RDP PRESIDENT KIM YOUNG-SAM FELT OBLIGED TO MAKE A PUBLIC APOLOGY OVER THE SCANDAL, ALTHOUGH HE DENIED KNOWING OF THE BRIBERY PLAN IN ADVANCE. IT POINTS OUT THAT A CANDIDATE OF ROH TAE WOO'S DJP SCORED A LARGE VICTORY IN THE ELECTION.

-- REUTER (SEOUL) NOTES THAT SOUTH KOREAN INVESTIGATORS SAID FRIDAY THEY HAD RELEASED 2 LEADERS OF A SEOUL NEWSPAPER DETAINED OVER THE PAPER'S PLAN TO SEND REPORTERS TO NO. THEY SAID, HOWEVER, THAT EDITOR-IN-CHIEF CHANG YOON-HWAN AND DIRECTOR CHUN TAE-KI OF THE "HANKYOREH," BOTH SUSPECTED OF VIOLATING LAWS BANNING PRO-NORTH ACTIVITIES, WOULD CONTINUE TO BE INVESTIGATED, ACCORDING TO REUTER. IT ADDS THAT THE 2 WERE TAKEN INTO CUSTODY THURSDAY UNDER A COURT INJUNCTION GRANTED TO THE AGENCY FOR NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING.

LAST WEEK, REUTER RECALLS, A "HANKYOREH" ADVISOR, LEE YOUNG-HEE, WAS CHARGED WITH DRAWING UP A PLAN, WITHOUT SEEKING PRIOR ROKG APPROVAL, TO LEAD JOURNALISTS TO VISIT

PYONGYANG, AND LEE WAS ACCUSED OF DISCUSSING THE PLAN WITH CHANG AND CHUNG. IT SAYS THEIR ARRESTS DREW PROTESTS FROM OPPOSITION GROUPS AND OTHER MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS AGAINST WHAT THEY SAW AS A REPRESSION OF PRESS FREEDOM. IT POINTS OUT THAT THE ROKG SAYS IT SHOULD BE THE SOLE CHANNEL OF CONTACT WITH NK AND THAT IT UNCLASSIFIED

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WILL PUNISH ALL UNAUTHORIZED MOVES SO AS TO PREVENT CONFUSION IN THE ROK OVER HOW TO REUNIFY THE NATION.

-- THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR'S SNEIDER (ULSAN) REPORTS THAT KOREA'S SHIPYARDS ARE QUIET RIGHT NOW, BUT THE MOOD REMAINS TENSE. HE SAYS THE ROKG AND "HYUNDAI" ARE CONFIDENT THAT THE HEAVY HAND OF THE POLICE WILL USHER IN PEACE. THE WORKERS ARE RETURNING TO WORK, SOME WITH RELIEF, OTHERS WITH SULLEN RESENTMENT, HE ADDS. BUT

THERE IS STILL EVERY REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THIS IS ONLY AN UNEASY CALM BEFORE ANOTHER STORM, HE SAYS.

SNEIDER STATES THAT THE ROKG SEES THE ULSAN STRIKE AS A TEST CASE FOR A NATIONWIDE CONFRONTATION WITH AN EMERGENT COALITION OF "DEMOCRATIC UNIONS" LOOSELY ALLIED WITH ANTI-GOVERNMENT ACTIVITISTS. HE REPORTS THAT ARRESTS THIS WEEK ACROSS THE ROK WERE AIMED AT BLOCKING A PLANNED MAY 1 GENERAL STRIKE BY THE MILITANT GROUP. HE QUOTES SHIM YOUNG SOO, A SENIOR VICE-PRESIDENT OF "HYUNDAI HEAVY INDUSTRIES," AS PREDICTING THAT THE OUTCOME AT ULSAN "WILL AFFECT MANAGEMENT-LABOR RELATIONS IN THE FUTURE... ALL OVER KOREA."

ACCORDING TO SNEIDER, KOREAN WORKERS HAVE EXERCISED THEIR NEWLY WON DEMOCRATIC FREEDOMS TO FORM TRADE UNIONS AND DEMAND A BIGGER SHARE OF THE ECONOMIC PIE. HE ADDS THAT THEY HAVE CONFRONTED KOREA'S LARGEST CORPORATE GIANT, "HYUNDAI," WHICH IS UNWILLING TO SHARE POWER WITH ITS WORKERS. HE QUOTES SHIM AS SAYING THAT THE PROBLEM ISN'T BETWEEN MANAGEMENT AND WORKERS; IT IS "AN INTER-UNION CONFLICT" BETWEEN A MINORITY OF MILITANTS AND A MODERATE MAJORITY, HE MAINTAINED. SNEIDER ADDS THAT SHIM CHARGED: UNCLASSIFIED

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"THE HARD-LINERS ARE THREATENING AND INTIMIDATING WORKERS" AND ARE BACKED BY RADICAL POLITICAL ELEMENTS FROM OUTSIDE.

SNEIDER SAYS THAT THE ROKG IS EMBARRASSED BY "HYUNDAI" OWNER CHUNG JU-YONG'S REFUSAL TO EVEN TRAVEL TO ULSAN OR TO TALK WITH THE WORKERS, AND SENIOR OFFICIALS URGED HIM TO DO SOMETHING. HE ADDS THAT LEE SUK HO, HEAD OF THE ULSAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND OWNER OF THE LARGEST DEPARTMENT STORE IN THE CITY, TRIED TO MEDIATE. BUT HE NOTES LEE SAID THE GOVERNMENT'S INTERVENTION WAS "INEVITABLE." HE ADDS LEE STATED THAT "IT WOULD HAVE BEEN MUCH BETTER IF CHUNG HAD SHOWN A MORE POSITIVE ATTITUDE, SUCH AS COMING DOWN HERE TO SEE, AND MADE EFFORTS TO NEGOTIATE."

SNEIDER REPORTS THAT A NEW UNION ELECTION IS SCHEDULED FOR APRIL 24, AND THE COMPANY SAYS IT WILL TALK WITH NEW UNION LEADERS. HOWEVER, HE ADDS, MANY OF THE CURRENT UNION LEADERS CANNOT ATTEND THE MEETINGS FOR FEAR OF ARREST.

7. QUAYLE ASIA TRIP

-- REUTER REPORTS THE HUMAN RIGHTS GROUP "ASIA WATCH" FRIDAY URGED VP QUAYLE TO RAISE HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTIONS

DURING HIS 11-DAY TOUR OF SOUTHEAST ASIA AND AUSTRALIA STARTING NEXT WEEK. IT SAYS "ASIA WATCH" EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR SIDNEY JONES WROTE QUAYLE, ASKING THAT HE QUESTION THE LEADERS OF AUSTRALIA, SINGAPORE, THAILAND, AND INDONESIA ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN THEIR COUNTRIES. HOWEVER, IT ADDS, A SPOKESMAN FOR QUAYLE SAID THE VP HAS NOT YET RECEIVED THE LETTER.

REUTER SAYS THE VP DEPARTS MONDAY FOR CHICAGO, LOS UNCLASSIFIED

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ANGELES, HAWAII, AND AMERICAN SAMOA EN ROUTE TO AUSTRALIA, WHERE HE IS SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE WEDNESDAY.

REUTER REPORTS JONES PROVIDED QUAYLE WITH A LIST OF ALLEGATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS, INCLUDING THAT INDONESIA HOLDS AT LEAST 400 PRISONERS ON SUBVERSION CHARGES FOR "PEACEFUL EXPRESSION OF THEIR POLITICAL OR RELIGIOUS VIEWS," WITH GEN HARTONO REKSO DHARSONO NAMED AMONG THE

MOST PROMINENT PRISONERS; THAT QUAYLE SHOULD SEEK ASSURANCES THAT HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS AND JOURNALISTS CAN VISIT EAST TIMOR, WHERE THERE ARE CONTINUING REPORTS OF TORTURE OF SUSPECTED OR CAPTURED FRETILIN GUERRILLAS; THAT IN THAILAND THE KHMER ROUGE IS REPORTED TO BE FORCING TEENAGERS AND PREGNANT WOMEN TO CARRY ARMS AND AMMUNITION THROUGH HEAVILY MINED TERRITORY, AND THE THAI GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE URGED TO ALLOW INTERNATIONAL AID AGENCIES COMPLETE ACCESS TO REFUGEE CAMPS ALONG THE THAI-CAMBODIAN BORDER; THAT SINGAPORE SHOULD RELEASE 2 PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE, TEO SOH LUNG AND VINCENT CHENG, ACCUSED OF SUBVERSION; AND THAT AUSTRALIA HAS ALLOWED MORE THAN 100 ABORIGINAL PRISONERS TO DIE IN CUSTODY SINCE 1980, ALTHOUGH MANY OF THE DEATHS COULD HAVE BEEN PREVENTED.

8. VIETNAM/LAOS

-- REUTER'S WAGSTAFF (WASHINGTON POST VIENTIANE 4/18) REPORTS VIETNAM AND LAOS MAY BE DRIFTING APART, ACCORDING TO WESTERN DIPLOMATS AND LAO OFFICIALS. HE QUOTES THEM AS SAYING THAT DIFFERENCES OVER ECONOMIC COOPERATION HAVE HIGHLIGHTED STRAINS IN THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LAOS AND CAMBODIA. WHILE PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY THE 2 SOVIET ALLIES STILL EULOGIZE THE "EVERLASTING BONDS" UNCLASSIFIED

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BETWEEN THEIR PEOPLES, THEIR MUTUAL DEPENDENCE SEEMS TO BE WANING AS BOTH LOOK INCREASINGLY TO NON-COMMUNIST STATES FOR AID AND TRADE, ACCORDING TO WAGSTAFF.

WAGSTAFF QUOTES A LAO OFFICIAL AS SAYING OF THE VIETNAMESE: "THEY PROMISED US EVERYTHING, BUT WORDS COME CHEAP. THEY HAVEN'T DELIVERED."

WAGSTAFF REPORTS LAOS IS INCREASINGLY TURNING TO ITS NATURAL TRADING ROUTE TO THE SEA THROUGH ITS ETHNICALLY RELATED SOUTHERN NEIGHBOR THAILAND. IT HAS TAKEN YEARS TO BUILD THE VIETNAMESE ROUTE -- A ROAD FOR COMMERCE THROUGH THE MOUNTAIN SPINE OF THE INDOCHINESE PENINSULA THAT TERMINATES AT THE VIETNAMESE PORT OF DA NANG, HE SAYS. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE ADDS, PLANS ARE QUICKLY CRYSTALLIZING FOR A NEW BRIDGE OVER THE MEKONG RIVER TO LINK WITH THE SUPERIOR ROAD NETWORK TO THE GULF OF THAILAND.

WAGSTAFF SAYS LAOS HAS RELIED HEAVILY ON SOVIET AID AND

VIETNAMESE SUPPORT SINCE IT AND ALL OF VIETNAM BECAME COMMUNIST IN 1975. BUT UNLIKE THE CASE IN VIETNAM, HE ADDS, NEITHER CHINA NOR THE US CLOSED ITS EMBASSY IN LAOS, DESPITE SOURING RELATIONS AND SPORADIC EXCHANGES OF ACCUSATIONS AND RECRIMINATIONS. HE SAYS BOTH INDOCHINA COUNTRIES HAVE IMPLEMENTED LIBERAL REFORMS AND SOUGHT CLOSER RELATIONS WITH THE NON-COMMUNIST WORLD. BUT HE REPORTS DIPLOMATS SAID LAOS HASN'T BEEN HINDERED BY SOME OF THE CONSTRAINTS VIETNAM WORKS UNDER, SUCH AS HANOI'S 10-YEAR MILITARY PRESENCE IN CAMBODIA.

WAGSTAFF QUOTES LAO VICE FOREIGN MINISTER SOUBANH SRITHIRATH AS SAYING THAT VIETNAM HAS WITHDRAWN NEARLY ALL ITS TROOPS IN LAOS, WHICH HAD BEEN ESTIMATED TO NUMBER 40,000, HE SAYS. ALTHOUGH THE REASON GIVEN WAS AN IMPROVING SITUATION ON THE LAOS-CHINA BORDER, LAO

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OFFICIALS SAID THE TROOPS' CONTINUED PRESENCE WAS UNWELCOME AND UNNECESSARY, HE REPORTS. "THEY WENT BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT NEEDED, AND WE DIDN'T WANT THEM HERE," HE QUOTES ONE OFFICIAL AS SAYING.

WAGSTAFF ALSO SAYS THAT THOUGH THE 2 COUNTRIES' COMMUNIST PARTIES HAVE STAYED CLOSE SINCE THEIR JOINT FORMATION IN THE 1930'S, LAO OFFICIALS SAID THE RELATIONSHIP HAS SHIFTED IN THE LAST FEW YEARS. HE REPORTS THEY SAID THE LAO PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY CHIEF KAYSONE PHOMVIHANE MADE SEVERAL UNANNOUNCED TRIPS TO HANOI AFTER THE DEATH OF HIS VIETNAMESE COUNTERPART LE DUAN IN 1986, AND "KAYSONE HELPED ENSURE A SMOOTH TRANSITION OF POWER AT THE (1986) PARTY CONGRESS. IT CONFIRMED HIM AS THE MOST SENIOR COMMUNIST LEADER IN INDOCHINA," HE QUOTES A LAO OFFICIAL AS SAYING.

WAGSTAFF REPORTS DIPLOMATS SAID LAOS IS SHIFTING ITS POSITION WITH VIETNAM, AS IT BROADENS ITS TIES WITH "TRADITIONALLY HOSTILE" CHINA AND CAPITALIST THAILAND.

"HERE'S A RATHER SMALL STATE WHICH HAS TO BALANCE BETWEEN 3 POWERFUL NEIGHBORS," HE QUOTES ONE AS SAYING.

ACCORDING TO WAGSTAFF, AN OFFICIAL HISTORY OF THE LAO COMMUNIST PARTY TO BE PUBLISHED THIS YEAR BY THE "COMMITTEE FOR SOCIAL AND HISTORICAL RESEARCH" WILL EMPHASIZE THE LAO ROLE IN THE VIETNAMESE REVOLUTION. HE SAYS THE BOOK IS NOT EXPECTED TO PLEASE HANOI AND WILL

ASSERT THAT LAO COMMUNISTS DELAYED THEIR TAKEOVER OF LAOS FOR 2 YEARS SO THAT VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS COULD USE THE HO CHI MINH TRAIL THROUGH LAOS TO INFILTRATE SOUTH VIETNAM. "LAOS COULD HAVE BEEN LIBERATED BEFORE, BUT WE UNCLASSIFIED

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WAITED FOR THE VIETNAMESE," HE QUOTES ONE OFFICIAL AS SAYING.

9. LAOS

-- AFP'S DE NERCIAT (VIENTIANE 4/20) REPORTS LAO PREMIER KAYSONE PHOMVIHAN MAY VISIT FRANCE IN THE NEAR FUTURE TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS BETWEEN LAOS AND ITS FORMER COLONIAL RULER, ACCORDING TO SOURCES IN THE LAO CAPITAL. IT SAYS KAYSONE, WHO IS ALSO THE LAO COMMUNIST PARTY CHIEF, WOULD BE THE MOST SENIOR OFFICIAL FROM INDOCHINA TO VISIT FRANCE SINCE A 1978 VISIT THEN VIETNAMESE PREMIER PHAM VAN DONG SHORTLY BEFORE VIETNAM INVADED CAMBODIA.

ACCORDING TO DE NERCIAT, SINCE 1982 WHEN FRANCE REOPENED ITS MISSION IN VIENTIANE BOTH SIDES HAVE BEEN MOVING TOWARDS IMPROVED TIES, WITH THE FIRST IMPORTANT STEP LAST YEAR A BILATERAL ACCORD ON LAOS' 15.9-MILLION-DOLLAR DEBT. HE SAYS THE ACCORD CANCELLED LAOS' 11.1-MILLION-DOLLAR PUBLIC DEBT AND PROVIDED FOR RESCHEDULING ITS 4.8-MILLION-DOLLAR COMMERCIAL DEBT OVER 15 YEARS WHILE ALLOWING LAOS TO RECEIVE FRESH LOANS, ACCORDING TO DIPLOMATIC SOURCES. ALSO UNDER THE ACCORD, HE REPORTS, FRANCE PROVIDED LAOS WITH A 950,000-DOLLAR LOAN TO DEVELOP ITS HYDROELECTRIC AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTORS, CONSIDERED A PRIORITY BY VIENTIANE.

DE NERCIAT SAYS THE FRENCH EMBASSY IN LAOS WOULD NOT GIVE COMPREHENSIVE FIGURES ON THE CURRENT AMOUNT OF FRENCH AID TO LAOS, BUT EMBASSY OFFICIALS DID SAY THAT THE AMOUNT IS EQUAL TO THAT PROVIDED BY AUSTRALIA, ONE OF LAOS' PRINCIPAL WESTERN DONORS. HE QUOTES LAO OFFICIALS AS SAYING AUSTRALIAN AID BETWEEN 1989-92 IS EXPECTED TO REACH 24 MILLION DOLLARS.

DE NERCIAT SAYS LAOS HAS FOR THE PAST 2 YEARS BEEN UNCLASSIFIED

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PROMOTING AN EXTERNAL POLICY OF GREATER OPENNESS TOWARDS WESTERN NATIONS AND ITS NON-COMMUNIST NEIGHBOR THAILAND, WHILE ENCOURAGING THE DEVELOPMENT OF A PRIVATE SECTOR AT HOME. HE QUOTES LAO DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER SOUBAN SALITTHILAT AS SAYING THAT THE DEBT ACCORD (WITH FRANCE) HAD PAVED THE WAY FOR POSSIBLE BILATERAL COOPERATION "IN A LARGE NUMBER OF AREAS." HE ADDS SOUBAN SAID "FRANCE IS ALWAYS WELCOME IN LAOS" AND THAT LAOS WANTS TO DEVELOP COOPERATION FURTHER WITH FRANCE IN "PRIORITY AREAS FOR OUR COUNTRY." HE ALSO QUOTES SOUBAN AS SAYING THAT A HIGH-LEVEL GOVERNMENTAL VISIT TO FRANCE "WOULD LEAD TO GREAT THINGS IN THE FUTURE," BUT HE WOULD NOT CONFIRM A POSSIBLE VISIT BY KAYSONE.

DE NERCIAT REPORTS DIPLOMATIC SOURCES SAID THE CURRENT LEVEL OF COOPERATION WOULD ALLOW FRANCE TO HELP RESTRUCTURE WHOLE SECTIONS OF THE LAO ADMINISTRATION, INCLUDING PLANS TO TRAIN LAO OFFICIALS AND SEND BUREAUCRATS TO THE FINANCE MINISTRY IN PARIS TO STUDY WAYS OF SETTING UP A NATIONAL TAX AND ACCOUNTING SYSTEM.

DE NERCIAT NOTES THAT LAOS AND FRANCE SIGNED AN AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION DURING A VISIT TO VIENTIANE EARLY THIS YEAR BY FRENCH AGRICULTURE MINISTER HENRI NALLET, AND THE FRENCH EMBASSY IN VIENTIANE SAID AN AGREEMENT ON CULTURAL COOPERATION WAS TO BE SIGNED SOON THAT WOULD COMPLETE THE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS.

10. PAPUA-NEW GUINEA

-- REUTER (PORT MORESBY 4/18) SAYS A POLICEMAN WAS SHOT AND WOUNDED TUESDAY NEAR PAPUA-NEW GUINEA'S BIGGEST GOLD UNCLASSIFIED

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AND COPPER MINE ON BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND, WHERE MILITANT LANDOWNERS ARE WAGING A CAMPAIGN OF SABOTAGE, ACCORDING TO POLICE. IT STATES THAT THIS WAS THE LATEST IN A SERIES OF VIOLENT INCIDENTS ON THE ISLAND, WHERE AT LEAST 12 PEOPLE HAVE BEEN KILLED SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE YEAR.

REUTER REPORTS THAT POLICE SAID MONDAY NIGHT THAT A DISTRICT ADMINISTRATION COMPLEX WAS BURNED DOWN, AND LAST WEEKEND SABOTEURS BLEW UP AN ELECTRICITY PYLON, HALTING

PRODUCTION AT THE MASSIVE BOUGAINVILLE MINE FOR 40 HOURS. IT SAYS THE MILITANTS ARE DEMANDING AROUND 12 BILLION DOLLARS IN COMPENSATION FROM THE AUSTRALIAN-OWNED MINE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE TO THE ISLAND.

REUTER NOTES THAT PNG PM RABBIT NAMILIU HAS SENT TROOPS AND POLICE REINFORCEMENTS AND A DUSK-TO-DAWN CURFEW AROUND THE MINE HAS BEEN IN EFFECT SINCE JANUARY.

REUTER ALSO REPORTS THAT OUTLAWED REBEL LEADER FRANCIS ONA, WHO IS IN HIDING IN THE JUNGLE, LAST WEEK CALLED FOR THE SECESSION OF BOUGAINVILLE FROM PNG, DESCRIBING PORT MORESBY'S CONTROL -- IN A HAND-WRITTEN NOTE CIRCULATED TO POLITICIANS -- AS "FOREIGN EXPLOITATION." IT ADDS ONA STATED: "WE ARE NOT PART OF YOUR COUNTRY ANYMORE."

REUTER SAYS THE OPERATOR OF THE MINE, "BOUGAINVILLE COPPER LTD," IS 53.6 PERCENT OWNED BY THE AUSTRALIAN RESOURCE COMPANY "CRA LTD" AND 19.1 PERCENT BY THE GPNG. IT REPORTS THAT THE MINE ACCOUNTS FOR 45 PERCENT OF THE PNG'S EXPORT REVENUE.

COMMENT AND ANALYSIS

11. CHINA

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-- THE WASHINGTON POST (EDITORIAL) SAYS THAT TO THE DISQUIET STIRRED BY THE PAUSE IN ECONOMIC REFORM IN CHINA HAS NOW BEEN ADDED A BURST OF UNREST OVER THE LAG IN POLITICAL REFORM. IT SUGGESTS THAT STUDENTS AND OTHERS NUMBERING IN THE TENS OF THOUSANDS SEIZED THE OCCASION OF HU YAOBANG'S DEATH TO GO INTO THE STREETS WAVING THE DEMOCRATIC BANNER AND (SOME OF THEM) HEAVING ROCKS.

THE POSTS SAYS THAT POLICE HAVE ESCALATED THEIR RESPONSES, AND BEATINGS ARE NOW REPORTED. THE SCALE OF THE PROTESTS AND THE EXTENT OF THE GOVERNMENT'S DISTRESS ARE AT THIS POINT NOT TO BE EXAGGERATED, BUT ALREADY THESE EVENTS ARE TAKING A PLACE AMONG THE LARGER KNOWN OUTBREAKS OF PUBLIC DISORDER SINCE THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION 2 DECADES AGO, ACCORDING TO THE POST.

STUDENTS, THE POST SUGGESTS, ARE CHALLENGING THE REIGNING REFORM ORTHODOXY, SAYING THAT ECONOMIC REFORM WITHOUT POLITICAL REFORM AS WELL CANNOT SUCCEED. IT SAYS THIS IS

THE FUNDAMENTAL POINT THAT THE DEMONSTRATORS ARE MAKING NOW. IN SO DOING, IT ADDS, THEY ARE PRESSING ON THE MOST NEURALGIC POINT OF THE CHINESE REFORMS: THE STUNTED PROGRESS ON THE POLITICAL SIDE.

THE POST POINTS OUT THAT IT IS OFTEN OBSERVED THAT THE DEMOCRATIC SPIRIT IS SWEEPING THE WORLD, TOUCHING THE USSR, EASTERN EUROPE AND, FOR THE FIRST TIME, CHINA. IT HOPES THIS IS TRUE, BUT IT THINKS THAT WHAT IS REALLY HAPPENING IN PLACES SUCH AS CHINA IS THE COLLAPSE OF AN ARBITRARY, CRUEL AND UNWORKABLE POLITICAL ORDER -- COMMUNISM.

THE POST SUGGESTS THAT THE INSTITUTIONS AND LEGAL UNCLASSIFIED

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PROCEDURES OF DEMOCRACY MAY NOT BE AVAILABLE TO THOSE SEARCHING FOR A WAY OUT, BUT THEY TURN AS A MOTH TO A FLAME TO THE SYMBOLS AND SLOGANS OF DEMOCRACY IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH ACCOUNTABILITY FOR POWER THAT HAS BEEN ABUSED. IT CONCLUDES THAT GOVERNMENTS UNDER THIS SORT OF SIEGE WILL BE JUDGED BY WHETHER THEY ACCEPT THE CHALLENGE AS LEGITIMATE AND MEET IT.

-- THE BALTIMORE SUN (EDITORIAL 4/20) SAYS THAT THE THOUSANDS OF STUDENTS DEMONSTRATING THIS WEEK FOR DEMOCRACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES IN CHINA ARE NOT A LARGE NUMBER AMONG THE BILLION CHINESE PEOPLE. BUT THE AUTHORITIES HAVE BEEN PUSHING THEM ASIDE WITH KID GLOVES; THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION DID NOT TREAT BOURGEOIS CAPITALIST ROADERS SO GENTLY, IT COMMENTS. IT BELIEVES THE PROTESTS MATTER. IT SAYS THE PROTESTS ARE A LARGE SCALE DEMAND FOR MORE REFORM AFTER THE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS DECREED IN MARCH A COOLING OFF AND PARTIAL ROLLBACK OF REFORMS. CONVENIENTLY, IT ADDS, HU YAOBANG DIED.

DURING THE DECADE OF REFORMS, BENEFICIARIES WHO CAME OUT OF CHINA WOULD BE ASKED HOW THE CHINESE PEOPLE WOULD REACT TO A REVERSAL OF LIBERALIZATION, THE SUN STATES. THE ANSWER, IT ADDS, WAS ALWAYS THAT THE CHINESE PEOPLE FAVOR THE CHANGES TOO MUCH AND THAT THE FORCES COMPELLING CHANGE ARE TOO STRONG FOR ROLLBACK TO BE CONTEMPLATED.

THAT NOTION, THE SUN SUGGESTS, IS BEING TESTED. LI PENG HAS BEEN ALLOWED TO SPEAK OUT FOR "GUIDANCE" AND "RESOLUTE MEASURES TO CURB INFLATION," IT ADDS. TO MANY,

THE SUN CONCLUDES, THAT MEANS A RETURN TO RIGID MAOISM, POLITICAL CONFORMITY AND ECONOMIC REGRESS. IT BELIEVES THE DEMONSTRATIONS FOR HU YAOBANG COME IN REPLY.

-- THE NY TIMES' KRISTOF (BEIJING) THINKS THAT PERHAPS UNCLASSIFIED

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THE MOST SURPRISING THING ABOUT THIS WEEK'S DEMONSTRATIONS IS THAT THE GOVERNMENT PERMITTED THEM AT ALL. BUT HE SAYS THAT THE GOVERNMENT'S RESTRAINT IS NOT TOTAL, FOR THE POLICE AND SOLDIERS HAVE BEEN DEPLOYED TO DISPERSE PROTESTERS IN FRONT OF CCP HEADQUARTERS, AND THEY HAVE BEAT SOME WHO LINGERED. BUT, HE ADDS, IN GENERAL THE AUTHORITIES HAVE ALLOWED ILLEGAL GATHERINGS BY TENS OF THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE WHO BLOCK TRAFFIC IN BEIJING.

KRISTOF COMMENTS THAT THE EXPLANATION FOR THE

GOVERNMENT'S RELATIVELY RESTRAINED RESPONSE TO DATE IS SHROUDED IN HISTORY AND CULTURE, PARTICULARLY THE NOTION THAT SCHOLARS HELP TO CONFER MORAL LEGITIMACY ON A GOVERNMENT. REPEATEDLY IN MODERN CHINA, HE SAYS, STUDENT PROTESTS HAVE HAD A DECIDED IMPACT ON POLITICS. THUS, HE SUGGESTS, FOR THE LEADERS WHO ARE THE TARGETS OF THE PROTESTS, AS WELL AS FOR THE YOUNG PROTESTERS, THE DEMONSTRATIONS IN BEIJING THIS WEEK HAVE A GREATER RESONANCE THAN THEY MIGHT IN ANOTHER CAPITAL.

ACCORDING TO KRISTOF, THIS SENSE OF HISTORY IS CRUCIAL IN UNDERSTANDING WHAT MIGHT LEAD THE GOVERNMENT TO CHANGE ITS MIND AND CRUSH THE LATEST DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE SAME WAY THAT IT ENDED THE STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE WINTER OF 1986-87.

FOR NOW, ACCORDING TO KRISTOF, THE GOVERNMENT MAY BE BETTING THAT TIME IS IN ITS FAVOR, THAT THE DEMONSTRATIONS WILL PETER OUT AFTER HU YAOBANG'S FUNERAL SATURDAY. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE SAYS, THE RISK FOR THE GOVERNMENT IS THAT THE STUDENTS WILL DECIDE TO CONTINUE UNCLASSIFIED

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PROTESTS AT LEAST UNTIL MAY 4, THE 70TH ANNIVERSARY OF

CELEBRATED NATIONALIST DEMONSTRATIONS IN 1919 THAT TOOK "DEMOCRACY" AND "SCIENCE" AS THEIR SLOGANS -- THE STARTING POINT BY SOME RECKONINGS OF MODERN PROTEST POLITICS IN CHINA.

IN ADDITION, KRISTOF STATES, CHINESE AUTHORITIES MUST BE CAREFUL TO AVOID APPEARING TO DISHONOR THE DEAD. CURTAILING DEMONSTRATIONS HONORING HU YAOBANG MIGHT PROVOKE A HARSH REACTION AND WOULD BE REMINISCENT OF THE 4/76 MEMORIALS IN HONOR OF ZHOU ENLAI, HE SUGGESTS. HE SAYS THOSE INCIDENTS SEEM TO BE IN THE BACK OF EVERYBODY'S MIND THESE DAYS. BUT THERE IS WIDE DISAGREEMENT ABOUT WHETHER THE CURRENT PROTESTS WILL BE A TURNING POINT AS THE 1976 RALLIES WERE, HE REPORTS.

WHILE SOME SAY THEY ARE THE SAME, A GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL POINTED OUT THAT THERE WERE MANY MORE PEOPLE INVOLVED IN 1976, AND THEY WERE NOT ONLY STUDENTS, BUT ALSO WORKERS, ACCORDING TO KRISTOF. IN ADDITION, HE NOTES, THE OFFICIAL SAID THAT WHILE THERE MAY NOW BE A BROAD DISCONTENT WITH POLITICAL LEADERS, PEOPLE ALSO HAVE A STAKE IN THE SYSTEM AND WILL BE UNWILLING TO RISK INSTABILITY.

YET, KRISTOF CONCLUDES, THE DEMONSTRATIONS SEEM TO HAVE MARKED A MILESTONE IN CHINESE POLITICAL PROTEST, SIMPLY IN THE STUDENTS' DARING TO OPENLY CONFRONT THE

GOVERNMENT. THE STUDENTS HAVE LEARNED TO MARCH ON THE COMPOUND WHERE CHINESE LEADERS LIVE, THE ZHONGNANHAI, AND THEIR SUCCESS IS NOT SOMETHING THEY ARE LIKELY TO FORGET, HE THINKS. EVEN IF THE CURRENT DEMONSTRATIONS PETER OUT, HE BELIEVES, PERHAPS THEIR LEGACY WILL BE THE BOLDNESS OF THE STUDENTS TO BESIEGE THE SEAT OF POWER AND CALL FOR THE DISMISSAL OF THOSE WHO RULE THE COUNTRY, AND IF THE

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DEMONSTRATIONS CONTINUE AFTER SATURDAY, THAT BOLDNESS WILL BE DIFFICULT TO CONTAIN.

BAKER

ERRORS= N/A

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CONCEPTS= REQUEST, LOBBYING, NEGOTIATION, PEACE, SETTLEMENT, TROOP WITHDRAWAL, CAT-B

TAGS= PREL, MOPS, IS, LE, US, XF, (SHULTZ, GEORGE P), (SHAMIR, YITZHAK), (HABIB, PHILIP C), (KIMCHE, DAVID)

<<<<>>>>

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LONDON FOR AMBASSADOR HABIB, PARIS AND ROME FOR
AMBASSADOR DRAPER, CAIRO FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY VELIOTES

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, IS, LE, US, XF
SUBJECT: ORAL MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY TO FOREIGN
MINISTER SHAMIR

REF: STATE 75320 (NOTAL)

1. _____
2. AT SHAMIR'S REQUEST, I DELIVERED SECRETARY'S
ORAL MESSAGE TO FOREIGN MINISTRY DIRECTOR GENERAL
DAVID KIMCHE THIS MORNING. KIMCHE TOOK CAREFUL NOTES
OF THE MESSAGE AND PROMISED TO PASS IT ON TO THE
FOREIGN MINISTER IMMEDIATELY. HE DID NOT COMMENT ON
THE SUBSTANCE.

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3. KIMCHE SAID THAT HE HAD JUST HEARD FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON THAT THEY WISHED TO DEFER FURTHER NEGOTIATING SESSIONS UNTIL FRIDAY IN NETANYA. KIMCHE WANTED US TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL WAS ANXIOUS TO CONTINUE THE NEGOTIATIONS IN NETANYA AND KHALDEH, AND THE DELAY PROPOSED BY THE LEBANESE WAS NOT THE ISRAELIS' FAULT. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE GOI HAD RESPONDED IMMEDIATELY TO THE NON-PAPER IN ORDER TO AVOID DELAYS. I TOLD KIMCHE THAT THE LEBANESE HAD TOLD US THAT THEY FELT IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO DIGEST THE RESULTS OF THE WASHINGTON MEETINGS BEFORE PROCEEDING WITH THE NEGOTIATIONS. I TOLD HIM WE THINK THAT PERHAPS WE COULD DEFER THE SECURITY TALKS BUT GO FORWARD ON THE NORMALIZATION TALKS ON MONDAY. KIMCHE NOTED THAT THE LEBANESE PRESS IS SAYING THIS MORNING THAT THE TALKS ARE NOW FROZEN UNTIL THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL RESPONDS TO THE U.S. PROPOSALS. TO SUM UP, IT APPEARS THAT THE ISRAELIS HAVE ACCEPTED THE LEBANESE PROPOSAL THAT FURTHER TALKS WILL NOT BE HELD UNTIL FRIDAY IN NETANYA. FOR OUR PART, I TOLD KIMCHE THAT OUR TEAM WILL BE HERE TOMORROW, AND WE ARE READY TO PROCEED.
LEWIS

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FOR ROSS (BEIRUT) AND HABIB (LONDON) FROM DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, XF, LE, IS, US

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: NEXT NEGOTIATING ROUND

REF: A) BEIRUT 3050; B) TEL AVIV 3848

1.

2. I WOULD ORDINARILY PREFER TO SORT OUT NEXT STEPS IN THE FORMAL TRILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS AFTER PHIL AND I GET TO ISRAEL ON SUNDAY AFTERNOON. I THINK THAT FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS HAVE TO WAIT UNTIL WE HAVE HAD FURTHER CONSULTATIONS WITH THE ISRAELIS AND LEBANESE, BUT MUTUAL RELATIONS IS ANOTHER MATTER. IF WE LET ANOTHER WEEK GO BY WITHOUT TALKS BETWEEN KIMCHE AND KHARMA ON NORMALIZATION, WE WILL NOT HAVE ACCOM-

PAGE 02 PARIS 10372 191340Z

PLISHED WHAT WE HAD HOPED TO DO BEFORE PASSOVER COMPLICATES NEGOTIATING SCHEDULES.

3. THEREFORE, SUBJECT TO PHIL'S CONCURRENCE, I SUGGEST THE FOLLOWING:

-- TEL AVIV: PLEASE ASCERTAIN WHETHER KIMCHE WOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR A SESSION WITH KHARMA ON MONDAY PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE FOR EUROPE, WHICH HE TOLD ME WOULD HAVE TO TAKE

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PLACE ON THE 21ST. IF HE WILL BE UNAVAILABLE EITHER BECAUSE OF HIS EUROPEAN TRIP OR BECAUSE OF OUR VISIT, THEN LET'S FORGET IT AND WAIT UNTIL FRIDAY. IF ON THE OTHER HAND HE IS AVAILABLE FOR A MONDAY SESSION, TEL AVIV SHOULD NOTIFY BEIRUT (ROSS) TO SEE IF KHARMA AND THAT PART OF THE DELEGATION INVOLVED WITH MUTUAL RELATIONS COULD COME TO NATANYAH.

4. NOTE THAT IT IS IMPORTANT THAT KIMCHE BE PRESENT FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH KHARMA. KHARMA DOES NOT WORK WELL WITH THE OTHER ISRAELIS.
GALBRAITH

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FROM DRAPER FOR AMBASSADOR LEWIS AND DCM FLATEN

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, US, IS, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: MEETINGS IN
KHALDAH, MARCH 8

1. [REDACTED]

2. BEFORE DEPARTING ISRAEL, DAVID KIMCHE ASKED
ME TO LET HIM KNOW WHETHER THE LEBANESE STILL
WANTED TO HAVE MILITARY SUBCOMMITTEE MEETINGS
ON TUESDAY, MARCH 8. PLEASE TELL KIMCHE THAT,
WHILE I WAS PREPARED TO SUGGEST TO THE LEBANESE
THAT THEY HOLD OFF MILITARY SUBCOMMITTEE MEET-
INGS ON TUESDAY IF THEY SEEM TO HAVE PROBLEMS,
THIS TURNED OUT TO BE UNNECESSARY. THEY ARE
PREPARED TO PROCEED AS PLANNED WITH A FULL RANGE
OF DISCUSSIONS ON TUESDAY IN KHALDAH. PUGH

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INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE

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FROM HABIB/DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MARR, PREL, FR, IS, LE, SY, XF

SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: UNIFIL ROLE IN
LEBANONREF: STATE 57413^{NR}

1. [REDACTED]

2. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT IT IS BEST IF THE ISRAELIS TAKE ON FULLY THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES AS AN OCCUPYING POWER IN LEBANON AND PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROTECTION FOR THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMPS AND ELSEWHERE. THE SITUATION IS, HOWEVER, A SOURCE OF SERIOUS CONCERN. ACCORDINGLY, IN OUR MEETING TODAY WITH SHAMIR, AMBASSADOR LEWIS RAISED THE NEED

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 02 JERUSA 00761 041255Z

FOR THE ISRAELIS TO DO MUCH MORE, AND SHAMIR AGREED THAT MORE SHOULD BE DONE.

3. USING UNIFIL IN THE CAMP AREAS NOW IS NOT ONLY CONTRADICTIONARY TO OUR VIEW THAT ISRAEL SHOULD TAKE RESPONSIBILITY BUT ALSO IS MORE AND MORE A NON-STARTER. WE ARE DOING OUR BEST TO ARRANGE A ROLE FOR UNIFIL IN THE CAMP AREAS FOLLOWING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, BUT THE ISRAELIS REMAIN OPPOSED. GROVE

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